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Acciones de DocumentoMonitors of Election IntegrityMonitoring the electoral process is an important integrity safeguard. It is one of the checks-and-balances that protect the viability and honesty of election administration, as well as the participation of political parties, candidates and interest groups. Monitoring promotes compliance with the legal framework and deters questionable activities. Public reporting by monitors increases transparency and helps ensure election officers’ accountability. Monitoring includes official oversight by a government auditor or agency, as well as observation of the process by political parties, the media and individual electors, as well as non-governmental organizations and international groups. Monitoring may be partisan (conducted by political parties) or non-partisan (conducted by national or international observation groups). Partisan monitoring focuses on protecting the interests of a particular candidate or party. It is important to have participation by monitors from different political parties throughout the process in order to ensure that incidents detrimental to any of the parties or candidates is reported. Non-partisan monitoring is expected to be impartial and to provide objective reports. Since reporting on elections usually involves forming an opinion about the process, integrity in monitoring is itself important. Integrity issues related to monitoring are discussed in this section. To be effective, monitoring should cover the entire electoral process, not just some aspects such as voter registration or polling. Among other things, monitors must examine:
NOTES [1] Boneo, Horacio, “Observation of Elections,” in Rose, Richard, ed., International Encyclopedia of Elections, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000, pp. 197-98. Official OversightIn every electoral system, there is at least one body responsible for the official oversight of election administration. This may be a separate office within the electoral policy or management body (such as an auditor or inspector general). It can also be a separate institution, including a legislative committee, a court or a statutory body; examples are the Commissioner of Canada Elections and Mexico’s Federal Electoral Tribunal. Inspector general or auditor general offices provide oversight of the electoral process on a regular basis. In some systems, they work together with electoral administrators to improve management and the electoral process; this is part of their mandate to promote savings and curb waste and abuse. This type of oversight can help managers identify systemic deficiencies and make corrections to ensure compliance with all regulations and achievement of intended results. An inspector general or an independent oversight commission may also investigate complaints made by employees or other participants in the electoral process. The complaints may be allegations of misconduct or mismanagement, illegal activities, waste, abuse of authority, or public health or safety threats. [1] NOTES [1] Comptroller General of the United States, Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision. Integrity Issues in OversightCertain conditions are required for official oversight to be effective and properly play its checks-and-balances role in maintaining integrity. Independence Oversight agencies and inspectors general should have enough independence to ensure their impartiality. This means they must have sufficient human and financial resources to do their job without having to depend on other institutions. Their staff members should be non-partisan and have no personal stake in the outcome of their oversight work. As organizations, they should have the independence to perform their duties without interference. Auditors should be shielded from any political pressure to ensure their objectivity and enable them to report their findings and present their opinions/conclusions without fear of repercussions. As far as possible, the merit principle should apply in determining their salaries, training, job tenure and promotion. [1] In Canada, for example, official oversight is the responsibility of the Commissioner of Canada Elections. The Commissioner is independent, and is free to act without influence from political parties or the government. The Commissioner reports to Parliament through the Chief Electoral Officer. [2] Lack of independence can give rise to various problems:
Access For effective oversight, the agency responsible needs access, when requested, to election offices, persons and information. The oversight agency must be able to examine documents and computer files or databases. It needs physical access to verify the existence and condition of goods and services purchased with public funds. Access is usually guaranteed by law and regulation. In addition, in most systems, official oversight agencies have the authority to compel election authorities, or others, to furnish documents. Quality and Accuracy Good oversight must be professional, impartial, accurate and timely. It is more easily achieved if the agencies responsible can count on properly trained staff who apply good practices, have sound judgment, and understand the electoral system and its legal context. The findings of oversight agencies should be accurate and reflect the actual situation. Problems and instances of non-compliance are documented and reported in context. Oversight reports should not be editorials, or contain unsubstantiated or biased opinions. Factual reports containing all relevant information can help electoral administrators correct integrity