Establishment of Criteria for Delimiting Districts

Countries often institute a set of formal rules, or criteria, for their boundary authorities to consider when drawing electoral districts. Although this is especially true in countries that employ boundary commissions or election commissions to draw districts, many countries that allow the legislature or a government agency to redistrict have enacted criteria as well. These rules are usually listed in the electoral law, but they can sometimes be found in the country's constitution. Examples of redistricting rules enacted by selected countries can be found in Election laws or constitutional provisions listing redistricting criteria for selected countries.

The rules often specify that districts should be as equal in population as possible. Administrative and/or natural boundaries and other geographic features such as sparsely populated or isolated territory are factors also commonly listed. Respect for communities of interest is another factor many countries specify. In some countries, especially developing countries, redistricters are asked to consider the means of transportation and/or communication as well.

Almost all countries that have formal redistricting criteria require that districts be as equal in population as possible. Many countries specify tolerance limits or allowable deviations from the population or electoral quota. The population or electoral quota is simply the population of the territory to be redistricted divided by the number of legislative seats (or districts) to be allocated to that territory.

Although the representation of voters has taken precedence over the representation of communities in the twentieth century--as evidenced by the number of countries that require districts to be as equal in population as possible--respect for administrative areas, physically-defined natural communities and geographically concentrated communities of interest continue to play prominent roles in redistricting. In fact, a primary function of single-member districts is to provide representation for geographically-defined communities.

Criteria Relating to Election Outcomes

Equal population, geographic considerations and communities of interest are criteria that relate directly to the process of creating districts. Other criteria relate to the outcome of the redistricting process--for example, requiring that district plans be drawn so that political parties are fairly represented or that racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities have an equitable chance of representation. But countries that delimit districts usually do not adopt criteria relating to the fairness of the outcome. This is because countries with single-member districts can rarely meet these standards, if fairness of outcome is defined as proportional or near proportional representation for political parties and minority groups.

Conclusion

Redistricting criteria can conflict with one another. For instance, although almost all countries list population equality as a redistricting criterion, few countries actually have districts that are very close to equal in population. The reason is that other criteria have been deemed more important than strict adherence to population equality. Respect for administrative boundaries and natural communities, for example, often require districts to be smaller or larger than the electoral quota. Countries that establish redistricting criteria must either prioritise the criteria or accept certain inconsistencies in district configuration. Many countries choose to specify the most important criteria and/or place limits (such as tolerance limits) on the boundary authority, but still permit redistricters some discretion in balancing these criteria.

Equal Population in Redistricting

The most widely accepted rule for redistricting is that districts should be relatively equal in population. This is because representation by population is a central tenet of democracy, and, in countries that employ single-member districts, this rule translates into the principle of equal populations across districts. Equally populous districts are necessary if voters are to have an equally weighted voice in the election of representatives. If, for example, a representative is elected from a district that has twice as many voters as another district, voters in the larger district will have half as much influence as voters in the smaller district.

The degree to which countries require population “equality” and the population figure (for example, total population, citizen population, registered voters) that is used to determine equality differs across countries. Approximately half of the countries that delimit districts use “total population” as the population base for determining equality across electoral districts. Another third of the countries employ registered voters as the population base. Several European countries use citizen population as the relevant base for determining population equality. Lesotho uses the voting age population as the base; Belarus uses the number of voters in the previous election.

The degree to which countries demand population equality also varies. Many countries have no established tolerance limit regarding the extent to which constituencies are permitted to deviate from the population quota. Among those that have established limits there is a range from “virtually no deviation allowed” (the United States) to as high as a 30 percent tolerance limit (Singapore).

