In recent years, far too many elections have ended with the major protagonists at loggerheads over bitterly disputed results and with conflict spilling onto the streets. Cries of fraud are heard frequently, especially among the losers in tight winner-take-all presidential races. Protests challenging election outcomes have broken out in locales as diverse as Caracas, Harare, Kabul, and Kuala Lumpur. Accusations of vote rigging are particularly common in countries whose histories of electoral malpractice—vote buying in Mexico, media bias in Russia, or intercommunal violence in Nigeria, for example—have weakened the public’s confidence in the integrity of elections.

Even established democracies are not immune to electoral controversy: After questions were raised about the 2012 U.S. elections, a new bipartisan presidential commission was set up to explore ways of strengthening election administration in that country. So there is reason to be concerned not only about disputed elections that make headlines and have far-reaching and sometimes deadly consequences. Even in countries where election results are generally accepted both at home and abroad, the quality of the contests may vary in significant ways.

How do we determine whether or not an election has met international standards, let alone assess its overall quality? This is a pressing issue for practitioners, who not only must make such determinations but must decide, based on the evidence, what types of interventions would most effectively improve elections in a particular country facing a par-
ticular set of problems—for example, Afghanistan might need policies aimed at reducing vote fraud, while Kenya might need greater security at polling places.

Evaluating the quality of elections is equally important for political scientists striving to classify regimes more precisely. They need to be able to distinguish autocracies that permit superficial competition and manipulated elections from states that are more clearly moving toward democratic contests that would allow alternation between governing and opposition parties. Scholars of comparative politics, voting behavior, electoral systems, and security studies would all benefit from more nuanced and reliable election assessments.

Election evaluations have generally come from a few main sources: election-observation missions, the media, broader measurements of democracy (such as Freedom House and Polity IV scores), and field experiments and election postmortems. While all these sources have strengths, each also has limitations and flaws.

Observer missions of regional bodies such as the Organization of American States, the African Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe do their best to provide systematic and authoritative assessments of the quality of elections. Guidelines for such missions were laid out by the United Nations in the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which sought to establish agreed-upon standards and norms for credible observation activities. Yet the number of observer groups has multiplied in recent years, and many do not adhere to these uniform standards. As a result, different observer missions' evaluations will sometimes sharply disagree, as a recent study by International IDEA found.

Some media reports evaluate elections. But do such reports constitute reliable, independent evidence? The more repressive regimes tend to muzzle critical coverage and keep the courts and electoral authorities in their pockets. Even in more open contexts, however, journalists may have partisan leanings, their opinions swayed by political scandals, or they may be too close to the whirlwind of election disputes to have an objective perspective on the contest.

What other sources are available to help determine the quality of an election? Given that elections are central to democracy, scholars often use indirect yardsticks such as the Polity IV measures of democracy and autocracy or Freedom House’s political-rights and civil-liberty scores. But can either really be considered reliable proxies for the quality of elections? After all, even some long-established democracies have in recent years experienced major problems with electoral integrity—for example, allegations of voter suppression and voter fraud in the United States, the “robocall” scandal in Canada, and security flaws in the administration of postal voting in the United Kingdom.

We can also learn about the quality of elections from “election au-
topsies” conducted using such forensic evidence as vote shares and turnout rates in specific polling places, although statisticians continue to dispute the most appropriate indicators. Likewise, field experiments are becoming increasingly common in political science, especially to determine the effects of specific interventions on preventing ballot fraud and dishonest vote counts. Though such investigations are rigorous in determining causality, it remains difficult to generalize from their results. The absence of vote fraud is only one dimension of the far broader concept of electoral integrity, and many aspects of an election can be manipulated by the government well before the final stages of the process—for example, by restricting access to the ballot box, gerrymandering boundaries, and limiting the opposition’s access to the media.

