Lessons Learned: Integrated Electoral Assistance in UN Mission Settings

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The lessons learned exercised was conceptualized and managed by a joint Working Group on UN Integrated Electoral Assistance, formed by Aleida Ferreyra of the Democratic Governance Group, UNDP, Elizabeth Moorsmith of the Electoral Assistance Division, DPA, and Herbert Loret of the Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, DPKO. The Working Group provided strategic guidance and assistance throughout the research, setting the parameters for the study in a Concept Note and then providing support in arranging interviews, and providing guidance and feedback on drafts.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty years, United Nations assistance to post-conflict electoral processes has engaged a full array of UN capacities and actors. Perhaps the largest scale, most complex and most visible exercises, have been electoral processes supported by the Security Council. Outside the seven elections studied here, these experiences range from Cambodia to Liberia, the Balkans to Afghanistan, and Haiti. A review of Comprehensive Peace Agreements in the period 1990-2006, showed that elections were the most common provision, appearing in nearly 95% of agreements. The perspective of holding elections has become one of the most widely used incentives to end violent conflict, with the prospect of re-distributing power and legitimately re-establishing executive and legislative arms of a post-conflict state. With elections playing pivotal functions in peace processes, the impact of direct UN support to them and support to the political and security enabling environment, are key issues.

Many of these internationally-assisted war-to-peace transitions have seen the transformation of parties to a conflict to registered political parties. In very insecure environments, there have been remarkably high levels of participation in national voter registration drives and in voting itself. In many cases participation has included refugees voting overseas, or – such as with internally displaced persons – returning to their communities of origin to register and vote. Soon after their return, disarmed and demobilized former combatants may have also returned to the same communities. As these transitions progress, and with risk of relapse into violence ever-present, successful electoral processes have also become a means to measure and benchmark the consolidation of state authority. They have been a key measure of peace consolidation and, for some, ‘the exit strategy,’ signaling sufficient stability to warrant downsizing and exit of armed UN and other Council-mandated military and police.

In providing electoral assistance in these Mission settings, the UN is asked to manage and prioritize political, security, technical and logistical imperatives in fast changing political and conflict environments. The art of UN integration is to bring UN capacities to bear to achieve common strategic outcomes. This is done by maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN presence at the country level, including through minimizing duplication and optimizing available logistical, human, and financial resources to meet the combined aims and mandates of the various components of the UN presence.

Electoral assistance in post-conflict settings is at the intersection of humanitarian, peace and security, and development assistance, with a corresponding host of national and international actors involved in support, or at least impacted by the outcome of an election. An integrated approach to electoral assistance in a mission setting, where multiple UN actors (mission and country team) have a mandate and role to provide electoral assistance, requires that all partners agree to work in a coordinated and complimentary way to achieve a common vision and objectives.

The cases studied in this report show that integrating UN electoral assistance poses unique challenges when opposing national political actors seek explicitly different

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strategic outcomes through that ballot and its accompanying political process. With the Security Council directly mandating the UN Mission, and the UN funds, programs and agencies receiving global mandates from other UN Member State bodies, UN mission and electoral leaders were confronted with particularly high levels of national political and UN institutional complexity. This study seeks to provide recommendations on improving Integrated Electoral Assistance (IEA), to shed light on innovations and ultimately to improve UN assistance and national electoral processes in countries on the agenda of the Security Council.

1.1 Executive Summary

The research: This Lessons Learned Study on UN Integrated Electoral Assistance (IEA) was initiated by the United Nations Development Programme’s Bureau for Development Policy’s Democratic Governance Group (UNDP/BDP/DGG), the Department of Political Affairs’ Electoral Assistance Division (DPA/EAD) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ Peacekeeping Best Practices Service (DPKO/PBPS).\(^3\) In twenty years of practice, it is the first lessons learned research on how, or how not, electoral assistance has been integrated. The study follows the first ever UN IEA policy, namely the UN Secretary-General (SG) decision agreed at an October 2010 UN Policy Committee meeting that discussed effective electoral assistance.\(^4\) The SG’s Decision also mandated DPA and UNDP, consulting all relevant partners, to “develop a complete set of UN system-wide electoral policy and best practice documents within two years based on principles including sustainability, cost-effectiveness, national ownership, and strengthening human rights.”

Evidence for the research was primarily collected from 145 interviews of UN and non-UN staff between November 2011 and April 2012. Additionally there was an on-line survey with 164 respondents and relevant documentation was also studied. The research looked into how the UN has integrated electoral assistance in Mission settings, specifically in seven electoral processes in six countries listed here:

- Democratic Republic of Congo, 2006 National elections
- Timor-Leste, 2007 National elections
- Iraq, 2010 Parliamentary elections
- Sudan, 2010 General elections (12 in total)
- Burundi, 2010 General elections (5 in total)
- Cote D’Ivoire, 2010 Presidential elections
- Southern Sudan, 2011 Referendum

The case studies, all representing Security Council mandated electoral assistance in a conflict or post-conflict setting, reflect vastly different Peacekeeping Operations, Special Political Missions and United Nations Country Teams (PKOs, SPMs and UNCTs) in countries in very different stages of a conflict cycle, political settlement, peacebuilding and democratic development. National elections in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2006, Cote D’Ivoire 2010 and Sudan 2010 were first post-conflict elections. The Timor-Leste 2007 elections were fourth national elections but the first that national electoral organs were responsible for, and took on characteristics of first post-conflict elections following relapse into violence and crisis the year before. The 2010 elections in

\(^3\) Informally, the origins of this study came from a view that in Sudan (general elections cycle 2008-2010) HQ did not support the field with sufficient guidance and best practices on IEA.
\(^4\) SG Decision 2010/23, Effective electoral assistance, 12 October 2010, Para (iii)
Iraq were their second parliamentary elections and their sixth elections since 2003, and Burundi was in its second electoral cycle since the Arusha peace process. The Southern Sudan referendum in 2011 led to creation of the first new state in Africa since 1993, and the second globally since Timor-Leste independence in 2002. Five of the seven elections took place in an 11-month period, March 2010 – January 2011.

In order to advocate for a one UN approach, the study looked at policy changes impacting IEA in the last twenty years. It aimed to provide an overview of common findings across IEA experiences between PKOs, SPMs and UNCTs, and to provide recommendations to electoral practitioners, mission planners and decision makers in DPA, DPKO and UNDP and others, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN’s assistance in specifically Mission settings. The overall objective is to identify policy and practice that could be developed for future cases.

**Key findings:** As with the integration agenda more broadly, the aim of integrating UN electoral assistance is to help the UN family to deliver assistance as one. By integrating electoral assistance the UN seeks to manage the different global mandates, legislative bodies, cultures and administrative systems between different UN entities. The Security Council deploys PKOs and SPMs in vastly different circumstances, and UN configurations are equally diverse. Likewise every post-conflict electoral process and configuration of national political and institutional actors is unique. The outcome of UN integrated structures and methods should be to coherently meet requests from those national authorities to support their electoral processes, and to implement Security Council electoral assistance mandates.

The study showed that there is not as broad a gap in the integration of UN electoral assistance mandates, cultures, approaches and vision among the different agencies. Across the case studies in the last seven years, as well as in survey results, the study found a healthy degree of creative learning and adaptation within and between countries in UN Mission settings. This includes elections taking place before and after the SG’s 2008 UN Integration policy and the SG’s 2010 UN IEA. Annex 1 to this report provides a checklist of emerging key ingredients and conditions for IEA in these settings to assist planners and decision-makers consider the options best suited to their national circumstances. Throughout the report, specific recommendations are in bold text. Key recommendations are included below and more detailed recommendations on sustainability and knowledge management are provided in Annex 6, and a list of all findings from the seven case studies is at Annex 7.

Where specific conditions in each case study country primarily drove the UN’s decisions on IEA structures and methods, four general problems were identified. **First,** while new SG decisions on Integration and on IEA were welcomed by interviewees, most learning and adaptation has been ad hoc or accidental, largely as a result of the lack of comprehensive and clearly defined policies. **Second,** many misunderstandings began from poor knowledge, a lack of trust, and inaccurate perceptions, between and within parts of the UN in headquarters and in the field. The near or complete absence of collective outreach or training from UN headquarters on UN policy and practice on integration has contributed to these misunderstandings and, in some cases, it has engendered competition instead of collaboration in the field.

**Third,** while the seven cases studied did receive at least some guidance on broader UN

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5SG Decision 2008/24, *Integration,* 26 June 2008; SG Decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010
integration policy and practice, they received little to no explicit IEA policy and guidance. Lastly, electoral processes are not solely technical processes, and in countries on the Security Council’s agenda, greater attention needs to be given to integrating political, security and technical perspectives. The post-conflict elections studied showed that efforts to move as fast as possible to secure the environment for and organize elections invariably led to election administration shortcuts. The shortcuts may have improved the delivery of the election and acceptance of results, but may have reduced national ownership and the sustainability of the electoral process. All of these factors pointed to a need to better calibrate short-term and longer-term objectives when providing assistance: a primary goal of integration is to consciously achieve that balance. IEA structures and processes should help to re-calibrate strategic priorities and UN assistance in the middle of an electoral process, and to do so with the full engagement – not at the expense of – national counterparts.

Key recommendations:

For Member States and legislative bodies:
- IEA as a UN-wide policy norm to be included in the next biennial GA resolution, be separately directed by the UNDP Executive Board, and be more consistently and explicitly included in country-specific Security Council mandates;
- the Security Council to more consistently direct UN leadership of international assistance for individual elections; and
- the Security Council to separately include longer-term assistance objectives for democratic institutions like EMBs in mandates establishing new or successor missions.

For UN policy development.
- to develop a tiered, plain language IEA guidance package;
- to develop and launch a comprehensive outreach and training strategy on UN integration and IEA;
- IEA to continue to be driven by (and be better informed of) broader integration, peacebuilding and civilian capacity agendas;
- a package of administrative reforms to be proposed to change rules that impede IEA;
- deficiencies in PKO/SPM human resources and financial systems to be addressed to measure electoral data and evaluate the efficiency of PKO/SPM assistance;
- subordinate Mission settings Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) guidance to be developed to provide one UN division of labor plan;
- one UN electoral component to be created in all cases, recruited from improved fast-track and more integrated procedures fed by the UN electoral roster;
- the electoral component be led as a norm by a CEA on a mission contract, and as a norm, and subject to existing guidance on integration, electoral components in structurally integrated missions should report to the SRSG or mission head through the Deputy SRSG who is also Resident Coordinator;
- three levels of co-location to be stated as policy by UN leaders at the outset, including compulsory co-location of the UN electoral component, and optional co-location with other UN staff, the EMB and other international assistance providers; and
- lessons learned exercises after every election to be compulsory for all integrated electoral components.
For UN practice in the field:

- NAM missions to be more inclusive and UN Focal Point decisions more widely disseminated;
- CEAs to promote election-specific coordination mechanisms as the center of gravity for UN assistance;
- IEA methods to make the best use of existing UN integration machinery but not at the expense of close coordination with non-UN partners;
- EMBs to be involved and ideally to drive operational and logistical planning at the outset, especially in PKOs;
- UN leaders to advocate better commitment from government and donors to fund sustainable electoral authorities;
- UNDP to identify ways to improve institutional capacity assessment of EMBs as a service to the UN system;
- UN leaders to articulate one vision and strategy on sustainable electoral assistance, balancing short and longer-term priorities, ideally developed with the EMB;
- UN leaders to provide a vision for IEA, facilitated by UN administration.

1.2 Methodology

The goals for this research team were first articulated in mid 2011 when the DPA/UNDP/DPKO Working Group on Integrated Electoral Assistance was created and completed a Concept Note outlining its tasks. Funded by UNDP/BDP/DGG, the research team began its work in November 2011, conducting the research as ‘home-based’ consultants. This report reflects the findings of documentation research (see Annex 8 bibliography), and evidence collected from 145 interviews with a broad range of stakeholders both within and external to the UN System. The Working Group selected seven electoral processes in six countries on the agenda of the Security Council, reflecting a mix of countries hosting PKOs and SPMs, three of them first post-conflict elections, two in their second, and one in its third electoral cycle. Six of the case studies are full studies including the overall political and integration context that IEA took place in. The study on DRC is shorter and focuses solely on integration structures and methods.

In addition, a global online survey (in both English and French) was completed by 164 respondents, 80 per cent of those from within the UN System and 20 per cent non-UN. The strength of the evidence in the survey is demonstrated by the diversity of respondents (UN electoral, HQ and field staff, Mission and UNCT, national EMB, and International NGOs) and by a geographic scope beyond the seven selected case studies, including experiences from Mission-assisted elections in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia and Haiti.

Following initial interviews, on 18 November 2011 the research team submitted an Inception Report to the working group. The bulk of interviews and the on-line survey were conducted between November 2011 and March 2012. The team consulted with researchers working on two of UNDP’s parallel studies: the Lessons Learned on Longer-Term Impact of UNDP Electoral Assistance; and, the independent UNDP Evaluation Office’s strategic-level evaluation of UNDP’s contribution to strengthening electoral systems and processes. Preliminary findings and recommendations were then discussed, fine-tuned and endorsed at a Validation Workshop held with 34 participants from DPA, DPKO, UNDP and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in New York on

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*Concept Note: Lessons learned on integrated electoral assistance, DPA, DPKO and UNDP, October 2011*
Tuesday 6 March 2012.\(^7\)

Limitations of the research included the absence of travel to the countries studied, the lack of interviews with or survey responses from some key stakeholders,\(^8\) the lack of quantitative data (for reasons outlined in Section 4.4), and the broad scope in the Concept Note which could not be met in all areas (see Section 3.13). Finally, while this was not a study of either national electoral processes or of UN electoral assistance to them, the impact of integrating that UN assistance is organically connected to both. The recommendations seek to concentrate exclusively on improving IEA, and through those changes, to improve UN assistance and national electoral processes in countries on the agenda of the Security Council.

2. UN INTEGRATION AND POLICIES IMPACTING IEA

The DPA/UNDP/DPKO Working Group on Integrated Electoral Assistance directed the research team to review the broader UN integration framework and the cross-practice linkages of IEA with other areas of UN assistance, and to make recommendations to ‘serve as a tool for decision-makers.’ This broader approach to IEA recognizes that IEA is a sub-set of much larger challenges for UN entities ‘varying greatly in their mandate, structure and methods’ to deliver as one. A desk review of documentation and interviews with key policy makers highlighted the closely linked development of peacebuilding, civilian capacity, integration and IEA policy and practice in the last twenty years.

IEA was found to have been largely driven by all of these broader reforms, and may confront more change in the coming years with increased Member State oversight on the efficient use of scarce UN resources. With a continued focus on integration in the future, the UN is also asked to deliver post-conflict electoral assistance in a manner that keeps national EMBs at the center of decision-making, builds their capacity, and prevents unaffordable and unsustainable election practices. Most issues discussed in Sections 3 and 4 stem from these agendas.

2.1 Integration between UN entities and within UN Missions

’integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations.’\(^9\)

Integration between UN entities: UN integration has involved efforts to integrate between entities working across the four UN pillars – development, human rights, peace and security and therefore between PKOs, SPMs, and different members of the UNCT in the field. With respect to elections, the integration of PKO/SPM-UNDP efforts has become increasingly important as greater volumes of UNDP technical assistance have become more common in Mission settings, and with the establishment of UNDP-
managed election basket funds or Multi-Partner Trust Funds (MPTF) now the norm. Also important is strategic integration at UN headquarters between the lead departments of the Secretariat (DPKO and DPA) managing missions deployed by the Security Council and the HQ offices of the agencies, funds and programs with significant presence and resources in the same countries.

Integration within UN Missions: With the advent of multidimensional peacekeeping in the early 1990s, ‘electoral’ and other civilian PKO components came to ‘play as central a role as the military.’ Early innovations in military integration helped civilian components work together, as well as improved the integration of electoral tasks completed by military contingents (electoral security and logistics in particular). Internal UN Mission integration is more important for IEA than at any previous time: the number of Missions providing electoral assistance globally reached its highest point between 2009-2012.

2.2 UN configurations

Several Secretariat and fund, program and agency actors have been consistent providers of UN electoral assistance based on their mandates. Likewise, there has been growth in the number of other international assistance providers, including some Member States (other EMBs), INGOs, and intergovernmental and regional organizations. The research found that the range of IEA modalities in Mission settings was as varied as the number of different configurations of PKOs, SPMs and different members of the UNCT. Although PKOs dominated in terms of total number of components and staff providing assistance, the increase in field-based SPMs in the last fifteen years has broadened the diversity of UN Mission configurations. For the cases studied, in Sudan there were two UN Special Representatives and four Deputies among two PKOs totaling 40,199 staff deployed in the year of the election. There was also a joint AU-UN mediation process, a Khartoum/Juba divide of the PKOs, and a complex web of UNCT entities similarly dispersed. By contrast Burundi had one Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) and one SPM with 420 staff in highly integrated structures with UNCT members, deployed in just five locations country-wide. UN IEA policies should recognize that electoral and political actors, mandates, and UN configurations are different in every election, requiring tailored country-specific IEA and avoiding one-size-fits-all practices.

