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Election IntegrityThe Election Integrity topic area considers the role of integrity in the electoral process. Integrity is an essential part of a free, fair, and reliable election. It is inherent in the principles of a democracy and a representative system of government. Issues such as transparency, accountability and accuracy of election administration are considered together with ethical electoral behaviour and integrity monitoring systems. For more general information on this topic area, please select Overview. Integrity is covered as part of the electoral process. Integrity problems and some of the solutions being used to treat those problems are discussed. All aspects of the process are considered, as integrity problems in areas such as the Legal Framework or the Institutional Framework could create problems later on in the elections. The major sub-categories in Election Integrity that address these issues: Integrity in Election Administration Monitors of Election Integrity Enforcement of Election Integrity Please use the feedback buttons to forward suggestions, commentary and additional information that will enrich the topic area. Enjoy. OverviewThis section considers the role of integrity in the electoral process. Integrity is an important factor in both the administration of free and fair elections and in the participation of political parties, candidates, interest groups and voters. The purpose of competing in an election is to win public office and to gain power and influence over public policy and state resources. Elections are the result of a complex process that requires the participation of a multitude of actors, each with different roles and agendas. Elections result in winners and losers. Everyone wants to be the winner, few want to be the loser. Stakes can be high as can be the temptations to ensure a certain win through unethical or illegal means. Integrity is inherent in the principles of a democracy and is an integral part of free and fair elections. Free, fair and competitive elections are the basis for a representative form of government. Without integrity, there is no guarantee that the will of the voters will be reflected in the election results. Elections could be fixed, predetermining winners and losers. Elections could be disrupted, undermining candidate or voter participation and casting doubt on the legitimacy of the results. An election without integrity defeats the purpose of a democratic election and cannot be considered free and fair. Integrity is an ethical code of behaviour as well as a system of mechanisms adopted to protect the honesty and viability of the process. Electoral integrity requires:
Each of these requirements will be looked at in-depth in the sections to follow. Election corruption is usually thought of as political corruption-- manipulating the process to ensure the election of a particular candidate, party or position. However, economic corruption enables political corruption and, therefore, both need to be addressed. Those interested in subverting the system could bribe a corrupt election official for special treatment or to actually fix election results. Kickbacks and other personal financial incentives in procurement could inadvertently hurt election integrity through the purchase of substandard or nonexistent services. Or if it involved the selection of a dishonest company with a political agenda to print something as sensitive as ballots, it could deliberately and adversely affect election integrity. Integrity requires a political will for good governance and 'clean' elections. Given the factional nature of politics and society, integrity cannot be taken for granted. Mechanisms to safeguard and enforce integrity need to be built into the electoral framework, electoral administration and conditions for participation. These include checks and balances on election administration within the electoral management body, oversight by another agency or branch of government, independent monitoring of the process by civil society and the media, and enforcement of rules and regulations through administrative or legal action. Enforcement of integrity is especially important because without enforcement the best rules and regulations can end up as nothing more than good intentions. Identifying election corruption and stopping it through administrative or legal action acts as a deterrent to future corruption as well as a means to maintain the integrity of the current process. The challenges to electoral integrity, and the mechanisms developed to protect the integrity of the election process, are described in the Election Integrity Chapter. Guiding PrinciplesIntegrity is a concept that can be hard to define, but is an essential component of a democratic system of governance. Electoral integrity involves both ethical behaviour and a legal and institutional system which promotes and protects free and fair elections. These systems may vary according to the social and political context of each country, but the basic objectives are the same: ensuring that all political actors who want to compete in the elections are able to do so on an equitable basis; ensuring that voters are able to vote freely for the representatives and parties of their choice; and ensuring that their votes are accurately reflected in the election results. In general, election integrity requires: Respect for the Principles of Electoral Democracy Election integrity means that the Principles of Electoral Democracy are respected. In brief, these ensure that all citizens have equal rights to participate as voters and candidates, that all citizens have equal voting power even if they do not have equal political influence; that all citizens are free to organize for political purposes; that voters have the right of access to political information; that electoral law is administered fairly and in a non-partisan manner; and that elections are held regularly and decided by the freely cast votes of the majority. Integrity requires a will to abide by the democratic governance system and the rule of law; to channel participation and complaints through the system; to work within the system to change it where needed; and to accept the decisions and official results of free and fair elections. The system protects the principles of an electoral democracy and a free and fair election through its Legal Framework and Institutional Framework and in its institutional values, ethical conduct and the decision-making of its electoral managers, law makers, overseers and participants. Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson have identified a number of components that are required for 'free and fair' elections. Freedom is defined as 'the right and the opportunity to choose one thing over another' and fairness is defined as 'impartiality.' 1 Among the freedoms required for a 'free election' are the freedom of movement, speech, assembly, association and freedom from fear. Among the 'fair' factors required for a 'fair election' are a transparent electoral process, an equitable electoral law and system, equal opportunities for participation, an independent and impartial elections commission, lack of intimidation, proper procedures and acceptance of the electoral results. 2 More information on fair and 'genuine' elections can be found in Parties and Candidates: Guiding Principles Ethical Conduct Election integrity implies an ethical code of behaviour (see Ethical Behaviour) for officials, candidates and parties, as well as the system of institutional mechanisms adopted to protect a free and fair election. Ethical conduct means that the behaviour of all participants should promote an open, fair and free process and avoids conduct that would jeopardize the integrity of the process. This means that public officials (including electoral managers) do not use their official position or facilities for personal or partisan benefit, and that they carry out their duties in a professional, transparent and impartial manner. It also means that candidates and parties should not misuse campaign contributions and should disclose the source of their campaign funding. It means lobbyists should not use money or other incentives to improperly influence an electoral or public official and should disclose their funding and spending as required by law. Election integrity also requires a tolerance of the political rights and activities of others; an acceptance by the citizens and officials that everyone has the right to freely debate political issues and to promote different political points of view, and that it is not right to interfere with political parties trying to get their message out or with the political activities of other citizens. The ethical conduct expected in an election by all participants is formalized in many systems through a code of ethics or conduct. Most public officials, including electoral managers, are bound by a professional Codes of Conduct/Ethics that may be legally binding. Many systems also use codes of conduct to regulate and enforce good behavior of political parties, candidates and their supporters. Institutional Protections One of the greatest dangers to electoral integrity is factional interest or action. The idea of a faction, or group of individuals who act in their own self-interest regardless of the effect on others, is an old one. In 1789, the Federalist Papers, written to persuade American voters to ratify the U.S. Constitution, defined factions as a group of persons who are united by a common interest adverse to the rights of other citizens or the community. Factions today are commonly called interest groups, although factions can exist within political parties. Factions can still attempt to influence and control the decision making process. Because the root cause of factions are 'sown in the nature of man,' the Federalist Papers argued that the only way to control factions is to control their effect: '... if men were angels, no government would be necessary.... (but) experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.' 3 The auxiliary precautions adopted by the framers of the U.S. Constitution included a separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. Other systems try to achieve the same results in different ways. These mechanisms are widely used today to protect integrity and to keep elections free and fair. To be effective, they must be part of the legal and institutional frameworks. Institutional protections ensures that the different powers inherent in the electoral process are divided among different entities. For example, the electoral law could delegate official oversight responsibilities and power to a separate office of an Inspector General or an Electoral Court. Or it could delegate enforcement powers for election law violations to the justice system. These institutional mechanisms provide the official 'checks' on the administration of elections. It also provides checks over political party participation in such areas as campaign finance. Balances come from the power delegated among the different institutions as well as the roles played by political parties, civil society and the media in monitoring the elections and providing public reports. For more information on checks see Administrative Considerations, and for more on balances see Checks and Balances. Accurateness Integrity problems are usually thought to be the result of corrupt or fraudulent action. But they can also occur from human error or an honest mistake. It is essential for election administration to be professional and accurate. Sloppy work or inaccuracies in reporting such things as tally sheet totals, can raise serious integrity questions and threaten the validity of an election. The same checks and balances mechanisms that were designed to limit power and ensure accountability, can also catch mistakes. Although a deliberate action to derail the process or change the election results would be treated as a criminal issue, problems relating from mistakes and inaccuracies usually remain an administrative or civil matter. Integrity problems can also arise from badly drafted laws or poorly designed systems. For example, laws and regulations delegate responsibilities to electoral managers to administer the elections. A badly drafted provision could delegate too much discretion to an individual officer, creating the opportunities for misuse of his/her position. Or, a badly designed voter registration system could enable dishonest persons to register multiple times or leave out large segments of the eligible population. Outdated laws could also let problems, such as computer-based fraud, fall through the cracks if they were drafted before the adoption of the new technology. For example, the use of the internet or modern campaign techniques might also not be covered under the provisions of an older system. Inaccuracies in both the legal and institutional frameworks, as well as in their implementation and enforcement, can inadvertently create as many problems as deliberate fraud. They can seriously weaken the credibility and legitimacy of an election and must be addressed. Continuous Enforcement An atmosphere of impunity and a lack of enforcement encourage a climate of corruption and mediocre work. Transparency International found that '...many officials in the public sector believe that they not only can secure immunity for themselves against prosecution, but that the chances of their criminal activities being discovered are low.' 4. In a climate such as this, there is little incentive for individual electoral managers or candidates to follow the rules or play fair. Enforcement of the legal and regulatory framework for the elections is essential to control the action of personal and special interests and to create the conditions for a free and fair election. It acts as a deterrent to those contemplating illegal or unethical behavior and punishes those who have broken the laws.
The integrity of the voting process stands at the very heart of our system of representative government. Where elections are corrupted, arbitrary and corrupt government inevitably follow. Rooting out corruption in the election process, and bringing those responsible for it to swift and sure justice, is an important national law enforcement priority.5 Transparency Finally, a system with integrity is transparent. Transparency makes the institutional systems, actions and decisions open to the participants and the public. Under the glare of publicity, it is difficult to maintain or justify a system that permits abuse and corruption. Transparency helps ensure that the actors involved in the election are held accountable for their actions. That electoral managers are held accountable for the decisions made during election administration and for the public resources and assets used to conduct the elections; that legislators are held accountable for the content of the laws they pass and the funding levels allocated for the elections; and that candidates and political parties are held accountable for their conduct, and those of their supporters, during the campaign. Having an open and transparent process helps public understanding of the process, of the difficulties encountered, and how and why the electoral managers made the decisions that they did. Transparency helps build public support for the elections, and increases the credibility of the process and legitimacy of the results. One of the problems with a lack of transparency is that is difficult to refute a loser's claims of fraud and manipulation as the reason for their electoral loss. This happened in Haiti in 1995 where many losing parties boycotted after the first round of the legislative elections, and in Cambodia in 1998, when the 'losers refused to believe that they had lost.' 6 A free and fair process, that is accurate and transparent, monitored and enforced, makes it difficult for participants and voters not to accept the election results or the legitimacy of the newly elected officials.
Administrative ConsiderationsIntegrity problems and anti-corruption activities extend beyond electoral issues to the wider political, social and economic issues addressed by every government. However, integrity issues related to the electoral process must be taken into consideration by electoral administrators and legislative law makers when designing an electoral system and administering elections. Good systems can combat and expose economic and political corruption and help ensure integrity. Building a good electoral system with checks and balances is a priority of most electoral management bodies. Designing Checks and Balances A good system, with checks and balances, appropriate to the political and economic conditions of the country (Social and Political Context) reduces the possibilities for electoral fraud and increases the chances that corrupt activities will be detected. A credible election process encourages participation and fosters a healthy electoral climate. The separation and limitation of powers is first be built into the Legal Framework for elections. For example, the law can separate the administrative aspects of elections from the criminal enforcement aspects, as well as separating prosecution from the court which will pass judgement. The validity or constitutionality of election legislation or administrative action should be open for challenge through the judicial system or other mechanism, such as a Constitutional Council, in order to provide a check on its legality. In New Zealand, for example, there is a separation of responsibilities for specific electoral tasks among different institutions. The Chief Electoral Officer is responsible for running the elections and is an employee of the Ministry of Justice. Voter registration, and the maintaining of voters lists is done by the Electoral Enrolment Centre which is part of the New Zealand Post Office. The Electoral Commission is a separate and independent statutory body which registers political parties and their logos, promotes public awareness of electoral matters, allocates public funds for campaign broadcasting, and receives campaign financing reports. The police are responsible for investigating breaches of electoral law and for prosecuting suspected offenders in the courts. An independent statutory body, the Representation Commission, determines the boundaries of electorates and a committee of Parliament reviews the administration of elections and makes recommendations for law reform. 7 However, the separation of electoral functions in New Zealand is largely for historical reasons, and, consideration may be given in due course to creating one electoral management body similar to the federal Australian Electoral Commission. 8 When there is a separation of electoral powers between several bodies, it is important to develop good coordination mechanisms to ensure that the organizations are working together, and not duplicating efforts or going in conflicting directions. It is also important to be sure that the public, politicians and parties are informed on the roles and responsibilities of each agency to avoid confusion and misunderstandings. 9 In transition countries, where there is no history of an independent judiciary or a functioning legal system (see Special Considerations in Countries in Transition), the establishment of an electoral commission with wide-ranging powers, of the type that would normally be exercised by legal institutions, may be the only way to counter the influence of the exiting institutions. 10 Within the electoral management body, the delegation of authority and the limitation of power for each division and staff position can also be clearly delineated within the administrative Regulations, along with the checks and balance mechanisms to be used. This will ensure electoral authorities know their responsibilities as well as the extent of their authority, and that a system is in place to keep the electoral officials from exceeding their responsibilities. Integrity mechanisms can also be built into the procedures for election administration to ensure a fair, transparent and honest implementation of the legal framework. These are described in the Integrity in Election Administration texts, with each subtext detailing the integrity problems inherent in that step of the process and the mechanisms that can be used to address them. Codes of Conduct/Ethics can set standards of integrity in participation and administration, and are used in many electoral systems. These can vary from standards of expected behaviour to binding ethical codes of conduct for electoral administrators, candidates or political parties. In cases of elections in transition, or post-conflict countries, codes of conduct can provide a standard of expected behaviour that, if followed and enforced, can help build trust in the electoral process and reduce the levels of cynicism or fear. Enforcing Integrity The enforcement of good procedures and the legal framework is essential to combat corruption. Enforcement mechanisms (Enforcement of Election Integrity) need to be developed in both the legislative and administrative context so that election law violators are caught and dealt with in a timely, professional and non-partisan manner. Effective enforcement also serves as a practical deterrent to future problems. An example of electoral reform that succeeded using the separation of powers and checks and balances is the Mexican electoral system which underwent a series of reforms from 1990 to 1996. According to Dr. Andreas Schedler, this reform incorporated six mutually re-enforcing mechanisms:
In order to subject the electoral leviathan to credible restraint, political parties set up a comprehensive scheme of interlocking institutional constraints. Among other things, they wrote a new electoral law, the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE). They took the administration of elections out of the hands of the Ministry of the Interior, and established a permanent, non-partisan, and autonomous election management body, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). They designed a specialized judicial tribunal to settle electoral disputes. They formulated a catalogue of electoral crimes backed by harsh penal sanctions, to be enforced by a special prosecutor. They revamped the electoral registry and issued new, high-tech and high-security voter ID cards. And they established a 'panoptic' regime of party surveillance, allowing political parties to monitor each step of the process. 11 Avoiding Conflicting Legislation and Regulations Electoral policymakers and administrators must understand how the different legal and administrative pieces fit together. The relevant legislative and administrative codes should work together to form a cohesive legal framework for the promotion and protection of election integrity. For example, is election fraud that is criminal in nature included in the penal codes? In a federal system, who has jurisdiction over election corruption? Is it the national or state governments? Could a crime go undetected or unpunished because of a gap in the legal or administrative framework? Whether designing a new system or improving an old one, electoral administrators and policymakers need to take a comprehensive look at all of the different laws, regulations and procedures that work to protect election integrity. Gaps, errors and conflicting legislation or regulations should be identified and corrected. Cost ConsiderationsThe cost of integrity depends on the systems used and the extent of the extra safeguards adopted. The need to adopt specific integrity mechanisms and the cost of these mechanisms has to be balanced against the level of risk associated with each part of the electoral process. Electoral managers and policy makers have to make a judgement on whether the cost of each mechanism justifies its adoption. This can be done by asking the question: How likely is it that the integrity of the electoral process will be affected if we do not take this measure and incur the costs involved?12 This assessment will differ according to the Social and Political Context of each country. In electoral systems characterized by high levels of mistrust, extensive safeguards are usually adopted, in part to reassure the participants, and in part to ensure the integrity of the process. These safeguards can involve higher costs, but the additional expense can be justified if it results in a credible election that is accepted by the country. On the other hand, in established electoral systems, where election procedures are routine and unquestioned, the benefits from adding extra safeguard mechanisms might not justify the additional cost. This concept is discussed in the Case Study on Voter Identification in Australia There are integrity mechanisms that can be adopted that do not require massive amounts of additional spending. For example, effective planning and the development of good systems (see Election Management) require only the good use of the time and knowledge of competent electoral professionals. This is also true for internal control mechanisms and supervision, which are already part of the electoral administrative system (see Staffing and Recruitment). Transparency, and holding electoral managers accountable for their actions, are integrity safeguards which do not have to add additional costs. Training is another important integrity factor which is probably already in place, but which could be intensified and extended through out the system. Cost of Integrity Safeguards The cost of adding integrity mechanisms to an electoral system will depend upon the security mechanism adopted and the scope and nature of the integrity problem. In general, however, the more extensive the control system, the less discretion there is for electoral managers to pick the most cost effective systems or materials. This is true, for example, in the case of Mexico, where the extensive control mechanisms were deliberately designed to limit the discretion of election administrators. Having adequate personnel to hold an election is another integrity safeguard, yet personnel costs are likely to be the most significant expense of election administration. There is significant risk to integrity if the number of personnel is insufficient, or is inadequately trained. A related issue is the supervision and control mechanisms that detect and deter fraud and corruption. These require trained personnel with adequate resources. Safeguard mechanisms on electoral materials can also add to election costs. For example, serial numbers on ballot stubs add to the cost of the printing but can provide a simple and effective mechanism for tracking ballots. However, the more sophisticated the mechanism, the more expensive the cost. The use of watermarked security paper security for ballots is likely to cost more than the use of regular paper. There may also be fewer sources of supply for special paper or other election materials and a longer lead time if the supplies cannot be obtained locally and have to be brought in from elsewhere. Electoral managers need to balance the cost of sophisticated security systems and items, such as holograms, with the benefits the security item will provide. What is the probability that the problem will actually occur and how will it affect the integrity of the election? How effective is it? Will it increase trust in the integrity of the process? Will it increase the credibility of the process? Can we afford it and is it sustainable over time? Are there cheaper ways of achieving the same result? The use of new technology can aid integrity through computerized inventories and registration lists that have built in checking and control mechanisms. Initially, new technology can be expensive, but the costs can be recovered if the machines and software are used for subsequent elections. Cost-effective technology is usually adapted for the local conditions, as placing high tech equipment in a location without electricity, maintenance systems or training for the personnel who will use the equipment, can be extremely expensive and unsustainable. Other alternatives to purchasing technology can include:
Adopting safeguards or new technology to improve integrity can be expensive in the short term because of the increased costs associated with capital expenditures and training, In the long-term, however, if they are appropriate, they can save money.14 The Mexican experience with extensive control mechanisms is that the cost for the initial election with safeguard mechanisms was high, but that the costs were lowered over time. For example, the preliminary budget for the 2000 presidential election was one-third lower in absolute terms than its 1994 budget, while the costs per registered voters were nearly halved. 15 Monitoring election integrity is another important integrity mechanism, and it can also be costly. In Kenya, 28,000 observers covered the 1997 elections. This cost $2 million, mostly funded by donors. This was an expensive operation, but the end result was a general acceptance of the election results.16 Having independent monitors who can organize a credible national election observation and verify the count through a parallel or quick count, can provide savings in the long run, if their participation ensures the acceptance of the election by all parties involved. (See the case study on Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity in Indonesia.) Good oversight and enforcement are key factors in maintaining electoral integrity, and require having accessible and effective means to detect and prosecute political and economic corruption. Election security also needs to be ensured so that there is an election environment conducive to free and fair elections. This requires good law enforcement with the means to respond quickly and effectively to election security problems. This usually means good communications, transportation and equipment. Setting up the initial system can be costly, but as with the new technology systems, it can become more cost-effective if law enforcement uses the materials and procedures over a long period of time, and for each subsequent election. Voter education is another key integrity mechanism. However, as with personnel, when funds are low, voter education programs may be among the first things cut. Electoral managers can seek to find low-cost alternatives to disseminate information, such as negotiating free time for public service broadcasting on radio or tv, regular press conferences and using NonGovernmental Organizations to help spread critical voter education messages. Ensuring voters are knowledgeable about the electoral process and are able to participate in an informed manner is critical to maintaining public and political confidence in the integrity in an electoral system. Costs of Not Adding Safeguards The cost of adding integrity mechanisms into the process, and the extent of these mechanisms, must be weighed against the costs of having an election without them. Elections lacking integrity may not be seen as credible, nor the election results as legitimate. There could be a security environment where candidates and voters were afraid to participate. There could be suspicious irregularities that cast a cloud of doubt that the election was free and fair or that the outcome represented the will of the majority of voters. Having a political party boycott an election because it doubted the freeness or fairness of the process, or having to do extensive re-run elections because of integrity problems, can cost far more money than adopting the safeguard mechanisms that should have prevented them in the first place. Corruption itself is expensive. Fighting corruption can cost money, but what is the cost of unchecked corruption? Lost productivity by electoral workers? Substandard equipment or materials? Kickback costs on top of purchase prices? Allowing corruption to flourish can add millions of dollars to the cost of an election and, in some cases, can end up jeopardizing the elections themselves. As Robert Klitgaard says:
.. the killer is systemic corruption that destroys the rules of the game. It is one of the principal reasons why the most underdeveloped parts of our planet are that way.17
Social and Political ContextThe nature and scope of electoral integrity issues are affected in great part by the type of governance within a country and the cultural practices and social norms of its people. Although the basic problems are the same everywhere-- the unethical or illegal use of money, power or influence to artificially affect the election results-- the social and political context determines in large part, how these problems will manifest. Has the government taken an active stance against corruption? Do the citizens understand the importance of elections and maintaining election integrity? Do the political parties know how to contest the elections, and do so in an honourable manner? The integrity mechanisms adopted need to be responsive to local conditions. What can be a serious integrity problem in one country requiring strict protective measures, could be insignificant in another and therefore not require the same degree of attention or protection. Governance Each country has a unique type of governance, evolving from its political, economic and cultural history. The type of governance will affect the scope and nature of election integrity issues and the effectiveness of the different mechanisms which establish and enforce integrity. Countries with a history of governance based on the rule of law, with public officials that are accountable and procedures that are public and transparent, usually provide an environment that is conducive to maintaining electoral integrity. Violations of the electoral law can be identified and remedied, while prosecution and punishment of criminal actions can be processed through a working legal system. In countries struggling with governance and rule of law issues, maintaining electoral integrity can be much more difficult. Here the electoral policy body and the electoral management body might need to establish their institutional and administrative credibility. Keeping election policy and administration neutral, professional and transparent can be difficult and might require additional mechanisms such as international technical assistance, or the presence of long term international observers (see International Election Observation). In the absence of credible legal and judicial systems, the election management body itself might have to be given wide powers to decide on complaints about the conduct of election officials, parties, candidates and others. Political Culture The political culture of a nation has been found to affect the conduct of its citizens and leaders, including their participation in elections. Political culture affects the public's perception of the electoral process and whether the elections and its outcome were legitimate. It is also a major factor in a national perception of what is and what is not an integrity problem. Universal standards have been identified for free and fair elections (see Guiding Principles), but political culture affects how these standards are interpreted. For example, 'ethical behaviour' is a part of integrity yet definitions may vary about what is and what is not 'ethical'? Education, socialization, occupation, culture- all shape the way behaviour is perceived and judged. In countries with deep social and political cleavages, it can be difficult to agree on a national standard for integrity. Keeping elections 'genuine' is much easier when there is a national or widespread consensus on the rules of the game (see Policy) and the value of integrity. Countries have taken cultural and political differences into account when drafting their electoral legislation and regulations. For example, in Mexico the electoral law makes it a crime for 'ministers of religious cults to induce voters to vote for or against any candidate or political party or who talk voters into abstention, all this in performing religious activities.' 18 In the case of India, candidates are told not to 'induce or attempt to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered the object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure.' 19 While in the other countries, such as the Philippines, it is illegal to buy, serve or sell alcohol on polling day. 20 Participation Groups promoting their own self-interest are inherent in every society. Democratic pluralism includes participation by groups and institutions that have organized around different occupational, economic, religious, ethnic or other shared interest. But the type and nature of their activities are shaped by their political culture. One of the primary participants in the elections is Political Party Organizations. Political parties compete in elections in order to win public office and run the government. The type of national system that has developed directly affects the nature of the integrity issues and the types of mechanisms needed to address those problems. For example, is it a two-party or a multi-party system? Is there a dominant party or parties that receive preferential treatment or access to public resources for election purposes? Are smaller parties excluded? Is the multi-party political party system so new that many parties are still in the formative stage? Each one will generate a different kind of integrity issue. Another factor is Interest Group Organizations, which promote a particular interest or candidate. Although interest groups do not compete in the elections, they work to influence the outcome of the elections. Their methods and ability to influence the process vary by country and will determine the type of protective mechanisms required. In some countries interest groups are not politically active. However, in other countries, such as the U.S., interest groups have organized and proliferated to such an extent that they are known as 'pressure groups.' These groups actively carry out programs to influence candidates, voters and the government. (See Interest Groups). Here mechanisms have developed to help transparency by requiring disclosure of lobbying and campaign financing. The nature and intensity of political participation by citizens is also a reflection of their political culture. Some nations have a history of mass action, such as demonstrations, requiring physical security mechanisms to maintain integrity during campaign events or voting. Other nations can have peaceful participation but voter turnout that is so low it can jeopardize the integrity of the election. In each case, the integrity mechanisms required to encourage and safeguard healthy participation would need to be adjusted to fit the particular problem and cultural context. Monitoring Monitoring the electoral process is one of the key mechanisms to ensure election integrity (see Monitors of Election Integrity). The scope and depth of domestic monitoring will depend on the political and social context of each country. In countries with a long history of the rule of law, there are usually institutional mechanisms for electoral oversight, such as legislative committees or government inspectors. There are also well organized citizen watchdog groups that closely follow the process and publicize irregularities, along with an active and free Media that plays an investigatory role. In the newer democracies, these mechanisms may still be developing. 'Independent' oversight or domestic monitoring might be used more for partisan purposes than objective observation. In many countries, international assistance has been provided to help establish the institutional and objective monitoring capacity of domestic civil society organizations (see National Election Observation). The capacity of these non-governmental organizations (NGOs) vary considerably from the very well established NANFREL in the Philippines, to the nascent COMFREL in Cambodia. In some of the more difficult countries, domestic monitoring can be a risky business. Domestic monitors who attempt independent monitoring can be threatened or in extreme cases, have been physically injured or killed. In such cases, international election observers (International Election Observation) can help increase the security of domestic observers through their physical presence, as well as provide an independent assessment of the electoral process. Role of Money Money has always been a factor in politics and elections. But the amount of money spent in pursuit of public office today has brought new dimensions to an old problem. In the U.S., $1.5 billion was spent on the 1998 congressional campaigns. 21 In Argentina, the ruling party Partido Justicialista, spent $13 million in the last national elections.22 Money, or things of material value, can be used as an incentive to vote for a particular candidate, to obtain a lucrative electoral contract, or to pay off a corrupt election official to tamper with the election results. Each political culture forms the way in which money is used. The fact that so much money is being spent on election campaigning and, with studies suggesting that the winner of an election is often the one who spends the most money23, makes campaign financing one of the key integrity issues for almost every election. Money can be used for advertising and for vote buying. It can help organize voter registration drives or get voters to the polls. It can be used ethically or unethically. In a few countries, the use of large sums of money by criminal elements, including drug money, has added a sinister element to the problem of maintaining election integrity. For more information on this see Narco-traffic. Elections involve money and power, and unchecked power and money can lead to corruption. Transparency International's 1999 international Bribe-Payers survey found that 33% of respondents felt that corruption was increasing. The major causes cited were:
In each case finding a mechanism that can address the problem of money is a difficult one, and to be effective, has to be tailored to fit the particular economic and cultural context of each country. In Indonesia, efforts to diminish the importance of 'money politics' 'illustrate the difficulty of integrating legal restrictions with political and civil society awareness to promote compliance.' 25 Trust Trust in the electoral system and its institutions is an important variable when discussing election integrity and the mechanisms needed to protect election integrity. In countries where there is a high degree of trust, the government routinely administers elections and there is little concern by the voters or candidates that the government will manipulate the process or election results. However, in countries with little trust in government institutions or in the other political parties to follow the rules, mistrust is a major factor. The degree of mistrust helps determine the institutional and administrative frameworks for the elections, and the additional safeguard mechanisms that will be needed to protect the integrity of the process. As discussed in the following excerpt from Commissioner Maamong of the Philippines Elections Commission (COMELEC) , mistrust is one of the primary reason why candidates cheat, and why a comprehensive safeguard system needs to be developed.
Why do some candidates cheat? Perhaps their genetic structure has something to do with it, but an answer can be capsulized in one word: MISTRUST. Candidates really have no desire to cheat but because of mistrust some of them do. Those who cheat say: Do unto others before they do unto you. COMELEC will not allow candidates to cheat each other. As a result, we become paranoid. We do not trust the candidates. The candidates do not trust COMELEC and so the feeling becomes mutual. We do not even trust the voters. That is why we put indelible ink on their fingers by assuming that they will vote again unless they are prevented from doing so. In effect, the presumption of innocence has been effectively reversed.