problems. Oversight agencies usually benefit from an internal quality control system that reviews investigative reports. Internal review can help ensure compliance with applicable standards, policies and procedures. Effective quality control depends on a number of factors, including the extent of the agency’s resources, the degree of autonomy allowed to it, and its organizational structure. [3] Authority Integrity will be enhanced if the oversight body can publish its findings and recommendations, without interference. A report or its findings should not be suppressed, censored or altered because it might embarrass or criticize the election administration or ruling party. The ability to publish findings and recommendations is crucial to the independence of the oversight body. It is vital for the transparency of the process, and the accountability of electoral administrators and election participants. Political Use of Oversight Official oversight should not become a political tool. Instead, it should seek to provide routine, impartial audits of the electoral administration and the actions of election participants. However, politicians also have an oversight function, for instance, as members of legislative committees. Sometimes they may use their role for political ends. Political considerations may affect the timing of an investigation (e.g. initiated at a politically sensitive moment), its scope, or the timing of the release of a report (e.g. just before an election). All this can hamper the administration of elections—for example, by giving rise to funding freezes or calls for the resignation of senior executives of the electoral policy or management body. Legislative oversight is a checks-and-balances function, but it can be difficult to separate politics from this type of oversight. One of the checks on overly partisan legislative oversight is public monitoring by the media and public interest groups. Enforcement of Findings Integrity problems identified by oversight bodies need in-depth attention. Most systems have mechanisms to ensure that oversight findings and recommendations are acted on by the election body or other affected organizations. These mechanisms are usually part of the legal framework, which may also ensure compliance by imposing sanctions, such as a freeze on public funds or the levying of fines. Illegal activities uncovered through oversight are usually handled by the justice system. Special investigators are mandated to determine the facts, gather evidence and, depending on the case, convince prosecutors to institute proceedings. NOTES [1] Comptroller General of the United States, Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision. [2] Commissioner of Canada Elections, *Investigators’ Manual*, 2004. [3] Comptroller General of the United States, Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision. Monitoring by Political PartiesPolitical Party Monitors Political parties are in the best position to assess the political environment, and to identify the obstacles to free campaigning as well as the implications of the choice of electoral system. This is especially true of parties that can establish a presence at all polling stations on election day. Political party monitors are therefore an essential component in maintaining election integrity. [1] Political party monitors are agents of the political parties competing in an election. In most systems they are given the authority not only to monitor the electoral process but to intervene if they believe that legal requirements are not being respected. They can also contribute directly to the administrative process by signing ballots and tally sheets to validate them, and by participating in voting administration and vote counting. This is a voluntary role in most systems, and voting and the count go ahead even if no political party monitor is present. The roles played by monitors and candidates differ. Candidates campaign, working to convince voters to support them. Monitors are observers and should not attempt to influence those they are observing. Monitoring must be performed in an impartial and professional manner. The very presence of candidates may create a danger of tension and conflict. Even if candidates do not behave in a threatening manner, voters may feel intimidated by their presence and lack confidence in the secrecy of their vote, particularly in areas characterized by inter-party conflict and violence. [2] For this reason, election regulations should prohibit the presence of candidates within polling stations, in keeping with international practice. Party agents who are well trained in the various aspects of the election law and regulations will be best able to monitor the proceedings and protect the interests of their party. However, their role will be constructive only if they understand exactly what is expected of them, what their rights and responsibilities are, and what they are not permitted to do. Political parties must ensure that each of their agents is properly trained, and prepared to abide by the electoral code of conduct and all other applicable regulations. To protect the integrity of the process and the interests of their party and candidates, monitors must perform the following tasks:
NOTES [1] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, The Future of International Electoral Observation: Lessons Learned and Recommendations, 1999. [2] Electoral Commission of South Africa, “Code of Conduct for Political Parties,” Election Administration Manual of South Africa, Ch. 5, 1995, p. 28. Monitoring by the MediaThe media contribute to monitoring of the electoral process by keeping the public informed about electoral events and the political campaign. The media also play an important investigative role that helps to ferret out electoral fraud and corruption. Conditions Required for Media Effectiveness Several conditions must be met for the media to serve as an effective integrity mechanism. They must have access to the electoral process and its participants. They must have a safe environment enabling them to investigate and report news without fear of intimidation or retribution. And they must be able to publish their reports without censorship. Specifically, the media require the following:
Media Protection and Oversight The media have gained a degree of protection as international monitors. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has appointed a Representative on Freedom of the Media. The Representative observes the state of media freedom in all 55 OSCE member countries, and promotes compliance with OSCE principles and commitments concerning freedom of expression and media freedom. [1] Some non-governmental organizations focus on protection for journalists. National and international observers may also monitor press freedom and the accuracy of election reporting. In the first and second rounds of the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, government officials limited the media’s ability to report certain issues and events. The result was biased media coverage favouring the presidential candidate of the ruling party. It was only in the second runoff election, after challenges before the Supreme Court regarding the validity of earlier election results, that the censorship was discontinued and media coverage became more balanced. [2] Impact on Election Integrity Good media coverage of the electoral process can help in various ways:
NOTES [1] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Representative on Freedom of the Media. [2] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ukraine, Presidential Election: 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, May 2005. Monitoring by IndividualsIndividual citizens are the first line of defence. A well-informed voter who asks the right questions can expose, stop or deter an integrity problem. Even a voter who is not informed but who questions something that does not seem right or fair can be an effective integrity mechanism. A voter can challenge unfair or arbitrary actions by sending letters to the press, or by filing complaints with the election management or enforcement body. On election day, voters usually spend anywhere from 20 to 45 minutes at the polling station, looking for their names, lining up, and marking and casting a ballot. In some cases voters may spend more time, depending on how large the crowds are at the polling place. During that time, voters can protect their own interests and those of their fellow citizens by keeping a protective eye on the electoral process and reporting irregularities. A number of civil society groups and non-governmental organizations encourage voters to protect the integrity of the electoral process. Organized National Election ObservationMonitoring of the process by organized national groups acting as independent observers is an essential tool for promoting election integrity. These groups span a wide spectrum of non governmental organizations and other civil society groups, including national and local citizen groups, citizen networks, human rights groups, student associations, professional bodies and religious groups. [1] They collect information from their observer teams, analyze the democratic conduct of the electoral process, assess the quality of the election and publish their findings. The groups can be effective guardians of election integrity, especially in countries undergoing a transition. Their activities foster transparency and accountability on the part of the electoral administration. They thus help to instill public confidence in the integrity of the process. Codes of conduct for observers set ethical and professional standards for observing elections. An outstanding example of domestic monitoring can be found in the 1997 elections in Kenya, for which civil society organizations trained more than 28,000 national observers. These were posted at nearly 12,600 polling stations and each vote counting station. Their pervasive presence encouraged voter turnout. [2] In Indonesia, more than 600,000 national observers covered the 1999 elections and helped ensure the integrity of the election results through their close monitoring of the count. However, in the 2004 presidential elections, Indonesia’s General Electoral Commission refused to accredit the Independent Monitoring Committee of the Election (KIPP) because that body had published an observation report on the previous legislative elections without approval from the election authorities. [3] Some countries impose severe restrictions on the recognition of organized national observation. In the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, the law limited national observation to candidates’ representatives. Ukraine’s Committee of Voters nonetheless deployed thousands of observers accredited as journalists. In that capacity, however, the observers were not entitled to receive copies of electoral documents or to demand that these documents be made public. [4] In Ethiopia’s 2005 parliamentary elections, the country’s electoral management body limited the access of national observers, an action that was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court ruled against the electoral management body but the decision was not handed down until the day before the