The Electoral Integrity Project

In early 2013, the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) launched a new pilot study seeking to provide a more systematic and comprehensive source of independent evidence that would make possible authoritative and rigorous assessments of the quality of elections worldwide. The EIP was developed by a team of scholars from the University of Sydney and Harvard University, led by Pippa Norris, in conjunction with an international advisory board and many partner organizations in the international community.

Together with Jørgen Elklit of Aarhus University and Andrew Reynolds of the University of North Carolina, the EIP developed an expert survey of “perceptions of electoral integrity” as a way to gather evidence for the pilot study. The natural sciences have been using expert surveys for years. Pooling expert knowledge is common practice when dealing with difficult and controversial issues where other sources of comparative evidence are lacking. This is the method that Transparency International uses to compile its well-known Perception of Corruption Index.

The EIP’s pilot study on electoral integrity, conducted in April and May 2013, focused on twenty independent nation-states around the world that had held national presidential or parliamentary elections during the previous six months (between 1 July and 31 December 2012). This group includes a diverse array of societies and regime types, ranging from Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States on the one hand, to Belarus, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone on the other. The list of contests is presented in an appendix that appears on the Journal of Democracy website.

For each country, the project identified around forty election experts—social scientists who, through their work, had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country. The selection
### Table 1—Measuring Dimensions of the Electoral Cycle in the PEI Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Election</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. Electoral Laws | 1-1. Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties (N)  
                    1-2. Electoral laws favored the governing party or parties (N)  
                    1-3. Election laws restricted citizens’ rights (N) |
| 2. Electoral Procedures | 2-1. Elections were well managed (P)  
                              2-2. Information about voting procedures was widely available (P)  
                              2-3. Election officials were fair (P)  
                              2-4. Elections were conducted in accordance with the law (P) |
| 3. Boundaries    | 3-1. Boundaries discriminated against some parties (N)  
                    3-2. Boundaries favored incumbents (N)  
                    3-3. Boundaries were impartial (P) |
| 4. Voter Registration | 4-1. Some citizens were not listed in the register (N)  
                                 4-2. The electoral register was inaccurate (N)  
                                 4-3. Some ineligible electors were registered (N) |
| 5. Party Registration | 5-1. Some opposition candidates were prevented from running (N)  
                                   5-2. Women had equal opportunities to run for office (P)  
                                   5-3. Ethnic and national minorities had equal opportunities to run for office (P)  
                                   5-4. Only top party leaders selected candidates (N)  
                                   5-5. Some parties/candidates were restricted from holding campaign rallies (N) |
| **Campaign**    |                                                                           |
| 6. Campaign Media | 6-1. Newspapers provided balanced election news (P)  
                                 6-2. TV news favored the governing party (N)  
                                 6-3. Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising (P)  
                                 6-4. Journalists provided fair coverage of the elections (P)  
                                 6-5. Social media were used to expose electoral fraud (P) |
| 7. Campaign Finance | 7-1. Parties/candidates had equitable access to public subsidies (P)  
                                    7-2. Parties/candidates had equitable access to political donations (P)  
                                    7-3. Parties/candidates publish transparent financial accounts (P)  
                                    7-4. Rich people buy elections (N)  
                                    7-5. Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning (N) |
| **Election Day**|                                                                           |
| 8. Voting Process | 8-1. Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls (N)  
                                  8-2. Some fraudulent votes were cast (N)  
                                  8-3. The process of voting was easy (P)  
                                  8-4. Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box (P)  
                                  8-5. Postal ballots were available (P)  
                                  8-6. Special voting facilities were available for the disabled (P)  
                                  8-7. National citizens living abroad could vote (P)  
                                  8-8. Some form of Internet voting was available (P) |
| **Post-Election**|                                                                           |
| 9. Vote Count    | 9-1. Ballot boxes were secure (P)  
                                 9-2. The results were announced without undue delay (P)  
                                 9-3. Votes were counted fairly (P)  
                                 9-4. International election monitors were restricted (N)  
                                 9-5. Domestic election monitors were restricted (N) |
| 10. Post-Election | 10-1. Parties/candidates challenged the results (N)  
                                   10-2. The election led to peaceful protests (N)  
                                   10-3. The election triggered violent protests (N)  
                                   10-4. Any disputes were resolved through legal channels (P) |
| 11. Electoral Authorities | 11-1. The election authorities were impartial (P)  
                                        11-2. The authorities distributed information to citizens (P)  
                                        11-3. The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance (P)  
                                        11-4. The election authorities performed well (P) |

