In some countries, the process of appointing expert-based EMB members is initiated by the head of state, who nominates candidates to the legislature for confirmation. Examples include Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Ukraine, and Yemen. Involving the legislature, including opposition parties, in the confirmation process can help to provide some degree of multi-partisan support for the appointments. For example, in Indonesia, the president determines a pool of nominees equal to twice the number of vacancies and notifies the legislature, which then conducts a written and public oral examination ‘fit and proper test’ of each nominee, before voting to rank the nominees, and sending the appropriate number of highest-ranked nominees to the president to be appointed. In some Commonwealth countries, including Fiji, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago, the head of state appoints EMB members on the advice of the prime minister and following consultation with the leader of the opposition. In Papua New Guinea, there is an Electoral Commission Appointments Committee made up of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Appointments, and the Chair of the Public Service Commission.

The division of EMB appointment powers between the executive and legislature provides for checks and balances in appointment procedures and enhances the appointment process. If one branch of the government (especially the executive) has the sole right to appoint EMB members, the danger is that such appointees, even if they are men and women of integrity, may be perceived by the public, and especially the opposition parties, as pawns of the appointing authority.

Even if the power to appoint the EMB members is divided between the executive and the legislature, this arrangement will be fettered if the two branches are dominated by the same party, or if the executive effectively controls the legislature. In this case, the requirement of a two-third legislative majority to approve EMB appointments could be a useful remedy, because it may guarantee veto power to minority parties: this is the case in Mexico, Nigeria, Uruguay, and Yemen.