Special Considerations in Countries in TransitionThe issue of integrity in less developed countries (LDCs), and countries undergoing a transition from authoritarian rule to a more open democratic system, is as important as it is in the more established democracies. In addition to the universal problems of the influence of money and the factionalism of special interest groups, LDCs and countries in transition face a lack of operating funds, low levels of literacy or understanding of elections, and security problems. A pervasive lack of trust in transition or post-conflict societies can poison the atmosphere for 'free and fair' elections, and result in low levels of candidate or voter participation. Ensuring the transparency and integrity of the process in these situations can be difficult and requires special consideration. Some of the problems that can occur in these situations is evident in this summary of the 1996 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. 'Before the election at least 13 people were killed and hundreds wounded in the clashes between the opposition and government's security forces. The Awami League's call for a boycott was heeded, and fewer than 10% of the eligible voters turned out for the polls. About a dozen people were killed during the election. The electoral commission invalidated the results for 100 of the 300 contested seats because of fraud.' 27 Reliance on External Support LDCs and post-conflict societies often do not have sufficient resources to administer an election without external assistance. This can result in a reliance on external assistance. The percentage of donor funding for elections can vary, depending on the needs of the country and the degree of donor interest. A high percentage of external election funding, coupled with donor conditions for the use of the funds, can sometimes raise concerns over the integrity of a 'national' process. The lack of sufficient funds to implement an election can preoccupy underfunded electoral authorities through an entire election. Even if donor pledges help cover the estimated cost of the elections, shortfalls can occur with unexpected expenses. Donor funding is also dependent on the funding cycles and regulations of the individual donor country. Funds can come late in the process forcing the electoral management body to scramble to cover start up and registration costs. If political conditions are included and are not met, donor funds could never materialize. Thus, uncertainty over funding can negatively impact the integrity of the process. The issue of having sufficient funds for the electoral management body on a timely basis is an important issue for electoral integrity and is dealt with in more depth in Budget. Technical Assistance The international community provides technical assistance to electoral management bodies in LDCs and countries undergoing transitions. This technical assistance plays a valuable role in helping the often inexperience electoral managers understand the need for integrity, transparency and viable systems. Technical assistance, though, can create problems for new electoral administrators when the different assistance groups disagree over procedures or alternatives. This dilemma is noted by the Vice Chairman of the 1998 National Elections Commission (NEC) in Cambodia, Kassie Neou:
Much of the credit for the administrative success of the elections goes to the foreign donors and experts who advised the NEC at every point.... This constant diplomatic pressure markedly improved the conditions for the elections. Of course, foreign experts sometimes created problems too. At times our three separate advisor teams fought with one another and the NEC would have to mediate. But on balance, the foreign advisors were a vital resource. 28 Conditionality of External Assistance Donor funding can be provided without strings as a gift to the country or election management body. However, it is usually conditioned on the recipient country holding 'free and fair' elections. Conditioning funds gives donors leverage over the process which can be used to help keep the elections on track and to make sure integrity is respected. For example, donors can ensure competitive bidding is done for expensive communication or computer systems or that voter registration is open to all eligible citizens. In the case of the 1998 Cambodian parliamentary elections, one of the donor conditions was the establishment of the Constitutional Council, a supreme court that was written into the Cambodian constitution but which had not yet been created. The establishment of a functioning Council was an important element for the integrity of the process as it was a key constitutional mechanism to resolve electoral disputes. In some cases donors can attach conditions which surpass the scope and authority of the electoral administrators. In the 1998 Cambodian elections, donor conditions included the apprehension and trial of human rights violators. Although this condition directly affected election funding, it was a political condition which could only be resolved by governmental action. The electoral management body could only indirectly address this condition by lobbying the appropriate government ministries. Security Another factor which can negatively affect the integrity of an election is the security environment. In LDCs and post-conflict countries, physical security can be a serious issue. In the 1995 Haitian legislative elections, 'death lists' circulated with the names of some of the Haitian electoral commissioners, candidates and political party officials. The political assassination of a prominent attorney who had been named on one of the lists reinforced fears, resulting in the prolonged absence of an electoral commissioner and affecting the decision-making of those who remained. The presence of UN peacekeeping forces kept violence from erupting during voter registration and polling, but did not stop post-election incidents of burning ballots and counting sheets. In those places, the integrity of the process was so badly damaged, that rerun elections were required. Peacekeeping Elections Elections held as part of a peace accord are special cases and require special considerations. These elections are usually held after an internal war as part of the peace and reconciliation process. There is usually significant international assistance to the peace process which involves not only elections but issues such as demobilization of former combatants, demining, and the return of refugees or the internally displaced. Peacekeeping elections have been held in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, and Nicaragua.29 Some of the special integrity problems faced in peacekeeping elections include:
In Cambodia, the system established by UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia) in 1993 was beyond the financial and human resource capacity of the national government. A new, scaled down system had be to designed and every voter re-registered for the 1998 elections. In Mozambique, many voter registration books from 1994 could not be found and every voter had to be re-registered for the 1999 elections. In Haiti, the voter registration books were kept, but were seen to be suspect, so the entire country was re-registered for the 2000 elections. Historical ReviewBy Ai Watanabe As the world moves toward democracy, the means of public political participation have increased over time. The most fundamental method of the participation is participation in democratic elections. This includes participation as a voter, as a candidate, and as a supporter of a candidate or political party. Universal suffrage is common in most parts of the world today, and elections are becoming more competitive. The competition can make it difficult for governments and electoral managers to maintain election integrity since some candidates who are not able to succeed in free or fair elections can turn to fraud, intimidation, and discrimination in order to assure a win. Despite these difficulties, most governments and election managers make substantial efforts to ensure election integrity, so that free and fair elections may be guaranteed to every citizen. Expansion of Suffrage Universal suffrage has become prevalent in most parts of the world as a result of continuing electoral reforms throughout history. Ancient Greek and Roman assemblies first developed elections. Then the electoral process expanded to local and regional assemblies in Europe during the Middle Ages. However, modern elections were established in the Europe and the United States in the 17th century. In Political Manipulation and Administrative Power, the author Eva Etzioni-Halevy defined a modern election as 'the basis for the selection of parliamentary assemblies,' 'focussed on the individual as the electoral unit to be counted,' and 'considered as the mechanism of establishing the consent of the governed to those who governs them.'31 This is the concept of a representative government based on one-person-one-vote. However, these principles were not commonly practiced. Until the 19th century, most countries in Europe and the United States granted suffrage to only those who held recognized community membership. This membership tended to be in association with nobility, clergy, and/or in relation to ones in power.32 In the 19th century, revolutions in Europe reversed the monarchical control to popular assemblies. Civil access to political participation was extended, and suffrage was given to men who met the property and/or income criteria. Nevertheless, suffrage was still limited to the elite minority population, and there were problems of multiple voting and unequal voting ratios for representation. By the late 19th century, most suffrage criterion for social and economic status had been abolished as the revolutions and industrialization in Europe triggered movements by labour organizations. As a result, most of the adult males in Europe and the United States gained suffrage. Women were denied suffrage for a long period of time, even though they comprise approximately half of the world's population. Women acquired suffrage in the Western sphere in the late 19th century to the early 20th century. Women's suffrage was first established in countries with large immigrant populations; for instance, Wyoming in the United States (1890), New Zealand (1893), and South Australia (1895). Many Scandinavian countries; such as Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, followed this example during 1906 to 1921. However, Switzerland did not adopt women's suffrage until 1971. Roman countries, such as France, Belgium, and Italy, finally recognized suffrage for women after World War II.33 Other parts of the world proceeded, and most countries currently allow women's suffrage. However, some countries, including Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, do not allow women to vote.34 35 The eligibility for suffrage was modified throughout history as definitions of citizenship and residence evolved. The residence requirement has varied depending on circumstances of a country. In the 19th century, many countries required long-term residence to be considered for suffrage. The long-term residence requirement was originally intended to restrict temporary mass migration in order to influence the result of an election. Also, the requirement was meant to grant voting rights to those whom would still reside in the constituency and be affected by the results of an election. However, this restriction often prevented minority, middle and lower class citizens from voting since they were more mobile or transient because of their employment situations. In the 20th century, requirements for residency term changed. Terms before one becoming eligible for suffrage became shorter, especially in local elections.36 Unequal requirements for suffrage, such as literacy and national language requirements, were used to exclude particular ethnic and racial groups in elections. For example, a literacy test was used to exclude African-Americans from obtaining suffrage in the United States in the late 19th to mid 20th century. South Africa used similar requirements to exclude non-Caucasians, who comprised 70 percent of South African population, from voting until the 1990s.37 History of Corruption and Its Regulation Today, universal suffrage has been achieved in most parts of the world. The election process has evolved from elections by a handful of privileged elite men to one where leaders are chosen based on a system of one-person-one-vote. The elite's control over the government has weakened as the world has moved toward democracy by the expansion of suffrage, increased public political participation, and more competitive elections. Since some elites could not survive the competitive elections, they have turned to using election fraud as a means to decrease the degree of competition and sustain their power. This fraud can include bribery, undue influence, ballot stuffing, physical intimidation, and dissemination of false information. As methods and the degree of fraud grew, governments found it necessary to regulate fraud and maintain elections free and fair. Governments had various reasons to hold free and fair elections, for instance, to gain national or international respect and legitimacy.38 Significant attempts to regulate electoral fraud emerged in the late 19th century. France introduced the concept of the secret ballot in 1789; however, Australia was the first country to actually employ it in the late 1850s.39 40 The purpose of the secret ballot was to discourage bribery and intimidation. It was intended to reduce the likelihood that others would know for whom the bribed and/or intimidated citizen had voted. The United Kingdom adopted the secret ballot in 1872, and most countries in Western Europe followed in the late 19th century.41 The United Kingdom began to confront fraud and corruption with the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act of 1854 that dealt with bribery. The Ballot Act of 1872 challenged impersonation. Impersonation is when a person votes pretending to be someone else, for instance, using a name of a deceased person. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883 covered a variety of fraud related issues. This Act was one of the first major efforts by the United Kingdom to intensely combat corruption. It penalized candidates and others who engaged in corrupt acts, such as giving gifts to influence an election result, undue influence, illegal payments, and illegal practices including illegal employment.42 The United States dealt with corruption by political machines in the 19th century. One of the high-profile cases of corruption by political machines is that of William Tweed in Tammany Hall. Tammany Hall was the executive committee of New York City's Democratic Party organization, and it used a method called gerrymandering to manipulate elections. Gerrymandering is districting or redistricting in a discriminatory manner. This discriminatory districting strengthens one political group and weakens another.43 William Tweed was first elected as a municipal legislator in 1851. He eventually became a state senator and principal leader of Tammany Hall by 1868. With the power he secured, he created a law office to obtain financial contributions from corporations by labelling the contribution as a 'legal service fee.' He also established the New York City board of audit, enabling him to control the treasury. The estimate of the amount that he extracted from the city is between 30 million to 200 million dollars.44 Campaign finance became one of the major tools to manipulate elections. (See Campaign Financing) Some candidates used bribery to ensure their victory by buying votes and giving presents. The invention and wide distribution of television dramatically increased the amount of financing needed to campaign. The increase in the amount of money needed to run a successful campaign became dependent on raising large sums of money. Campaign contributions by individuals and organizations became common in an effort to influence the candidate's policy on various political issues. This in turn led to questions about the influence of large donors and the independence of candidates. As a result, some governments started to regulate campaign financing, such as setting limits on fund-raising and expenditures. There are two kinds of major regulation in campaign finance: limitation of the acceptable source, and limitation of the maximum size of an acceptable contribution. In the United States, Richard Nixon utilized the fund made up with legal, yet undisclosed contributions and illegal corporate contributions for his presidential campaigns in 1968 and 1972. This fact was discovered during Nixon's Watergate hearings and disseminated to public. Public outrage caused by this scandal led to the Congressional establishment of regulation mechanisms for campaign finance. In 1974, Federal Campaign Finance Act (FECA) was amended to limit individual contributions and to require disclosure of the amount of contributions. Also, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) was established to enforce FECA in 1975.45 FEC was given authority to investigate violation of FECA and to penalize its violators.46 Prosecution of violators of electoral law is essential to ensure electoral integrity since it allocates accountability of the crime and makes the violator responsible for it. (See Accountability and Prosecution and Judicial Proceedings) In order to seek accountability of campaign participants, other countries established similar regulations and mechanisms to prosecute campaign finance abusers; for example, Canada in 1974, Japan in 1976, and Spain in 1985.47 As the world moves toward democracy, elections have become a more and more essential part of increasing public political participation. And the international standards of free and fair elections have been adopted, at least in principle, by most democracies. On the other hand, the more important elections became, the more election fraud has become refined and diverse. (For more on this see Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud) One of the ways to manipulate elections is that a dominant party or government administers unfair elections to maintain its advantage. For instance in Chile, legal methods to exclude potential voters from voting were adopted in 1962. The Chilean government set up a very limited and inconvenient voter registration period, which was limited to two hours each day during an eight-day period in a month.48 Changing the timing of elections is also used to influence the result of elections. The dominant party or government sometimes modifies election timing to an earlier date, so that the opposition does not have time to organize itself to acquire and mobilize public support. Such arrangements occurred in elections worldwide; for instance, Turkey in 1946 and Korea in 1985. Transparency at all levels of elections needs to be enforced, especially at vote counting and campaign finance. Transparency in election process is necessary to attain public confidence in a government and approve the result of an election.49 Lack of transparency in electoral system makes it easier to manipulate election results. An example of non-transparent elections is the Bolivian election in 1978. It is widely assumed that General Pereda Asbun exercised fraud and won the election by 50 percent of votes, which was the exact amount of votes required to win the election. However, no one could prove the fraud because of the non-transparent electoral system.50 In the 2000 Peruvian presidential election, incumbent Alberto Fujimori was accused of large scaled election fraud including adopting a new vote counting software. The Organization of American States requested to examine the software because of unexplained ballot overcast by more than 1.4 million after the election; however, Fujimori refused the request.51 52 Intimidation of opposition candidates and their associates has also been used to decrease competition and unfairly influence an election outcome. Intimidation and harassment include physical and/or psychological threats or violence, confiscation of personal property, and imprisonment. A recent example of intimidation was made by President Robert Mugabe and his ruling party ZANU-PF in the election in Zimbabwe in 2000. The party used physical violence on supporters of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The intimidation included killing of the opposition supporting farmers, and ordering hospitals to refuse treatment to opposition supporters.53 International Promotion of Free and Fair Elections As democracy became an international concept, walls among countries became lower because of globalization. Some countries confronted election fraud in their systems; however, other countries lacked willingness and/or capacity to enforce election integrity. Therefore, the international community started to take actions to expand the free and fair election system worldwide. (See International Election Observation) International organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, assisted many countries in achieving democracy through free and fair elections. The United Nations' efforts toward extension of democracy through the free and fair election system started with decolonization of the world. In order to achieve democratic election, independence and self-governance was fundamental. The United Nations established the Trusteeship Council under the UN Charter XIII (articles 86-91) for decolonization of more than 80 colonies that were home to 750 million people.54 In order to accelerate the decolonization process, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Today, the number of the non-self governing territories has been reduced to 17, and they contain fewer than 2 million residents.55 Further more, according to Samuel P. Huntington, the author of The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, the percentage of democratic states in the world increased from 19.7 percent in 1942 to 45 percent in 1990.56 The United Nations has also provided electoral assistance since its establishment in 1945. It created the Electoral Assistance Division in the UN Department of Political Affairs whose objectives are:
'to assist Member States in their efforts to hold credible and legitimate democratic elections in accordance with international recognized criteria established in universal and regional human rights instruments;'57 and The United Nations has provided a variety of electoral assistance including coordination and support of international observers, technical assistance, organization and conduct of an electoral process, and supervision and verification of an electoral process. Technical assistance, such as advice and assistance for accountable electoral management and revision of electoral laws and regulation, are provided to increase the capacity of a government to administer a free and fair election. Election observation has played a significant role in increasing transparency and attracting international attention to the integrity of an election. Election observation became more prevalent as more international donors of electoral assistance became concerned about the sound utilization of their contribution. Another organization besides the United Nation that has observed elections in order to ensure their integrity is the Organization of American States. This organization started election observation in the 1960s in countries of Latin America. It has observed more than 45 elections in countries including the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Panama.59 60 Another major way the United Nations promotes free and fair election is through their peacekeeping operations. The traditional role of peacekeeping operations has been the procurement of stability and security in a conflict zone in order to assist conflicting parties to find a peaceful resolution. However, the nature of peacekeeping operations has been modified and current operations also involve electoral observers, civilian police officers, and human rights monitors.61 These features of non-traditional operations have served as additional safeguards to guarantee the integrity of these peacekeeping elections. Globalization and advancement of information technology has made it easier to oversee elections in the world. The rise of a global mass media has made the world aware of unethical elections and has created a universal concept of free and fair elections. (See Institutional Framework-Media, and Monitors of Election Integrity-Media) Increased communication among countries, such as the internet, international television stations, trade, and travel, enabled people in non-democratic countries to be aware of alternative political systems. Democracy became a universal norm, and principles of free and fair elections became an international goal. The journey of achieving universal suffrage and a global value of free and fair democratic elections has come a long way. However, despite the fact that there are many mechanisms to enforce free and fair elections today, electoral fraud and corruption still exist. The right to free and fair elections is a basic human right. The effort to reduce electoral corruption and fraud should be more intensively emphasized in order to ensure free and fair elections, and to serve as a method of democratic political participation, for every citizen regardless of their ethnicity, gender, race or political and economic background. Additional ResourcesThere are many resources available on election integrity issues. Some sugestions includes: Election Commissions The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) website, http://www.ifes.org , has links with many election commissions. Most election commission websites include copies of their electoral laws, rules and information on electoral issues. Association of African Election Authorities. http://www.ifes.org/afrassoc/charter.htm Association of Asian Election Authorities. http://www.ifes.org/AsiaAssocSite/a_asia_ea/s_gray.htm Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials. http://www.ifes.org/AsiaAssocSite/a-asia-ca/s-toth.htm California. Secretary of State. This website contains in-depth analysis on campaign spending broken down by winners and losers, incumbents and challengers. http://www.sa.ca.gov/prd/finance98_general_final/98gencandmainpage.htm Centro de Asesoria y Promocion Electoral. Located in Costa Rica, the CAPEL website contains information on South and Central American elections and integrity issues. http://iidh.ed.cr/infgen.htm Hawaii. Secretary of State. The Report on recount of 1998 elections caused by faulty voting machine readers is of interest as it discusses integrity issues involved with machine counting of ballots. http://www.hawaii.gov/elections/rev98.htm
Independent Commissions (for Monitoring and Oversight) Fair Political Practices Commission. An independent agency that administers, interprets and enforces the provisions of the California Political Reform Act. http://fpcc.ca.gov/facts.htm Hong Kong. Independent Commission Against Corruption. http://www.icac.org.hk Independent Commission Against Corruption, New South Wales, Australia. http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au Seattle Ethics and Election Commission. This Commission provides oversight for elections in Seattle, Washington. The website contains instructions for what to do if you witness an ethics violation. http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/ethics/ethic.htm International Organizations and NGOs Some of the many organizations directly involved with election integrity issues include: American Society of Newspaper Editors. This Association's website has many links to issues involving media coverage. http://www.asne.org Amnesty International. This NGO focuses on human rights issues. Its website, http://www.transparency.org, includes many useful documents related to integrity including its Fair Trial Manual. Article 19. This NGO monitors, lobbies and litigates on behalf of freedom of expression issues. Its website, http://www.article19.org, includes a copy of its Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies. California Bar Association. The Association publishes The State Bar of California Rules of Professional Conduct at its website, http://www.calbar.org/pub250/1995rpc.htm, which is a comprehensive code of conduct for lawyers. California Voters Foundation. The Foundation's website has many links to election and democracy websites. http://www.calvoter.org/links.htm Center for Civic Education. This NGO focuses on civic education and has developed a comprehensive Framework for Civic Education, http://www.civnet.org/resources/teach/basic/civitas/exe.htm Center for the Independence of the Judges and Lawyers. The Center has developed a Final Policy Framework for Preventing and Eliminating Corruption and Ensuring the Impartiality of the Judicial System. located at http://www.icj.org/cijl/alerts/fpf.htm Commonwealth of Nations. Issues pertaining to election integrity are found at http://www.thecommonwealth.org Committee to Protect Journalists. This NGO works to protect journalists and keeps statistics on intimidation and threats to journalists. http://www.cpj.org Common Cause. This U.S. public interest group follows election campaign finance issues and promotes honest and accountable government. http://www.commoncause.org. Council on Governmental Ethics Laws. COGEL is an association of public officials that focuses on ethics in public service. http://www.cogel.org European Union. The website of the EU, http://www.europa.eu.int has information on election issues in EU member states. International Association of Chiefs of Police. This website, located at University of Maine, includes the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics which is an important element of integrity in election law enforcement. http://www.ume.maine.edu/~pubsafe/txt/ethics.htm International Foundation for Electoral Systems. http://www.ifes.org IFES has a comprehensive library of international election documents and sample materials. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. IDEA has done research on electoral integrity issues and has developed model codes of conduct and lessons learned. These can be found at its website: http://www.idea-int.se League of Women Voters. The League focuses on informed voters and a fair election. http://www.lwv.org Media Institute of Southern Africa. This NGO was established to promote the objectives of the Windhock Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic Africa Media. http://www.misanet.org NANFREL. A monitoring coalition of NGOs from the Philippines. http://www.kababaihan.org/wewatch98/fraud/fraud-tips.htm National Association of Attorney Generals. This Association website contains codes of conduct for prosecutors. http://www.naag.org National Democratic Institute. NDI provides elections assistance worldwide. Its website includes integrity documents such as Lessons Learned and Challenges Facing International Election Monitoring, http://www.ndi.org/ndi National Endowment for Democracy, http://www.ned.org Organization of American States. The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, http://www.oas.org focuses on election issues. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The OSCE site provides information on elections monitored by the OSCE http://www.osce.org. It also contains documents of interest including Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE area. Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System, , and the The ODIHR Election Observation Handbook, http://www.osce.org/odihr/election/hanbook/index.htm. Society of Professional Journalists. This website contains Code of Ethics for journalists. http://spj.org/ethics/code.htm South Africa Electoral Institute. The Institute covers election issues in South Africa. http://www.eisa.org.za It has issued a Gender Checklist for Free and Fair Elections Transparency International, TI focuses on issues of corruption and transparency. Its Bribe-Payers Survey, and National Integrity Systems Manual are directly related to election integrity issues. http://www.transparency.org United Nations. The UN website, http://www.un.org, has many documents relating to election integrity issues. Some of these include Independence of the Judiciary, A Human Rights Priority, http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1837e.htm and Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on the Role of the UN in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principles of Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democracy, http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/ead/2res96.htm.
Journals Africa Includes articles on elections in Africa, such as David Throup's 'Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya' (Vol 63.3, 1993). Election Today . This is published by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and is a good source for current information. For example, the September 2000 edition focused on the issue integrity in campaign finance. Journal of Democracy. This NED publication, http://www.ned.org, has many articles which focus on election integrity and electoral governance. Some key articles are in Volume 8.3 (1997) including 'The Observers Observed' by Thomas Carothers and ' What Makes Elections Free and Fair' by Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson Journal of International Affairs from Canberra, includes articles on election integrity issues, such as John Sanderson and Michael Maley's, 'Elections and Liberal Democracy in Cambodia,' (vol. 42.3.1998) Official Oversight Agencies Comptroller General of the United States. The website for the Comptroller General contains detailed manuals and standards for audits. http://www.ignet.gov/internal/manual/yellow/gas1.htm U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. http://www.doj.gov/ert/voting/clarify3.htm Published Works Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. Free and Fair Elections. International Law and Practice. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva. 1994 Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay. The Federalist Papers, Hamilton New American Library, 1961, New York Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 Kumar, Krishna ed., Post Conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder. 1998. Electronic Published Works Connolly, Stephen and Bruce Hatch, Election Procurement, Open and Free 1999. http://www.electionbuyersguide.org/procurement.htm Dundas, Carl, Compendium of Election Laws, Practices and Cases of Selected Commonwealth Countries, 1998/1999. http://www.thecommonwealth.org PolicyElection policy is a reflection of the Social and Political Context of each country. Policy is an important factor when it comes to developing the legislative and regulative framework for elections as well as ensuring an adequate allocation of funding for election administration. It also determines the parameters for participation by political parties and candidates, and sets the tone for the type of elections held in each country. A free and fair election requires a general consensus on the rules of the game and the value of electoral integrity. A good impartial election policy will help establish an electoral environment that is conducive to holding free and fair elections. A general consensus on election policy by the major political and civil actors minimizes one of the primary causes of integrity problems-- fundamental disagreements over how and when the elections should be held. This problem is most frequent in post-conflict societies or in countries undergoing a democratic transition where new policies are developing and mistrust is rampant (see Special Considerations in Countries in Transition). Policy affects the mechanisms adopted to protect integrity in all democracies. These include such things as equal Access to Media, the ability for citizens to obtain and discuss political information, the allocation of public funds for campaigns (Campaign Financing), transparency of the process (Fair Process) and how to deal with fraud and corruption. For policy to be effective it must be clearly reflected in the legal and electoral framework. This ensures that the policies are respected in the implementation of the elections and are enforced. For example, in the U.S. State of California, citizen action resulted in a change of policy on election integrity. Through a ballot initiative, Californian voters approved the Political Reform Act of 1974, a set of new legislation designed to support election integrity. Because of the policy change implemented through the adoption of the Act, the conduct of public officials and campaign committees are now more closely regulated. Political campaign contributions and spending by candidates must be fully disclosed, as are those by lobbyists. And state and local government officials, including those who implement elections, were made subject to a stricter set of ethical standards. 62
PrinciplesCompetitive elections are the basis for a representative democracy where citizens elect representatives to act as their agents in making and enforcing laws and decisions. Elections also serve as a mechanism for holding elected officials accountable for their performance in office, as voters pass judgement on the incumbents by voting for or against them or their party. Electoral processes can also make political decisions, such as when referendums are held on public issues. Since the citizens have a personal stake in the election, and will be governed by the personalities and policies of those who win, elections can become emotional events. The high political and personal stakes in the results of an election, or the perception of a personal stake, can be the source of many integrity problems. Most of these involve unethical personal behaviour aimed at trying to ensure a certain election result. (see Ethical Behaviour). But not all integrity problems are caused by deliberate or corrupt action. In order for the process to accurately reflect the will of the voters, the electoral system must be free, fair and competitive. This requires that the Legal Framework and Institutional Framework be designed to protect election integrity and that it include the legal and institutional safeguards of a free and fair process. It also requires an accurate and transparent administration (see Fair Process) of the legal framework and electoral process and that all officials and participants are held accountable for their actions. (see Accountability). Finally it requires continued monitoring and enforcement. (see Monitored and Enforced) These institutional and legal mechanisms must also ensure a climate free from intimidation and fear, so that voters are able to freely express their will without fear of retribution. These principles are summarized in the Charter of the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA) whose objectives include:
Ethical BehaviourEthical conduct is an essential component of election integrity. Ethics embodies the ideals we should strive for and how we should behave. Standards for ethical conduct vary depending on the Social and Political Context of each country. However, there are certain basic principles of ethical behaviour that are required for free and fair elections in any country or electoral system. These ethics are based on the belief that public service is a public trust. The loyalty and efforts of public officials, electoral managers and others involved in election administration, belong to the constitution and laws of their country. And that they perform these duties for the public good and not use their position or offices for personal or partisan benefit. These basic principles of ethical behaviour are reflected in the South African Code of Conduct for Persons in Positions of Responsibility (SA). This voluntary code of behaviour reflects the belief that any person in a position of responsibility, whether they are in government, the business community or civil society, have a duty to act with integrity, and promote democracy and justice. The Code's standards include:
Most governmental and electoral systems institutionalize these principles of ethical behaviour in a code of conduct that specifically details the ethical behaviour that is expected and required. Codes of conduct or ethics vary by systems and countries, but there are usually codes for electoral managers as well as separate codes for the conduct of political parties, lobbyists, the media and accredited observers and monitors. The codes that are incorporated into the legal or regulative framework are binding legal documents (see Codes of Conduct/Ethics). These legal documents include penalties and sanctions for violating the code. Others, such as codes of conduct for political parties, or the South African Code listed above, are standards of expected behaviour to which the parties voluntarily subscribe. They are usually the result of negotiations between the different political actors or parties. The ethical conduct of voters is regulated by the laws of each nation for the protection of persons and property, and are enforced through the justice system. The following are some of the ethical standards of behaviour which are usually expected during a free and fair election. Ethical Standards for Election Officials:
Ethical Standards for Political Parties and Candidates:
For more information on ethics for political parties and candidates in election campaigning, see Campaign Ethics. Ethical Standards for Lobbyists:
Ethical Standards for Monitors and Observers:
For more detailed information see Monitoring Ethics, Code of Conduct, and Standards to Judge Elections. Ethical Standards for the Media
For more information on the press see Media Code of Ethics.
Fair ProcessA fair process is an another essential component of election integrity. To be fair the process must provide equal treatment and opportunity for all participants. However, what is 'fair' requires a subjective judgement which can vary according to the political and cultural norms of each society. Despite these cultural differences, as with Ethical Behaviour, there are basic standards of 'fairness' that must be met in order to have a genuine election. These standards include: Acceptable Legal Framework The Legal Framework is the basis for the electoral system. A good legal framework that allows for free, fair and competitive elections is the foundation for election integrity. It must be nonpartisan and cover all of the legal requirements for an election, including the institutional mechanisms to protect electoral integrity (oversight, enforcement and other checks and balances). A legal framework that is written in a clear and precise manner helps ensure that its provisions are unambiguous and can be interpreted according to the intention of the drafters. An up to date legal framework which reflects the actual status of the country, such as the deliniation of electoral districts, can avoid many integrity problems. Neutral Administration The legal and Institutional Framework is only as good as its implementation. The electoral policy and management bodies have a responsibility to implement the electoral process as prescribed by law. They must be able to fulfill this responsibility impartially and objectively, and without political interference. A neutral administration treats all political parties and candidates equally without discrimination or favourable treatment. The perception of a partisan administration, or the belief that an administration is dedicated to a certain election result, can destroy public trust and confidence in the system as well as that of the political parties participating in the elections. Electoral systems can adopt a variety of mechanisms to ensure a neutral administration. In nations where citizens trust the government to provide impartial public services, election administration is usually done by the government. Where there is a history of ruling party domination and manipulation of the process, an 'independent' electoral commission system can be adopted which separates election administration from the ruling party's influence. Although the Election Commission is supposed to be an independent institution, it is still a public institution dependent on the government for its financing. In other countries, a 'balanced' system may be adopted where each party is represented in the electoral administration. This representation serves as a check and balance mechanism on the action of the other commissioners and the election management body. Yet other systems adopt a combination of these mechanisms, some having an independent commission with political balance. Some systems try to ensure the neutrality of the key electoral administrators by removing them from politics. They may be appointed for a set number of years, without the government being able to remove them except through extraordinary circumstances, such as a judicial hearing. An example of this is India, where the Election Commission is a permanent Constitutional body. The Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners are appointed by the president for 6 years or up to 65 years of age. The Chief Election Commissioner can be removed from office only through impeachment by parliament. 65 Other systems do not allow the key electoral administrators to participate in politics. In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer and the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer are not allowed to vote in federal elections. Returning officers are also not allowed to vote unless a judicial recount confirms that there is a tie in the vote, in which case they may cast the deciding vote. 66 Electoral officials may also be required to give up political party positions during their tenure on the election management or policy bodies. Neutrality and nonpartisanship of electoral administration is an essential integrity factor. In many countries, especially those in transition, some political parties are still convinced that they only way they can win an election is to control the electoral machinery. If political parties and voters believe that an election management body has not acted impartially, even if this is not true, it can tarnish the credibility of the election and reduce the legitimacy of the results. And it can also provide a reason for the losing candidates and parties to reject or boycott the results. Equal Treatment Equal treatment, including equal opportunity and equal access, are also parts of a fair election. This means that participants receive the same treatment by electoral managers and have the same opportunities to participate. They have equal access to information as well access to the election management and policy bodies, oversight and enforcement agencies, and to the media and the voters. Voters also have access to voter registration, and voting facilities as well as the mechanisms developed to process complaints. A related issue is the concept of a level playing field-- that all sides can compete on an even basis. In most countries, there are dominate parties or candidates and there are the smaller or newer ones, struggling to get established and get their campaign messages to the voters. They have different level of human and financial resources, as well as different degrees of organizational development and outreach strengths. Even if there is equal opportunity, the inequality of resources can create a sense of inequity, as the strong parties are able to take advantage of opportunities, while this may not be possible for the smaller ones. In Mexico, for example, opposition parties use 'the vocabulary of fraud to denounce not fraud, but inequitable conditions of inter-party competition. For instance, the left-wing opposition party PRD, still tends to denounce 'fraud' anytime it loses at the polls; and when pressed to be precise, its leader comes forward with allusions to unfair practices and inequitable resource endowment of political parties.' 67 The question of how level a field is required for the process to be considered fair is discussed in depth in Level Playing Field, Fairness. Transparent Process Transparency of the electoral system, including its legal and institutional frameworks, is essential. Participants need to have access to all of the procedural information so that they can understand how the process will work, what they need to do, and where to go for redress if required. Transparent decision making and procedures usually build trust in the process and demonstrate that everyone is being treated equally according to the rules. A system that is opaque, where the rationale for decision making is unknown, can feed mistrust in the system and the perception that the process is being manipulated for partisan or personal motives. Closed systems can provide cover for those interested in subverting the system and makes detection of their actions difficult. Transparency International found that government secrecy was cited by 57% of the respondents in their 1999 Bribe-Payers Survey as being one of the major reasons for an increase in corruption. 68 Transparency, and the public scrutiny that comes with transparency, usually forces electoral officials and others involved in the electoral process to comply with the rules and account for their actions. To be effective, transparency usually requires good communications with both the public and the candidates and parties competing in the elections. Regular consultations between the electoral policy and management bodies and the political actors can help build a transparent electoral administration and a framework that is acceptable to the participants. This is especially useful in the countries undergoing a transition, where procedures are still being developed and candidates have concerns over the capacity of the electoral management and policy bodies to organize and hold free and fair elections. Keeping the public informed is an essential part of voter understanding of the process and of problems or road blocks encountered. The manner in which the election policy and management bodies communicate with the public will affect the voter perception of the process, and, in turn, its level of trust. As explained by IDEA:
For an election to be successful, participants in the process have to feel able to accept the decisions of the election administration. Those participants will most likely feel able to accept those decisions if they can easily satisfy themselves that the decisions were made appropriately. To do that, they must have access to the information on which decisions are based. 69 Transparency can help build confidence and support for the process. For example, in the Haiti 2000 voter registration process, some of the materials were destroyed by partisan hooligans intent on gaining control over the electoral machinery in the west of the country. There was no response to the Provisional Election Commission (CEP)'s request for police action and protection of registration materials. The President of the CEP then addressed the nation through radio and TV disclosing the problems, reiterating the CEP's commitment to holding free and fair elections on time and in a secure environment, and asked for public support. As a result, a subsequent poll showed only 6% of the population felt that a slip in the date of the election would be the fault of the CEP, while over 50% said the government and political parties would be responsible.70 Covers entire process and all participants A process is usually free and fair if the mechanisms to protect freedom and fairness cover all of the participants and the entire process. These mechanisms can start with building the integrity protection mechanisms into the legal and institutional frameworks and continue through the process of electoral administration; preparation for the elections; registration of voters and candidates; electoral campaign; voting; counting; dispute resolution, and the winner being able to take office. It can cover all of the participants from the electoral managers and those who provide oversight and enforcement, to those competing in the elections. It also usually covers those who work to influence the election results as well as the observers of the process. Ultimately, it include the voters themselves and their conduct throughout the process. AccountabilityAccountability is another important aspect of election integrity. Elections are, after all, the means by which citizens hold their elected officials accountable. Election managers and policy makers are accountable for the type of electoral process they design and administer. Electoral managers use public resources for the public purpose of elections and are accountable for the use of those funds. They are responsible for the decisions they make and how those decisions were made. They are responsible for election administration and how that administration functions. They are accountable for their compliance with all laws and regulations and for having developed adequate systems to monitor compliance as well as detect waste, fraud and abuse. Accountability usually requires reporting to official oversight agencies and the agency that provides the funding. Accountability can be ensured by the regular monitoring of Official Oversight agencies and through audits of the financial and performance reports, both of which can assess their integrity performance and the stewardship of their electoral responsibilities. Accountability is a public issue. According to the U.S. auditing standards: 'While not always specified by law, this accountability concept is inherent in the governing process.... The public needs to know whether government funds are handled properly and in compliance with laws and regulations. They also want and need to know whether government organizations, programs and services are achieving their purposes and whether these organizations, programs and services are operating economically and efficiently.' 71 Political parties and candidates are also accountable for how they participate and campaign. Lobbyists and interest group organizations as well. Monitors and observers are accountable for how they observe and report. And voters are accountable for the manner in which they participate. For more information on accountability for political party and candidates see Accountability. In a few countries, there is a system of immunity for high elected or public officials. These systems can be reviewed to ensure that they do not hinder the accountability process or hurt the integrity of the electoral process.
Monitored and EnforcedTo ensure a free and fair process, and for administrators and participants to be held accountable for their actions, the legal and institutional frameworks require monitoring (see Monitors of Election Integrity) and enforcement (see Enforcement of Election Integrity). Continuous monitoring of the process, by internal and external control mechanisms (see Election Management, Official Oversight, Political Party Monitors, National Election Observation and International Election Observation) can identify problems in the system, and the groups or individuals responsible. Fraud and corruption can flourish in an atmosphere of impunity where laws are not enforced. The Bribe-Payers Survey by Transparency International found that 63% of respondents felt immunity of public officials was one of the main factors in the increase in corruption. 72 To maintain integrity, problems identified through monitoring need to be dealt with by the respective authorities. Inappropriate procedures or actions can be changed. Criminal violations can be dealt with by the legal system, with appropriate sanctions for those responsible. Without enforcement, the best procedures, systems and integrity mechanisms can be bypassed, ignored or selectively applied. Effective and timely enforcement helps ensure accountability and serves as a deterrent to future problems and illegal actions. Legal FrameworkThe legal framework provides the foundation on which the institutions are built and determines the scope and nature of political participation. The legal framework for elections, and especially election integrity issues, is usually found in a number of inter-related laws and regulatory provisions. The foundation in most nations is the Constitution which is their supreme law. This foundation is supplemented by legislation enacted by the parliament or legislature, which includes election laws (laws that include the provisions for the electoral process, campaign finance and voting rights), criminal laws, penal codes, and Regulations, including Codes of Conduct/Ethics, issued by the different regulatory agencies related to elections. Within the legal provisions are the guidelines for the structure of the electoral administration, instructions for the electoral managers on how to administer the elections, and the rights and responsibilities of political parties, the media, the voters and other participants. The legal framework authorizes the election management body to administer the elections according to the structure detailed in its provisions. It empowers the political parties to raise funds and participate in the elections according to the legal provisions. And it ensures that the voters retain their political rights to vote and elect their government representatives. In most countries, the legal framework for elections has evolved into a complex combination of legal statutes, regulations, judicial rulings and actual practice. Some election laws may be new and up-to-date, others may be old statutes that are outdated but still in force. There can be gaps, conflicts and inconsistencies between the different pieces of the legal framework that forms the electoral process. In Argentina, for example, the Argentinean chapter of Transparency International found that there were more than 90 different pieces of legislation on political party financing. 73 For integrity purposes, it is important to review the entire legal picture in order to understand the legal framework and to determine whether corrective action is needed, and, if so, what type of action should be taken. The Foundations for Integrity To ensure that the election results accurately reflect the will of the voters, the legal framework must protect the principles of a free, fair and competitive election (see Fair Process). They can be designed, as, for example, in the Philippines, towards having '.. honest, orderly, peaceful, credible, and fair elections, and to give our countrymen equal opportunity for public service.' 74 The legal framework can protect election integrity in several ways. Power is given to specific bodies for specific functions. But the amount of power can be limited by separating it among different institutions and subjecting it to a series of checks and balances. For example, an election management body is empowered to administer the elections but another body may be authorized to set the boundaries of the electoral districts or to administer public funding for political parties. Checks can be provided through power delegated to an oversight agency or office, such as an Inspector General, to monitor the administration of the elections, identify problems and make recommendations for corrective actions. Enforcement of the laws is usually handled by the judicial system, the police, the courts and the prisons. In the newer democracies, the rules for free and fair elections are still evolving. In these instances, it is important to include the basic principles in the legal framework. According to Robert Pastor, in the case of elections in countries undergoing a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime 'the challenge is to negotiate electoral rules that all parties can accept and respect.' 75 Once this basic legal framework is completed, work can then start on the development of the institutional and administrative frameworks for the electoral process. Reforming the legal framework, can be the starting point to bring integrity back into the electoral process. For example, this was the case in Mexico, where legal reform provided the 'lever'76 for genuine democratic change. Using their new election law as the foundation, a new institutional framework and modes of participation were created. These institutions then established procedures and operating methods that reinforced the election integrity provisions in the new legislation. These series of reforms successfully brought integrity into the Mexican electoral system. 77 More information on the legal framework for elections can be found in Legal Instruments (Doctrine/Theory).