2.3 Benchmarking IEA: the Impact of Peacebuilding and Civilian Capacity Policy

The research found that changes in electoral policy and practice have been accompanied – often driven – by a set of reforms to remove barriers that slow down overall UN responsiveness in conflict environments. Since 2005, there has been exponential growth in a set of policies on how the UN works together in support of conflict-affected countries, which ultimately gave rise to the IEA policy in 2010.

Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict: Since 2008, Member States have pushed UN headquarters to provide a more reliable package of integrated UN support in

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11 The SG lists these partners in A/66/314, 19 August 2011, paras 19-27. Another overview of international ‘elections and electoral process’ actors is in [http://www.civcapreview.org/]
12 See A/66/340, Figure 1: Comparison of field-based special political missions and mandate tasks, 1993-2011, 12 October 2011, p 6
13 UNMIS Special Representative of the Secretary General and UNAMID Joint Special Representative for the African Union and the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.
the aftermath of conflict. An agenda to address the ‘severe shortages of expertise and capacity,’ were outlined in the SG’s 2008 report *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, the independent Senior Advisory Group’s *International Review of Civilian Capacity*, and related reports. The arrangements for providing UN electoral assistance were reported on and assessed in both reports.

The SG’s Decision 2010/23 that included the new policy on IEA came from this broader peacebuilding agenda, and included a decision to ‘benchmark’ each area of assistance, led by the ‘global service provider,’ in this case DPA/EAD. The reports – and interviews with non-electoral UN staff – generally held UN electoral assistance arrangements to be a model for other areas, for example, the role of the UN Electoral Focal Point, and what are seen as the established and generally effective and operational partnerships between DPA/EAD, UNDP/BDP/DGG and DPKO/Office of Operations. One benchmark in the SG decision on electoral assistance that followed was that a HQ coordination mechanism should exist, described in the 2010 revised DPA/UNDP Note of Guidance and endorsed by a subsequent GA resolution.

14 Member States called for: global comparative expertise, global lessons learned, and more practical support like rapidly deployed UN experts. For each different area of civilian capacity, Member States sought better clarity on global roles and responsibilities (distinct from any country-specific division of labor), to minimize the duplication of effort between UN entities with overlapping or less demarcated global mandates. 

15 For a full list of those reports, see Annex 9 bibliography.

16 The Policy Committee mandated internal reviews to benchmark nine “key priority areas” of UN civilian capacity. Those other areas are: mine action; public administration; employment generation; reintegration of returnees; Rule of Law; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and mediation support. See SG’s Decision 2009/8, 22 May 2009, outlining the SG’s Implementation Plan for *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, Annex A para 17, and reported in A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, pp 16-21, and A/64/866-S/2010/386, 16 July 2010, pp 9-14.

In the last four years, further demarcation of UN electoral assistance global roles and responsibilities has been accompanied by enhanced clarity on how UN entities providing that assistance work together in peace and security contexts. One example is the progress made to refine UN Secretariat roles and responsibilities triggered by the creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS), early in the SG’s first term. SG Bulletins that followed laid out the functions and organization of DPKO, DPA and DFS, clarifying DPA’s support to elections in DPKO-led Missions, and DFS’ operational and logistical support to all SPMs, including those providing electoral assistance.  
Another example relates to UNOPS, where electoral support is one of five core practice areas in UNOPS’ current strategic plan approved by the UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Joint Executive Board. UNOPS has no technical assistance mandate, but it may act as a service provider to various actors in the development, humanitarian and peacekeeping arenas, including the United Nations, its agencies, funds and programmes, donor and recipient governments and intergovernmental organizations. UNOPS’ service provider and project management model tends to mean that when operating in partnership with another part of the UN, the Project Board is run by the technical partner. This means all UNOPS engagement is implicitly integrated, and a leadership role exercised by the UN partner. Various guidance exists for how UNOPS may work with other parts of the system. For example, in 2009, the UNDP/UNOPS Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was updated, outlining a strategic partnership and generic framework for cooperation when UNOPS has a comparative advantage of speed, flexibility and cost. That followed a

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18 Security Council Affairs Division, Department of Political Affairs, Mandate Database, July 2010
20 United Nations, Executive Board of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNOPS Strategic Plan, 2010-2013: Operational excellence for results that matter, August 2009
UNOPS/Secretariat MoU concluded in 2008 for PKOs and SPMs. However there is limited reference to electoral assistance in the UNDP/UNOPS MoU,21 and none in the UNOPS/Secretariat MoU.22

UN Civilian Capacity: The broader reform on UN civilian capacity is now a top policy issue of the Secretary-General and Member States, and the reform is tackling issues directly relevant to IEA and this study: guidelines for national capacity development, integrated planning, UN gender expertise, strengthening UN partnerships with other assistance providers, and developing a corporate emergency model for rapid deployment of UN staff. EAD/DPA with key partners should engage with the UN Civilian Capacity unit to advocate UN policy changes that will improve integrated UN electoral assistance in the field. New IEA policies should be connected explicitly to peacebuilding and civilian capacity policies, so they do not diverge from this broader reform.

2.4 The impact of UN Integration policies on IEA

The Brahimi Report in 2000 described electoral assistance as one of the core and more common Mission activities that demanded an integrated approach. While not all Brahimi Report recommendations were taken up, some of the resulting integration policies directly benefited IEA, such as the creation of DSRSGs with Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator responsibilities, facilitating integrated electoral component reporting lines.23 Later in 2005, the first policy on Integrated Mission Planning Processes (IMPP) was disseminated, and a considerable amount of more recent integration policy has since been issued for headquarters and the field through the Integration Steering Group (ISG).24

This research showed that these policies and existing UN integration machinery in-country have had particularly positive effects on a UN electoral team deployed into them, facilitating electoral work and reducing the transaction costs of IEA. They have also made it easier to create election-specific coordination mechanisms with an EMB and other assistance providers. However, the research revealed that there are low levels of knowledge from electoral staff in the field of the collective reform effort25: non-electoral UN staff26 were generally more aware of these broader initiatives. With high mobility among UN electoral staff,27 as a group they are less likely to receive induction training or top-up briefings on integration. One exception has been with large UN Volunteer (UNV) election related deployments where comprehensive induction briefings have been

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21 Memorandum of Understanding for a Strategic Partnership between UNDP and UNOPS, signed 5 June 2009. The MOU states that UNDP may seek proposals from UNOPS on various areas, including “support services for discreet components within election and mine action projects.”
22 Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and UNOPS, Arrangements governing the provision of services by UNOPS to offices and departments of the UN. United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions, signed 25 June 2008, extended by amendments, the latest on 29 June 2012.
23 See the SG’s 2000 Note of Guidance on Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators (SRSG, RCs and HCs).
24 The ISG was created in 2008, and now drives this policy agenda. Integration is also now commonly used by the Security Council in mission titles, including in two of the case study countries (BINUB and UNMIT). See Annex 9 Bibliography for a list of key UN integration policies.
25 In the survey 49% of 152 respondents said awareness of integration policy and practice was poor or very poor; 50% of 152 respondents said awareness of lessons learned and best practices from one country to another was poor or very poor.
26 More than half of those surveyed and interviewed were non-electoral UN staff.
27 UN electoral staff are frequently deployed into and repatriated out of Mission settings quickly, and move from one country’s election to another on UNDP and Mission contracts.
organized by the local UNV office. It is therefore recommended that EAD/DPA, DPKO and UNDP implement an outreach strategy for UN electoral staff to provide induction briefings and periodic updates on broader UN integration policies, lessons learned and best practices.

All the electoral processes of the seven case studies in this research occurred after the IMPP policy was issued, and five of the elections occurred in an 11-month period during the development of the most recent policies. Interviewees generally reflected that this growing package of integration policy and practice positively impacted IEA. However, even if overall integration was found to benefit IEA, it is more difficult to ascertain whether the package of integration policies themselves directly improved IEA. With UN election planning and deployment seldom parallel to collective planning and deployment of other entities and Mission components of the UN family (see an illustration of operational tempos at Annex 2), the current integration policies are not directly relevant to election planners and managers preparing for a specific election event. This fact, combined with the unique decision-making role of the UN Electoral Focal Point, and the call for more guidance in electoral assistance from the Policy Committee, makes it necessary that EAD/DPA, in consultation with other ICMEIA members, develop an IEA guidance package.

2.5 Global Electoral Mandates and UN Coordination

Notwithstanding the number of UN actors involved, electoral assistance has generally benefitted from Member State legislative clarity (in particular from the GA), and internal clarity (in particular between DPA and UNDP, and DPA and DPKO). There are twenty years of Reports of the SG and accompanying GA resolutions about electoral assistance, establishing (in 1991) and refining the roles and responsibilities of the UN Electoral Focal Point. In a decision on electoral assistance in 1992, the GA stressed ‘the importance of coordination by the focal point within the United Nations system,’ and in 2011, reaffirmed the “clear leadership role within the United Nations system of the United Nations focal point for electoral assistance matters.” Overall the research found that this GA legislative framework, within which IEA takes place, is sufficiently clear on the UN Electoral Focal Point, and that the relationship with UNDP, DPA, DPKO and DFS should ensure ‘comprehensive coordination’ to ‘avoid duplication.’ In fact it has been argued it is the – or one of the – clearest of all areas of UN civilian capacity.

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28 More detailed integration policy and practice has developed around: (i) UN leadership, especially DSRSG/RC/HCs, and more recently Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General; Integrated Strategic Assessment; operational management through Mission Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMAB), Joint Operation Centers (JOC), and Joint Logistic Operations Centers (JLOC); coordination at HQ through Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (I/M)TF; and; most recently on Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISF).

29 The original resolution from a December 1991 GA plenary meeting was A/RES/46/137, 9 March 1992. The SG submits reports under the area ‘Promotion and protection of human rights,’ and with the title Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization. For a selection of GA resolutions see: http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections

30 Originally endorsed as a senior official in the Offices of the Secretary-General, then assigned to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and subsequently assigned to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

31 A/RES/47/138, 18 December 1992. DPA/EAD, the ‘focal point for electoral verification and electoral assistance,’ was established in 1992 to support the UN Electoral Focal Point.

32 A/RES/66/163, 10 April 2012, Para 15

33 A/RES/66/163, 10 April 2012, Para 13

State sovereignty and non-interference concerns, it is also perhaps the most legislated.

Legislative issues undermining IEA: However, three issues impact negatively on IEA. First, knowledge of the biennial SG reports and accompanying GA resolutions seems particularly low among relevant staff/practitioners in the field, and in no case appears to have influenced how IEA took place. DPA/EAD, DPKO and UNDP should periodically disseminate to the field each new biennial GA resolution dealing with elections. Second, there is no distinction in GA resolutions between electoral assistance in Mission compared to Non-Mission settings, yet Mission settings now have extensive integration policy exclusively applicable to them, and are subject to norms and practice of the Security Council. All entities must ensure clarity on this during their briefing and trainings.

A third issue affecting broader IEA acceptance is that there is confusion among most UN staff about the roles and authority of the GA and of the UNDP Executive Board. Several experienced staff identified this as a ‘fundamental factor’ undermining IEA. For example, numerous interviewees assumed GA mandates were to be followed by staff on Secretariat contracts, and the Executive Board governed all the work of UNDP, or for others it created dual accountability for a UNDP staff member. The problem was largely one of knowledge, not of legislative contradictions: first, the UNDP Executive Board was created by and is accountable to the GA.35 Second, UNDP’s current strategic plan (endorsed by the UNDP Executive Board) notes that UNDP’s democratic governance work on ‘electoral systems and processes’ is done in close collaboration with DPA/EAD, following the division of responsibilities agreed by the GA. There is a separate mention for UNDP to collaborate with DPKO ‘in states emerging from conflict... to support countries develop transitional governance structures.’36 DPA/EAD and UNDP, with ICMEA, should develop basic guidance that spells out the hierarchy of these resolutions, seek their dissemination to all UN actors involved in electoral assistance in Mission settings, advocate compliance and provide the information in all induction trainings.

2.6 The new IEA Policy

Although the short IEA policy itself is still very recent, the principles underlying it have been practiced and applied in the field before and throughout the twelve years of integration and civilian capacity policy development. This partly explains the earlier finding that in the absence of formal policy, the study still found a healthy degree of creative learning and IEA adaptation within and between countries. The 2010 IEA policy itself was driven by the need to learn from more recent experience, including five of the electoral processes studied here that occurred as the policy was developed.37 The IEA policy was promulgated in SG’s Decision 2010/23 following the Policy Committee meeting of 12 October 2010. The DPA-UNDP Revised Note of Guidance on Electoral

35 UNDP’s current 36 member Executive Board was created by GA resolution A/RES/48/162, 20 December 1993. The Executive Board is governed by the overall policy guidance of the GA and the direct authority of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Board’s functions include: to implement GA policies, and; to ensure that ‘the activities and operational strategies of each fund or programme are consistent with the overall policy guidance set forth by the General Assembly,’ Para 22 (c)
37 Several interviewees from different parts of the UN system reflected that the lack of HQ policy to guide an integrated approach for Sudan general elections 2010 in particular shaped the policy, and it subsequently drove strong levels of structural integration for the 2011 Southern Sudan Referendum.
Assistance of September 2010, negotiated through that year, was annexed.

The key text of the SG’s 2010 IEA policy was that all UN electoral assistance delivered in Mission (PKO and SPM) settings ‘be delivered in a fully integrated manner from the outset. ...[a]s a norm, and subject to existing guidance on integration, electoral components in structurally integrated missions will report to the SRSG or head of mission through the Deputy SRSG who is also Resident Coordinator.”38 Again, the problem identified in the survey was the lack of knowledge about the new IEA policy,39 not surprising given this study is the first of its kind. It also relates to the poor dissemination of peacebuilding and integration policy and practice to the UN electoral community.40 However, this first IEA policy– with implications for all UN and non-UN actors involved in Mission setting electoral assistance – is currently classified as confidential. A related recommendation is therefore that an appropriate request should be made to de-classify IEA and other UN electoral assistance SG decisions to ensure their full dissemination and implementation.

When developing the IEA guidance package recommended in Section 2.4, two factors should be considered. First, with some experienced practitioners advocating little or no more policy (so field staff have more autonomy), a greater number of interviewees believed more guidance was necessary (for a variety of reasons), but cautioned against prescribing too much detail: UN leaders in the field should be given sufficient flexibility to implement electoral assistance mandates in often fast-changing and volatile political environments. This research also looked at seven vastly different political and electoral contexts, with correspondingly different EMB and UN capacities and structures – post-conflict contexts which do not lend themselves to prescriptive policies. Therefore, future IEA guidance should combine short policies with flexible guidelines to allow field staff to adapt it to their circumstances.

Second, while the case studies showed instances where integrated mission planning had little or no bearing on integrated electoral planning, it did partly overlap in the first post-conflict election case studies, and in Timor-Leste 2007, when a new mission was deployed while preparations for national elections were beginning. In any case, UN integration and IEA policies should be consistent and complementary. When planning processes do overlap, how, for example, does a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) relate to a NAM? IEA guidance should be built from existing UN integration policies and similarly future UN integration policies should refer back to IEA guidance.

3. LESSONS FROM IEA EXPERIENCES IN MISSION SETTINGS

This section outlines the more practical findings from the study, mostly emerging from case study interviews and survey responses. It begins with the lessons from the first steps of planning and deploying an integrated electoral team (electoral mandates, planning, leadership, recruitment and structures) and then discusses practical issues to improve IEA practice (coordination methods, co-location, administrative and other issues).

3.1 Integrating Political and Technical Objectives

A key issue that emerged in the course of the consultation process was the critical

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38 SG Decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010, Para (iii)
39 49 per cent of 152 survey respondents said awareness of IEA policy and practice was poor or very poor.
40 Notably SG Decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010, Para (i) called specifically for a ‘dissemination strategy.’
importance of integrating political and technical aspects of the UN’s electoral assistance. Specifically, practitioners feel integration should explicitly ensure coherence between political aspects of the Security Council’s mandate, and the UN Mission’s work, and technical assistance provided by an integrated UN Mission/UNDP electoral component to an EMB.

Interviewees reflected that there is a general perception that political considerations trump technical considerations in IEA in all Mission settings, when keeping or building the peace is prioritized. Underlying this issue is the reality that the two considerations cannot, or should not, be isolated: all ‘technical issues’ (eligibility to vote criteria, candidate nomination requirements, ballot paper design, polling station placement) can become political issues, and may be used by parties to reject the outcome of an election, for example, in Burundi 2010 following the postponement of the elections for several days. A total of 77 per cent of the 160 survey respondents considered that integration provides the necessary increase in coherence between the sometimes competing demands of political and technical objectives.

3.2 Security Council Mandates and IEA

In the last 20 years, there has been exponential growth in the number of UN Missions and UNCTs providing complex electoral assistance to multiple electoral events in the same country. Figure 1 above captures the growth in the number of Security Council resolutions from 1995-2011 with references to elections. The research showed that Security Council language has been ambiguous and inconsistent with regard to UN electoral assistance in general and specifically to integrating that assistance, with no references found to IEA and cases with no explicit mandate for electoral assistance at all. Four issues point to this lack of Council direction continuing if unaddressed.

