Investigations

Where voter fraud is suspected, intensive investigations would generally be undertaken after the close of voting. The framework within which these investigations take place would be determined by the legal provisions relating to challenges to election outcomes and investigation and prosecution of voter fraud. The methods by which the electoral management body responds to any responsibilities given to it under the legal framework will be governed by its management framework for dispute and challenge resolution.

Electoral Management Body Responsibilities

While decisions on and conduct of prosecutions of voter fraud would generally, and more appropriately, is the responsibility of civil law enforcement authorities, the electoral management body requires systems in place to fulfil two specific responsibilities:

• Detect and document all attempted cases of voter fraud, so that suspected perpetrators may be identified and subject to the appropriate processes under electoral or other legislation and regulations;
• Determine, if at all possible before the finalisation of counts and the announcement of election results, if the extent of any detected fraud regarding voting is sufficient to have a possible effect on the results of any election.

Election Challenges

All results of electoral management body investigations into suspected cases of voter fraud must be made public as swiftly and in as open and transparent a manner as possible.

This will maintain confidence in the integrity of the election management system and allow challenges to the election results by political participants or by the electoral management authority itself.

(For further discussion of challenges to election results, see Management of Challenges and Complaints.)

If the extent of fraud detected is sufficient to have possibly affected an election's results, the electoral management body itself making application to the relevant judicial authorities that an election be set aside will aid in projecting the image of the electoral management authority's vigilance, professionalism, and integrity in the face of attempts to manipulate election outcomes.

Security of Materials

Where investigations of suspected voter fraud are undertaken prior to the expiration of any period for challenging an election's results, care must be taken in handling any relevant ballot materials.

They should be maintained in a secure area, and the unsealing and resealing (when not in use) of relevant materials into their packages should be scrupulously undertaken and witnessed.

Strict care must be taken during investigations that no markings are placed on any election materials used during voting.

Multiple Voting

Detection and investigations of multiple voting will depend on:

• The integrity, accuracy, and sophistication of methods used to compile voters lists;
• Whether, to enhance accessibility, voters have a choice of voting locations or methods which they use, and whether each voting location and method uses a unique voters list to establish voter eligibility;
• The strictness of voter identity controls at voting locations;
• The quality and accuracy of voting records maintained, and the professionalism of voting station officials in strictly applying voter identification requirements, marking of voters lists, and enforcing ballot issue controls;
• The integrity and comprehensiveness of system and access controls on computer systems or other machines used for vote recording or result calculation.

Where there are no strict controls against duplicate entries on voters’ lists (for example a lack of thorough identity checks prior to being registered, and/or of systems for automatically deleting the previous entry in the voter’s register when registration is updated under continuous voter registration systems), the potential for multiple voting is high.

If election frameworks do not compel unique voters’ lists for every voting location and method, detection of multiple voting will require the implementation of systems to enable consolidations of the records of all voters who cast votes, and examination of this consolidation to determine if more than one ballot has been cast in any voter's name.

Where different types of identity cards may be produced to verify voter identity, additional controls, such as marking the voter with non-removable ink, will be required.

If voters’ lists are not used for an election, it will be difficult to investigate, or even detect, multiple voting.

Suspected Multiple Voting

Multiple voting could be suspected where voting show:

• during ballot paper reconciliations, greater numbers of ballots cast at a voting location than names marked off the voters lists for that location;
• during any consolidation of voting records (e.g., of votes cast in a foreign country, or absentee votes with voting station attendance records, where separate voter registers for each method of voting are not maintained) the same voter is detected as having voted by different methods in different locations.

Documentation and Investigation of Apparent Multiple Voting

Documentation of suspected multiple voting cases for assessment and further investigation by civil law authorities should show:

• the location of places where multiple voting is suspected to have occurred and relevant statements from voting station staff at these locations;
• complete and accurate records of ballot or system reconciliations to voter numbers. if it is suspected that ballots have been illegally introduced into ballot boxes, or computer/machine voting systems;
• certified copies of voters lists and other documents (e.g., voter eligibility declarations for mail, absentee, or other special ballots) indicating that a voter may have cast more than one ballot.

Preliminary investigation before referral to civil law authorities should be thorough and tactful. There may well be instances where errors by voting station officials, or confusion, particularly on the part of elderly or less-literate voters faced with multiple methods of voting, rather than any fraud, were the cause of apparent instances of multiple voting.

Impersonation

A voter casting one or more ballots in the name of other voters, when not authorised by any proxy voting provisions to do so, is difficult to detect after the event. The best defence against it is accurate voters’ lists combined with rigorous voter identity integrity controls within each voting location  and insistence on voters marking their ballots individually and in secrecy.

Impersonation, however, may be suspected and should be investigated in cases where:

• inaccuracies in voters registers have allowed deceased persons' names to have remained on the registers, and people have voted in their names;
• voter registration systems allow persons known to be in distant locations or out of the country to remain registered at their former address, and their names have been marked on voters lists as having voted in their former locality of residence;
• mail ballots have been apparently completed by a person other than the voter to whom they were officially provided;
• voters have been challenged as to their identity in a voting station, and election systems allow them to cast a sealed ballot pending further investigation.

Impersonation in voting by mail may be detected on checking voter eligibility/identity statements accompanying the returned mail ballots and discovering difference in details or handwriting from mail ballot application or vote registration applications.

Similarly, irregularities may be detected where a number of mail ballots originate from the same location (e.g., aged persons' nursing institutions, armed forces bases, hospitals) bearing similar handwriting.

All such occurrences should be carefully and tactfully investigated by voting operations administrators prior to any referral to civil law authorities. As with multiple voting, voting station official error could be the cause of seemingly irregular voting patterns.

Documentation provided to civil law authorities for further investigation would normally include:

• certified copies of any relevant voters’ lists;
• certified copies of challenged voters' statements and relevant death certificates, ballots, statements accompanying mail or other special ballots;
• statements by voting station officials and other witnesses.