ConstitutionA constitution is the supreme law of any nation. It provides the framework of government, designates the powers and duties of the branches of government or governmental agencies and establishes the relationship between the people and their government. It details the basic rights and obligations of its citizens and usually provides the framework for the nation's electoral system. For election integrity purposes, the constitution can ensure universal suffrage, set the frequency of elections and the basic eligibility requirements for the major elected offices. In doing so, the drafters of the constitution should take into consideration the capacity and conditions of the country. For example, setting elections at too close an interval can be burdensome for some less developed countries. In countries coming out of conflict, a proportional system might allow for more power-sharing than a winner-take-all system. Constitutions can also ensure the basic political freedoms needed to hold competitive elections, such as freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press. It can also enable political actors to form into groups for the purpose of contesting office or to support group interests. Constitutions may also authorize institutions to undertake specific electoral functions. For example, it may give election administrative power to a government institution or an independent commission; and enforcement powers and responsibilities to the judicial system or a specific electoral court. LegislationLaws are usually enacted by the legislative branch of government and are enforced by the police and the courts. There are usually a number of interrelated and mutually reinforcing laws to support election integrity. There is an election specific law, as well as laws related to the enforcement of the laws. There are criminal codes that punish illegal activity and civil laws that pertain to such things as defamation of character and other personal harms. In countries with a federalist system of government, this is further complicated by the existence of state or local laws in addition to the national laws. The end result can be a complicated maze of legislation with perhaps, conflicting provisions. Laws must also not be vague or too broad, leaving them open to different interpretations. In these cases, disputes arising out of conflicting laws are usually settled in court. It is usually the responsibility of the legislative branch of government to ensure that all of the institutions and laws implied in the Constitution are created. For example, the Constitution may provide for a system of local government. The electoral administration may hold elections for these offices, but if the legislation governing these local bodies is not passed, there will be elected officials without authority or resources. For election integrity, the laws adopted must protect the principles of a free, fair and competitive election (see Guiding Principles) and are updated regularly to keep pace with the political and technological evolution of the country. As explained by Agustin Ricoy, Secretary-General of the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute:
The law must evolve at the same rhythm of the reality it rules. This phenomenon of integration and perfecting of the law allows us to give an adequate dimension to the democratic development of peoples, and it allows them also to grow in other social and economic aspects, on the basis of respect towards their sovereign will expressed through the ballot.78 In the case of New Zealand, this flexibility is maintained by the Electoral Law Committee. This select committee is appointed by each Parliament to consider electoral matters. After a general election, the Electoral Law Committee conducts an inquiry into the administrative and legal aspects of the election. It reviews reports from the Chief Electoral Officer, Ministry of Justice, the Electoral Enrolment Centre and public comments. It then makes recommendations to the House on revisions that should be made to the electoral law. 79 Electoral Law Many countries have adopted a national election law which is comprehensive and covers most aspects of an electoral process. Included in an election law are the mandates for the electoral policy and management bodies; the timetable for elections; the requirements for voter, candidate and political party registrations; polling and count principles; control mechanisms; and, penalties for election law violations. It also usually details the procedures and mechanism for dealing with complaints and disputes regarding the electoral process. (For more in depth information see Electoral Law) Systems that have one comprehensive election law can minimize integrity issues stemming from conflicts between different pieces of legislation. If there is one comprehensive election law, the enforcement mechanisms for upholding the law can also be described within that law- specifically detailing what responsibilities are those of the electoral policy or management bodies, and what responsibilities belong to the justice system or other enforcement mechanism. Applicable Penal Laws Election integrity issues that involve fraud, corruption or violence are usually covered under the criminal codes of each country. These involve actions that surpass election-specific problems and involve larger issues such as maintaining law and order, and fighting fraud and corruption. There may also be general anti-fraud and anti-kickback laws that would apply to these offences committed during the electoral process. In addition, there are usually specific laws that are adopted that directly relate to electoral fraud and corruption, such as the appropriate use of campaign funds, prohibitions against bribing voters, limitations on financial contributions to the campaigns and the like. The criminal justice system usually comes into effect if the Government brought charges against a person or group of persons for violating one of these laws. The case is settled in court, which also sentences the offender if found guilty of having broken the law. It is important to ensure that the penal codes include electoral law violations and that criminal offences do not fall through the cracks because of omissions. For example, this was done as part of the Mexican electoral reforms, where an office of Special Prosecutor was created. It is the responsibility of this office to ensure that the Mexican penal codes covered criminal election actions, including:
behaviours negatively affecting the conditions of the electoral contest (electronic media coverage, spending and financing of political parties, and government actions ad programs, specifically the deviation or resources, property or services used by any public servant with electoral purposes), as well as those that can produce or favour irregularities, all this with the aim of protecting human and political rights of Mexican citizens.80 Civil Right Laws Some countries have adopted civil rights laws to protect voter rights and prevent discrimination. These laws supplement the political rights provisions in the constitutional and legal framework by targeting specific areas where the country has historically had problems with discrimination, arbitrary treatment of minorities or other groups by the government or individuals. In the case of the U.S., a series of Civil Rights Acts were enacted to prevent racial discrimination. Their provisions included outlawing arbitrary discrimination in voter registration, expediting voting right suits and creating a bipartisan Civil Rights Commission to investigate civil rights issues. These Acts were supplemented by a Voting Rights Act that specifically targeted restrictions that were used to prevent minority voters from exercising their right to vote. Among these legal provisions was a court test for the legality of poll taxes (which the court found unconstitutional), a suspension of the use of literacy tests, and federal registrars to register in areas with a history of discrimination.81
RegulationsRegulations are the set of procedures and rules that institutions adopt to implement the responsibilities given to them in the legal framework. Generally, executive agencies or ministries have independent power to issue regulations without requiring legislative action. These regulations fill in the details - the how to - of, in this case, election administration. The electoral policy or management bodies are authorized by the Constitution, or relevant electoral laws, to issue electoral regulations. These regulations govern the conduct of the elections and the political parties competing in the elections. Regulations, by either these electoral bodies or other election-related bodies, also apply to the other aspects of an election, such as the media, campaign finance and lobbyist registration. Regulations should follow the same principles for integrity found in the Principles for a free and fair elections and in the legislative framework. To be effective, they are clear, equitable and minimize restrictions on the political freedoms of the candidates and voters. Good regulations can help ensure the fairness of the process, equality of opportunity and accountability of all participants. Since regulations are issued by an agency, they are easier to change and update than the formal legislation, and provides election managers with an effective tool to address new integrity problems as they arise. Regulations are similar to legislation. They authorize electoral officials to do a certain task, but they also limit their discretion for independent action. Regulations need to be enforced and enforcement helps ensure the accountability of election officials and others involved in the electoral process. The penalties and sanctions for noncompliance are usually included in the regulation. These can range from fines to imprisonment depending on the infraction. (More information on this is available at Administrative Regulations.) In the Mexican electoral system, Dr. Andreas Schedler has identified three regulatory checks on election administrators that help maintain integrity in the system. These are:
Decrees Governmental decrees are used in some systems and are similar to regulations in that they are an executive branch order that has the force of law. In Argentina, for example, a Presidential Decree in 1997 created a National Office of Public Ethics. This office, located within the Office of the President, elaborates national rules of public ethics and monitors their enforcement. 83
Codes of Conduct/EthicsCodes of conduct or ethics are usually a set of written rules that govern the conduct of public officials, including election managers. Some electoral systems include codes of conduct to govern the conduct of political parties, candidates and lobbyist groups. Codes are designed to prevent unethical behaviour (see Ethical Behaviour) and, if legally binding, can hold officials accountable for their individual actions. Codes of conduct or ethics can be a stand alone document or a part of a larger piece of legislation. For example, the Ethics and Disclosure Act, Wyoming 84 is part of a larger piece of legislation on public service, and Wyoming electoral managers are bound by this code of ethics. In South Africa, the Code of Conduct for election managers is a separate regulation that was designed specifically for elections. Codes of conduct or ethics that are enacted in legislation or regulations are enforced and include sanctions and penalties for violations. Sanctions can be a fine, suspension from office or disqualification as a candidate. For example, violations of the Wyoming Ethics Law are misdemeanours punishable upon conviction by a fine of not more than $1,000. Violations of ethics laws are also usually sufficient cause to terminate a public employee's employment or to remove a public official from office.85 Violations of the code that involved criminal action are referred to the criminal justice system. In India, political parties and contesting candidates are expected to abide by a Model Code of Conduct. The Code was issued by the Election Commission after the political parties reached consensus on its content. The Model Code lays down broad guidelines as to how the political parties and candidates should conduct themselves during the campaign.
It is intended to maintain the election campaign on healthy lines, avoid clashes and conflicts between political parties or their supporters and to ensure peace and order during the campaign period and thereafter, until the results are declared. The model code also prescribes guidelines for the ruling party, either at the Centre or in the State, to ensure that a level field is maintained and that no cause is given for any complaint that the ruling party has used its official position for the purposes of its election campaign.86 For more on codes of conduct for political parties, see Codes of Conduct for Political Parties, National Election Observation (for National Observers) and Standards to Judge Elections (for International Observers).
Institutional FrameworkThe institutional framework for elections is built on the institutional foundations laid in the legal framework. It is composed of a number of separate agencies and organizations that form the institutional structure of the electoral system. The main institutional actors in an election are:
The roles of these institutions in maintaining election integrity are discussed in each of these sections. It is important that the roles of each institution be clearly defined in the Legal Framework. In addition, a separation of powers, and a rational checks and balance system, between the institutions, can help maintain integrity. As discussed in Administrative Considerations, for instance, if an electoral management or policy body is given too many roles- such as drafting the electoral legislation, applying and enforcing the legislation and then acting as a supreme court for electoral matters, there are few institutional checks on its actions.87 Institutional arrangements, and agreement on these structures, is an important election integrity factor. One of the primary institutional questions is whether or not to have an independent electoral policy and management body. In countries with a history of ruling party domination over the electoral apparatus, opposition parties and civil society may expect an independent commission to be established in order to ensure an impartial administration of the elections. Having agreement by the main political and civil actors on the type of institutional framework to adopt before the institutions are created, can result in a more credible election body and build trust in the system. Without agreement, discontent and distrust can start at this initial phase and continue to fester throughout the process. For example, in Kenya, 'institutional arrangements for the 1992 and 1997 parliamentary and presidential elections were the immediate cause of intense political conflicts.'88 The electoral commission, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, the Kenya Police, Provincial Administration were all 'regarded as adjuncts of the incumbent Kenya African National Union government in having served its purpose during the 1992 multi-party elections.' 89 Whether the institutional system adopted is 'balanced' among political party representatives, 'independent' in that it is made up of independent citizens, or whether it is part of a government institution, the election institutions must have the political and financial independence necessary to be able to administer a free, fair and competitive election. It must also be able to ensure that political parties and candidates are able to participate equally and fairly.
Electoral Policy BodyAn electoral policy body is the organization responsible for the making of policy decisions regarding the conduct of elections. The scope of its mandate will vary according to the country, but each makes policy decisions relating to the administration of elections. In some cases an electoral policy body is also responsible for drafting election legislation and providing electoral oversight. Its role in protecting election integrity usually includes: Adopts policies that protect election integrity The primary role of the electoral policy body is to determine electoral policy. It is critical that it does so in an independent and non-partisan manner. Some of the integrity policy issues it can address include:
Drafts electoral legislation protective of election integrity If the election policy body is mandated with the responsibility to draft laws, it can ensure that any legislation drafted includes built-in mechanisms for the protection of election integrity. These could include clearly specifying the role and mandate of each institution involved, the powers they will have to fulfil their role, and the control mechanisms for each institution and stage of the process. For more on this see Legislation. Provides oversight to ensure the integrity mechanisms function correctly When the electoral policy body has the responsibility to act as an oversight body, it can ensure that the process is being implemented in a neutral and transparent manner, and that the results of the elections are an accurate and faithful expression of the will of the voters. It can also ensure that the public resources provided for the holding of elections are adequate and are used for that purpose, and that the election managers are held accountable for their management of the funds, for the assets used in conducting the election and for their administration of the process. For more on oversight roles see Oversight Agencies Electoral Management BodyThe electoral management body is responsible for the administration of elections. It deals with technical issues and decision-making. It is responsible for an honest, impartial and accurate implementation of the procedures detailed in the legal and regulative frameworks. In some cases, it might also deal with drafting electoral regulations and, in most cases, drafts the operating procedures for voter and candidate registration, voting and the count. For an electoral management body to fulfil its primary role of holding free, fair and reliable elections, it: Administers the process impartially and according to the law Electoral managers are supposed to administer the process impartially and according to the legal requirements. Laws are designed to protect citizens' rights and the basic principles of a free and fair election, as well as to limit the discretionary power of managers. The laws must be respected and can be used to hold the election body accountable for its actions. If there is a problem with the law, the electoral management body can bring this to the attention of the relevant authorities for correction, because selectively implementing the law can lead to serious integrity problems. For example, one of the problems identified in the 1998 Cambodian90 and 1999 91 Indonesian elections was that the election management bodies did not administer the elections according to the law, and as a result many of the safeguards that had been built into the law, such as the complaints process, were undermined. Maintains a professional, neutral and transparent administration A neutral and professional administration of the process is essential for free and fair elections. All participants in the electoral process are supposed to be treated equally by the electoral management body, and its decision-making and operations should be as accurate and as transparent as possible. (For more, see Fair Process). It must also be perceived as being neutral or it can lose credibility, even if it is acting correctly. To avoid the perception that it favours a particular outcome, it is essential to have a transparent administration, with as much information as possible being made available on a timely basis to political parties, the media and the public. Adopts procedures to protect integrity in its operations The internal management and operational procedures adopted by the electoral management body have a significant effect on the integrity of the process. The procedures must be written, systematic and publicly available. The procedures usually cover every aspect of electoral administration, including Budget, internal management, recruiting and supervision (see Staffing and Recruitment), and operating procedures, including rules for Procurement. The procedures also include the control procedures for electoral materials and the safeguard mechanisms to be followed to ensure their protection. Mechanisms to protect election integrity throughout election implementation are discussed in more depth in Integrity in Election Administration. Designs electoral materials to ensure integrity The electoral materials designed and purchased by the electoral management body must protect the integrity of the system and the electoral documents. For example, the way ballots are designed has an effect on how voters vote. Who gets to be listed first? Who is listed last? Who is buried in the middle? Ballots need to be neutral, without any party or candidate gaining an advantage because of the way they are listed or presented on the ballot. Ballot design also needs to include safeguards to protect the integrity of the materials, such as serial numbers or security paper. Identifies and assesses integrity risks and takes corrective action when necessary The internal management and operational procedures should include built-in mechanisms to identify integrity risks, assess the risk involved, and ensure that the proper persons or oversight agencies are contacted, and that immediate corrective action is taken. The electoral management body needs to ensure it also has a system to receive and address outside complaints made by the political parties, observers or oversight agencies. This is an important factor to ensure not only concerning integrity in the system but also to promote accountability of its administrators and participants. Promotes voter awareness of electoral integrity issues The electoral management body should promote the widest possible dissemination of information on the electoral system, the mechanisms built into the system to safeguard integrity and the need for citizens to take an active role in the protection of their electoral process. This can be done through specific voter education programmes undertaken by the electoral management body, or through other mechanisms to disseminate information, such as using press briefings, civil society voter education programmes or government civic education programmes in the schools. (See Voter Education.)
Oversight AgenciesOversight of the electoral process is an important integrity mechanism. Most electoral systems have empowered a specific office or agency to provide the official oversight of the election management body. This office can be located within the election management or policy bodies, or in a separate institution, such as an Auditor General that works for Parliament or an independent commission. Official oversight is an important check in the checks and balances of maintaining election integrity. However care needs to be taken to ensure oversight is nonpartisan and is used to improve integrity rather than to obstruct or manipulate the process (these issues are addressed in Integrity Issues in Oversight). Oversight agencies can look for integrity problems in:
Oversight agencies can ensure routine oversight of the electoral process as well as undertake specific investigations based on complaints. To be effective, oversight agencies require:
The primary roles of oversight agencies in the protection of election integrity includes: Independent oversight of the electoral process This can be done through:
Ensures compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks In this role, it reviews election policy and management for compliance with the legal requirements for administration and the process. It also reviews election management for compliance with the performance and financial reporting required by law. In Canada, for example, the objective of its oversight office, the Commissioner of Canada Elections, is 'to assist in maintaining the confidence of the public in the electoral process and to achieve compliance through measures which are remedial rather than punitive and to enforce the Canadian Elections Acts by undertaking investigations and authorizing prosecutions of offences.' 92
Detects and deters integrity problems including corruption, abuse of power and discriminatory practices Oversight agencies promote the efficient use of assets, and the effectiveness of management systems to ensure they are economic, effective and efficient, and to uncover and prevent waste, fraud and abuse. They can also review existing and proposed legislation and regulations, and make recommendations regarding their impact on the economy and efficiency in election administration and operations. They can also recommend policies to promote economy or to prevent and detect fraud and abuse. Depending on its mandate, oversight can include such issues as official misconduct, vote buying, election fraud, obstruction of justice and other breaches of public trust related to elections. Promotes accountability Oversight agencies can:
Promotes transparency and builds credibility for the process Public access to oversight reports helps the transparency of the process and builds credibility and legitimacy in its results. The public will know whether the decisions made by the election management body were made in accordance with proper procedures, and if they complied with the laws and prevented discrimination, fraud and abuse. Oversight reporting keeps the electoral policy body and principle election managers, as well as others with a need to know (such as Congressional or Parliamentary oversight committees), fully and currently informed of problems in election programs and operations. Oversight by a neutral and professional mechanism in countries in transition, that has gained the trust of both the political parties and the election administrators through its objective work, can help build confidence in the process and increase participation. Enforces compliance with legal framework Oversight agencies can play the same role as enforcement agencies if they have the power to determine accountability for actions and have punitive powers. The actual enforcement power of an oversight agency will depend on its mandate, but could include imposing sanctions, such as fines or suspensions, on violators. In serious cases, the oversight agency can recommend termination of employment or refer the matter to the criminal justice system for prosecution. (see Enforcement Agencies). In the case of the U.S., electoral districts with a history of electoral discrimination based on race, such as denying access to voter registration and polling sites, were subject to federal oversight. This was done through the sending of federal registrars to monitor the process and register those who were denied access by the states. They were also given extensive civil enforcement powers to ensure compliance. 94 Ethics Oversight Some electoral systems have oversight committees that monitor the ethics of electoral administrators and candidates. These committees or agencies can be citizen bodies, a government inspector or office or some other combination. These committees monitor and enforce the codes of conduct or ethics adopted by the electoral system. The U.S. city of Seattle, for example, created an 'Ethics and Elections Commission.' The Commission is a seven-member citizen body that interprets, administers and enforces the Seattle Elections Code, Code of Ethics, and other related codes. This commission investigates complaints received about violations of the code of ethics, and settles the complaint, either directly with the employee, or through a public hearing. It can levy sanctions of up to $500 per violation but the committee has no disciplinary powers. It can only recommend disciplinary action to the employer who then must report back on the action taken.95
Political Party OrganizationsThe role of political parties in an election is to field candidates in order to win public office, operate the government and determine public policy. Although the basic objective of a political party is one of self-interest (winning elections), that self-interest plays a check and balance role in maintaining election integrity. Political parties want to ensure that the process is not misused by other parties or manipulated to affect the election result, and as a result, their self-interested vigilance plays an important role in maintaining the honesty of the process. Political parties can protect election integrity in several areas. These include: : Monitor the process to make sure there are no deviations from the rules or special treatment Political parties and candidates watch the electoral process closely. Most political parties will monitor the entire process, from how the election management body is established, to political party and candidate registration, voter registration, how the other candidates and parties campaign, to polling, the count and the announcement of the results. Political parties and candidates can serve as a kind of early warning system for integrity problems if they find they are not allowed equal access to the process, or if they find that they are treated differently than other parties. Their complaints to the electoral management or policy body can help electoral managers identify problems and, by making their complaints public, help increase the transparency of the process. Monitor voter registration, polling and the count for irregularities Political party and candidate monitors can ensure that the interests of the political parties are protected by observing the electoral process. Through their observations, monitors can identify cheating, discrimination or other deviations from the regulations. Monitors usually are given the authority to intervene in the process if they believe laws or regulations are not being following. Monitors can also certify election documents with their signatures, including count tallies. This is discussed in detail in Political Party Monitors. Publicize integrity problems Public reporting by parties of their treatment by the election management body, and their monitor reports, can help increase the credibility and transparency of the process. Reports that are critical and expose a great number of irregularities can generate public debate and build public support for electoral reforms or corrective measures. Reports that are positive can help alleviate public concerns over integrity issues and help build trust in the system. Promote electoral integrity, fairness and accurateness Political parties serve as one of the primary checks and balance in most electoral systems. They are supposed to support electoral integrity, and the freeness and fairness of the process. This is supposed to be done in both word and deed. Campaigns that are positive and clean can help build public support for the electoral process. Their participation is supposed to be done through the system, working with electoral managers, following procedures and electoral regulations. Unfortunately, because of their direct stake in the outcome of the election, political parties and candidates can also be the source of integrity problems. They can attempt to bypass the system or try unethical methods to win an election. For example, a dominate party can monopolize the media and expect and receive preferential treatment. A ruling party can use its access to state resources for campaign purposes. Smaller parties that do not have enough public support to win an election could attempt to fix the election results or boycott the process, claiming it was not free or fair. These problems are addressed in Political Parties and Candidates. Interest Group OrganizationsInterest groups do not compete in elections. Their purpose is to influence public policy and the election results. They can be interested in a certain ballot measure or in a candidate or political party that supports their views. These groups can vary in size, wealth, power and objectives, but all use the same methods to influence public opinion and obtain favourable treatment for their candidate and position. These methods include lobbying, campaigning, advertising through the mass media, entertaining important figures and providing information for use by candidates, law makers and policymakers. There are also public interest groups that work to protect the rights of the public and to improve government processes. These groups are discussed in NonGovernmental Organizations. Interests groups can play a positive role in maintaining election integrity in the sense that they monitor the process to make sure that opposing interests do not receive preferential treatment. However, the vast amount of money being spent by interest groups today to influence public opinion, and thus the election results, raises many integrity issues which are discussed in more depth in Campaign Financing, PACs and Interest Groups.
Independent ObserversIndependent observers are an important integrity mechanism. These are citizen groups or organized public interest groups that objectively monitor the process. As their interest is good, clean elections, they are not supposed to have a partisan stake in the election outcome and, in principle, should provide more objective reporting. Observing an election involves watching the process closely, gathering information on how it unrolls and making an informed judgement on how it went. IDEA has identified several roles for observers including:
National Observation The role of national observers in promoting a free and fair election includes:
Active monitoring by domestic monitors (see National Election Observation) provides feedback to the electoral management and policy bodies on problems encountered. This allows for corrections to be made during the process, rather than after, when it is too late to make any changes. In some cases, active monitoring can be more effective in maintaining election integrity than passive monitoring, which does not interact with the election managers and results in a report at the end of the process. Raising an integrity issue when it is first observed enables its correction before the problem becomes large enough to systematically, or negatively, affect the electoral process. International Observation International Election Observation has become widespread in countries that receive international donor assistance for elections, and in countries undergoing a democratic transition. International observation is done by many different organizations and the international donor community. Most international observation is objective and assists the notion of free, fair and competitive elections. International observation can:
International observation that is not neutral or balanced can create a number of integrity problems which are discussed in Integrity in International Observation.
MediaThe free flow of information is an essential part of a free and fair election. The media is often used to disseminate electoral information, and as such, plays several very important roles. It provides information on the electoral process to the citizens. It covers the campaigns of the candidates and provides analysis of their platforms. It acts as a watchdog and investigates election fraud and corrupt practices. It is also used by the political parties, candidates and special interest groups to influence the public through political advertising; the objective being to gain public support for themselves or their positions, and that this public support translates into votes on election day. The power of the media is evident in the election-related 'Watergate' investigation, undertaken by the Washington Post, that resulted in the resignation of the U.S. President, Richard Nixon. The power of the media to reach so many potential voters, and the faith of the citizens in what it reads in the newspapers, hears on the radio and sees on TV, gives the media a responsibility towards the public to provide accurate, fair and balanced reporting, and in its advertising, to ensure equal access and treatment to all. (For ethics in reporting see Media Code of Ethics) Public Enlightenment According to the Society of Professional Journalists, the primary role of the media in a democracy is public enlightenment which is 'the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues.'97 This role is supported by the Associated Press which states in its code of ethics: 'The public's right to know about matters of importance is paramount. The newspaper has a special responsibility as surrogate of its readers to be a vigilant watchdog of legitimate public interests.' 98 Some of the other roles played by the media to help ensure election integrity: Voter information Voters learn about the electoral process through the coverage provided by the media on the elections, the candidates and their platforms, as well as through the political advertising done through the media. The media's coverage and analysis of the process, the candidates, and the thoughts of the voters, helps educate the public on how the process works, how integrity can be maintained and who is accountable for what. The media's comparison of platforms with candidate records and actions provides information to voters that they can use to make an informed choice on election day. The media can also publicize the dates, time and location for campaign events, voter registration and polling. Integrity Watchdog Through its investigative role, the media can uncover fraud and corruption and add transparency to the electoral process. The Society of Professional Journalists believe that the media needs to 'recognize a special obligation to ensure that the public's business is conducted in the open and that government records are open to inspection.' 99 The Gannett Newspaper Division Principals of Ethical Conduct encourages investigative journalists to uncover fraud and abuse: 'Aggressive, hard-hitting reporting is honourable and often courageous in fulfilling the press' First Amendment (freedom of press) responsibilities, and it is encouraged.' 100 Enables candidates to reach voters with their campaign information In a fair election, the voters need access to information from all candidates so that they can make an informed choice on election day. The media can give candidates an equal opportunity to reach the voters. Through its news coverage, the media provides free publicity of electoral events and campaigns. However, most political parties and candidates competing in elections, as well as lobbyists and others with a special interest, will supplement this news coverage with paid political advertisements done through the mass media. This makes money for newspapers and broadcasters, and helps disseminate information to the voters. However, it can also raise integrity issues such as:
International Media The international media, and the rise of global news stations, have increased the international visibility of elections around the world. The international media is playing an increasingly important role in election integrity, especially in the newer democracies and countries undergoing a democratic transition. These can include:
Enforcement AgenciesEnforcement agencies are those institutions that enforce the laws, including election-related laws. Enforcement is an important integrity mechanism as it deters those who might be interested in subverting the system as well as identifies and punishes those who have broken the law. The responsibilities for enforcing laws and codes are usually divided among different agencies, depending on the nature and severity of the problem. Initial investigations may start with the oversight agency, but can be referred to an enforcement agency if it was determined that legal enforcement was required. For example, potential criminal cases uncovered during a routine audit can be referred to the justice system. If the prosecuting authorities decide to pursue the case, they could charge and prosecute the alleged perpetrator, with a court pronouncing sentence if the defendant were found guilty. Effective enforcement requires a functioning legal system and a respect for the rule of law. An important factor in maintaining integrity in enforcement is the independence of the judiciary, as justice is supposed to be administered fairly, equally and impartially. In countries where the criminal justice system is inadequate, a body, such as an electoral court, can be empowered to enforce election law violations. The principle institutions and their roles in the enforcement of election integrity are: Election Management and Policy Bodies Election management and policy bodies can be given enforcement powers. For example, in Mexico, the Federal Electoral Institute and the Federal Electoral Tribunal have the mandate to oversee the enforcement of election legislation and challenges, as well as the application of sanctions in cases of administrative faults. In the case of South Africa, the Chief Electoral Officer may institute civil proceedings before a court, including the Electoral Court, to enforce provisions of the South African electoral law. Regulatory Agencies Regulatory agencies usually have the power to enforce the regulations they issue. They can sanction individuals found guilty of violating the regulations and, depending on the system, can levy fines or recommend criminal prosecution. Investigative Agencies Each country has its own institutions and procedures for investigating allegations of electoral wrongdoing and misconduct. Investigators:
The investigation report, evidence and findings are used by prosecuting agencies to determine whether or not to initiate civil or criminal proceedings against an individual or group of persons. This role can be assumed by a law enforcement agency, or a specialized election investigation body. In Canada, for example, this role is undertaken by Special Investigators who report to the Commissioner of Canada Elections. In New Zealand, this is done by the police. For more see Investigations. Security Forces Election security is the responsibility of the government and is usually handled by the police. Good security is an essential part of election integrity and assures the ability of the electorate and candidates to participate in an electoral climate free of fear and intimidation. Good security can help voter turnout and enables a free campaign and exchange of information. The primary roles of security forces in maintaining election integrity are to:
Prosecutorial Authorities Prosecution of electoral wrongdoing is an essential part of enforcement. It tells those interested in manipulating or corrupting the process that it will not be tolerated and that those who act illegally will be punished. The role of the prosecutor in preserving election integrity is to:
In most countries, the prosecutor is a government employee or elected official. As an elected official, the prosecutor is aware of public opinion and the political circumstances of each case. The prosecutor may also have discretion in determining which cases to prosecute. The potential for abuse of this discretion can raise integrity issues in the enforcement process which are discussed in Decision to Prosecute. Courts The judiciary plays an important role in maintaining integrity. It is supposed to make sure that the laws are enforced on the basis of impartial standards rather than political bias, and that those found guilty of crimes are punished. The scope of the role of the court in election integrity varies according to the electoral system and the level of trust in a country. In countries with a deep level of mistrust in the electoral administration and the administration of justice, specialized electoral courts may be established as was done in Mexico and Kenya. These courts may play a more active role in adjudicating electoral disputes that might otherwise be settled by the election management body. In general, the role of the courts in helping to maintain election integrity is to:
Integrity in Election AdministrationThis section on election administration covers integrity issues starting with the creation of the electoral policy and management bodies and the management and administration of elections. Potential integrity issues are identified for each part of the process, along with the mechanisms that have been used to address them. Despite its technical nature, election administration can be highly politicized and emotional. Control over the electoral apparatus and its manipulation of the process has been one of the primary tools used by nondemocratic governments to ensure their continued win at the polls. In addition, election administrators themselves can be suspect, as they can be seen as agents of the government, of a particular party, or sector of society. As stated by Dr. Andreas Schedler,
.. In transitional regimes or new democracies (as in Mexico), monopolies of power tend to go hand in hand with the abuse of power. Opposition parties tend to fear, with good historic reasons, that incumbent parties will use their eventual control of the electoral apparatus in particularistic ways to their own benefit.101 Inexperienced commissions can also be suspect. The persons may be unknown or untested. The inexperience of a new election policy or management body, can be taken advantage of by seasoned politicians and parties. For example, in the 1998 Cambodian elections,
The National Election Commission's (NEC) inexperience was an important weakness in dealing with the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The ruling party (CPP) managed to exploit deficiencies in the election law to outmaneouvre the NEC on several points. For example, although the spirit of the law called for a neutral election apparatus from top to bottom, with government officials kept out of the process, the CPP managed to get its partisans, including officials, into the system at many levels.103 Distrust of the electoral apparatus still exists in many places and is one of the primary reasons for the prevalence of extra safeguards and in the monitoring by parties and civil society. It is one of the primary factors in changing an election administration, both structurally and administratively. It has also led to the promotion of 'independent commissions'. As stated by Dr Andreas Schedler:
This distrustful attitude towards leviathan controlling of the organization of elections explains today's consensus on the need to have, at the core of election management, an independent election commission, as well as the corresponding impressive spread of independent election management bodies in new democracies.102
If participants see the electoral process as being administered by a partisan group or being manipulated for partisan purposes, the result can be nonparticipation or a rejection of the election results. For an election to be perceived as free and fair, it must have a good and neutral administration. A well organized, credible election administration can eliminate many of the opportunities for those opposed to the process to undertake fraudulent or discriminatory actions and, in turn, builds trust in the elections and its institutions.
