Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties

Almost invariably, the public media are thought to have a duty to publish or broadcast election statements by competing parties. It is generally accepted that the publicly funded media have some obligation to allow parties and candidates to communicate directly with the electorate.

Beyond that, however, there are many issues to be determined.

Paid Advertising, Free Access, or a Mixture of the Two?

It will have to be determined whether direct access by political parties will be free or paid or, as is often the case, a mixture of the two. Different rules are often adopted for print and broadcast media. Sometimes all parties are allocated free direct access but can top this up with paid advertising.

How Is the Time or Space Divided?

In a system of paid advertising, this may not be an issue - time is simply allocated to those who can pay. (Many would argue that this is why paid advertising is an unfair option.) But if direct access broadcasts are to be allocated by a regulatory body, how will this be done? What criteria have to be taken into account to divide up the available time? Is it to be done on the basis of equality - so that every party gets the same time - or equitability (fairness), whereby parties are allocated time according to the degree of popular support they enjoy. If the latter, then how is that determined? Should time be allocated on the basis of past electoral support (the number of seats currently held in parliament), opinion polls, the number of candidates standing - or some other criterion or a mixture of all of them? Different countries have adopted widely varying systems.

Timing of Slots

Will there be regulation about the times that slots are broadcast? If everyone is to get a chance to broadcast in peak time, how can slots be allocated? What order will the parties be allowed to broadcast in?

Who Pays - and Who Makes the Programme?

Will the party be responsible for making its own broadcast or will facilities be made available by the public broadcaster? And who foots the bill for the production of these spots?

Who Decides What is Broadcast?

Does the regulatory body have any say in the content of direct access broadcasts or political advertising? Can the parties say what they like? What are the limits?

Equal or Equitable Direct Access Coverage?

One of the fundamental decisions to be made in organizing direct access broadcasts by the parties is whether slots are to be allocated on the basis of equality or equity. Equality, clearly, means that every party or candidate gets the same access. Equity means that everyone gets fair access - the idea being that a party with large popular support should have more airtime than one that does not.

The Argument For Equality

Everyone gets an opportunity to put their point of view to the electorate. It will be the electorate that chooses, rather than a broadcaster or an electoral regulator. This is a simple system to administer and everyone can understand it. It is particularly attractive in a first democratic election when there is no sure way of knowing how much support the different parties have.

The Argument Against Equality

Equality gives a built-in advantage to the incumbent party, which has many other opportunities to convey its policies through the media. What equality does is to promote the no-hope opposition parties at the expense of those with a genuine possibility of ousting the ruling party. Equality may also mean that there is simply too much material being generated for the electorate to absorb. They will get bored and the direct access process may become a waste of time. Again this is likely to favour the incumbent.

Another argument against automatic equal access is that it will encourage frivolous candidates who are only interested in the free publicity.

The Argument For Equity

If direct access is allocated on a fair (or equitable) basis, this ensures that all parties are given an opportunity to speak to the electorate, roughly in proportion to their popular support. This means that the electorate gets to hear the arguments between the main contenders for office, while parties with less support also get a say (but a smaller one).

The Argument Against Equity

This system is an obstacle to the emergence of new parties, since it is always based on what support they achieved last time. And what if there was no last time? How is popular support determined in a first democratic election? The system could thus be open to abuse.

And the Answer?

There is no right or wrong answer to this problem, as can be seen by the variety of solutions in both well-established and new democracies. But the different approaches may suit different political systems better. Here are some further considerations:

• Equality may work better when there are fewer parties or candidates. When there are too many then the "cake" may have to be cut into impossibly tiny slices, or made so large that there is too much election broadcasting for anyone to take in.
• Equality may work better in a new or "transitional" democracy. This perhaps contradicts the previous point, since new democracies often have many parties (and ruling parties in new democracies may encourage this). But the point is that if there has been no previous democratic election, then there will be no commonly agreed measure of how much popular support each party has.
• Conversely, equity may work better in an established democracy where there are clear measures of past electoral support. Or are the equality advocates right, and does this just obstruct the emergence of new political alternatives?