sought to include a roughly equal balance between international and domestic experts. We then asked the selected experts to complete an online survey. In total, the EIP received completed responses from 226 specialists—just under a third (30 percent) of those contacted.

The EIP defines electoral integrity according to agreed-upon international conventions and global norms that apply universally to all countries worldwide and cover each stage of the election cycle—the preelection period, the campaign, election day itself, and the postelection period.8 To measure this concept, the EIP questionnaire included 49 items about electoral integrity during each stage of the electoral cycle (see Table 1). These items fell into eleven sequential dimensions. Efforts to detect fraud—say, by using the presence of observers to deter ballot-stuffing, vote-rigging, and the manipulation of results—generally take place during the final stages of the voting process. But intervening this late in the game may be as inefficient as patting your pocket after the pickpocket has already run off with your wallet. As indicated in Andreas Schedler’s “menu of manipulation,”9 the notion of an electoral cycle suggests that shortcomings in even one step of the sequence, or one link in the chain, can undermine electoral integrity.

The 49 electoral-integrity items in the survey were recoded so that higher scores consistently represent more positive evaluations. Missing data was estimated based on mean substitution of the national score. The items were then summed and standardized to 100 points in order to generate the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index. To allow for more accurate and detailed analysis, the EIP also generated indices for each of the eleven dimensions in the electoral cycle.

How does electoral integrity compare across the countries and elections in the pilot study? The Figure below shows the standardized summary PEI Index. Overall, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and South Korea ranked highest in the study. Each had held recent elections that election observers and the media regarded to be without major flaws. At the same time, elections in Belarus, Angola, Kuwait, and the Republic of Congo—the bottom four in our index—were found by observers to be of poor quality. In Belarus, two parties boycotted the September 2012 parliamentary elections, two others withdrew their candidates citing a flawed process, and jailed opposition leaders remained imprisoned. International observer missions reported that they were restricted in their work in Belarus and said that the vote process lacked transparency.10 In Angola’s August 2012 parliamentary elections—the second since the end of a protracted civil war—the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won three-quarters of the vote. Human Rights Watch accused Angola’s government of “numerous incidents of political violence, intimidation of protesters, and crackdowns on peaceful demonstrations.”11 There were few international observers on the ground, but some who were there reported uneven media
coverage and misuse of state resources during the campaign, although African Union observers were more generous in their assessment.

The United States ranks sixth among the countries in our pilot study, slightly higher than Mexico and slightly below several newer democracies. Thus one interesting finding is that the length of a society’s experience with democratic elections is not necessarily an accurate predictor of the perceived quality of contemporary elections.

What were the key factors driving these results? Overly simple “pass-fail” judgments are of little use to reformers seeking to strengthen electoral processes. The underlying issues will most certainly be far from uniform. In other words, the causes of electoral violence in fragile states with a recent history of civil war will not be the same as the causes of flaws in states that abuse human rights and repress opposition parties or in democracies plagued by vote buying and media bias. Any precise diagnosis must dig deeper than the simple blanket judgments that are so prevalent in headlines. The main innovation of the PEI Index is that it allows for detailed scrutiny of the eleven dimensions of electoral integrity as well as the 49 specific survey items.

