



POST-ELECTION STRATEGY GROUP (PESG)
PRELIMINARY REPORT
25 July 2005

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PREFACE

This is a preliminary report on post-electoral issues and strategies. It is the first product of the Post-Election Strategy Group (PESG). The PESG was formally established and mandated by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

PESG Membership

- General Assil, Chairman of the PESG (Deputy Chairman of the IEC)
- Peter Erben, Chief Technical Advisor on Elections to the SRSG (Currently also Chief Electoral Officer)
- Julian Type, Deputy Chairman of the JEMB
- Momena Yari, Afghan Commissioner of the IEC/JEMB
- Abdul Hakim Murad, Afghan Commissioner of the IEC/JEMB
- Daoud Ali Najafi, Afghan Counterpart to the Chief Electoral Officer
- Hiroko Takagi, Representative of UNDP
- Adam Bouloukos, Representative of UNOPS
- Ameerah Haq, Representative of UNAMA
- Kawun Kakar, Representative of the Government/President's Office
- Rafael Lopez-Pintor, Senior Electoral Expert to the PESG
- Other Electoral Experts associated with the PESG
- Anne-Sofie Holm, PESG Coordinator

The purpose of the PESG is to develop a comprehensive post-election strategy for the electoral institution and the process for which this institution will be responsible. This is being achieved by coordinating the contributions made by all interested and relevant stakeholders toward the development of the strategy. The main aspects of this strategy include: policy and legal framework; structuring of a post-election electoral administration and voter registry; operational concept and budgets; retention and capacity building of staff; civic engagement; physical infrastructure; and involvement of donors and partners.

The overall content of the report is on the capacity building of an electoral system and electoral administration that would be sustainable in all of its dimensions: political and legal, institutional, technical and financial. The system will be technically sustainable when no international technical support is further needed, either for the consolidation of organizational structures of the electoral administration, ordinary in-house training, outreach programmes or the polling operation. Technical sustainability is the easiest and fastest to achieve. Financial sustainability is obtained when the entire system can be funded from domestic resources embedded in the budget of the nation. This takes some time to achieve. Finally, the system becomes politically sustainable when its legal and institutional framework and outcome (both of the polling operation as well as the official electoral results) are accepted as legitimate by all stakeholders. This is the hardest to achieve because it depends so much on the ebbs and flows of politics in the country.

A number of sub-groups were established for in-depth discussions and writing of a concept paper on each of the issue areas referred to above. These concept papers are the main inputs for this preliminary strategy paper. The preliminary report is expected to serve as an initial overview of the future electoral processes and a basis for guidance to governmental officers and donors on policy making and decision making on the implementation of different programmes. It may also guide further preparation of project documents on different assistance issues.

Explanatory notes

The words "transition" and "transitional period" are used with two different meanings in this report, depending on the context. One is the transition up to the expiry of the Bonn Agreement at the end of 2005. The other is the transition between the current institutional electoral calendar and a prospective new one, assuming that the Constitution is amended sometime around 2010.

Most of the rough cost estimates included in the different sections of the paper are made on a one-year basis and intended as guidance for the time when a fully Afghan-staffed IEC will take complete ownership of the elections after the expiry of the Bonn Agreement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Electoral Calendar

1. One of the consequences of the current electoral calendar is the occurrence of one election every year for the next 60 years (38 elections); in certain years, simultaneous elections will take place in the same year; for example, the presidential and provincial council elections are scheduled for 2009. The electoral cycle implied in the current calendar does not seem functional in political, logistical or financial terms.
2. International experience, both global as well as Asian regional, shows that national elections tend to be held separately from local elections and that, particularly in emerging democracies, a two-tier electoral cycle with national and sub-national elections held on a fixed calendar is recommended.
3. Three main options are presented and one is recommended; all assume that the current electoral calendar is to be changed sometime in the near future. The recommended option suggests that only presidential, legislative, provincial and municipal elections be conducted by direct popular vote. In a two-tier cycle, presidential and legislative elections could be held together every five years, while provincial and municipal elections would also happen every five years, but offset two years from national elections. District and village councils would be filled, like the Meshrano Jirga, through secondary elections among members of municipal councils and other indirect mechanisms.
4. This option is also recommended due to: a) the simplicity of its political rationale with national as opposed to municipal administrative elections; b) five levels of government by popular vote seem too many for a country without a federal structure; c) technical efficacy by facilitating strategic, management and operational planning; d) financial cost-effectiveness and e) the possibility that the passing of time would mitigate the apparently complicated challenge of delineating district and village boundaries.
5. If the recommended option is chosen, future electoral practice could evolve in the following direction: assuming a municipal election occurs by August-September 2006, all prior elections according to the current Constitutional calendar would occur within the one-year period between April 2009 (presidential, provincial councils and municipal) and May 2010 (the earliest time possible for Wolesi Jirga elections; expiry dates and dates for new elections in the provincial and municipal councils have not been established in the Constitution or the law). In the meantime, while Constitutional reform is introduced, staggered elections could be organized between 1 April 2009 (latest possible date for next presidential election) and 1 April-1 May 2010 (earliest possible dates for next Wolesi Jirga election). Given the legal vacuum on this aspect, the next provincial and municipal elections could be held together or separate anytime between May and June 2009, following the presidential election of April of the same year. Synergies can be made by concentrating administrative and logistical resources on a one-year electoral season without the need for prior Constitutional reform. Constitutional reform could be more easily introduced during the ensuing presidential and legislative term, when the National Assembly has consolidated its institutional role and *modus operandi*. If a calendar with four direct elections organized in a two-tier cycle were established, the new cycle could start with presidential and legislative elections held together in 2014 and provincial and municipal elections together in 2016.
6. The electoral calendar is not the only cost determinant of elections. Other factors of paramount importance are the kind and quality of voter lists, proper allocations of voters to specific polling stations, formula of representation that strongly affects the format and cost of the ballot paper, the size of the permanent electoral staff and pay to temporary staff, including polling station officers. Finally, the cost impact of the availability of governmental structures at different levels (e.g. police, school system and local government) and their possible assistance with the logistics of the elections shall be mentioned.

Reviewing the Electoral Legislation

1. The present electoral legislation was initially drafted in great haste for the 2004 Presidential Election. As a result, provisions concerning the elections are spread over a number of legal

instruments, including the Constitution, the Electoral Law itself, the Political Parties Law and the Municipal Election Law, and contain some errors, imprecise terminology and contradictions. For example, the 2002 Municipal Election Law requires harmonization with the 2004 Constitution in a number of essential elements (e.g. the electoral formula for councils and mayors and the electoral authority in charge of the elections).

2. In the spring of 2005, the Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat (JEMBS) Legal Support Department drafted an amendment to the Electoral Law that addressed most, if not all, of the concerns. This amendment was not adopted in its entirety, but the minimum changes absolutely necessary for the People's Assembly and Provincial Council elections were made. The period after the 2005 elections is an opportunity to review and harmonize all the electoral legislation, including the Electoral Law, since this law was intended to apply only during the Bonn Agreement period.
3. Different options are examined: a) making amendments as needed to the different legal bodies; b) a complete rewrite of all electoral instruments; and c) putting all the various legal instruments into one unified electoral code. The first option is recommended.

Institutional Framework for the Independent Electoral Commission

1. Afghanistan has a permanent Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), established in accordance with Article 156 of the Constitution.
2. Issues confronting the IEC can be categorised as institutional, operational or transitional, depending on the size and scope of responsibilities of a fully Afghan IEC and the necessary international assistance at different stages of the consolidation process.
3. A professional and permanent IEC—including nine Commissioners, the Secretariat and 34 provincial offices—would require a minimum of 110 professional staff, including the Commissioners, plus the necessary office and logistical support staff.
4. Provincial electoral staff should ideally pursue office-sharing arrangements with other public institutions.
5. Given the current limited development of the judicial system in Afghanistan, there is a good case for the continuation of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) as a permanent, quasi-judicial adjudicator of electoral disputes.

Voter Registry

1. Desirability, feasibility and costs of different models of the voter registry are considered: one continuous automatic voter registry, one that is periodically updated or a brand-new registry before every election.
2. In comparison with other registries of people (e.g. civil registry or ID card registry), voter lists are meant for the exclusive purpose of recording the enfranchisement of voters and facilitating the voting operation, allowing individual voters to vote only within a given constituency and at a given polling station.
3. Electoral authorities always have a responsibility to at least survey the formation and quality of voter lists, no matter which institution is in charge of the production of the registry (e.g. the Electoral Authority itself, Civil Registry, Ministry of Interior or Institute of Statistics).
4. In the Asian region, four countries run a system of continuous registration in which the voter does not have to show up to register for the first inclusion but instead the state authority takes the initiative (these are India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Maldives, where enumerators visit the voters' homes). In a larger number of countries, registration requires the citizen to voluntarily show up one time. Once the citizen is initially registered, there is continuous maintenance of the voter lists.
5. Updated permanent registration with an opening of the voter lists before every election can be considered an option for Afghanistan, independently of whether continuous registration is made possible in the near future.

6. The first activity recommended after the 2005 elections is an independent review of the current voter lists to assess the viability and cost of updating them, including cleaning up the lists of multiple registrants and the deceased. Proper identification of the province and place of residence (village and *nahia*, or district), which would enable the allocation of voters to constituencies and polling stations, should equally be ensured.
7. If the option of producing a national ID card jointly with a voter list is decided upon, the ID document would also work as voter identification. In a first instance, the voter registry would almost automatically emerge from citizen identification. In the future, the voter list would be periodically updated after requiring new registrants to be properly identified with an ID card, or *taskera*. Several projects for a national ID card have been proposed to the government. This might be the time to focus on the feasibility of such a joint venture of generating a voter list at the time when all citizens are duly identified. Joint planning on this aspect should be pursued by the IEC and the Ministry of Interior.

Retention of IEC Staff

1. In order to ensure that the professional cadre of Afghan election officials is not lost to the IEC when transitioning to a stand-alone election authority, a staff policy identifying incentives to retain the various key staffing categories must be developed and implemented. The IEC's retention policy must also take into consideration how to attract new staff members to replace the ones that will inevitably depart from the Afghan election authority.
2. Three possible retention policies are offered. Given the critical transitional period, a hybrid policy is recommended outlining a long-term viable retention policy while at the same time taking into consideration the unique conditions and challenges facing the IEC during 2006-07.
3. The recommended *transitional knowledge-based retention policy* contains two components: (a) By becoming a lead governmental organization for whom to work, the IEC would be able to attract the right caliber of individuals to perform its tasks in a professional and timely manner. In order to achieve this objective, a permanent election training programme would need to be established, catering to entry-level, mid-level and executive management staff needs. Both specific election-related subjects as well as more generic management-related issues should be included in the curriculum. (b) Special two-year contracts for a limited number of key electoral officers that would allow enough time to recruit and properly train the Afghans who would ultimately form the nucleus of the permanent IEC management. This should be made in consultation with the Civil Service Commission and the Priority Reform and Restructuring.

Training within the IEC and Broader Civic Engagement

1. The IEC will require skills development and learning opportunities during the transitional period that follows this election in order to build administrative capacity and to increase the buy-in of electoral administrators to the new body.
2. These learning opportunities can and should come from a variety of sources, one of which should be a strong in-house training structure.
3. An Electoral Resource Centre is being developed under the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) with a collection of academic and practical documentation and material to be used in support of training activities as well as other information needs of the IEC.
4. The IEC needs the ability to reach out to other elements of Afghan society and government through training programmes, particularly for school teachers, police and military personnel and civil society activists.
5. The IEC needs to build civic engagement into the electoral process in order to ensure buy-in from relevant sectors of society as part of a strategy for long-term sustainability. This programme will also fit in with on-going democratization and electoral public outreach campaigns.

Physical Infrastructure

1. The issue of asset management is complex for a number of reasons. First, the assets presently in use by the elections project are owned by a number of partners (e.g. UNOPS, UNDP, UNAMA and the Afghan government). Second, the use of the assets is largely dependent on the electoral calendar, the expected national staffing table and how many international staff will remain in-country as part of a new election programme. Third, since it is highly probable that the current asset base is a function of the significant international presence in country, the full range of assets would not be required in a post-election environment in which the Afghan government is more directly involved. Fourth, other governmental activities and UN activities will require assets in 2006 and 2007 that may off-set the overall financial burden placed on the IEC.
2. An inventory stock exercise is recommended at all levels as soon as possible.
3. Allocation of assets in the field should be considered. It is recommended to retain necessary assets at the provincial level and retain the rest in the UN-administered regional logistical hubs for maintenance and security. This equipment can then be leased on an *ad-hoc* basis.
4. The IEC should be encouraged to engage in broader dialogues with government ministries and with international donors in an effort to articulate the genuine asset and infrastructure needs of Afghanistan.
5. The elections project presently manages 70 properties throughout Afghanistan. Of those, only six are rent-free facilities provided by local government departments. The IEC should consult with local government authorities to explore the opportunities for shared office facilities.