First, where the Council mandated electoral assistance, it was generally for one election event only, while other uniformed and civilian components in multi-dimensional missions generally received their mandate in founding or establishing resolutions that lasted the whole Mission lifecycle. This original mandate, added to or re-framed, but often intact for many years, provided justification for staffing and budgets subsequently submitted to the GA in the annual PKO or the biennial SPM budget cycles. It is recommended that Security Council mandates should be more consistent about IEA.

Second, operative sub-paragraphs mandating electoral assistance generally fell under paragraphs tasking the Mission, and therefore explicitly excluded, for example, UNDP. This contributed to the perception that the Council was not mandating the UN to conduct electoral assistance; rather it was only mandating the mission.

Third, electoral calendars are frequently subject to change, more so in a post-conflict environment. Most other Council mandate areas are not bound by any equivalent cyclical calendar.

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31 See below the discussion on UN electoral budgets, and the different PKO and SPM systems.
32 Across 16 PKOs in the 18 months 1 July 2010 – 31 December 2011, the Security Council authorized a total of 33 UN mission mandate renewals. 21 of those renewals were for 12 months, 9 were for 6 months, 3 for other periods. 3 of the PKOs had mandates ‘ongoing, until the Security Council decides otherwise.’

Fourth, the mandate gap has become more pronounced as countries remain on the agenda of the Security Council for longer periods with multiple transitions to and from SPM/PKO successor missions.\textsuperscript{43} UN missions are therefore increasingly covering a greater number and diversity of electoral cycles and events.

Additionally, to ensure clarity and consistency by the Council on how the UN should work together to achieve mandate goals, it is recommended that the UN seek an informal Group of Friends on UN integrated electoral assistance, which could develop an aide memoire or informal template language for Security Council UN electoral assistance mandates. This has been successfully done in other thematic areas, providing greater consistency both on the level of Council practice, as well as consistency in the way that UN Missions implement the Security Council’s policies.\textsuperscript{44}

3.3 Needs Assessments and Integrated Electoral Planning

Electoral Needs Assessment Missions: The first feature of electoral assistance in Mission settings is that electoral events operate in unique cycles, taking electoral assessment and planning out of all other integrated UN assessment and planning cycles as shown in Annex 2. Electoral Needs Assessment Missions (NAMs) remain the primary vehicle for UN electoral assessment at the strategic level in all Mission and Non-Mission settings. NAMs across the case studies were conceived and conducted very differently. Although most of the differences can be attributed to country-specific circumstances, the new NAM guidelines in SG decision 2011/23 help to establish greater global consistency.

*Resolution of differences: ...the DSRSG/RC/HC is expected to assume a lead role in the mediation effort.*\textsuperscript{45}

The cases showed there are significantly more national and international actors in Mission settings than in Non-Mission settings. The high visibility of electoral assistance meant that any gaps or duplication in efforts, and any internal disputes on who should do what, had a negative impact on the UN’s overall credibility. The new NAM guidelines applying globally state that a NAM ‘may recommend a broad division of labor amongst relevant actors in the UN system.’\textsuperscript{46} While the NAM guidelines also state that ‘the specifics of implementation will be detailed at country level among electoral assistance providers,’ more could be done by the NAM to guide subsequent Mission planning and UNDP/UNCT project formulation (discussion on this follows below). In particular, NAMs could be more explicit in asserting the principles of IEA contained in SG decisions 2010/23 and 2011/23, and in providing guidance on IEA structures and methods.

The UN Electoral Focal Point decision: Currently, NAM reports and the subsequent UN Electoral Focal Point Decisions are necessarily confidential and as a result not widely

\textsuperscript{43} A/66/340, 12 October 2011, page 9

\textsuperscript{44} Several Groups of Friends exist to bridge perspectives among Member State groupings, the General Assembly and the Security Council, most recently for Mediation, and for Civilian Capacity. Championed by other diverse Groups of Friends, the precedent is well established for the Council to have more consistent operational language, guided by boilerplate text, for example, on DDR, Children and Armed Conflict and now on the Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict agendas: see S/PRST/2004/46, 14 December 2004, S/RES/1612 (2005), 26 July 2005 and S/RES/1960 (2010), 16 December 2010 respectively.

\textsuperscript{45} This relates to UN division of labor disputes: SG’s Note of Guidance, Integrated Missions: clarifying the Role, Responsibility & Authority of the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC, 17 January 2006, paras 25-25

\textsuperscript{46} A similar sentiment was voiced in the DSRSG/RC/HC Retreat, 18-19 May 2010
disseminated. The new NAM guidelines address this by including explicit consultation guidance, focused on making NAMs more inclusive and increasing field participation in them. In this regard, the UN Electoral Focal Point could also share a non-confidential summary of the key elements of the UN Electoral Focal Point decision with the UN family, EMB, host government authorities and international partners to be used for further planning.

A suggestion from the survey is that after a NAM, the lead department and DPA/EAD could conduct a follow-up IEA mission to assess the degree of integration being carried out, with recommendations for field-based UN leadership. Such a role for ongoing DPA/EAD assessment is called for in the 2010 revised Note of Guidance and was usefully done in Sudan for the 2011 referendum.

Existing UN integration planning machinery: The cases reveal that functioning existing UN integration planning machinery can improve IEA planning. An example is national and sub-national analysis on the political environment coming from JMACs, as well as the knowledge of the UNCT and UN Military Observers on national infrastructure. If there is an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), electoral planners can identify existing governance and capacity building programs with direct relevance for electoral assistance. Although ISFs are a recent tool, in the Timor 2007 case study, while electoral assistance was completely absent from Security Council mandates and UN planning, more recently it has been given appropriate mention in the 2011-2012 ISF. IEA should utilize and harness existing integration planning machinery and electoral assistance should appear in ISFs where the Security Council has mandated, or is expected to mandate, electoral assistance.

There are two further outputs of integrated planning where HQ could help UN actors in the field establish functional integration arrangements. The first is that all planning processes should produce “one” UN electoral component organogram. Second, some interviewees spoke of the benefit of a mission-specific Memorandum of Understanding or Agreement agreed in the planning phase, in particular between the UN Mission and UNDP (Sudan 2011). In some cases, IEA structures may arrive in a PKO/SPM/UNCT partnership governed by an existing MoU/Agreement (Iraq, see Annex 7). To ensure consistency, HQ should develop an IEA Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/Agreement template to guide Mission/UNDP MoUs drafted in the field that outline administrative arrangements for IEA methods and structures. One example of an Agreement outline is found in the toolkit in Annex 5, and in considering a template for future IEA, several topics should be considered compulsory.

UNDP Project Documents: UNDP Project Documents (ProDocs) are critical planning documents in UN System electoral assistance efforts, but they are infrequently conceived and constructed collectively with other actors of the UN System and international partners. The current policy is that ProDocs are to be formulated by UNDP in

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47 The survey responses recorded 52% who said they 'were aware of an DPA/EAD Needs Assessment Mission recommendations and the decision of the UN Focal Point for Elections' in the country they wrote about, and 48% who said they were not aware.

48 SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 5 – UNDP/DPA Note of Guidance, 12 October 2010, para 7 (f)

49 Notwithstanding the need to tailor every IEA MoU/Agreement, three elements should always be present: (i) lines of reporting and accountability among UN electoral leaders and structures, to and from the SRSG, CEA, UNDP Country Director, integrated electoral component and sub-national offices; (ii) administrative and fiduciary accountability and decision-making, and; (iii) administrative and security measures to manage co-location and resource sharing.
consultation with DPA/EAD. Ideally, the formulation process should also include other relevant UN agencies providing direct or indirect electoral assistance, through discussion under the lead of the DSRSG/RC. Another weakness identified in the study is the absence of institutional assessments of EMBs, and strategies developed with EMBs to set out a vision for institutional development. As a follow up to this study and perhaps the parallel Lessons Learned study on UNDP’s Long-term Electoral Assistance, UNDP could commission further research on how to improve participation in Mission setting ProDoc development, and on how to improve the quality of EMB capacity assessment.

**UNOPS:** One actor that would be positively affected through improved IEA planning is UNOPS. When UN leaders needed to negotiate institutional politics between UN entities in the field, there were delays in operational planning and staff and material deployment, and international procurement. In some of the case studies (Cote D’Ivoire and Sudan 2011), this resulted in UNOPS being brought in to these processes late, thereby increasing budgets and expenditures (with considerable cost overruns in some cases) and resulting in UN electoral assistance being less timely, cost-effective and sustainable. This was an IEA problem, because although UNOPS now has global MoUs (discussed in Section 2.3), other substantive UN actors were unable to identify UNOPS comparative advantage early. UNOPS should develop a document, based on lessons from specific country cases, on what and how they can contribute to UN electoral support and present this to other ICMEA partners.

### 3.4 UN Electoral Leadership and Structures

“Today, the SRSG and his/her team must be a combination of diplomat, military commander, humanitarian relief coordinator, development expert, personnel manager, public affairs officer, and even psychologist.”

**Selection, preparation and deployment of mission leadership:** Leadership in this context is focused on UN Heads of Mission and Deputies, and the head of the UN electoral component, or Chief Electoral Adviser (CEA). The research identified that strong leadership is critical to the successful integration of UN electoral assistance. IEA places significant pressure on UN leaders, including as mediators of last resort for UN in-fighting on division of labor conflicts. The SRSG is particularly expected to be able to set a broad and clear strategic direction in the face of dynamically changing conflicts, utilising complex UN institutional structures. An absence of mission leadership in the planning phases of Sudan’s 2010 general elections placed pressure on already fragmented electoral components, exposing electoral staff in a politically sensitive period when the electoral law was being negotiated and the electoral commission was being established. A similar experience occurred in Burundi 2010 when for several months prior to the election no ERSG was present.

The Secretariat (in particular the lead departments DPKO and DPA, guided by DFS) has undertaken a number of efforts to improve the selection, preparation and deployment of

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50 SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 5 – UNDP/DPA Note of Guidance, 12 October 2010, para 7 (c)
51 The Very Model of a Modern SRSG: The New World of UN Peacekeeping Missions, D. Steinberg, Deputy President, International Crisis Group, presented to UN Senior Mission Leaders Program, 17 July 2009
52 Electoral processes invariably throw up new threats that require troubleshooting, re-prioritization, and re-configuration of UN staff and their resources. Familiarity with the workings of the UN Secretariat, as well as the various structures and cultures of members of the UNCT, are increasingly expected.
mission leadership. A leadership section was established within the Office of the Under Secretary-General (USG)/DFS in July 2007, followed by a review of the senior appointments process. Guidance was subsequently approved to ensure the process was more predictable, helping reduce time lapses between senior field appointments from a median of 87 days in 2007–2008 to 31.5 days in 2009–2010. Also in 2009, the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) led the review and updating of new RC selection and appointment procedures that positively impacted recruitment to the DSRSG/RC/HC position.53 DFS/0 USG and lead departments should ensure that the timing of an electoral process is an important criteria in planning UN leadership succession in country.

Figure 2: Electoral leadership and structures across the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>UN electoral lead through54</th>
<th>Electoral component(s) lead55</th>
<th>Mission and UNDP staff on one team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC 2006</td>
<td>DSRSG/RC</td>
<td>Chief Electoral Division</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste 2007</td>
<td>DSRSG/RC</td>
<td>CEA UNMIT &amp; UNDP Project Manager</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi 2010</td>
<td>UNDP CD</td>
<td>CTA UNDP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI 2010</td>
<td>DSRSG/P</td>
<td>CEA &amp; a CTA</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 2010</td>
<td>DSRSG/P</td>
<td>CEA &amp; a UNDP Project Manager</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 2010</td>
<td>DSRSG/P</td>
<td>CEA UNMIS</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSRSG/RC</td>
<td>CTA UNDP56</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 2011</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Director Electoral Division &amp; one Deputy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The current SG policy on integration specifies that “as a norm, and subject to existing guidance on integration, electoral components in structurally integrated missions will report to the SRSG or head of mission through the Deputy SRSG who is also Resident Coordinator,” and this report finds that this should be maintained. There are several settings where electoral decisions were made by the SRSG or the DSRSG/Political. These exceptions created problems on the one hand, such as separating oversight of mission technical assistance from the UNDP electoral project, its basket fund management and fiduciary oversight, and from other UNDP democratic governance programs. However, it also solved other problems that are inherent in the DSRSG/RC reporting line, such as fragmenting mission political and electoral work, civil affairs, public information, police and electoral security.

Reflecting on the reporting lines shown in Figure 2 above, the team interviewed five current or former SRSGs and DSRSNGs. Generally they found the current SG policy wording on the DSRSG/RC reporting line about right – stating a norm but allowing UN leaders in the field to make decisions according to political realities, as well as the need

53 As part of the UN Reform process, UNDP has a lead mandate for the UN in system-wide coordination, and one aspect of this with implications for UN leadership of IEA is that the GA asserts that ‘...the management of the resident coordinator system should continue to be firmly anchored in the United Nations Development Programme,’ A/RES/62/208, 14 March 2008, para 104
54 The person the CEA or CTA reported to; see SG Decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010, para (iii)
55 Titles of Heads of UN electoral components depend on Secretariat human resources rules, depending on the size of the unit, office or division, and the rank of the head, Director, Chief or Senior Adviser.
56 The title was ‘Principal Senior Elections Adviser.’
to build a balanced leadership team. DPA/EAD and DPKO should compile past SRSG/DSRSG and UN electoral component reporting lines and make it available for new SRSGs and NAMs in the design stage. UNDP could draft a one-page rationale for the DSRSG/RC line ‘norm’. This would also allow SRSGs to understand what they need to compensate for if a decision is made for the electoral staff to report directly to the SRSG.

CEA: Another lesson emerging from the case studies is that, as a norm, UN electoral components are led by a CEA on mission contract. As a norm, and subject to existing guidance on integration, electoral components in structurally integrated missions should report to the SRSG or mission head through the Deputy SRSG who is also Resident Coordinator. UNDP and/or other UN entities will be headed by a Senior Electoral Adviser who will have dual reporting lines to the CEA and also to the head of their entity. Moreover, where justified by the size of the electoral support provided through the Mission and UNDP, the electoral component could have two deputies: first, the Senior Electoral Advisor of the UNDP Electoral Project, with administrative and fiduciary responsibility to that project, reporting on those issues to the UNDP Country Director and DSRSG/RR, and the second deputy with appropriate responsibilities for staff on Mission contracts and linking with the rest of the Mission structures.

Interviewees who staffed SRSG and DSRSG offices reflected on the need for the CEA to be close to and contributing to the deliberation and decision-making of the Mission leadership. While electoral assistance is understood to be a prioritized UN activity in the months before election day, the CEA should be present at the table well before and after each election. This is particularly the case as the number of Mission mandates expands: at the time of the Sudan 2010 elections and the Southern Sudan 2011 referendum UNMIS had 36 mandated tasks and UNAMID had an additional 29. In every case, the CEA should be present at the table of the SRSG’s Senior Management Team. Also, there should be an annual meeting of all CEA, Senior Electoral Advisors and Chief Technical Advisers allowing them to propose practical steps for DPA/EAD, UNDP/BDP and DPKO to improve their preparation.

Finally, the case studies confirmed the logic of SG decision 2010/23 that all IEA should be integrated from the outset, pulling together all UN staff whose full-time job is electoral assistance, regardless of contractual status and parent entity. Parallel teams increased the probability of duplication and competition, were confusing to national partners, and introduced unnecessary transaction costs for the way the UN integrated its assistance. Future IEA policy should specify that one UN electoral team under the same DSRSG should be established in all Mission settings. To capture some of the practice, organograms are annexed for each of the three cases with one UN electoral component (DRC 2006, Iraq 2010 and Sudan 2011).

3.5 Integrating UN Electoral Staff Selection, Recruitment & Deployment

The UN Electoral Roster: Perhaps the most critical element of successful IEA was found to be the UN staff. UN electoral assistance, and the UN electoral community, benefit
from the 20 years of development and management of the expert UN electoral roster. The research found the UN electoral roster to be critical to successful IEA, and no other area of UN civilian capacity appears to have an equivalent, although other areas aim to base their rosters on the UN electoral roster model. As of 25 August 2010, the UN electoral roster had 549 men and 251 women across all Director and Professional levels.

**Integrated recruitment planning:** The UN electoral roster has been used effectively and strategically to build a balanced UN electoral team (Iraq 2010). This not only avoided competition for the same staff by different UN bodies, but the environment encouraged staff mobility between the Mission and agencies. That is, when integrated planning took place – with a collective vision for UN electoral tasks, division of labor, leadership and structures – it was easier to build a team from the UN electoral roster with complementary skills, languages, and personalities (Sudan 2011). In two of the case studies where integrated planning was less deliberate, and there was not an inclusive organogram, parallel approaches by the mission and UNDP led to competition for electoral professionals, and some duplication between positions (Timor 2007, and Sudan 2010 on voter education). The 2011 SG’s decision to move towards an inclusive UN electoral roster is therefore welcome. To ensure inclusivity, professionals with substantive knowledge of elections, even if it is not their main area of expertise, should be added. The research team concluded that in Mission settings planning for recruitment should be integrated and the use of the UN electoral roster should be encouraged.

