EMB Composition and Roles

An EMB’s activities generally require both determining policy and implementing major administrative and logistics operations. In Governmental Model EMBs, both these functions are undertaken by public servants, employed within one or more bodies of the executive. While members of the executive branch of government, such as Ministers, may also take an active role in a Governmental Model EMB’s policy making, it is more common that its Secretariat head, who may be termed Director of Elections or the like, is responsible for policy. It is not usual for Governmental Model EMBs to have members: rather, they are fully composed of secretariat (public service) staff.

In Independent Model EMBs, the policy function is undertaken by a person or persons from outside the executive branch of government, specially appointed for this task. This person or persons are the EMB’s ‘members’. Their role is similar to that of the board of a corporation – to guide the direction of the EMB - though in many cases EMB members have a fulltime job and a more ‘hands on‘ role than would be usual for a corporate board. Similarly, in Mixed Model EMBs, the Independent component of the EMB is guided by a ‘board’ of members.

EMB Membership

EMB members need a very high level of management skills and commitment to maintaining integrity under pressure.

Given the range of skills necessary to ensure that an EMB can function effectively – such as legal, communications, education, logistics, corporate management – it would seem useful for the EMB to include members with a wide range of appropriate skills. Public confidence in EMBs is enhanced where the electoral legislation contains qualifications for appointment to EMBs that are clearly defined and appropriate for the complex task of impartially managing electoral processes, and mechanisms for selection and appointment that are transparent and based on the candidates’ merits. The mode of selection and appointment, and provisions for tenure, of members of the EMB vary from one country to another.

There are various titles for the members of EMBs, with similar meaning, but each with its own nuances, related to the basis, role, and powers of the policy-making members of the EMB. In Canada, where the Chief Electoral Officer is both the chief and sole policy maker and the head of administration (secretariat), he or she is called the EMB member or commissioner. ‘Commissioner’, however, is a term that is inconsistently applied. In Australia, the Electoral Commissioner is both the head of the secretariat and a full voting member of the EMB (although not the head of the EMB), while the deputy and assistant commissioners are staff of the secretariat. Similarly, the Jamaican Director of Elections, who is both the head of the secretariat and also a member of the EMB (but without a vote), may be referred to as a Commissioner. In Francophone countries and Latin America, the head of the EMB may be termed ‘President’.

Some EMBs have a chair who by law is known as the Chief Electoral Commissioner, and who serves as the EMB’s chief executive. The role of such a chair should be understood in the same way as that of an executive chair or executive director in the corporate world. Unlike other chairs in other EMBs, the Chief Electoral Commissioner has executive powers and is more hands-on in directing the electoral process. Although he or she may be assisted by other commissioners and the secretariat, the Chief Electoral Commissioner in these countries will have the final say in matters of finance and administration and also on key aspects of the electoral process.

Status of EMB Members

For an EMB to operate effectively, its members need to have a status that entitles them to respect from and an equal relationship with the government, the legislature, and society. The head of the EMB especially needs a status that affords her or him access to the highest levels of government, and ensures adherence to the EMB’s decisions. The Chair of the EMB in Pakistan (also known by law as Chief Electoral Commissioner) has the same conditions of service as the Chief Justice, as do his counterparts in numerous other countries. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil, and Romania, the chair of the EMB has the rank of Minister, guaranteeing access to the legislature and the government, and in Yemen, the EMB chair has the rank of a Deputy Prime Minister, and EMB members have the rank of Minister.

While it is important that EMB members have a high status, it is also important that members do not then behave as though they are bigger than the EMB institution that they are serving, or come to be regarded by society as ‘the EMB’. Personality-based institutions can be highly polarising. A good practice model for EMB members to follow is to personalise the institution they serve, rather than institutionalise the person or persons leading the EMB.

The EMB Chair: A Special Role?

In some countries, the legal framework provides for a two-stream procedure for the appointment of EMB members: one for the chair and another for all other members. In some cases, the EMB chair serves as a "first among equals" appointed by the head of state/government at a level higher than the other members, and in others the legislature appoints the EMB chair, while the other members are appointed by the Head of State and the Prime Minister respectively. An EMB Chair can also be appointed at the level of a senior judge, while other members are at the level of judges of a lower court.