But even these considerations are only pointers. Many established democracies - France, Italy, Denmark - allocate direct access broadcasting in the public media on the basis of equality (in at least some elections). And many new democracies - South Africa, Brazil, Namibia - have allocated time on a proportional or equitable basis.

Whichever approach is adopted, its success will depend in large measure on the credibility and impartiality of the regulating body that allocates the broadcasts. This is a very strong argument for having the political parties themselves involved in drawing up the regulations governing media and elections. Parties are more likely to be committed to a process in which they have been consulted and have contributed to designing the system.

All these arguments clearly apply primarily to criteria for allocating direct access time - that is, direct access broadcast programmes that are available free to parties. Paid political advertising, where it is allowed, will usually be on the basis that parties can have as much direct access time as they can afford (or as they are allowed within campaign spending limits). But this may not always be the case. And if limits are to be applied to paid advertising, then the same considerations of equality and equity may apply.

Equal Access for All Parties?

Many countries have allocated direct access broadcasting time on the basis of equality between the different political parties or candidates. Even so, there may be certain differences in the way that these systems work. Sometimes, for example, there may be a qualification criterion or threshold of support that must be met before equality applies.

France

The formula for allocating direct access broadcast time in the French presidential elections is one of equality for all candidates, who usually number about 14. If no clear winner emerges there is a second round run-off between the two leading candidates, and again air-time is allocated equally between them. [1]

Denmark

Denmark allocates equal time to all political parties in parliamentary elections, so long as they satisfy certain basic criteria: they must have been registered with the Ministry of the Interior, which requires that they will have collected signatures equivalent to one in 175 of the votes cast at the last election. [2]

Norway

In Norway, time is allocated equally, but again certain criteria must be met. Parties must have been represented in one of the last two parliaments, have a national organization and be fielding candidates in a majority of districts. Smaller parties that do not meet this threshold nevertheless have a short programme. [3]

Italy

The state broadcaster, RAI gives equal time to all competing parties in an election. However, private commercial broadcasters have no such obligation. [4]

Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia's first democratic election, all parties received the same allocation of broadcast time - a total of four hours over a campaign period lasting 40 days. The slots were then divided up into slices of different time lengths. The exact schedule was then determined by lots. [5]

Armenia

Armenia gave equal access to each party, but the amount was limited to five minutes for each candidate or party. This avoided the problem of information overload but perhaps created an opposite problem. Was this really enough information for the voter?

Japan

Japan has a system of equal access but with a minimum qualification threshold. In order to receive equal broadcasting time a party must field at least 12 candidates. In the Upper House, however, all candidates receive five and a half minutes of free broadcasting time.

Netherlands

The Netherlands, like Japan, has a system that is a sort of modified equality. In principle all parties have equal broadcasting time. However, the regulatory body, the Media Commissariat, may allocate extra time to parties running candidates in all electoral districts. [6]

[1] Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, "The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[2] Karen Siune, "Political Advertising in Denmark", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Gianpiero Gamaleri "Italy and the 1994 Elections: Media, Politics and the Concentration of Power", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

[5] Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries, Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

[6] Kees Brants, "The Blank Spot: Political Advertising in the Netherlands", in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Equitable (or Fair) Access for Political Parties?

If the approach of equality is rejected, there is a wider range of approaches that can be adopted in order to achieve a fair or equitable distribution of broadcasts between the parties or candidates. The main considerations are likely to be:

• a party's strength in previous elections
• the number of candidates it is fielding

There is usually a minimum allocation of time to all parties, or at least to those fielding a certain number of candidates. This is an attempt to address the criticism that an "equitable" approach is not very fair to new parties.

These calculations are more difficult to make in a presidential election, where a candidate may be standing for the first time. In Brazil, this is overcome by allocating broadcast time in the presidential election on the basis of a party's strength in parliament. In the second-round run-off, time is allocated equally.