Election ManagementGood management of the elections by a credible election management body is a critical element of election integrity. To be credible, the election management body has to be impartial, respected and have the institutional capacity to be able to implement free and fair elections. In the older democracies, the institution that administers elections is usually taken for granted. It has delivered elections for generations, and if there is a problem, it is usually not related to the credibility or legitimacy of the institution itself. In many of these countries, the electoral management body is part of the Government, either in the Ministry of Interior or in the local government structure, and election managers are civil servants. In the newer democracies, the election management bodies may still be developing and can be the subject of intense criticism and scrutiny. In addition to the problems inherent in organizing an election, the body may have institutional problems with inadequate staffing, funding or experience. To ensure integrity of the electoral institution, as well as in the electoral process, some of the primary considerations are: Establish a credible and depoliticized management body Election administration is a technical task. The administrative system adopted and the institution that develops to manage that administration should be technical. This is true whether the electoral management body is part of the government apparatus and the electoral workers are civil servants or if it is a separate, independent agency with its own personnel and policies. Politics and policy-making are supposed to belong with the policy-making body. However, in reality, it can be very difficult to separate politics from technical administration. In many systems, the election policy body creates the electoral management body and hires its staff. And in some systems, a decision has been made to have politically balanced electoral policy and management bodies. In these cases, both bodies are staffed on the basis of political affiliation and ability to protect the interests of their party. For instance, this was done in the 1999 elections in Indonesia where the policy body of 53 members were from every political party plus the government, and the implementation body had the same structure of 53 members. 104 Having a politically balanced policy and management body can politicize election management, even if the intention is to have a neutral administration. This politicization can turn technical administration and problems into political issues. As political issues require political compromises and negotiations, decision-making can be slow, making it impossible to keep to the electoral calendar. It encourages centralized control over the process and discourages delegating authority to the operational or regional levels. It can also mean that issues, such as sustainability and cost-effectiveness, may not play an important role in decision-making. In extreme cases, politicization of the decision making process can paralyze the entire process. An example of this is from the peacekeeping elections in Mozambique (1994). The draft electoral legislation was held up for almost a year in Parliament while the parties argued over Article 16. This was the article that contained the formula for the division of seats for the electoral commission (CNE). The two parties to the Peace Accords, Renamo and Frelimo, finally agreed on a formula which they carried through to the staffing of the electoral management body (STAE) at every level. The end result was a politicized management body and commission that centralized and politicized decision-making, turning routine technical issues into political footballs, making a rational, timely implementation of the process extremely difficult. Another example is the second Cambodian election (1998) despite efforts to balance the National Elections Commission (NEC) between the major political parties and neutral citizens. 'On a few important issues, the CPP (Cambodian People's Party) bore down on the NEC and had its way, compromising the NEC's neutrality and damaging the process as a whole.' 105 Election integrity is facilitated by a neutral and nonpartisan election administration. Even when election managers are selected for their political affiliation, they are still expected to fulfill their duties in a nonpartisan and politically neutral manner. Almost every electoral law calls for this neutral administration of elections. For example, the South African electoral law requires all officers to 'be impartial and exercise their powers and perform their duties independently and without fear, favour or prejudice.' 106 Even in the cases discussed above of Mozambique and Cambodia, on-the-job experience led to increased professionalism and efforts to do the jobs right. According to the Vice Chairman of the NEC in Cambodia, 'given their CPP origins, what astonished me was that at all levels of the electoral process, most NEC employees rose above their party affiliation to do their jobs honourably.'107 Independence of the electoral administration is another important factor, even if the elections commission is based on a politically balanced model. Financial and institutional independence allows electoral policy and management bodies to be able to work without political interference or ending up beholden to special interest contributors. This can be especially true of the lower levels of election management, where entrenched local government officials tend to consider local electoral workers as part of their staff. This occurred after the electoral reform in Mexico, where 'it is impressive to note how quickly the idea of nonpartisan election officials established its superior legitimacy over competing conceptions; how quickly actors transited from discussing alternatives to discussing improvements, how quickly electoral reforms were set on a track of self-reinforcing path-dependency.' 108 Create a good management and financial system There is consensus that good management is one of the best protections of election integrity. Good management creates good systems, ensures good planning, hires qualified personnel and provides adequate supervision and oversight. It also ensures the accurate collection of data and information so that the electoral management body knows what is going on and is able to address problems before they become an issue. Insecurity, fraud and corruption can flourish in an atmosphere of chaos. Good management can remove many of the opportunities for subversion or graft. Good management also means good financial and asset management. The development of good internal financial management systems, with oversight and routine audits, can help maintain financial integrity and deter the problems resulting from bad financial management. This can include labour strikes by staff, shortage of operating expenses and graft (for more on this, see Budget). Asset management and good Procurement are also important parts of maintaining integrity in operations where valuable assets and resources are purchased and used. Bad or sloppy management can leave the door open to misuse of the resources and the process for political or personal purposes. Public resources provided for election administration can be diverted for political uses or to ensure the win of a certain candidate or party. Create a good operations system, and include integrity mechanisms at each step The same problems caused by bad management can be found in bad operational systems. Good systems facilitate work and make it easier to avoid problems. A good logistical system, for example, can avoid the problem of having ballots arrive in country but then sit at the port or airport because of a lack of transportation or storage. Bad systems can make it difficult to track sensitive materials, such as voter registration cards or ballots. The lack of tracking can make it difficult to know if ballots have been diverted or tampered. Operational systems usually include systems to disseminate information to participants in a timely and systematic manner. Parties and candidates have to know when and how to register to compete in the elections, and how to apply for public resources that might be available for their campaign. They also need to know what quantities of materials have been ordered, when they are delivered and where they will go so their monitors can track them. Feedback systems, whereby problems identified, and complaints made by candidates and others, can be systematically received and addressed, can facilitate the development of good procedures. Electoral operations are massive logistical exercises, and a good operating system based on strategic planning can help ensure that the timetable is respected with the least amount of problems. India, for example, has a large electoral operation, which if not organized effectively and efficiently could create many problems:
Conduct of General Elections in India for electing a new Lower House of Parliament involves management of the largest event in the world. The electorate exceeds 600 million voting in 800,000 polling stations spread across widely varying geographic and climatic zones. Polling stations are located in the snow-clad mountains in the Himalayas, the deserts of the Rajastan and in sparsely populated islands in the Indian Ocean. For an operation of this size to succeed, it must be organized. The problems of bad management and the lack of organizational systems were evident, for example, in the 1995 legislative elections in Haiti. Implementation began without standardized systems and procedures in place. Tracking voter registration cards was difficult because they were distributed without first noting which office got what serial numbers. Candidates were added to the ballots after the deadline for printing, forcing a delay in the calendar. There was no system to receive ballot boxes at the counting centres and many poll workers ended up dumping their ballot boxes on the sidewalks in front of the counting centres and counting their ballots in the street. This disorganization adversely affected the integrity of the process and the credibility of the results. Although the consensus of most international observers was that the end result reflected the will of the majority of voters, the losing candidates and parties used the organizational problems as grounds to reject the results, and boycotted the reruns and subsequent presidential elections. Effective use of information management systems New technology can provide management tools and control mechanisms that can help electoral managers develop and implement good working systems and protect election integrity. The use of a computerized voter registration list can identify duplicate registrations (assuming the same voter information is used) and identify under-aged voters. The use of a printed voters list can eliminate the problems created by illegible handwriting and can be easily printed out to be posted at sites or given to political parties and observers. In a number of countries, computerized lists of registration and polling sites, with the numbers of registered voters per site, are used in the logistical planning for distribution of electoral materials. This helps ensure all aspects of electoral operations have the same accurate information on numbers and sites. These lists can also be used by monitors and observers in their monitoring. Computerized lists of personnel and temporary employees (registrars and poll workers), are also used in mnay systems for for training as well as payroll purposes. The easy availability of basic information increases the transparency of the process, which in turn increases political party and voter confidence in the system. For computers and other technology to be an effective management tool, the proper equipment and training must be available. More on technology and the electoral process can be found at Elections and Technology. Use of adequate integrity controls and supervision Election managers are entrusted with public resources, and are responsible for using those resources efficiently, economically and effectively to achieve free and fair elections. These resources are expected to be used in compliance with the laws and regulations on the use of public assets as well as the provisions of the electoral law. The electoral management body has to ensure that adequate control systems are put into place to safeguard their resources (both financial and material), that laws and regulations are followed, and that reliable reports are kept and disclosed as required. Public disclosure of the election budget and expenditures can help increase transparency of the process, and in turn, helps the integrity of the administrative process by making it easier to ensure accountability for the use of these funds. This can be as simple as ensuring that there are proper inventory controls on assets, that financial records are accurate and up to date, and that an office or person is delegated the responsibility to ensure compliance with the rules and regulations. Holding managers responsible for the actions of their staff and requiring supervisors to verify and certify their office's compliance with all rules and regulations can also be effective. One of the safeguards against partisan and illegal actions recommended by the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Australia includes installing a checking mechanism on electronic databases. 'Computer systems should include a programme that allows management to check which staff are reading and/or removing confidential information from the organization's data base without permission or a valid reason.' 110 This control mechanism has also been used in other systems, such as Elections Canada. Supervisory mechanisms also require a system to receive and address complaints, both internally and externally to the Official Oversight agency. The electoral management body is usually given the responsibility to ensure that the electoral laws and other related laws are enforced and that those accused of breaking the law are reported to the proper authorities for investigation and prosecution if warranted. Be Transparent and Accountable Transparency of the election institutions, as well as their activities, is essential to build its institutional credibility and legitimacy for the elections it administers. The electoral management body can achieve transparency in several ways. These can include:
Transparency aids with accountability as it makes clear who is responsible for what. Public officials, and others entrusted with public resources, must be accountable to the public and to other levels and branches of government for their actions and for the public resources they use to carry out the elections. (For more, see Accountability)
BudgetHolding an election can be a costly undertaking. Staff needs to be recruited, trained and equipped. Offices need to be rented and set up. Voters, parties and candidates need to be registered. Registration lists and ballots have to be printed and distributed to every polling site in the country. Polling stations need to be opened and staffed. Votes must be collected and counted. This requires personnel, communications, transportation, equipment, supplies, and operating funds. (Information on developing an election budget can be found at Budgeting/finance). There are several integrity issues involved with election funding, including: Adequate Funding Having enough funds to implement the elections according to the legal framework is a key factor for election integrity. Not having enough funds can negatively affect almost every aspect of election administration. It can mean not being able to afford transportation so the ballots or registration materials are not distributed in time to meet the election date. It can mean not being able to afford security mechanisms detailed in an election law- such as watermarked ballots with serial numbered stubs. It can mean staff is underpaid, or unpaid, resulting in demonstrations or staff holding voting registers or the election results hostage for back pay. Good planning and systems can overcome many budget restraints, and there are cost-effective solutions to many problems. However, good planning and systems still require enough funds so the elections can meet its legal requirements. Source of funds The source of funds can be an integrity issue. The election management body is usually included in the annual government budget and is supposed to be allocated enough funds to hold elections during election years. Having an established budget, with funds available on a timely basis, provides the election management body with the financial independence it needs to hold an election. In India, for example, the Secretariat of the Commission has an independent budget, which is finalized directly between the Election Commission and the Finance Ministry. The Finance Ministry generally accepts the recommendations of the Commission for its budget. 112 Unfortunately, some election management bodies, especially in less developed countries (LDCs), have to compete for scarce government resources and may end up with an insufficient allocation of funds. Sometimes, the electoral management body is allocated enough funds in the government budget, but the funds are administered through a particular ministry or government office. This makes the election management body dependent on that intermediary for its financial support. In the case of the 1998 Cambodian legislative elections, the funds were allocated in the government budget but were held by the Ministry of Finance and released on a piece meal basis, making it difficult for the National Elections Committee to get established. Commissioners started the process by using their salaries to cover running costs, such as paying electric bills and buying paper for the photocopy machines. The international community can also be a source of funding for countries undergoing a democratic transition or for LDCs. Donor funding is usually conditioned on the holding of free and fair elections and is tied to the funding cycle of each donor country. This can sometimes result in problems in the timing for the availability of the funds. These issues are discussed in more depth in Special Considerations in Countries in Transition. In some systems, the election management body is also allowed to receive funds from other sources. Prominent citizens or groups can make contributions. However, as accepting private funding can lead to the perception that money buys influence, electoral managers can reduce misperceptions through disclosure and ensuring that the donor realizes that no special favours can be provided. In other systems, such as Thailand, this is prohibited by law. 113 Integrity problems caused by a lack of funds Having adequate resources on a timely basis to run the elections is an important factor in the independence of the electoral management body. The following are a few of the integrity problems that can result from delayed or insufficient funding:
Integrity problems caused by late funding
Mechanisms to address these problems The following are some of the ways to address the problem of not having enough money, although finding additional funding from overextended government coffers can be extremely difficult. Donors, as well, are constrained by their own budget limitations and funding regulations.
Staffing and RecruitmentHaving the right staff working in election management and administration is important. The wrong person can create integrity problems, either intentionally or through ignorance and mistakes. The right person in the right position will make the system work better and eliminates many potential integrity problems. The right person is usually the person with the professional experience, attitude and training for that particular position. The right person is also an honest employee with professional and ethical conduct. (For more information see Personnel Appointment and Training.) To create an election management body with a professional, honest and dedicated staff, the following factors can be taken into consideration: Develop a rational staffing pattern One of the first steps for an electoral management body is to determine its internal organizational structure and its staffing patterns. This can be plotted on an organizational chart which electoral managers can use to clearly delineate the different responsibilities between divisions and staff. Most electoral management bodies are divided along functional lines -- management, administration (including human resources), finance, operations, legal services, technology support and public relations. Charting the staffing and working systems by divisions, along with each staff position, can help facilitate the development of a rational staffing pattern. Providing a clear objective statement for each division, and each staff member in that division, can avoid integrity problems that could arise when personnel are unclear as to their job responsibilities as well as help avoid duplication of efforts. One way to organize an organizational charts is to do so hierarchically starting with the chief electoral officer and division chiefs, going down to the office chiefs and staff they supervise. These charts can help ensure institutional and electoral integrity, because they show the distribution of responsibilities and the staffing allocated for each task. Distributing it to every employee ensures that everyone knows how they fit into the overall structure, how the chain of command works, what their responsibilities are, what and who they are responsible for and how information will get through the system. These charts can also help maintain integrity in recruitment as it tells the human resource managers how many staff members they need to recruit, what the job requirements are and who they will be working for. As it also ranks personnel according to their responsibilities, it enables a ranking of every position on a professional salary scale. If this system is followed, it can help ensure that qualified people are hired for the right job and receive equitable pay for their level of work. Organizational charts can also be used as a monitoring tool because it lists the supervisor for each staff member and lets the supervisors know who they are responsible for. Supervision of the process and staff, is another important element to safeguard integrity of the elections Competitive recruitment Integrity requires that staff be recruited on the basis of merit. Advertising open positions widely ensures potential staff, with appropriate qualifications, are aware of vacancies. Advertisements generally list the type of position, job description, selection criteria and salary range, with enough time provided for the information to circulate and for candidates to submit their applications. Closing dates to receive employment applications are supposed to be respected and the best qualified person selected. For more on recruitment see Internal Personnel Office. Written personnel policies Integrity also requires standardized personnel policies to ensure that every employee is treated equally and knows their rights and responsibilities as employees. This is facilitated if employment policies are written and distributed to all employees. Most public sector employers, including election administrators, include the norms of professional behaviour and a code of ethics/conduct in their personnel policies. The penalties for breach of professional conduct, such as termination of employment for accepting kickbacks or tampering with election materials are usually also included in the code of conduct. Some electoral systems use volunteers for pollworking. In Mexico, for instance, more than 730,000 private citizens worked as poll workers in the 1997 elections 114 With this number of volunteers, integrity can be facilitated through the use of written personnel policies that include the selection criteria used to recruit volunteers, job descriptions, expected conduct and sanctions for breach of trust or bad conduct. Competitive pay for professional staff The issue of how much to pay an electoral worker always generates a debate. Payrolls are a significant part of an election management budget and, when funds are low, the tendency is to minimize salaries. However, pay for professional electoral workers (workers who live off of their elections salary) that is too low can create integrity problems. These problems can include:
Unhappy employees have been a major source of integrity problems in several elections. For example, in Mozambique, poll workers wanting an additional day of pay for an extra day of voting in the 1994 elections, surrounded the UNOMOZ headquarters trapping the UN personnel inside until the extra day of pay was negotiated. In Haiti in the May 2000 elections, poll workers in the North refused to be trained until they received better pay, and delayed the delivery of electoral materials to polling sites until the morning of polling. 116 Training Electoral staff must be adequately trained so they can act as integrity agents, rather than being a source of integrity problems. All levels and types of employees require training. Managers have to be trained in good management techniques and in proper supervision of employees. Communications staff require training on the equipment being used by the election administration. Warehouse staff require training in the proper warehouse management and inventory control systems. Registrars need training in who is eligible to register and how the process is done. Poll workers need training in how the polling and count will be conducted. In addition to knowing how to do their jobs, election staff needs to be aware of general integrity issues and the control mechanisms that are built into the system to protect integrity. Although the training of poll workers and registrars is usually short and focused on the task at hand, the integrity of the process benefits if they can gain a broader knowledge of such things as how the complaint process works and the importance of making suggestions for improving the process. Integrity also benefits if permanent staff receive systematic and comprehensive training in all aspects of integrity and the electoral process. Good training can substantially reduce the number of errors that are the cause of many integrity problems. It also helps deter deliberate attempts to subvert the system from within as the employees and employers know that there are control mechanisms in place and that the employees know how to use them. Good training requires good planning and organization as the regulations and procedures will need to be developed before training can commence. Written registration and polling manuals can help protect election integrity because they can be used during training as a text book and serve as a reference during registration and polling. Some systems have found that the use of mock voting or registration kits can increase the effectiveness of training as the personnel is able to run through the process before the real thing. They can receive hands on training in such things as how to set up a polling site, how the seals are attached to the ballot box and filling in forms. Supervision Effective supervision is another key integrity mechanism and tool of good management. It can help ensure that employees not only do their jobs effectively, but that this is done in the professional and ethical manner required for free, fair and credible elections. Supervisors can identify problem employees and areas, and ensure that corrective measures are taken. An example of some of the things supervisors usually watch out for, and which justify a dismissal in most systems, are found in this list from the South African Elections Commission:
ProcurementElections require a lot of equipment, materials and services. Communications and computer systems need to be purchased and installed. Millions of voter registration cards and ballots must be printed. For election integrity purposes, these systems have to be secure and reliable. They also involve a lot of money and provide opportunities for economic corruption. Transparency International's 1999 Bribe Payers Survey found that 33% of the respondents felt that corruption was increasing. Of these, worsening public procurement practices were cited by 51% of the respondents as one of the primary reasons. 118 Ensuring integrity in the procurement process is an important component of election integrity. Integrity Problems Some of the integrity problems that can arise from an inadequate or badly designed procurement system:
Integrity Mechanisms Many procurement problems that affect election integrity are avoidable. The following are some of the mechanisms that can be used during the procurement phase to reduce integrity problems:
For more on developing a competitive procurement system see Election Procurement, Open and Free (IFES). Standards Most items that are purchased have to meet minimum standards. This is especially important for equipment that directly impacts on the integrity of the process. The standards usually include security measures for printed Ballots and Voter Registration cards, and minimum standards for voting machines (see Voting Mechanisms). These standards are listed in the request for bids and can be used as well as one of the determining factors in awarding a contract. Standards are usually developed by the election management body, in coordination with the manufacturers of the type of equipment being used, and government or independent testing agencies. The degree of collaboration will depend on the system in each country. Standards usually include technical specifications that are used as guidelines to ensure that the equipment purchased is reliable and accurate. Standards also include testing procedures to ensure that equipment meets the standards. Standards for items such as computers and mechanized voting machines can cover both the hardware and software.
Voting SystemVoting systems differ, and differ in their ability to protect election integrity. Each country has developed its own voting system resulting from its political history and culture. Every system has its merits (usually the reason why that system was adopted in the first place), but each system also has its problems. Integrity, and the type of voting system used, becomes an issue when a particular system is used as a mechanism to exclude a portion of the eligible population, or to deny the winner of the popular vote his/her seat. Integrity issues could also result from a system that was not changed to respond to changing social or political conditions. 119 Even if the result was unintentional, denying representation to a portion of the population, or not awarding the office to the candidate who won the popular vote (if that is the electoral system used), raises integrity questions. How votes are counted affects the election results Votes can be counted in different ways, and the way they are counted determines who wins the elections. There are several different systems and variations of the systems in use. One system is the plurality vote count where the votes are counted and the candidate who received the most votes wins. Another system is a majority vote count system where the winner must receive more than 50% of the vote. The 50% threshold is to ensure that the winner polls more votes than all of the other candidates combined. In most majority vote systems, if no candidate received 50% of the votes in the first round, a second run-off election is required. This system has several variations which use different formulas to eliminate the weaker candidates for the second round, and to determine the number of run-off elections. Both the plurality and majority formulas favour the stronger parties at the expense of the weaker parties, or parties without a regionally concentrated base. Proportional representation divides the seats up for election among the candidates and parties according to the proportion of the votes they received in the elections. This avoids the winner-take all results of a single member district system and allows for a wider range of parties to win office and form a coalition government. The outcome of proportional representation also depends on the formula used to divide the seats (for more on this see PR Systems) Thresholds and Representation Thresholds can also be established that require each party to receive a minimum percentage of votes in order to win a seat. Setting the threshold level varies according to the system. For example, New Zealand has a threshold that a political party must pass before it is entitled to receive a share of all the seats based on its total number of Party Votes. It must win at least 5% of all the Party votes, or it must win at least one General or Mäori electorate seat. 120 Most thresholds are set to ensure an equal representation of political parties according to the votes received during the election. The formula used can also help increase representation of traditionally under-represented sectors of society. Other mechanisms can also be used for this, such as reserved seats, and candidate quotas. In India, a single transferable vote system is used for members of the State parliaments to elect the upper house (Council of States, Rajya Sabha). This system is:
designed to ensure more diverse representation, by reducing the opportunity for blocks of voters to dominate minorities. The ballot paper lists all candidates standing for election and the voters list them in order of preference. A threshold number of votes, known as the 'quota' is set, which candidates have to achieve to be elected. For presidential elections the quota is set at one more than half the number of votes, ensuring that the winner is the candidate with the clear majority. For the Rajya Sabha, the quota is set at the number of votes that can be attained by just enough MPs to fill all the seats but no more. Votes that are deemed surplus, those given to candidates who have already got a full quota of votes, or votes given to candidates who are deemed to be losing candidates, are transferred according to the voter's listed preferences, until the right number of candidates have been elected. 121 The use of a threshold raises integrity issues if the threshold is used as a means to prevent smaller parties from winning office. In the 1994 parliamentary elections in Mozambique, a five percent national threshold was required to win a seat in parliament. The result was that even if a party won a large percentage of the votes in one region, it could not get any seats in Parliament unless its national average was 5%. This effectively eliminated all of the smaller parties but one. This was also true in Kenya, where a constitutional amendment 'required any presidential candidate to win not only a plurality or majority of the popular vote, but also at least 25 percent in no fewer than five of Kenya's eight provinces. This was meant to wreck the presidential prospects of popular opposition figures.. who drew the bulk of their support from their ethnic homelands. ' 122 However, some systems deliberately use the threshold in an effort to increase the chances of having a stable government by reducing the number of parties required to form or support a government. 123 This was the purpose of New Zealand's adoption of the MMP (Mixed Member Proportional) system. (see New Zealand's Change to MMP) as well as Denmark's system as described below. To balance the two issues, some proportional representation systems allow small parties to combine their votes for threshold purposes, known as 'apparentement', but then allocate seats to parties individually. 124 Denmark has three different electoral thresholds- winning a seat directly, vote/seat ratio in two of the three electoral regions and a two percent national threshold. Their experience has shown that the national threshold is an issue of contention among the smaller parties which have had difficulty reaching the threshold. The discussion in Denmark:
The argument is that a threshold rule is undemocratic as it leaves some voters without representation, which is not in accordance with the constitutional principle of equal representation of different political opinions and attitudes. Bills to either eliminate or lower the threshold are from time to time submitted to the Folketing, but they are never passed. Conversely, other voices - especially from the larger parties speak in favour of raising the barrier to, for instance, five percent as in Germany. The main argument in support of such a change is that it would lead to fewer parties in parliament, which would in turn produce stable governments, greater political decision-making power, fewer elections, and the like. However, a bill to raise the threshold has not been submitted to the Folketing since 1953.125 Problems in Mixed Systems Sometimes countries mix the different ways to count, creating other integrity issues. For example, the U.S. electoral system uses a plurality vote count system to determine electoral winners, except for its presidential elections. The way Americans vote for president is an archaic relic of its political history. In each state, voters vote for a presidential candidate. However, in reality, they are voting for a slate of electors who have pledged to vote for that candidate in the Electoral College. The candidate who wins the most votes in each state, wins all of the electoral votes for that state. (The number of electors is based on each state's number of representatives in Congress.) To win the presidential election, a candidate must receive the majority of votes in the Electoral College. If a candidate does not win a majority, the elections are decided by the U.S. Congress which chooses among the top three candidates. The end result is a system that can, and has in the past, elected presidents who did not receive the most popular votes. This system has become an issue in the close 2000 presidential election race. Systems must be decided before candidates register For the process to be fair and transparent, the rules for counting, and any formulas adopted, must be decided before candidate and party registration. There needs to be easy access to clear, neutral and accurate information on the procedures, so that candidates, political parties and monitors can understand the technicalities of the count. This includes issues such as whether blank votes will be taken into account in the calculation of an absolute majority. These rules should be followed by election authorities during the count and allocation of seats. In the 1998 Cambodian elections, the issue of which formula to use for proportional representation arose during the count, when several political parties questioned the division of seats. They charged that the formula being used was not the one adopted by the National Elections Committee. Lax record keeping by the electoral management body made the charge hard to disprove and the formula issue was used as justification for several parties to question the validity of the election results. (see Dispute Resolution Mechanisms)
DistrictingDistricting refers to the drawing up of electoral district lines. An electoral district is an administrative unit for counting votes. However, the size and boundaries of an electoral district can have a profound impact on election integrity. In order to respect the one person one vote principle, representation from each district needs to be relatively equal in terms of the ratio of seats to the number of voters. In reality, however, when districting is done by a partisan group, it can become a political tool to marginalise the representation of certain groups or to ensure sure wins for particular politicians or parties. Ensuring the equality of representation between districts is important integrity task. Districting should be done on a frequent enough basis so it takes into account population migration, but at the same time, it should not be done so frequently that it creates unrealistic administrative burdens. Districting also requires that choices be made by the districting authority, such as what level of importance will be given to populations living in remote areas. It is in these choices, that integrity problems can arise. Partisan influences Fair districting or redistricting (redrawing of district lines after a population census) respects the equal population principle. This is to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their location, receive equal representation. The number of seats assigned to each district is an important factor in ensuring this equal representation. Districting can be done by independent bodies or electoral managers, but in many cases is done by partisan majorities in the legislature. As such, politicians can draw up boundaries for partisan benefit, whereby boundary lines are drawn in such a way that opposition support is concentrated in relatively few districts, leaving the ruling party with majorities in the remaining districts. This results in the ruling party and its candidates receiving a disproportionately large share of seats in the elections. Districting can also be manipulated to ensure a 'safe' district for a political party. By grouping a majority of party supporters within one electoral boundary, that party's candidate is usually assured of an easy win. When these boundary lines are drawn up to obtain partisan or factional advantage, it is called gerrymandering. Gerrymandering hurts electoral integrity because it violates the one person one vote principle and can create arbitrary district boundaries that, in turn, can create logistical and other operational problems for electoral managers. The term 'gerrymandering' was coined from U.S. districting problems, but gerrymandering is an integrity issue that affects other systems as well. For example, according to Joel Barkan, in Kenya the purpose of districting 'has always been to over-represent the members of Kenya's smallest and most spatially dispersed ethnic groups by giving them more constituencies than the larger and more concentrated groups receive.' 126 For more on this see Partisan Considerations in Choosing a Boundary Authority. Timing of redistricting Populations move over time. Rural residents move to urban areas, and the demographics of a country change. Electoral districts need to keep up to date with these changes or certain areas may end up under-represented, while other areas end up over-represented. How these boundaries are updated, and how often it is done, are election integrity factors. The general consensus is that a logical time to redistrict is after a regular census. Most countries have a national census every 5 to 10 years. After a census, a reapportionment of the seats in the legislative branch (if it is based on population rather than a specific geographic region) can be done based on the results of the census. In these cases, regions with population increases receive additional seats, while regions with a decrease in population lose seats. Increases or decreases might also require the district lines to be redrawn. The timing of redistricting can also impact the outcome of an election. For governments or politicians interested in gerrymandering, the ideal time to redistrict is before an election. Lines can then be drawn to maximize strengths and marginalise areas where there is opposition. By doing this right before an election, there is also not enough time to challenge redistricting problems through the court system before the elections are held. Mechanisms to address districting integrity issues Some of the mechanisms used to ensure integrity in the districting process are: 1. Use of a nonpartisan body, or a technical division of the electoral management body, to draw up the electoral district lines. Taking the beneficiaries of districting out of redistricting can help reduce the personal and partisan bias of the process. This independent approach has been used in New Zealand, for instance, which reviews its electoral boundaries every five years after its population census. The boundary changes are done by an independent statutory body, the Representation Commission, that includes the Government Statistician, Surveyor-General and the Chief Electoral Officer. All changes are designed to ensure equal representation in Parliament based on the resident population (rather than the actual number of voters). 127 2. Use of the courts to challenge suspect districts. Using the court system as a check on arbitrary or unfair districting can be effective. In the U.S., for example, where gerrymandering has been a significant problem, a court challenge resulted in the 1964 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that boundaries should be drawn on a basis of substantial equality of population. Although gerrymandering is still an issue, the Supreme Court ruling has reduced the size of the problem. 3. Use of government administrative districts for electoral districts. Using existing government administrative districts is another way to avoid drawing district lines for partisan benefit. For example, Denmark has found that, as a result of doing this, 'delimitation issues are virtually absent from the Danish political debate... Every five years, seats are redistributed among the districts based on the procedures in the Constitution and Election Act. The delimitation of the local polling districts is the responsibility of the municipalities. These districts have no effect at all on the outcome of the election, and changes in delimitation are carried out primarily for reasons of convenience.' 128
CalendarThe electoral timetable can be a mechanism to keep the process on track as well as being a source of integrity problems. Electoral timetables can be set in a constitution, election laws or fixed by the electoral management body. Dates that are set in the legal and constitutional framework limit the flexibility and discretion of electoral managers as they are dates that must be met. Dates that are set by the electoral policy or management bodies are not mandated by legislation and therefore are easier to change if needed. How much time is enough to prepare for the physical event of voting and for candidates to register and get their messages out? Much depends on the particular circumstances of the country. For democracies with a well-established electoral system, the physical preparations for elections are established and routine. For the newer democracies, especially in countries with a lack of physical infrastructure, preparing for an election can be a major undertaking and take much longer. (For more information, see Establish and Follow Administrative Calendar). For integrity purposes, problems can arise from timetables that are either too short or too long. A happy medium needs to be found for each system. In countries with severe weather, electoral timetables are usually designed around the climatic calendar. There are other non-election factors that can affect an electoral calendar, as explained by the Elections Commission from India:
'In a country as huge and diverse as India, finding a period when elections can be held throughout the country is not simple. The Election Commission, which decides the schedule for elections, has to take account of the weather - during winter constituencies may be snow-bound, and during the monsoon access to remote areas restricted; the agricultural cycle - so that the planting or harvesting of crops is not disrupted; exam schedules - as schools are used as polling stations and teachers employed as election officials; and religious festivals and public holidays. On top of this there are the logistical difficulties that go with holding an election - sending out ballot boxes, setting up polling booths, recruiting officials to oversee the elections.' 129 This is also true in other countries, including Cambodia, where an Election Commissioner stated: 'I know that many of my fellow citizens would not vote during the rainy season. They would be in the rice fields, preparing for their next harvest. Most Cambodians are farmers and food is still their number-one priority.' 130 Integrity issues would arise in these cases, if the dates were set to exclude those sections of the population that were affected by the weather, agricultural cycles or other timing factors. Integrity problems arising from a tight calendar Some of the integrity issues arising from a short timetable to take into consideration:
Integrity problems arising from a long calendar Some of the integrity-related issues that can arise from having an electoral timetable that is too long:
Timetable as an integrity mechanism Electoral calendars can be used effectively to protect election integrity. Some of these ways are:
...time rules limit power. Decision-makers do not just have an abstract obligation to do something. They have to fulfill it with determinate time limits, and may be held accountable for it. On the side of rights, time rules legitimate power. If those who hold certain rights, be it political parties or individual citizens, do not make use of them within the time frame set by law, the responsibility for forfeiting their rights falls back on them themselves. ....the responsibility for any eventual failure to act in a timely fashion lays with the one who ignores the legally established limit. 132 Some countries have mechanisms that enable them to change the electoral timetable in times of crisis. For example, in India, the timetable for elections has been adjusted when civil unrest made the holding of elections problematic. 'Disturbances in Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab and Assam have led to the postponement of elections. Holding of regulation elections can only be stopped by means of a constitutional amendment and in consultation with the Election Commission, and it is recognized that interruptions of regular elections are acceptable only in extraordinary circumstances.' 133 South Africa also allows for a postponement of the elections in individual sites, or of the entire election, if it is necessary to ensure a free and fair election.