Where the EMB chair is appointed on different terms from the other members and at a higher level, he or she tends to play a more prominent role, over and above the role of presiding over the EMB’s meetings. He or she may have additional powers in relation to matters such as chairing various EMB internal subcommittees, actively supporting the secretariat in policy implementation and monitoring, and liaising with stakeholders. In Lithuania, for example, the EMB chair has specified powers to hire and fire staff, to keep and direct the use of the EMB seal, and also to represent the EMB in state institutions, in court, and in international organisations. In Liberia, the Chair of the National Elections Commission is also by law the official spokesperson for the Commission, though there are secretariat staff carrying out the day-to-day work of maintaining contacts with the media.

In many countries, all EMB members are appointed on the same terms, and the chair (and in some cases the vice-chair and secretary) is elected by his/her peers after the first meeting. In this context, the main responsibility of the chair is to preside over the meetings of the commission and/or its subcommittees if necessary.

There are no specific advantages or disadvantages associated with specifically appointing a person as EMB chair as a first among equals or having members of the EMB select their chair from among themselves. The appropriate practice depends on the context in which the EMB structure was originally designed and continues to function.

The case for a ‘first among equals’ EMB chair is stronger where the EMB is still nascent and requires some nurturing, and the position is full-time. This may also apply where the Chair is a full-time position and other members are part time. Where the EMB is a part-time body, it may be more appropriate for the chair to be elected by his or her peers and for him or her to have the same conditions of service as all other EMB members.

EMB Members: Respected Experts or Watchdogs on Each Other?

In countries where either Independent or Mixed Model EMBs exist, electoral legislation specifies the framework for the membership of the EMB. There is a myriad of different legal provisions that govern these critical issues, some of which are more conducive to EMB independence and others less so. A basic difference is in the distinction between a multiparty-based EMB and an expert-based EMB. Some countries have combined elements of both of these and have mixed EMBs.

Multiparty-based EMBs

Multiparty EMBs comprise a mixture of political party nominees as EMB members. The legal framework may entitle all political parties contesting an election to be represented on the EMB, or representation may be restricted by some threshold – for example, to those represented in the legislature or with more than a specified proportion of members in the legislature. In Venezuela in the mid 1990s, the larger parties each had their own representative, while smaller parties of the left and right were represented collectively.

Political party-based appointment often implies that EMB members are serving on the EMB as political party representatives or agents and, as well as impartially managing electoral processes, serve to ensure that their nominating political parties’ interests are protected. While each individual member is seen from outside as partisan, each is also ensuring that the others do not take partisan advantage – so the EMB can nonetheless credibly be perceived as an impartial body. Political party-based members often hold office for a fixed term and cannot be dismissed except for cause, such as a breach of their duties, or upon their withdrawal by their nominating authority. Allowing parties to replace their representatives at their own discretion is potentially very disruptive of the work of the EMB.

In some countries, however, political party nominees to the EMB are eminent persons who are required to maintain high standards of impartiality and professionalism, and thus they do not serve as political party representatives on the EMB, although in some cases it has not been easy for even these eminent political party nominees to be completely impartial.

Many countries, especially those that experienced difficult transitions from authoritarian rule to multiparty democracy, have chosen multiparty-based or partisan EMBs. In such societies, public servants are likely to have been largely discredited as electoral policy makers due to a history of being agents of the authoritarian former ruling party or military regime. Additionally, the fight against authoritarianism may have polarized society to the extent that it is difficult to find public figures widely accepted as ‘independent’ to serve on the EMB for a transitional election. Many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe adopted multiparty-based EMBs during their transitions.

Many electoral analysts believe that having political party representatives on the EMB engenders consensus among actors in the electoral contest and contributes to enhanced transparency, all of which lead to improved confidence in the electoral process. Voters may feel more encouraged to participate in elections if their political party leaders are playing an active role in the electoral process, specifically through representation on the EMB.

Multiparty EMBs may assist in promoting trust and confidence in electoral processes in the initial stages of democratic transitions. Depoliticization of EMBs may be more appropriate as confidence in the electoral process grows.