Deviations from Population Quotas

Minimal

The United States is unique in its adherence to the doctrine of equal population. No other country requires deviations as minimal as the “one person, one vote” standard that has been imposed by U.S. courts since the early 1960s. In the 1983 court case Karcher v. Daggett, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no point at which population deviations in a congressional redistricting plan can be considered inconsequential: “there are no de minimus variations which could practically be avoided but which nonetheless meet the standard of Article I, Section 2 [of the U.S. Constitution] without justification.” The Court went on to reject a New Jersey congressional redistricting plan that had a total population deviation of only .7 percent. Following this decision, most states interpreted Karcher as requiring the adoption of congressional redistricting plans with exact mathematical population equality or, at minimum, with the lowest possible population deviation. Although the courts later upheld the legality of some redistricting plans that had less than the absolute de minimus population variation possible, none of the plans upheld contained total deviations of even one percent.

Medium

Macedonia, with a Regional List PR electoral system and six electoral districts, comes closest to this strict standard, with allowable deviations of no more than plus or minus three percent from the population quota. New Zealand, Albania, and Yemen allow deviations of up to five percent from the population quota. Australia, Belarus, Italy, and the Ukraine specify 10 percent as the maximum allowable deviation.

The population requirement in Australia, however, is actually more complicated than a 10 percent tolerance limit: Australian election law also requires that electoral districts deviate by no more than 3.5 percent, three years and six months after the expected completion of the redistribution. This criterion was devised to produce equality of population halfway through the seven-year Australian districting cycle and to avoid wide discrepancies at the end of the delimitation cycle. To meet this requirement, the Australian delimitation commission (referred to as the Redistribution Commission) must use population projections as well as current population data. Australia's close attention to population equality is relatively recent. Thirty years ago, the practice of heavy rural loading--creating rural districts that were much smaller in population than urban districts--was quite common. (For more information on Australian redistricting practices, see the case study on Australia, Federal Redistribution in Australia.)

Large

Armenia, Germany, and the Czech Republic allow population deviations of no more than 15 percent. (In Germany, proposed electoral districts cannot deviate by more than 15 percent, and districts that deviate by more than 25 percent must be redrawn.) Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea have set the maximum allowable deviation at 20 percent. In Canada, the independent commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts are allowed to deviate by up to 25 percent from the provincial quotas. But since 1986, commissions have been permitted to exceed the 25 percent limit under "extraordinary circumstances." This provision was used to create five of the 295 seats in the Canadian House of Commons in 1987, and two of 301 seats in 1996. In 1996, one Quebec seat was created with a population 40.2 percent below the provincial average, and one Newfoundland district was created with a population 62.5 percent below the provincial average. (For more information on Canadian redistribution, see the case study on Canada, Representation in the Canadian Parliament.) The United Kingdom allows even larger deviations in district populations. The original standard was set at 25 percent in 1944. But the standard was repealed only two years later. The current rule requires that constituencies be "as equal as possible," but this rule must be balanced against the principle of respect for local boundaries as much as possible. Equally populous districts can also be disregarded for "special geographic circumstances." Allowances for natural communities prompted English boundary commissioners in 1983 to leave the Isle of Wight with 95,000 electors as a single constituency, while respect for local London boundaries left suburban Surbiton with only 48,000 electors. Likewise, recognising the difficulties of island travel, the commissioners in Scotland granted the Western Isles (population 24,000) and Orkney and Shetland (population 31,000) their own representatives.

Conclusion

The degree to which a country adheres to strict equality of population is related to the significance attached to individual political equality. The United States is strongly committed to individual rights, so perhaps it is not surprising that it developed the strictest population deviation standards of any country using single-member districts. Other countries, while recognising the importance of population equality, have chosen to balance this factor against other redistricting criteria perceived as equally valid. In the United Kingdom, respect for local administrative boundaries is given precedence over exact equality of number. In many African countries, the need to keep individual tribes intact in a single electoral district may take precedence over population equality. Each country must determine how much variation from the ideal of exact population equality will be tolerated to accommodate other redistricting goals.

Geographic Criteria for Delimiting Electoral Districts

In many countries, the electoral laws specify that geography, or certain geographic factors, be taken into account when delimiting electoral district lines. Geographic criteria can be divided into two categories--criteria relating to geographic boundaries and criteria relating to geographic size and/or shape. A boundary authority may be asked to consider factors from either or both criteria.