Voter RegistrationIn most systems, a voter must be registered before s/he is eligible to vote. Unless a civil registry is used as the basis for a voters list, registration is the responsibility of both the voter and the electoral management body. The electoral management body provides the means for registration, but the voters usually must make the effort to register and provide proof of their eligibility. To ensure integrity in voter registration, the electoral management body has the responsibility to develop a free, fair and credible registration system, where:
Elections are won or lost by votes. As a result, who is able to register, and subsequently, to vote, can directly impact the outcome of an election. Ensuring the integrity of voter registration is critical and is facilitated by a well-designed and implemented process which is adequately monitored by political parties and civil society. Integrity problems in voter registration can be found in most systems, and are not confined to newly emerging democracies or polarized societies. For example, in the 1996 elections for the U.S. Congress in Orange County, California, a citizens' monitoring group found 12,000 duplicate voter registrations. Most of the duplicates were from hotly contested areas where one candidate lost by 1,000 votes and another had lost by only 92 votes. The monitors also found that most voters with duplicate registrations had requested absentee ballots (see Absentee Voting) in order to avoid having to vote in person.134 New technology, such as computerized voter lists, is enabling electoral managers to develop regional or national lists, allowing for computerized checks for double registration or against such things as immigration files to ensure the voters are citizens. For instance, Elections Canada shifted from registering voters for every federal election to a permanent registration list because 'by the early 1990s, the technology had evolved to the point where customized software could be developed specifically to produce preliminary and official lists of electors, in a format that could be imported into most word processing' 135 For more on technology see Elections and Technology. Eligibility requirements The right to vote is one of the foundations of a democratic system of government. However, the right to vote is usually considered as a privilege of citizenship, and as a result, every nation has established eligibility requirements for voting. These requirements usually include citizenship status, a minimum age and sometimes a residency requirement. Voters abroad during elections are usually treated as a separate category. The requirements set certain conditions where citizens can lose their right to vote. These can include residency in a mental institutions or certain classes of convicted criminals, including those guilty of electoral offenses. Integrity issues can arise when conditions are added to the eligibility requirements for the purpose of excluding certain groups of citizens from registering. Literacy tests have been used in some systems to determine fitness for voting. However, these tests can also be used as a means of discrimination, as they can give examining officials discretion in determining who passes and who doesn't, especially when the tests are administered orally. For example, this practice was used in several U.S. southern states as a means to exclude African Americans until a federal law, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, suspended the tests. This suspension was challenged through the court system, but was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Property requirements can also be used as a means to determine fitness for voting and can be used to discriminate against landless voters. Ensuring eligible citizens are able to register Eligible citizens are only able to vote if they are registered. Ensuring that every citizen who wants to register is able to register is another integrity challenge. In less developed countries there are logistical problems associated with registration, and in most systems there can be problems if eligible citizens try to register but can't because of access or other problems, including discrimination. There are different voter registration systems. Some systems use the civil registry as the voter registry and, as a result, everyone is automatically registered. For example, Denmark uses its computerized national civil registry to produce a computerized voter list. Ireland uses a list of voters prepared annually by the county councils and county borough corporations. Using a civil registry can reduce the number of integrity problems related to the individual citizen's ability to register and can help ensure that every eligible citizen is registered to vote. Other systems place the responsibility for registration on the citizens themselves. Citizens register on either a permanent registry (requiring a one-time registration) or on a periodic registry which requires voter to re-enroll at fixed intervals. The permanent register can be less burdensome on voters, but requires regular upkeep by electoral officials to ensure that voters who have moved away, or who have died, are taken off of the lists. Canada for instance, found that with new technologies, a permanent computerized register was less expensive, time-consuming and labor intensive than their earlier system or registering voters for every federal election. Elections Canada estimates it will result in a net savings of $30 million for every federal general election, and believes it has exceeded their expectations for efficiency, accuracy and cost savings. 136 For the newer democracies, or in countries undergoing a transition, it is often necessary to create new registries by re-registering every voter in the country. This can be an enormous logistical undertaking for the electoral management body, requiring the recruitment and training of registrars, designing a new registration system and physically registering every eligible citizen. (For more information on the logistical aspects of registration see Supplies - Distribution, and Supplies - Recovery and Evaluation) Access to registration sites can also be a problem for voters. Some countries require the physical presence of the voter at registration as an integrity measure. However, this can create logistical problems for electoral managers in trying to reach rural residents, or for residents in sparsely populated areas to reach a voter registration site. It can also create problems for citizens with a physical handicap who have mobility problems. (For more information on this see Equal Access to the Electoral Process.) In several countries this issue has been addressed by using a mail-in registration system. However, in turn, mail-in registration has created its own integrity issues (see Registration by Mail). Many countries have adopted special regulations to make it easier for handicapped persons to register. In New Zealand, for example, a physically handicapped person can get someone else to fill in, date and sign the voter registration application. However, that person must be a registered voter or have power of attorney. There is even a special number to call to find out if a family member can register if they are mentally incapable. 137 The timing of registration can also create integrity issues. Registration is usually cut off by a fixed date before the elections to enable election managers to determine how many ballots will be needed and for them to be able to do their logistical planning. In countries with severe weather (see Calendar) or for voters with access problems, it may be difficult to get out and register within the specified timeframe. This means that voters who are unable to register during the allotted time, or who move after the registration period, may lose their right to vote in that election. Some countries, such as Canada, have addressed this issue by allowing voters to register on voting day. Others publicize the close-off date widely so that citizens are aware of the registration timeframe. Discrimination Issues
The right to register and to vote is usually found in the Constitution or in relevant laws allowing for the enforcement of voting rights. Discrimination by registrars or other electoral officials in registering voters based on race, language or other minority status, is illegal and is treated as a civil rights matter in most countries. In Kenya, 'where approximately 60 percent of the population's ethnicity can be determined by the first letter of their surname, errors in the registration of voters - especially with names beginning with the letters A (Gusii), G (Kikuyu), K (Kalenjin or Kikuyu), M (Kamba), N (Kikuyu) and O (Luo)' can be used to exclude certain groups from voting. 138 In these cases, electoral managers need to ensure adequate measures are taken to protect the rights of all qualified citizens to register. Canada, for instance, adopted a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 which protected the freedoms and rights for all citizens to vote and run as candidates. It also allowed for court challenges based on discriminatory voting regulations. Elections Canada states: 'the adoption of the Charter has been the single most effective trigger for the removal of the last vestiges of discrimination.' 139
Right to privacy Voter registration lists need to be available for political party and public inspection in order to ensure the integrity of the lists. However, making private information public can raise the issue of privacy. Countries address this issue in different ways. For instance, New Zealand has an 'unpublished roll'. This is a special registry for persons who are afraid that registering to vote and listing their address would jeopardize their safety:
If you believe that having your details recorded on the printed roll could threaten your personal safety, you may request that your particulars are not shown on the printed roll. You will need to make a separate application for this and produce some evidence of your personal circumstances, such as a protection order, a restraining order, or a statutory declaration from a member of the Police.140 Canada has protected the privacy of all information in the National Register of Electors by passing the Canada Act and the Privacy Act. This requires that information on the registry can be used only for electoral purposes, and any other use is illegal. A Privacy Commissioner was established that has the right to audit how information from the National Register of Electors is collected, stored, updated and used. Only registered political parties, members of Parliament, and candidates are allowed access to the names and addresses, and they are allowed to use this list only to send campaign information, recruit new members and seek campaign contributions. This Act also enables every voter in Canada the right to have their name removed from the Register to prevent the transfer of their name to the provinces or territories. This must be done in writing to the Chief Electoral Officer. Electors who choose not to be on the National Register of Electors still retain the right to vote, but must re-register before the election in which they wish to vote.141 Another way to handle the privacy issue is not to make the voters list available, as is done in Denmark, where the electoral register is not published nor is it accessible to the public or political parties. This may be because the electoral registry is based on the computerized civil registration system administered by the Ministry of the Interior. 142
Registration by MailIn an effort to facilitate voter registration, more and more countries are allowing mail-in voter registration. With technology advances, in some systems this is being extended to e-mail and fax registration. This is boosting voter registration but has raised concerns about ineligible or nonexistent persons registering, or eligible voters registering multiple times. In New Zealand, for example, these concerns are addressed by revisions of the voters lists at regular intervals. The Registrar of Elections sends a form to every registered voter asking for corrections. If the form is not returned, the voter is taken off of the lists. In the case of the U.S., a federal law, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), allows for mail-in registration, despite the concerns raised by state electoral managers over the difficulties in protecting against fraudulent applications. The NVRA provides a standard mail-in registration form that can be used anywhere in the United States. The primary concern by the U.S. states is the lack of a control mechanism in mail-in voter registration to ensure that the mail-in applicant is eligible. Several states are currently designing state legislation to add control mechanisms. For example, the Secretary of State for Arkansas has proposed reforming the state election law to increase the county clerk's ability to verify a voter's eligibility. These reforms would require comparison and verification of signatures, and voting for the first time in person at a polling site for someone who applies to register to vote by mail. 143 Despite these concerns, the U.S. Federal Elections Commission (FEC) reported to the U.S. Congress that in the first two years of mail-in registration, it found only a 5.2 percent duplication rate. Two-thirds of these were new registrations, and the remaining third were from changes of name and address.144 According to the FEC Report:
The mail registration provisions of the NVRA caused relatively few problems for the States and accounted for nearly one-third of all voter registration applications from 1995 through 1996. ... Motor vehicle registration provisions of NVRA appeared to be the easiest for states to implement and .... also yielded the highest volume of registration applications among the various agencies mandated by the NVRA, accounting for 33.1% of the total number of registration applications in the U.S. during 1995 and 1996.145 The FEC also recommended a number of changes to improve the NVRA, including:
Avoiding Voter Registration FraudBecause voter registration is one of the places where it is possible to manipulate the election results, special attention should be taken to ensure that the voter registration list is accurate and reliable. An accurate list means that all eligible voters are registered, that they are only listed once, and that the list only includes eligible persons. Creating and maintaining an accurate voter registration list requires close monitoring and multiple checks and balances. These include keeping the registries up to date, eliminating duplicate registrations and voters who are no longer resident in that electoral district. Enforcement of anti-fraud and voter registration laws is also important. It deters future fraud as well as ensures that persons who have broken the law are held accountable for their actions. Ensuring only eligible voters register Some political parties and candidates go to great lengths to ensure their supporters are included on the voter registration list. As a result, they can provide incentives for their supporters to register, such as transportation to registration sites, or promises of benefits for the area once the candidate wins and is in office. However, when parties and candidates transport citizens to register in other electoral districts or bring in ineligible persons to register, serious integrity issues can arise. In Kenya, for example, moving citizens to register in other districts, has been used to manipulate the process. According to David Throup, 'In December 1992 crude means of rigging the elections were not employed. Instead the provincial administration 'fixed' the election six months before the general election, during the registration process. KANU supporters were bussed in from the party's rural stronghold to marginal seats in Nairobi and Mombasa.' 147 Many systems use residency requirements to avoid this out-of-area registration problem. Some persons may try to register who are not citizens or who are under-aged. Some persons may try to get multiple cards. They may either register as themselves in multiple locations, or use aliases. In most systems, these persons are deterred and caught through a requirement to show proof of identity or citizenship. These requirements are most often used in countries with a lack of trust in the electoral system or a history of voter fraud. However, if proving identity becomes so burdensome that it deters potential voters from registering, this can become an integrity issue. This can be avoided by requiring documents that are easily available, such as a national ID card, birth certificate or passport. Adding an alternative for those without papers can assist those whose papers have been destroyed by war or who were never issued birth certificates or other government papers. For example, in the 2000 elections in Haiti, two registered voters could vouch for a third person without papers. The registration numbers of the two persons who vouch for the voter are noted on the registry and are held responsible for the accuracy of their guarantee. Ensuring the integrity and accuracy of voter registration cards and registries In most systems there is a list of registered voters which is used on polling day to determine who can vote. Usually, as only those persons who are listed on the registry can vote, the list must be accurate and protected against tampering. In some systems, this list is supplemented by cards given to the voter during registration. These cards prove that the person has applied for, and been accepted as, a registered voter. The voter must produce their card at the polls in order to vote. As voter cards are used as an integrity mechanism, the cards usually include security features to deter forgeries and unauthorized duplication or use. These security features include serial numbers so that electoral managers can track the cards, and in cases where registration fraud has been a major problem, water marks or special paper can be used to make the cards more difficult to duplicate. Some systems include voters' fingerprints or photographs to ensure that no one else is able to use that card. These photos and fingerprints can also be placed in the voter registry. Voter registries include serial numbers so that the electoral authorities can track the registers and know if any are missing. They are made in duplicate or triplicates so that the local election office can maintain a copy while the regional or national office can also have a copy. This can deter internal tampering, such as adding names or deleting them, as it would be hard to ensure changes were made to every copy. Registration lists are also usually posted in a public place so that citizens, political parties and monitors can check the names on the list. A period of time is usually allowed in the electoral calendar for corrections to be made to the registration lists so that mistakes can be corrected and ineligible names eliminated. Registers must also be accurate and up to date. For instance, in San Francisco, a grand jury in 1988 found that 1,800 dead people were still listed as eligible voters on the voter registration lists. 148 Before the electoral reforms in Mexico, the voter registry was used as a tool for electoral fraud--decreasing the votes of one segment of the population and increasing the votes of others. One of the reforms was to ensure an accurate voter registry. Specific standards were set in the electoral law to make registers more difficult to duplicate, as well as standards for storage and destruction of spoiled cards and registers. During registration, political parties sign the voters' cards to validate them, and the thumbprint of the voter is placed on each card during voting to avoid multiple voting. 149 Monitoring Monitoring voter registration and the use of the cards during polling provides a check on the distribution and use of the cards. Domestic and international observers (see Monitors of Election Integrity) who observe the process, and political party monitors who can question the process, act to expose problems and serve as a deterrent to fraudulent registration and use of the cards. According to Horacio Boneo, former Director of the UN Electoral Assistance Unit, the 'best way to deter some widespread types of fraud and manipulation that take place during voter registration and on polling day is by ensuring the presence of large number of both independent and party observers present in every instance in which voters are registered and in each polling station.' 150 Individual citizens can also act as monitors and help ensure a clean registry. They can look at the posted registration lists and challenge registration of persons they feel are not eligible. In New Zealand, for instance, every Registrar of Electors Office has a copy of the entire national voter registration list, and each post office has a copy of the local list. These lists are open for public inspection. 151 This is the case in most places, except for systems, such as Denmark, where registration lists are based on the civil registry, and are not shared with the political parties, other voters or civil society. Enforcing registration laws Enforcement of registration regulations and the anti-fraud provisions in the election law are essential checks on a clean and accurate voter registration. In almost every electoral system, it is illegal to tamper with the voter registration process and voter registries. Violations of these laws are usually dealt with through the legal system- which in most fraud cases is the criminal justice system. For more see Enforcement of Election Integrity.
Party RegistrationIn most electoral systems, political parties are required to register before they can field candidates and compete in elections. In some systems, independent candidates cannot run for office and must be affiliated with a registered party. Registration procedures and requirements for party registration can be a source of integrity problems if they are used to exclude certain parties or actors from the electoral process. Registration procedures that are straightforward and widely publicized can avoid many problems. For example, an open registration process, with enough time allowed before every election, enables new parties to register. Subjectivity in determining eligibility can be diminished if the review is done on the basis of predetermined criteria using standard procedures. Parties are notified in writing whether their application has been accepted or rejected. This notification usually inlcudes the reasons for the rejection and provides information on the appeal process. Registering usually entails obligations that parties must meet. To be fair, these should be clear, standard and up-front so that the parties know what is required before they register. Most electoral management or oversight bodies require registered political parties to provide information on their activities, membership and funding. This requirement helps ensure the integrity of the process. Some of the integrity issues that can arise from this include the type of information and how much of it is needed. Reporting requirements that are complicated or require extensive amounts of information may become burdensome and could discourage some parties from registering. It can also raise privacy issues which are discussed later in this section. Reporting on expenditures and contributions is discussed in Campaign Financing. Registration is optional in some systems. This is the case, for example, in Canada where:
Registration brings with it strict reporting requirements but also several advantages. For example, a candidate endorsed by a registered party can have the party affiliation shown on the ballot, and registered parties are entitled to an allotment of paid and free broadcasting time during general elections. There are also financial advantages to registration. For example, registered parties are eligible for reimbursement of a percentage of their election expenses, according to a formula set out in the legislation, and donations to the party are tax-deductible to a set maximum. 152 The result of this process in Canada has been an increase in the number of registered political parties from four in 1972 to ten in 1997 and an increase in the number of candidates registering for federal elections from 632 to 672. 153 Eligibility Requirements In order to register as a party, most electoral systems have established minimum eligibility requirements. These are usually based on having a certain number of registered voters as members or dues paying members. Problems can arise if this number is set too high or too low. If it is set too high, it can exclude smaller or newer parties from the process. If the number is set too low, it enables frivolous or unviable parties to register. In New Zealand, for instance, the number of dues paying members for registration has been set at 500:
In general terms, the Commission will wish to be satisfied that the applicant represents a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political influence through the election of members of the party to the New Zealand House of Representatives. The Commission will also wish to be satisfied that the party has a category of membership through which individual persons pay a membership fee (distinct from a donation) which entitles them to be a member of the party for a specified and appropriate period.154 As part of the application process, parties must submit the names of its members to prove it meets the basic requirements. A sample of the list is usually checked to ensure that the voters exist, and are dues paying members. Integrity problems can arise in countries in transition or coming out of a conflict, where identifying political party supporters, especially those from opposition parties, can raise security concerns. (See Privacy Concerns below). Most registration procedures also have restrictions on the party names that can be registered. These can be for practical reasons, such as with New Zealand, that limits the name to 52 characters including punctuation and spaces, so that it fits onto the ballot, and refuses names or abbreviations that are likely to cause confusion or mislead voters. 155 Registration applications are usually only accepted during a given period of time, and applications are not accepted after the closing date. The period of time needs to be long enough so that the parties can complete and submit their application. Some registration rules may require a deposit which, depending on the system, is returned to the party if it receives a certain percentage of the vote. This deposit is to ensure that the parties are serious, but if it is set at too high a level, it could discourage the smaller or less affluent parties from participating. Privacy concerns of political party members When parties are required to have a minimum number of members and must provide a list of the names of these members to register, it can raise several integrity issues. One is the right to privacy for the political party members. In polarized societies, or in countries coming out of a history of internal conflict, political party members may be afraid of being publicly identified with a particular party for security reasons. In other places, individuals may also not want to be publicly identified with a party for employment, social or other reasons. In the case of New Zealand,
privacy issues are taken seriously by the Election Commission. Despite the need to collect information in order to verify membership .... a party may request the Commission to keep membership information confidential by including a statement such as the following in a covering letter accompanying the information: Categorizing Political Parties Some electoral systems categorize political parties when they register or later when they apply for Public Funding of Campaigns. They can be categorized according to membership size, election success or geographical coverage. For integrity purposes, there should be a valid reason for the categorization, such as dividing free airtime or public funds for election campaigns among the competing parties. In India, for instance, the Election Commission categorizes parties as 'National' or 'State' and 'registered' or 'unrecognized', based on their length of political activity and the party's success in elections.
How a party is classified determines a party's right to certain privileges, such as access to electoral rolls and provisions of time for political broadcasts on the state-owned television and radio stations. . and also the important question of the allocation of the party symbol. Party symbols enable illiterate voters to identify the candidate of the party they wish to vote for. National parties are given a symbol that is for their use only throughout the country. State parties have the sole use of a symbol in the state in which they are recognized as such. Registered unrecognized parties can choose a symbol from a selection of 'free' symbols.157 Registration of political party logos Electoral authorities may also register a party logo that is printed on the ballot papers in some countries. There are also requirements for registering logos, which usually include submitting the application before the deadline, meeting certain formatting requirements such as black and white or colour logos or a certain size. Logos are important in countries with a low literacy rate, as they enable voters to identify their candidate or party based on the logo. Being able to register the symbol which best represents the party is an important integrity issue. Election authorities have discretion in rejecting logos that they consider offensive or that might confuse the voters. To ensure integrity, the standards for logos are usually included in the registration guidelines. They are standard to avoid a subjective review and are not designed to discriminate against a particular party. As with party registration, rejections of logos are usually made in writing with the reasons for the rejection clearly stated, along with the procedures on how to file an appeal. Candidate RegistrationA fair and equitable candidate registration process is important to maintain electoral integrity. A clear, standardized and reasonable process facilitates the equal treatment of potential candidates and helps ensure each candidate has an equal opportunity to register. Candidate registration is an important part of the electoral process. Having a competitive process, where potential candidates understand the requirements and are able to register if qualified, is important. Integrity problems can be avoided when the process is transparent and scheduled far enough in advance in the electoral calendar so candidates have time is prepare their applications, and for electoral managers to review the applications and notify candidates of their decision, before the start of the electoral campaign period. As in the registration of voters and political parties, integrity concerns include having reasonable eligibility requirements, a fair and transparent review of the application, timely notification of acceptance or rejection, and the right to an appeal if required. Eligibility requirements The basic eligibility requirements for national office candidates are usually found in the constitution, or other basic laws. These can include citizenship, age and residency requirements. Specific registration requirements are added by electoral policy-makers. These can include the date by which the application is due, a nomination petition signed by a certain number of registered voters, financial deposits or other documents required to prove eligibility. For integrity purposes, these requirements must be reasonable, standardized, public and not have the effect of excluding a particular group or individuals. One of the basic requirements of a free, fair and credible election is to have a competitive election. This usually requires having enough candidates competing to give the voters a choice. Candidate requirements can affect the number of candidates. In general, the easier the requirements, the more candidates will register. What is the right number of candidates? Too few can limit choices, but too many can confuse the voters. As discussed in Party Registration, the right formula will depend on the system and its Social and Political Context. Having too few or too many candidates can be addressed by changing the number of signatures required on a petition to support a nomination or changing the amount of deposit each candidate must submit with their application. For instance, Canada tightened its requirements as it raised the number of signatures required to support a nomination in 1970 from 10 to 25 and in 1993 to 100, and required a C$1,000 deposit. 158 Some countries have adopted an affirmative action type of formula to correct past problems. This means different standards are applied to different categories of persons. In India, for instance, candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes pay half the deposit required of other candidates. India also requires nominations to be supported by only one registered voter in the constituency. This has increased the number of candidates contesting elections from 3.8 per constituency in 1952 to 26.6 in 1996. 159
Some commentators have criticized the openness of the nomination process, arguing that it is far too easy for frivolous candidates to stand for election, and that this confuses the electoral process. Certain remedial measures have been taken in August 1996, which included increasing the size of the deposit and making the number of people who have to nominate a candidate larger.160 These actions reduced the number of candidates competing in India's 1998 elections. India also furnishes candidates with a list of Do's and Don'ts for Candidates (India) containing practical advice for candidates submitting their application. This helps ensures that all candidates receive the same information and advice. Review of applications and rejections The electoral management body determines who is eligible to compete in an election. The review of applications is supposed to be done in accordance with established eligibility criteria, and in a fair, timely and transparent manner. Establishing standardized review procedures and standards for supporting documentation, can help ensure reviews are done uniformly throughout the review process. Rejections done in writing, with the reason for the rejection clearly stated provide information for candidates and help increase the transparency of the process. It also provides the information needed for candidates who may wish to contest the decision of the registration body. This can be facilitated by including the appeal procedures in the rejection letter. In Ireland, for example, the process is as follows: 'the returning officer, accompanied by a judicial assessor, who is either the President of the High Court or another judge of the Court nominated by the President of the Court, rules on the validity of the nominations received. Every prospective candidate or his/her representative must attend the ruling on nominations, and must furnish all relevant information required by the presidential returning officer or the judicial assessor.' 161 Exclusions because a candidate did not fill in a form right, or did not meet the basic requirements, are usually straightforward as long as they are applied evenly to every candidate. However, exclusions for other reasons, such as political affiliation to an outlawed political party, can entail a judgement call-- and this is where rules can be applied subjectively and selectively. In the 1995 Haitian elections, for example, one of the eligibility requirements was that a candidate could not be a member of the ruling party from the Duvalier era. Determining who was a duvalierist and could be excluded from the process was subjective and could have been used as a justification to reject other politically unacceptable candidates. Right to appeal A second hearing for rejected candidate applications, can protect candidates against arbitrary rejections. The mechanism for doing this will vary according to the system. In South Africa, for instance, this is done by the Commission to the Electoral Court. The dates for appeals are set in the electoral timetable. 162 The appeal process must also be done in a timely enough manner so that a wrongly rejected candidate can be reinstated in time to compete in the electoral campaign. In Suriname, this is done by the President, who must decide within 8 days of receiving the appeal. 163 Right to withdraw Candidates may wish to withdraw from the race and election managers need to ensure there is a mechanism for these candidates to withdraw within a reasonable time frame. As ballots need to be printed in enough time before the elections to enable their nationwide distribution by polling day, withdrawal by a candidate after a certain point may mean that the candidate's name remains on the ballot. The deadline to withdraw in many systems is set to coincide with the date for the final approval on the design of the ballots. Clearly specifying the rules and dates for candidate withdrawal in the electoral law or procedures can help avoid the integrity problems that could arise if a candidate decides to withdraw after the ballots are printed. This includes having clear rules on how a candidate can refuse to accept public office after winning an election, and the rules for selection of his/her replacement.
Accrediting ObserversElection observers and political party monitors are important elements of election integrity. They monitor the process in order to detect and deter integrity problems. They also increase electoral transparency by publicly reporting on their findings and making an informed judgement on the freeness, fairness and credibility of the process. (More on observing as an integrity mechanism can be found at Independent Observers and Political Party Monitors.) For observers and monitors to be able to function effectively, they are usually officially accredited by the electoral management or policy bodies. Many international observation groups also require invitations from the government or election management body before they will field an observation mission. Inviting observation groups can help promote integrity as discussed in International Election Observation. Observers and monitors need access to electoral sites in order to fulfill their observation and monitoring responsibilities. Accreditation identifies those persons who can have access to electoral sites by providing them with a badge, or other form of identification. This badge lets registration and poll workers know that the observer has permission from the electoral management body to access the registration and polling sites. Having accreditation is an integrity mechanism as persons without official approval should not have access to electoral sites or sensitive electoral materials. Integrity problems can arise if accreditation procedures or requirements are used to limit the number of observers or to deny access to certain groups of observers or monitors. If accreditation takes such a long time that observers are not able to be accredited before the elections, or if selected accreditation is provided, it can hurt the credibility of the process, and raise suspicions that the election management body has something to hide. Most electoral systems establish eligibility requirements for observers and monitors in their election laws or procedures. Reasonable and appropriate procedures, that require the minimum amount of burden on both the observation group and the election management body, can help avoid integrity questions. Straightforward and objective requirements can help minimize problems such as discrimination or favouritism that might inadvertently result from subjective accreditation. Some election management bodies add behavioural or other conditions to the eligibility requirements. These are usually used to exclude nondemocratic actors, such as in the case of South Africa, where accreditation will only be provided to observers who: will promote conditions conducive to a free and fair election, including observing that election impartially and independently of any registered party or candidate contesting that election, be competent and professional in observing that election and subscribe to the Code governing observers. 164However, behavioural or other conditions that are not neutral or partisan in nature can provide opportunities for arbitrary or discriminatory action in accreditation. Accreditation usually requires that observers comply with the rules of accreditation while observing. Accreditation rules usually include such things as obeying instructions from a polling officer or member of the security forces working on election security. If the accredited observer fails to comply to a material extent with the conditions of accreditation, the election management body may cancel the accreditation. To protect the integrity of the accreditation process, the conditions, and the procedures for the cancellation of accreditation, are usually included in the election regulations or laws. For more on integrity in observation, see Integrity in Domestic Observation and Integrity in International Observation.
Electoral CampaignElectoral campaigns are the competitive efforts by candidates and political parties to win voter support in the period preceding an election. Candidates use a variety of techniques to reach the voters, from public appearances and rallies to the use of mass media advertising. Campaigning for public office is usually done for a longer period of time than the 'official' campaign period specified in the electoral calendar, when candidates may receive special treatment, usually in the form of access to public media or public funds for campaign purposes. Campaigns in today's media age can cost enormous sums of money, raising integrity issues over the raising and spending of money and whether elections are won by the candidates who spend the most money. These issues are discussed in Campaign Financing. In the campaign, candidates work to get their messages out and to encourage voters to turn out and vote for them or their party. There are several campaign issues that can affect the freeness and fairness of the election. These include the timing of the campaign, ability to campaign freely, the neutrality of electoral officials during the campaign, security for participants, and Access to Media. Because of these integrity issues, most systems regulate certain aspects of the campaign process. However, a few systems, such as Denmark, only set guidelines for equal access to the media and have not set any rules to limit the amount of money or time that may be spent on electoral campaigns. 165 Timing The electoral calendar sets the dates for the 'official' campaign. This is usually the month or so before voting day. Actual campaigning for office can start much earlier, but candidate benefits, such as public funding, are usually only available during the official campaign period. The length of the campaign can affect the ability of the parties and candidates to get their messages out. Short campaign periods tend to benefit established parties and political incumbents who are already known by voters. Longer campaign periods gives lesser known parties and candidates more time to prepare and to inform the electorate on their platforms and positions, but it also requires more resources to sustain a campaign over the longer period of time. Longer campaigns can also negatively affect voter turnout as voters may tire of the never ending electoral campaigning. This is particularly true in the U.S., where active campaigning for a political party's nomination for president can start more than two years before the actual presidential election. Freedom to Campaign The ability to freely participate in the electoral campaign is a key election integrity issue. Candidates must be able to circulate freely among their supporters and publicize their political platforms. Voters must be able to attend rallies, and other political events, without interference and without fear. They must also have free access to political information so they can make an informed choice when voting. A free and fair campaign is dependent on the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association. The right to freely associate for political purposes is a basic integrity requirement. Voters must be able to gather to discuss candidates and issues. Political parties must be able to meet and plan their electoral campaigns with their supporters. The right of association is usually not restricted except for meetings organized to accomplish illegal purposes, such as promoting public disorder to disrupt or manipulate the process. Freedom to campaign also means freedom of movement. Candidates must be able to campaign anywhere in the country. In countries with security problems, this can be a law enforcement issue. However, arbitrary restrictions on the movements of candidates and their supporters which could interfere with their lawful ability to campaign should be avoided. Free and fair circulation of election information The free circulation of information is another basic integrity issue. The press must have the ability to publish and disseminate information without censorship or manipulation of their coverage. Press that abuses its rights by publishing slanderous or false information should be held accountable for its wrongdoings. In most countries, this is done in a court of law, after the wrongdoing has been done. Protecting the free flow of information is the responsibility of the government. It can pass laws protecting the freedom of expression, make special efforts to investigate threats towards the media and bring those responsible to justice. A free press does not feel intimidated when covering an election campaign nor does it have to exercise self censorship out of fear. The government and the public broadcasting system can set standards to help ensure a free and fair circulation of information. As stated by Article 19:
Election campaign broadcasting standards must address such serious human rights abuses as part of an effort to secure the broadcast media's role in promoting transition to democracy. The government's failure to protect the media or to hold accountable those responsible for such abuses undermines the potential for free and fair elections.166 In the campaign period, the public broadcasting system has a responsibility to ensure that they provide an equitable and fair coverage of the process. Article 19, an NGO focussed on ensuring the freedom of expression, has developed guidelines for broadcast coverage of election campaigns in transitional democracies. These guidelines include:
Another integrity issue is the amount of money it takes to disseminate information. In developed countries, campaigns have increasingly centered around the use of television advertisements. The cost of these advertisements has inflated the cost of election campaigns to the point where, in some countries, only wealthy individuals or those with financial support from major interest groups, can compete and win a national or state office. Each system addresses the equity issues stemming from the costs of political advertisements in different ways. In countries such as Denmark, advertisements by political parties are not allowed on national and regional radio and TV channels. 168 In South Africa, printed material intended to influence the outcome of an election, must be labelled clearly with the full name and address of the printer and publisher. And the publisher of any publication must start the article with the word 'advertisement.' 169 In Ireland, free postage is provided for candidates for a letter to every registered voter. 170 Other systems provide public funds for campaign purposes. For more on these issues see Public Funding of Campaigns. Quality of campaigning The quality of a political campaign becomes an issue if the campaign resorts to unethical tactics to discredit other candidates or to disrupt the process. The content and quality of TV advertisements have become issues many countries. The NGO Alliance for Better Campaigns, states: 'political campaigns set the tone for the most important relationship in any democracy- the one between citizens and leaders. Especially in an individual political culture such as ours, it is the campaign itself that must draw citizens into the public square. Our campaigns drive them away.' 171 Some public interests groups (see NonGovernmental Organizations) are working to improve the quality of election campaigns, and to encourage the media to carry more substantive candidate debates. Neutrality of election officials Election campaigns are designed to be noisy, public events that use patriotic and other symbols to get voter support. It can be difficult for an election manager to remain neutral during the campaign period. However, the administrators of the elections have to remain nonpartisan and impartial in the delivery of their services and in the fulfilment of their responsibilities. Their office, resources or positions should not be used to help the campaign of any party or candidate or to attempt to influence the outcome of the vote. (For more on neutrality of electoral managers see Fair Process and Ethical Behaviour.) This restriction is usually also applied to government officials and resources. To ensure a fair playing field, government resources, position and influence are not used to help any candidate. Officials are supposed to remain neutral in their official capacity during the process. In some countries, governments limit their pre-election activities so that their actions cannot be perceived as support for any one candidate or party. For example, before an election the Philippines prohibits the appointment or hiring of new employees; the creation or filling of new positions; promotions or salary increases or privileges; releasing public funds for public works; new social services or construction of public works; delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants.172 The distinction between public official and party partisan interests by elected government officials can be difficult to maintain. For example, in the U.S., the President of the United States is considered the leading member of his political party and is expected to actively campaign for his party's candidates. However, this is supposed to be done within the context of his party affiliation, not in his official capacity as President. He is also not supposed to use the resources of his office to help promote the campaign of anyone. Public Opinion Polling Public opinion polling is used by the political parties, candidates and media to measure voter support for particular candidates, parties and positions. Polling is used to target campaigns and to develop voter messages. In most systems, polling is allowed without political interference or unreasonable restrictions. When polling results are made public, the methodology of the polls are also provided so that users can judge the accurateness of the polling. This usually includes the margin of error, sample size, and demographics of the respondents (age, location, gender, occupation, etc.). The timing for the release of a public opinion poll can be an integrity issue because, depending upon when a poll is released, it can affect the election outcome. Poll results can influence undecided voters and build momentum for candidates or positions. A voter can think the election is already decided so why vote, or why vote against majority thinking. In countries with a large number of time zones, the winner of a presidential election can be predicted before the polling opens in some regions. This can negatively effect turnout, and the voting choices of the last areas to vote. For example, this was an issue in the 2000 U.S. elections for president, where the American media announced the winner of the state of Florida before polls were closed in the midwest and west. Because of the electoral college system, a win in Florida was critical to winning the electoral college vote. In addition, their projections were inaccurate and they later changed their projection to 'too close to call', but this was only minutes before the polls closed in the west. To address these issues, some systems prohibit the release of polls at sensitive times- usually right before or during polling, and some systems prohibit the release of exit polls until the end of polling. These regulations range from Mexico, where it is a criminal offense to release a poll predicting an election winner from eight days before the election until after the polls have closed, 173 to South Africa, where no exit poll may be published until the polls are closed, to Denmark, where there are no restrictions on polling or the releasing of results. Security The ability to campaign in an atmosphere free of fear and intimidation is another essential component of a free and fair election. Candidates need to be able to move freely to meet the voters without fear for their own physical safety, or those of their supporters. Voters need to be able to circulate and attend campaign rallies without fear. Monitors, observers and the press need to be able to cover the process and to publish their reports without fear of intimidation or retribution. The security environment affects the elections results. According to John Sanderson and Michael Maley, 'If opposition party activity is suppressed by a climate of fear- if opposition parties are unable to recruit, organize, establish offices and engage in dialogue with the voters, or are only able to do those things in a limited period or in certain parts of the country- then the inevitable consequence is an electoral environment biassed in favour of the ruling group, a consequence of which is likely to be fewer votes for the opposition.' 174 Security concerns are present in many countries. In December 1999, the Sri Lankan President was hurt during a suicide bomb attack at a campaign rally. Fourteen people were killed and more than 105 injured. The same day, a second bomb blast killed another seven and injured 40 at a rally for the main opposition party.175 Ensuring an electoral climate where voters feel free to vote, is an important integrity issue. If voters are intimidated during the pre-election run up, if may affect their voting behaviour on election day. As explained by John Sanderson and Michael Maley:
When individuals, authorities or political parties wish to manipulate an election result, it is not necessary for them to coerce or intimidate every voter, or improperly influence events at every polling station. Indeed, at an internationally observed election, it would be counter-productive to do so, since what had been done would become obvious and could attract the displeasure of the international community. They merely have to influence enough voters to affect the result.176 For more information on election security see Security.
Access to MediaHaving access to the media for election campaign purposes is an essential component of electoral success. Since most voters can be reached through the mass media, ensuring that every candidate has access to the media is essential. Because a mass media campaign can be expensive, and not every party has the same amount of resources, ensuring equality of access is an important integrity issue. Most countries have addressed media access in their election law or related legislation and regulations. Most systems require the media to grant access to anyone with the means to pay for the advertisement. Some also require the media to provide equal time for all candidates. Some systems provide public funds or free airtime to help even out the parties' ability to afford media time (see Public Funding of Campaigns). Eligibility requirements for equal time, or public funds for broadcasting, can be based on how the political party is categorized during its registration and other factors, such as the percentage of the vote it won in previous elections, or the number of elected seats it has in government. Equal Access and Treatment Most election laws or regulations require equal access and treatment to those wishing to broadcast election advertisements. In New Zealand, for example, the law 'prohibits a broadcaster from offering or giving to any political party terms for broadcasting time that are more favourable than those offered or given to any other party for comparable time. That section also prohibits a broadcaster from offering or giving to any candidate terms for broadcasting time that are more favourable than those offered or given to any other candidate for comparable time.' 177 Equal terms for access may not guarantee equal treatment. In a crowded field of competing candidates and parties, which candidates get to go on the air first-- or last? Is there enough time for all the candidates' advertisements to air in the official campaign period, or for the voters to be able to absorb these messages? What time slots are the candidates allotted and when in the campaign? Even if candidates have equal airtime, do they have equal or timely access to the production resources needed to make their advertisements? Public Allocation or Funding of Airtime Even if equal access is provided, parties will differ in their ability to pay for the advertisements. To even out these differences, most systems try to provide either public funding for campaigning or free airtime provided by public broadcasting systems. This requires an equitable formula to divide the resources or airtime and can be based on how a political party has been categorized by the electoral management body (for more on this see Party Registration and Public Funding of Campaigns). Once a reasonable formula is decided, it must also be fairly applied in practice. For instance, in Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer appoints a Broadcasting Arbitrator. The Broadcasting Arbitrator allocates paid and free broadcasting time for political parties during the elections according to a formula established by law. In India, the Election Commission provides all national and state parties free access to the state owned electronic media on an extensive scale for their campaigns. The commission allocates 122 free hours equitably by combining a base limit and additional time linked to poll performance of the party in recent elections. 178 In New Zealand, parties are prohibited from using their own funds to buy radio or television time to broadcast election programmes. 179 Instead, the Broadcasting Act of 1980 provides for an allocation of free or discounted election broadcasting time on radio and TV during the official election period. This includes broadcasting the opening and closing addresses of political party leaders on national television and radio.180 To qualify, political parties must have been registered at least three months before the dissolution of Parliament, or have at least five candidates nominated. The allocation of free time is based on a number of criteria including how many people voted for that party in previous elections, popular support for the party as shown in opinion polls and party membership figures, and the number of MPs belonging to that party at the time of dissolution. 181 Enforcement of Access There are countries that protect equal access of the media through legislation and regulations, which also have mechanisms to ensure that they are enforced. This enforcement is needed to ensure that the intent and provisions of the legislation are applied in practice. Enforcement differs according to the system and the legal requirements. In the case of New Zealand, for example, the law requires every broadcaster to provide the Electoral Commission with a 'complete and accurate' report on all election programmes broadcast for parties and candidates during the election period. The report has to include:
In most systems, civil law enables parties or candidates who believe they have not been given equal access or treatment by broadcasters to take those broadcasters to civil court. Criminal violations of the laws would be handled separately through the criminal justice system.
Voter EducationVoter education can have an important impact on integrity. In addition to the dissemination of balanced and objective information on what voters need to know in order to exercise their right to vote, such as what time the polls open, on what day, the offices that are being contested and how to mark a valid ballot, voter education usually provides information about the electoral process and why voting is important. In some countries it is an integral part of the larger civic education programmes which they undertake to educate their citizens. Voter education is supposed to be targeted at promoting the participation of an informed and responsible citizenry. Voters need to understand their rights and responsibilities under their constitution and election law so that they can fulfill their obligations in an informed manner. According to Civitas, voter education should also 'nurture competent and responsible participation. Such participation involves more than just attempting to influence public policy. Competent and responsible participation must be based upon moral deliberation, knowledge and reflective inquiry'. 183 There seems to be consensus that building a democratic culture is an important key to the protection of a free and fair election, and that is why in many democracies voter education starts even in elementary schools as part of the basic civic education programme. The rationale behind this is that students can relay important information to their parents, as well as understand their role in a democracy when they become eligible for voting.