On the other hand, a political party-based EMB can put at risk or cripple decision-making, especially in situations where their critical interests are at stake. The presence of politicians on the EMB may undermine confidentiality in matters such as the security of balloting materials. Multiparty-based EMBs also tend to generate dissatisfaction, especially among minority parties which might be excluded from sitting on the EMB either because they are not represented in the legislature or because they did not participate in the negotiation leading to the initial appointments of EMB members.

Expert-based EMBs

Expert-based or non-partisan EMBs are those which the legal framework requires to be made up of individuals appointed on the basis of their professional standing. In some cases, members of an expert-based EMB may be nominated by political parties or civil society, but this does not imply that such nominees will be directed by their nominating political parties or act in a partisan manner.

Qualifications to be a member of an expert-based EMB may include

• impartiality,
• minimum age,
• professional qualifications, and
• electoral knowledge.
  
  

Expert-based EMB members are often eminent public figures renowned for political neutrality with expertise in fields such as law, public administration, political science, or the media. As of 2006, expert-based EMBs can be found in countries such as Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, and Thailand. The law in many of these countries provides that EMB members must not have been active in party politics in the recent past, and must not be a political party member whilst a member of the EMB.

Brazil is an example of a judicial EMB: elections there are the responsibility of national and state electoral tribunals, which are considered a specialized segment of the judicial branch, comprising judges of various categories, along with a small number of expert lawyers; below the tribunals, regular judges are detailed for a short time to oversee electoral preparations and operations in each electoral ‘zone’ (district) in the country.

In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer is not allowed to vote in any federal election or referendum.

EMBs with Both Expert and Multiparty Membership

Some electoral legal frameworks specify that EMB members should be partly drawn from independent technocrats - such as judges, academics, civil society representatives and career public servants - and partly from appointments by political parties. This may combine advantages from both models, producing even-handed bodies that have both political party buy-in and transparency in their operations.

This ‘combined’ model can be implemented in various ways. In Croatia, a standing EMB formed from five members of the legal profession is augmented for election periods by three members of each of the majority and opposition blocs in the legislature, all with equal voting rights. Thus, only if opposing political tendencies agree can the independent members be outvoted. In Hungary, the chair and four members of the National EMB are elected by the legislature, and the political parties participating in the elections delegate one member each. The elected and delegated members have equal rights. Decisions of the EMB are made by simple majority, and decisions may be appealed to a court. In Mexico, the EMB is a permanent body comprising eight expert members plus a representative of each political group in the legislature and of each national political party. However, in the Mexican case, the legislators and party representatives are non-voting members.

Similarly to multiparty EMBs, ‘combined’ EMBs can find decision-making difficult. For example, in the 1999, Indonesian elections the ‘combined’ EMB was unable to validate the election results because members representing some very minor political parties refused to sign off on the validation unless their parties were allocated seats to which they were not entitled by their votes. This has been the rationale in some cases for making the party representatives non-voting members of their respective EMBs.

For a comparative table on advantages and disadvantages of multiparty, expert and ‘combined’ EMBs, see “Advantages and Disadvantages of Multiparty, Expert, and Combined EMBs” on the right hand side bar.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Multiparty, Expert, and Combined EMBs

Full-time or Part-time EMB Members?

Whether it is more appropriate for EMB membership to be a full- time or part-time position will depend on the electoral and administrative circumstances. In a permanent EMB, workloads may be high throughout the electoral cycle, and demand that EMB members be full time and thus readily available for speedy consultation and decisions. Full-time EMB members may be a good option in a situation of recurring activities, such as regular partial or by-elections, voter education, continuous voter registration, or continuing electoral law reforms. In a temporary EMB, the election-period workload may be such that full-time members are preferable. Full-time EMB membership may also be appropriate where there are doubts about the impartiality and skill levels of the EMB’s secretariat.

Some electoral legal frameworks require that EMB appointments be full-time. Other countries appoint full-time EMB members even though it is not a legal requirement. In 2006, all members of the South African EMB but one (a sitting judge) hold full-time office, although this is not a legal requirement.

On the other hand, in countries where election dates are fixed and the EMB has limited responsibility between elections, it may be advisable to have part-time EMB members. This arrangement applies in countries such as Botswana, Cambodia, Croatia, Jamaica, Japan, and Namibia. In some countries, members of the EMB are part-time while the chair and deputy are full-time. Alternatively, members could serve part time in non-electoral periods and full time during electoral periods.