South Africa

Broadcasting time is allocated on the basis of a combination of criteria: a minimum allocation to all parties, a portion on the basis of the number of candidates standing and a portion on the basis of past support. The latter is ordinarily measured on the basis of the number of seats held in the outgoing national and provincial legislatures. However, the Independent Broadcasting Authority may take account of opinion polls if it chooses.

Greece

The three largest parties in the previous Parliament are entitled to at least thirty-eight minutes weekly on televised programmes. Smaller parties with members in the previous Parliament are entitled to eight minutes weekly. Parties with no representation in the Parliament, but with a list of candidates in seventy-five percent of the electoral districts, are entitled to five minutes weekly. In addition, each of the three largest party is entitled to one forty-five minute broadcast.

Spain

Parties that did not win seats in the previous election have ten minutes' broadcasting time. Parties that won less than five per cent of the vote have 15 minutes' broadcasting time. Parties that won up to 20 per cent have 30 minutes and those that won more than 20 per cent have 45 minutes' broadcasting time.

United Kingdom

The formula for allocation of broadcasting time is reviewed by a committee of broadcasters and political parties at each election. It is roughly as follows: all parties fielding 50 or more candidates are allocated one free broadcast. The two main parties receive equal broadcasting time - usually about five ten-minute broadcasts. The third main party receives slightly less - usually four ten-minute slots. [1]

Israel

All parties contesting an election are given a basic allocation of 10 minutes broadcasting time. Parties that were represented in the outgoing Knesset (parliament) receive an additional three minutes for each seat they held. [2]

Turkey

All parties contesting the election are entitled to ten minutes broadcasting time. Parties with parliamentary representation may receive an additional ten minutes. In addition, the governing party is entitled to an additional 20 minutes, and the main opposition party to another ten minutes. [3]

[1] Brian Wenham "The United Kingdom: Impartial broadcasters and a Partisan Press", in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

[2] Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

[3] Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 194.

Criteria for Allocation of Direct Access Time

Applying criteria for allocating direct access broadcasts is primarily an issue when some consideration of equitability is applied, rather than simply allocating slots on an equal basis. However, in systems of "modified equality", such as in the Netherlands, the regulatory body may have some discretion to allocate additional time to the major parties.

In any system, the first criterion to be established is whether there is a qualification threshold. Even some equality-based systems (such as Denmark, Norway, and Japan) require a form of qualification - such as number of seats contested or a minimum of public signatures.

Equity systems will also have to decide on a qualification threshold. In new democracies, it is more likely that the threshold will be set low, because of the difficulty of knowing what level of popular support each party enjoys. Thus in South Africa, for example, all parties receive a minimum allocation. In long established democracies, the threshold is often higher. The threshold should usually be determined by the number of seats contested, rather than the number previously held, since the latter would be a great obstacle to the emergence of new parties. Hence in the UK, for example, the threshold is 50 contested seats - roughly seven per cent of the total.

Once the threshold has been established, the other two criteria that are usually taken into account in allocating direct access broadcasting are:

• How many seats are the parties contesting (or how many candidates are they fielding)?
• How much popular support have they enjoyed in the past?

In answering the first question, it is immediately clear that this will be determined to a considerable extent by the nature of the election and the electoral system. Presidential elections, for example, are likely to be far more equal in the allocation of broadcasting because they are generally based on a more individual competition than simply a difference of parties. Hence France allocates broadcast time in its presidential elections on a purely equal basis, although Brazil has done so on the basis of the level of parliamentary support for the candidates' parties.

In parliamentary elections, the nature of the voting system clearly determines how significant smaller parties are likely to be to the outcome, which may in turn determine what time allocation they receive. In a first-past-the-post system, a party that wins 10 per cent of the vote nationwide is likely to be completely marginal (and possibly unrepresented in parliament), while the same party in most proportional representation systems could be an important player. Thus the allocation of broadcasting time under the latter system is likely to tend towards greater equality, or at least a lower threshold for qualification.