Badly designed or nonexistent voter education programmes can create integrity problems. Too optimistic messages on the ease of voting can lead voters to unrealistic expectations on the time they need to allow to, for example, wait in line at the polls. Or badly designed messages on election security could increase voter feelings of insecurity. Voter education is expected to provide factual information for voters in a neutral way so they can participate knowledgeably. If voter education has a partisan content, it is more like political propaganda, which is primarily designed to influence public opinion and build support for a particular position or candidate. Voter education can provide factual information for voters in a neutral way so they can participate knowledgeably.
In many countries, voter education also provides information for voters with special needs so they know how they can participate and where they can get assistance. These can be citizens abroad who need to know if they are eligible and able to vote overseas, or it can be physically handicapped voters who need special access facilities. Information needed to participate Integrity requires that voters be able to participate on an equal basis with all other voters. One of the responsibilities of electoral managers is to ensure that voters receive the basic information needed to participate equally - for example: when, where and how to register and to vote; what documents they will have to bring; how to mark a ballot so that it is valid and can be counted accurately. All of this information has important integrity ramifications. For example, if voters do not know where to register, they might not be able to vote on election day. In most democracies election managers have the responsibility to ensure that all citizens receive this basic information and that it is neutral in content and nonpartisan in presentation. In some systems they can be assisted by civil society groups, either officially or by voluntary work done by these NGOs. In South Africa, for instance, accreditation by the Election Commission is required to provide voter education. Only those applicants who meet the Commission's standards and who can promote 'voter education and conditions conducive to free and fair elections' will receive accreditation. The Commission's standards include ability to conduct activities effectively, impartially, independent of registered parties or candidate contesting the election. The applicant must also subscribe to the code governing persons accredited to provide voter education. 184 Information needed to make an informed choice The integrity of the election outcome depends on voters being able to make an informed choice among the different candidates and issues. If they are provided with partial or inaccurate information, it can affect the way they vote. Having access to objective and neutral information assists voters in making an informed choice. This information can be provided in the campaign period by the different candidates, parties and the media. This includes the political platforms of the different candidates, campaign pledges and their past history of accomplishments or unkept promises. Voters also usually want to know political affiliation, sources of candidate funding and other essential elements that factor into a voter's decision to support or not support a particular candidate. Having sufficient information to make an informed choice is an important integrity issue because of its effect on voting and is addressed further in Access to Media. Information needed to protect integrity of process Voter education can also be used to increase the transparency of the electoral process at the same time that it builds support for the integrity of the elections. The public needs to be reassured that the election managers are taking every precaution to ensure a free, fair and credible election, that their vote will be counted accurately, and that the election results will represent the will of the people. In addition, basic mechanisms designed to protect the integrity of the process need to be publicized. This usually includes information on the security features of the electoral materials and processes, how to identify registration or polling fraud and where to make complaints. Voter education has also been used to promote nonviolence in the process. This was done for the 1998 elections in Cambodia (see the Cambodian case study Civic Education for a Nonviolent Election), where it was feared that violence would disrupt the process:
The NEC (National Elections Committee) did institute anti-violence education. It asked King Norodum Sihanouk to make a statement condemning violence and guaranteeing the secrecy of the vote, which he did. Twenty thousand copies of this statement were distributed to all polling stations and nine thousand audiotapes containing his remarks were distributed by local nongovernmental organizations. Prominent Buddhist monks, a senior general, and [the Vice President of the NEC] repeatedly went on television and radio to stress nonviolence. After a spate of incidents, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen himself appealed to his supporters not to commit violence or intimidation. 185
BallotsStandardized ballots make it possible to have a secret vote. The design and type of ballot can affect the integrity of the process. A good ballot design can, for instance, help ensure that the voters are able to find their candidate of choice on the ballot and that they can mark the ballot so that their intention is clear. This can avoid many problems during counting. There are many different types of ballots, including paper ballots, machine ballots (see Voting Mechanisms), and soon internet balloting, but to assure integrity, each ballot needs:
Long ballots with many candidates and races that are used in some countries, for instance, can create confusion for some voters. These can be broken up into separate short ballots for individual races, but this does not eliminate the problem of voters losing interest or becoming overwhelmed before they finish voting. Ballot position can also affect voting behaviour so a neutral design of the ballot is especially important. In some countries, candidates are grouped by office contested and within that office, in either a random or alphabetical order. Depending on the system, candidates can also be listed by party columns enabling voters to vote a straight ticket for all candidates of a particular party with one mark In some multi-cultural societies, the election policy body will need to determine the language of the ballot. The needs of illiterate voters will also need to be taken into consideration. This is addressed in several systems through the use of numbers or party logos to identify parties and candidates in addition to the written text. Some systems also add photographs of the candidates to the ballots. Protecting the integrity of the ballots Once a ballot design is decided, electoral managers have to ensure that they have control over the number of ballots printed, distributed and circulated. They also need to ensure that it is difficult, if not impossible, for ballots to be tampered with or pre-marked, and that there are enough ballots in every polling site in time for polling. Some systems include additional security features in the ballot design to make unauthorized duplication or tampering more difficult. These can include water marks and the use of special paper. These features can involve additional costs (see Cost Considerations) which can play a factor in whether or not they are used. For more on design considerations see Printed Ballot Integrity Controls. To ensure protection of the ballots from tampering and from damage, as well as the right of every legitimate elector to cast his or his vote, good planning by election managers is critical. This includes having a good estimate of the number of ballots needed for each polling location to ensure that all voters can exercise their right to cast their choice. Not having enough ballots can seriously jeopardize the integrity of the poll and the validity of the results. For example, in the 1995 elections in Haiti, the degree of urban migration had been underestimated, raising serious concerns right before polling of not having enough ballots. This was resolved by photocopying ballots the night before the polling which ensured that there were enough ballots, but at the same time, short-circuited security mechanisms, such as tracking numbers. Not having enough ballots was also an issue in some places in the 1994 elections in South Africa. Election managers must also ensure the integrity of the ballots during storage and their distribution to avoid damage to the ballots or tampering that would affect their integrity. Good planning as to the number of ballot packages and the quantity of ballots per packet, can eliminate the need to open and rehandle ballots after delivery from the printer. Good tracking systems are essential to protect ballot security. (For more information see Supplies - Distribution and Supplies - Recovery and Evaluation.) When voting machines are used, as is done in some systems, the same good planning and security mechanisms can be used to protect the integrity of the machines. Electoral managers have the responsibility to ensure they are not accessible to unauthorized persons during storage, distribution or in the pre- or post-voting period in the polling stations, so that they cannot be programmed to alter the election results. Political party monitors can also play an important role in ensuring the integrity of the ballots. In Mexico, for example, political party monitors observe ballot storage and distribution. During distribution, wrappers are stamped and signed by all officials and monitors present. This makes it difficult to sidetrack or switch ballots without detection. VotingVoting and the counting of that vote are the main events of the electoral process. Voting is the means by which voters make their choice among competing candidates and issues, and their collective vote determines who wins or loses an election. A free, fair and credible election requires that voting respects the democratic principle of one person - one vote, that only eligible persons vote, that they vote only once and that their vote is secret, freely cast without intimidation or interference. There are several parts of the voting process that can affect the integrity of the process and the election results. These include the level of voter turnout, polling hours and location, having enough electoral materials for each polling station, Access to the polling stations, Security and whether the voter votes in person or by mail (see Absentee Voting). Outright voter fraud and intimidation is discussed in Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud. Turnout The levels of voter participation can affect the integrity and legitimacy of the process, especially if the turnout is extremely low. Low turnout can be attributed to many factors, including voter apathy, lack of an interesting choice between candidates and the feeling that voting has little effect on what elected officials do. These kinds of problems can be addressed by effective voter and civic education programmes. Turnout can also be affected by security concerns, bad weather or other factors beyond the control of election managers. Issues such as polling access can be addressed by electoral managers in their planning and placement of polling sites. They can also work with law enforcement agencies to ensure that a good security plan is developed. In the U.S., for example, the National Voter Registration Act was passed to facilitate voter registration so that more Americans could vote. It resulted in 72.7% of the eligible population registered to vote (1996) which was the highest percentage of American voters registered since good record-keeping started in 1960. But even though more Americans were registered, voter turnout declined by more than 5%. 186 Compulsory voting A high degree of participation among all social groups is achieved in some countries through compulsory voting. In these systems, voting is considered as a civic duty as well as a right of citizenship. This system exists in Australia, for example, where compulsory voting was originally instituted because of low turnouts. It is also practised in Brazil, where voting is compulsory for 19 to 69-year-olds, but voluntary for those 16 to 18 and over 70. An integrity question raised by compulsory voting is whether a low turnout is also a means by which voters deliberately express their dissatisfaction with government policies and candidates, rather than being a result of apathy or ignorance. Although, in compulsory voting systems voters can express dissatisfaction through the casting of unmarked ballots. Timing Timing of the polls can play a critical role in the integrity of the elections. Are the polls open long enough so that all those who want to vote are able to vote? Are they open on a working day or a holiday when work hours are not a factor? Some countries hold polling over several days to ensure that voters have enough time to vote. This in turn can raise other integrity issues, such as protecting the ballots overnight when the polls are closed. Fair polling requires standard hours that are widely publicized so all citizens know when the polls are open, and that they are open long enough so that all voters have an equal opportunity to participate. In New Zealand, for instance, the law requires an employer to let employees off at 3 PM for the rest of the day so that all working persons can vote. 187 In the case of Canada, poll hours were extended to 12 hours so that everyone would have enough time to vote. They also staggered the times for the opening and closing of the polls across the country so that a majority of the results would be available at approximately the same time across the country. 188 Staggering polling hours can address some of the integrity issues that are created by the voting across different time zones, which were discussed in the Electoral Campaign. In large countries, the election results can be announced for the eastern portions of the country before the voters in the western portions of the country start to vote. In the U.S., for example, voters in the small state of Hawaii will know the results of a presidential election before they can start voting, and, unless the race is extremely close, they also know that their vote will not make a difference. In India, another country with many time zones, voting is held on different days in different constituencies. One of the reasons for this is so that the security forces will not be spread too thin and will be able to maintain law and order. It also enables monitors to cover more of the polls. 189 Polling times can be changed in some systems if a postponement is necessary to ensure a free and fair election. This is discussed under Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud. Having adequate polling staff and electoral materials It is essential for the integrity of the electoral process that citizens be able to cast their vote freely and easily. This means that there must be enough ballots and election materials at every polling site. As discussed in Ballots, these materials must be in place in time for the opening of the polls. Polling stations need to be adequately staffed. Poll workers should meet minimum professional qualifications and be adequately trained so that they know the procedures, can recognize integrity problems when they arise and know how to address them. Not having enough staff or materials can result in voters being unable to vote on polling day. All of this requires good planning, procurement, operations and management by election officials. Polling site locations The location of a polling site can affect the integrity of the vote, especially if it is not located in a neutral, easily accessible or safe location. Polling sites in candidates homes or in government offices in countries in transition, may make voters uneasy and afraid that their vote is not secret. Sites that are hard to access may discourage voters from voting. Some of the integrity considerations for selecting a polling site include:
Some systems use mobile voting stations to facilitate access for those in isolated areas or those who are in hospitals or other institutions. Mobile voting shares most of the same integrity issues as fixed site voting, as well as the issues involved with ensuring that the mobile units are able to reach the sites intact and in time for the voters waiting there to vote. More on voter access can be found at Access.
SecrecyA secret vote is an essential integrity issue because it allows voters the independence to vote their conscience. If a vote is made in public, or can be identified when it is counted, the voter could be intimidated into voting a different way. In the case of manual voting methods which are still used in most countries, secrecy is usually achieved by marking a standard ballot in a private place, such as behind a screen, out of the sight of others. It is then placed in a ballot box where it is mixed with many other ballots, making it impossible to trace back to a specific voter. The number of ballot boxes that need to be mixed together before counting to ensure the secrecy of the ballot can be an issue which is discussed in Counting. Secrecy makes intimidation or coercion less effective. It also makes it more difficult for special interest groups, unions or ethnic groups to 'deliver the vote' for certain candidates or political parties. Secrecy is only effective if it is enforced and therefore mechanisms have to be designed and implemented to ensure that privacy rules are respected during voting and that nothing is done that would jeopardize that secrecy. In Mexico, for instance, the electoral law makes polling officials responsible for the protection of the secrecy of the vote and punishes those who know of conditions or activities that affect the freedom and secrecy of vote, and who do not act to correct the situation. AccessAccessibility is an important integrity issue. All voters must have equal opportunity to cast their vote and this requires access to a polling site or to an alternative voting method. To have access, they must be legitimate voters. In most systems, this means being registered to vote (see Voter Registration). Voters also have to know where their polling station is located, and when it is open. Depending on the country, polling site locations are published in the papers, posted outside public buildings or advertised in another manner, such as announcements on radio. In some countries, a sample ballot is mailed to the voters, which provides the address of the polling station and a phone number for those who require additional information. Problems can sometimes arise with voters living in isolated areas. In India, for example, the Election Commission tries to ensure that there is a polling station within two kilometres of every voter and that no station has more than 1,200 voters. In New Zealand, voter registration instructions request rural voters to sketch a map to their homes on the back of the voter registration form so that they will know where the voters live and where they should vote. Voters in institutions or who are hospitalized can have problems accessing their polling station. This is addressed in some systems through the use of Absentee Voting, and in others by using mobile polling stations. In Ireland, for instance, a special presiding officer accompanied by a Garda (police officer) will bring ballots to immobile voters in hospitals and nursing homes. 190 In the case of Canada, Elections Canada has worked to make voting as accessible as possible to all Canadian voters. The Canadian efforts included improving administrative practices and amending sections of the Canadian Elections Act. These changes included:
Ensuring easier access can also open the door to potential integrity problems. In the case of Ireland, 'the law specifically prohibits a presiding officer from acting on any written instructions received from a voter. The reason for this is that the written instructions may not represent the voter's real wishes - someone else may have written them, for example.' 192 Ireland also notes that assisting voters takes time and that voters who need assistance should be advised to go to the polls early. 'Assisting an elector can take time and the law, therefore, allows a presiding officer to refuse a request for assistance during the last two hours of voting (i.e., the busiest time) if helping one elector would delay or obstruct others. Presiding officers are reluctant to use this power and sensible cooperation should make its use unnecessary.' 193 Transportation to polls Transportation to the polls is another integrity issue. It is difficult for some voters to find a way to get to the polls, especially if they are off public transportation lines. In some countries, candidates or political parties can help provide transportation of their supporters to the polls to vote. In the U.S., for example, it is legal for interest groups to provide payments to make it easier for voters to get to the polls.194 In other systems, providing transport to the polls is illegal. Transportation becomes an integrity issue if it is used as a means to bus voters from one area to another for the purposes of manipulating the election outcome. Access for observers As monitoring the electoral process can be an important mechanism to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process, the access to polling locations by political party monitors and domestic and international observers is also an important integrity issue. To properly monitor the process, observers have to be able to easily obtain a list of polling sites and their addresses, so that they can plan an adequate coverage during their observation. Observers also need to be provided with accreditation by the electoral management body so that they can have access to the interior of the polling stations (see Accrediting Observers). In most systems it is illegal to deny access to an accredited observer or monitor. Since, in some ways, the media also serves as a monitoring mechanism, their representatives also need access to polling sites for election coverage purposes. As with observers, they need to receive proper official accreditation from the election management body to freely undertake their reporting responsibilities. At the same time, the media has an obligation not to disrupt election activities through their coverage, which is discussed in Media.
SecurityBeing able to vote in an atmosphere free of fear, intimidation or manipulation is an important integrity principle. Security during the election process is critical, especially during voting, counting and transmission of the results. A peaceful election environment facilitates a free, fair and credible election, and avoids the security problems that could jeopardize the integrity of the materials, participation or election results. Security of the process includes the security of the participants as well as security for the materials and electoral systems. Voters must be able to vote without fear and monitors must be able to observe without intimidation. Candidates must be able to campaign without fear of assassination or harm to their supporters. To ensure integrity, election managers need to be able to plan and implement elections without interference, and election materials must be safeguarded so they are not tampered to change the election outcome. Good security provides the peace of mind that is essential for a free and fair election process. Insecurity breeds fear and has participants reacting to what they think might happen instead of what they think should happen. Maintaining physical security for elections is the responsibility of the government and is usually done through the civilian police force. The arrangements on how security is handled vary by country and circumstances. An important integrity aspect is that law enforcement remains neutral and professional, that it provides enforcement equitably and that law breakers are prosecuted in a fair trial. Good Security Planning Good security requires good planning. This usually starts by identifying vulnerable areas in the electoral process and the physical sites that need protection. Once these vulnerabilities are identified, protective measures can be developed and put in an election security plan. Election security also includes control and tracking systems for documents within the election management body, ensuring payrolls are delivered on time and that poll workers and security agents have received adequate training. A good security plan is enhanced by good coordination between the election management body and the law enforcement agencies. A joint security plan might be developed and a coordination mechanism established to facilitate information-sharing and decision-making. This is usually done at the national, regional and local levels of both institutions. In Cambodia, for example, security was a major concern in the 1998 elections. There were still elements of the Khmer Rouge active in the north, and unresolved extra-judicial killings from the factional fighting that had occurred the year before. The National Elections Committee (NEC), in coordination with the government security forces and the domestic NGOs, developed a multi-faceted security plan:
With the cooperation of the government, the NEC also worked out a successful security plan for the actual voting and ballot counting. Security personnel drawn from the armed services or police and seconded to the NEC were attached to each polling station, but they were not in regular uniform and were identified only by an NEC arm-band. The low visibility of soldiers and policemen played a major part in maintaining peace on election day and in creating an atmosphere conducive to high voter turnout. The NEC also encouraged NGOs in their training of thousands of military, police and gendarmes as election peacekeepers.195 For more on the training of security forces to act as election peacekeepers in Cambodia, see the case study Civic Education for a Nonviolent Election.
Neutrality of the Security Officers Good election security relies on the neutrality and professionalism of law enforcement officials. They act in a professional manner and treat everyone equally. The constitutional and civil rights of the citizens are respected and they do not become involved with the political campaign or agenda of any political party or candidate. The security officials must also respect the law and enforce it without the use of excessive force or violence. In some systems, especially post-conflict societies and those undergoing a transition, security problems can stem from police misconduct. They can harass voters attending rallies or stop voters from going to the polls through the use of road blocks. The law is not enforced and a climate of insecurity can permeate the elections. Ensuring the neutrality and professionalism of the security services in these situations can be difficult. A start can be made by adopting a binding Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement and focusing public and government attention on its enforcement. Protection of Polling Sites and Electoral Offices. Physical security for electoral sites (management offices, registration and polling sites) and the electoral officials who work in those sites enables an environment where the process can be administered in a neutral and unobstructed manner. Theft of electoral supplies and equipment can adversely affect the integrity of the process and needs to be addressed through good on-site security, such as security officers controlling the entrances and exits, employee photo identification badges, sign-in sheets for after-hours use of the building, as well as good inventory control management systems. Badges for observers and monitors can also assist, as they allow security officers to know who is authorized entry into areas where critical aspects of the process are carried out. Physical security of offices and electoral personnel is also important. In high crime areas, visible security in the form of fences, window bars, well lit entrances and parking lots, and uniformed officers could have a deterrent effect. In conflict areas, electoral administrators and workers can become political targets and need additional safeguards to ensure that they are able to do their work in a safe and secure environment. This can be a challenge in countries in transition with new police forces and nervous electoral workers. (See Special Considerations in Countries in Transition). Threats against the process or personnel do not need to be credible to frighten and disrupt the electoral machinery, so the security fears of electoral officials and staff should be taken seriously and addressed as soon as possible. In polling stations, order needs to be maintained during their establishment, polling, and the count. In some countries, this is done directly through police protection and by taking indirect measures, such as closing bars and liquor stores during polling. For example, in the Philippines, it is illegal to serve, sell, buy or take intoxicating liquor on polling day. 196 Firearms are prohibited within a certain radius of a polling station by most electoral laws. Some systems have a person responsible for security at every polling site. They control access into the building, allowing a limited number of voters into the polling station at a time, keeping the line orderly and moving in order of first come, first serve. This can avoid mob scenes at crowded polling stations, which can get out of hand and disrupt polling. Orderly lines also provide less fodder for those intent on creating disorder. For more on site security see Entrance and Queue Control. At the same time, these security personnel should not appear to be intimidating or biased or their presence could discourage some voters from entering the polls. Protection of Electoral Materials Ballots, tally sheets and other electoral materials must be protected from unauthorized duplication, destruction or tampering to protect the integrity of the vote. This protection should start upon their arrival in the country or delivery to the election management body and continue through their storage and distribution to polling sites. Some systems require the return of ballots to central storage areas after the count in case they are needed for recounts. Keeping track of ballots is facilitated in most systems by the use of a serial numbered stubs that can be used in a paper trail. The way ballots are packed also helps with security. Packaging ballots in different sized tamper-proof packaging can enable distribution of the right amount of ballots to each polling station without the need to open and repack the ballots. Sealed containers with the right number of ballot packages per electoral district, with the serial numbers, polling location and type of ballot marked on the outside, can also facilitate storage and distribution and minimize the opportunities for mishandling. Protection of Candidates, Monitors and Voters Candidates are verbal targets for opposing parties and candidates, but they can also be targets for violent acts by those who would like to disrupt the process or eliminate opposition figures. Candidate protection is usually provided by the police and other specialized law enforcement agencies. In addition to candidates, campaign rally sites, debates and other public events where large numbers of people gather for campaign purposes need to be protected. Polling must also be protected. Voters need to be able to leave their homes and vote without fear of violence in the streets or intimidation in the polling station. They need easy access to the polling station. Having to work their way through threatening individuals or partisan groups to vote can artificially reduce voter turnout. Voter registration cards also need to be protected from unauthorized confiscation or theft. Monitors also require security so they can observe the process, ask questions of officials, make comments on the election summary sheets, and sign the tally sheets without intimidation or fear of retribution. Domestic observers in countries in transition can feel vulnerable to intimidation and violence, especially when they observe problems stemming from the ruling party or security forces. For example, in the insecure environment of the 1998 elections in Cambodia, domestic monitoring groups, such as COMFREL, 'organized meetings at which its volunteers discussed concerns about political conditions with party representatives, election officials and local authorities... This dialogue had a positive effect and decreased the level of violence during voter registration and the campaign period.' 197 Threats on election day, can come from within the election management body as well as from the outside. In some systems, unhappy poll workers can strike right before or after polling, take polling materials hostage for things such as better pay. These issues can be minimized through good planning, training and competitive pay (see Staffing and Recruitment.) Problems can also come from other sectors of society which might take advantage of election day to publicize their own issues or disrupt the process. These can be strikes by public transporters or even collective action by the security forces. For instance, in South Africa 'strikes and lockouts on voting day by employees and employers in the public transport or telecommunication sector are prohibited and are not protected in terms of Chapter IV of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.198
Code of Conduct for Law EnforcementPolice, and those in law enforcement involved in election security, hold a position of public trust. Their fundamental duties are to protect lives and property and to ensure that laws are enforced. In most countries operating under the rule of law, the public expects the police to be impartial, fair and responsible in the enforcement of public order and the laws of the country. These principles should be reflected in the institutional values of the law enforcement agencies, such as this one from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Rigorous obedience to constitutional principles ensures that individually and institutionally we always remember that constitutional guarantees are more important than the outcome of any single interview, search for evidence or investigation. Respect for the dignity of all whom we protect reminds us to wield law enforcement powers with restraint and to recognize the natural human tendency to be corrupted by power and to become callous in its exercise. Fairness and compassion ensure that we treat everyone with the highest regard for constitution, civil and human rights. Personal and institutional integrity reinforce each other and are owed to the Nation in exchange for the sacred trust and great authority conferred upon us. Most police systems use a code of ethics for the conduct of the police officers and others involved in law enforcement. These codes are usually binding and include:
For more on ethics in policing, see Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Voting MechanismsIn addition to voting by the traditional paper Ballots, voting machines can be used. The use of mechanical or electronic voting machines has not substantially changed the voting process, but it has made counting the vote faster, more accurate and economical, and it has made it more difficult to tamper with the results. Traditional mechanical voting machines require the use of a lever to mark the ballot or for the voter to use a dark pencil that a machine can read. In the system that uses a dark pencil, after an optical scan, the darkest mark within a given area is counted as the vote. One of the newer voting systems ('direct recording electronic') has no paper ballot and the voter marks their choice into electronic storage with the use of a touch screen button. Some voters may have difficulty understanding how the machines work, so a good education effort on the machines is required. To ensure the integrity of votes cast by machine, the machine must meet basic standards (see Procurement). In the U.S., for example, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) developed standards after the first machines in the 1970s were found to be unreliable. The National Bureau of Standards found that one of basic causes for computer-related election problems was the lack of appropriate technical skills by electoral managers to develop or implement the sophisticated and complex written standards against which voting system hardware and software could be tested. As a result, national standards for computer-based voting systems were developed for the states to voluntarily adopt, which according to the FEC, eliminated the problem of substandard machines in U.S. elections. The FEC does acknowledge though that current U.S. standards, set in 1990, need to be updated in order to include the newer technologies that have since developed. 200 Integrity issues that arise during counting of machine read ballots include mechanical error or the problem of a machine not being able to determine the intention of the voter if an extraneous mark is made on the ballot. These issues are discussed in Counting.
Absentee VotingMost systems allow for some kind of absentee voting if the voter is unable to vote in person on election day at their polling station. Some systems limit this voting to those who are travelling or abroad. Others allow any registered voter to vote by absentee ballot in order to make voting more accessible. Although it may facilitate access and make voting easier, ensuring the integrity of an absentee ballot can be difficult. How to be sure that the voters who requested the absentee ballot filled it in themselves, freely and without duress? And, how to ensure the identity of the voter, yet keep that vote secret? Voting by mail, or soon by e-mail, also bypasses many of the safeguards put into a polling station vote, such as inking the fingers of voters to be sure they only voted once, or to show up physically so that everyone knows that this voter exists and is eligible. These issues need to be taken into consideration when designing the absentee voting system. In the case of Canada, absentee voting is allowed under Special Voting Rules. The voters may request a voting kit, but the request must be received by a set date. The kit includes a special ballot and an anonymous multi-envelope system designed to protect the identity of each voter. The ballot is blank and the voter writes in the first name or initials and the surname of the candidate of their choice: The special ballot voting kit contains three envelopes. Having completed the ballot, the voter inserts it into an unmarked inner envelope, seals it, and places that envelope in an outer envelope: which bears voter registration information and a declaration. Envelopes sent to electors residing outside Canada and electors away from their electoral districts also feature a bar code for verification. The voter signs and dates the declaration on the outer envelope, seals it and places it in a pre-addressed third envelope; which is then mailed or delivered either to the Chief Electoral Officer in Ottawa or, if the voter is in his or her own riding, to the returning officer for that riding. In the Canadian system, it is the responsibility of the voter to know the names of the candidates, because the ballot is blank. It is also the voter's responsibility to return the absentee ballot by the specified deadline or it will not be counted. Voters who request an absentee ballot cannot vote in any other way for that election. In the case of Ireland, protections against voter impersonation in casting absentee ballots include requiring that the voter have their 'declaration of identity witnessed by a Garda (police officer) before marking the ballot paper and returning it by post to the returning officer.202 Once rare, absentee balloting is being used more and more as a convenience by voters. Absentee ballots can make a difference in the election outcome. For example, in the 1960 U.S. presidential elections, the electoral votes for the state of California went from John F. Kennedy to Richard Nixon after the count of the absentee ballots. With the electronic revolution, voting by Internet will fast become the next absentee ballot system. Safeguards will need to be put into place to ensure that electronic absentee voting is honest and reliable. For more on elections and technology, see Elections and Technology.
Discrimination, Intimidation and FraudAn election can be affected by discrimination, intimidation and fraud. Discrimination can result in eligible voters not being able to vote. Intimidation can affect voting behaviour and fraud can affect the outcome of the vote. Measures must be taken to ensure that these problems are not systemic, that they are addressed immediately, and that they do not affect the outcome of the election (see Integrity Measures to Protect Against Fraud). Because of the secrecy of the vote, a tainted vote is impossible to invalidate once it is cast. And each tainted vote cancels out a valid vote, hurting the integrity of the process. Problems can be on an individual level, involving small scale intimidation or corruption. This usually affects individuals and the way they vote, but does not change the outcome of the election. Problems can also be widespread and systemic which can affect the process to the point where the final results do not reflect the will of the voters. Both types of problems must be addressed, although systemic problems that raise questions about the validity of the results must be assessed immediately to determine whether the problem was so severe that the elections must be reheld. Discrimination Discrimination, aimed at preventing certain groups of voters from being able to vote, is not a problem confined to any one system or locality. It can done systematically through bureaucratic obstacles to voting, such as poll taxes, or through individuals refusing certain voters to access the polling sites. Bureaucratic obstacles can make it difficult for certain segments of the population to register or to vote. These can include:
Voters can also be denied entry into polling stations by polling staff, monitors or other persons hanging around outside the polling station. These actions are illegal in all systems. In the case of the U.S., racial discrimination in voting was addressed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This Act was passed at a time when discrimination in some parts of the southern U.S. prevented African American voters from voting. To combat this problem, the Act included some extraordinary remedies which were applicable to the problem areas for a limited time. These included:
These provisions were originally scheduled to expire in 1970 but have been renewed several times and are now scheduled to end in 2007. 203 Intimidation Intimidation can take many forms, and can be subtle or involve brute force. But the purpose of intimidation is usually to intimidate voters into voting for or against a certain person, party or position. Intimidation tactics can include:
Intimidation can be done by anyone - a candidate, a political party monitor, another voter, an election manager or a government official. Most electoral laws make intimidation illegal. However, the subtle forms of intimidation can be hard to prove. In the case of Mexico, its electoral law makes it illegal for any administrator or party official to exert pressure on voters on election day inside polling stations or where voters are standing in line. It is also illegal for them to carry out any type of electoral propaganda when fulfilling their duties or for anyone to obstruct voting or exert a physical or moral force on the electoral officials. Spreading false information about the development of the election and its outcome is also illegal. 204 Fraud Fraud during voting, can be found at the voters' level when ineligible persons vote or eligible voters vote more than once. It can also be found at the administrative levels where those with access to sensitive electoral materials or sites can stuff ballot boxes with premarked ballot, vote for no-show voters or change the results of the count on the reporting sheets. At the voting level, possibilities for fraud include:
On the administrative side, possibilities for fraud include:
Integrity Measures to Protect Against FraudProtecting against Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud during voting is the responsibility of the election management and policy bodies and law enforcement. Integrity can be helped by Political Party Monitors, National Election Observation, International Election Observation, and the Media, as well as through the active participation of the voters themselves (see Every Voter a Poll Watcher (NANFREL)). Although, as stated by Elklit Jorgen and Palle Svensson, 'irregularities on polling day seriously threaten freedom and fairness only to the extent that they are extensive, systematic or decisive in a close race' 206, irregularities need to be addressed. Even if they do not affect the election results, they undermine the credibility of the process and the legitimacy of the official results. Protective measures can be designed into both the electoral management and operations systems. Some of the measures that can be taken to minimize integrity problems during polling include: Good management and operational systems Overt fraud, as well as operational problems, can be dealt with by good management and supervision. This is facilitated by good planning and the development of systems that use checks and oversight mechanisms. These could include:
For more on good management of polling see Voting Control. Secure and neutral polling sites Voters need to feel protected from political activists and pressure during voting. Polling sites should be located in a safe and neutral location, such as a school, sports centre or village hall. They should not be in the home or on the property of a candidate or political party official. In some systems, a dominant ruling party may be in control of government operations and, as a result, government buildings may not be seen as neutral polling locations. Troublemakers should be kept away from polling sites, and crowds kept at a far enough distance that they do not hinder access to the station by voters. In South Africa, for example, voters must leave the polling station as soon as they complete voting. In Ireland, the presiding officer may order the arrest of any person suspected of committing an electoral offense. 207 The polling site needs to be secure enough that it can protect the polling materials and ballot boxes. In some places, losing candidates have been known to steal ballot boxes or destroy them after the elections in order to invalidate the results from that area. Another tactic is ballot box substitution, where the entire ballot box is exchanged after the polling. 208 These can be detected by the use of seals on ballot boxes, and good continuous monitoring by political party monitors and observers. For more on polling site security see Security. Good monitoring Monitors and observers who watch polling and the count can deter and detect many integrity problems. Monitors, in particular, who may challenge irregularities on the spot, can be an effective integrity agent. (For more see Monitors of Election Integrity.). In Mexico, for instance, political party agents certify the authenticity of election day files through their presence and personal signatures. They are authorized to sign ballots before election day, and at the start of voting, to ensure that ballots have not been tampered with or substituted. 209 Having monitors from several political parties along with domestic observers reduces the chance of collusion with polling station officials to manipulate the results. Monitors usually sign the tally sheet and ensure that they have a copy that they can use to double check that the results are not changed later. This is an important mechanism because as explained by former MP Ding Tanjuatco in the Philippines:
After the count is completed in the precinct, the votes are recorded in a document called the Election Return. The intercalation of a single digit can result in a hundred votes added in favour of a candidate. And this is so easy to do because by this time the level of awareness had been relaxed, the recording being anticlimatic to the counting.