The benefit of having full-time EMB members must always be weighed against the cost of their services, when it may be years before the next election. There is also the risk of a potential conflict between senior members of the secretariat and full-time EMB members, especially when the former begin to interpret the full-time presence of the EMB members as interfering in implementation of policy.

How Many EMB Members?

The electoral legal framework will generally specify the number of members of the EMB. It is not possible to specify an exact number for multiparty EMBs whose membership is determined by a criterion such as party representation in the legislature, as this number may vary over time.

The number of members of an EMB varies considerably worldwide, and need not be related to the size of the country. As of 2006, in the small country of Lesotho, the EMB has three members, whilst Nigeria, a much bigger country, has a 13-member EMB. However, countries like Canada, despite its sizeable land mass, and India, with about 600 million voters, have one-member and three-member EMBs, respectively. Having a larger number of members of the EMB may provide for broader representation, whereas a smaller number can facilitate discussion and decision-making.

EMBs which include political party nominees tend to have higher numbers of members, so as to accommodate a credible range of political interests, while expert-based EMBs tend to have fewer members. Having an uneven number of members of the EMB ensures that simple majority vote decisions can be made without having to resort to measures such as giving the EMB chair a casting vote.

In some cases, electoral law allows for the appointment of alternate or deputy members to EMBs. Under certain circumstances, a deputy member can then automatically take the place and exercise the powers of a member.

Term of Office of Members of Permanent EMBs

In many permanent EMBs, EMB members have a specified term of office. Some EMBs’ terms of office are defined in relation to the legislature’s term of office. In the case of EMBs with an unspecified term of office, members remain in office once appointed until they reach retirement age, unless they resign or are removed. Usually, the chair remains in office until he or she reaches retirement age.

The advantage of limiting the term of office is that it promotes constant generation of new ideas through new appointments. However, on the flipside, such a practice may undermine institutional experience, especially if EMB members’ terms coincide with a single electoral cycle. Many electoral laws which specify limited terms of office for EMB members allow for extension of the term by mutual consent between the appointee and the appointing authority. Some countries limits EMB members to two terms of office, while others do not put a limit to EMB members’ terms of office. The terms of EMB members can also be staggered. For example, a seven-member EMB could have one seat come up for (re-)appointment each year.

Staggering EMB members’ terms of office greatly assists retention of institutional experience and provides for smooth leadership succession. If appointments to the membership of the EMB are not staggered, the new EMB members should be appointed several months the last election to allow the former EMB members to have completed and reported on their election evaluation, and long enough before the next election for the new EMB members to master their responsibilities before the election period commences.

Recruitment and Appointment of EMB Members

The process for appointing members of any EMB is generally defined in electoral law, and the recruitment and selection methods may also be defined in the electoral legal framework. Appointment may be by the head of state, a judicial body, the executive, or in some cases by political parties, and may be consultative or unilateral. Recruitment and selection may be from closed nominations or from open advertising, may include some form of public or private test of merit and integrity, and may be from a pool of nominees or only the exact number of nominees required. Recruitment processes may be able to be more open for expert-based EMBs than for EMBs whose membership is wholly or partially nominated by political parties.

Recruitment through Open Advertisement

In some countries, members of an expert-based EMB are recruited through open advertisement, and interested candidates may apply directly to be considered for appointment; in a few cases, they may also be nominated by members of the public, or by civil society organisations or specified professional bodies such as the Bar Association. Applications are received and screened (through public interviews) by an independent body (for example, a judicial selection committee or a committee of the legislature). In Botswana, all applications are received by the EMB secretariat and are forwarded to an all-party conference which nominates 15 candidates to the judicial service commission. The latter appoints five members from the all-party conference nominees in addition to the EMB chair (who must be a judge of the Supreme Court) and his or her deputy (who must be a legal professional).

While open advertising and screening mechanisms can provide a broad range of applicants for EMB member positions and promote competency in selections of members, it does not necessarily guarantee that the most appropriate candidates are chosen. Where the mechanism for screening and appointing EMB members is dominated by one political grouping, competent candidates not in favour with this grouping may have lesser chances of selection.