Operational Concept and Budget

1. Post-conflict elections are often expensive operations and the Afghan presidential election was no exception. International donors are currently funding the elections in Afghanistan. This will not continue indefinitely, however, and it is important that the cost of elections in Afghanistan be reduced.
2. The main factors influencing the cost of future elections are discussed. Some policy recommendations are made for partner organizations that will help to reduce future electoral costs, such as: transfer of assets from the current electoral project to the IEC; rationalization of the electoral calendar; creation of a permanent registration system; and adequate training of Afghan electoral staff. Another primary factor for cost reduction is local production of all polling materials.
3. Depending on the security situation and quality of the future voter registry, the cost of the next election may range between USD 50 and 80 million and perhaps lower for municipal elections. In Afghanistan, like other post-conflict countries and despite initially high electoral costs, substantial cost reduction could be expected within the next ten years (progressive reduction down to \$5-10 per registered voter in future elections).
4. As for the operating cost of the IEC, an estimate is made of \$2,081,640 per non-election year, of which \$1,529,000 (73%) would be subsidized by the international community during the next few years, covering primarily salary expenses (57%) and infrastructure and asset maintenance (16%).
5. International electoral assistance for the next five years, including subsidizing the ordinary running of the IEC, the voter registry and the polling operations, has been estimated at slightly over \$101 million.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The electoral calendar should be changed by Constitutional reform in the near future for the sake of sustainability both of election management as well as of the democratic process. Such Constitutional reform could be more easily introduced during a second presidential and legislative election, when the National Assembly has consolidated its institutional role and *modus operandi* and the democratic government has further settled down.
2. A review of the Electoral Law is legally mandated and will also be necessary after the transitional period. A number of essential elements in the Municipal Election Law must be harmonized with the 2004 Constitution (e.g. the authority in charge of elections and the formula for electing Municipal Councils and Mayors are incompatible with Constitutional provisions). Expertise in legal drafting would be necessary.
3. An independent review of the current voter lists should be conducted after the 2005 elections in order to assess the viability and cost of updating them, including the elimination from the list of multiple registrants and the deceased. Proper identification of the province and place of residence (village and *nahia*), which would enable the allocation of voters to constituencies and polling stations, should equally be ensured.
4. A permanently based IEC should be consolidated after the transition period with a professional staff of around 110: nine Commissioners and the Secretariat as well as 34 provincial offices with two professional staff in each. The Secretariat would essentially maintain its current structure: Chief Electoral Officer and Deputy; two Chiefs of Operations and Staff and their Deputies; eight department heads with their Deputies and one technical assistant.
5. Upon harmonization of Municipal Electoral Law with the Constitution, the Ministry of Interior shall cancel the existing posts for electoral officers in Kabul and the provincial administrations, as they are from a period in time when municipal elections were a function of the Ministry. A dialogue between the IEC and the Ministry is necessary.
6. A separate permanent ECC with three Commissioners should be established at modest running costs, which should be funded in a similar way to that of the IEC. Rough estimates would amount to \$88,160 per year. It may be composed of three Commissioners and office support staff.
7. A staff retention policy should be adopted by the IEC. A Transitional Knowledge-Based Retention Policy is recommended that is comprised of special two-year contracts for a limited number of key electoral officers, enabling enough time to recruit and properly train the Afghans who would ultimately form the nucleus of the permanent IEC management. This should be done in consultation with the Civil Service Commission and the Priority Reform and Restructuring.
8. The IEC should develop its own permanent in-house training programme for electoral officers. Moreover, it should reach out to other elements of Afghan society and government through training programmes, particularly for school teachers, police and military personnel and civil society activists.
9. The international community should subsidize the operations of the IEC over the next few years (\$1,529,000 out of \$2,081,640 – the running budget consists mainly of salary expenses and infrastructure and asset maintenance).
10. Other infrastructure support and asset maintenance costs, not included in the IEC's ordinary budget, amount to \$1,660,800, bringing the total to \$2,000,000 as an overall assistance subsidy for infrastructure support and asset maintenance. Of this, it is recommended that \$339,200 be placed under direct budgetary control of the IEC and its Secretariat. The remainder would be used for continued communications and information technology support, continued facilities development (especially at the Jalalabad Road complex) and maintenance of transitional and residual assets.
11. It is strongly recommended that the IEC and ECC ordinary budget be included as a permanent line within the consolidated budget of the nation. Furthermore, the international assistance subsidies to these bodies should be established as a tied contribution to the consolidated budget. This should be included at the time of the mid-term budget review in August/September 2005.

This would set a necessary precedent and also establish the principle of budgetary autonomy as one main factor ensuring the independence of the IEC.

12. It is recommended that an inventory stock exercise should be carried out at all levels as soon as possible. Allocation of assets in the field should be considered. It is recommended to retain necessary assets at the provincial level and retain the rest in the UN-administered regional logistics hubs for maintenance and security. This equipment can then be leased on an *ad-hoc* basis.
13. The IEC is encouraged to engage in a broader dialogue with government ministries and with international donors in an effort to articulate the genuine asset and infrastructural needs of Afghanistan.
14. The elections project presently manages 70 properties throughout Afghanistan. Of those, only six are rent-free facilities provided by local government departments. The IEC should consult with local government authorities to explore the opportunities for shared office facilities.
15. As a cost reducing mechanism, jointly with other measures, immediate efforts should be made to rapidly develop the capacity to locally produce adequate and cost-effective electoral materials (especially ballot papers and ballot boxes).

1. POLICY, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 ELECTORAL CALENDAR

Issues to be addressed

Had the presidential and legislative elections been held together, the subsequent election cycle would be one with presidential and Wolesi Jirga elections held simultaneously every five years, provincial council elections every four years, and district and local elections (village and municipalities) together every three years. Within such a cycle, provincial council elections would overlap with presidential and legislative elections every 20 years and with district and local elections every 12 years. District and local elections would overlap with presidential and legislative elections every 15 years and with provincial elections every 12 years. A complete overlapping of the three types of elections would never take place within the next 50 years, but at least one election would be held almost every year starting in 2008 when the departure of separate election calendars would start with local elections.

The prospects are not much different in the way the electoral cycle is developing now. With Wolesi Jirga and provincial council elections being held together in 2005, no matter which date is established for other elections (e.g. municipal), maintaining different terms of office for national, provincial and local authorities will generate an electoral cycle of the type described above. For example, presidential and provincial council elections shall both be held in 2009. As for the Meshrano Jirga, like the senate in other countries, it would be less problematic since seats are filled by portions according to the rotating calendar for provincial and district elections.

This type of calendar does not seem functional either in terms of political rationality (different elections occurring in the same year without any other rationale than the sheer running of time); or in terms of financial and technical efficiency (too many separate elections, but too close in time). Finally, there is the risk of electoral fatigue among the electorate being called to the polls practically every year. There would be an election in 38 out of the next 60 years. Which other calendars can be envisaged in view of enhancing the legitimacy and sustainability of electoral and democratic processes? Are there any lessons learned from international experience?

International experience

The questions of *how many tiers* would be ideal for an electoral cycle and *which elections should go together* have no simple answers. It very much depends on political tradition, a regime's founding philosophy, short-term political necessity and technical and financial imperatives. In many European countries with traditions of regional or federal government, a three-tier electoral cycle is not uncommon, with national, regional or state and local municipal elections held on separate schedules (e.g. France, Italy and Spain). This is also the case in a number of Latin American countries with federal or quasi-federal structures (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico). In contrast with this, there are countries where national, provincial and local elections are all held on the same day (e.g. Ecuador and most of Central America). A recent survey of 63 countries from different regions of the world has shown that in 42 countries (67%), national elections are held separately from regional or local elections. In the remaining 33% of countries, national and some kind of sub-national elections are held on the same day. In most of these cases (22%) three different types of elections take place simultaneously: national, regional and local elections. In a smaller proportion, national elections are held on the same day as local elections (this 7% of countries includes India, Bosnia and Botswana). Finally, a still smaller percentage of countries have national elections on the same day as regional elections, not including local municipal or commune elections (4%, including South Africa and Switzerland)¹.

The situation in Asia closely follows the global trend, with a larger number of countries holding national and sub-national elections—especially local elections—on separate time schedules. The pattern is particularly clear in Japan, Taiwan, Thailand and Cambodia, where national elections are not held on the same day as local elections. In the Republic of Korea, regional and local elections take place on the same day, but separately from general elections. Thus, there is a pattern of staggering elections within a given short period of time; this keeps the election days distinct but

¹ IDEA (2002)

captures various contests in a given electoral cycle and harmonizes the mandates of the various bodies. In Pakistan, local-municipal, provincial and national elections are staggered over a four-month time period. Local elections are first, then provincial and general simultaneously, the most recent electoral event having taken place between May and August 2004. In Indonesia, sub-national and national elections—both parliamentary and presidential—are held separately although staggered within a four-month time period; electoral events are currently being held between June and September 2004. In Bangladesh, separate but staggered national and local elections take place within a three-month time period, the most recent electoral events were held between January and March 2003.

A third pattern is a mix of national elections taking place simultaneously with some, but not all, kinds of sub-national elections. In India, national elections are held on the same day as local elections only, but not with other sub-national elections. In the Philippines, senators, congressmen and local government officials are elected in mid-term elections, but during presidential election years, everyone is elected at the same time (similar to the United States pattern). During synchronized elections, more than 17,000 positions are filled at all levels of government. Nevertheless, elections for *barangay* government—the lowest level of government roughly corresponding to the rural villages and urban neighborhoods—are held separately from other contests. Finally, there are a few countries where both national and the only established sub-national elections are held simultaneously. One example is Sri Lanka, where all kinds of elections take place on the same day.

In emerging democracies without long electoral traditions, a two-tier electoral cycle is most frequently established, with national elections held on the same day and sub-national elections held together on another day (especially local and municipal elections). More specifically, the experience in post-conflict societies—including Afghanistan—shows that general elections tend to take place separately from local elections and local elections are most often scheduled after general elections. Exceptions to the rule of separate elections are Nicaragua and Guatemala, where all kinds of elections customarily take place on the same day. Exceptions to the rule of local elections held only after general elections are Mozambique, Ethiopia and Kosovo, where some local elections take place before the first general election. The evidence suggests that political elites perceive local elections as even more politically sensitive than national elections in the post-conflict scenario. Consequently, the decision for local elections to follow national elections may be based on profound political considerations.²

Among the advantages for holding separate national and local elections, historical evidence strongly suggests that there are differences in the political nature of the different kinds of elections. Depending on the country, the expression of the political pluralism of a society tends to take different forms at different electoral occurrences (e.g. general versus regional and local elections and sometimes between national presidential and parliamentary elections). Voters can focus on different issues at different times. Local and provincial elections have sometimes been considered as "administrative elections" in the sense that they allow for the possibility of concentrating on local issues largely concerning service delivery by local and regional governments (e.g. health, education and physical infrastructures). Furthermore, at times of democracy building, special consideration should be given to the argument of whether the merging of different types of elections is likely to have favorable, indifferent or detrimental effects upon the democratization process in terms of national reconciliation, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms and the operation of democratic institutions, either national government and parliament or regional and local councils and administration.

Policy options

The options discussed below are all based upon the assumption that the current electoral calendar is changed by Constitutional reform in the near future for the sake of sustainability both of election management and the democratic process. The policy options address questions that relate to a new electoral calendar and whether there is to be a one-tier, two-tier or more-tiered election cycle. In addition, where several tiers are preferred, which elections would feasibly occur simultaneously?

1. The first option is a one-tier cycle in which all elections held by direct popular vote (the current six types of elections or a smaller number) are held together every five years, with the first joint event in 2009 when the current presidential term will expire. Such is the case in a number of

² Lopez-Pintor, 2005, assessing the situation in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, West Bank/Gaza, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Latin American countries (Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica). This option is particularly inadvisable for emerging democracies since it requires strong electoral experience and well developed local government structures taking care of the burden of the electoral operation at the field level.

2. The second option provides that six different elections occur by direct popular vote on two tiers, with presidential and legislative held together every five years and all sub-national elections (provincial, district, village and municipal councils) together every five years, but offset by two years from national elections. The cycle could begin in 2007 with provincial, district, village and municipal elections all together, followed in 2009 with presidential and legislative elections. Subsequent local and general elections would alternate in 2011, 2014, etc. The holding of local elections two years after national elections, instead of two-and-a-half years, for example, avoids the climatic conditions of the winter season.
3. The third option provides that only certain elections are conducted by direct popular vote. These would be presidential, legislative, provincial council and municipal elections. These electoral events more clearly express the direct interests of the people and would be more akin to international practice. In a two-tier cycle, presidential and legislative elections could be held together every five years, while provincial and municipal elections would also happen every five years, but offset two years from national elections. Like the second option, this is a model of sub-national elections as mid-term administrative elections. Among other advantages (political, logistical and financial), such a cycle would avoid having different kinds of election events occurring every given number of years. It would also avoid having a given type of elections sometimes held just one year before or after other elections. District and village councils would be filled, like the Meshrano Jirga, through secondary elections among members of municipal councils and other indirect mechanisms as provided by the law. Among other countries, the formula is used in Spain nationwide for provincial elections and for certain local bodies in the Basque Country.

In Afghanistan, if the politics would allow, the third option is recommendable due to:

- The simplicity of its political rationale with national political as opposed to municipal administrative elections;
- Five levels of governments by popular vote seem too many for a country without a federal structure;
- Technical efficacy by facilitating strategic, management and operational planning;
- Financial cost effectiveness; and
- This option might also allow the passing of time to mitigate the apparently complicated challenge of delineating district and village boundaries.

Furthermore, the *concept of municipalities* could easily encompass around 240 cities and townships around the country, and this would certainly bring electoral democracy to the local level³.

If the third option is chosen, electoral practice in the coming few years could evolve in the following direction: Assuming a municipal election by August-September 2006, all elections held until then according to the current Constitutional calendar would occur within the one-year period between April 2009 (presidential, provincial councils and municipal) and May 2010 (the earliest time possible for Wolesi Jirga elections; expiry dates and dates for new elections in the provincial and municipal councils have not been established in the Constitution or the law). Like in other countries in the region, and only in the meantime until Constitutional reform is introduced, staggered elections could be organized between 1 April 2009 (latest possible date for next presidential election) and 1 April -1 May 2010 (earliest possible dates for next Wolesi Jirga election). Given the legal vacuum on this aspect and by analogy, the next provincial and municipal elections could be held together or separately anytime between May and June 2009, following the presidential election of April of the same year. Synergies can be made by concentrating administrative and logistic resources on a one-year electoral season without the need of previous Constitutional reform. According to comparative

³ As defined by the 2002 Municipal Elections Law, which reenacted a 1964 legal text under which several municipal elections had been conducted, municipal elections should be held in all provincial capitals, and in rural towns with no less than 1000 houses within the radius of one kilometer. The figure 240 is an estimate from information provided by the JEMBS in the field.

experiences, this should be considered reasonable and feasible for a country at the level of social and economic development as Afghanistan.

Such Constitutional reform could be more easily introduced during the ensuing presidential and legislative term, when the National Assembly has consolidated its institutional role and *modus operandi* and democratic government has further settled down. If a calendar with four direct elections organized in a two-tier cycle is established, the new cycle could start with presidential and legislative elections held together in 2014, provincial and municipal elections together in 2016 and so on.

Activities involved

Two main courses of action would be in place: first and most importantly, a political decision on which election (e.g. municipal and district councils) would be next and when it would take place. Second, legal reform would be necessary to adjust the Municipal Elections Law to the Constitution and to the Electoral Law⁴.

A review of the Electoral Law will also be necessary after the transitional period. Finally, Constitutional reform shall be considered if the electoral calendar and electoral cycles are to be changed. For all of these, expert support at legal drafting would be necessary.