Criteria Related to Geographic Boundaries

Respect for clearly established boundary lines is often specified as a criterion for those redistricting to consider when drawing electoral district lines. These boundaries can include administrative boundaries such as county and municipality lines and/or natural boundaries created by dominant topographical features such as mountain ranges, rivers or islands.

Perhaps the most commonly mentioned geographic factor listed by countries is consideration for local administrative boundaries. Dozens of countries list this as a criterion to consider including: Albania, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Tanzania, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Yemen. Botswana’s Constitution specifies consideration of not only administrative district boundaries, but the boundaries of tribal territories.

Another geographic feature commonly listed is population density or sparseness of population. Several Caribbean countries as well as Kenya, Mauritius, Nepal and Papua New Guinea identify this as a factor to take into account when redistricting. In Malaysia, the Election Commission is required to weight sparsely populated rural constituencies in a manner to guarantee their over-representation in the legislature.

Geographic redistricting criteria such as respect for administrative boundaries and physically defined natural communities are a higher priority in some countries than in others. In the United Kingdom, for example, respect for local administrative boundaries and natural communities is the most important concept guiding boundary commissioners. Large population disparities are tolerated as a result.

Criteria Related to Geographic Size and Shape

Two other factors that are sometimes listed as redistricting criteria relate specifically to the geometric shape of a district: contiguity and compactness. Advocates of these criteria hold that districts should not be oddly shaped and that all pieces of a district should be inter-connected. The election commission in Mexico, for example, is required to create electoral districts in which the perimeters are regular in shape. Other countries that specify that constituencies be compact include Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Dominican Republic, India, Italy, Pakistan, and the United States.

In the United States, district compactness has not been required by federal law since 1929, but when a number of states created some bizarrely-shaped districts in the1990s round of redistricting, the U.S. Supreme ordered the redrawing of a number of these districts. Although the shape of these districts was not actually the basis for the Court's decision, the fact that the districts were not compact was considered evidence of an impermissible motive in creating the district boundaries. (For additional discussion of these court cases see Role of the Courts in Electoral District Delimitation.)

Special Provisions for Minority Groups When Delimiting Electoral Districts

Criteria specifying fairness for minority groups within a country focus on the electoral outcome, rather than the process, of redistricting. Electoral systems that rely on single-member districts, however, cannot guarantee proportional representation or even some minimal percentage of seats for ethnic, racial, religious or other minority groups in the population. This is particularly true of electoral systems that rely solely on single-member districts for the election of representatives (i.e., FPTP and AV systems). On the other hand, List PR and Mixed systems – such as Parallel and MMP systems – can accommodate requirements for minority representation within the context of the party lists if so desired.

In districted systems, voters of a specific minority group will find it very difficult to elect members of their group to legislative office if voting is polarized along majority-minority lines. Only if separate seats are reserved for this minority group, or if special electoral districts are drawn for the group, will minority voters succeed in electing minority representatives. A few countries have made such special provisions to ensure that racial, ethnic, or religious minorities are represented in the legislature. Examples of these countries include Croatia, Fiji, India, Mauritius, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and the United States.

Croatia, which has a List PR electoral system with electoral districts that are not typically redrawn, reserves specific districts for members of the (1) Hungarian, (2) Czech and Slovak, and (3) Ruthenian and Ukrainian and German and Austrian minorities. In addition, three seats are specifically reserved for the Serbian minority within the Republic of Croatia.

In the Block Vote (or Party Block Vote) systems of Mauritius, Singapore, and the Palestinian Territories, a number of seats are reserved for minorities:

• Singapore – Most members of parliament are elected through a “Party Block Vote” in multimember Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs). Parties contesting a GRC must propose a slate that includes at least one member of an official minority (listed as Indian, Malay, Eurasian, or Other). Within the GRCs, voters select from among closed party lists, with the party receiving a plurality of votes winning all seats in the district.
• Mauritius – In addition to the 62 representatives elected from 21 multimember constituencies, there are a maximum of eight additional seats allocated to the “best losers.” These “best loser” seats are apportioned among four constitutionally recognized ethnic or religions communities (Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, and “Creole”) to ensure some representation for each of these minority groups.
• Palestinian Territories – The West Bank and Gaza Strip are divided into 16 multimember electoral districts. In the 1996 elections, the political party obtaining the greatest number of votes in each district took all the seats allocated to the district. Six seats across four districts (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Gaza) were reserved for the Christian population; one seat (in the Nablus district) was set aside for the Samaritans.