**The speed of selection, recruitment and deployment:** IEA was complicated in all of the cases when staff arrival was slow as well as disjointed and spread out over a long period of time. Slow and disjointed recruitment (Burundi and Cote D’Ivoire) undermined the UN’s image and the quality of electoral assistance, and complicated the establishment of IEA and election-specific coordination mechanisms. The UN therefore needs to address speed of deployment of an integrated team overall, as well as different speeds between UN contract and deployment systems. Improvements should aim at being more ‘nimble’ to address fast moving and highly operational electoral needs, and meet the expectations of national counterparts. Based on the collective lessons of the seven case studies, interviews and survey, reform of the UN electoral roster procedures should improve fast track measures for Mission settings.

**The depth and quality of the UN Electoral Roster:** One of the challenges to the roster is identifying and developing a cadre of staff who could be future CEAs and CTAs. For IEA to function, CEAs and CTAs need to deploy first and depart last, but pressure is being placed to move them to the next election with so many elections being supported.

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60 The roster was established after the experiences of early Security Council and GA mandated assistance to support self-determination and post-conflict electoral processes in Namibia and Cambodia. Those experiences led the GA to exceptionally mandate in a December 1991 plenary meeting the creation of the roster within DPA/EAD. Currently the policy is that there is a single UN electoral roster of experts (the GA mandated electoral roster), which can be used by the UN Secretariat and the Agencies, Funds, Entities or Programmes as a source of electoral expertise. A/46/137, 9 March 1992, para 9, SG Decision 2010/23 para (vi) and Annex 1 para F and Annex 2

61 In the first ever GA resolution specifically on mediation (A/65/283, 28 July 2011) the GA didn’t mandate a mediation roster, but ‘supports the efforts of the Secretary-General in maintaining an updated roster of mediators, and encourages the continuing efforts to improve its gender balance and equitable geographical representation,’ Para 8

62 SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 3 - UN Electoral Assistance Roster Capabilities, 12 October 2010

63 For a definition of nimble see A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011, Section V
An additional factor that respondents to the survey and interviewees underlined was that CEAs and CTAs with experience in both Missions and UNDP tend to be better at navigating and exerting leadership in an integrated environment, where they understand institutional cultures and rules. DPA/EAD and UNDP should take specific measures to identify and develop future CEAs and CTAs, and to ensure electoral staff mobility is rewarded.

3.6 Electoral Budgets and Expenditure – PKO/SPMs and Basket Funds

Electoral expenditure in PKOs and SPMs: To assess whether IEA led to greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of UN resources, only a qualitative assessment could be made due to the lack of accurate budgeting and recording of electoral expenditure in PKOs and SPMs. Four endemic issues challenge UN electoral budgeting and IEA: First, IEA is more frequently being conducted in countries with Council-mandated SPMs. While PKOs have well defined and accessible budgeting systems, SPMs have more limited mechanisms. While currently the subject of a budget reform proposal requested by the GA, this has had implications for IEA, including affecting decisions on whether to situate an electoral component in a UNDP office instead of in a mission. It has also impacted the speed of funding and material resources available for electoral component start-up and expansion, as well as access to operational capabilities, such as UN helicopters, trucks, sub-national facilities, IT and communications networks.

Second, the study found eight different budget and operational capacities to support UN IEA in HQ and the field by the two lead departments and UNDP alone. These reflect a crowded field of potential funding sources for UN crisis management start-up, peacebuilding and democratic governance, needing to be adapted by UN electoral planners. IEA guidelines for electoral planners should identify and explain each existing start-up funding source.

Third, the case studies pointed to significant budgetary implications of planning tempos of electoral assistance compared to other areas of assistance (see Annex 2). Interviewees pointed to particular challenges in PKOs when large electoral assistance resource demands (and their inherent volatility) led to re-deployment of funds away from other areas of assistance (DDR, for example), or when a separate electoral budget needed to be developed and negotiated in the General Assembly.

Fourth, given short time frames and the increased number of ‘out of budget cycle’ electoral events, lack of knowledge of different budget systems and cycles undermine electoral assistance planning and budgeting. The process of mobilizing resources for

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65 The eight sources were: (i) triggered by a Security Council mandate, applying to the ACABQ for SPM Regular Budget or PKO Reserve Fund start-up or expansion funding, (ii) submitting a separate electoral budget out-of-cycle to the GA Budgetary Committees from Regular Budget/SPM account or from the Peacekeeping Support Account for a PKO, (iii) using or re-deploying existing resources from the overall SPM budget envelope or within each PKO budget envelope, under the respective USOs’ authority, (iv) applying to EOSG for the SG’s unforeseen and extraordinary fund, (v) using existing DPA Rapid Response Extra-Budgetary (XB) funds, or equivalent DPKO or DFS Trust Fund resources, (vi) applying to PBSO, the Peacebuilding Contact Group and the SG for PBF IRF funds, (vii) UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) and (viii) UNDP Global Programme on Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS).
66 Adding to the cycle complications for an electoral planner, SPMs are funded collectively in one account and biennially on a January-December calendar from the UN Regular Budget and its Scale of Assessment, and PKOs are funded individually and annually on a July-June calendar under the Peacekeeping Scale of
assistance generated high levels of distrust between UN entities in some of the case studies. UN electoral staff involved with budgetary issues should be minimally literate on each of the three systems (PKO, SPM, UNDP). The study found few substantive, let alone administrative staff, with an overall basic knowledge of these systems. DPKO, DFS, DPA and UNDP should develop a systematic basic induction on the rules and methods of the three key budget systems to increase knowledge and confidence of targeted UN electoral staff.

Cost-sharing arrangements, trust funds, and basket funds: Funding arrangements for UNDP-led electoral assistance projects can involve cost-sharing arrangements, trust funds, or basket funds, the last being a mix of the two other modalities. Cost-sharing arrangements are donor contributions to specific UNDP projects, managed at country level. Trust funds require clearance from UNDP Headquarters and are based on arrangements established between UNDP and one or more donors. Basket fund arrangements are a modality allowing donors to support one overall project through cost sharing and trust funds arrangements, thereby improving the coordination of donor-funded activities.67

UNDP-managed Electoral Basket Funds68 are present in Mission and Non-Mission settings. These funds are put in place to finance specific activities foreseen in the electoral assistance project document (ProDoc). According to national beneficiaries supported by basket funds, the disbursement of funds is often complicated by cumbersome procedures. This is especially the case if no specific administrative supporting structure or Service Center already exists in the UNDP country office. Service Centers help streamline procedures and procurement and are established based on the amount of funds to be managed, the need for specialized financial and procurement expertise, and to avoid project level implementation units. Service Centers can also serve other UN bodies in implementing their respective projects. UNDP should establish Service Centers as standard units for electoral assistance in Mission settings and in the case one of the above mentioned conditions are not met, pass on best practices to Country Offices expecting to support electoral assistance projects.

The funding arrangements to be used for the implementation of electoral assistance projects depend, as stated earlier, on a variety of country-specific factors and have to be evaluated on the ground. However, it is important that actors on the ground are aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the different modalities (i.e. time needed to set up, flexibility of funds, administrative costs involved, reporting and staffing requirements).

UN Mission and UNDP tensions on Basket Funds: Tensions on the use of the Basket Fund have sometimes emerged due to UNDP technical management of the project of assistance and fiduciary responsibility for the funds, and Mission’s desire to have input on the use of the funds, especially in cases where the DSRSG is not the RC. In order to avoid these tensions, Basket Funds should continue to be exclusively managed and implemented by UNDP and the Mission should engage early on in the drafting of UNDP project documents to provide input on how funds should be used. However, due to the dynamic nature of the context in which projects are implemented,

Assessments. See A/RES/64/248, 5 February 2010 and A/RES/64/249, 5 February 2010.
68 The revised UNDP/DPA Note of Guidance recognizes that UNDP at the country level plays a key role in the ‘financial coordination of donor funds for electoral support as well as the coordination of electoral support through meetings and donor coordination forums’ SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 5 - DPA and UNDP Revised Note of Guidance on Electoral Assistance, 12 October 2010, Para 6(c)
modification of the project due to political imperatives must be an option if necessary. This requires that smooth lines of communication between UNDP, Mission, and Basket Fund partners are established and maintained throughout the project.

With greater numbers of UN bodies now involved in electoral assistance, it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of activities and funding available for the various UN actors. In cases where a number of UN actors have an expected mandate and role in providing electoral assistance, where international partners are willing to provide significant funds, and where there is the required timeframe for implementing projects, it would be advisable to create a country-specific Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), under the authority of the DSRSG/RC. In such instances, one administrative agent would be appointed to manage the Trust Fund and the Steering Committee, chaired by the DSRSG/RC, and would respond to funding proposals coming from various UN entities, thereby ensuring coherence and complementarity. This would allow the CEA to be aware of all project proposals and activities, and would provide the UN with a clear coordinated role in electoral assistance vis-à-vis national and international partners.

3.7 Election-Specific Coordination Mechanisms

Whilst the UN Integrated Missions concept should be the centre of gravity of the larger [UN] system, it cannot be a closed system, nor can it assume that others will simply fall into step with its approach.\(^{69}\)

As illustrated in Figure 3 below, methods of integrating electoral assistance have two additional aims beyond the need to integrate assistance across the UN family: first, to ensure appropriate transparency of the UN’s direct assistance (especially substitution) to an EMB and other national authorities, thereby ensuring national ownership as well as technical and operational coordination across all areas of assistance, and second to ensure the most effective and efficient employment of assistance across all international assistance providers, for similar reasons. The research found that in addition to existing UN integration machinery, a series of election-specific coordination mechanisms should be established to work in partnership with the EMB and other national authorities, and to engage with other international electoral assistance partners. A remarkably similar set of coordination mechanisms were created across all case studies to achieve those goals.\(^{71}\)

\(^{69}\) Previously Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), similar to the one used for Iraq

\(^{70}\) C. de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Security in Practice no. 5, 10 December 2007. The report goes on to say UN integration should face the triple challenge of ‘facilitating its own internal coherence, supporting and encouraging coherence among all the international or external actors, and facilitating and supporting coherence between the external and internal actors.’ p5

\(^{71}\) The UN’s approach in 2006 was an early model for the other cases, where MONUC assumed overall responsibility for coordinating international assistance, and performed this function through a range of formal multilateral committees at political and technical levels.
Although existing UN integration mechanisms and IEA methods and structures improve the efficient delivery of UN assistance, they can also undermine and compete with national planning processes, limiting the learning that takes place within national institutions. As far as possible, CEAAs should promote election-specific coordination mechanisms as the center of gravity for UN assistance. There are four election-specific coordination mechanism levels that could be established, namely (i) diplomatic coordination, (ii) donor coordination and basket fund management, (iii) election, technical and policy coordination, and (iv) other subordinate operational and thematic working groups such as on logistics, electoral procedures, women’s participation, and voter education. See Annex 5 for illustrations of all four levels.

3.8 Coordination with International Partners

“Partnerships are increasingly a fact of life for UN peace operations; they create additional challenges – strategic ambiguity, an over-emphasis on process, weakened command and control and unequal burden-sharing – that cannot be eliminated, but rather need to be managed.”

Where most of the key international actors have been providing electoral assistance for twenty years or more, there are more Mission and Non-Mission setting concurrent elections receiving that assistance, a greater volume of funds (in particular US-funded NGOs and INGOs), and new international actors. This has increased the importance of coordination between them. Member States are increasingly providing assistance and expert civilian capacity, including through their own EMBs. South Africa was a major partner in providing electoral assistance for the 2006 DRC elections, providing over 150 information technology experts to support the EMB. IEA principles have been extended in some cases to include those assistance providers, in particular in Iraq in 2005 when all international assistance providers were integrated by the UN in the International Electoral Assistance Team (IEAT).

Interviewees who have worked in non-UN organizations highlighted that international coordination in the past was more informal, and the role of personality has been key in determining whether the coordination was effective. Some assessed that coordination with international partners was not optimal in some cases, leading to duplication or gaps in assistance and causing confusion among national stakeholders. Coordination during implementation phases of the electoral processes was generally sound, framed by the

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72 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine), ‘Figure 6: The Challenge of Mission Integration,’
election-specific coordination mechanisms above, and in line with the revised Note of Guidance. However, the research found uneven involvement of internationals and – in some cases – insufficient coordination with them in the planning stage. International electoral assistance providers should be included in the UN’s integrated planning from the outset. Further, a CEA could consider appointing liaison/focal points to facilitate communication and information sharing between the UN and international partners, as done in Iraq 2010. Additional measures could include establishing rules for sharing information between UN, EMB and other international actors, and to create jointly drafted and promulgated documents (operational orders, technical guidelines) to avoid confusing partners and field offices.

In limited cases, the Security Council has called for close coordination and cooperation between these partners, but there has been inconsistency between countries or within the same country, and language has not been precise. EMBs in the cases studied had significant challenges bringing different elements of their own transitional or elected governments together to organize elections. The additional burden for these generally new and inexperienced institutions to coordinate and lead all international assistance providers was generally beyond their capacity, and they relied on and expected leadership from the UN to perform this function. There may also be cases where the UN is not the appropriate entity to provide that lead. The Security Council called on the United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to support the electoral process ‘with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners.’ In most cases, the scale, political profile and complexity of Mission setting electoral assistance justifies an explicit lead of international assistance, as given to the UN in Sudan 2011. While the Security Council has mandated the UN to ensure ‘coherence among electoral assistance providers,’ it is recommended that the Security Council directly designate the UN, or request another organization, to ‘coordinate’ or to ‘lead’ (as appropriate) all electoral assistance. To support this, Member States, when requesting assistance, could also designate the United Nations (or other organization) to help ensure coherence among electoral assistance providers.

3.9 Co-Location on three levels

In Mission settings, integration is enhanced by bringing electoral staff on different contracts together to work as a team. To some degree, co-location lessons were learnt from one case study to another, but there was too much variation and \textit{ad hoc} practice between them. Across the 162 survey respondents and 142 direct interviews conducted in this research, there was effectively unanimous support for both the team building benefits of co-location, and the conclusion that co-location leads to more effective and efficient UN electoral assistance. The research also pointed to perceived and real barriers to co-location from different UN administrative systems. An early collective vision of UN assistance and strong leadership in the planning phase was key to successful co-location. It is recommended that co-location should be stated as policy at the outset by UN leadership.

Co-located integrated UN electoral components: Following the design of Figure 3 above,

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74 \textit{SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 5 -DPA and UNDP Revised Note of Guidance on Electoral Assistance, 12 October 2010, Point 8}
75 S/RES/1528/2004, 27 February 2004
76 In April 2010, nearly two weeks after the general elections when international coordination had been problematic, a stronger UNMIS mandate was given for the 2011 referendum, adding: to ‘play a lead role in international efforts to provide assistance,’ S/RES/1919/2010, 29 April 2010, para 7
77 See A/66/314, 19 August 2011, para 59
the research showed that three levels of co-location should be considered by electoral planners in all Mission settings. The first level involves co-located integrated UN electoral components, specifically all UN electoral staff, whether they are recruited on Mission, UNDP, UNOPS or other contracts. In all case studies, integrated UN electoral components produced more effective teams, but co-located integrated UN electoral components achieved the highest quality IEA overall. Parallel offices created their own parallel chains of command and reporting lines, and proved to be counterproductive and confusing to other UN and external partners. It is strongly recommended that co-location at UN electoral component should be the policy norm in all cases.

Co-located non-electoral UN staff: The second level applies to non-electoral UN staff whose core functions are outside or beyond elections, but are involved in some election related activities. In all seven case studies, the UN electoral assistance mandates required significant effort from a diverse range of non-electoral UN staff who provided direct and full-time assistance to EMBs and other national authorities and civil society organizations. These UN staff were also more effective and efficient when co-located, but the research found too much variation between case studies to justify one prescriptive co-location policy. When designing who to co-locate in what area of assistance, the country-specific assessment should consider the Security Council mandate and how it is translated into a UN division of labor, the UN family footprint country-wide, and the EMB capacity and footprint, especially at sub-national levels. In some cases, the security assessment of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) may drive a decision to co-locate sub-national UN offices.

Co-located UN, EMB and other international electoral assistance providers: The third level applies to UN, EMB and other international electoral assistance providers, where co-location can increase coherence and impact overall. This third level is driven even more by country-specific circumstances, organizational risk assessment, and the nature and complexity of each electoral process. Political will, UN leadership and administrative flexibility combined to facilitate this third level of co-location in DRC 2006, and, to a lesser degree in Timor-Leste 2007, Iraq 2010 and Sudan 2011. In some cases, DSS may assess staff security to be negatively impacted by co-location with non-UN staff. In other cases, the benefits to effective and efficient technical assistance and the sustainability of that assistance may be outweighed by political issues and perceived risks to the UN’s credibility. Substantive staff interviewed were in agreement that these risks should be appropriately weighed, but that administrative issues should not drive these decisions; on the contrary administrative barriers to co-location should be lowered. Limited interviews with DFS staff suggested administrative issues more often have to do with the UN leadership and the interpretation of UN administrative rules than with the rules themselves being the problem. It is recommended co-location of non-electoral UN staff, and of UN, EMB and other international assistance providers should be a policy principle considered in the planning phase of each electoral process.