Some advantages and disadvantages of open advertising for members of EMBs:

Nomination of Candidates for EMB Membership by the Head of State and Confirmation by or in Consultation with the Legislature

In some countries, the process of appointing expert-based EMB members is initiated by the head of state, who nominates candidates to the legislature for confirmation. Examples include Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Ukraine, and Yemen. Involving the legislature, including opposition parties, in the confirmation process can help to provide some degree of multi-partisan support for the appointments. For example, in Indonesia, the president determines a pool of nominees equal to twice the number of vacancies and notifies the legislature, which then conducts a written and public oral examination ‘fit and proper test’ of each nominee, before voting to rank the nominees, and sending the appropriate number of highest-ranked nominees to the president to be appointed. In some Commonwealth countries, including Fiji, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago, the head of state appoints EMB members on the advice of the prime minister and following consultation with the leader of the opposition. In Papua New Guinea, there is an Electoral Commission Appointments Committee made up of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Appointments, and the Chair of the Public Service Commission.

The division of EMB appointment powers between the executive and legislature provides for checks and balances in appointment procedures and enhances the appointment process. If one branch of the government (especially the executive) has the sole right to appoint EMB members, the danger is that such appointees, even if they are men and women of integrity, may be perceived by the public, and especially the opposition parties, as pawns of the appointing authority.

Even if the power to appoint the EMB members is divided between the executive and the legislature, this arrangement will be fettered if the two branches are dominated by the same party, or if the executive effectively controls the legislature. In this case, the requirement of a two-third legislative majority to approve EMB appointments could be a useful remedy, because it may guarantee veto power to minority parties: this is the case in Mexico, Nigeria, Uruguay, and Yemen.

Unilateral Appointments of EMB Members by One Branch of Government

Where EMB members are appointed unilaterally, for example by the head of state, no other consent is required, and there may be no consultation with or advice received from any other institutions, such as the legislature, political parties, or civil society, before making EMB appointments. If the head of state does have such consultations or take advice – and in many occasions this does take place – it is informal and not binding. In countries such as India, Malaysia, Senegal, and Zambia, the head of state unilaterally appoints members of the EMB. The unilateral appointment of EMB members, especially by the executive, has been criticized by many analysts, who argue that it could encourage the head of state to appoint EMB members who are government and ruling party sympathizers rather than impartial arbiters in the electoral process.

In other countries, such as Costa Rica, the Supreme Court of Justice unilaterally appoints members of the EMB. Their appointment is made by two-thirds of the members of the court.

Involvement of Other Actors in EMB Appointment

An alternative that is used to limit executive influence over EMB appointments is to involve judicial and non-state actors in either the nomination or the vetting of candidates. This can be done by a judicial body, by civil society organisations, academia, or by professional bodies such as the Bar Association.

Qualifications for Appointment

Whether the personal qualifications required for appointment to an EMB are detailed in electoral law generally depends on whether the EMB is expert-based or multiparty-based. For multiparty EMBs, it is more usual that political parties use their own criteria for appointing their representatives to the EMB, such as

• seniority in the political party hierarchy,
• political party membership,
• or professional qualification.
  
  

There are some multiparty EMBs for which the law defines criteria for members' qualifications, such as

• not being a party activist or
• not having held political office recently.
  
  

In Burkina Faso and Mozambique, for example, members of the multiparty EMB are by law expected to be professionally qualified and to carry out their work with integrity, independence, and impartiality. This means that political parties are obliged to nominate candidates who meet the qualifications of non-partisanship and independence. Such nominees are in many cases eminent members of the community rather than members of the political parties which nominated them.

In the case of expert-based EMBs, the electoral law may define an extensive set of personal qualifications for EMB members.Alternatively, the law may rely on its definition of the EMB’s expected behaviour and functions to define the qualities of EMB members to be appointed.

It is usual to expect EMB members to meet the criteria of professional competence and political neutrality. In some countries, professional qualifications include legal training and experience, especially for the chair, who in many cases must be a judge or a judge or former judge or somebody qualified for senior judicial appointment. In some cases, EMB members must have a law degree or university-level law education, while in others, members of the EMB must have at least a university degree. Other formal requirements for EMB membership would generally include citizenship, and often include age.