Rough cost estimates

For activities involved:

The financial cost of the above activities (political decision making and legal drafting) would be almost negligible, and probably covered by the normal operation cost of other programmes (e.g. "Support to Parliament"). Additionally, the cost of convening a Loya Jirga for Constitutional reform would be largely the cost implied in the ongoing activities of the National Assembly, which would be the main component of such a Loya Jirga, according to the Constitution. As for other members of the Jirga coming from the provinces, it is likely that several hundred thousand dollars would suffice.

For election cycle:

Independently of extra electoral integrity costs implied in prevailing political and security conditions in Afghanistan, the current electoral calendar is by itself particularly expensive, due to two main factors. One is the rotation of polling along a three-tier cycle (every five, four and three years), which demands higher expenses than those of a more-simple cycle with one or two tiers. The other factor is the overlapping of different types of elections every given number of years, which does not facilitate effective planning by the electoral administration.

A one-tier cycle allowing for six different kinds of elections by direct popular vote may not be recommended in an electoral system like that of Afghanistan. This would be not only expensive in financial terms, but also hard to achieve logistically and politically, at least during the initial stages of democratic development.

A two-tier cycle would more likely imply lower costs due to the concentration of no more than three elections on the same date and the implications of the simpler concept of national as opposed to local elections. More specifically, electoral costs are expected to lower significantly as the country continues to move from a post-conflict scenario (with high integrity costs such as security and international staff) towards one of transitional democracies (decreasing integrity and moving toward standard core costs). There is concluding evidence that electoral costs tend to slide down from around US \$20-40 per registered voter toward \$5-10 as the post-conflict stage is surmounted⁵. As a consequence, an electoral budget in the region of \$50-80 million could be envisaged for the time when Afghanistan surmounts its current political and security conditions, and if a standard and self-sustaining voter registry is organized. Integrity and start-up voter registration costs are the largest components of post-conflict elections. Examples of varying success on this domain can be observed

⁴ For example, according to 2002 Municipal Election Law, in cities with more than one *nahia* (city district), only *nahia* councils are elected by direct popular vote; the municipal council are filled by second-level elections from among *nahia* council members, and the mayor is elected by a third-level election by and from among the members of the municipal council. But Article 141 of Constitution establishes that "the mayor and members of the municipal councils are elected by direct elections."

⁵ UNDP 2000, and 2005 Cost of Registration and Election project.

in other countries a decade after their first post-conflict election, such as Cambodia, Bosnia, El Salvador and Mozambique.

It goes without saying that the electoral calendar is not the only cost determinant of elections. Other factors of paramount importance are the kind and quality of voter lists, proper allocations of voters to specific polling stations, formula of representation that strongly affects the format and cost of the ballot paper, size of the permanent electoral staff and pay to temporary staff, including polling station officers. Finally, the cost impact of the availability of governmental structures at different levels and the assistance with the logistics of the elections should be emphasized (e.g. police, school system and local government).

1.2 REVIEWING THE ELECTORAL LEGISLATION

Issues to be addressed

The present electoral legislation was initially drafted in great haste for the 2004 Presidential Election. As a result, provisions concerning the election are spread over a number of legal instruments, including the Constitution, the Electoral Law itself, the Political Parties Law and the Municipal Election Law, and contain some errors, imprecise terminology and contradictions. In the case of the 2002 Municipal Election Law, it requires harmonization with the 2004 Constitution in a number of essential elements (e.g. the authority in charge of elections and the formula for electing municipal councils and mayors are incompatible with Constitutional provisions).

The precise kind of electoral legislation to be passed depends, to a large extent, on the political and legal culture of the society involved. In a federal system, laws may be established on both the federal as well as local levels. In other countries where the central government is more powerful, it is possible to find only one layer of legislation, with either many components of the electoral law in many different instruments or in one unified electoral code. Choosing which approach is most appropriate requires a highly individualized assessment of each country's situation.

In Afghanistan, legislative documents are not in an orderly state. There is no comprehensive collection of laws, as libraries and other legal archives were destroyed by the previous twenty-four years of war.⁶ In many ways, writing legislation now is almost starting from scratch, which presents both an opportunity as well as a liability. Article 128 of the Constitution does provide for the application of *hanafi* jurisprudence where no provisions exist regarding a particular case. However, as there is disagreement among scholars as to the proper application of the principles of *hanafi*, certainty regarding the outcome of a particular case is not always possible.

In addition, we must consider that, as a result of years of conflict, Afghanistan is an extremely poor society when looking at the traditional measures of social, political, human, financial and natural capital. While some areas are stronger than might be expected after years of drought, war, emigration and the distortions brought on by the massive international presence in Afghanistan, the overall picture is not positive.⁷ This means that concerns about the sustainability of the electoral process must be at the forefront of all considerations.

Whether a decision is made to merely make amendments to the electoral legislation as it stands now or to create a unified electoral code, this background must be taken into account in order to make the best choice for the Afghan elections.

Policy options

There are three options to be considered. The first is to leave the general legislative structure in place and make amendments as needed. The second option is to completely rewrite of all electoral instruments from scratch, using the experience of the 2004 and 2005 elections. The third option is a unified electoral code, putting all the various legal instruments into one place.

⁶ <http://www.idlo.org/afghanlaws/index.htm>

⁷ Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan (September 2002)

Option one is the default choice and the one chosen by the government for the 2005 elections. On the face of it, this choice entails little political risk, as the documents involved have already been accepted by the government and, for the most part, have been accepted by the political players. Unfortunately, as discussed previously, the electoral legislation as it presently exists was drafted quickly for the 2004 Presidential Elections. As a result, there are some errors, inconsistencies and policy choices that were not entirely thought through. Because of this, the amendments necessary to bring the electoral legislation up to standard will be extensive enough that a complete rewrite of the legislation would not entail significantly more risk than merely amending the legislation. Technically imperfect as it may seem, this alternative is the one entailing fewer political shortcomings, and is recommended for the time being.

Option two provides the opportunity to perfect the electoral legislation. The political costs of a full rewrite are not significantly higher than amending the legislation, as proposed in option one, because of the extensive nature of the needed amendments. The opportunity to have a set of legislation perfected may far outweigh the additional political cost.

Option three is qualitatively different from options one and two. Both options one and two maintain the fragmented state of the electoral legislation. Option three, writing a comprehensive electoral code, simplifies the legislative environment significantly. The electoral code would compile and harmonize all regulations referring to political parties, the structure and functioning of the electoral administration, voter registration, voting and counting procedures, media access and monitoring for elections and rules governing an independent Electoral Complaints Commission. By placing all electoral legislation in one place, election law may become more transparent and more easily explainable to political actors, observers and the general population. In addition, drafting legislation as one unitary instrument creates the greatest opportunity for internal coherence, consistency and clarity.

Activities involved

Active Afghan participation is essential for the success of any legislative reform. That said, all three options involve essentially the same activities, i.e. meeting with stakeholders and government officials to build support for necessary changes. The differences involve only the extent to which stakeholders and government need to be prepared for changes.

Rough cost estimates

There are no significant cost differences between the different options. For all three, a team of two legislative drafters for a period of three to four months, along with a small support staff, would be necessary, for a total cost of approximately \$180,000 (\$20,000/month/person, including support staff), assuming logistical support from an already existing organization.

1.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (IEC)

Issues to be addressed

Afghanistan has a permanent Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), established in accordance with Article 156 of the Constitution, whose existence is widely thought to generally correspond with best current international practice.

However, many significant issues concerning the environment in which the IEC will operate remain unresolved. Some will only slowly be resolved as the IEC and other arms of government mature, but the IEC will be well served by a strategy to navigate the issues.

The issues can be divided broadly into those surrounding the IEC's institutional, operational and transitional environments:

1. *Institutional issues:* a) Terms of appointment, eligibility for reappointment, grounds for dismissal and fixing remuneration of IEC members; necessity of a degree of continuity of membership. b)

Dependency of the IEC on the national budget. c) Relationship of the IEC Commissioners to its Secretariat. d) Permanence, size and responsibilities of provincial electoral commissions. e) Relationship of IEC to the President, Ministries and National Assembly. f) Relationship of the IEC to an electoral adjudication body. g) Relationship of the IEC to the Civil Service Commission. h) Relationship of the IEC to election observer organizations, both domestic and international.

2. *Operational issues:* a) Immediate future of voter registry. b) Immediate future of municipal and district elections. c) Staffing of and resources for field offices to best match project delivery requirements. d) Whether any requirement for electoral districting capacity is required, now or in the foreseeable future.
3. *Transitional issues:* 30 days after the conclusion of the transitional period⁸, the autonomy of the IEC is clear, but the IEC may wish to avail itself of international support and advice: a) Level of international support and advice sought by the IEC. b) Level of off-budget funding required for short-term sustainability. c) Timeframe for on-budget sustainability.

Policy options

A summary of lessons learned from global experience includes the following:

1. Elections run by independent electoral bodies are preferable to those run by government executives, and permanent electoral administrations are more cost-effective than temporary ones.
2. Electoral bodies are also better protected when their members are appointed either by parliamentary approval or from lists approved by a parliamentary committee integrated with members of parliament and representatives of different social segments (e.g. universities, judiciaries and civil society organizations).
3. Regardless of the composition of an electoral commission, it can operate neutrally and independently if the necessary institutional mechanisms are put in place (e.g. appointment procedures, term of office and budgetary consolidation).
4. Maintaining a minimum of permanent and professional staff has proven not only instrumental for institution building but also cost-effective.
5. Among the cost-effective measures: continuous voter registration; integrated, strategic and operational planning; decentralization of some main electoral operations; and coordination between donors, election authorities and political parties and candidates.

Institutional

Although the IEC is appointed by the President, there is a need for the independence of its members to be more demonstrable. It would, therefore, seem desirable for the President to appoint members of the IEC from a list of candidates prepared by either a joint committee of the Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga or by a panel of eminent members of civil society nominated by such a joint committee.

The term of office of an IEC member should be linked to the election cycle and, therefore, extended to five years. To maintain a degree of continuity and corporate memory, IEC members should be eligible for reappointment to a maximum of three terms. The current method of removing a member of the IEC, by a two-thirds majority of his/her colleagues or upon criminal conviction, appears to be a generally adequate protection of the IEC's independence. However, there may be a case for removal of one or more members by a special, say two-thirds, majority of both the Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga to deal with the contingency of a corrupt or incompetent faction on the IEC.

Given the current limited development of the judicial system in Afghanistan, there is a good case for the continuation of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) as a permanent, quasi-judicial adjudicator of electoral disputes. Members of the permanent ECC could be appointed and removed analogously to members of the IEC, removing the current special authority of the Supreme Court, Independent Human Rights Commission and United Nations. Its implied power to dismiss a member of the IEC should be reviewed so that the IEC and ECC powers and relationship are demarcated to

⁸ The expiry of Bonn Agreement at end of 2005

the greatest extent possible. Another alternative would be to assign all adjudication powers to the IEC itself, as is customary in many countries.

It is too early to form a judgment on the efficacy of Provincial Electoral Commissions (PEC), although in theory, they should represent a useful watchdog for provincial electoral administrations. Following the 2005 elections, the JEMB and ECC should review the performance of PECs with a view to fine-tune their terms of reference and deciding whether they fulfil a useful purpose outside election periods. Two options that are successfully applied in many countries are:

1. PECs are maintained in between elections, but with only one commissioner full-time and the others active only at election periods. One or two full-time professional staff are appointed on a permanent basis, normally an administrative/logistic officer and a trainer/civic educator. These staff would be part of the Secretariat.
2. All PECs are appointed only for election times, but a permanent provincial electoral staff of the Secretariat would remain in charge of election-related affairs (e.g. voter lists, civic education, inventories and custody of electoral materials and review of logistics planning). The two above-mentioned officers could carry out these tasks. In all cases, provincial electoral staff could share office facilities with the provincial or local government administration under different possible legal/financial premises (e.g. rent, lease, cost-sharing).

It should be noted that the Ministry of Interior still employs two electoral officers in the provincial administration from the time when municipal elections were a function of the Ministry. However, a harmonization of the Municipal Election Law with the 2004 Constitution would automatically remove any electoral responsibility from the Ministry, and therefore former electoral staff should be reassigned to different tasks.

A professional permanent IEC, including nine Commissioners and the Secretariat as well as 34 provincial offices, would require around 110 to 142 professional staff, plus the necessary office and logistical supporting staff. The size of the professional staff would depend on whether provincial offices are staffed with two or three officers (totalling 68 and 102, respectively). In any case, the Secretariat would essentially maintain its current structure: Chief Electoral Officer and Deputy; two Chiefs of Operations and Staff and their Deputies; eight department heads with their deputies and one technical assistant.

The current model of the IEC and its Secretariat has as its nexus a Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) with full executive responsibility for the Secretariat. The CEO is responsible for the majority of the activities of the IEC and is accountable to the Commission. This model has much to recommend itself, and it provides clear lines of management while leaving IEC members with full regulatory and surveillance powers.

There may be significant savings in administrative and operational expenditures were the IEC to form strategic partnerships with other arms of government for the purposes of project implementation. For example, the Department of Education has a network of buildings suitable as polling centres, a network of literate personnel suitable as polling officials and an established system for paying those personnel. Similarly, maintenance or revision of the voter registry might have synergies, at least at the logistical level, with the proposed 2007 census, or with the extension of citizens' identification nationwide. Either of these possibilities might limit the number of personnel required to be employed directly by the IEC and thereby improve the IEC's sustainability.

Irrespective of continuing donor support, the IEC will need to establish an institutionalized relationship with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which will have a role in fixing the salaries of IEC members and Secretariat staff. It is to be hoped that the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) programme will assist in the retention of key staff by authorising salary maintenance while IEC operations move away from the United Nations partnership. Nonetheless, to ensure recognition of the IEC as an integral part of the state apparatus, running costs should move from direct donor funding to the national budget as soon as possible. The role of the CSC should be sufficiently circumscribed to preserve the appearance and reality of the IEC's independence.

As for the relationship between the IEC and domestic election observer organizations, the IEC regulates and grants accreditation to observers, both individual and organizational. As for international observers, cooperation between electoral authorities and observer organizations is usually subject to the same intra-governmental arrangements as other international cooperation activities. Formal approval by the government or parliament is not necessarily required, but consultation with Foreign

Affairs is necessary since it is the responsibility of the government to grant visas and import licenses for certain materials, with diplomatic protection and without.

Operational

All electoral administrations are composed, to sharply varying degrees, of ongoing core staff augmented by implementing partners and temporary employees, in order to stage an electoral event. The size of the core staff dictates the level of expertise, corporate memory and preparedness to stage an event, while augmentation provides the opportunity to control costs and limit underemployment.