Table 2 on page 131 presents more fine-grained assessments of countries’ performances in each of the eleven dimensions. To summarize the comparisons across each of the 100-point standardized scales, the EIP categorized mean assessments below 49 as low in integrity; those from 50 to 74 as moderate; and those over 75 as high.
In many countries, issues of campaign finance were regarded as most problematic, with more than half the elections seen as poorly conducted. The survey included questions about whether parties and candidates had equitable access to public subsidies and political donations, whether parties’ and candidates’ accounts were transparent and published, whether state resources were improperly used for campaigning, and whether “the rich buy elections.” There has been little progress in establishing minimal international standards for regulating campaign finance, although several regional agencies have sought to develop practical guidelines.

Similarly, when asked whether newspapers provided fair coverage, whether television news favored the governing party, and whether parties and candidates had equal access to political broadcasts and advertising, experts highlighted unbalanced media coverage as an area of concern. The international community has tried to improve media standards, for example by building journalists’ capacity for reporting elections, expanding Internet access, and strengthening access-to-information laws. As with campaign finance, however, there is no regulatory framework for ensuring fair coverage.

The results also highlight specific problems occurring in particular countries, notably the partisan and decentralized nature of gerrymandering district boundaries in the United States (earning the country its lowest score), problems of the voting process in Venezuela, and uneven media coverage and campaign-finance issues in Romania. Thus the PEI Index and the dimensional scores help to highlight the particular problems in each country that experts identified as deserving special attention by domestic stakeholders and the international community. Further work is needed to establish the precise causes of such flaws, however, and to determine how to remedy the situation before the next contest.

Reliable Evidence?

Just as the reports of international observer missions and media outlets are open to challenge, so are the reliability and validity of the expert survey. How do we know whether the PEI Index and its dimensions generate valid and reliable measures? Given that the project is still at the pilot-study stage, further development is necessary to expand the number of countries included, improve the expert response rate, and revise the research design. The PEI survey aims ultimately to cover national presidential and parliamentary elections in every country that holds multiparty contests. Nevertheless, even at this preliminary stage, several tests lend confidence to the utility of the new PEI Index. As with any index, it is important to test for external validity (with independent sources of evidence), internal validity (consistency within the group of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Low 50–74</th>
<th>Moderate 75–100</th>
<th>High 76–100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

experts), and legitimacy (to what extent the results can be regarded as authoritative by stakeholders).

**External validity.** For external validity, we must check whether the PEI expert survey is yielding results similar to those produced by independent sources. A perfect correlation with existing indices should not be expected, not least due to variations arising from differences in the underlying concepts and measurement instruments, data sources, and time periods. Still, it would raise questions if the PEI survey results diverged dramatically from the closest equivalent measures. Overall, there is substantial agreement between the PEI Index and the 2012 Freedom House political-rights and civil-liberties scores standardized to a 100-point scale (the Pearson correlation is $R= 0.866$ Sig. .001). There are a few outliers, however, including Kuwait’s December 2012 parliamentary elections, which the PEI ranks slightly higher than Freedom House rates the country, and Ukraine’s October 2012 parliamentary elections, which PEI ranks slightly lower than the Freedom House political-rights and civil-liberties scores for Ukraine.

Clearly, Freedom House’s index includes many aspects of political rights and civil liberties that extend beyond elections (such as freedom of the press, freedom of association, and the rule of law), so a perfect correlation with electoral integrity would not be expected or indeed desirable. Despite different time periods, methods, and concepts, there is a similar level of congruence between PEI other independent indices, including Judith Kelley’s 2012 Quality of Elections scale ($R= 0.640$ Sig. .004), Yale’s NELDA (National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy) data ($R= 0.694$ Sig. .001), and the University of Essex’s Electoral Malpractice Index ($R= -0.869$ Sig. .001). It may be hard to define and measure electoral integrity, but it does appear that expert judgments display considerable agreement.