The manner in which EMB members are nominated for appointment may influence the type of person chosen, which may discriminate in favour of or against certain sectors of society. For example, in Indonesia in 2001, it appears that the initial nominations for potential members of the new EMB were sought solely from distinguished academics: thus the bulk of the persons nominated for consideration as members of the EMB were also academics. Apparently open processes may hide a more controlled environment of appointment to EMBs. For example, in 1999, the law on the EMB in Azerbaijan required that half the EMB members be appointed by the legislature and half by the president. With the president’s party totally controlling the legislature, this resulted in a nominally non-partisan but in reality government-influenced EMB.




While some electoral laws specify that EMB members must follow a certain occupation (e.g. all judges and/or eminent legal practitioners), few specify any appropriate mix of experience or skills. Where qualifications are required, these are generally legal. In the corporate world, a company with activities as large and broad as an EMB’s would be unlikely to have a narrowly focused board.

In some countries, the electoral law identifies persons who may not be appointed as members of the EMB. For many Independent or Mixed Model EMBs, this includes incompatibilities of position – for example members may not be a member/recent member of a political party, an elected representative of the people, or concurrently hold a government position. Other barriers to EMB membership, such as health qualifications, may allow hidden discrimination.

For a comparative table on “Qualifications Stated in Electoral Law for Appointment to Four Recently Reformed ‘Expert’-Based EMBs”, see bar on the right hand side.

Conditions of Service and Security of Tenure for EMB Members

In those countries where EMB members hold full-time office, their conditions of service, especially salaries and benefits, are determined either by law or by decisions taken by the head of state/government in consultation with other offices, such as the legislature, a Public Service ministry (or commission or similar body), or the treasury. Members of the EMB may be appointed under the same conditions of service as senior judicial officers, or other senior public officials.

In those countries where members of the EMB serve in a part-time capacity, it is usual for them to receive a sitting allowance when they attend EMB meetings, as happens in Botswana. Some countries (e.g. Namibia) augment this with a monthly retainer allowance. Such allowances are determined by the government in line with its own policies and regulations.

In many countries, EMB members’ remuneration is charged directly to the consolidated fund. This arrangement assures members’ benefits and salaries during their term of office and assists them to maintain full independence in their work.

EMB members’ security of tenure and immunity from any unwarranted harassment – such as salary cuts, reductions in conditions of service, or malicious prosecution - and removal from office by either the executive or any other authority enables members of the EMB to carry out their work impartially, professionally, without fear and favour, and resisting political pressures. EMB members may be less confident to take decisions which are unpopular with the executive or the legislature if they know that they may be removed from office, or their salaries and conditions reduced, without due process of law.

In many countries, the tenure protection for EMB members in the electoral law is the same as that for senior judicial officers: they can only be removed from office for a cause, such as misconduct, or mental and physical incapacity. Protection from arbitrary reductions in salary and conditions of service may also be guaranteed by law. In some other cases, the President may remove a member for a cause.

Protecting the tenure of party representatives on multiparty based EMBs can be a complex issue. If parties are responsible for appointment and removal of their representatives, they may also be free to replace their EMB representatives when they wish. Alternatively, the law could state that EMB members, whether nominated and appointed by political parties or otherwise, are independent from their appointing authority; in this case, any interference by the appointing authority in their work could be prohibited and punishable by law.

Oath/pledge-taking or Affirmation

In some countries, EMB members take a formal oath or a pledge of allegiance, loyalty, and integrity before taking office. The oath or pledge may be administered by a senior official or judicial officer. The oath/pledge-taking binds the EMB members to uphold the Constitution and the electoral laws of the country. The text of the oath or pledge may be simple, or more detailed. It may also include or refer to the code of conduct or any law governing conflict of interest for EMB members.

EMB Decision-Making Processes

Methods of making EMB decisions vary according to the Model of EMB, a country’s decision-making culture, and the requirements of electoral law.

In Governmental Model EMBs, where EMBs rarely have ‘members’ and administration may be directed from the executive branch of government, the EMB’s role may be as much one of proposing as determining action. Powers to determine policy and administrative issues may be delegated to the chief of the EMB secretariat by the government institution within which it is located.

For Independent EMBs and the independent component of Mixed Model EMBs, electoral law may specify some decision-making issues, such as election of the chair, decision making powers of the EMB chair and/or EMB members meeting in plenary, requirements for majority or super majority votes, role of the chair in voting, and use of casting votes.