But strangely, the classic first-past-the-post model, the United Kingdom, makes a conscious effort to compensate for the inequities of the electoral system in its allocation of time. Thus the third national party, the Liberal Democrats, which consistently receives parliamentary representation much lower than its share of the popular vote, nevertheless receives a time allocation that is actually proportionally higher not only than its number of parliamentary seats, but also than its vote.

An interesting recent approach is that developed in South Africa, a new democracy where the media regulatory body has devised a formula that:

• Gives all parties some access
• Allocates time on the basis of seats contested and presumed popular support
• Takes into account the fact that national and provincial elections are held simultaneously.

Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots

The timing of direct access slots is clearly of paramount importance. A broadcast when everyone is asleep or at work will be of little use to anyone. As with commercial advertising, everyone will aim for "prime time".

All this is obvious, yet it is surprising how often it is overlooked. In the 2000 Zimbabwe referendum campaign, the Yes vote campaign (supported by the government) almost invariably received slots at around the time of the main evening news. The No campaign had to go to court to get its own broadcasts aired - yet the ruling did not specify when these were to be aired, so they received less advantageous times.[1]

The issue may not only be when a slot is broadcast, but also what is on the other channels. In the 2000 presidential elections, Serbian television tried to reduce audiences for broadcasts by opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica by scheduling them simultaneously with a popular soap opera.

Yet the issue can be exaggerated. In Chile's 1988 plebiscite, broadcasts were deliberately put out at obscure off-peak times in order to dampen down political enthusiasm. But a population denied any active political debate for 15 years was not to be deterred and watched them eagerly.[2]

The key point is equality of access to the best slots, whenever these may be. A popular way of achieving total equality is by drawing lots - an approach that is most common when there is also equality in the amount of time allocated.

A mechanism that found favour in the past was the simultaneous broadcast of party election broadcasts on all channels. This approach has something to recommend it, but has been generally abandoned in favour of a philosophy where viewer choice is sovereign. In practice, the proliferation of television channels in many countries made it unenforceable.

A second issue is the length of broadcasts. There are two competing trends here. Traditionally, the purpose of law and regulations has been to ensure that slots are long enough for parties to get their message across.

But in the age of slick advertising and sound bites, it is increasingly felt that the 10-minute election broadcast is a thing of the past. In the United Kingdom, for example, the main parties are allocated five 10-minute slots - but only actually broadcast for five minutes of each of them. If the rules permitted they would no doubt take 10 five-minute slots, but they do not. So the parties prefer to forego half their time allocation in order not to repel the voters by going on at too great length.

In the United States, there are moves to ensure a minimum length for political advertisements in order to compel politicians to make appeals to the voters' reason rather than their emotions.

For the regulator, there are two alternative approaches. One is to specify precisely the time slot available - say a five-minute broadcast - and then it is up to the party to fill it. If they choose not to, then they lose the time not used. The second is to give an overall allocation of time that the party can then use as it chooses. The problem with the second approach is that it makes planning on the part of a broadcaster almost impossible.

A third approach might represent a compromise between the two. Parties could be given a total allocation of broadcast time in accordance with an agreed system. That time allocation could then be broken into different length time slots, allowing parties a mixture of lengthy and reasoned argument on the one hand and snappy advertising messages on the other.

[1] Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

[2] ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 16.

Who Pays for Direct Access Broadcasts?

Party election broadcasts, as distinct from political advertising, are usually described as "free". But all this means is that the parties themselves do not pay for the time that is allocated to them. This leaves unanswered two questions:

• Who does pay for the time?
• And who pays to make the programme itself?