The IEC is at present confronted by the situation of not knowing whether it will be required to conduct district and/or municipal elections in 2006, not knowing the future of the voter registry, and not knowing whether it will have a joint role (with the Ministry of Interior, currently charged with this task) in delineating electoral boundaries, with which it has no experience at all.

What is certain is that the IEC will have to develop the capacity to manage these processes as they do occur, and will therefore need to develop a field structure capable of managing them.

Additionally, there is a clear need for an ongoing civic education programme dealing with not only electoral rights and responsibilities, but also with the roles of elected institutions and representatives. This programme should be extended to the schools' curriculum as well, in order to develop a citizenry with a sense of ownership of the institutions and knowledge of what to expect from their representatives.

A civic education and schools programme will require at least a provincial presence. This, and future operational requirements, dictate that at least a provincial structure and communications infrastructure will be required.

Two parallel strategies should therefore be developed: a) Organisational consolidation and preparation for electoral events after 2005, either municipal, district or both. b) Planning for the associated revision of the voter registry in 2006.

Transitional

Naturally, transitional arrangements for the IEC will depend on operational requirements in 2006 onwards. Any major project—elections, major revision of the voter registry or electoral districting—may be best managed as a direct donor-funded project with a significant international advisory role. In the absence of a major project, the IEC may be able to spend the next year consolidating the knowledge and lessons learned of the two elections and consolidating the field structure to support off-year projects.

Current members of the IEC have sought the continued presence of a small team of international experts in an advisory capacity. These experts could concentrate on areas such as: legal and policy support and electoral reform; information technology support and training; assets management; voter registry issues; election planning; field operations structure; capacity building; civic education; electoral education in schools; and electoral districting (if required).

The preference of current IEC members is that international assistance be provided as part of a unified assistance project, rather than as a series of disaggregated sub-projects implemented by a range of partner organisations. However, it is recognised that offers of assistance may, to a point, have to be considered "as offered".

Activities involved

Institutional

Most of the institutional policy options involve preparation of policy papers for the government and national assembly and establishing and formalising relationships with relevant departments, notably the Civil Service Commission, Department of Finance and Department of Justice. If the Department of Education is seen as a strategic partner, this relationship will also need to be carefully nurtured.

Operational

As described above, operational activities will either consist of a period of consolidation, planning and capacity building accompanied by a civic education outreach programme, or a major electoral project.

It is therefore difficult to provide a meaningful prognosis until the intentions of the government, and possibly of the donor community, become clearer.

Transitional

Transitional activities should focus on the orderly handover of full authority and sustainable assets to the IEC, along with provision of continued international advice and support at a level with which the IEC feels comfortable.

Rough cost estimates

The annual costs of a limited electoral assistance programme described above may involve the following:

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
10 international experts @ \$150,000 each	1,500,000
Security, support and travel	500,000
Retaining subsidy for 101 national staff @ \$10,000 each (average)	1,010,000
Subsidy for infrastructure support and asset maintenance	2,000,000
Total estimated annual cost	5,190,000

Running cost of the IEC with Kabul headquarters and 34 provincial offices

The following is an estimate of the fixed cost of maintaining two professional staff per province. It is assumed that they will be provided with support staff comprising an office assistant, cleaner and driver; will be housed in office accommodation appropriate to senior provincial civil servants; will each have a mobile telephone for official purposes; will share one vehicle; and will travel within the province and occasionally to Kabul. It is assumed that information technology infrastructure will continue to be donor-supplied as domestic facilities, with the exception of mobile phone networks, do not yet provide a viable alternative. Some costs will vary widely between provinces, and the following estimates should be viewed as an average. It is assumed that all project expenditure will be separately budgeted:

Expense per province	Cost per annum (USD)
2 professional staff @ \$11,200 each	22,400
Office assistant	720
Driver	840
Janitor	600
Vehicle maintenance	1,000
Fuel	3,000
Per diem, Kabul (\$10)	200
Office rental	4,800
Stationery	200
2 mobile phones @ \$50/month	1,200
Depreciation and repairs	3,000

Total per province	37,960
Total x 34 provinces	1,290,640

Equivalent costs for headquarters staff are estimated as follows:

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
Office assistant x 10	7,200
Driver x 10	8,400
Janitor x 5	3,000
Gardeners x 5	3,000
Guards x 10	6,000
Vehicle maintenance	10,000
Fuel	20,000
Per diem, provinces (\$10)	3,000
Stationery	5,000
42 mobile phones @ \$25/month	12,600
Depreciation and repairs	30,000
Total	108,200

Salaries for professional personnel are estimated as follows:

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
33 staff @ \$11,200 average	369,600
9 Commissioners @ \$24,000	216,000
Commissioners' transport @ \$900/month x 9 x 12 months	97,200
Total	682,800
Grand Total, Kabul headquarters and 34 provincial offices	2,081,640

Within this annual budget framework, \$1,529,000 (73%) out of \$2,081,640 would be subsidized by the international community during the next few years; covering primarily salary expenses (57%) and infrastructure and asset maintenance (16%).

Other infrastructure support and asset maintenance costs, not included in the IEC ordinary budget, amount to \$1,660,800, which would square with a total of \$2,000,000 as the overall assistance subsidy for infrastructure support and asset maintenance. Of this, it is recommended that \$339,200, broken down as above, be placed under direct budgetary control of the IEC and its Secretariat. The remainder would be used for continued communications and information technology support, continued facilities development (especially at the Jalalabad Road complex) and maintenance of transitional and residual assets.

Budgeting and funding an independent Electoral Complaints Commission

If the option of a separate permanent ECC with three Commissioners is taken, the annual budget for a non-election year would approximately equal the cost of two provincial electoral commissions together, and it should be funded similarly to the IEC. Rough estimates would amount to \$88,160.

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
3 Commissioners @ \$24,000 each	72,000
Office assistant	720
Driver	840
Janitor	600
Vehicle maintenance	1,000
Fuel	3,000
Per diem, Kabul (\$10)	200
Office rental	4,800
Stationery	200
3 mobile phones @\$50/month	1,800
Depreciation and repairs	3,000
Total	88,160

It is strongly recommended that the IEC and ECC ordinary budget be included as a permanent line within the consolidated budget of the nation. Furthermore, the international assistance subsidies to these bodies should be established as a tied contribution to the consolidated budget. This should start being included at the time of the mid-term budget review in August/September 2005. This would set a necessary precedent and also establish the principle of budgetary autonomy as a main factor ensuring the independence of the Electoral Commission.

2. VOTER REGISTRY

Issues to be addressed

Desirability, feasibility and cost of different models of the voter registry shall be considered. Is it more advantageous having a continuous automatic voter registry than either one that is updated by periodic calls on voters or a brand-new registry before every election? What are the requirements for keeping voter lists updated (to reflect the deceased, changes of residence and citizens abroad)? Which authorities shall be responsible or share a responsibility for voter lists? What relationship can be drawn between voter registries and other lists of people (e.g. civil registries and ID card lists)? Under which conditions can a continuous voter list be extracted from other lists of people? What is the relationship between voter registries and population censuses?

In comparison with other registries of people, the exclusive purpose of a voter registry is recording the enfranchisement of voters and facilitating the voting operation by allowing individual voters to vote only within a given constituency and at a given polling station. Other registries of people exist for the

achievement of different purposes: civil registries, lists of residents and records of personal identification documents (e.g. ID cards, passports and driving licenses). Voter lists should not be considered as registries of citizens or residents. Voter lists per se are intended neither to help with the identification of citizens nor to serve as a resource for the quantification of the population of a given country.

The kinds of links between voter lists and other types of registries depend on the legal administrative tradition of the country and on the special circumstances under which voter registration is first organized. Especially in emerging democracies and post-conflict societies, a deficit of population statistics, civil registries and citizen identification as well as problems with displaced populations may determine the procedures whereby voters are first registered. In general terms, the main link between voter lists and civil registries is the requirement of a birth certificate as proof of citizenship (which is normally defined by nationality) and a proof of residency (which would normally be required for the allocation of individual voters to constituencies, polling centres and polling stations). As for the link between voter lists and personal identification documents, there is the necessity for the voter to be identified at the polling station. Finally, the link of voter lists with population censuses can be found in the facilitating role that census data plays in the organization of early voter registration and the disaggregating of voter lists into constituencies, not to mention the use of population statistics as an instrument for cross-checking voter lists in assessing the size of the segments of the population that are susceptible to enfranchisement at the current or future election.

Policy options

Assuming that undertaking voter registration on an *ad hoc* basis for particular elections is an unsustainable model, voter lists can be produced on a permanent basis either by periodic updating or through a more-continuous process. Periodic updating of voter registries is usually done either on an annual basis or in the period immediately preceding an election. As for continuous registration, it requires an appropriate infrastructure to maintain the voter lists either by the electoral administration or by another authority (most frequently civil registry or institute of statistics); adding the names and other relevant information for those who satisfy eligibility requirements (attaining citizenship, satisfying residency requirements, attaining voting age); and deleting the names of those who no longer meet the eligibility requirements (usually through deaths and changes of residency).

From a global perspective, compulsory continuous voter registration is quite common in Western Europe as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, because it is organized on a continuous basis whereby the voter becomes automatically registered on a voter list after turning 18 years of age, without any requirement to show up before any public authority. This is a voter registration system based on individual citizenship and age information, which is provided from either civil registry records or residents' rolls compiled by local governments. In contrast, compulsory registration is not widely practiced in Africa or North America. In South America, there exists an even distribution between the two practices. All models are related to the way civil registries and residence records are organized.

In the Asian region, three countries run a system of continuous registration in which the voter does not have to show up to register the first time, but instead the state authority takes the initiative for first inclusion of the voter on the voter lists (Japan, Republic of Korea and Maldives). In India, a continuous registration of its own kind has been established, relying on an extensive civil service and effective local government. The voters do not have to show up the first time, as enumerators go house-to-house making the voter list once every five years. During the years in between, the voter list is displayed for one month every year for the public to file their claims and objections. Once updated, the list is put in the post offices or municipal offices on a permanent basis, and if someone wants to file claims and objections, this can be done at any time. Thus, annual and continuous revision takes place. The every-five-year house-to-house enumerations are a practical mechanism to clean the voter lists of the deceased and reflect changes of residence that may not have been reported. The enumerators' information is just a periodic push for the continuous updating of the voter registry. The cost of this enumeration is not particularly high, as it is done by local civil servants who are given extra pay.

In a larger number of countries, registration requires the citizen to voluntarily show up one time, but once the citizen is first registered there is continuous maintenance of the voter lists, which is normally done by state initiative (this is the case in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand). A third group of countries periodically updates voter registries in which citizens

can be added, removed or corrected at their own initiative. Cambodia falls into this last category, together with Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal and Singapore.⁹

Permanent registration with an opening of the voter lists before every election can be considered as an option for Afghanistan, at least until and if continuous registration based on local government support is made possible. A permanent registry can normally only be successfully transformed into automatically conducted continuous registration if the first entry of the citizen into the voter registry contains information on birth and residence. In addition, both a living as well as a residence condition must be systematically revised by public authorities after death notice and changes of residence are provided. This requires adequate record keeping at the local administration level and certainly the existence of a roll of residents in the village and municipal level, which is different from a civil registry where, in many countries, only births, death and marriages are recorded. However, this is not the case in Afghanistan. Given the non-existent civil registries and citizen identification mechanisms countrywide, the more-sustainable voter registry would be one based on periodical updating of existing voter lists—if these are found adequate—before every election. Perhaps with time, a continuous voter registry similar to the one used in India can be developed as far as civil service and local government is concerned (in India, as in Afghanistan, births and deaths are rarely registered before any public authority).

Activities involved

The first activity recommended after the 2005 elections is an independent review of the current voter lists to assess the viability and cost of updating them, including the clearing of the lists of multiple registrants and the deceased. Proper identification of province and place of residence (village or city *nahia*, or district) should equally be ensured to enable the allocation of voters to constituencies and polling stations. Polling-station-specific lists should be produced (current lists do contain village information for certain areas, but not *nahia* information, at least in Kabul).

Whether the cost of such an update would be lower, similar to or higher than conducting a brand new registration operation will depend on the conclusions of the reviewers of current lists. If it is concluded that a brand-new registry is advisable, the question is then whether the production of a national identity card for all citizens (or extension of the existing *taskera*, or ID card, to everybody) would be preferable. This ID document would also work as voter identification. In this instance, the voter registry would almost automatically emerge from citizen identification. In the future, voter lists would be periodically updated after requiring new registrants to be properly identified with an ID card or *taskera*. The widest-possible public exposition of voter lists would help, if not ensure, getting the lists updated with both the deceased as well as new residents. As said before, a house-to-house enumeration might be carried out every given number of years, like in India, as civil service and financial resources allow.

It should be noted that several projects for a national ID card system have already been proposed to the government. This might be the time to focus on the feasibility of a joint venture of generating a voter list at the time when all citizens are duly identified. Joint planning in this regard should be pursued by the IEC and the Ministry of Interior.

Rough cost estimates

Some lessons learned stemming from a recent UNDP global survey and other sources are relevant here:

1. There are post-conflict situations where no citizens' records of any kind are available or reliable, and therefore no resource exists from which a voter registry could be extracted. The most recent example was Timor L'Este, where both a civil registry and a voter registry had to be constructed from scratch, and it was done simultaneously—although not without some serious difficulties. In comparison, in Cambodia there are voter lists that are periodically revised (from October to December every year), and are considered inclusive of the largest percentage of the estimated eligible population. The building from scratch of a civil registry is usually an operation more time consuming, complex and expensive than the creation of voter lists.