Tampering with the results can be discovered through a parallel vote count, where the party monitors or domestic observers report back the results from each table, and these results are compared with the official results announced by the election management body. For the use of the parallel count in Indonesia see the case study Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity. Confirming voter identity To avoid the problem of voter impersonation, where a person uses the valid registration of another voter to vote, some systems require voter identification. This enables the polling officers to check that the person who showed up to vote is the person who is registered. This can be done by producing the official voter registration card, or through showing some other type of acceptable identification. In the case of Ireland, voters can only vote if the presiding officer is satisfied with the elector's identity. This can mean being required to produce proof of identity for the presiding officer, and without proof, may not be permitted to vote. 211 In South Africa, the polling officer may require that the voter's fingerprints be taken to ensure identity. 212 In other systems, requiring proof of identity is seen as a means of harassment or discrimination, and is prohibited. In the U.S., for example, the federal Voting Act does not allow a polling official to ask for voter identification. This has led to a widespread perception, that noncitizens or other ineligible persons, are able to vote in the place of anyone on the voter registration list. Several states are addressing this issue by proposing state legislation to require voter identification at the polls. This includes California where:
Under the current system, virtually anyone can walk in off the street, sign the voter registry using any name on the voter roll and cast a ballot. Once that ballot is cast, even if we can prove fraud after the fact, the nature of the secret ballot prevents us from being able to invalidate the illegal vote. With this one common-sense reform (requiring voters to show IDs), we would be able to tighten and improve the security of California's election process. 213 Identifying voters who have already voted To avoid the problem of individual voters voting more than once, some systems mark the voters who have completed voting. Once marked, the voter can no longer vote. The most common marking system is the use of indelible ink on one of the voter's fingers. Other systems use hand stamps which are visible under fluorescent lights. For the ink to be effective, the election management body must ensure that there is enough ink for every voter and that it is potent enough to last through the polling period. Storage and distribution of ink is also usually monitored, as ink can be used by those interested in subverting the process to prevent eligible opposition voters, or those who have been paid not to vote, from actually voting. Ensuring ballot integrity It is important to ensure that there are no unauthorized copies made of the official ballot, that voters receive unmarked ballots for polling and that the ballots are not switched before or after the count. To accomplish this, some systems mark the ballots with an identifying mark. Some systems use special paper or watermarks to discourage and identify unauthorized duplication (see Ballots). Others mark the ballots as they are being handed to voters to ensure that the voter returns the same ballot. In Ireland and Kenya, for example, ballots are not valid until they are stamped with an official's authenticating mark. In the case of Mexico, after checking to make sure the ballots have not been pre-marked, political party monitors can sign the back of the ballots. In several other systems, including the Philippines and South Africa, the head of the polling station authenticates the ballot by signing the back of it. These can deter most efforts to provide voters with pre-marked ballots or to replace valid ballots with fraudulent ones. However, in a few places, these safeguards have been bypassed by 'chained balloting.' As explained by Ding Tanjuatco, a former MP in the Philippines: Some candidates will take the word of the bought voter. However, if he wants to be sure that he gets his money's worth, the candidate will employ chained balloting or 'lansadera'. At the start of the day, all the potential 'buyees' are gathered in one place and, as soon as the polls are opened, one of them is sent to the polling place. After the usual identification process, he obtains a ballot from the poll clerk, which he takes with him to the polling booth. Protection for absentee ballots Voting by absentee ballots contains more possibilities for fraud since most systems do not require the physical presence of the voter at any stage in the process. Electoral managers can include mechanisms to protect the secrecy of Absentee Voting but it is still difficult to detect an individual who votes more than once using different names. In the case of the U.S. state of Arkansas, the Secretary of State is working to tighten the procedures for absentee voting in her state. She has proposed that a voter be limited to picking up and delivering five ballots to the county clerk's office for each election, that only one ballot per envelope be allowed, and that the registered voter should sign the outside of the mailed envelop to enable the county clerk to verify the signature with the voter registration records. 215 Other systems, such as Denmark, protects pre-election voting, by limiting it to being done in person at a national registration office, and only after presenting identification documents. Use of appropriate equipment As with the use of good systems, the use of appropriate equipment can minimize some integrity problems. For example:
For more on appropriate equipment see Voting Day Equipment. Good security A free and fair vote requires good security. This is important both inside and outside the polling station and applies to the voters, polling staff, monitors and materials. For more see Security. Enforcing the laws Enforcement of the electoral and criminal laws is a key deterrent. Good enforcement requires incidents to be investigated, suspects interviewed and those believed to have broken the law prosecuted. Those who are found guilty of a criminal offence should be held accountable for their actions and be sentenced according to the provision in the law. Enforcement should be done impartially and with equity. Most systems do not allow high level officials and others in government to be immune from criminal prosecution. Prosecution and removal of office of those found guilty of election fraud can be a disincentive to election fraud. For example, in 1994, a U.S. federal judge removed a state senator from office over election fraud and another 16 persons either pleaded guilty or were convicted of absentee ballot fraud. 216 For more on enforcement and prosecution see Enforcement of Election Integrity. Educate voters Preventing the buying of votes or the manipulation of the vote through intimidating tactics can be difficult, especially in countries with high unemployment, low incomes and security problems. The voters may not be aware of their rights, of the mechanisms that will be used to protect the secrecy of their vote or of the motives of the vote buyers. A good voter education programme can make voters more aware of their rights, where to go for redress and how the systems is supposed to function. It can also explain the effects of corruption and the need for integrity in public service and the electoral process. For more, see Voter Education. Changing election dates or polling hours If something has gone fundamentally wrong, and it is impossible to have free and fair polling in certain locations, the election management authorities may consider changing the polling hours or date of the election. The scope of the changes usually depends on the type of elections being held and the size of the problem. South Africa, for instance, allows for a general postponement of the elections if necessary to ensure a free and fair election. It also allows for reruns in certain polling stations or different voting hours for different voting stations. It can also extend voting hours at a voting station until as late as midnight on voting day or temporarily close a voting station for part of the day if it is 'temporarily impossible to conduct a free and fair election at that voting station.' 217
CountingIntegrity problems can arise in several areas of the count. They can be at the polling table level where the individual ballots are counted or in the collation of the polling station totals. They can be the result of a genuine mistake or they can be a deliberate action to manipulate the outcome. Votes counted by hand may be subject to math errors or other human errors. Machine counts may be more accurate, but at the same time, a machine cannot determine the intention of the voter if the voter's mark is not in the spot read by the machine. Some of the integrity issues involved in ensuring a valid and accurate count: Time and location of the count The timing of a count can affect its integrity. The longer the ballots remain uncounted, the more time there is for tampering. The general consensus is that counting should be done as soon as possible after the close of the poll. At the same time, minimum conditions must be met, such as having adequate light, security and the presence of monitors. Where intimidation is a problem, counting at the individual table level may be problematic. There could be security problems or the problem of identifying the voting trends of a small group of voters. Where this is an issue, counting can be moved to a regional location where tables can be mixed before counting. This provision is included in the election laws of several countries, including South Africa's, which gives election managers flexibility, by allowing a count to be moved 'in the interest of ensuring a free and fair elections.' 218 Ensuring the voter's intention is counted Voters can mark their ballots but miss the check off box or space. This can lead to the issue of how to count the vote. A too strict application of where voters can place their mark can result in the invalidation of otherwise valid votes. In a country with low literacy rates, this can raise integrity concerns. For instance, Mozambique used this strict interpretation in its first election in 1994. Even if it was clear who the voter voted for, for example, by checking the face of the candidate instead of the box, the vote was counted as a spoiled ballot. Missing the check off space is also an issue for machine read ballots, as the machine will only read the check off box spaces. New Zealand addresses this issue by using a clear intention test: 'Even though the voter may not have marked his or her vote exactly in accordance with the instructions, the overriding test for deciding whether a vote should be counted is whether the voter's intention is clear.' 219 Ensuring voters votes are not identifiable The secrecy of the vote is maintained when ballots are not marked with anything that could identify the voter. If ballots are validated by a stamp or signatures, using a standard mark can help ensure that these marks cannot be used to connect a ballot with a voter. Voter education can also focus on ensuring that voters know not to put their name or other identifying mark on their ballot. Maintaining the secrecy of the vote can arise when votes are counted at too low a level. If a table only has a handful of voters and the votes are counted at that table, it will be clear how the persons voted. This can also be true to identify collective votes, such as how a village voted. This can be an issue in countries undergoing a transition or which have problems with intimidation, as discussed above in Timing and Location of Polling Sites. For instance, in the 1998 elections in Cambodia, counting was to be done at the table level, but domestic election observers and opposition candidates pushed for a revision of the electoral law to permit the mixing of ballots from different villages. This mixing was ultimately allowed and prevented the identification of how villages voted. It did create, however, problems for monitors, who found it difficult to adequately cover the consolidation sites where many tables were counted simultaneously. Ensuring an accurate count A count must be accurate so it reflects the votes cast. As with ensuring free and fair voting (see Integrity Measures to Protect Against Fraud), problems in the counting can be minimized by:
Machine counting New technology is changing the way voters vote. Electronic voting or the use of ballots that are counted by machine is becoming more and more prevalent. Providing the machine meets the minimum standards (see Voting Mechanisms), electronic counting of votes is usually able to provide a rapid and accurate count. Machine counting removes the subjectivity involved in assessing the validity of the vote and can ensure an impartial count, but machines cannot determine the intention of the voter if the voter made an extra mark on the paper or missed the spot where the machine reads. This can invalidate an otherwise valid vote and is an integrity issue. Voters need to be aware of how to correctly use and mark a machine-read ballot, and this can be done through a targeted voter education programme. Machine counting also eliminates many of the human errors in counting and opportunities for manipulating the count and consolidation of the results. However, machines are not infallible and, if not programmed or maintained correctly, can make mistakes. For instance, in the 1998 elections in the U.S. state of Hawaii, seven voting units out of the 361 used had problems reading the ballots. These were caused by lens occlusion, defective cables and read heads. It was a very close race and the losing candidate felt the results from these seven machines might have altered the outcome of the election. The Hawaiian Legislature ordered a statewide elections review - the first in the history of the state. An Oversight Committee was formed to oversee a recount. The Committee found that the machines had been defective, but that the recount had not changed the election results. Their report concluded that 'elections are far more complex than publicly known and the procedures have far more safeguards built in than most people were aware of. ' 222 This type of Official Oversight helps ensure the integrity of the count and the accuracy of the process.
Complaints and AppealsThe appeals process and the adjudication of complaints are essential parts of a free and fair election. Those who think they have not been treated equally or those with a valid complaint must have the opportunity and the mechanism to seek redress. The appeals process can catch and correct fraudulent action as well as genuine mistakes. A fair and equitable complaint and appeal process can also vindicate accused election managers and expose those who make fraudulent or unjustified accusations. Some candidates and parties may refuse to accept an electoral defeat and charge fraud or manipulation without any grounds. Some candidates may have grounds and the evidence to prove their charges. The investigation into the machine count problems in the 1998 Hawaiian elections (see Counting), showed that making a timely and public investigation increased transparency as well as public confidence in the integrity of the process. In this case, they felt it was important to dispel unfounded charges:
Easy solutions offered for real or imagined problems in elections may result in weakening the process. The process is too complex to warrant tinkering by those who are unskilled in administering the process... This review will be acceptable to reasonable people. It is unlikely that all charges, opinions or concerns will be totally answered to the satisfaction of those who base their concerns on fear and suspicion without concrete factual proof of allegations. Democracy is a fragile process, too important to all of us to allow unfounded or unproven allegations.223 Election integrity requires a willingness by the election management body and the justice system, to effectively address complaints. It also requires a willingness by the complainant to use the official complaint mechanism and to abide by its decision. The complaint and appeal process must be taken seriously with effective systems devised so that complaints can be evaluated and addressed in an efficient and timely manner (see Management of Challenges and Complaints.) For example, in the 1998 elections in Cambodia, the 'NEC (National Elections Committee) failed to grasp the importance of handling these complaints in a transparent, forthcoming and sensitive fashion. The CPP (Cambodian People's Party) pressed the NEC to wrap up the complaints process hastily. This in turn, only increased the opposition parties' suspicion of a cover-up. As a result the NEC's reputation was irreparably damaged.'224 (For more on the problems of the complaint process in Cambodia, see the case study Dispute Resolution Mechanisms) The institutions that handle complaints and appeals will differ according to the electoral and judicial system of the country. Some systems use the electoral management or policy body to handle electoral complaints and appeals. Other systems use a specialized court, such as an electoral court. Some systems, such as Denmark, use the legislature. According to the Danish constitution, the Folketinget determines the validity of the election of its members and is the sole judge in matters of eligibility. Decisions on matters related to the approval of elections rest entirely with the parliament itself. This is in accordance with traditional parliamentary theory and theories of representation. Since 1920, no election has been declared invalid, which would result in a second ballot taking place.225 On the other hand, in South Africa, complaints are first made at the Elections Commission, and then appeals are made to the Electoral Court. However, 'an election may not be set aside because of a mistake in the conduct of that election or a failure to comply with this Act, unless the mistake or failure materially affected the result of the election.' 226 This highlights the importance of adequately documenting a complaint so that the review body can determine if it is a valid complaint and the extent of the problem. For more on challenges and the complaint process, see: Challenges to Voters and Challenges to Validity of Ballots. Recounts Recounts are usually held in cases where a candidate or party challenges the vote count because they have reason to believe that the count was inaccurate. This can be because ballots were improperly counted or rejected, or because the poll workers improperly carried out the official addition. In some systems there is an automatic recount in a close election. In the case of Canada, an automatic recount is done if the two leading candidates are separated by less than one-thousandth of the total votes cast in the electoral district. The judicial recount is requested by the returning officer who also advises the candidates in writing. Citizens may also ask a judge to carry out a judicial recount by submitting an affidavit within 4 days of the official tally.227 To ensure the integrity of the recount, it is usually done within a short period of time after receipt of the complaint. This is to ensure ballots are not destroyed or tampered with before the recount. Monitors and observers usually watch the recount to ensure it is done accurately. Administrative Reviews Internal reviews can be done by the election management or policy bodies and are usually the first step after receiving a complaint. These reviews are part of the internal checks and balances of most election administrations. The reviews can deal with persons who had problems registering either as voters or as candidates, party registration issues or challenges to registration, voting or the count. To ensure integrity in the review process, the decision of the electoral management body is usually subject to an appeal. This enables the person who filed the complaint to seek a review of the decision with a higher-level institution, such as a constitutional court or other judicial entity. As described below, the appeal process serves as a check on the decisions made by the initial review board and can deter arbitrary or biased decision-making. In most systems, complaints regarding criminal activities are usually handled separately through the criminal justice system. Appeal Appeals are part of a free and fair electoral process. They can be one of the checks and balance on the decisions made by a lower-level court or administrative review of complaints. Each system handles their appeals differently, according to their legal and institutional frameworks, but it is important to have a user-friendly system that can review lower decisions in a systematic, neutral and timely manner. In Ireland, for example, the result of a presidential election may be questioned by way of petition to the High Court, presented by the Director of Public Prosecutions, a candidate or the agent of a candidate at the election. A petition may be presented only if the High Court, by order, grants leave to a person to do so. Application for leave to present a petition must be made within seven days of the declaration of the result of the election. The High Court, at the trial of an election petition, must determine the correct result of the election and for this purpose, may order the votes to be recounted or the poll to be taken again in any constituency, or it may declare the election void, in which case, a fresh election is held. The decision of the High Court is final, subject only to appeal on a question of law to the supreme court.228 On the other hand, in India, once the actual process of elections has started, the judiciary does not intervene in the conduct of the polls. Once voting is completed and the result declared, the Election Commission cannot review any results on its own. This can only be done as a result of an election petition which can be filed before a court.229
Official ResultsThe final step for electoral managers is to announce the official results. The official results should be an accurate reflection of the vote totals and include the official resolution of disputed ballots and counts. Ensuring accurate results is an essential election integrity issue. Manipulating the official result can often be used as a 'mechanism of last resort'230 whereby victories are inflated or defeats corrected. In these cases, the official results may not reflect the will of the voters, damaging the integrity of the election. The integrity of the official results can be protected by using the same safeguards that are used to protect the integrity of the vote (see Integrity Measures to Protect Against Fraud) and Counting. These include having efficient systems with adequate control mechanisms and good oversight. Continued monitoring throughout the count by observers and monitors can deter manipulation of the results. Monitors can compare their parallel vote count with the official results and immediately report any differences through both the official complaint system and the press. Releasing the official results in a timely manner is also important. The longer it takes to release results, the more time there is to manipulate the count. A long delay in the release of results, even if they are accurate, can raise suspicions of tampering which can damage the credibility of the results when they are finally released. In South Africa, for instance, issuing timely results is ensured by 'the commission (which) may determine and declare the result of an election without having received the results of all voting stations, if: a) to wait for the receipt of the result from every voting station would unduly and unreasonably delay the determination and declaration of the result of that election; and b) the outstanding results are not likely to materially influence the overall result of that election.'231 Taking Office The final step of a vaild electoral process is for the winner of the election to take office. In the older democracies, the transfer of power from one elected official to another is routine and not an issue. But for countries in transition, such as Angola or Myanmar, this final step can be difficult and can abruptly end the democratic election process. In post-conflict societies or countries with a history of undemocratic rule it is important to address these issues directly in the planning process. Having an election that is accurate, transparent, free, fair and credible (see Guiding Principles) can help minimize the excuses for a loser not to accept the election results. Accurate parallel counts by political parties can help validate the results. International Election Observation missions can certify an election and its elections results as 'acceptable'. All of these make it more difficult for a loser to justify its rejection. However, if a ruling power with control over the security apparatus or a militarized faction refuses to accept the election results, it is usually beyond the control of the electoral management body, and is an issue which is usually dealt with on a political level. Integrity in ParticipationElections do not take place in a vacuum. Electoral administrators set up the framework and processes by which political parties, candidates and voters participate. Genuine participation in elections is essential to election integrity. Political parties need to field candidates so the process is competitive. Candidates need to campaign and get their political platforms out so they can win the support of voters. Interest groups work to motivate public opinion into supporting certain candidates or issues. And voters participate by discussing political issues, working on campaigns and voting on election day. Participation is an important factor in democratic elections and, for a free, fair and credible election, must be done with same degree of integrity as that of election administration. The major participants in an election are: Political Parties and Candidates; Interest Groups which are interested in influencing the outcome of the elections; public interest groups who watch out for the public interest (see NonGovernmental Organizations); and the Voters themselves. The participation of election monitors is discussed in Political Party Monitors. Political Parties and CandidatesPolitical parties are organized groups that compete in elections in order to win public office, operate the government and determine public policy. The organizational structure of political parties differ according to the Social and Political Context of each country but all share the same interest in fielding candidates and winning elections. Through this interest, political parties can help maintain integrity by monitoring the electoral process to ensure that no other party receives preferential treatment (see Political Party Monitors). They also publicize political issues, stimulate interest in the political process, recruit candidates and carry out election campaigns. (For more in depth information see Parties and Candidates. Many electoral systems will allow independent candidates to run without a party affiliation, and independent candidates and their monitors serve the same integrity functions as candidates from political parties. For a free and fair election, the internal workings of a political party should be transparent and as free and fair as the electoral process itself. This means that the mechanisms for the selection of candidates are transparent, fair and inclusive. Political party leaders are held accountable for their actions by internal party regulations as well as by legislation that covers participant activity. Political parties have not always been models of transparency and integrity in their pursuit of elected office. In the U.S., for instance, some regional or local political party organizations have been known as 'political machines.' The name came from parties that operated like a well oiled machine- headed by a boss, or small group of autocratic leaders, whose orders were carried out by a small group of loyal members. These 'machines' were known for their unethical methods of keeping themselves in elected office, such as the use of bribery, patronage, graft, control over nominations and the rigging of elections. The power of these political party machines was reduced through the introduction of internal party elections ('primaries') to select a party's candidate, and citizen activism in restoring a clean and accountable government. (For more on this see Historical Review.) Having a political party that acts in an ethical and legal manner during the electoral process is an effective election integrity mechanism. It can reduce attempts to manipulate the process and helps ensure the accountability of electoral administrators and other participants. In general, integrity in political party participation includes:
Open and fair selection of candidates One of the primary purposes of a political party is to select candidates and help them win office. For election integrity purposes, the candidate selected should be the candidate with the most popular support within the party. In some systems, political party bosses, or small cliques within the party, select their nominees. The nominee is then beholden to the bosses who would expect favours and other preferential treatment. This can also be true of large donors to parties who may try to 'buy' candidates (for more on this see Campaign Financing.) One way to open up the selection of nominees is to elect the nominees. In the United States, for example, the hold of party bosses was decreased through the introduction of the 'primary' election which opened up the nomination process and made nominee selection more representative and democratic. A primary system can give rank and file party members a larger voice in party affairs and enables party members to get rid of an unpopular, but strongly entrenched party leader. In the U.S., primary elections are held by the state or county election authorities and are funded by taxpayers. They add an extra layer to the U..S. election system, but have almost eliminated conventions or closed door meetings (caucus) as a means for the major parties to nominate candidates. Primaries can be restricted to party members ('closed primary') or open to all registered voters ('open primary') depending on the rules of the party and electoral system. The integrity issue associated with a closed primary is that voters must state their affiliation with a political party at the time of voter registration. Voters who do not want to be officially affiliated with a political party may not vote in a closed primary. The integrity issue raised by an open primary is that members of other political parties get to select the nominees of another party-- presumably selecting the weakest candidate so that their own party candidate can win in the general election. The caucus (or party meeting) is another mechanism to select party candidates. It can be done with just party leaders or include rank and file party members. Integrity issues that arise from using a caucus include its often unrepresentative nature, the lack of a separation of powers within the party, the use of secret deals or exchanging favours to manipulate the caucus, and the use of a 'snap' caucus by which small cliques control the nominating process by not notifying all eligible participant of the meeting. It can, however, produce compromise among different factions of a party and costs less, making it more affordable for some parties. Running a clean election campaign Political parties and candidates participate in an election by conducting a campaign in order to persuade voters to vote for them on polling day. Some of the issues involved with having an environment conductive to a free and fair campaign, include the freedom to campaign (see Electoral Campaign) and Access to Media. Running a clean election campaign helps parties maintain their integrity, and the integrity of the process. A clean campaign means they participate fairly, campaign on the issues and abide by campaign regulations. Although the electoral contest is supposed to be a peaceful process, campaigns are designed to motivate voters and have them associate candidates with particular issues or emotions. Because no one is sure whether voters vote for or against candidates, candidates often rely on attack measures. They can focus on the negatives in the other candidate and why they think that person is not qualified to lead. Increasingly, this can include exposing the personal life and qualities of the other candidates, rather than attacking their political positions. The quality of the campaign and the ethics that should be used in campaigning are discussed in Campaign Ethics. Campaigns have become costly undertakings and are become more expensive every year. Studies indicate that the candidate that spends the most money is usually the candidate who wins the election. For example, in the U.S. State of California, the Secretary of State compared spending by winning and losing candidates for State Assembly elections. Winners consistently outspent losers. The average cost of a winner running for State Assembly in 1976 was about $40,000, but by 1998 it was almost $250,000. Losing candidate spending did not increase from 1976 and the spending radio between winners and losers went from roughly 3 to 1 in 1976 to 14 to 1 in 1998. 232 The need to raise the large sums of money that is required to win a campaign, can raise serious integrity issues. Where does this money come from? How and where is it spent? Is the contributor buying access or special treatment? Is it possible for a candidate to remain impartial after being elected because of the large contribution made by someone or some organization? To ensure a clean campaign, most electoral systems have adopted some kind of Campaign Financing regulation and have moved towards regulating lobbyist activities (see Interest Groups).
Campaign EthicsCampaigns are events where voters receive information about the political parties, their candidates and their political platform. Voters use this information to make a choice among the competing candidate and parties on polling day. For voters to be able to make a rational and informed choice, they need clear and accurate information on the candidates, platforms and issues. They need to be able to make a decision on who to vote for in a secure environment, free from fear or intimidation. Integrity suffers when voters are unable to attend a campaign rally or openly support a political party or candidate because they are harassed by the supporters of another political party. Candidates and political parties need the support of the voters in order to win an election. Integrity requires that they be able to get their message out without interference, and without having to resort to violence or smear tactics. Campaign ethics and the behaviour of the parties, candidates and their supporters has a direct impact on the integrity of the electoral process. Unethical campaign behaviour or treatment that artificially affects the election outcome and the process does not allow for a free, fair or credible election. To ensure integrity in the electoral campaign, most electoral systems require campaigns to be conducted:
Codes of Conduct for Political PartiesSome electoral systems use a code of conduct to regulate the conduct of political parties, candidates and their supporters during an election. These can be voluntary, nonbinding agreements that result from a consensus among the parties, or they can be part of the legislative and regulative framework that is binding and enforced. Codes of conduct or behaviour should be adapted to the special circumstances of each electoral system. In the older democracies, where campaign financing is an issue, ethical codes include detailed instructions on what is, and what is not, allowed in campaign financing. In countries undergoing a transition, the focus of a code of conduct is usually aimed at renouncing the use of violence and agreeing to accept the election results. Codes of conduct for political parties include the parties, their candidates and supporters. Some require the party to control the activities of their supporters and to be responsible for violations of the Code by its supporters. Voluntary Code of Conduct IDEA (the Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance) has developed a model Code of Conduct: Political Parties (IDEA) . This is a voluntary code based on negotiations between the parties. These negotiations establish the ground rules for campaign ethics and help build confidence in the conduct and outcome of the elections. IDEA believes that parties are more likely to act in good faith if they have to voluntarily commit themselves to comply to a code of conduct. Public exposure is the inducement for them to act with self-restraint and to abide by the code. Mandatory Code of Conduct Some electoral systems include a mandatory code of conduct that parties and candidates must abide by if they are competing in the elections. These codes can form part of the legislative or regulative framework and are enforced through the use of administrative and legal sanctions. A candidate could be disqualified from the race for breaking the code of conduct, as well as be the subject of legal action. For integrity purposes, mandatory codes must be clearly written, with the obligations of the parties unambiguous, and the sanctions for breaking the code reasonable and detailed within the code. An example of a code of conduct for political parties in a country undergoing a transition, is the 1995 South African Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties. This Code is automatically binding on any party, candidate and party representative that submits an application to contest the elections. The term 'representative' is broad and includes 'party agents, messengers, subscribers to the nomination of a candidate, persons on party lists for proportional representation, and supporters (including all party members or financial subscribers.' 233 And the party is held accountable for violations of the code by any of their representatives. A summary of the South African Code of Conduct for Political Parties:
Campaign FinancingCompeting in an election costs money and election campaigns are becoming more and more expensive. Funds are needed to establish a campaign office, hire staff, do polling, get the campaign message out and for the candidate to travel and meet the voters. One of the main factors in the increase in the cost of campaigns is the increasing reliance on the use of expensive mass media advertising. In the U.S., for example, the 1998 congressional campaign was estimated to have cost $1.5 billion. Candidates raised $781 million, while the Republican and Democratic National Party Committees raised $445 million in 'hard money' (money given directly to them) and another $224 million in 'soft money' (money spent on their behalf). In addition, 'issue advertising' on television around election issues was estimated at $112 million, and another $11.7 million 'independent' expenditures were made in support of candidates by organizations.235 Integrity problems in campaign financing With elections costing so much money, and with studies suggesting that winners are the ones who spend the most money,236 political parties and candidates can be absorbed by the issue of raising funds. How campaigns are financed and what candidates and political parties do with donations, can be the source of many integrity problems. According to Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 'corruption and abuses related to the financing of elections and political parties are among the most common dangers confronting democracies today.' 237 These dangers can include:
According to Common Cause, a U.S. public interest group which lobbies for accountable government and clean elections:
The way congressional campaigns are currently financed is corrupt. It is a system where individuals and groups can contribute significant sums of money to elected officials who have the power to make decisions affecting the interests of those donors. It is also a system where incumbents' financial advantage often results in noncompetitive elections, making them less responsive to the voters and more responsive to special-interest contributors.238 Regulating campaign financing Most electoral systems attempt to limit the impact of money and the influence of large donors through the regulation of campaign spending and financing, and by providing public funds for campaign purposes. Regulating assistance to a political campaign, be it in the form of volunteering time and labour to assist a favourite candidate or donating funds and resources, can be sensitive as it touches on issues such as freedom of speech and press. Most election systems have avoided regulating the fundamental right of a voter or group to support their candidate of choice. Instead they focus on the transparency of the financing process-- requiring a maximum of publicity through public disclosure of all donations and expenditures. Campaign finance laws require a regular reporting process, and can sometime limit the amount of funds that can be raised or spent. In the U.S., for instance, a number of laws have been passed to regulate federal campaign spending. One of these was the Federal Election Campaign Act which created the Federal Elections Commission and was 'designed to ensure that candidates in federal elections were not- or did not appear to be - beholden to a narrow group of people. Taken together, it was hoped, the laws would sustain and promote citizen confidence and participation in the democratic process.' 239 Congress enacted this law because it believed that the 'representative form of government needed protection from the corrosive influence of unlimited and undisclosed political contributions.' 240 In the case of New Zealand, every registered party is required by law to appoint a qualified independent auditor to audit the financial return of the party. The auditor must have access to all records, document and accounts which relate to the party's election expenses. The auditor's report on a party's return must state whether the return does or does not fairly reflect that party's election expenses, whether s/he received all the information required to carry out the audit and whether proper records of the party's election expenses were kept by the party. The appointment of auditors was seen as mechanism to encourage compliance with all recommended measures. 241 Limiting election expenditures Some systems limit the amount of funds that can be spent on an election. In New Zealand, for example, the law requires that a party competing the election, not exceed $1 million plus $20,000 for each constituency candidate nominated by the party in the three month period preceding the election. 242 In the case of Nepal, because of the difficulties in ensuring political party compliance with disclosure of actual expenditures, they are working to reduce the level of campaign expenses To reduce costs, and to make competing in elections more affordable, restrictions have been placed on the duration of the electoral campaign, campaign materials that can be used, and the size and number of campaign posters that can be distributed:
If campaign expenses are restricted considerably or election expenses met by the state, and the voters are well educated and popular persons are nominated by the political party as candidates, the election campaigns, in such crude form will be less warranted, and contesting elections will not be a costly affair. Capable, honest, sincere people with less financial resources can contest elections and the quality of the legislature will definitely improve by way of the integrity and honesty of the members elected in the twenty first century.243 Limiting campaign contributions In addition to limiting expenditures, most systems regulate who can contribute to political campaigns, and how much they can give. These restrictions on 'hard money' (money given directly to support a candidate or party) can include:
Independent campaign expenditures Independent expenditures made by an individual or group on behalf of a campaign are usually protected as part of freedom of speech or press. This funding, known as 'soft money,' is a way for large contributors to help their party, candidate or issue without being restricted by the funding limits in most campaign finance laws. According to Common Cause, 'soft money corrupts for a simple and obvious reason. Soft money donations are given in such huge amounts--$50,000, $100,000 or more-- that the donors typically expect to receive something in return for their investment.'246 In the U.S., for example, individuals or groups may make unlimited 'independent expenditures' in connection with federal elections or for 'party building.' It can be done by corporations, unions, and large - '$100,000, $250,000 or even $1 million- contributions given by wealthy individuals.' 247 To be considered independent, the expenditure may not be made with the cooperation or consent of the candidate or his/her campaign; nor may it be made upon a request or suggestion of either the candidate or the campaign.248 Each system has its own mechanism to deal with independent expenditures. In the case of New Zealand, All advertisements or broadcasts encouraging or persuading or appearing to encourage or persuade voters to vote for a registered party [must] be authorized in writing by the party secretary or the Secretary's delegate... It is not possible to remove an advertisement from the scope of the definition [of election activity] by willfully failing to authorize it officially.249 In the fall of 1999, Common Cause asked U.S. presidential candidates in the 2000 presidential race to sign a pledge 'not to violate federal campaign finance law by waging soft-money funded shadow' campaigns.' The pledge read in part:
I publicly pledge to comply with federal campaign finance laws by agreeing that neither I, nor my agents, will use any third-party entities- such as state-level PACs, nonprofit foundations, or corporations- to raise and spend soft money to promote my candidacy for President of the United States.250 Neither of the major candidates for President signed the pledge and both Governor Bush (Republican) and Vice President Gore (Democrat) went on to raise record-breaking amounts of soft-money to support their campaigns. Public disclosure requirements Many election systems require public disclosure of campaign financing so that the voter will know who is financially backing a candidate and whether this might influence future decisions once in office. Public disclosure of financing is usually done through periodic reporting by candidates, political parties, political action committees and lobbyists. These reports disclose the amount of funds raised and spent. Enough information should be required in the report so that the authorities can determine whether the campaign finance laws are being respected, and for voters to know who is financially supporting the candidates. Disclosure reports are usually made available to the public and monitored closely by NonGovernmental Organizations. Reporting requirements have been challenged by political parties and candidates. Some of their complaints focus on the amount of information required by the reports. In New Zealand, for example, the Court of Appeal, upheld the need for adequate financial reporting by political parties. The judge ruled:
Parliament clearly contemplated that these extensive requirements relating to parties, election expenses and donations were necessary to ensure the integrity of the new electoral system. As the Solicitor-General urged, detailed disclosure assists the supervising body, in this case the Commission to be satisfied that the statutory limits have been complied with. Disclosure is also of value in itself in that it increases public confidence in the political system and enables the electorate to make informed choices about which party of candidate to support. 251 In the case of Denmark, political parties that received public financial support from the government, previously only had to file a written declaration to the Ministry of Interior stating that 'the amount has been used for political purposes within Denmark, and that such activities will be carried on.' However, since 1996, they now must list all contributions. 253 In Argentina, only public funds to political parties are disclosed. The Argentinean chapter of Transparency International, Poder Ciudadano (PC), has attempted to determine the source of private money into these campaigns:
Even though parties are obliged to present balance sheets after each election, they rarely do this. PC contracted two companies to measure the parties expenditures on TV -radio ads, deduct the free air time provided by the Ministry of Interior and calculate the difference between the amount of public funds provided and the cost of the advertisements. Enforcement of campaign finance laws To ensure campaign laws are respected, a credible and effective enforcement system is usually an integral part of the campaign regulation package. This is needed, because, as stated by Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 'where high stakes are involved and where ambitious, clever politicians vie against each other, they will always try, often successfully, to evade the law or at least to circumvent the aims of the law.'255 To maintain the fairness of the electoral process and integrity in the campaign finance system, good enforcement of well designed regulations is critical. Most systems delegate enforcement responsibility to their election policy body or other specialized institution. Good enforcement requires staff, adequate funds and appropriate penal sanctions. In Brazil, for example, court reviews are undertaken, but there are no legal sanctions or funding limits. The Electoral Court only has the power to verify the information provided by the political parties by doing an administrative review of the reports to determine conformity to established principles of accounting and the general provisions of the campaign finance law. If the financial report is rejected, there are no sanctions placed on the candidate or on their eligibility to compete. 256 In the U.S., on the other hand, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has exclusive jurisdiction over the civil enforcement of the federal campaign finance law. If an FEC review of a financial disclosure report, or a complaint made by a citizen, indicates that a violation has occurred, the commissioners will authorize an Investigations. If the investigation confirms that a violation has taken place, the FEC attempts to reach a conciliation agreement with the respondents. If an agreement cannot be reached, the FEC may file suit against the appropriate persons in court. In Canada, compliance with campaign finance laws is enforced through the Commissioner of Canada Elections. Noncompliance is found through the auditing of reports. Penalties can include a fine, imprisonment, loss of the right to vote or to be a candidate in a federal elections for 5 years. 257
Public Funding of CampaignsTo counter the dependence of candidates on large donors, and to even the playing field, some systems provide public funding for political campaigns. To be credible and effective, an equitable formula to divide the funds among competing candidates and parties is generally developed and used. Recipients are accountable for using the funds as intended, and usually for providing a financial report when the elections are over. Public funding programs have eligibility requirements to determine which parties or candidates are entitled to receive funds. These requirements are used to differentiate between serious and frivolous candidates and parties. A requirement frequently used is to have obtained a certain percentage of the vote in the past election, or to have a certain number of elected officials in the government. Some systems have matching requirements, where the candidate or party has to raise a certain amount of money before becoming eligible. Eligibility requirements that are reasonable and equitable aid in ensuring integrity in a public funding program and help avoid the situation where one candidate or party receives the bulk of public funds, while other parties receive little or none. One way to ensure requirements are fair is to open them up to public comments before they are adopted. This can also be done to ensure the formula adopted to divide the funds up among the eligible parties is also fair. Each system has its own regulations and restrictions on the use of the public funds. A common restriction is that the funds can only be used for the purchase of broadcasting time (see Access to Media.) There can also be restrictions placed on the amount of private funds that can be accepted by the candidate or party once they have accepted public funds. Logical restrictions that are easily understood and are applied equitably, can help maintain integrity in the use of the public financing.