In practice there are two possible answers to the first question: either the broadcaster is required to provide the time for free, or the government or electoral authority will purchase the time from the broadcasting company. For public broadcasters, the answers will almost always be the first. The charter or regulations governing the public broadcaster will require them to provide this service. In some cases a similar public service obligation might exist for private broadcasting licensees. But in the latter case it is more common that a supervisory body will buy the time on the parties' behalf. This is what happens in Mexico, for example, where the Federal Electoral Institute buys and allocates 15 minutes a month of television and radio time for each party.

The second question - who pays for the programme itself - is altogether more complex. Usually, the answer is the party, although this in itself may be constrained by legal limits on campaign spending. Costs can be kept relatively low by the use of sympathetic personnel - most famously the Hollywood film directors John Schlesinger, Hugh Hudson and Mike Newell, who have made party election broadcasts for the main parties in Britain (although in each case the saving on the director's fee was probably more than offset by the high production costs).

If the party makes its own election broadcasts, this clearly favours the richer parties. This led South Africa's Independent Broadcasting Authority to prohibit television slots in 1999 on the basis that smaller parties could not afford to make them.

The alternative solution is for the public broadcaster to put production facilities at the parties' disposal. This was the approach in the early days of party political broadcasts, which were studio-bound and really just an extension of the old-fashioned ministerial address to camera. It has been revived in transitional democracies where new parties are unlikely to have either the funds or expertise to produce their own broadcasts.

Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?

In certain circumstances – especially transitional elections in poorer countries – political parties may have no facilities to make their own election broadcasts. A well-designed system will take account of this, making sure that parties have easy access to private or (more likely) public broadcasting studios where they can plan and record their material.

In Mozambique in 1994, a number of parties did not have the facilities to make their own election broadcasts and were unaware of the procedures for providing video cassettes to the broadcaster. The result was that their slots went out with a blank screen, or at most a caption urging viewers to vote for the party. [1]

In the Polish elections of 1990, by contrast, state-owned Polish television provided facilities for the parties to produce their broadcasts according to strictly defined criteria. It made available a studio for recording, or a camera team consisting of three technicians and a journalist. (The parties could decide not to have the journalist if they felt that his or her presence would compromise their own editorial control of the broadcast.) The role of the team was purely technical:

Any technical assistance rendered by Polish Television staff which has a bearing on the substantive contents of the broadcast may take place only in the presence of a member of the candidate's staff. Proper note of this must be entered into the production log.

The candidate's staff were allowed to be present at any time during the recording, editing or post-production phases of preparing the broadcast. [2]

[1] Diana Cammack, Election reporting: a practical guide to media monitoring, ARTICLE 19, London 1998, p. 4.

[2] Karol Jakubowicz, "Poland and the 1993 Election Campaign: Following the Line of Least Resistance" in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Direct Access in Referenda

In a referendum or plebiscite, many of the complex questions related to allocating of broadcasting time fall away. The choice is a straight yes or no. Since the question will not have been asked before, there can be no question of taking into account previous voter opinion on the matter. Equality and equity coincide: both sides should have equal time to put across their arguments.

This was the conclusion of the UN Technical Team on the 1993 Malawi Referendum:

In the case of government-owned media it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides.[1]

Such also was the practice in, for example, the 1988 Chile plebiscite on the restoration of democracy.

However, things may be slightly more complex. Commonly, more than one party may line up on each side of the referendum debate – indeed, sometimes parties may be divided within themselves. Who, then, has a right to speak for each side?

In 1979, a Scottish court had to determine just such an issue in a referendum on devolution of political power. Both the main UK parties were divided on the issue, with members campaigning for both sides in the referendum debate. Broadly speaking, three main parties in Scotland lined up in favour of devolution and one against. The court concluded, nevertheless, that the Yes and No camps should have equal time - party support was irrelevant.[2]

Yet more complex issues will arise if different groups support the same proposition in a referendum but from a different perspective and organized in different campaigns. In that case, some of the normal allocation criteria used in elections will have to be brought into play to determine how much broadcasting time each group is allocated. However, the overall principle of equality between the two sides will not be affected.

[1] Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 27.

[2] Wilson v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, 1979 SLT 279.