⁹ Survey by International IDEA of 124 countries in 2004, IDEA Data Base

2. "Permanent registries promote both transparency and cost-effectiveness, particularly when they are periodically updated with corrections, additions and deletions without obliging voters to re-register. Recent reforms in this direction are being implemented in a number of new as well as older democracies such as Botswana, Canada and Chile..."¹⁰ Moreover, "the single most important cost-cutting measure is probably continuous registration. . . . Given the huge costs involved in undertaking voter registration operations for the first time, permanent registers that can be updated periodically will prove cost-effective in the long run"¹¹.
3. Voter registration through a periodic voter registry is ultimately a more expensive operation than maintaining a continuous registry¹². Periodic voter lists, particularly those updated prior to each election, entail a significant cost spike in comparison to permanent and continuous registries, where the costs are spread throughout the electoral cycle. In order to truly spread out the registration burden in the inter-election period, there needs to be adequate voter education to target newly eligible voters or those who have moved and encourage them to register as soon as possible. This would reduce the likelihood of a rush to registration as an election approaches. In addition, there needs to be proper administrative and technological capacity to handle the continuous nature of registration as well as a shared ethic to produce the most-accurate list possible and avoid the accumulation of "deadwood" on the voter rolls¹³.
4. The use of computer technology may be relevant for the quality and cost of voter lists: "Among other recent developments, the computerization of voter registries has proved to be a reliable and effective mechanism for updating and cross-checking the lists at the national level." Nevertheless, it is apparent that "new technologies in themselves cannot improve the political quality of elections, particularly if mistrust and lack of transparency must be overcome."¹⁴
5. Regarding the use of voter cards, "allowing citizens to vote with a variety of identification documents, such as a driver license or passport, rather than requiring a voter's card, should be considered good practice. The use of voter cards does not in itself add anything to democratization and its nominal cost (normally very high), in addition to the tasks involved in distribution, can deter voter turnout and otherwise delay or disrupt the electoral process. Moreover, it does not prevent multiple voting, which can be checked by other means ranging from indelible ink to computerized systems"¹⁵.
6. The cost of an in-depth review of voter lists in Afghanistan would not be high, probably ranging around several hundred thousand dollars. A different matter is the cost of brand-new internationally standardized voter lists at a time when the delineation of over 34 problematic districts and probably thousands of villages remains uncertain. This delineation will be needed in order to link voters to constituencies and polling stations. The same could be said about properly documenting the entire population (*taskera*). The main advantage of this latter operation would be providing all citizens with an ID document for multiple uses, including voting.

3. HUMAN RESOURCES

The current elections project, carried out under international supervision and an internationally funded budget, comes to a close at the end of 2005. While international support for Afghan elections is likely to continue for a significant amount of time, a transition must be made to the Afghan national budget and an electoral administration managed by Afghans alone. It is assumed that the IEC will continue in its present form with nine Commissioners, and that the IEC will maintain a permanent structure at headquarters and provincial levels. Out of over 190 national staff that have been recruited under the 2005 Elections project, 20 are considered core national staff by the electoral management. Afghan election professionals that currently hold these positions should form the core of the future IEC administration and are the target group for current and future capacity building programmes. The period in which the international community will act in an advisory role to the IEC and will continue to

¹⁰ UNDP (2000) p. 126

¹¹ Ibid. p. 128

¹² IDEA (2002) p. 30

¹³ ACE (2003)

¹⁴ UNDP (2000) pp. 126-27

¹⁵ UNDP (2000) p. 126

contribute to Afghan elections with funding and expertise should be considered an extended transition during which Afghan election administrators must be given the opportunity to learn all of the necessary skills of their profession. Furthermore, staff retention and buy-in to elections will largely depend on learning and skills development opportunities. Election professionals accustomed to an international mission setting for the elections must become accustomed and equipped to establish and maintain a bureaucracy.

3.1 RETENTION OF IEC STAFF

Issues to be addressed

Significant efforts have been made and resources used to develop a professional cadre of election officials in Afghanistan. To ensure that these valuable human resource assets are not lost when the IEC transitions into a stand-alone election authority, a staff policy identifying incentives to retain the various staffing categories must be developed and implemented.

The two key focus areas would be to identify the various IEC staff categories affected by the retention policy and to recommend suitable strategies to retain them.

As the IEC will find itself in a transitional period for the next couple of years, it is essential that the policy cater to the needs of the IEC both during the transition period as well as in its permanent state.

Policy options

The IEC is facing the very same staffing problems as most election authorities in a post-conflict environment. The Commission needs to retain its professional permanent staff both at headquarters as well as in the field, while at the same time ensuring that qualified *ad hoc* election workers are available when major electoral events, such as voter registration and polling day, are taking place. An integral aspect to retaining staff is the issue of how to attract new staff members to replace the ones who will inevitably depart from the Afghan election authority.

Experiences from other countries indicate that a uniform approach to retaining staff is only partially successful. The lessons learned are that the needs and requirements of various staffing categories vary drastically and therefore more tailor-made policies are required.

In general, the following five categories need to be considered in any encompassing retention policy:

1. Election Commissioners;
2. Senior JEMB administrative staff;
3. Chief Election Officer and Heads of Departments (IEC headquarters);
4. Heads of Provincial Offices;
5. Election Officers (both headquarters and field offices)

Option 1: Remuneration-based retention policy

Currently all salaries for the election staff are paid from the donor-supported election budget. As the election authority is competing with other UN agencies and international institutions for competent staff, today's salary levels are significantly higher than what the average governmental organization is currently paying its staff.

Continuing paying the inflated (by Afghan standards) salaries would have the added advantage that current staff employed by the JEMB would most definitely stay on and recruitment of new staff would be significantly facilitated. However, it is highly unlikely that the Afghan national budget would be able to accommodate such a large election budget. In addition, no compelling reasons exist as to why the staff of the IEC should be treated any differently than the officials of the security, education and health sectors.

Option 2: Knowledge-based retention policy

For the long haul, it is strongly recommended that IEC personnel, except perhaps its Commissioners, be recruited from the civil service on a normal civil servant's package. It is true that the IEC has a special independent status as enshrined in the Constitution, but no arguments can be made as to why

the IEC staff should enjoy a more-lucrative financial remuneration package than their fellow Afghan civil servants.

The regular election officer, both in the field as well as in headquarters, is expected to be content with what a civil servant remuneration would entail given the scarcity of work in Afghanistan. No major change in the unemployment situation is foreseen that would affect the IEC's recruitment and retention policies. However, organizing and implementing elections in a timely and professional manner is not something that can be left to average civil servants, at least not without them first going through extensive training. This could be the key to the IEC's successful personnel policy.

High-quality professional training is in scarce supply in Afghanistan today. By establishing a continuous training programme both for entry-level election officers as well as more-advanced courses for operational and administrative managers, the IEC could become an attractive employer.

Like all organizations offering solid internal educational possibilities, the IEC, too, would become the target of recruitment actions from other governmental organizations. IEC would run the risk of having its staff poached by other institutions. However problematic it might be to continuously replace staff, by becoming a lead governmental organization to work for, the IEC would be able to attract the right caliber of individuals to perform its tasks in a professional and timely manner. To achieve this objective, a permanent election training programme would need to be established catering to entry, middle and executive management needs. Both specific election-related subjects as well as more-generic management-related issues should be included in the curriculum offered.

Unfortunately, this knowledge-based retention strategy cannot be implemented immediately, as this is a policy that would only become effective once the election training programme has been established and proven its value to civil servants. Therefore, this strategy will be of less relevance to the IEC during the transitional phase. An alternative must be developed.

Option 3: Transitional knowledge-based retention policy

Since 2003, significant resources have been spent on a capacity-building programme for key Afghan election functionaries. A large proportion of these key senior election officers are expected to leave the IEC following the completion of the JEMB's mandate if no acceptable retention policy is in place by October of this year. The primary reason is that their skill sets can attract a significantly higher remuneration package than what the Afghan civil service corps is offered. Losing such key individuals would be detrimental to the IEC's capacity to properly plan and implement the forthcoming elections, which are likely to be very complex. One option is to provide key staff with quality binding contracts. These special contracts would be for two years, allowing enough time to recruit and properly train the Afghans that would ultimately form the nucleus of the permanent IEC management. Ideally, these individuals would have to sign a contract committing themselves for two years.

The key election officials warranting special attention would be:

1. Chief Electoral Officer and Department Heads at the IEC Secretariat
2. Senior JEMB administrative staff
3. Provincial Election Officers

Before a remuneration package can be defined for the remaining staff at headquarters and in the field, these positions must be classified according to the Afghan civil service structure. Furthermore, individuals already working for other ministries would also be allowed to apply for transfer to the IEC, or be seconded from governmental organizations to the IEC.

While a permanent election training programme is being established, the IEC must immediately commence offering training to its staff. Several different approaches should be employed to fulfill the training requirements of the various staffing categories. A mix of "off-the-shelf" election training programmes, such as BRIDGE and BEAT, for Department Heads and Provincial Electoral Officers could be utilized. Generic management programmes should also be considered, as well as more-specialized training for budget and finance staff. Schooling abroad could also be an alternative for a limited number of key staff.¹⁶

¹⁶ Sending staff for training abroad is particularly expensive. Therefore, the IEC should consider entering into a contractual obligation with the person benefiting from the international training committing her/him to work at the IEC for a specific amount of time. This is a common strategy used in many developing countries.

Activities involved

The IEC staff categories and target groups for current and future capacity building programmes need to be agreed upon (potentially as identified above). An agreement needs to be made on a suitable strategy to retain the IEC staff categories identified. Active Afghan participation and meetings with government officials is essential for the success of a sustainable tailor-made policy of retaining staff. As the IEC will be in a transitional period for the next couple of years, it is crucial that the policy also include the necessary considerations for both the transitional as well as the permanent state.

Urgent consultation with the Civil Service Commission and the Priority Reform and Restructuring programme is needed to determine a sustainable salary structure for electoral administrators. Whatever transitional mechanism is put in place, the end result should be a salary structure that is part of ordinary government funding.

Rough cost estimates

Embarking upon a transitional knowledge-based retention policy has two unique costing categories: establishing a permanent election training programme and special contracts for key electoral staff. Although the remuneration packages for the individual positions will vary, an estimate can still be made. However, an estimate for the training programme is necessarily rougher, as the scope and extent of the programme have yet to be defined:

Expense (one-year transitional retention budget)	Cost per annum (USD)
Retaining subsidy for 101 posts @ \$10,000/year	1,010,000
Establishing and maintaining an election training programme	300,000
Total	1,310,000

3.2 TRAINING WITHIN THE IEC AND BROADER CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Issues to be addressed

Several key areas of knowledge and skills have been identified as the core for a capacity building programme during this transitional period, the most important of which is general electoral knowledge in an Afghan and comparative context. This area is currently being addressed through the counterparts and BRIDGE offerings, but will require continued attention into the future. Bureaucratic skills will also be required, such as office management, human resources management, planning, budget writing and management. Additionally, a high level of information technology skills must be created for the maintenance of the voter registry.

The IEC may also need the capacity to train other elements of the Afghan government in order to train partners helping to carry out the elections (such as the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police). An internal ability to offer curricula such as the BRIDGE and BEAT programmes will also add to the IEC's capacity to elicit national buy-in from various partners. An essential element of such projects is to build civic engagement in the electoral process to increase cooperation with other governmental bodies, to build national ownership of the process and to establish a base of knowledge in society, from which the electoral administration can draw when necessary.

Policy options

There are several ways in which this learning package can be delivered to enhance the organization's staff retention. The primary method is to develop in-house capacity to deliver all of the necessary curricula. In-house training capacity will be required independent of the learning needs of the permanent electoral administration, as the large numbers of polling officials required for each election will require training on a regular basis. However, the breadth of expertise required from electoral trainers who are addressing internal learning needs is much broader. Under this system, the training unit size would be much larger and the education level of the trainers much higher. This would add expense to the elections budget. However, depending on the outcome of discussions of the elections

calendar, the training unit may have interim, non-electoral years during which it could completely focus on internal capacity building, which would increase the utility of the unit. This type of training unit is also best equipped to train partners within Afghanistan who will be assisting in carrying out elections.

An additional option is to rely on partners in the public sector to provide elements of the learning package discussed above. This may include electoral administrators participating in training programmes that are established for other government officials, such as parliamentary staff, on such topics as management and budgeting. Learning needs will largely be shared among new elements of the bureaucracy. Funding for these programmes may also be sourced from the international community, which would remove some pressure from the IEC budget. This would also allow electoral trainers to focus their attention on developing a robust programme on the conduct of elections. In addition, it may be an opportunity for IEC employees to network with other new bureaucrats, which could contribute to buy-in and staff retention.

A third option is to maintain only a small or even a seasonal in-house training unit and outsource capacity building training completely. This would perhaps guarantee the best quality of training, as specialists in one field could be brought in with the express purpose of training the electoral administration. However, this would only be a solution during the transitional period, as the regular training of newly recruited election administrators could not justify such a programme. In addition, long-term skills-development requirements would make this option unrealistic, since hiring outside experts is only a short-term solution.

The training activities under the responsibility of the IEC should go beyond its own staff and reach out to other relevant sectors of society. First, appropriate electoral education curriculum materials could be produced and distributed for use in the Afghan school system. Second, electoral education workshops could be prepared and conducted for teachers of appropriate subjects and for staff of civil society organizations. The goal of this training would be to increase the buy-in of governmental partners and would serve to clarify the Constitutional role of the IEC. The training should target the Ministry of Interior, the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army, and could be branched out to include other relevant government entities, such as the Wolesi Jirga, once it is constituted. Such a programme may also assist in developing the political will to make certain key decisions on Constitutional issues that affect the development of the IEC, such as the district boundaries.

Finally, the messages contained in these training projects should be included in a general public outreach programme for one of the two years of transition during which there are no elections. This will consolidate the population's general knowledge of elections and the Afghan electoral system, as well as publicize the IEC's role in election administration. This should be carried out by the IEC's public outreach department.

As a resource for training and other services of the IEC, an Electoral Resource Centre should be developed with national facilities and provincial resource branches.

Activities involved

The first option would require maintaining a larger, better-educated training unit within the IEC, capable of attaining knowledge and writing curricula on a large spectrum of subjects. This would also require substantial training of trainers at the close of the current electoral project to consolidate the knowledge of the Afghan trainers and to continue the BRIDGE and BEAT programmes into the transitional period. This would be an important element of a knowledge-development-based staff retention strategy. Furthermore, the skills and knowledge of the Afghan trainers themselves should be regularly updated through participation in training opportunities within and outside Afghanistan.

The second option requires greater coordination with other actors in the public sector, particularly emerging sections of the Afghan government. This is perhaps an appropriate focus for international advisors during the transitional phase.

The third option would require hiring educators or consultants to come to the IEC to provide brief trainings. Follow-through on these trainings would rely on the IEC itself. This option could also include international study trips for a small number of election administrators. Although the Commissioners will have substantial experience, they will need further knowledge. Targeted training could be further conducted in areas including planning, budgeting, human resources management, comparative electoral systems, electoral management/operations and effective office management.

Further training of trainers needs to be conducted and training capacity within the permanent structure of the IEC needs to be built through activities currently being undertaken by the elections team, as an essential component of exposure to electoral systems and management that is affordable by the country.