**Internal validity.** Using the PEI survey, we can test the internal validity of the dataset by examining the degree of congruence among different types of experts. For example, do the assessments of international and domestic experts largely agree? Does it matter whether they are located on the left or right of the political spectrum or if they supported the winners or losers in a contest? Do the evaluations of young and older, male and female experts tend to agree? We must answer these questions in order to gauge the consistency of expert judgments and to hone the expert-selection process for the future.

The PEI survey collected information on all these background variables. The simplest way to test these propositions is to use OLS (ordinary least squares) regression analysis to predict responses at the individual level on the 100-point PEI Index. Among the factors that proved significant was sex—male experts were far more critical in their perceptions of electoral integrity than were women. Length of time living in the country also proved important, as longtime residents tended to
have more positive perceptions. At the same time, however, the expert’s nationality and citizenship were not significant. Reassuringly, political ideology (across the left-right spectrum) was insignificant, as were age and education. We could also check whether supporters of the losing side were more critical than were those who backed the winners, though many respondents did not answer this question (either because they had not participated in the election or because they were unwilling to disclose their support). Among those who did, however, backers of the losing side were significantly more negative in their assessments, as expected.

**Legitimacy.** Some might argue that even if the so-called experts agree with one another and with the independent evidence, their judgments are still not a legitimate reflection of public opinion in each country. Indeed, due to their educational training, exposure to global communications, and elite status, these experts’ judgments may well display a “Western” or “liberal” bias. Previous studies have observed a gap between the judgments of international observers and Russian public opinion, for example.\(^{15}\) To test this claim, we can examine the level of congruence between expert assessments and mass indices of electoral integrity. To this end, the EIP added a battery of items to the sixth round of the World Values Survey. As a result, we have nine questions that were identical in popular and expert surveys with which to make direct comparisons.

The results demonstrate that experts and the general publics in the countries under study overwhelmingly agree in their evaluations of electoral integrity. The degree of congruence is actually quite remarkable (R= 0.896), given all the reasons why expert opinions might be expected to differ from those of the masses. Further tests are needed once more societies can be compared across both surveys, but the initial five-nation results suggest that expert evaluations closely match popular opinion about elections in these countries.

**The Need for Credible Evaluations**

More and more countries have adopted direct multiparty elections for legislative and executive office over the years, and the international community has invested considerable resources and technical assistance in support of the electoral process in developing democracies. During the early 1990s, it was commonly assumed that holding direct multiparty elections would be a major step in the transition toward democracy, and this idea persists in contemporary journalistic commentary—for example, regarding the recent changes in the Arab world. Democratic setbacks during the past decade have tempered the initial heady optimism that characterized the 1990s, however, and a growing literature on regime transitions has identified competitive authoritarianism as a major
type of regime. While such regimes hold nominally multiparty elections, the outcomes are marred by infractions of international standards. The fig leaf of elections too often masks one-party-dominant systems. It is therefore important for scholars to develop more precise and rigorous indicators for identifying when, where, and why elections fail to meet international standards—indicators that go beyond rather impressionistic “thumbs up or thumbs down” judgments.

It is equally or even more important for practitioners to have reliable and credible evaluations of the quality of elections. Practitioners need such a tool for determining priorities, diagnosing problems, and coming up with effective solutions. The larger Electoral Integrity Project is using many different methods and techniques to assess the quality of elections. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index is an important component that we hope will contribute to better assessments. The PEI Index provides a rigorous, independent, and standardized assessment that is particularly useful for cross-national comparisons. It has another key advantage—it can be disaggregated in considerable detail to reflect different concerns and concepts. The dataset is freely available for secondary analysis on the EIP website. Given that the index demonstrates external and internal validity as well as congruence with popular opinion, researchers can be confident in the data therein. As the study expands to include more countries and contests over a longer time span, more and more users will be able to take advantage of this new and important tool.

NOTES


5. See, for example, Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


7. All details about the Electoral Integrity Project and the dataset from the survey can be found at www.electoralintegrityproject.com.