While some key decision-making issues may be covered by the electoral law, it is usual for the detail of the EMB’s decision-making processes to be defined in standing orders or administrative procedures determined by the members of the EMB. Such documents may define a range of issues, including EMB member authorities, such as:

• the role of the chair;
• responsibilities for decision making and abilities to delegate these;
• methods of calling EMB meetings;
• frequency of meetings;
• responsibility for meeting agendas, processes of decision-making – proposals, rules of discussion, and types of voting and/or requirements for consensus;
• attendance at meetings and quorums; rights and roles of secretariat staff at meetings;
• invitations to outsiders to attend EMB meetings;
• taking, authenticating, and issuing meeting minutes; method of issuing EMB policies and directions;
• methods of suspending or altering the standing orders; and
• responsibilities for media conferences.
  
  

In many instances, a quorum is formed by 50 per cent of the members, and decisions are taken by simple majority of the EMB members present. However, in some cases, EMB decisions must be taken by consensus; or members present during a meeting may not be allowed to abstain from voting; or a member with a dissenting opinion on a matter may not be able to prevent the execution of the majority decision.

Meetings of EMB Members

The electoral law, or internal EMB regulations, may require decisions on particular matters – such as issuing of subsidiary regulations, validation of election results, staff appointments, or decisions affecting stakeholders’ electoral rights – to be agreed in a plenary session of EMB members. Regular EMB member meetings also assist in developing agreed policy directions, reviewing EMB performance, and providing guidance on policies to EMB secretariat staff.

Whilst full-time EMB members may be available daily to provide direction to EMB secretariat staff, part-time members of EMBs are more likely to merely meet occasionally to deliberate on policies and activities which shape the EMB’s operations. Outside election periods, full-time membership EMBs may meet every week. Part-time membership EMBs usually meet less frequently, often monthly. During peak electoral event periods, more frequent meetings are usual: full-time EMBs may meet as often as daily. It is common for EMB member meeting minutes to be signed by both the chair and the secretary, and in some cases (especially of multiparty EMBs) by all members of the EMB, as a way of authenticating them.

Closed or Open EMB Meetings

EMB meetings that are open to the public may promote greater trust in the EMB. Where meetings are open to the public by law, it is important that the EMB publicises the dates of its meetings. Decisions taken during each meeting still need to be publicised. It is also important that the EMB cooperates with the police to ensure the maintenance of security and protocol during EMB sessions. In some cases, the law provides for EMB meetings to be open to members of the public, and/or members of the public may record or film EMB sessions provided such activities do not disrupt the proceedings.

On the other hand, EMB meetings may be closed to any person who is not a member, unless he or she attends by special invitation. Closed EMB meetings may allow more open discussion, especially on sensitive matters, and members do not have to fear public reprisal for personal views on any matter brought before the EMB. However, closed meetings reduce the transparency of EMB decision-making and can lead to public suspicions about the influences on the EMB. Any closed EMB meetings need to be followed closely by a public announcement or media conference on their deliberation and results. Posting minutes and summaries of EMB meetings on public notice boards and EMB websites can keep the public informed about the EMB’s decisions and activities.

EMB Member Committees

For EMBs with a relatively large number of members, it can be advantageous for the EMB to form committees to oversee or manage some of its activities. In some countries, the formation of such committees, responsible to the full membership of the EMB, has allowed greater specialization and concentration by EMB members on key policy tasks. They may be an advantageous means of rationalising oversight workloads during peak electoral activity periods. In a few cases, such committees have powers to co-opt non-EMB members, such as professionals from outside the EMB, or EMB secretariat staff.

Where EMB members are involved in day-to-day leadership and management of the EMB’s activities, as was the case in Indonesia in 2004, allocating specific direction and oversight tasks in this manner clarifies responsibilities and provides greater surety to secretariat staff.

EMB Members Relationships With The EMB Secretariat

In Independent and Mixed Model EMBs, the relationship between the members of the EMB and the secretariat is critical. Appropriate roles for EMB members can vary widely. EMBs made up of part-time members are more likely to adopt a more hands-off approach of providing broad policy review and oversight, whilst those with full time membership may be more directly involved. Members of Mixed Model EMBs may be less likely to be involved in detailed administration issues, and more involved in overall integrity and quality control. Especially in elections marking transitions to multiparty democracy, members of Independent Model EMBs using a public service secretariat, and members of Mixed Model EMBs, may find it prudent to assume a publicly visible operational management role to enhance the public credibility of the electoral process.