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78 A clear UN electoral security mandate may warrant dedicated co-location of key UN actors involved in electoral security analysis, monitoring and response to incidents. Dedicated mandates to promote participation of women in the electoral process or to support the EMB and civil society to launch nationwide voter and civic education campaigns, may be well served by co-located UN teams in those areas of assistance. This second layer of co-location could therefore involve staff from UNDP democratic governance, UN Women and WFP logistics, and any number of staff from Mission substantive components, including military and police, and administration components.
3.10 UN Administrative Rules

*United Nations work in conflict settings ... requires embracing calculated risk.*

Administrative rules and regulations: Emerging from the survey and interviews was the clear need for administrative rules and regulations to be reviewed and potentially revised to facilitate IEA and reflect the realities on the ground in Mission setting electoral assistance. While there is a need to maintain administrative control over the use of resources belonging to one entity or another, there is also a need to balance these administrative risks with the risk for the UN to lose credibility when it is not effective in implementing its mandates or not efficient in the collective use of UN resources. For example, in the case of the 2006 elections in DRC, interviewees cited UN Mission transport rules as problematic, noting that UNCT personnel were not allowed to board MONUC vehicles, even in remote locations, without written authorization from Kinshasa. For IEA to work, there is a need for administrative leadership and vision, as in Iraq where well before 2010 there was agreement on integrated support to the UN mandate.\(^\text{80}\) ICMEA should advocate a package of administrative reforms to change rules that impede IEA, and improve knowledge of rules that promote IEA; develop an MoU/Agreement template for the use of UN resources by all UN actors involved in IEA.\(^\text{81}\)

Standardization of IT systems: A lack of IT standardization between the Mission and UNCT can also create unnecessary delays for UN electoral assistance and complicate assistance to an EMB.\(^\text{82}\) Staff in a UN electoral component often confront the need to operate two independent IT systems: the Mission and the UNDP systems. In the post-conflict elections studied, EMBs were also frequently reliant on the UN for its national telecommunications footprint. Even in the highly integrated structures in DRC in 2006, the different email systems inhibited the rapid electronic communication necessary for election administration. With security threats to electoral staff present in most of the cases studied, a lack of standardization was particularly troublesome for emergency communication.

Where there was a collective will, leadership and a shared vision of UN assistance, administrative issues were resolved, and assistance was delivered more efficiently. A recommendation is that electronic rooms (e-rooms) be created to allow UNCT staff to be connected to Mission staff on a joint platform.\(^\text{83}\) Moreover, general rules and regulations on communication and information sharing need to be revised or interpreted more consistently to better facilitate working together in an integrated team. In most of the case studies, agency personnel did not have access to Lotus notes, where flight, security and other administrative information was disseminated. Missions were unable to share minutes of political and diplomatic meetings with the UNCT due to internal DPKO confidentiality rules. In Afghanistan, however, UNDP and UNAMA formally agreed to allow UNDP contracted electoral staff to have UNAMA identity cards and access to Lotus Notes. Where relevant, it is recommended that an IEA management working group be established in the field with responsibility for system standardization, colocation and other administrative issues.

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\(^{79}\) A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011, p 23
\(^{80}\) As per the model in the toolkit at Annex 6
\(^{81}\) Possibly by the DFS-Chaired operational support review process mandated in SG Decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010, Para (v), and SG Decision 2011/23, 10 November 2011, Para (vii)
\(^{82}\) See the ‘battle for air-conditioners’ in S. S. Smith, *Afghanistan's Troubled Transition*, 2011, pp70-72
\(^{83}\) Burundi 2010, as per the model in the toolkit at Annex 6
3.11 Lessons from Good Offices and Preventive Diplomacy

'peacebuilders can use a variety of methods to promote greater moderation in the parties contesting elections.'

The study found that IEA structures and methods can contribute to more effective and integrated use of the UN’s good offices and preventive diplomacy capacities in electoral processes. There has been extensive research and reflection in the last five years on the imperative to prevent election-related violence. The benefits of integrated strategies or a ‘holistic and comprehensive approach’ by national and international actors have been recognized, combining national and international mediation, conflict prevention and dialogue capacities. All of the cases studied faced direct and indirect election threats that escalated into violence.

Interviewees generally reflected that success in preventing and responding to violence involved the combination of integrated UN action that was linked to the actions of other national and international political and security actors. Diplomatic coordination groups were cited as providing an effective meeting place for informal discussions on strategy. While there is guidance for UNDP programming to prevent election-related violence in all settings, there is none applicable for UN Mission settings, and very little available on sub-national engagement with local political conflicts and the experiences of UN actors. DPA could consult on a short guidance note to outline practices and experiences in the use of good offices in preventing election-related violence and integrating UN efforts to that end.

3.12 Integrating Public Information

‘Given that elections are fundamentally political events, the Organization’s impartiality remains its biggest asset.’

A key difference between the post-conflict elections studied and elections in other settings is that the political and conflict environment greatly increased the visibility of the UN’s assistance. As a result, UN electoral assistance was directly tied to the overall reputation and credibility of the United Nations in-country, elevating the need to coordinate accurate and timely public messaging. In several of the case studies, press releases on elections were not verified by the CEA and CTAs, or different UN entities released statements without being cleared by the UN spokesperson, exposing the UN to

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84 R. Paris, At War’s End: building peace after civil conflict, 2004, p 189
86 C. Fomunyoh, Mediating election-related conflicts, July 2009, p 6
87 One of the key resources describing that violence were the SG’s reports to the Security Council written during and after each electoral process. Further, 40% of post-conflict countries revert to violence in the decade following war, P. Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes, Harper Collins, 2009, p 75
88 In addition extensive UN Volunteers sub-national experience in the last twenty years, UN Civil Affairs Officers have untapped knowledge as well. See Civil Affairs Handbook, DPKO and DFS, February 2012
89 A/64/304, 14 August 2009, p 2
90 SG decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010, Para (ii), and Annex 5 - DPA and UNDP Revised Note of Guidance on Electoral Assistance, Par 7 (k)
unnecessary reputational risk, as well as its leaders.\textsuperscript{91} Electoral pronouncements also need to take into account existing post-conflict messaging strategies, for example, on reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Given the above, it is important that staff from the Department of Public Information (DPI) and the Public Information staff of the lead department are integrated at the NAM stage, and to factor in their deployable capacities and specialist skills (as done in Timor-Leste 2007). More could also be done to integrate existing public information capacities with election-specific UN Mission and UNDP voter and civic education capacities. For example, in some cases deployment of dedicated UNV Public Information Electoral Officers in tandem with electoral staff deployments has proven to be an effective way of sustaining public information outreach throughout electoral cycles. DPI should undertake a short study with ICMEA on the integration of public information capacities in the UN’s electoral assistance. IEA public information guidance should stress that all communications related to the electoral process are cleared by both the CEA and the SRSG’s public information structures.

3.13 A broader agenda: Gender, Human Rights, and other areas of assistance

This study was tasked with looking at the link between integrated electoral assistance and gender and human rights, in order to assess if integration improves UN support in these two areas. Too little information was gathered on these subjects, in particular on human rights, to do justice to the topic. In terms of women’s participation and gender mainstreaming, in all seven case studies, there were country-specific UN mandates to improve women’s issues and election-specific programmes on women’s empowerment were in place.\textsuperscript{92} Entities working on gender, in particular components within the Missions, former and current staff of UN Women, and UNDP, were better served by being involved in IEA, feeding into those structures and gaining valuable election-specific information from them. The research did indicate that there was insufficient depth and quality of gender analysis undertaken in the NAMs, so the recent commitment to ensure ‘full consideration of gender issues’ in the NAMs is a welcome start to address this gap.\textsuperscript{93}

Input from UN Women stressed the importance of focusing on the impact of IEA on women’s participation and gender mainstreaming, given recent attention to these issues in peace process mediation, inclusive politics in electoral processes during and after conflict,\textsuperscript{94} and the special role Member States have directed for UN system support. While the recent decision to develop specific UN guidance on gender and electoral assistance is timely,\textsuperscript{95} it is recommended that this guidance be preceded by more research. Specifically, there needs to be a stronger understanding of the impact on women of electoral technical assistance in various areas, for example, voter registration in conflict-affected communities, polling booth location, and targeted voter education.

\textsuperscript{91} There are several examples of SRSGs being declared \textit{persona non grata} at least in part because of positions taken on UN electoral assistance.
\textsuperscript{92} Earlier recommendations relate to improving gender analysis in NAMs, and considering IEA and/or election-specific coordination mechanisms to improve women’s participation.
\textsuperscript{93} See A/65/354-S/2010/466, 7 September 2010, which in its seven commitments sought to improve the quality of UN technical assistance, including the use of temporary special measures as a tool to increase women’s political participation; SG Decision No. 2011/23, \textit{Annex A Needs Assessment}, 10 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{94} See, for example, the most recent ‘Women, Peace and Security’ Security Council debate, S/PRST/2012/3, 23 February 2012
\textsuperscript{95} See: SG Decision 2011/23, 10 November 2011, para 6; UNDP is also conducting an internal review on some of these issues through its Lessons Learned on Gender Mainstreaming in Electoral Assistance.
Such research could also be an opportunity to increase dialogue and share lessons between the UN electoral community and the UN gender community. It is therefore recommended that there should be a dedicated study on the impact of IEA on UN programming to improve women’s participation and gender mainstreaming. Further, as of 25 August 2010, the UN electoral roster had 251 women across all Director and Professional levels (31%). Given the benefits to integration of balanced UN electoral teams, and existing UN gender mainstreaming policy on this issue, DPA/EAD should work with partners to achieve parity and increase the pool of women selected on the UN electoral roster, as well as the number of women recruited to senior electoral posts.

**Integrating support to political parties and parliament:** The study revealed issues related to UN assistance to political parties and parliaments that were clearly key to the overall conduct of each electoral process, including to sustainability, national ownership and transition. For various reasons, political parties received very little direct support and any support provided was marginal compared to that provided to EMBs in each of the case studies. In concert with INGOs long established in this field, UNDP has been developing targeted longer-term programmes to support parties, often linked to parliamentary support. More could be done by UNDP, more could be done with the assistance and political cover of the UN Mission, and the extensive experience in this sensitive area could be captured and analyzed. The key mission resource in this respect are the staff in the Political Affairs Component (totaling about 569 professionals in PKO/SPMs in 2011). Stronger partnerships and greater integration could be achieved between UNDP’s democratic governance area and those components.

**UN peacekeepers and UN police:** A significant weakness of this research has been the lack of input from, and analysis on, UN peacekeepers and UN police. While 20 UN Police completed the survey, only four UN military staff did, and no interviews were conducted with either group. Yet data on the year of each election shows the largest volume of resources available in the UN family came from UN contingents: for Sudan’s general elections there were 5,258 contingent owned vehicles alone in the country; and, adding up all those deployed across all case studies in the year of the election, there were 61,536 deployed troops and 10,385 police, compared with an estimate of 1,822 electoral staff (see Annexes for estimates). Numerous interviewees spoke of the key role military and police components played in UN supported electoral processes, in particular in security, logistics, operational planning and management, and crisis response.

Voters country-wide were more likely to receive election information directly from – or have their ballot transported by – UN peacekeepers and UN Police than any other groups in the five PKO cases studied. Each issue deserves separate study, though for the UN electoral community, perhaps the most urgent research question is the degree to which military logistical lift is helpful or harmful to election events and related cost-effectiveness and sustainability questions. The research team recommends that follow-up research should also be conducted on UN electoral assistance and human rights, support to political parties and parliament, and the role of UN military and UN

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96 SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 3 - UN Electoral Assistance Roster Capabilities, 12 October 2010
97 While there is no clear lead global service provider on UN support to political parties, it is being taken up by the SG since being raised in A/66/311-S/2011/527, 19 August 2011, p 15
98 Center on International Cooperation, Review of Political Missions 2011, p 154 showing 259 political affairs officers at 30 April 2011, and Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012, p151 showing another 310 political affairs officers at 31 October 2011. Statistics are from DFS/FPD and DPKO EO. PKO/SPM Civil Affairs Officers are frequently directly involved as well.
Comparing experiences with other areas of civilian capacity: Several interviewees and survey responses pointed to common challenges with integration in other areas of civilian capacity. Some of the work of the ISG is designed to address those challenges, in particular from the ISG’s Support Working Group, as well as the follow up to the International Review of Civilian Capacity. A recent report on UN integration with humanitarian action provides many relevant findings, and there were common experiences in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), even if – unlike electoral assistance – steps in DDR generally occur just once in any given conflict cycle. A recommendation is for ICMEA, with the Civilian Capacity Unit, to share this lessons learned study with other areas of civilian capacity, to exchange experiences on integration, and to strengthen the call for broader policy changes that benefit integration.

4. INTEGRATING SUSTAINABILITY & CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

‘The Panel supports ..better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.’

With the Lessons Learned Working Group requesting analysis on the principles of sustainability, cost-effectiveness and national ownership, the research team posed questions in the survey, sought the views of experienced electoral practitioners and UN leaders, collected data across all seven case studies, and delved into these issues in more detail in specific case studies. The research team also collaborated with the UNDP Lessons Learning on UN’s Long-Term Electoral Assistance, holding validation workshops for the two studies in New York the same week.

The research pointed to challenges in reconciling what the Concept Note described as ‘differing peacekeeping and developmental approaches,’ and whether it was possible and desirable to ensure ‘objectives of immediate stability and longer-term sustainability.’ This pointed to a larger Mission setting challenge for integration to concentrate ‘on those activities required to consolidate peace’ through a ‘shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives.’ More detailed analysis was prevented due to systemic data collection problems relating to both UN electoral staff, and to PKO and SPM electoral budgets and expenditure. Those issues are also outlined in this section. Finally, the research team identified a lack of UN commitment and strategy to invest in and develop the capacity of its own electoral staff. This section provides recommendations to address these gaps, and more detailed recommendations are found separately in Annex 6.

4.1 Sustainability Challenges in Mission Settings

‘the new challenge is to build sustainable [electoral] procedures that function effectively without external assistance. In this area, progress has been slow.’

EMB institutional development and sustainable electoral administration: Based entirely

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99 See the recent report: V. Metcalfe, A. Giffen and S. Elhawary, UN Integration and Humanitarian Space, Humanitarian Policy Group, and Stimson Center, December 2011
101 SG Decision 2008/24, 26 June 2008
on qualitative analysis, the seven case studies highlighted the considerable challenge of supporting longer-term EMB institutional development and sustainable electoral administration in post-conflict settings. Every aspect of assistance in these Mission settings was seen to have had a potential positive or negative impact on sustainability. Although sustainable and integrated electoral assistance was seen as a component of the larger goal to consolidate peace, there were significant differences across the case studies in terms of the scale and type of sustainability challenge faced between first and subsequent post-conflict elections, and between elections supported by PKOs versus by SPMs. Post-conflict elections also concentrated ‘normal’ election challenges, for example, delays in finalizing Constitutions, drafting electoral laws and establishing EMBs, resulted in very short electoral timeframes, reducing the time needed to formulate more sustainable electoral administration practices. EMB counterparts in four of the case studies were new and all lacked capacity and legitimacy.

First post-conflict elections: The case studies showed that the most difficult electoral assistance scenarios, with high IEA and sustainability transaction costs, were first post-conflict elections. Electoral assistance was supported by a PKO in four of the seven case studies, three of them ‘first post-conflict elections’: DRC 2006, CDI 2010, Sudan 2010 and 2011. In the early stages of electoral planning, the UN and its Member States describe being confronted with a dilemma of where to focus effort and limited resources: on strategies supporting sustainable and cost-effective electoral and political processes, or, to meet the political and logistical challenge of holding a timely, credible and accepted election event required by the peace process. Although these two are not mutually exclusive objectives, the latter was described as frequently dictating the former.

Two comments were commonly heard: on the one hand there was an over-reliance on peacekeeping logistical lift, invisible to the EMB, and on the other hand, donors tended not to allocate funds in a way that promoted sustainable institutions. In DRC 2006, an extraordinary volume of resources were made available, and the electoral process was principally organized, financed and secured through international assistance because it was ‘too important to fail.’ In other cases, EMBs accepted the option to effectively outsource election logistics to the existing and already nationally-deployed and functioning PKO planning and operational apparatus. Guidance should be developed with DPKO and DFS to integrate peacekeeping logistical planning with an EMB’s operational staff, and to utilize the capacity more transparently and sustainably.