The drafting of a basic curriculum that would serve as the core of the programme would require cooperation with a domestic body like the Ministry of Education or an international organization. The curriculum should be a base for the schools-based project and leave open the possibility of a more-articulated school programme in the future. The basic curriculum should then be developed into several modules aimed at several age groups and educational groups by the IEC training/capacity building department.

As for the Electoral Resource Centre, such a resource is being developed under the JEMB with a collection of academic and practical documentation. This material, including all materials adopted by the JEMB in the last two years, should be used by the electoral administrators. It will also serve as the National Afghan Electoral Archive, including reference materials that were developed through the voter registration and elections 2004-2005. The documentation and resource materials need to be translated into Dari and Pashto to the extent possible. Registration data needs to be effectively transferred, with appropriate information and technology that can ensure levels of data management and access to information comparable to that of the rest of the world.

Finally, a transitional budget needs to be developed urgently to secure funding in the national budget through the mid-term budget-review process.

Rough cost estimates

An overall budget estimate for 2006 will need to be developed based on a comprehensive action plan, in order to secure sufficient resources from the national budget. Advance planning and budgeting capacity needs to be built within the IEC.

Budget estimation of staff salary and operational costs needs to be made in two phases: Phase 1—post-elections through March 2006 (budget to be secured through Mid-Term Budgetary Review) and Phase 2—Fiscal Year 2006, starting at the end of March. It is essential to develop an action plan for 2006 and to have advance planning and a budget estimate for future elections vis-à-vis the electoral calendar.

Cost estimates for some training activities on a yearly basis for the next few years are proposed below:

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
Conduct capacity building and training for permanent IEC, at both national and provincial levels	300,000
Establish an Electoral Resource Centre	300,000
Develop, produce and distribute appropriate electoral education curriculum materials for use in the Afghan school system, including a mock election kit that could be used for the conduct of school elections or during electoral education classroom activities	200,000
Develop and conduct electoral education workshops for teachers of appropriate subjects and staff of civil society organizations	150,000
Conduct electoral awareness training for participants of mid-level courses at the Afghan Police and Military Academies	100,000
Total	1,050,000

4. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

4.1 PHYSICAL ASSETS

Issues to be addressed

The issue of asset management is complex for a number of reasons. First, the assets presently in use by the elections project are owned by a number of partners (e.g. UNOPS, UNDP, UNAMA and the Afghan government). Second, the use of the assets is largely dependent on the electoral calendar, the expected national staffing table and whether or not international staff will remain in-country as part of a new election programme. Third, since it is highly possible that the current asset base is largely a result of the significant international presence in-country, this existing range of assets would not be required in a post-election environment increasingly run by the Afghans themselves. Fourth, other governmental activities and United Nations activities will require assets in 2006 and 2007, which may off-set the overall financial burden placed on the IEC. For example, the future Afghan census will require significant logistical and asset support.

There are a number of issues that need to be resolved before a clear course of action can be agreed upon. The key issues are the following:

Inventory accuracy

To facilitate accuracy in decisions on asset allocation and disposal, the project needs to have a functioning, accurate and real-time inventory control system. This would require a baseline understanding of current asset holdings in all field offices and headquarters. Currently, such information is incomplete. Thus, the completion of a preliminary 100% inventory stocktaking should be considered. Accurate inventory will allow timely and effective decision-making in relation to:

- How assets are to be redistributed
- Disposal actions for excess, irreparable and missing equipment
- Proper preparation for future storage and distribution of assets

The disadvantages of conducting this stocktaking is the initial cost involved in the recruitment, training and deployment of teams to the field. In addition, there is possible disruption to field offices as a result of stocktaking teams' presence at key times of the project.

Post-election requirements

A complete analysis of equipment needs after the elections must be conducted and completed with a formal Memorandum of Understanding or similar agreement modality. Once the redistribution of equipment is determined, the equipment can be correctly packaged and distributed accordingly.

Allocation of assets

The physical allocation of assets will determine a number of subsequent activities. The decision must be made as to whether to consolidate the assets at the headquarters, regional or provincial level.

Policy options

Option 1: Complete backload to Kabul

This option would entail the complete shipment of most non-expendable assets back to Kabul. The advantages of consolidating in Kabul are:

- High level of control over assets
- Complete investigation into status of equipment requiring repair or refurbishment before further redistribution
- Good security over assets, as they would be stored within UNOCA and adjacent elections facility
- No requirement for high levels of staff presence and supervision once equipment is reconciled and accounted for

The disadvantages of this option are:

- Requirement of a complex and expensive distribution and transport solution
- In the event that the equipment is to be distributed back out to various agencies and organizations in the field, this option would prove expensive and inefficient
- The sheer volume of equipment adds complexity to the recovery operation
- Storage space is limited

Option 2: Retention of assets at provincial level

This option would entail the complete reconciliation of assets at the provincial level. There are some advantages to this option, including:

- Provides a simple solution that does not require asset redistribution until a full reconciliation has been completed and a full understanding of needs is determined
- Inexpensive and simple
- Avoids double handling
- Equipment is effectively distributed to the election staff when needed for elections purposes

There are some significant disadvantages to this option, including:

- Requires significant and dispersed effort for reconciliation
- Probable deficient control over assets
- Security of assets will become a problem, particularly as provincial offices close down or minimize their activities
- Employing national and/or international staff in each provincial office and holding leases on otherwise unused compounds for the purpose of storing equipment is inefficient and expensive

Option 3: Regional reconciliation

This option involves the complete reconciliation of assets in the regional centres. This option has the following advantages:

- Allows for a good level of asset control
- Relatively secure storage of assets in well-developed facilities
- Provides good strategic hubs for re-dispersal of assets based on planning requirements

There are some disadvantages:

- Somewhat complex transport is required
- Equipment is not necessarily available to election officials when needed
- Controversial ownership of assets, as several provinces share resources

Option 4: Retention of assets at different levels

This is a hybridized option whereby some assets are kept at the provincial level, some at the regional level and some in Kabul. This option is the one recommended below. Its main advantages are:

- The assets can be distributed depending on their use, their value and ease of transport.
- There are assets (e.g. mobile phones and laptops) that might be best kept in Kabul where they can be stored more securely.

The main disadvantage of this option is that an intense initial effort is required to clarify which assets are to be allocated at the different levels.

Activities involved

The decision on ownership and method of dispersal and allocation of assets is crucial, and some key questions need to be addressed:

- Who will own the equipment?
- Where and how will the equipment be stored?
- Who will maintain the equipment?
- What is the intention of the donors?

The IEC should be encouraged to engage in a broad dialogue with government ministries and with international donors in an effort to articulate the genuine asset and infrastructural needs of Afghanistan.

In terms of asset allocation, all previously mentioned options need to include a pre-phase stocktaking of assets, but first a decision on hub consolidation at either headquarters, regional or provincial level needs to be agreed upon. A full consolidation in Kabul would be very expensive and, due to the probable inefficiency of this option, does not seem viable.

It is recognized that the “regional structure” is largely a United Nations creation driven by logistical considerations and that it does not have any legal or political significance. It is, however, also recognized that there may be a continued necessity to provide assets to, and support through, regional hubs. Again, it should be noted that Afghanistan does not have a regional level of governance to be accountable to, and in the future Afghanistan would ideally need a province-based election administration, in line with the government structure, with minimal electoral staff.

A slightly hybridized version of provincial maintenance supported by a regional logistics hub could therefore be suggested as follows:

Consolidate and reconcile all non-expendable/high-value items in the regions for a limited period, for further redistribution as follows:

- Intra-regional equipment allocations sent directly from regional hubs to various agencies, governmental and non-governmental organizations
- Inter-regional equipment allocations sent back to Kabul
- Where decisions are pending and long-term agreements need to be reached, or where allocations are unknown, the equipment is to be returned and stored in Kabul

To support this course of action, the following activities need to occur:

- Deployment of inventory stocktaking teams to the field to complete all inventory checks, complete by early September 2005. It is recommended that four stocktaking teams consisting of one international and two national staff are assigned to regional and provincial offices to complete a 100% stocktaking
- Identification of the allocation of equipment by type and location for post-elections use to allow pre-emptive planning for reallocation
- Field Logistics Coordinator to commence planning to identify storage space, staffing requirements and transport needs to achieve consolidation
- Prioritization by province and region of the areas requiring faster retrieval and evacuation before winter renders various areas inaccessible
- Plan for storage and staffing requirements for maintenance of equipment over winter period
- Finalize and implement disposal procedures in accordance with UNDP requirements
- Coordination of specialist teams required for retrieval – i.e. pack-up teams.

Rough cost estimates

The cost estimates will be entirely contingent upon the method of dispersal and the allocation of assets. Based on a provincial continuance and a regional hub consolidation and distribution plan, the following costs will need to be forecast:

- Lease and purchase costs associated with storage
- Transport costs for redistribution of equipment to regional hubs and further intra- and inter-regional transport requirements
- Staffing costs for inventory teams, clean-up teams in provinces and teams at regional offices
- Stay-behind national staff for unclosed provincial offices, international staff at regional offices and Supply Department staff for headquarters
- Possible loss and damage costs that may be revealed when equipment is consolidated

4.2 COMMUNICATION NETWORK

Issues to be addressed

For the 2004-2005 elections, an elaborate communications network, including data and voice communication networks, was established linking all regions and provinces. Each office throughout the country was brought up to MOSS standards with the required communication assets. The post-election issues are those of asset management, the necessary facilities to house these systems and the continued staffing needed to maintain these systems. The present elections project employs a large number of IT staff, both international and national. In addition, there are significant IT hard assets in the provinces that require considerable upkeep. The following issues are to be addressed:

- The continued need for this communications network throughout the country for IEC operations
- The close-out phase of these offices and the UN organizations' long-term strategy for support to the Afghan government
- Ownership of the systems
- Status of the emergency communications system discussed at the SMT meetings and future plans for a security communications network
- Possibility of donation or sell-off of systems to other UN or Afghan organizations (e.g. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense) to support their country programmes or aid in the stabilization of certain regions
- Additional costs involved in the teardown and reinstallation of communications equipment at later dates
- Additional costs involved in the storage and maintenance of the physical assets
- Eventual expiration of all IT equipment warranties
- The VSATs are under a maintenance contract until July 2006, at a cost of \$55,000

Policy options

The value and utility of the extensive communication network established by the elections project should be acknowledged. Hence, it must be carefully considered how this network might be reduced, modified or redistributed. As it is unlikely that the IEC will require a communication network as extensive as the one presently in place, other possible uses for the communication assets should be considered.

It is suggested to maintain an emergency communication network and/or provide equipment to other government offices and UN agencies for regional and provincial programmes.

Activities involved

Inventory of all communication equipment in all regions/provinces:

1. Identify and document all equipment at each location
2. Determine ownership of said equipment
 - a. Research each purchase by purchase order
 - b. Research each local purchase
 - c. Determine donor requirements
3. Determine long-term strategy
 - a. Obtain each organization's long-term strategy for Afghanistan
 - b. Based on long-term strategies, determine procurement and fielding plan of equipment
 - c. Determine effect of closure/removal of equipment on security coordination
4. Determine shut-down plan
 - a. Based on Items 3-a. and 3-b
 - b. Determine winter effects on movement and prioritize these locations
 - c. Determine effects of shut-down of office and how it will affect security of UN personnel in those regions and provinces
5. Determine storage plan
 - a. Based on future need of the equipment, these items will be stored in their current offices, a provincial warehouse, a regional warehouse or Kabul headquarters
 - b. Storage of physical assets
 - c. The warranties of each item must be identified and items reissued in accordance with their warranties, to be more cost-effective
6. Determine re-distribution plan
 - a. The above items must be accomplished before this can take effect
 - b. Re-distribution of physical assets
7. Create maintenance plan
 - a. Determine manpower requirements to support the continued infrastructure
 - b. Personnel hired should be able to maintain this equipment either in the field in use or in storage

Rough cost estimates

Expense	No. of offices	Cost per office(USD)	Total cost (USD)
<u>Reinstallation of VSATs</u>			
Reinstallation of VSATs	27	1,500	40,500
Rewiring	27	500	13,500
Total			54,000
<u>Reinstallation and Maintenance</u>			
Salaries			

International	8	8,000	64,000
National	16	700	11,200
Total			75,200
<u>Re-initialization costs</u>			
VSAT equipment original cost	1	450,000	450,000
Bandwidth Charges for 1 year	1	405,000	405,000
Annual Maintenance charges	1	55,000	55,000
Total			910,000
Grand Total			1,039,200

4.3 LEASE AGREEMENTS AND ELECTORAL PROPERTIES

Issues to be addressed

The elections project currently manages 70 properties throughout Afghanistan. Of these, only six are rent-free facilities provided by local government departments. Monthly rental costs amount to \$70,000 for these properties. The number of properties is directly related to the number of international staff working on the current project, since they require fully MOSS-compliant offices and accommodations.

The UN country team has requested UNOPS to maintain some regional and provincial offices that could accommodate various projects, including future electoral projects. However, the requirement of terminating most lease agreements while still maintaining a minimal regional presence needs to be addressed.

The present Elections Compound in Kabul is being leased by UNOPS. The rent per month is \$10,000. The duration of the lease agreement is 12 months, from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2005. According to the lease agreement, notice for termination of the lease should be given 30 days in advance in writing.

The new Elections Compound is being constructed and will be finalized within the current budget of the 2005 Elections project. At the time of writing, both warehouses have been completed, the media centre is 50% complete and construction of two office blocks will be completed by 12 August 2005. Two more office blocks will be completed by 15 August 2005 and the final office block will be completed by 19 August 2005. The new Elections Compound grounds are owned by the Ministry of Mines and Industries (MMI). Fortunately, there is strong support for the elections project. The no-cost lease agreement with MMI provides a phased handover of the compound. Within one year after completion of the compound, one office and the south-eastern corner (25%) of the compound is to be handed over to the MMI (roughly 1 September 2006); the southern half of the entire compound is to be turned over to the MMI in five years' time (this area includes one warehouse and two additional office blocks); within ten years' time, the entire compound is to be given over to MMI, including two warehouses, six office blocks, a media centre, the generator house and all sewerage and drainage (see annex for a cost estimate).

UNOPS will clarify the termination agreements of each lease (e.g. handover costs, notice periods and leave-behind criteria).

Income generation activities should be considered with regard to the Elections Compound; if there is space that is not being used it can be rented out for different activities.

