With punch-card voting systems, the ballot is a card (or cards) and the voters punch holes in it (with a supplied punch device) next to their candidate or choice. After punching the hole(s), the voter may place the ballot in a ballot box, or the voter may feed the ballot into an electronic vote tabulating device at the voting place.
Two common types of punch-card voting systems are the "Votomatic" and the "Datavote" system. With the Votomatic card, the locations at which holes may be punched to indicate votes are each assigned numbers. The number of the hole is the only information printed on the card. The list of candidates or ballot issue choices and directions for punching the corresponding holes are printed in a separate booklet. With the Datavote card, the name of the candidate or description of the choice is printed on the ballot next to the location of the hole to be punched. The re-count of ballots in Florida during the 2000 presidential election created a debate about the reliability of punch-card voting systems. After 2000, the popularity of punch-card voting systems in the US decreased significantly.
These systems use an optical scanner to read and count marked ballot papers. Various systems can be defined as optical scan (voting) systems including
Optical scan voting systems combine paper with electronic devices. All the systems keep a tangible ballot paper which serves as a tangible record of the voter´s intent. By that, optical scan systems allow for manual recounts of ballots. The big advantage is that the counting process can be done in a central place and that the counting is much faster. The system is easily understandable by the voter: for him/her it doesn´t really change much; they can still mark their preference on a ballot paper. And if – for whatever reason – the scanning system fails to work, ballots can be counted manually.
With a DRE machine, voting can be done on Election Day or it can be used as an advance voting device in polling stations. It is easily understandable: the voter just pushes a button next to his/her favourite candidate or choice. Or the DRE machines have a touch screen displaying the ballot. After the election or referendum, the DRE machine produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and/or as printed copy. The system may also allow for transmission of individual ballots or vote totals to a central location. The result can then be consolidated in one central place.
DRE voting machines started to be massively used in 1996 in Brazil. They were also used on a large scale in the US after the Florida 2000 experience. Vision-impaired voters benefit from DRE machines because they can cast their vote without help from another person. DRE machines were also deployed in Europe, e.g. in the Netherlands, where the company NEDAP provided their own DRE machines since 1989. They were used in the Netherlands until 2006. In 2009, the German Constitutional Court found that the DRE-type voting machines used in parliamentary elections in Germany were unconstitutional since they did not allow citizens to examine the determination of the result.
A voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or verified paper record (VPR) is not an e-voting system itself, but refers to a component that can be combined with various forms of non-document ballot voting systems. VVPAT means that a paper ballot for each vote is printed by the electronic device that was used to cast the vote. A VVPAT is intended as an independent verification system for voting machines designed to allow voters to verify that their vote was cast correctly, to detect possible election fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the stored electronic results.
Internet voting refers to the use of the Internet to cast and/or transmit the vote. Internet voting can take various forms depending on whether it is used in uncontrolled environments (remote Internet voting) or not (Polling Site Internet Voting, Kiosk Voting). With remote Internet voting neither the client machines nor the physical environment are under the control of election officials. Voters can cast their vote at practically any place (at home, at the workplace, at public Internet terminals etc.). The vote is then transmitted over the Internet. This method offers the most advantages to voters, but at the same time it suffers from them most security concerns. They include doubts about the Internet as a means of transmission of confidential information, fear of hacker attacks and anxiety about the possibility of undue influence being exerted on the voter during the voting process (e.g. ‘family voting’).
The other options (polling site Internet voting or kiosk voting) refer to systems where voters cast their ballot from client machines that are physically situated in official polling stations or in public places that are controlled by election officials. In both cases, hardware and software components are controlled by election officials. The difference is that with polling site Internet voting the authentication of the voters may take place by traditional means and with kiosk voting (in public places), the physical environment and voter authentication are not directly under control of election officials.
In some international documents (e.g. the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies (October 2013)) the term “New Voting Technology” is used instead of e-voting. They usually mean the same thing and can be used synonymously. E.g. the OSCE/ODIHR defines NVT as the use of information and communications technologies (ICT) applied to the casting and counting of votes. This understanding includes the use of electronic voting systems, ballot scanners and Internet voting.