election, when it was too late for national observers to effectively carry out their monitoring activities on a large scale. [5] Benefits of National Observation In a few cases the presence of international observers is indispensable—for instance, elections in countries requiring a peacekeeping force or undergoing a difficult transition, or where non-partisan civil society groups are virtually non-existent or non-functional. In the long term, however, the forming of domestic groups that are able to monitor their own elections without external assistance is an essential part of democratic development. National election observers have important advantages over international observers. They can more easily turn out in large numbers, even in the thousands. They know the political culture, language and territory. Consequently, they are capable of seeing many things that may pass unnoticed by foreign observers. [6] National monitoring groups are often better equipped than international observers to carry out particular types of specialized monitoring efficiently. Examples include verifying the voter registry, monitoring the complaints process, documenting instances of intimidation and human rights violations, and media monitoring. And unlike international observers, national civic organizations have an important role to play in implementing civic education programs and promoting electoral law reform. [7] Accrediting Observers Observers and monitors can function more effectively if they are officially accredited by the electoral management or policy-making body. Accreditation gives them access to election sites. Integrity problems may arise if accreditation procedures or requirements are used to limit the number of observers, or to deny access to certain groups of observers or monitors. If the procedure is too time-consuming and cannot be completed before election day, or if accreditation is selective, the process will lose credibility and the election management body will be accused of having something to hide. Most electoral systems establish eligibility requirements for observers and monitors in the election laws or procedures. Straightforward and objective requirements can help minimize problems such as discrimination or favouritism that might inadvertently result from subjective accreditation. Some election management bodies add behaviour conditions to the eligibility requirements. These are generally used to exclude persons considered to be anti-democratic. In South Africa, for example, accreditation is provided only to observers who will uphold conditions conducive to a free and fair election, including impartiality and independence from any political party or candidate contesting the election, competent and professional observation, and adherence to the code of conduct for observers. Security Problems and National Observation In countries undergoing a difficult transition or in post-conflict societies, national observers may be targets for intimidation or threats. This situation may affect the observers’ ability to travel, observe freely and report on the information collected without self-censorship or fear of retribution. For example, one report on the 1998 national elections in Cambodia states, “Threats, intimidation and violence were daunting challenges to the Cambodian observers during this year’s election process. None of the groups suggested that their ability to release public statements was compromised by the political environment. They noted, though, that intimidation affected their ability to gather information on the process and that threats coloured the reports … received from observers.” [8] NOTES [1] Bjornlund, Eric C., Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004. [2] Barkan, Joel and Ng’ethe, Njuguma, “Kenya Tries Again,” Journal of Democracy, 9(2), 1998. [3] Carter Center, The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report, June 2005. [4] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ukraine, Presidential Election: 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, May 2005. [5] Carter Center, Final Statement on the Carter Center Observation of the Ethiopia 2005 National Elections, September 2005. [6] Carothers, Thomas, “The Observers Observed,” Journal of Democracy, 8(3), 1997, p. 25. [7] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, The Future of International Electoral Observation: Lessons Learned and Recommendations, 1999. [8] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Asian Monitoring Network Conference, October 1998. Efficacy of National ObservationThere are several prerequisites for national observation to be effective:
International Election ObservationInternational election observation has become an important mechanism for ensuring election integrity in countries undergoing a transition to democracy or in post-conflict societies. International observation today enjoys almost universal acceptance, and helps in raising voter confidence and evaluating the legitimacy of an electoral process and outcome. [1] It has also become a learning opportunity for national electoral administrators and election participants. It promotes bilateral exchanges of knowledge and information on electoral practices, sometimes leading to lasting international relations. Ordinarily, international observation is used when there are concerns about the freeness or fairness of an election. For international observation to be an effective detector and deterrent of integrity problems, it needs to be adapted to the type of electoral system and election it is covering. An election in a post-conflict society requires a far different kind of observation