Policy options

Elections offices can either be all closed, all left open, or some left open depending on the needs of the IEC. Assets will require care-taking; the minimum number of staff required should be determined and the need for international staff should be assessed.

As indicated earlier, the maintenance of provincial offices as a priority, with case-by-case determination of the utility of regional hubs, is recommended. There is, however, a clear need for guidance from the IEC, other National Priority Programmes and other United Nations activities when determining the need for lease agreements.

It is recommended that the IEC look carefully at securing government-owned facilities on a no-cost basis. Again, lease agreements and property usage would depend on the size of the permanent staff of the IEC and on the temporary requirements of a given election component. However, based on a provincial office maintenance structure with two officers, they should ideally move into a shared office with other local government authorities.

Activities involved

The primary activity with regard to electoral properties is the management of all contractual obligations and lease agreements. These activities will be conducted by the legal office of APIF within the current project and timeline.

Continued work on the new compound will remain a priority. APIF will ensure completion of the new Elections Compound within the current elections project and budget.

All staff and assets must be relocated from the present compound to the new Elections Compound by the end of 2005. The present project contains the necessary resources to accommodate that move.

Rough cost estimates

The elections project presently manages 70 properties throughout Afghanistan. The average costs for maintenance of these properties are noted below:

Expense	Cost per month (USD)
Maintenance – paint, small construction	50
Guards (Ministry of Interior)-- \$4/day (maximum 9 guards)	1,080
Generator Fuel	900
Chowkidars	480
Office manager	120
Cleaner	80
Total	2,710
Total cost per annum	32,520

Note: These cost estimates exclude any winterization costs, subsistence for staff and vehicle-related maintenance.

See annexes, which indicate present lease agreements and the new Elections Compound operating costs.

5. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND BUDGET

Issues to be addressed

Post-conflict elections are often expensive operations. The Afghan Presidential Election was no exception, with the registration and election operation costing in the region of \$170 million. This is including the cost of the external voting programme for refugees in Iran and Pakistan, which is always a comparatively expensive operation. The cost per registered voter for the Presidential Election was around \$14. The 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections also required a substantial budget. The Joint Election Management Body (JEMB) has a direct budget of \$159 million, and there are many other costs associated with supporting the elections that are not borne directly by the JEMB budget. Cost per registered voter (both Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections) is around \$13.

International donors are currently funding the elections in Afghanistan, but this will not continue indefinitely, and it is important that the cost of elections in Afghanistan be reduced. There are many complex factors that will influence the cost of future elections.

For practical reasons, a methodological decision was made to make rough cost estimates on a yearly basis. This helps clarify the budget needs for the international community, pending a decision about the date of the next elections by the relevant authorities.

Policy options

While many of the factors influencing the future electoral budget are far beyond the influence of an election administration and some involve the establishment of effective control by state institutions on the territory of the state, there are some policy recommendations that can be made for the partner organizations in elections that will help to reduce future electoral costs.

First, it is clear that the transfer of assets from the current electoral project to the IEC at the end of the year will greatly assist in the quick establishment of the new, post-JEMB electoral administration and in reducing the costs of initial IEC budgets.

The electoral cycle needs to be modified so that elections are not held as frequently as they are under the current schedule. This should be combined with a limitation on the levels of elected institutions that will be administered by the IEC.

It is clear that a registration system suitable for use as a voter registry needs to be created that can be updated on an ongoing basis and cleaned of duplicates and deceased voters. A clear plan needs to be put in place for the establishment and maintenance of such a voter registration system.

Every effort needs to be made to adequately train Afghan staff to conduct future elections. A plan also needs to be created for ongoing but diminishing international assistance to the Afghan electoral process.

Finally, procurement of goods and services to the largest extent possible from within Afghanistan will reduce costs.

Activities involved

A brief description of activities that may be required follows, categorized by the main factors influencing the electoral budget:

Security environment

A considerable component of the 2004 and 2005 electoral budgets has consisted of security-related costs, whether directly in providing point and area security for electoral operations or in providing the infrastructure to mitigate attacks against the electoral process. The extent to which the current conflict with anti-government elements continues, as well as the ongoing threat level, will determine the impact that the security environment will have on the future electoral budget.

Electoral calendar and election cycle

The current cycle of elections, with presidential and Wolesi Jirga elections held every five years, provincial council elections every four years and district elections every three years, would mean that there will be elections across Afghanistan in nearly two out of every three years. There is also talk about introducing elections for municipalities. It does not seem that this electoral cycle is sustainable for a country as challenged politically, logistically and financially as Afghanistan.

Voter registration

Voter registration is a fundamental component of running any election that aims to meet international electoral standards. The voter registration system should provide photo ID proof of registration, allocate voters to polling locations, be open to scrutiny and challenge, be maintained on a regular basis to ensure that new voters are added and deceased ones removed and allow for identification and removal of duplicate voters prior to issuing proof of registration.

Such a system of voter registration does not currently exist in Afghanistan. The voter registry does not allocate voters to polling locations and has no system for removing deceased and duplicate voters.

The establishment of a suitable system of voter registration is an expensive exercise and one that takes a number of years in order to achieve an acceptable level of accuracy. Should Afghanistan wish to conduct elections for sub-province units, it will have to develop such a voter registration system and it can expect that this development will be expensive in the initial years.

The establishment of an accurate voter registry can be done in combination with the establishment of a national ID card system, and this can help spread the costs of establishing the system among its beneficiaries.

Assets and infrastructure

The conduct of an election requires many assets and offices from which to implement the election. These are often a large part of the initial election costs. The complicated ownership of assets currently being used by the election project raises the question of whether the initial investment in assets and infrastructure will have to be borne again by the IEC. Should assets and infrastructure not be passed over from the current electoral administration, the first election held under the IEC could be much more expensive than subsequent ones because of the need to re-purchase these assets and re-establish the infrastructure.

Domestic materials production

Many of the materials required to conduct elections are quite specialized materials or require specialized production processes. While some of these materials will need to be purchased only once, and can be re-used for subsequent elections, other materials, in particular ballot papers, will have to be purchased new for each election.

The capacity to produce many of these materials does not exist in Afghanistan at this time. Other materials can be produced in Afghanistan, but not in the quantities required. All such materials will have to be produced internationally and transported into the country, which substantially increases the cost of these items. Until domestic capacity is developed for these items, the comparative cost of this materials component of the election will remain high. An effort should be made to rapidly develop the capacity to locally produce cheaper electoral material.

State infrastructure

The conduct of a complex operation like an election relies heavily on the government infrastructure that exists in the country, especially at the provincial and local levels. Where this infrastructure is lacking, it inevitably leads to increased operational costs for the conduct of elections. Afghanistan is a state with very little administrative infrastructure, and therefore the conduct of elections in this environment is likely to be comparatively more expensive until this infrastructure is developed.

Capacity building and international assistance

The current election relies on a large component of experienced international electoral staff to conduct the election operation. As a result, international staff makes up a significant component of the electoral budget. The faster that sufficient electoral expertise and experience can be passed to Afghan JEMBS staff so that Afghans can take the lead in running elections, the faster this component of the election budget can be substantially reduced.

This is difficult when a complex election is being administered in a short timeframe, as is the case for the 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections. However, efforts are being made to effect this capacity building and to ensure that the next Afghan elections are led by Afghans and only supported by internationals. The speed with which this capacity can be built and the international support reduced will affect future electoral budgets.

Rough cost estimates for alternative budget scenarios

It is clear from comparable examples of other post-conflict electoral processes that despite initially high electoral costs, states can relatively quickly—usually within ten years—move to much-more-reasonable costs of elections. In Cambodia, Mozambique and Kosovo, the cost per voter in elections has fallen from as high as \$20-45/voter down to \$5-10/voter within such a period.

In Afghanistan, Wolesi Jirga and provincial council elections are being run together in 2005 at a similar cost as the 2004 Presidential Elections. In spite of only having to conduct an update of voter lists this year, the voting materials are substantially more complex and expensive than the simple presidential ballot. It should still be noted that existing voter lists are far from meeting the necessary requirement for a fully operational voter registry, since they do not allow for voters to be assigned to polling stations.

Depending on the security situation, the quality of a future voter registry and locally produced voting materials, the cost of the next election may range from \$50-80 million—perhaps lower if it is for municipal elections, which would only involve the 34 provincial capitals along with rural district capitals that provide municipal services and that have no less than 1000 houses within a radius of at least one kilometer (Article 3 of Municipal Electoral Law). Municipal elections would thus be held in over one hundred cities and townships.

Furthermore, if the electoral calendar was reformed in the next few years with a smaller number of elections and a cycle of no more than two tiers, this would improve the cost-effectiveness of the overall electoral process.

Finally, the speed with which this cost reduction can be effected will also largely depend on the establishment of national infrastructure and capacity capable of conducting complex electoral processes.

Rough cost estimates on specific components of the electoral process to be provided through international assistance have been offered in the different sections of this report. A summary of those figures follows. Similarly, a summary of the running cost of the IEC and ECC for a non-election year is included.

Summary rough cost estimates for international assistance:

Expense	Cost
One-time expenses	
Two legal drafters	180,000
Assessment review of current voter lists	200,000
Establishing the Electoral Resource Centre	300,000
Total	680,000
Yearly expenses (independent of how many elections there are between 2006 and 2010)	
Structural support to IEC ¹⁷	5,190,000

¹⁷ Cost of reinstallation and maintenance of the communication network and maintenance of properties as described in pp 34-36 are included in a consolidated manner on cost of the support programme to the IEC as described on p. 16. Cost for dispersal and allocation of physical assets is left unspecified pending decision on provincial continuance and consolidation at regional logistic hub as described on p. 31.

Permanent training programme for IEC	300,000
School curriculum programme	200,000
Workshops for teachers and NGOs	150,000
Awareness training for police and army	100,000
Total	5,940,000
Yearly expense of joint operation ID card and voter lists	
Total	15,000,000
Partial funding of a substantially reduced electoral budget during the current cycle (especially for transport and polling materials in one municipal and three staggered elections between 2006 and 2010). Assistance budget per election \$5-8 million.	
Total (average year)	6,500,000

Summary of running costs for IEC and ECC:

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
Annual running costs for 34 provincial offices	1,290,640
Annual running costs for IEC headquarters	791,000
Total IEC costs	2,081,640
Annual running costs for ECC	88,160
Total IEC and ECC costs	2,169,800

Within this annual budget framework, \$1,529,000 (73%) out of the \$2,081,640 budget for the IEC would be subsidized by the international community during the next few years, comprising primarily salary expenses (57%) and infrastructure and asset maintenance (16%). If the option of a separate permanent ECC with three Commissioners is taken, the annual budget for a non-election year should be funded in a similar way to the IEC.

It is strongly recommended that the IEC and ECC ordinary budget be included as a permanent line within the consolidated budget of the nation. Furthermore, the international assistance subsidies to these bodies should be established as a tied contribution to the consolidated budget. This should start being included at the time of the mid-term budget review in August/September 2005. This would set a necessary precedent and also establish the principle of budgetary autonomy as a primary factor ensuring the independence of the Electoral Commission.

Total cost of assistance over next five years, assuming the recommended election cycle:

Expense	Cost
One-time expense	680,000
Assistance independent of partial funding of a given electoral budget (5 years)	29,700,000

Joint operation ID card and voter lists (3 years)	45,000,000
Partial funding of budget for four electoral events (1 separate, 3 staggered)	26,000,000
Total	101,380,000

What would the electoral budget look like in the near future (estimated costs)?

Expense	Cost per annum (USD)
Fixed running cost of IEC and ECC for given year	2,200,000
Polling operation proper (e.g. voting materials, transport and communication, salaries of temporary hired staff)	7,000,000
Production/update of voter lists until a definite registry is in place	30,000,000
Hidden costs in the school system, police and army, transport and other infrastructural assets provided by UN regional logistics hubs	4,800,000
Total	44,000,000

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ANNEXES

ANNEX I – PHYSICAL ASSETS

Item		Procured by UNDP (UNDP Asset)	Procured by UNOPS (UNDP Asset)	UNAMA Asset	TOTAL
VEHICLES					
White Fleet	Ford Rangers				86
	Toyotas (JEMB)				15
	RHD (UNDP)				28
	UNOPS (APIF)				100
	Nissan Patrols				25
Total White Fleet					254
Mol Fleet- UAZ Jeeps (2250)					2184
Motorbikes					6
Toyota Hilux Ballistic Blankets					23
GENERATORS					
Varying in size from 200 - 1.5 kVA		49	87	9	145
ACCOMMODATION AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT					
Cogims (prefab + wooden)			143	14	157
Containers			141	14	155
AC Units		45	185	25	255
Fridges		3	53		56
Freezer			2		2
Tables (conference and desks)					410
Chairs					530
Drawers, shelves and cabinets					277
Conference Tables			10		10
Lounge Suites			20		20
Safes - various		25	30		55
COMMUNICATIONS					
VSATs			38		38
Codans - mobile		3	36	16	55
VHF - mobile		20	17	15	52
Repeater			38		38
VHF Handheld Radio		811	259		1070
Thurayas		5635	15	0	5650
HF Docking Stations			53		53
VHF Docking Stations			42		42
Thuraya Docking Stations			124		124
IT EQUIPMENT					
Laptops		269	429	2	700
Desktops		264	339	57	660
Printers - various		43	325	5	373
Scanners - various		3	147		150
Digital senders			15		15
Plotters		1	2		3
Reisograph			1		1
Digital Cameras		243	16		259
Photocopiers - various		24	66		90
Fax machines		17			17
Mobile		600			600
Video Camera		10			10
Flash Disks			800		800
GENERAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT					
TVs (various)			124		124
DVDs			65		65
Satellite TV Receivers			43		43
Digital Projector		2	3		5
Teleconference System			1		1
Simultaneous Translation Equipment			2		2
Shredders		21	10		31
Public Announcement Systems		13	43		56

SECURITY					
Armoured Vests		215			215
Helmets		190			190
Trauma Kits			100		100
Metal wands			100		100
Extinguishers		300			300
POLLING AND REGISTRATION EQUIPMENT					
Ballot Boxes (various)		34,000	140,000		174,000
Registration Kit Boxes		4,500	49,000		49,000
Polling Screens			150,000		150,000
Polling Tables			120,000		120,000
Polling Chairs			210,000		210,000
Polaroid Cameras		3,250			3,250
MEDIA CENTRE					
X-Ray Machine			2		2
Video Conference System			2		2
Walk-through metal detector			2		2
AIR ASSETS					
Mi 8 Helicopter			3		3
B200 Kingair			2		2

ANNEX II - THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK

1. VSATs (in each regional and provincial office) providing data and voice communications for e-mails, file transfer and VOIP service.
2. Codan (HF) network to link all offices to Kabul and the regional offices for security.
3. Codan (HF) link to the Ministry of Interior (police). All Codan HF base stations in the regional and provincial offices are linked to the regional and provincial police HQ and the 1100 Russian Jeeps that were issued by UNDP.
4. VHF repeater system: Many of the regions and provinces have VHF repeater systems that expand their "push-to-talk" capability in their region. In some regions and provinces, radio communication can be achieved up to 50-60 km away from the station. These systems are also linked with coalition forces in some areas to aid the Quick Reaction Force.
5. VHF base stations are located in each office to aid in the combined communications of each UN/NGO or other governmental agencies working in these regions and provinces.
6. Thuraya network: Each office is outfitted with a Thuraya fixed docking station in the bunkers and also most radio rooms in order to facilitate communication.
7. Vehicles: Most vehicles have been outfitted with Codan (HF) and VHF radios that are linked back to these offices for road missions and increased communication capability. Many vehicles are also outfitted with Thuraya docking stations.
8. Codan vehicle tracking systems: All eight regional HQs have Codan vehicle tracking systems installed to track equipped vehicles, even while on road missions.
9. Phone systems: Most of the regional offices have PABX systems installed and are supported by two UNAMA phone lines each, linking all regions with Kabul.
10. Internet website: The JEMB has established a website that contains updates on the elections process and the Commission.
11. Service providers: UNOPS has several agreements with communication service providers (e.g. internet access) throughout Afghanistan. Many of these arrangements provide service to the JEMBS.