The false dilemma of event-versus-cycle: The research pointed to a sea change in the last

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103 For example: using the UN’s 1,628 police in Timor-Leste nation-wide as the face of electoral security in 2007 was a deliberate strategic decision of UN and national leaders, as was the extensive use of MONUC’s 27 fixed wing and 70 rotary wing air assets to logistically support the DRC’s elections in 2006. Every UNDP-managed donor basket fund provided a platform for donors to fund electoral tasks, activities that would otherwise be funded by government direct to their electoral and other supporting institutions.

104 Short timeframes drove rational decision-making and shortcuts by nationals and internationals to ensure sequential and concurrent political, technical and operational tasks for a given election were completed; and these shortcuts may well impact negatively on sustainable electoral administration in the future.

105 Some electoral commission members were the product of compromise between political elites, in several cases the EMBs did not trust UN assistance until very late in the process, and in one case the EMB was explicitly established for one election only.

106 These elections required integration between three distinct areas of IEA: between new components of a large multidimensional PKO completing its deployment; between the PKO and a large new UNDP electoral project, and; between other UNCT actors who were in some cases already present in-country.

decade among UN electoral staff who more often felt the “event-versus-cycle approach” question had been answered, especially in countries on the Security Council’s agenda. Reflecting “peace versus justice” debates, the impression of the more than 50 staff interviewed on this topic reveals event-versus-cycle is a ‘false dilemma.’ Interviewees generally had a high level of awareness of when UN capacities were used in place of national capacities, and that this substitution traded – to some degree – longer-term sustainability goals to achieve shorter-term peace objectives.

With so much politically invested in election events, the question for UN leadership and CEAs in each country was how to minimize the risk of dependency, of setting unaffordable electoral administration precedents, and high expectations from voters to the EMB downstream. Many experiences and ideas were provided in interviews and the survey. However, a deeper understanding of these issues was only found in pockets of the UN electoral community and there is insufficient consistency and clarity in UN legislative policies to support it. As a start, new UN guidance should state the most effective sustainability strategy for UN assistance is a complementary ‘event and cycle approach’ to maximize the UN legacy, guided by the language in GA Resolution 66/163.

‘Elections in zones of conflict tend to be saddled with multiple and sometimes incompatible objectives.’

Seeking one UN sustainability vision and strategy: A key challenge from the research was identifying and articulating one UN vision and strategy on sustainable electoral assistance. The issues followed – to some degree – one of the central challenges for UN integration overall: the different sources of mandate claimed by the UN peace and security pillar represented by the Mission, and the development pillar represented by UNDP. It was also undermined by the fact that while the quantitative side of election delivery is eminently measurable, sustainability is a more nebulous concept, and is intertwined with other areas such as public administration and Civil Service reform, security sector and judicial reform. This interdependence increases the importance of not only an integrated UN approach, but also of electoral sustainability being integrated into broader peacebuilding and political settlement dialogue.

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108 ‘ICTJ Factsheet: Pursuing Peace, Justice, or both’, 7 April 2012
111 Across 31 interviews in the Sudan 2010 case there were particularly stark differences in visions for sustainability. Explanations for conflicting visions and ideological contentions, which matched descriptions in other cases, were: the fact the Mission received its mandate from the Security Council, and UNDP from its Executive Board; the Mission was funded by the GA and UNDP only from Western donors; UNMIS had to focus on the horizon limits of the peace agreement and its political outcomes, yet UNDP had a multi-year agreement, signed with the current government, looking towards longer-term developmental outcomes; UNMIS was a more centralized structure, with DPKO as lead department and more direct accountability to Member States, and the UNDP Country Office was decentralized with greater delegated authority from New York, less governed by Member State politics in NY.
112 Although a detailed review of all UN strategy documents wasn’t possible, the case study research pointed to particular difficulties for UN leaders and planners to develop one vision for sustainability, and allocate tasks accordingly. For a comparison of electoral assistance arrangements with other areas – DDR, SSR, Mine Action, etc; see: Andrea Woodhouse, Review of Current Institutional Arrangements in Priority Peacebuilding Areas, October 2010, for EOG
More pressure is placed on EMBs and the UN electoral community to deliver election events because post-conflict elections have been measures of a country’s trajectory to peace, stability and development, and Member States benchmark progress on them. Further, political calculations on sustainability goals in first post-conflict elections were frequently governed by the goals set in Comprehensive Peace Agreements and for second and later elections by a new array of national/international transition compacts. UN vision and strategy for sustainable electoral assistance should be embedded in broader national / international political agreements and transition compacts. When appropriate, and ideally before a first post-conflict election, CEAs should utilize Security Council mandates and NAM reports to articulate a longer-term vision for sustainable UN electoral assistance, developed jointly with the UN family and EMB; the vision could outline national and UN goals for EMB institutional development, to minimize substitution, and to seek cost-effective electoral administration. A UN sustainability strategy for electoral assistance should be included in the UN Integrated Strategic Framework.

4.2 Measuring the Impact of IEA and the UN Legacy

In the survey, 75 per cent of the 157 respondents deemed the effect of IEA on national ownership to be “positive” or “very positive,” and 64 per cent deemed the effect of IEA on sustainable electoral institutions and sustainable electoral management practices to be “positive” or “very positive.” This implies the way UN staff work, and the structures and processes they put in place to work with EMBs, may be sufficiently inclusive, but UN staff are perhaps less confident about the overall impact. A total of 56 of the respondents listed practical strategies taken to avoid non-sustainable processes. The interviews also revealed that, first, longer-term sustainability goals were enhanced when IEA methods connected UN electoral staff and built teams with others such as UNDP democratic governance, UN Women, and other Mission substantive components. Second, while IEA improved internal UN coordination, the structures were not transparent to EMBs, and could undermine sustainability and particularly national ownership. Therefore CEAs should maintain a strong focus on trust-building, mentoring and joint planning and decision-making in election-specific coordination mechanisms, especially when UN/EMB co-location is not possible.

Interviewees additionally identified three imperatives to improve the UN’s understanding of these questions. The first is that Mission setting UN assistance has involved quite intrusive mandates requiring the UN to co-administer elections and to comment on their credibility and legitimacy. UN roles have included certification or verification of the entire electoral process (Timor-Leste 2007, Cote D’Ivoire 2010, and Sudan 2011) as well as a UN presence in hybrid national/international electoral organs (Timor-Leste 2001 and 2002, and Iraq 2005).

The second imperative is that while interviewees understood Mission setting assistance (especially by PKOs) involved particularly expensive assets not available to national authorities, in only one of the seven case studies (Sudan 2011), a calculation was made of the cost of Mission electoral assistance, and in only one was there an estimate of

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114 It is also important to keep in mind that less than 10 per cent of the respondents were non-UN nationals.

115 The UNDP Lessons Learning on UN’s Long-Term Electoral Assistance includes one Mission setting – Liberia – and is researching this impact over time.
Mission transport assets utilized (Timor-Leste 2007).

The third reason for greater focus on measuring sustainability is that interviewees discussed there is little knowledge of the legacy of unsustainable electoral administration practices in Mission settings.\textsuperscript{116} While recent changes require NAMs globally to explicitly address sustainability questions, the needs of Mission settings provide unique and arguably significantly greater challenges on this question. At opportune moments (in between-election or Mission transition periods, for example) DPA/EAD could deploy a NAM follow-up with sustainability experts to make longer-term assessments and recommendations.\textsuperscript{117} Efforts to address this could learn from existing tools on the legacy of UN assistance.\textsuperscript{118} EAD/DPA with IGMEA members should consider drafting guidance on ‘Maximizing the legacy of UN electoral assistance in Mission settings.’

4.3 Seeking Clearer Sustainability Mandates

‘more important than an exit strategy is a comprehensive transition strategy,’\textsuperscript{119}

The UN’s normative framework on sustainability: The research found the normative framework on sustainability, cost-effectiveness and national ownership to be strong globally, but with insufficient attention to the specific needs of post-conflict elections and Mission settings. As shown in Figure 4 below, the most recent GA resolution includes specific language on sustainable and nationally owned electoral assistance, and for the SG, through the UN Electoral Focal Point, to improve longer-term assistance and institutional capacity building. A key element of UNDP’s global mandate is a commitment to national ownership, reaffirmed by the GA in the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review and its resolution on system-wide coherence.\textsuperscript{120} Further, UNDP also has subordinate and supportive global guidance from the UNDP Executive Board, as well as recent guidance on the ‘electoral cycle approach’ which has been recognized in the SG’s reports. The 2010 DPA/UNDP Note of Guidance states that ‘medium and long-term activities’ fall under UNDP’s democratic governance activities through the Country Program.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{116} Examples include: the extensive use of air assets; national voter registration having to be repeated in successive electoral cycle; low levels of election funding from the Government; and, low EMB staff retention between elections.

\textsuperscript{117} The new guidance states NAMs are required to assess the sustainability of UN electoral assistance (SG Decision 2010/23, Annex 5 - DPA/UNDP Revised Note of Guidance, para 7(c)). The more recent SG Decision 2011/23, Annex 3 - Needs Assessment, states that NAMs ‘recommend the length of UN electoral support,’ although that prerogative is balanced by the authority of the Security Council in Mission settings.

\textsuperscript{118} See, for example, United Nations, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008

\textsuperscript{119} J. Western, J.S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons from Somalia to Libya, Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, No. 6, November/December 2011, p 59


\textsuperscript{121} SG Decision 2010/23, 12 October 2010, Annex 5 - DPA and UNDP Revised Note of Guidance on Electoral Assistance, 12 October 2010, para 7 (h)
Figure 4: General Assembly Focus on Sustainability

The GA now recognizes: ‘the need for strengthening ... electoral institutions and national capacity building’; for UN technical assistance ‘throughout the entire electoral cycle, including before and after the elections... bearing in mind sustainability and cost-effectiveness’ and ‘particularly through appropriate, sustainable and cost-effective electoral technology’; and, encouraging the UN focal point to respond to the ‘growing need for specific types of medium-term expert assistance aimed at supporting and strengthening the existing capacity of the requesting Government, in particular by enhancing the capacity of national electoral institutions.’ A/RES/66/163, 10 April 2012

The Security Council and sustainability: Since 2008, considerable international attention has focused on the need to take a different approach to assistance provided in conflict-affected countries, for example in the recent Aid Effectiveness forum in Busan, where 3 of 6 case study countries were participants (DRC, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste were the international co-lead).122 The first of five goals agreed between Member States in a New Deal was ‘legitimate politics.’ More consistency from the Security Council to address similar electoral issues could also improve practice in the field. Analysis of Security Council mandates found nearly all to be electoral event dependent (to support a specific electoral process), with some alluding to longer-term objectives to support institution building. However, when the election event was finished, the Council’s operative paragraph directing institution building was generally deemed to have been achieved, and no longer part of the Mission mandate.

4.4 Measuring what counts: gaps in UN electoral data

‘Elections held as part of broader and long-lasting peacekeeping operations are the costliest of all.’123

In order to investigate the efficiency of IEA structures and methods and possible impact on sustainable electoral assistance, the research team sought to collect data on the number and type of contract of UN electoral staff integrated into UN structures, and the volume of UN expenditure directed to UN assistance (including staff and material costs), in order to establish if that expenditure was efficiently used, and whether IEA played a part in saving costs. This information should also be available for an EMB to understand how much their election cost in total, permitting a much more realistic assessment of sustainability and cost-effectiveness, and the UN legacy.

UN electoral staff data: The first finding from this exercise relates to the UN electoral staff data (see Annexes 3): there were significant difficulties obtaining UN electoral staff data, and there were significant discrepancies between UN entities providing that data for the same electoral component.124 Research proved that there is no systematic

122 Other Mission setting countries with UN electoral assistance included Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. In addition to the the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding presented at the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan 2011, international debates and norm setting on these topics in the last five years include the agenda on Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the International Review of Civilian Capacities, the World Development Report. For references see Annex 9 bibliography.
123 R. López-Pintor, J. Fischer, Getting to the CORE, June 2005, p 22
124 In addition to the different human resources systems, gaps in staff data were due to fast deployment for specific elections bringing together a complex web of UN staff on different contracts, as substantive or
documentation of staffing of UN electoral components either at HQ or in the field.\footnote{125} Across the different UN human resources systems, DPA/EAD should improve tracking all UN electoral staff in Mission settings, and provide a standard disaggregated template for electoral component staffing data to be used both for initial planning and for End of Mission reporting.

**PKO/SPM electoral budgets and expenditure:** UNDP Basket Fund mechanisms track electoral expenditure, whether from donors or Government, and are used publicly to budget overall cost of elections and electoral assistance and declare subsequent expenditure.\footnote{126} However, data on PKO/SPM electoral budgets and expenditure was as difficult to obtain as staff numbers, yet would be an essential baseline to make a judgment whether UN electoral assistance was sustainable and cost-effective, and whether IEA contributed – or not – to overall UN efficiency. Interviewees did not doubt significant proportions of Member State PKO and SPM budgets were spent on electoral assistance in the year of the elections,\footnote{127} and felt more could be done to capture this expenditure: the lack of data produces an accountability gap, as well as a credibility gap that allows assistance to be labeled “expensive” or “cheap” without recourse to facts.\footnote{128}

With one exception (Sudan 2011), the research was only able to record the total PKO/SPM Mission expenditure in the year the election took place. Resolution of the issue was understood to be, in part, within the budget information systems managed by the Secretariat’s Department of Management (DM), and for ICMEA to provide an outline of what data is needed.

To begin to remedy this gap, DFS and DM should analyze electoral budgets and expenditure across the seven case studies across major budget lines. Further, and without waiting for the results of the Operational Support Review Process tasked in 2010,\footnote{129} DFS and DM should establish a system to ensure that UN Mission electoral budgets and then expenditure can be captured from the outset, monitored, and regularly reported to UN electoral and EMB staff.

### 4.5 Developing the Knowledge & Capacity of UN Staff

**Institutional memory:** As shown earlier, the survey highlighted low levels of awareness among UN staff of IEA policy and practice, with remarkably little systematic capture of institutional memory in the last twenty years. Although there was high quality and integrated after-action reviews in several cases, in general the lessons learned from previous Mission setting IEA have been inconsistently documented, and little has been done to systematically distribute examples of best practice.

Ten years ago, informal networks shared this information, or the same staff were

\footnote{125} For example, the following data was received in response to the research team’s request for UNVs on UNDP contracts working on the second round of the November 2006 DRC Presidential Elections: DPKO 47; UNDP 53; and, UNV Bonn 3. Information provided by EAD was similarly inconsistent. The only staffing data that could be provided on the recently completed 2011 Southern Sudan Referendum was a paper outlining additional posts needed in UNMIS for 2011 Referendum.

\footnote{126} See footnotes 3 and 28 in D. Gillies, _Electoral democracy and the paradoxes of peacebuilding_, in D. Gillies ed, 2011, with UNDP electoral project figures but no PKO/SPM expenditure cited.

\footnote{127} See Annex 4 for PKO/SPM total expenditure in the year of the case study election, which should not be confused for ‘electoral’ PKO/SPM expenditure.

\footnote{128} Some unreliability in budget data would be expected given the operational complexity of running elections in Mission settings, the sometimes _ad hoc_ nature of electoral logistics and security, and dual use of transport and security capacities. See R. López-Pintor, J. Fischer, Getting to the CORE, June 2005, p 17

deployed from one election to the next. Now, however, the UN electoral roster is at capacity, and electoral processes are occurring in greater number on the Security Council’s agenda. It was stressed that there is a need for regular communication and sharing of information through a more inclusive knowledge management system. Communication across UN entities with different information technology systems continues to confound attempts at integrated communication, and the UN electoral community has extra challenges with staff highlighted above, including a particularly large contingent of experienced UNVs moving in and out of electoral roles globally. Given DPA/EAD’s responsibilities in this area, the UN Electoral Focal Point with ICMEA members should assess options for an electoral assistance knowledge management strategy including an online platform and database managed collaboratively and a critical assessment of the utility and feasibility of establishing a UN electoral assistance Community of Practice.  

IEA guidance package: Specific recommendations have been made through this study for the contents of a simple IEA guidance package, to articulate current policy, principles and best practices. Given the speed of learning in IEA, such a package should be light, in plain language and systematically updated and communicated to electoral practitioners. This report earlier recommended that a tiered IEA guidance package should be developed by ICMEA, which could include: several paragraphs of mutually reinforcing IEA policy from UN legislative bodies (GA, Security Council and UNDP Executive Board); the new SG electoral assistance arrangements policy at the end of 2012; with a subordinate IEA UN Electoral Focal Point Policy of IEA principles; and further detail in an ICMEA-endorsed IEA best practices guidance and annexed toolkits (see Annex 5).  

EAD/DPA with ICMEA members should outline a cascade strategy to disseminate and periodically improve the tiered IEA guidance package. Additional ideas provided in interviews, the survey, and the Validation Workshop to develop the knowledge and capacity of UN electoral staff are included in Annex 6. Such an approach would go a long way to addressing one of the reasons this study was launched in the first place, and one of the first findings of this report, that ‘most learning and adaptation has been ad hoc or accidental, and based as much as anything on personalities.’