India and Pakistan, both with FPTP electoral systems, have specifically reserved single-member districts to ensure the representation of certain minorities:

• Pakistan – There are three categories of seats in the National Assembly: (1) 272 general seats; (2) 60 seats reserved for women; and (3) 10 seats reserved for non-Muslims (Hindus, Christians, and others). Representatives of the general seats are elected by simple majority on the basis of 272 single-member constituencies. The seats reserved for women are filled on the basis of a proportional representation system based on the number of general seats won by each political party by province. The seats reserved for non-Muslims are filled under the same proportional representation system, except that the entire country constitutes a single constituency. Both women and non-Muslim candidates are chosen from closed lists filed by the political parties.
• India – A certain number of parliamentary constituencies in each state are reserved for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes based on their proportion of the total state population. In reserved constituencies, only candidates from these communities can stand for election. These reserved constituencies shift from one election to the next. In total, there are 79 parliamentary seats reserved for scheduled Castes, and 41 seats for Scheduled Tribes.

Fiji and Papua New Guinea, each with Alternative Vote systems, have separate sets of communal seats to guarantee representation of the major ethnic groups. In Fiji, for example, the 71 legislative constituencies are comprised of 46 “communal” constituencies and 25 “open” constituencies (where all eligible voters, regardless of race/ethnicity, caste votes), with the “communal” members elected as follows:

• 23 elected from a roll of voters registered as indigenous Fijians, 19 elected from a roll of voters registered as Indians, one elected from a roll of voters registered as Rotumans, and * three elected from a roll of voters not registered as Fijians, Indians, or Rotumans (this is the “general voters” roll).

Minority Representation in the United States

The United States, because of its sizeable racial and ethnic minority population and its history of discrimination against certain minority groups, has had to address the issue of fairness to minorities in promulgating redistricting plans. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendments in 1982 have established that a redistricting plan that dilutes the voting strength of minority voters by dividing the minority community among different districts may be invalid. Protected minority groups (blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans) must meet three conditions to qualify for this protection:

• the group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member district; the group must be politically cohesive (they must share common political interests); the group must be able to demonstrate that the majority population votes as a bloc against the minority community's preferred candidates and that the minority-preferred candidates usually lose.

If a minority group is able to satisfy all three of these conditions, a redistricting plan must be fashioned such that minority voters constitute a majority of voters in one or more districts. The minority community must demonstrate that these conditions are satisfied in a court proceeding. In fact, in a series of recent court decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court held that several jurisdictions that created "majority minority" districts voluntarily--that is, without being required by a court to do so--must redraw these "majority minority" districts without taking race or ethnicity into account.

The Voting Rights Act guarantees racial and ethnic fairness in some minimal sense in the United States. It is minimal because only minority communities that are able to satisfy all three of the conditions are given an opportunity to form the majority of a district and elect a candidate of choice. Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans are far from proportionally represented in the United States Congress. The minority community in New Zealand is better represented in the legislature because of a more effective provision.

Minority Representation in New Zealand

A unique feature of New Zealand's electoral system is a provision for representation of the descendants of New Zealand's aboriginal Maori population. In addition to sixty general legislative districts, the Representation Commission creates several Maori districts (five Maori districts were created in 1993, six in 1998, and seven in 2001, for example). These Maori districts are geographically defined and overlay the general electoral districts. To vote in a Maori district, rather than a general election district, a Maori voter must register on the Maori roll. Registration on this roll is optional; Maoris can choose to register on the general roll instead. Because of this electoral feature, Maoris have been represented in the legislature roughly in proportion to their percentage of the population for more than a decade. (See the case study on New Zealand, Electoral Redistribution in New Zealand, for a more detailed description of this provision.)