from an election in a country adopting electoral reforms. Decision to Organize an International Observer Mission Most international observers take on a mission by invitation. The question that arises is whether an electoral process must respect the basic criteria of a free and fair election to deserve being observed. Some organizations feel that a country must meet certain basic standards before they will decide to send an international observer mission. They take this stance because they are concerned that international observation might be perceived as conferring legitimacy on an illegitimate election. However, a country with an electoral process falling short of basic requirements may also need international observers to help it uncover illegal and dishonest practices. Effectiveness of International Observation To be effective in ensuring election integrity, international observation should cover the entire electoral process rather than a specific aspect, such as voting or counting of the ballots. Observers should have proper qualifications and training. One of the most common criticisms levelled at international observation is that it has become an opportunity for “electoral tourism”: observers are sometimes seen as lacking professional experience, and they arrive in a country only a few days before election day. To ensure that observer missions are effective and reliable, several conditions must be met:
Accreditation To be able to enter electoral sites and undertake credible observation, international observers must be accredited by the electoral management or policy-making body. Selective accreditation or no accreditation raises questions of integrity. Security Problems In countries with security problems, certain areas are off limits to observers if government security forces cannot guarantee their safety. How such restrictions affect election integrity and the quality of observation will depend largely on how much of the country is off limits to observers. NOTES [1] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, The Future of International Electoral Observation: Lessons Learned and Recommendations, 1999. Roles and Rules of International ObserversInternational observation plays an important role in safeguarding election integrity. This role may be compromised if election observers do not follow certain rules that should guide their conduct during their mission. International Observers' Role in Maintaining Election Integrity Serious and professional international observation can help maintain election integrity in many ways:
Rules of Conduct for International Observers To ensure the legitimacy of their work, international observers have to follow internationally recognized standards of conduct. Several organizations that specialize in international observation have developed codes of conduct to guide observers’ behaviour. The main requirements for ethical and professional observation3 are as follows:
NOTES [1] Carothers, Thomas, “The Observers Observed,” Journal of Democracy, 8(3), 1997, p. 19. [2] Ibid., p. 20. [3] Bjornlund, Eric C., Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004. Standards to Evaluate ElectionsThe issue of common standards for evaluating elections poses many difficulties. There is a generally agreed upon set of principles that define free and fair elections, including: equal voting power for all citizens; freedom to organize for political purposes and the right to campaign; the right of access to political information; and regular holding of elections that are decided by the freely cast vote of the majority. Applying the concept of free and fair elections can be difficult in practice, however, especially in a transitional election when parts of the process may go well but other parts are seriously flawed. If one candidate is denied media access but the rest of the process goes smoothly, is the election free and fair? If the process goes well but a prominent politician boycotts the election, are the results acceptable? Experience shows that these concerns are warranted and that it is not always easy to reach consensus. International observation reports may disagree because different observer groups use different criteria. The problem is that inconsistencies may give rise to confusion in the countries being observed. What’s more, contradictory reports undermine the credibility and purpose of observation. For example, during the 1998 election in Cambodia, the election observers’ statements sowed confusion and resentment. Many groups seemed to give a passing grade to the election, based on their observation of the voting and the count; a few others took emphatic exception, citing the unhealthy political atmosphere that had existed since long before the election. [1] Similarly, during Zimbabwe’s legislative elections in 2000 and its presidential elections in 2002, contradictory evaluations were issued by various international and national observation groups. [2] Once again, the reports were greeted with some bitterness by local participants. This is why adoption of common observation standards is becoming essential to ensure the credibility and legitimacy of missions. The criteria [3] are as follows: 1) The observation should cover a broad range of issues:
2) The observation should cover the entire process from beginning to end, including:
3) Coverage should be as broad as possible:
NOTES [1] Neou, Kassie and Gallup, Jeffrey C., “Conducting Cambodia’s Elections,” Journal of Democracy, 10(2), 1999. [2] Bjornlund, Eric C., Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004. [3] The criteria are taken from Beyond Free and Fair. Acciones de Documento |