Matters that can promote an effective working relationship between EMB members and secretariat include a clear delineation of powers and tasks between members and the secretariat, clear hierarchical authority between the members and the secretariat, and competent appointments leading to mutual respect between members and secretariat. For a trusting relationship between EMB members and the secretariat, it is important, where public servants make up an Independent Model EMB’s secretariat, that they report directly and only to the EMB, not also to an outside department of government. In Mixed Model EMBs and Governmental Model EMBs, a single departmental reporting responsibility for electoral issues handled by secretariat staff is highly preferable for the same reasons.

Attendance by the head of the secretariat or his/her nominee at all EMB plenary meetings, as an invited speaker or guest (as in Indonesia), a non-voting EMB member (as in Jamaica), or an EMB members with full rights (as in Australia), reinforces the links between EMB members and secretariat and ensures that all meetings have the benefit of advice on the practical operations of the EMB.

Internal Regulations

An EMB will generally need to issue and maintain a series of regulations governing the internal functioning of its operations. These may cover administrative, financial, and technical issues, such as staff safety and security, authorizations to speak to the media, meeting procedures and standing orders, internal committees’ membership, logistics controls, purchasing, asset controls, financial disbursements, and records management. These regulations may have more impact if required to be agreed and formally issued by the members of the EMB (or chief of the secretariat in a Governmental Model EMB).

EMBs could delegate powers to make less critical internal rules to specified members of the secretariat. Distribution of these rules to all EMB members and staff (in regional/local as well as central offices) will promote adherence. Clear and enforceable sanctions for breaches of these regulations are necessary. Enforcement procedures need also to be fully and openly defined, and follow accepted principles of justice. For Governmental Model EMBs, and other EMBs using public service staff, the appropriate public service regulations may apply automatically; modification for EMB use might also be possible

Summary: EMB Composition and Roles

• Independent and Mixed Model EMBs are guided by a ‘board’ of EMB members. With very few exceptions, Governmental Model EMBs do not have EMB members, only secretariat staff.
• There is no optimal number of members of an EMB or superiority of full-time or part-time EMB membership. The size of the country and its population, economic and geo-political issues, the EMB’s powers and functions, the strength of the EMB’s secretariat, and whether the EMB follows the Independent or the Mixed Model may determine the size and work schedule of the EMB membership.
• EMB members need to have sufficient status to entitle them to respect from their counterparts in other sectors of society, and constitutional or legal guarantees of their conditions of service and security of tenure sufficient to enable them to act without fear or favour.
• Independent and Mixed Model EMBs may have a membership that is multiparty – nominated by political parties qualified to do so, or expert - politically non-aligned members appointed on the basis of their professional skills, or combined – a mixture of political and professional appointees. Each type of membership may be suitable for a country, depending on its political environment and stage of democratic development.
• Fixed and secure terms of office for EMB members allows for institutional confidence and renewal. Staggering EMB members’ terms of office minimises disruptions and assists in retaining an EMB’s institutional memory.
• A quality EMB membership selection process can be achieved by open advertising for candidates and ranking all applicants according to a transparently applied ‘fit and proper’ test. The most widely accepted procedure for EMB appointment is for one branch of government to nominate and another to confirm. This process could start with the executive or judiciary and end with the legislature or vice versa.
• Electoral law would usually specify qualifications to be an EMB member, which would generally include citizenship, good repute, ability to act impartially, and professional qualifications or knowledge. They may include other factors such as age, health, holding or not holding specified positions (particularly in relation to political party membership or leadership), and residence.
• EMB members need to develop decision-making and management mechanisms suitable for the type of EMB and the country’s management culture. They need to adopt standing orders that ensure transparent EMB meeting and decision-making processes, and internal regulations for the good administration of the EMB. It may be useful for the EMB membership to form subcommittees dealing with various aspects of electoral administration.
• A good working relationship between an EMB’s members and its secretariat is critical for the effective functioning of the EMB.