ANNEXES

130 An overwhelming majority of 86.5% of survey respondents responded either “very positive” or “positive” to the suggestion of establishing a Community of Practice (COP) on IEA. However, many concerns were raised that suggest it is perhaps not the answer or requires more critical analysis: it could simply result in more emails, with limited impact; COPs are expensive, require full-time moderation and rely on motivated individuals to keep them dynamic; if a new COP didn’t have a clearly defined goal then it could duplicate and undermine the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network and UNDP’s electoral assistance COP; given most electoral staff enter and exit the UN system on short term contracts, any new COP would need to be open to staff off-contract and on personal e-mails; a key question would be whether to target the UN electoral community (effectively those staff on the UN electoral roster), or to open it to the many other UN staff who provide electoral assistance.

131 Such a package could be guided by the benchmarks set out in SG Decision 2010/23, 10 November 2011, Annex 4 - Benchmarks for UN Electoral Assistance
Annex 1 – Checklist for Integrating UN Electoral Assistance

The following are the key ingredients and conditions for integrated electoral assistance (IEA) success in UN Mission settings found from the study, regardless of the electoral process, political or conflict environment, and configuration of UN actors in the field:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clear Security Council mandates calling for IEA, tasking a UN lead of international assistance, separately signaling longer-term electoral assistance goals, and with broad Member State consensus on and support for all elements of the UN role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timely, integrated and inclusive political and technical needs assessment and planning, with one UN division of labor plan, and with subsequent HQ backstopping on IEA structures and methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated budget planning between the PKO/SPM and basket fund, tracking of PKO/SPM electoral expenditure at the outset, and involvement of the EMB in Mission operational and logistical planning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smart electoral team design leading to one integrated UN electoral component, outlined in one organogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear, inclusive and unified UN electoral leadership from the HQ lead department, DPA/EAD, the SRSG and relevant DSRSG, and a CEA, in the SRSG’s Senior Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timely and integrated UN electoral recruitment, and systematic IEA policy and best practices induction with staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The effective use of existing UN integration machinery by the UN electoral component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriately designed election-specific coordination mechanisms, involving the EMB, UN and other international assistance providers, in four areas: Diplomatic coordination; donor coordination and basket fund management; election, technical and policy coordination; and, other subordinate operational and thematic working groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-location at three levels from the outset: in all cases co-locating the UN electoral component; ideally co-locating non-electoral UN staff working on similar thematic areas (voter education); and ideally co-locating with the EMB and other international assistance providers, and creating a Joint Electoral Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN leaders to articulate one UN vision and strategy on sustainable electoral assistance, taking a complementary event-and-cycle approach to maximize the UN legacy, ideally developed jointly with an EMB and embedded in broader national / international political agreements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2 – *Typical Electoral Assistance Tempo in Mission Settings*

Figure A: UN Electoral Assistance Cycles

Figure B: UN Mission Lifecycle and Deployment Phases

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Annexes page [ii]
Annex 3 – UN Electoral Staff Estimates in Seven Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Country</th>
<th>Month of data</th>
<th>Data from DPKO/DPA</th>
<th>Data from UNDP</th>
<th>Data from UNV Bonn</th>
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Total electoral components 1757

133 In some instances, the figures reflect the approved staffing, and in others, actual staffing, including seconded and contracted staff. Staffing data sources also included: the CEAand/or CTA, the UNDP Country Office and DPA/EAD.
Annex 4 – *Total Mission annual expenditure vs Election Basket Funds in Seven Case Studies*\(^{34}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Mission and election year</th>
<th>PKO/SPM Total 12-month Mission expenditure in the election year</th>
<th>Election Basket Fund Expenditure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, UNMIS &amp; UNAMID 2010</td>
<td>$2,536,755,900</td>
<td>$76,188,447</td>
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<td>DRC, MONUC 2006</td>
<td>$1,058,100,200</td>
<td>$392,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan, UNMIS 2011</td>
<td>$1,007,632,300</td>
<td>$15,904,179</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire, UNOCI 2010</td>
<td>$570,335,500</td>
<td>$44,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq, UNAMI 2010</td>
<td>$153,527,000</td>
<td>$11,231,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste, UNMIT 2007</td>
<td>$146,848,800</td>
<td>$3,890,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, BINUB 2010</td>
<td>$45,738,200</td>
<td>$27,200,000</td>
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</table>

\(^{34}\) Note that the table measures two different things, election basket fund expenditure, and then total Mission expenditure in the year of the election. It does not measure Mission election expenditure, which was not known to be measured except in Sudan 2011.

PKO/SPM data source: Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Reviews of Global Peace Operations Reviews and of Political Missions*, which in turn source from DFS, DM and official SG and GA budget documents. Data excludes in-kind, Trust Funds, etc; Basket Fund data sources are generally Project Documents and Final Project Evaluations.

Timor-Leste: numbers are the middle point between UNOTIL Sep 06 and UNMIT Sep 07; sourced from Center for International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, and Annual Political Missions Reviews*, in the year and the year after the stated elections, 2007-2012

Annexes page [iv]
1. In terms of diplomatic coordination, the SRSG ‘is responsible for overall political coordination’ for UN electoral assistance. But this extends beyond the UN family, and given the mandate of the Security Council, it is generally expected that the SRSG takes a lead role internationally. In all case studies, the SRSG – or delegated to the appropriate DSRSG – convened meetings with the diplomatic community, including representatives of international and regional organizations. Through these mechanisms, international actors coordinated their good offices roles to troubleshoot political, security and electoral issues, and to agree strategies to persuade parties and spoilers to adhere to the rules of the game.

2. In the second area, donor coordination and basket fund decision-making, the case studies showed more structure, formality and deliberate decision-making. With UNDP managed basket funds, in all cases studied, DSRSG/RC/RR’s generally chaired these meetings (given their responsibilities for fiduciary oversight of the basket fund) with the appropriate national counterpart, possibly in a co-Chair role. These Steering Committees were backstopped by the UNDP Program Management Unit. In some cases bilateral donors not contributing directly into the basket fund (USAID, for example) were invited as observer in order to facilitate information sharing as well as to improve overall donor coordination, and international assistance division of labor.

3. A third high-level election technical and policy coordination committee dealt with electoral technical issues and procedures, but was present in quite different forms across the case studies and with quite different membership and decision-making. With new or not-yet established EMBs in first post-conflict election cases, this level may have involved internationals only, chaired by the DSRSG or Head of the Electoral

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Component. Where circumstances allowed, to enable national ownership, it would be chaired by the EMB’s Chief Electoral Commissioner or at least the Chief Electoral Officer.

4. The fourth and last level were multiple operational and thematic working groups. In all case studies, there was some form of operational and logistical working group, but not all had sufficient EMB representation to allow national ownership, thereby placing the center of gravity for logistical assessment, planning and operational management in international hands, in particular inside the UN Mission. This manifested not only in the capital, but at provincial and sub-direct levels. The cases also revealed low levels of integration and collaboration across voter education, civic education and public information, but the Timor-Leste 2007 case showed that an effectively and inclusively led public information working group could better integrate the UN’s effort as well as ensure meaningful EMB involvement.

Iraq: IEA Examples

Overall Integration Structures UNAMI 2011

Minimum Standards for Integrated Strategic Frameworks

*This document provides interim guidance and will remain valid until the issuance of the IMP Guidelines for the field (expected October 2009) or otherwise amended by the Integration Steering Group.*

![Diagram of ISF Building Block Approach](image)

**Figure 1: ISF Building Block Approach** for the development of the two main elements of an ISF: the “shared vision of the UN’s Strategic Objectives” and the associated “results, timelines, and responsibilities”. These first two building blocks comprise the ISF document, whereas associated work plans at the activity level are outside the scope.

- **Working Level Iraq Integration Task Force (IITF)** is co-Chaired by the Department of Political Affairs Iraq Team Leader and the UNAMI Chief of Staff. It will provide the platform for higher level technical consultations regarding a wide range of substantive issues including the political, human rights and humanitarian/reconstruction developments and their links and ramifications for operational and security matters related to the UN presence in Iraq. As an inter-departmental/agency group, the IITF facilitates coordination, planning and communication among various elements of the UN system.

- **Integrated Strategic Management Team (ISMT)** is chaired by the SRSG (or his designate) and is comprised of the DSRSGs, Chief of Staff, UNAMI section chiefs and representatives from the UNCT. It is responsible for general oversight and implementation of the ISF, the review of integration priorities and activities, while also serving as an active information sharing and consultative environment to

Annexes page [vi]
discuss strategic issues related to the integration agenda. This includes regular updates on progress achieved by the different integrated working group mechanisms based on reports consolidated by the RCO, and subsequently providing strategic advice and guidance on the implementation of key integration activities and the way forward. Through the RCO, the ISMT will coordinate with the UNDAF Steering Committee as needed, to strengthen harmonized reporting and information sharing. The ISMT reports on a semi-annual basis to the Iraq Integration Task Force (IITF). The ISMT will be supported jointly by the Chief of Staff’s Office and the Resident Coordinator’s Office, to coordinate planning, reporting, and overall secretariat support.

- **Integrated Operations Management Team (IOMT)** is co-Chaired by the UNAMI Chief of Mission Support and UNDP. It plays a key role in providing a forum for discussions regarding operational issues impacting both the UNAMI and UNCT, and ensuring that integrated solutions are found. It is also responsible for proposing policy and procedures to foster enhanced cost savings and integrated services for the UNCT and UNAMI by avoiding duplication of services and thereby costs.

- **Security Management Team (SMT)**, chaired by the SRSG/Designated Official (DO), is comprised of UNAMI Senior Management and senior security personnel, the Heads of Agencies, the SMT is a critical forum for discussing the state of play in Iraq, analyzing the impact of the security context on UN activities in Iraq, and identifying key policies necessary to safeguard all UN personnel.

- **The Task Forces** for the four integrated priorities will continue to meet and address the particular priorities reflected in their action plans. Comprised of UNAMI and UNCT members, these four groups will meet at least every two months and be responsible for putting forward integrated programmatic analyses, concepts and proposals to be implemented.

**Organizational Chart IEAT UNAMI 2006**

**International Electoral Assistance Team to the IECI**

Proposal for 2006
Agreement on Establishment of Common Services in Support of UN activities for Iraq

Note: Article headings are provided only. Full text was provided to the IEA Working Group

WHEREAS, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (hereinafter referred to as UNAMI) was established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1500 (2003) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfillment of his mandate under Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003);

WHEREAS, in his report to the Security Council of 5 December 2003 (S/2003/1149) the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of close coordination between UNAMI and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes engaged in relief, recovery and reconstruction activities for Iraq, including the adoption of innovative approaches to the use of common services, in order to maximize the capacity of United Nations activities for Iraq and reduce the risk to United Nations personnel and assets in the prevailing security environment; and assets in the prevailing security environment.

NOW THEREFORE, the United Nations bodies signatory to this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Participating Organizations”) have agreed the following collaborative arrangements to facilitate the establishment of common services at country level.

Article 1:Purpose
Article 2: Scope
Article 3: Obligations
Article 4: Oversight and Policy
Article 5: Implementation
Article 6: Participation
Article 7: Principles
Article 8: Financial Arrangements

Annexes page [viii]
Article 9: Status
Article 10: Indemnities
Article 11: Periodic review
Article 12: Dispute resolution
Article 13: Effective Date and Period of Agreement
Article 14: Expiration, modification and termination

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the duly authorized representatives of the Participating Organizations have signed this Agreement on the date(s) indicated below. For and On Behalf of:
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Office of the Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD)
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (HABITAT)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
World Health Organization (WHO)
World Food Programme (WFP)

Financial arrangements for cost recovery

Note: Headsings are provided only. Full text was provided to the IEA Working Group

I. Guiding principles
1. Common service costs may be allocated among the Participating Organizations using either of two approaches:
   (a) The entire direct and indirect cost of providing a common service is fully allocated amongst the client Participating Organizations (i.e. “pooled common services”); or
   (b) The incremental cost of providing the common service is distributed by the Participating Organization(s) providing the common service to, or proportionately amongst the Participating Organizations utilizing the common service.

II. Methodology
Human Resource Costs
Material Resources
III. Reporting

Burundi: IEA examples

ToRs for Consultative Strategic Committee, Electoral Process in Burundi

Note: This document outlines the composition, mandate and functioning of the Consultative Strategic Committee (CSC) for support to the electoral process.

I. Composition: The Consultative Strategic Committee shall comprise ambassadors accredited to Burundi or their representatives, the representatives of BINUB and UNDP and other representatives of the international community involved in the electoral process, including the African Union and the International Conference on the Great

Annexes page [ix]
Lakes Region. Meetings of the Committee shall take place in BINUB and shall be facilitated by the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) in Burundi, Head of BINUB or, in his absence, by his Deputy. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) shall be invited regularly as the national electoral management body. It may also request to meet with the Committee whenever necessary. The Consultative Strategic Committee may also invite members of government, national and international partners, institutions, senior officials and experts whose participation may be deemed useful to the accomplishment of the mandate and responsibilities of the Committee.

11. Duties
   a) Serve as a consultation forum to define the broad strategic guidelines for the assistance of the international community to the electoral process;
   b) Provide support for the preparation, organization and monitoring of the conduct of the electoral cycle;
   c) Provide the necessary support and advice to CENI, national institutions and partners involved in the preparation and organization of the electoral process and contribute to addressing the challenges inherent in the process;
   d) Promote the exchange of information and views among members of the international community, Burundian authorities and national partners to ensure a smooth conduct of the electoral cycle;
   e) Address political and strategic issues submitted to it by the Technical Coordination Committee (TOR attached) in order to allow for better coordination of the technical, financial and material support that will be provided to CENI;
   f) Depending on the circumstances, determine the terms and conditions of communication with national and international partners.

111. Functioning
   a) The CSC shall be chaired by the ERSG, Head of BINUB.
   b) It shall meet once a month, when convened by its Chairperson, to brief members on the support of partners and the status of the activities of the electoral process.
   c) It may hold ad hoc meetings on the initiative of its Chairperson or at the request of one or several of its members after consultation.
   d) Decisions shall be taken by consensus.
   e) BINUB shall act as its Secretariat.

**TORs Technical Coordination Committee, Electoral Process in Burundi**

This document outlines the composition, mandate and functioning of the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for support to the electoral process.

I. Composition

The TCC shall comprise representatives designated by members of the Consultative Strategic Committee. Its meetings shall take place at UNDP and shall be chaired by the Country Director or, in his absence, by his Deputy. The National Independent Electoral Commission shall be invited to its meetings as needed.

II. Responsibilities
   a) Serve as a structure for the technical and operational coordination of the international community’s support to the electoral process;

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b) Adopt a detailed operational plan of activities in support of the electoral process;
c) Report regularly to the CSC on the progress achieved and constraints it may encounter in supporting the electoral process;
d) Coordinate various contributions from partners, in particular through a basket fund to be established and managed by UNDP;
e) Facilitate the technical support required by CENI for all electoral operations;
f) Perform any other duty/task as required by the CSC.

