Mixed Model EMBs
Mixed Model EMBs have dual structures, with a policy, monitoring or supervisory component that is independent of the executive branch of government (as for the Independent Model) and an implementation component located within a department of state and/or local government (as for the Governmental Model). Under this model elections are organized by the governmental implementation component of the EMB, with some level of oversight provided by the independent component of the EMB.
The Mixed Model is used in France, Japan, Spain and many former French colonies, especially in West Africa, for example Mali, Senegal and Togo.
The powers, functions and strength of the independent component in relation to the governmental component vary in different examples of this model, and the classification of a particular EMB as a mixed model is sometimes not very clear. In some cases, the independent component is little more than a formalized observation operation, although this version is dying out, having been abandoned for example in Senegal. In other cases, the independent component has a role to supervise and verify the implementation of electoral events by the governmental component, as in Madagascar, and sometimes also to tabulate and transmit results, as in Congo (Brazzaville) and Togo. In some francophone countries, the Constitutional Council is engaged in the tabulation and declaration of results and can be considered as an independent component of the EMB. In Chad, this applies to referendums only, and not to elections. In Mali, both the Independent National Election Commission and the Constitutional Council undertake their own tabulation of results: the EMB may therefore be said to have three components, one which is governmental and two which are independent.
The relationship between the components of a mixed model EMB is not always clearly defined in legislation or interpreted by stakeholders, and friction can result. In the 1999 elections in Guinea-Conakry (which used the mixed model at that time), the majority representatives and the opposition representatives in the independent component had strongly differing approaches to its role to supervise and verify the elections, and its effectiveness was therefore heavily disputed.
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