ANNEX III - LEASE AGREEMENTS AND ELECTORAL PROPERTIES

Contractor	Province	Contract	Start Date	End Date	Duration	Month	Payable in Advance	Total Payable in Advance	Total Price in the contract
Mr.Ghulam Muhammad	Bamyan	Office Compound	1-Mar-05	28-Feb-08	3 years	\$175	\$525	Quarterly	\$6,300
M.Kabir	Bamyan	Guesthouse	1-Dec-04	1-Dec-06	3 years	\$370	\$1,110	Quarterly	\$13,320
Awaz Ali	Daikundi	Office Compound	1-Mar-05	31-Jan-06	11 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$3,300
Haji Ali	Daikundi	Parking Space	1-Mar-05	31-Jul-05	5 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$1,500
Subhan	Daikundi	Guesthouse	1-Mar-05	31-Jan-06	11 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$3,300
Mr.Mohammad Ali	Daikundi	Warehouse	1-Jul-05	30-Nov-05	5 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$1,500
Mr. Said Ali Raza	Jaghuri	Guesthouse	16-Apr-05	15-Oct-05	6 months	\$1,000	\$3,000	Quarterly	\$6,000
	Panjao	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	
Mr. Taqi Aziz	Jaghuri	Office Compound	1-Apr-05	1-Nov-05	7 months	\$1,000	\$3,000	Quarterly	\$7,000
Zalmay Khan	Kabul HQ	Parking Space	1-Jan-05	30-Apr-05	4 months	\$500	\$500	Monthly	\$2,000
Zalmay Khan	Kabul HQ	Parking Space	1-May-05	31-Oct-05	6 months	\$800	\$2,400	Quarterly	\$4,800
Aimal Rahim, Son of Mohamad Rahim	Kabul HQ	Office Compound	25-Apr-05	25-Apr-06	12 months	\$6,000	\$18,000	Quarterly	\$72,000
Zalmi	Karte Parwan	Vehicle Compound	25-May-05	24-May-06	12 months	\$1,100	\$3,300	Quarterly	\$13,200
Diana Rahim	Karte Parwan	Office Compound	1-May-05	30-Apr-06	12 months	\$6,000	\$18,000	Quarterly	\$72,000
Abdul Wakil	Panjshir	Parking Space	1-Apr-05	31-Dec-05	9 months	\$200	\$600	Quarterly	\$1,800
Bebe Zahra	Panjshir	Parking Space	1-May-05	30-Nov-05	7 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$2,100
Haji Dawoud	Panjshir	Office/Guesthouse	10-Jan-05	10-Jan-06	12 months	\$1,500	\$9,000	Semi-annual	\$18,000
Mr.Haji Faiz	Parwan	Office Compound	1-Mar-05	31-Aug-05	6 months	\$1,200	\$7,200	Semi-annual	\$7,200
Mr. Sayed Yahya	Parwan	Office Compound	1-Mar-05	31-Aug-05	6 months	\$1,200	\$7,200	Semi-annual	\$7,200
Haji Ghulam Mohammad	Parwan	Guesthouse	1-Jan-05	30-Jun-05	6 months	\$800	\$4,800	Semi-annual	\$4,800
Engineer Mirwais	Parwan	Parking Space	1-Jan-05	30-Jun-05	6 months	\$300	\$1,800	Semi-annual	\$1,800
Engineer Mirwais	Parwan	Parking Space	1-Jul-05	30-Oct-05	4 months	\$300	\$1,200	Four months	\$1,200
Afghanistan Textile Company	Kapisa	Office Compound	1-Jan-05	30-Nov-05	11 months	\$600	\$600	Monthly	\$6,600
	Logar	Office Compound	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	
	Wardak	Office Compound	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	Free	
Mr.Haji Mohammad Anwar	Paktia	Office Compound	1-May-05	31-Jan-06	9 months	\$1,000	\$3,000	Quarterly	\$9,000
Haji Niamatullah	Paktia	Guesthouse	1-Dec-04	31-Aug-05	9 months	\$1,500	\$1,500	Monthly	\$13,500
Eng.Agha Mohammad	Paktia		13-Sept-04	13-Feb-05	6 months	\$200	\$600	Quarterly	\$1,200
Haji Abdul Rahman	Paktia	Guesthouse	1-Jan-05	31-Sep-05	9 months	\$1,000	\$1,000	Monthly	\$9,000
Mr.Talib Jan	Paktia	Office Compound	6-Apr-05	6-Sep-05	5 months	\$250	\$250	Monthly	\$1,750
Farrooq	Paktia	Office Compound	17-Oct-04		9 months	\$150	\$450	Quarterly	\$1,350
Haji Ghulam Hossain	Ghazni	Guesthouse parking	1-May-05	31-Dec-05	8 months	\$170	\$170	Monthly	\$1,360
Haji Mohammad Nabi	Ghazni		1-Apr-05	31-Dec-05	9 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$8,100
Mr.Sayed Mansur	Ghazni	Guesthouse	15-Mar-05	15-Dec-05	9 months	\$380	\$1,140	Quarterly	\$3,420
Abdul Razak	Ghazni	Vehicle Service Compound	1-Jan-05	31-Dec-05	12 months	\$170	\$340	Monthly	\$2,040
Sayed Ghulam	Ghazni	Office Compound	1-Apr-05	31-Dec-05	9 months	\$700	\$1,400	Bi-monthly	\$6,300
Jahulam Sadiq	Ghazni	Vehicle Parking Compound	1-Apr-05	31-Dec-05	9 months	\$130	\$260	Bi-monthly	\$1,170
The Department of Agriculture	Khost	Office Compound	1-Jul-05	30-Jun-07	24 months	\$400	\$400	Monthly	\$9,600
	Paktika	Free—no details available							
Mr. Syed Nazar Ali Agha	Kandahar	Office Compound	1-Jan-05	31-Dec-05	12 months	\$1,000	\$3,000	Quarterly	\$12,000
Mr. Mohammad Arif	Kandahar	Warehouse	25-Jan-05	24-Jan-07	2 years	\$3,000	\$18,000	Semi-annual	\$72,000
Mr.Salah-ul-Din	Kandahar	Vehicle Compound	1-Jan-05	31-Dec-05	12 months	\$600	\$1,800	Quarterly	\$7,200
Mr. M.Kasim	Helmand	Office/Guesthouse	25-Jan-05	24-Jan-06	12 months	\$300	\$1,800	Semi-annual	\$3,600
Haji Rusotm Khan	Helmand	Vehicle Parking Compound	1-Jun-05	31-Oct-05	6 months	\$300	\$300	Monthly	\$1,800
Mr. Jaweed	Nimroz	Office Compound	1-Apr-05	31-Mar-06	12 months	\$1,200	\$3,600	Semi-annual	\$14,400
Mr. Shir Ahmad Barakzai	Nimroz	Guesthouse	5-Apr-05	4-Sep-05	5 months	\$700	\$2,100	Quarterly	\$3,500
Mr.Abdul Hakim	Nimroz	Warehouse	30-Jun-05	30-Nov-05	5 months	\$200	\$200	Monthly	
Haji Wakeel	Nimroz		15-Jul-05	15-Nov-05	4 months	\$800	\$800	Monthly	\$3,200
	Zabul	No details							

		available							
	Uruzgan	No details available							
	Herat	No details available							
Mr. Raz Mohammad	Badghis	Vehicle Compound	1-Mar-05	28-Feb-06	1 year	\$400	\$1,200	Quarterly	\$4,800
Haji Khaliq	Badghis	Office Compound	1-Mar-05	31-Mar-06	13 months	\$500	\$1,500	Quarterly	\$6,500
Dr.Azizulla	Badghis	Office Compound	1-Mar-05	31-Dec-05	10 months	\$500	\$1,500	Quarterly	\$5,000
Mr. Raz Mohammad	Badghis	Parking Space	1-May-05	31-Dec-05	8 months	\$200	\$600	Quarterly	\$1,600
Farid Ahamad	Farah	Parking Space	10-Feb-05	31-Dec-06	12 months	\$300	\$1,800	Semi-annual	\$3,600
Haji Assadullah Razaie	Farah	Office Compound	1-May-05	1-May-06	12 months	\$1,000	\$1,000	Monthly	\$12,000
Haji Mohai Udin	Ghor	Office Compound	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	3 months	\$1,500	\$4,500	Quarterly	\$4,500
Haji Mohai Udin	Ghor	1st Airport way	1-Jun-05	1-Sep-05	3 months	\$100	\$300	Quarterly	\$300
Haji Mohai Udin	Ghor	2nd Airport way	1-Jun-05	1-Jun-06	12 months	\$1	\$12	Year	\$12
Mr Bashir	Balkh	Office Compound	1-May-05	31-Mar-06	11 months	\$1,200	\$3,600	Quarterly	\$13,200
Abdul Ghafoor	Balkh	Warehouse	1-May-05	28-Feb-06	10 months	\$2,750	\$8,250	Quarterly	\$27,500
	Faryab	No details available							
Mr. Abdul Khail	Jawzjan	Vehicle Compound	15-Apr-05	14-Aug-05	4 months	\$600	\$1,800	Quarterly	\$2,400
Mr.Mohamad Hashim	Jawzjan	Office Compound	17-Mar-05	16-Dec-06	19 months	\$550	\$1,650	Quarterly	\$10,450
M. Yasin	Jawzjan	Guesthouse	6-Apr-05	5-Dec-07	2 years	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$7,200
Mr.Temor Shah	Jawzjan	Vehicle Compound	15-Aug-05	15-Feb-06	6 months	\$600	\$1,800	Quarterly	\$3,600
Mr.Haji Galil	Samangan	Office Compound	1-Dec-03	31-Dec-05	3 years	\$400	\$2,400	Semi-annual	\$14,400
Mr.Haji Esmail	Samangan	Vehicle Compound	1-May-05	30-Sep-06	16 months	\$500	\$15,000	Quarterly	\$8,000
Mr. Mohammad Ayob	Sari Pul	Vehicle Compound	1-May-05	31-Oct-05	6 months	\$200	\$600	Quarterly	\$1,200
Mr. Mohammad Raim	Sari Pul	Office Compound	1-Dec-03	1-Dec-06	36 months	\$500	\$3,000	Semi-annual	\$18,000
Mar Fazludin	Sari Pul	Vehicle Warehouse	1-May-05	31-Oct-05	6 months	\$500	\$1,500	Quarterly	\$3,000
Mr.Ghulam Sakhi	Kunduz	Office Compound	1-Jun-05	13-May-06	1 year	\$1,100	\$3,300	Quarterly	\$13,200
Mr.Haji Aman	Kunduz	Guesthouse	13-Jan-05	12-Jan-06	1 year	\$2,500	\$7,500	Quarterly	\$30,000
Farmer Department Kunduz	Kunduz	Warehouse	1-Jun-05	31-Dec-05	7 months	\$700.00	\$700.00	Monthly	\$4,900
Haji Ghulam Jan	Baghlan	Office Compound	1-Jan-05	31-Dec-05	12 months	\$2,100.00	\$6,300.00	Quarterly	\$25,200
Mr.Mohammad Aman	Takhar	Guesthouse	1-Jan-05	30-Jun-05	6 months	\$1,200	\$3,600	Quarterly	\$7,200
Haji Enayatullah	Takhar	Warehouse	25-Aug-04	25-Nov-04	3 months	\$100	\$300	Quarterly	\$300
Eng.Abdullah Osmany	Takhar	Parking Space	15-Apr-04	15-Oct-04	6 months	\$100	\$300	Quarterly	\$600
Sultan Mohammad	Takhar	Office Compound	15-Apr-04	15-Apr-06	2 years	\$400	\$1,200	Quarterly	\$9,600
Mr.Ali Murad	Takhar	Vehicle Compound	15-Jun-05	15-Dec-05	6 months	\$200	\$600	Quarterly	\$1,200
Mr.Abdul Saboor	Takhar	Vehicle Compound	25-Jun-05	25-Dec-05	6 months	\$200	\$600	Quarterly	\$1,200
Mr.Ali Jan	Badakhshan	Guesthouse	10-Mar-05	9-Jan-06	10 months	\$2,000	\$6,000	Quarterly	\$20,000
Eng.Ishaq	Badakhshan	Office Compound	4-Apr-05	4-Mar-06	12 months	\$300	\$900	Quarterly	\$3,600
Eng.Abdul Ghaffar	Jalalabad	Guesthouse	1-Mar-05	31-May-05	3 months	\$5,258	\$15,774	Quarterly	\$15,774
Eng.Abdul Ghaffar	Jalalabad	Guesthouse	1-Apr-05	31-Dec-05	9 months	\$3,000	\$27,000	Quarterly	\$27,000
	Kunar	No details available							
	Nuristan	No details available							
Grand Total						\$70,754	\$256,731		\$749,446