Conclusion

Countries that delimit single-member districts cannot guarantee proportional representation to minority political parties or to minority groups within their borders, at least not without special provisions or additional seats elected by a party list vote. Instead, redistricting criteria may be adopted to ensure a fair and impartial redistricting process. Although this will not necessarily produce proportional, or even minimal, representation for minority parties or groups, it does guarantee that any bias is unintentional.

Countries with deep racial, ethnic or religious divisions usually opt for some form of proportional representation rather than relying on single-member districts to elect representatives. Unless the minority group is geographically concentrated or special provisions for minority representation are adopted, the election outcome produced by single-member districts will benefit some groups at the expense of others. In a deeply divided country, this fact may well lead to instability rather than foster strong and stable governments.

Communities of Interest: Delimiting Boundaries

Because of requirements that single-member districts be relatively equal in population, single-member districts often do not reflect distinct geographic communities as signified by municipal, county or other administrative boundary lines. This does not mean, however, that political representation has been divorced from the notion of "community" in countries that delimit single-member districts.

Many countries that delimit single-member districts continue to emphasise the importance of creating districts that correspond as closely as possible to pre-existing communities, defined as administrative divisions and/or "communities of interest." The rationale for recognising communities in redistricting is that electoral districts should be more than conglomerations of arbitrary, random groups of individuals. Districts should, as much as possible, be cohesive units with common interests related to representation. This makes a representative's job of articulating the interests of his or her constituency much easier.

Defining Communities of Interest

A "community of interest" is rarely defined by statute but it is generally thought of as a group of individuals united by shared interests or values. These shared interests may be the result of a common history or culture, a common ethnic or tribal background, or a variety of other ties that create a community of voters with distinct interests.

Although the perimeter of a community of interest may correspond to the boundaries of an administrative division, this is not necessarily the case. For example, a river may form a boundary between two administrative divisions, but the entire river valley may comprise a unified community of interest. In this instance, an electoral district that follows the administrative boundary would divide a community of interest.

In general, criteria related to communities of interest can be divided into three categories: (1) criteria related to administrative or geographic boundaries; (2) criteria related to common interests or common characteristics; and (3) criteria related to patterns of interaction. Criteria related to administrative or geographic boundaries are discussed under Geographic Criteria for Delimiting Electoral Districts.

Some of the criteria related to common interests or characteristics are:

• Shared racial or ethnic background
• Common history and/or culture
• Common religion or language
• Shared socio-economic status

 

 

Some of the criteria related to patterns of interaction are:

• Transportation patterns
• Economic ties
• Communication networks (media markets)

 

 

Most countries’ electoral laws do not elaborate on what specific communities of interest are relevant to delimitation; the boundary authority is simply instructed to take into account “communities of interest.” German electoral law states that constituencies should form a “coherent” area. Nepal, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea electoral law instruct the boundary authority to consider “community and diversity of interest” or “homogeneity and heterogeneity of the community.” Australian electoral law offers more guidance, stating that the Redistribution Committee shall give due consideration to “community of interests within the proposed Electoral Division, including economic, social and regional interests.”

A handful of countries offer more explicit instructions as to what communities of interest are particularly pertinent when delimiting constituencies. In Hungary, for example, the boundary authority is to take account of ethnic, religious, historical, and other local characteristics when creating electoral districts. Panama and the Ukraine also require consideration of minority populations: in the Ukraine, the “density of national minority populations” is to be taken into account; in Panama, “concentrations of indigenous populations” must be considered. Minus electoral law provisions specifically designed to promote minority representation, however, criteria requiring “due consideration” of the minority population is likely to have little impact on integrating the halls of government with minority representatives.

Conclusion

Redistricting criteria inevitably conflict with one another. One possible means of resolving a conflict between criteria is to determine the most salient or most important "community of interest" in a given instance. Public hearings are essential to this process. For example, a redistricting plan that follows ethnic community boundaries rather than administrative boundaries may prevail if members of the public assert that the ethnic community boundaries are more relevant to them than administrative boundaries.