III. Functioning

a) The TCC shall be chaired by the Country Director of UNDP or, in his absence, by his Deputy.
b) Initially, it shall meet once every two weeks, when convened by its Chairperson, to brief members on the status of activities in support of the electoral process.
c) It may hold ad hoc meetings on the initiative of its Chairperson or at the request of one or several of its members after consultation.
d) Decisions shall be taken by consensus.
e) UNDP/Elections Project shall act as its Secretariat.
Instructions: Please check mark as desired:

- Create/Delete eRoom (Complete sections: A,B,E)
- Create/Delete external eRoom member account (Complete sections: A,C,E)
- Create eRoom group (Complete sections: A,D,E)

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Comments:
## Annex 6 – Additional Recommendations: Sustainability & Knowledge Management

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<td>Practice ICMEA</td>
<td>UN electoral leaders need to advocate for better government commitment to fund sustainable electoral authorities (including permanent bodies), and advocate that donors fund longer-term assistance beyond one electoral event.</td>
<td>Annex 6.1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practice ICMEA</td>
<td>UN electoral leaders should, where possible, advocate earlier electoral planning, allowing more time for national solutions to administer elections (in particular for electoral logistics).</td>
<td>Annex 6.1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practice ICMEA</td>
<td>UNDP could provide its capacity building expertise to improve institutional capacity assessments conducted jointly with EMBs, helping the development of more sophisticated options for EMB capacity development.</td>
<td>Annex 6.1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research ICMEA</td>
<td>Further study should map the democratic governance and capacity building efforts of PKO/SPM substantive components to understand their impact on sustainable electoral assistance.</td>
<td>Annex 6.1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice ICMEA</td>
<td>When there is the prospect of a permanent EMB, the UN should be more sensitive to support an incentives program/career plan, and be more sensitive to their needs when recruiting international electoral experts from new EMBs.</td>
<td>Annex 6.1.5</td>
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<td>Research ICMEA</td>
<td>UNDP should promote integrated and peer reviewed longer-term evaluations on sustainability and capacity building.</td>
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<td><strong>Knowledge Management</strong></td>
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<td>Policy ICMEA</td>
<td>Information sharing rules should be revised to better facilitate working together in an integrated team.</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.1</td>
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<td>Outreach &amp; KM ICMEA</td>
<td>ICMEA should publish a document twice a year (an ICMEA newsletter) that captures old and new lessons from End of Mission (EoM) reports, After Action Reviews (AARs), and other lessons learned reports.</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy ICMEA</td>
<td>At the conclusion of each electoral event each integrated electoral component should be instructed to conduct a ‘lessons learned exercise’ or After-Action Review, which would then be included in the UN’s institutional memory.</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.3</td>
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<td>Practice ICMEA</td>
<td>CEAs should promote joint evaluation and lessons learned processes with EMBs and other international assistance providers, ideally written up as public documents and translated.</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.4</td>
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<td>Policy ICMEA</td>
<td>A short End of Mission report should be required from each CEA, with DPA/EAD and UNDP providing templates on how to present data on UN electoral staff, and UN electoral budgets and expenditure.</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Outreach &amp; KM ICMEA</td>
<td>In addition to an annual CEA meeting, additional annual or bi-annual meetings should be held for key electoral practitioners and decision-makers, e.g. Deputy CEA or CTAs, COOs, UNDP Election Project Managers, Area Managers, and CLOGOs.</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outreach &amp; KM ICMEA</td>
<td>With the Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) introductory course becoming a more common certificate among UN electoral staff, DPA/EAD and ICMEA partners should develop a broader strategy to improve training on IEA and other issues in the UN electoral community (i.e. those staff on the electoral roster).</td>
<td>Annex 6.2.7</td>
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Annexes page [xii]
### Annex 7 – List of all Findings from the Seven Case Studies

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<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DRC 2006</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>IEA structures and methods systematically improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the electoral assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>The principle reason integration worked so well was because of exceptionally strong leadership and a group of people working together, committed to getting a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>The highly integrated and effective structure of the MONUC Electoral Division was initially proposed prior to the IEC and well in advance of the promulgation of the electoral legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Existing UN Integration Machinery/Election Specific Coordination</td>
<td>In addition to already existing integration structures (JMAC, JOC), effective election-specific integration and coordination structures were established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Integrating Political &amp; Technical Goals</td>
<td>Reporting to different DSRSGs, a weak link in the IEA was that the MONUC Political Division and Integrated ED tended to work in silos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>UN electoral assistance demonstrated solid complementarity between MONUC and UNDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Administrative Rules</td>
<td>Administrative hurdles and the lack of standardization of systems between MONUC and the agencies, particularly on the Mission side, rendered integration more challenging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>IEA demonstrated the need for more responsive and flexible human resources and recruitment processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>Key UN electoral staff with strong national EMB backgrounds gave a lot of credibility to the UN in working with IEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>From the outset, international support was grounded in the assumption that these elections were “too important to fail” and so the electoral process was principally organized, financed and secured through international assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timor-Leste 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Country Specific Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>The Security Council mandate put electoral assistance at the front of its agenda, but missed an opportunity to direct an integrated and sustainable approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 General</td>
<td>IEA benefitted and was shaped by the UN system’s overall integrated response to the Timor crisis, enabling re-deployment and re-configuration of the UN presence in a very short timeframe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Integrated Electoral Planning/NAMs</td>
<td>Although it confronted broader administrative and ownership issues related to integration overall, electoral assessment and planning was effectively integrated into broader UNMIT and UNCT assessment, planning and deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Electoral Leadership/Election Specific Coordination</td>
<td>The DSRSG/RC lead of electoral, and an integrated leadership team and division of labor between the SRSG, DSRSG/RC and DSRSG/P worked by combining several factors, namely: the new senior leadership team was fully in place four months before the first election, and that team worked well together, shared information, played to their strengths, and had solid support teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Electoral</td>
<td>Parallel UN electoral team leadership and structures prevented the most effective and efficient use of UN electoral capacity. One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Findings</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership/Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>integrated UN electoral component under a CEA, reporting to the DSRSG/RC, could have been established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Existing UN Integration Machinery/Election Specific Coordination</td>
<td>Re-established integration structures combined well with election-specific coordination, decision-making and information-sharing to improve UN electoral assistance, and sponsored – as far as possible – national ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Good offices</td>
<td>IEA methods directly assisted in the employment of UN good offices and preventive diplomacy, and facilitated integrated troubleshooting between UNMIT political, security and electoral components, and UNDP’s political parties and parliamentary support projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Public Information</td>
<td>A lack of clarity in public information, voter and civic education assessment and mandates pointed to the need for a division of labor an integration of efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Public Information</td>
<td>New electoral information and education responsibilities and challenges were successfully addressed by effective IEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sustainability/Capacity Development</td>
<td>Electoral administration was greatly enhanced by IEA, as well as sustainability and capacity building innovations piloted by the UN and other partners in the previous seven years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>Timor-Leste in transition revealed both the interdependence of electoral, security sector and judicial reform, as well as the limits of the UN’s ability to support the emergence of strong electoral organs capable of withstanding post-conflict political shocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>Despite attempts to improve national logistical and transportation planning and capacity for the elections, a substantial proportion of logistical lift was done exclusively by UNMIT and ISF with potential sustainability consequences downstream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>There was a lack of consistent and long term vision in Timor electoral mandates for high standards of sustainability and capacity building during and between electoral cycles; yet IEA methods, election-specific coordination mechanisms, high levels of UN-EMB trust, and UN-EMB co-location all contributed to sustainable EA and continued capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Developing Knowledge &amp; Capacity</td>
<td>There was a committed reflection on lessons learned, transition and change in IEA, and electoral assistance is included in the 2011-2012 Integrated Strategic Framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Developing Knowledge &amp; Capacity</td>
<td>No UNCT staff, in particular UNDP staff, will be able to access 2007 and subsequent lessons learned unless UN headquarters changes its current information and knowledge management practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Integrating Political &amp; Technical Goals</td>
<td>In conflict situations, political stability has a priority versus electoral (non-elections event) assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>The mandate should not only spell out the support for elections, but to the electoral process before and after the elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 NAMs</td>
<td>Needs Assessment Missions (NAMs) are essential to evaluate changing situations on the ground and should be ideally done after every electoral process to reorient the activities of the UN if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>It is important to involve the UN family at the planning stage to use their added value in specific areas (UNDP, UN Women,</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.)

5 Existing UN Integration Machinery
A Steering Committee, chaired by the UNAMI DSRSG, responds to project proposals. Within UNAMI, the CTA was asked for his opinion prior to the approval of election related project proposals.

6 Sustainability Challenges
The large amounts of money involved in elections results in challenges to sustainability.

7 Integrated Electoral Structures
Elections are highly political, but there needs to be synergies with other areas of election support, provided mainly by UNDP. It is better placed under the HC/RC to create de facto integration as per the Policy Committee decision.

8 Electoral Mandates/Structures
A main challenge is still the understanding of the different UN roles and structures. Clear mandates and structures are to be in place to make it clear to each agency how the system works.

9 Staff Selection & Recruitment
Staff mobility is essential for integration in order to understand each other’s values.

10 Staff Selection & Recruitment
Selection and recruitment procedures have to be faster and agreements on integration have to be formalized and not be personality based.

11 Electoral Leadership
Depending on the amount of direct technical support provided by the mission, the CEA may also be the UN CTA.

12 Integrated Electoral Planning
The main finding from UNAMI and IEA is that if conditions are right, integration will significantly increase the delivery of international electoral assistance.

13 Coordination with International Partners
The joint discussions of various UN bodies with the Government on issues related to the elections was very useful in delivering a comprehensive message.

14 Integrated Electoral Planning
Guidelines with clear definition of roles and responsibilities need to be put in place for all UN actors to follow to avoid integration falling apart.

15 Integrated Electoral Planning
Integration is important in order to sustain a common vision and assure the implementation of a coherent UN political strategy, including elections support.

16 Sustainability Challenges
The long-term impact on the electoral process is questionable due to the fragility of the institution and the high turnover rate of staff at the IHEC.

17 Sustainability Challenges
Big missions are overwhelming, as too many people are supporting the process and no space exists for the elections administration to breathe and learn.

Sudan, 2010

1 General
In addition to having never supported any election with two deployed UN peacekeeping operations, the UN has also never supported a first post-conflict electoral process with as many complex, distinct and concurrent election contests.

2 Country Specific Electoral Mandate
From the outset, IEA was undermined by insufficient direction in UN electoral mandates to integrate that assistance.

3 Integrated Electoral Planning
While overall planning for international electoral assistance was being coordinated, there was a lack of IEA and division of labor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>Parallel and dis-integrated UN electoral leadership and structures prevented integration of the UN’s electoral assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>A key reason to have IEA structures and methods is to build one UN electoral team, and reduce the probability of personality clashes becoming a dominant issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>There should be a policy of one HQ-approved organogram for UN electoral staff, regardless of their contract and parent organization, and co-location of that UN electoral component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>Dramatically conflicting UN visions to deliver the election or sustain democratic processes were made worse by a lack of integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>Election administration and international partners were caught in a very tight timeline and had to adapt the planning of their activities on the spot. Some technical hiccups were unavoidable, which provided an excuse to challenge the elections results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>The selection and recruitment system of DPKO, DPA and UNDP needs to be adapted to the urgency in elections and the presence of senior French speaking experts in the electoral roster needs to be increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>No single model is possible for integration and IEA has to be adapted to country-specific conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>The mission could not provide the best possible electoral advice to the mission senior management due to the absence of an Electoral Assistance Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>If the SPM is small enough, the ERSG could also serve as RC/RR to make structural integration easier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Administrative Rules</td>
<td>Administrative procedures were established to improve synergies between various UN staff working on elections, i.e. in terms of communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Electoral Budgets and Basket Funds</td>
<td>While UNDP was responsible for the basket fund, the mission believed that they could have a say in the use of the funds creating, on some occasions, tensions between the mission and UNDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Electoral Budgets and Basket Funds</td>
<td>If UNDP accepts the management of the basket fund and supports the process, this cannot be done through regular procedures. The procedures have to be adapted to the timing of elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>Clear division of labor was paramount (mainly political for the mission, technical for UNDP) and information with clear guidelines to allow all UN staff to know how the work was to be done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>One of the most important elements for successful integration is the personality of involved partners, especially at senior levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>It was very important for the provision of IEA that the UNDP Country Director (CD) had previous experience with IEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>Internal agreements were there on who is better placed to do what, including a mapping on available resources as a first step prior to engaging in electoral assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>The three-month long absence of an ERSG prior to the elections had a negative impact on the ability of the UN to support the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sustainability/Capacity Development</td>
<td>If long term support to the election administration may not be possible due to changing institutions and members, it is possible to support capacity-building of national partners in other relevant areas (gender, civic education, media, political parties, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>One main issue which remains to be resolved is that the national authorities will not be able to fund the same type of operation in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>CENI members have moved on and institution building has not worked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sustainability/Capacity Development</td>
<td>The creation of a permanent CENI through institutional capacity building is necessary. It is not sufficient to train staff and undertake study tours for Commissioners and senior staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cote D’Ivoire, 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Country Specific Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>Mandates of UN agencies (who support national Government as main partner) are different from the mandates of missions (which implement Security Council mandates) and each needs to be addressed in different ways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>Integration has to be field driven and aim to follow a bottom-up approach, building on concrete joint initiatives on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Integrated Electoral Planning</td>
<td>There needs to be a clear understanding of who is responsible for what within the UN family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>Integration can be (a) Structural and/or functional and (b) can follow different models and practicalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>The SRSG, UNDP RR, CEA and CTA are the main actors, and there is a need to assure a proper working relationship between each of them to make IEA happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Electoral Leadership</td>
<td>The DSRSG in charge of EAD should be also the RR to improve integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>The Electoral Assistance Division needs to have clearly defined roles as being complementary to UNDP and UNOPS roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>There was a need for a joint Elections Operations Room, either at the EMB, UNDP or PKO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Electoral Budgets and Basket Funds</td>
<td>The management of the basket fund is complicated by too many procedures. UNDP has to work harder on increasing flexibility and transparency of the use of funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Collocation</td>
<td>For electoral assistance to have the greatest lasting impact, co-location of UN and EMB is ideal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>It is not clear how, and if, the national authorities will be able to manage logistics in the future without substantial international support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sustainability Challenges</td>
<td>It is important to foster discussions with EMB and Government about exit strategies to support follow up programmes with UNDP and other UN actors staying behind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Developing Knowledge &amp; Capacity</td>
<td>Creating joint documents (operational, guidelines, etc.) is important, to avoid confusing partners with different UN documents on the same subject with sometimes different proposals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case Study</strong></td>
<td><strong>Findings</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Country Specific Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>There was inconsistency between the 2010 elections and 2011 referendum electoral assistance mandates, and an absence of an integration mandate with other UN entities (especially UNDP). However, there were also mandates tasking lessons learned, and directing a UN lead of international assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 NAMs</td>
<td>If the formality of a transparently conducted NAM is jettisoned in a Mission setting, there is the potential for confusion and a lack of strategic direction in IEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Developing Knowledge &amp; Capacity</td>
<td>The post-electoral period following the 2010 general elections experienced a lack of integration among UN lessons learned initiatives and narratives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Public Information</td>
<td>A key goal of the UN integration and therefore of IEA was to establish, communicate and manage the UN’s strategic priorities, as well as to manage the UN’s institutional complexity that flows from it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>IEA needed to overcome the powerful fragmenting force of the Khartoum/Juba divide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Integrated Electoral Structures</td>
<td>IEA took place in a particularly complicated and not especially functional set of existing UN integration structures and methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Developing Knowledge &amp; Capacity</td>
<td>Adapting global lessons on IEA leadership and structures, and applying them into smart IEA design appropriate to the national context from the outset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Coordination with International Partners</td>
<td>A strongly integrated and effective referendum component, with mixed buy-in across the UN family, and reduced coordination with other international assistance providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>The lesson learnt is not for UNDP to recruit separately, but to combine a deeper and more diverse UN Electoral Roster, with fast-track UN-wide recruitment, and better IEA in the recruitment phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Staff Selection &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>The UN electoral roster was stretched to capacity to find suitably qualified UN electoral staff. Diverse backgrounds were key. A lack of coordination on UN recruitment at times undermined, instead of helped, IEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Electoral Budgets and Basket Funds</td>
<td>The UNDP-managed basket fund displayed higher levels of budgeting and expenditure tracking than the mission, (with unknown cost of resources spent for UN electoral assistance by UNMIS, UNAMID, and by the SG Panel), but that UNMIS Budget staff identified methods to separate referendum from other Mission costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sustainability</td>
<td>More could have been done during the referendum and after to institutionalize cost effective electoral assistance and support foundations for future south Sudanese electoral organs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Annex 9—Acronyms

AAR  After-Action Review
ACABQ  Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACE  Administration and Cost of Elections
AU  African Union
BDP  Bureau for Development Policy (UNDP)
BNUB  Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi, United Nations Office in Burundi
BRIDGE  Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections
CCA  Country Common Assessment
CDI  Cote d’Ivoire, Ivory Coast
CEA  Chief Electoral Advisor
CTA  Chief Technical Advisor
CoP  Community of Practice
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAP  Country Programme Action Plan
D/CMS  Director/Chief Mission Support
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS  Department of Field Support
DGG  Democratic Governance Group (BDP/UNDP)
DOCO  UN Development Operations Coordination Office
DM  Department of Management
DPA  Department of Political Affairs
DPI  Department of Public Information
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG/P  Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Political
DSRSG/RC/HC/RR  Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Representative
DSS  Department of Safety and Security
EAD  Electoral Assistance Division (DPA/EAD)
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EISA  Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EMB  Electoral Management Body
EoM  End of Mission
ERSG  Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
GA  General Assembly
HPAC  Head of Political Affairs Component
HQ  Headquarters
HR  Human Resources
ICMEA  Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanism for Electoral Assistance
IEA  Integrated Electoral Assistance
IMPP  Integrated Mission Planning Process
I(M)TF  Integrated (Mission) Task Force
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organization
ISF  Integrated Strategic Framework
ISG  Integration Steering Group
IT  Information Technology

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Operations Center</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Assessment Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies au Congo, UN Mission in Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPTF</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Trust Fund</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Needs Assessment Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>(I)NGO</td>
<td>(International) Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF IRF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund, Immediate Response Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF PRF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund, Peacebuilding Response Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBPS</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (DPKO)</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProDoc</td>
<td>Project Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRST</td>
<td>Security Council Presidential Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SMT</td>
<td>Senior Management Team</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Special Political Mission</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>TAM</td>
<td>Technical Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educations, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteer</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>XB Funds</td>
<td>Extra-budgetary (donor) Funds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CASE STUDIES:

CS: Democratic Republic of Congo, 2006 Presidential and Parliamentary elections

CS: Timor-Leste, 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections

CS: Iraq, 2010 Parliamentary elections

CS: Sudan, 2010 General elections

CS: Burundi, 2010 General elections

CS: Cote D’Ivoire, 2010 Presidential elections

CS: Southern Sudan, 2011 Referendum