The increasing use of computer-based systems for electoral operations and management creates some additional challenges for EMB accountability. Apart from the issue of sustainability, public confidence in their accuracy and reliability needs to be assured.

Lack of any tangible transaction evidence in many computer systems, the lack of transparency and the incomprehensibility of computer programming to the bulk of the population, and the risks of interference with data that are widely publicized through media reports of computer worms, viruses, and hackers can affect the credibility of EMBs relying on computer systems for vital tasks such as voter registration, voting, and vote-counting, unless they are openly accountable for their use.

There is still intense debate about the reliability and security of computer-based systems for voting and counting of votes. Some of this debate in the USA entails the propriety of politically-aligned supplier behaviour beyond technical performance issues. Media reports of alleged integrity problems with mechanical and electronic voting machines in the USA, including with Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) ‘touch screen’ vote-recording machines (as in the state of Maryland in 2004) has increased pressure on EMBs to be open and accountable in their use of technology. These concerns led the 2005 report of the Baker-Carter Commission on Federal Electoral Reform to deal at length with concerns about electronic voting.

Measures that EMBs need to take to ensure integrity in computer-based systems include:

1. rigorous pre-implementation testing of computer systems and public release of the results of the tests;
2. use of open-source operating systems and applications, to promote transparency in the computer systems used;
3. making test versions of code for computer systems available for public comment, where open source code systems are used. For example, the Electoral Commission of the Australian Capital Territory posted proposed code for its computer-based vote recording and counting system on its web site, and invited comment from computer professionals;
4. holding of an audit-authenticated copy of the authorized code for each computer system in an independently controlled off-site location, and regular audited comparison of this with the code being used in the EMB, to detect and remove any unauthorized changes, as has been recommended in the US;
5. regular audit of computer systems, with particular attention paid to their security features;
6. ensuring that computer-based systems each leave a paper-based audit trail that can be used to verify the system’s results, as has been recommended in the US; and
7. ensuring backup systems are available in the event of computer system failure.