Illegal Campaign ExpendituresThere are several uses of campaign funds that are illegal in almost every system. These include: Vote buying Buying votes, or providing a financial or material incentive to a voter in exchange for a vote, is unethical and illegal. This include buying abstentions or paying voters to stay home. In the U.S., for instance, 30 out of the 50 states treat vote buying as a 'bribery' offence. 258 In Mexico, vote buying includes paying for the organization and transportation of voters to the polls in order to influence their voting intention. 259 Bribery of officials Transparency International's 1999 Bribe Payers Survey found that 33% of respondents felt that corruption was increasing. 260 Corruption includes bribery which is providing money, or something of value, in exchange for preferential treatment or services. Bribing public officials is illegal in almost every system. In an election, funds or things of value, should not be used in an attempt to buy a voter registration card or cards, to buy a candidate registration, or to encourage tampering of the election results. Money should also not be paid to official monitors or the police to look the other way. A kickback is another type of bribe. Using a kickback to obtain election-related contracts is also unethical and usually illegal. Kickbacks increase the cost of election supplies and materials and can result in the purchase of unnecessary or substandard items (see Procurement). Manipulation or destabilization of the electoral process The use of campaign funds to advocate violence, hire mobs or commit violent acts against the electoral process, candidates, parties or voters is illegal in every system. Campaign funds should not be used to create phony voter registration lists or fictitious polling stations. It should not be used to pay for the destruction of electoral materials or to intimidate electoral officials.
Political Party MonitorsPolitical party monitors are an essential component in obtaining and maintaining integrity. According to the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA):
The role of political parties in election observation is critical, for it is the parties that have the greatest self-interest in monitoring an election process. They are the best situated to assess the political environment, identify the impediments to free campaigning, the implications of electoral system choice, etc. In addition, strong parties that can establish a nationwide presence at polling stations on election day are often the best positioned to act as a deterrent to irregularities and attempts at manipulation. 261 Political party monitors are the agents of the political parties and candidates participating in the election. As such, in most systems they are given the authority to not only monitor the electoral process, but to intervene if they believe the legal requirements are not being respected. They can also be an integral part of the administrative process, by validating ballots and tally sheets through their signature, and by participating in polling administration and the count. Although this is a voluntary role in most systems, and voting or the count is not held up if a political party monitor is not present. The roles played by monitors and candidates differ. Candidates are active campaigners, working to convince voters to vote for them. Monitors are observers, and should not attempt to influence the vote of those they are observing. Monitoring is done impartially and professionally. The South African code of conduct for political parties underscores the difference in the roles between monitors and candidates, and how candidates should leave monitoring to their agents:
The presence of candidates themselves creates a danger of escalating tension and conflict. Even if candidates do not behave in a threatening manner, voters may feel intimidated by their presence and lack confidence in the secrecy of their vote, particularly in areas characterized by inter-party conflict and violence. Therefore, the election regulations should prohibit the presence of candidates within the inner perimeter of a voting station, in keeping with international practice. To protect the integrity of the process and the interests of their party and candidates, monitors usually:
Monitoring EthicsMonitoring ethics are usually included in the Codes of Conduct for Political Parties. The election management or policy bodies may also have a separate code of conduct that would apply to any party agent accredited as a monitor. In general, to ensure integrity in monitoring, monitors:
Interest GroupsAn interest group is an organized group whose members share common views and objectives and actively carry out programs to influence government officials and public policies. Their goal is not to run the government, but to ensure favourable treatment for themselves, their members and their interests. The size and influence of interest groups vary according to the Social and Political Context of each nation, but their main electoral objective is the same-- to influence public opinion and the outcome of the vote through lobbying and campaigning. The interest groups discussed in this section are those organized around personal, economic or other material interest. Public interest groups that act on behalf of the public are discussed in NonGovernmental Organizations. Lobbying Most interest groups hire professional lobbyists to carry out programs to influence policy makers, policies and voters. Lobbyists spend time and money to influence those already in office and to help candidates and parties who support their interest to win elections. Lobbyists can be of assistance to policy makers and regulators by providing factual information on their areas of interest. They can also testify on issues in public hearings. However, lobbyists are often criticized for their use of selected facts, and misrepresenting them for propaganda purposes. Because lobbyists are focussed on promoting the interest of the group that hired them, their interest and those of the public interest, are not always the same. Lobbyists also use money as a means to influence public opinion and policymaker actions. They can entertain candidates and policymakers at expensive restaurants or weekend getaways. They can use soft money to support a particular campaign or election issue through advertising in the mass media. The amount of money spent by lobbyists and the manner in which it is spent can raise concerns that interest groups are buying influence and special treatment. As a result, most countries require lobbyists to register (see Lobbying Registration) and to disclose their lobbying activities and spending. Lobbying Ethics Lobbying is similar to campaigning. It is a part of the election process that seeks to influence public opinion and action. Lobbyists must have the same high standards of Ethical Behaviour as the other participants in an electoral process. Although lobbyists can be highly partisan, and solely interested in promoting their own interests, they still must abide by the rules and regulations set out in the legal and regulative framework. This can include full disclosure of their employer, source of funding, what they do with that funding and what their lobbying activities entail. Lobbying RegistrationLobbying to support a position or candidate, is considered to be a part of the freedom of speech and press, and the right of the citizens to petition their government. As a result, most countries do not try to prevent lobbying, but to make it more transparent and accountable through public disclosure of its activities and financing. Many systems have adopted regulations which usually require lobbyists to register. Information that is requested can include their name, address, employer, salary, amount and purposes of expenses and duration of employment. Reporting is usually required on a regular basis and is open for public inspection. This enables the voters to know which candidate has received special interest funding, and the extent of that assistance. Enforcement can help ensure integrity in the lobbying registration process, and in the reporting of lobbyist activities and funding. The regulations and legislation dealing with lobbying usually list the agency responsible for enforcing the regulations, the process for the submitting complaints, and the penalties for noncompliance. PACsPolitical Action Committees (PACs) are interest groups that are created for the sole purpose of collecting money from their members and contributing these funds to candidates and political parties. In the U.S., for example, the creation of PACs was authorized by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. This Act allowed corporations, labour unions and other special interest groups to create a PAC in order to raise and spend money from their members on campaigns. The intention of the law was to clean up election financing but instead PAC spending has increased substantially and has become a major issue in Campaign Financing. NonGovernmental OrganizationsThis section covers NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) that work on the public's behalf to improve the quality and integrity of elections and related democracy issues. These nonprofit organizations can play a significant role in most systems by focussing on public accountability and helping to keep elections honest. During elections their National Election Observation and reporting help increase the transparency of the elections. They undertake voter education programmes and help ensure the dissemination of election information and issues. They can also lobby policy-makers and electoral officials for better policies and electoral legislation. Some of the areas, outside of general election observation, where NGOs can act as an integrity mechanism: Monitor campaign financing and advocate for campaign finance reform NGOs can increase the transparency of campaign financing through their close monitoring and public reporting on campaign contributions and spending. They can also lobby for tighter campaign finance laws. An example of an NGO that works in this area is the U.S.-based Common Cause, which describes itself as a 'nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' lobbying organization promoting open, honest and accountable government. Supported by the dues and contributions of its 250,000 members in every state across the nation, Common Cause represents the unified voice of the people against corruption in government and big money special interests.' 263 Common Cause does this by closely monitoring campaign finance reform and campaign financing. It actively lobbies for legislation to fundamentally reform congressional campaigns, including a reduction in special-interest political contributions and an end to 'soft money'. (see Campaign Financing). Common Cause publicizes campaign finances in its Follow the Dollar Reports (Common Cause). 264 Its Soft Money Laundromat (Common Cause) is a searchable database of special interest soft money contributions. 265 These sites enable voters and the media to see how much each candidate is receiving and from whom. Disseminate campaign information as a voter education service An informed citizen is a key integrity mechanism. NGOs undertake public awareness programmes (see Voter Education) so that the voters are informed on major campaign issues and have a factual basis for making their election choices. The NGO Democracy Network, which is active in the U.S. and Venezuela, is part of a 'large effort to create non-profit, non-partisan, interactive tools for local, state and national political participation.' 266 For example, it provides a website for candidates to post their platforms or campaign statements. Voters can access the information, contact the candidate to ask questions or to volunteer their time or resources to that candidate's campaign. NGOs can also assist the election management body with the voter education campaign for the election, either disseminating official information through their networks, or by supplementing the official campaign with their own materials. For integrity purposes, these voter education services must be impartial, and ensure equal dissemination of campaign information from all candidates and parties. Monitor campaign quality and urge for better campaigns Campaigns based on distortions and muckraking hurt the integrity of the campaign and can mislead voters into making misinformed choices. Some NGOs monitor the content of the electoral campaign and act to improve the quality of campaigns. For instance, the U.S. NGO Alliance for Better Campaigns, a public interest group founded to promote better campaigns 'where the most useful information reaches the greatest number of citizens in the most engaging way. We aspire to a politics larger than attack ads and the money chase that pays for them- a politics rooted in our sense of national community and purpose.' 267 For the 2000 U.S. presidential race, the Alliance has been working with the 1,600 U.S. television broadcasters to voluntarily commit to airing five minutes a night of candidate-centered discourse in the 30 nights preceding the elections. We believe this proposal offers a chance for stations and candidates to break the grip that expensive attack ads and empty sound bites have on campaign discourse. But our experience tells us that stations and candidates are reluctant innovators. They need cajoling and encouragement from the outside. 268
VotersElections are held for voters to pick their representatives or decide on public issues. Voters are targeted in the electoral campaigns as candidates and parties try to win their support and their vote on election day. The consolidated vote of the voters decides who wins and loses the elections. Effective, fair and knowledgeable participation by voters is an essential part of election integrity. Voters participate in an election in many ways. Each step is important to the overall integrity of the electoral process. These steps include:
Voters generally participate out of self-interest. The amount of time, and the manner in which they participate, will depend to a great extent, on how well they think the process and general situation are going. Other factors include the charisma of a particular candidate, the security situation and type of issues being decided. The integrity of voter participation is usually discussed in relation to voter fraud (see Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud), election turnout (see Voting) or in wealthy individuals providing large amounts of financial support to their favoured candidates (see Campaign Financing). However, there are a number of other integrity issues related to voter participation that should be considered. Among these are: The need for enlightened voters A free, fair and competitive electoral system should have an enlightened citizenry at its heart. Voters with a sense of civic virtue, where the public good is placed above private interest, can be the foundation for true electoral integrity and for the electoral and political processes to work effectively to promote the common good. According to the NGO CIVITAS, (a Framework for Civic Education done by the Center for Civic Education in Los Angeles), the principles by which citizens should act in a 'healthy democracy' are:
The importance of an informed voter Informed voters can make good use of their vote if they are able to assess the consequences of the different choices offered to them on the ballot. Being informed means that voters have information beyond who is running for what office. Being informed means voters understand their civic duties and responsibilities, and have enough substantive knowledge on the election and the candidates that they can make a considered and informed choice. According to Civitas, 'competent and responsible participation is based upon moral deliberation, knowledge and reflective inquiry.' 271 Informed, responsible voters are a key integrity mechanism. They do not make false statements that might disrupt or prevent an election. They do not participate in a hostile or illegal manner to intimidate other voters or try to manipulate the election results. They participate responsibly and turn out to vote in an election, because they understand the importance of their participation. Apathetic voters Some citizens show no interest in elections or in voting. There can be different reasons for this lack of interest, including a lack of a choice among candidates, or believing that their vote will not make a difference. In general, those with a lack of interest, or with low understanding of the process, tend to be less likely to participate. Who does not vote, also depends on the Social and Political Context of the country. Age, income, education and occupation are all variables. Nonparticipation can have important implications. According to Civitas, 'the failure of citizens to take part in elections at every level is just one indication, easily measurable and therefore unmistakable, of widespread disengagement of citizens from the responsibilities and rewards of involvement inherent in our constitutional system.' 272 In most systems, if the apathetic voters were to turn out and vote it could change the dynamics of governance, as studies indicate they would vote for different representatives than those currently in office. Apathy and increased participation, can be addressed through effective civic and Voter Education programs as well as mechanisms such as compulsory Voting. Overzealous voters Voters can become emotionally involved in an election, in the issues raised during the campaign, and in supporting a candidate running for office. This can help increase public debate and voter turnout, but can negatively affect the integrity of the process if it is taken to the extreme. Overzealousness can lead to intolerance and discrimination against others with a different point of view. It can result in tearing down of other party's posters and banners, or blocking opposing voters from registering or polling. Most of these activities are banned in the Codes of Conduct for Political Parties. To limit overzealousness, some election laws include restrictions on the types of activities that can be undertaken on voting day. In South Africa, for instance, no one may hold or take part in a political meeting, march, demonstration or engage in any political activity other than voting in the area within the boundary of a voting station. In the Philippines, as in a number of other countries, it is illegal to consume alcohol on polling day. Unethical and illegal activities Some of the unethical activities which are outlawed in most systems include:
Enforcing voter integrity Civic education programs can promote productive, rational participation by voters. However, education is only part of ensuring integrity. As with other parts of the electoral process, enforcement of voter integrity is essential. Enforcement of illegal acts and unethical behaviour is usually done through the legal system. Holding voters who break the law accountable for their actions can help deter others. Timely and effective enforcement in cases such as destruction of private property, harassment or other illegal behaviours, can help ensure a better electoral climate more conducive to genuine participation. Monitors of Election IntegrityMonitoring the electoral process is an important integrity safeguard. It is part of the checks and balance mechanisms that protect the viability and honesty of election administration and the participation by political parties, candidates and interest groups. Monitoring ensures compliance with the legal framework and acts as a deterrent to those thinking about undertaking questionable activities. The public reporting by monitors increases transparency and helps ensure accountability. Monitoring includes Official Oversight by a government auditor or agency, as well as observation of the process by the Media, Political Party Monitors, Non-Governmental Organizations (see National Election Observation) and international observation groups (see International Election Observation). It can also be done by other groups, such as official observers appointed by an election policy body, which is done in India. 274 Effective monitoring should cover the entire electoral process and not be limited to voter registration or polling. A preliminary list of areas for monitors to cover, developed by Horacio Boneo, former Director of the UN Electoral Assistance Division, include:
Monitoring by non-governmental observers can be partisan (such as political party monitors or a biassed press) or nonpartisan (such as public interest groups or an impartial press). Whether partisan or neutral, both types of monitoring play very important integrity roles. Partisan monitoring focuses on the protection of a favoured candidate or party's interests. Ensuring monitors from different political parties are able to follow the process, ensures that any incident that is detrimental to a candidate or party will be reported. Nonpartisan observers are expected to be impartial, and to provide objective reporting. As reporting on elections usually involves rendering a judgement on the process, the integrity of the monitoring effort is important. Integrity issues involved with monitoring are discussed in Integrity Issues in Oversight, Integrity in Domestic Observation and Integrity in International Observation.
Official OversightIn every electoral system, there is at least one body responsible for the official oversight of election administration. This can be a separate office within the election policy or management bodies (such as an auditor or inspector general) or it can be a separate institution, such as a legislative committee, a judicial court, or a statutory body such as the U.S. Federal Elections Commission. Offices, such as an Inspector General or Auditor General, provide oversight of the electoral process on a regular basis (see Audits). In some systems, they work directly with the election managers to help improve management and systems as part of their mandate to promote economy and curb waste and abuse. This type of oversight can help managers identify systemic deficiencies and to make corrections to ensure that they comply with all regulations, and that their activities achieve their intended results. Inspector Generals, or independent oversight commissions, can also act on complaints made by employees or others. These complaints can include allegations of misconduct or mismanagement, illegal activities, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. 276 Some oversight agencies have a mandate that is broader than just elections. An example of this is the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia, whose anti-corruption mandate includes:
Integrity Issues in OversightOversight usually requires several conditions for it to be effective and fulfil its checks and balance role. In general, these conditions include: Independence Oversight agencies and Inspector Generals usually need enough independence so they can work impartially. This requires adequate financial and human resources so they can do their job properly without having to depend on other institutions. It also requires an independent staff without a personal stake in the outcome of their oversight and the institutional independence so that the work can be done without interference.
Auditors should be sufficiently removed from political pressures to ensure that they can conduct their audits objectively and can report their findings, opinions and conclusions objectively without fear of political repercussions. Whenever feasible, they should be under a personnel system in which compensation, training, job tenure and advancement are based on merit. 278 For example, in Canada, official oversight is carried out by the Commissioner of Canada Elections. The Commissioner is independent but reports to a Parliament Committee through the Chief Electoral Officer. 'Independence is vital to the Commissioner's role. The Commissioner must be free to act without influence from political parties or the government. This political independence is an essential aspect of maintaining and promoting the exercise of fundamental democratic rights in the electoral process.' 279 Some of the problems that can stem from a lack of independence can include:
Access To effectively provide oversight, the official oversight agency needs access to election offices, persons and information. The oversight agency must be able to examine documents and computerized records or databases. It needs physical access to verify the existence and condition of property and services purchased with public funds. Access is usually guaranteed by law and regulation. In addition, it must be timely and appropriate. In most systems, official oversight agencies are given the authority to obtain subpoenas to compel the election authorities, or others, to produce specific documentation. These subpoena's are enforced by an order of the court, with punishment for noncompliance. In Israel, for example, The Internal Audit Law (Israel) provides penalties for situations where:
If an oversight agency is given investigative powers, it usually is able to administer and take affidavits under oath. (See Interviews & Collection of Evidence). For instance, the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia, can require a public authority to provide statements, produce documents, and with specific written authority, enter premises and inspect and copy documents. Warrants may be obtained to search properties, use listening devices and intercept telephone calls. It can hold hearings as part of its investigations, and call witnesses who must appear and testify. 281 Quality and accuracy Good oversight is professional, timely, impartial and accurate. This is helped whenthe oversight agencies are adequately staffed and have personnel with adequate skills and training. Oversight can be improved when personnel follow good practice standards, have sound judgement and understand the electoral system and its legal context. For integrity purposes, oversight findings should be accurate and fairly reflect the actual situation. Problems and instances of noncompliance are documented and reported in perspective. Factual reports that contain all relevant information can help overseers and the electoral managers locate and correct integrity problems. Oversight reports should not be editorials, contain unsubstantiated opinions or have a partisan slant. For more on reports see Audits. Oversight agencies usually benefit from an appropriate internal quality control system which reviews oversight and reporting. An internal review system can help make sure that applicable standards, policies and procedures are adequately followed. Good quality control depends on several factors, including the size of the agency, 'the degree of operating autonomy allowed its personnel and its audit offices, the nature of this work, it organizational structure, and appropriate cost-benefit considerations.' 282 Authority Integrity can be enhanced if the oversight body has the ability to publish its findings and recommendations, without interference. A report, or its findings, should not be suppressed, censored or altered because it might be politically embarrassing or is critical of the election administration or ruling party. The ability to publically disseminate findings and recommendations is an important integrity issue. It relates to the independence of the oversight body in being able to do its work in a professional and timely manner without interference. It relates to the transparency of the process, and it directly impacts the accountability of election administrators and participants. Political use of oversight Official oversight should not be used as a political tool. It should be a routine, impartial check and balance on electoral administration, and the actions of its participants. Unfortunately, politicians, who have an oversight function in their legislative committee capacity, can sometimes use oversight for partisan reasons. This can affect the timing of an investigation (initiating it at a politically sensitive moment), the scope of an investigation (fishing expeditions), or the timing of the release (just before voting). It can result in funding freezes until an investigation is over hampering the administration of the elections, or it can results in calls for high level resignations among the electoral policy and management bodies. Legislative oversight serves a valid checks and balance function, but it can be difficult to separate politics from this type of oversight. One of the checks on partisan excesses in legislative oversight is the public monitoring of legislative action by the Media and public interest groups. Enforcement of findings Integrity problems identified by oversight bodies need to be addressed. Most systems have a mechanism to ensure that the oversight findings and recommendations are acted upon by the election management body or other affected organization. These mechanisms are usually incorporated into the legal framework, and can include sanctions, such as the freezing of public funds or the levying fines, to ensure compliance. Illegal activities uncovered through oversight are usually handled by the criminal justice system.
MediaThe media plays an important role in monitoring the electoral process. By covering the election events and the political campaign, the media ensures that the public is aware of what is happening. The media also plays a very important investigative role which helps to ferret out fraud and corruption. For example, in the U.S. state of Florida, the staff of the Miami Herald newspaper won a Pulitzer Prize for their investigative reporting on vote fraud. Despite a 'hostile city administration, a public campaign accusing the paper of ethnic bias and attempted intimidation' the newspaper documented ballot fraud, tracing it back to the winning candidate for mayor. Twenty six persons were arrested and the court overturned the election results, appointing the defeated candidate as the new mayor of Miami. 283 Conditions required for an effective media There are several conditions that must be met for the media to serve as an effective integrity mechanism. It must have access to the electoral process and its participants. It must be able to investigate and report in a safe environment, without fear of intimidation or retribution. And it must be able to publish its reports without censorship. Specifically, it requires:
Media Protection and Oversight The media has gained a degree of protection through international monitoring. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has established a Representative on Freedom of Media. This Representative observes relevant media developments in all 32 participating European states on the freedom of the press and promotes compliance with OSCE principles and commitments on freedom of expression and a free media.286 Several NGOs have also focused their work on the protection of journalists. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) undertakes an annual worldwide survey on attacks on journalists. It recently called on the government of Zimbabwe to guarantee the freedom of journalists to cover the 2000 elections without fear of reprisal, stating: 'CPJ is deeply concerned about the climate of intimidation to which journalists covering the elections are being forced to work.' 287 National and international observers can also monitor freedom of the press issues and the fairness of their election reporting. Effect on Election Integrity Good media coverage of the electoral process can help:
An example of this role, was Radio UNTAC, in the 1993 elections in Cambodia. According to John Sanderson and Michael Maley:
'Radio UNTAC not only provided potential voters with extensive factual information about the voting process and strongly rebutted attempts to undermine public confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, but also enabled all political parties to convey their positions on an equitable basis.' 289
Media Code of EthicsThe media, as a monitor of the electoral process, can incorporate integrity into its coverage and reporting of news events, the campaign and the candidates. The voters rely on the media for the transmission of information and on the media's analysis of that information. As a result, the media has a responsibility to report on the news honestly, fairly and accurately. The following are principles of ethical behaviour by the press. These are usually incorporated into a code of conduct that forms part of the employment contract for journalists and editors with their newspaper or broadcasting company. The principles listed below are organized following the principles of the Code of Ethics for Journalists (US) 290 but incorporate elements from other codes, including Principles of Ethical Conduct for Newsrooms (US) and the Press Code of Ethics (Associated Press). Seek the Truth and Report It
Minimize Harm
Act Independently
Be Accountable
Ethics for Editors Editors determine which news stories will be published, where they will be placed in the paper, and when they will be run. They have a special responsibility as the gatekeeper of the news to make sure the stories are accurate, balanced and relevant. Some of the special ethical practices for editors identified in the Gannett Newspaper Division Principles of Ethical Conduct for Editors are:
Integrity in ReportingReporting on elections is an important responsibility. For the press to fulfil its election integrity role, its reporting must be responsible, accurate and professional. Uniformed or biassed reporters can spin a story, giving the public an unfair and inaccurate perception of a candidate or the process. Given the nature of public trust that most of the press enjoys (see Media), the press must have the highest standards for accurateness and fairness (see Media Code of Ethics). Some of the integrity problems that can arise from an unprofessional media:
A 1998 survey on media ethics in Hong Kong, found that 39% of the respondents felt ethics in the media was getting worse. The problems cited by the respondents included: exaggerated reports (41%), inaccurate reports (28%), and invented reports (22%). 292 Integrity in International News Coverage The international media can play a very important role in election integrity (see Media), but coverage of the electoral process by the international press can raise a number of different integrity issues. These include:
International media reports on the freeness or fairness of an election, can become a political football in the country holding the election. For example, a Pan African News Agency story questioned the reliability of an article in the Washington Post that claimed the 1999 Mozambican election results were fraudulent-- quoting an anonymous source in the State Department. According to the News Agency, the article was picked up immediately by Radio Mozambique and Mozambican TV and their reporting of the article raised an immediate cloud of suspicion in Mozambique over the validity of the election results:
The target audience is not in the country where the story was first published, but in the one where it is reproduced. This is an echo-chamber effect. The article is published in just one U.S. paper, but is then multiplied across the Portuguese media, and then amplified still further in the Mozambican media... The political effects are felt, not in the U.S., but in Mozambique, as it adds to the opposition RENAMO campaign to discredit all Mozambican institutions. 295
National Election ObservationThis section deals primarily with national observers who form part of an organized civil society observation effort. Individuals can also play an important integrity monitoring role, as do political party monitors which are discussed in Political Party Monitors. Individual citizens Individual citizens are integrity's first line of defence. A well informed voter who asks the right questions, can expose, stop or deter an integrity problem. Even a voter who is not informed, but who questions something that just does not seem right can be an effective integrity mechanism. For example, in the 1998 elections in the Philippines, the civil society monitoring group NANFREL urged every voter 'to act like a pollwatcher and help prevent electoral fraud.'
On Election Day, you will spend anywhere from 20 to 45 minutes looking for your name and precinct, lining up to get your ballot, filling it out and casting your vote. In some cases, you could spend more time depending on how large the crowds are at your polling place. During that time, you can protect your interest as well as that of other voters by keeping a protective eye on the electoral process.296 In the U.S., for example, the NonGovernmental Organization (NGO), Voting Integrity Project (VIP), follows the same line of reasoning by seeking to 'educate and equip American voters to protect the integrity of their elections in their own communities.' 297 VIP finds that election fraud is very difficult to prove and that 'pro-active programs designed to prevent election fraud are more productive.' 298 Organized national observation Monitoring of the process by organized civil society groups is one of the key integrity mechanisms. These groups collect information from their observer teams, analyse the observations, assess the quality of the election and publicize their findings. How effective these groups are as an integrity mechanism depends on their organizational strengths and financial capacity, as well as how civil society is regarded and functions within that particular system (see Social and Political Context). Elections are part of the internal workings of a country, and the ultimate judge of an election should be its domestic participants. There are a few cases where the presence of international observers is indispensable, notably peacekeeping elections or in countries undergoing a difficult transition, or where nonpartisan civil society groups are either nonexistent or not functional. However, in the long term, the establishment of domestic groups that are able to monitor their own elections without external assistance is an essential part of democratic development. An example of the power of domestic monitoring is the 1997 elections in Kenya where civil society organizations trained more than 28,000 domestic observers. According to Joel Barkan and Njuguma Ng'ethe: 'In what may have been the most comprehensive domestic observation of an African election, observers were posted at nearly 12,600 polling stations and at each counting station to monitor the tabulation of the votes. This pervasive observation presence may have also helped the turnout' which was 68%. 299 In the case of Indonesia, more than 600,000 national observers covered the 1999 elections and helped ensure the integrity of the election results through their close monitoring of the count. (See the Indonesia case study: Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity). The benefits of domestic observation over international observation, is discussed in IDEA's Lessons Learnt from International Observation:
Domestic non-partisan monitoring groups are often better equipped to carry out particular types of specialized monitoring more efficiently than international observers. A few examples include verification of the voter registry which is a highly personnel intensive activity, monitoring the complaints process, documenting instances of intimidation and human rights violations, and media monitoring. This position is supported in the article The Observers Observed:
Domestic election monitors, if properly organized and prepared, have important advantages over foreign observers. They can much more easily turn out in very large numbers, usually in the thousands. They know the political culture, the language, and the territory in question and consequently are capable of seeing many things that short-term foreign observers cannot. As citizens, they embody the crucial idea that the society in question should take primary responsibility for improving its own political processes. 301 Effectiveness Effective national observation is usually:
Difficulties National groups trying to fulfil their integrity mechanism role can face many difficulties, especially in countries undergoing a difficult transition or in LDCs. These difficulties can include:
To address these kinds of issues, for example, the national observation group, NANFREL, in the Philippines, seeks support from the business community. It believes domestic support reinforces the notion that democratic elections are in the community's best interest.
Integrity in Domestic ObservationNational observation plays a very important role in helping to maintain election integrity (see Independent Observers). It detects and deters problems by acting as a check on election administration and participation by parties and candidates. It helps increase the transparency of the process and provides an impetus for improvements. However, national observation can create integrity problems if it is not responsible or accurate. Some of the integrity issues involved with the process of national observation:
Code of ConductCodes of conduct for national observers focus on the ethical observation of the elections. Depending on the system, these can be part of the NGO's internal regulations, or they can be part of the accreditation process and a condition of observation set by the election management body. Some of the standards of expected behaviour for domestic observers include:
International Election ObservationInternational election observation has become an important mechanism to help ensure election integrity in countries undergoing a democratic transition or in post-conflict societies. International observation has also become a useful learning opportunity for national election officials and participants. The idea of using the indelible ink in the 1999 Indonesian elections to deter multiple voting, came from an Indonesian observer who saw the process being used in the 1998 Cambodian elections. That observer later became one of the Indonesian Electoral Commissioners. 306 According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), international observation has 'become a common feature of electoral operations undertaken by the international community and today enjoys almost universal acceptance as a means of contributing to voter confidence and assessing the relative legitimacy of an electoral process and its outcome.' 307 When international observation is used for integrity purposes, there is usually an issue with the freeness or fairness of that election. For international observation to be an effective detector and deterrent of integrity problems, it needs to be appropriate and adapted to the type of electoral system and elections it is covering. Elections in a post-conflict country, such as Bosnia, require a much different kind of observation than does an election held in a country undergoing electoral reform, such as Mexico. As a mechanism to ensure integrity, international observation should cover the electoral process, rather than focus on a specific event such as polling. It also requires trained and qualified observers. One of the most typical complaints made against international observation is that it has become electoral tourism, with either politically important, or professionally inexperienced, observers arriving a couple of days before voting. These persons 'glance' at a couple of polls, watch the start of a count and then return to their hotel in the capital to issue their findings and prepare their departure. Issues such as who are the international observers, what is their purpose, and how and what are they observing, are among some of the integrity issues involved in international observation. These are discussed in Integrity in International Observation. Impact on Election Integrity Serious and appropriate international observation can make a substantial contribution to the integrity of the process. Some of these integrity benefits include:
At the same time, international observation can add to existing problems if it:
This last point has created problems in several countries. As explained by the Vice President of the National Elections Commission in Cambodia, in the 1998 elections:
The election observers' statements sowed confusion and resentment. While most groups seemed to give a passing grade to the election, a few others took emphatic exception. The losing parties criticized may of the international observers for rushing to judgement and giving an unwarranted positive gloss to the process by lauding the voting and counting. On the other hand, the U.S. International Republican Institute, in subsequent Congressional testimony, called the election 'one of the worst' they had observed since 1993. These kinds of integrity issues are discussed in more depth in Integrity in International Observation.
Integrity in International ObservationInternational observers serve as an integrity mechanism in the elections they observe. This is done by watching the process and noting integrity problems. At the same time, international observers are assessing the elections and making a judgement on its competitiveness, freeness and fairness. To act as an effective integrity mechanism, the international observation itself must be done with integrity, otherwise it can aggravate the problems of the elections under observation. Some of the integrity issues involved in international observation include: Preconditions Some missions precondition observation. Some of the preconditions and the integrity issues involved are:
Each observation mission has a reason to observe an election. It can be to determine whether donor conditions of a 'free and fair' election were met. It can be to observe how effective domestic monitoring has been or to assess the political climate. Some international missions observe because of a domestic political agenda or a focus on a larger international issue. It is impossible to ensure that all international observation is nonpartisan, but integrity requires that each mission fully disclose the purpose of its mission in its reporting, as well as what they intend to do with their findings. Objectivity Every observer brings their own subjectivity to an observation based on past experiences, expectations and the purpose of their mission. For observers with a partisan or political interest in the process, it can be difficult to remain impartial. For observers from the older democracies, it can be difficult to recognize that a messy process in a newer democracy could be the result of a lack of infrastructure and resources rather than deliberate attempts to manipulate the process. To be effective, international observation is objective and provides balanced reporting. This protects the integrity of the mission as well as helps maintain the integrity of the electoral process. The mission must differentiate between observed facts, reported incidents and unsubstantiated rumours. Some attempt to determine the source or motive of problems witnessed. Was it fraud or was it a problem created by ignorance or lack of training? Distinctions are made between implementation problems and deliberate tampering. Selection of elections to observe International observation can be costly and missions tends to focus on 'important' elections: transition elections, peacekeeping elections or a presidential or national election. However, countries that can benefit from international observation, both in terms of integrity as well as in building democratic processes, still need international observers for local and second elections. For example, in Cambodia, the elections scheduled for 2000 will include the offices of governors and mayors. This is the first time these appointed offices will be open for election. Having elected officials responsible to the voters at the local level is an important democratic step, and it will be a difficult one. With entrenched local officials and an insecure security environment, international observation of these local elections could play a critical integrity role. Quality of observation There are many factors affecting the quality and credibility of an international observation effort. These factors can affect the integrity of the effort and the reliability of its assessment and judgement. These factors include:
Observers becoming participants International observers are part of the process. Even when playing a passive role, the fact that observers are present, observing, analysing and intending to issue a public assessment of the process, will affect that process. This is why observation can be an effective integrity mechanism. An integrity issue for observers is if they go beyond this role and become active participants. When observers act to help ensure the integrity of the process, it is usually seen in a positive light. Such as when observers help logistically-poor electoral authorities by helping to deliver ballots when they visit a polling station, or allow pollworkers to use their communications systems to transmit results. Observation missions have also played important arbitrator roles in peacekeeping elections, although most had a mandate to do so. For example, in Nicaragua, UN observation took a pro-active role that turned into mediation because 'the very fact that the future of Nicaragua literally depended on the fairness and freedom of the elections would have made a purely passive role for the ONUVEN (the UN group) morally unacceptable' 318 When observers become part of the process, they may lose the objectivity needed to impartially assess the elections. This includes observers who actively assist the electoral managers in election administration or become strategists for political parties or candidates. Coordination of international observation An election with international attention can be deluged with international observation missions. This can create problems for the election management body in being able to accommodate the large number of delegations with accreditation, briefings, materials, security and whatever other support they may need. It can also create problems with certain areas being saturated with observers. It can also result in delegations vying for media attention for their press releases, or confusion if conflicting reports are issued. To avoid these problems, and to ensure an even coverage of process and polling sites, international observation missions should coordinate. However, for some groups coordination implies an unacceptable loss of institutional independence. An excerpt from the IDEA Lessons Learnt Conference:
The discussion of this topic began with a rejection of the word 'coordination' in favour of words like 'harmonization' and 'cooperation.' It was unanimously agreed that there is a need for greater sharing of information and knowledge on all aspects of election observation. There was also general acknowledgment that the process of promoting greater harmonization among observer groups was complex due to a wide variety of purposes, objectives, motives, resources, mandates and approaches. It was rather recognized that institutional independence, both in approach and reporting would always be present to some extent.319 In several countries, such as Yemen and Cambodia, the United Nations was requested by the government to coordinate international election observation. One of the reasons for this was to facilitate logistical arrangements for observer delegations and ease the accreditation and coordination responsibilities of the election management body. In Cambodia, the Joint International Observation Group (JIOG), composed of bilateral and multilateral delegations, coordinated deployment and ensured coordinated reporting. However, even here, not all members agreed to be bound by a consolidated report and statement. Observation reports The frequency and the content of observer reports can affect the electoral process. Some of the integrity issues involved in reporting include:
Standards The standards used by international observation missions affects their judgement of the integrity of the process. This is discussed in Standards to Judge Elections. Politics International observation can include political overtones. Donors who provide assistance for election administration usually condition their funding on 'free and fair' elections (see Special Considerations in Countries in Transition). In some cases, they can set benchmarks that must be met for the international assistance to continue. International observation is used to verify whether these benchmarks are met, and whether the election met the free and fair criteria. For example, in 1997, the Cambodian seat in the United Nations General Assembly had been suspended following factional fighting. Regaining the seat depended on holding of free and fair elections in 1998. The determination on whether the elections were free and fair depended on the judgement of the international observation missions. Domestic politics can also affect the tone of an international observation effort. For instance, in the 1995 Haitian elections, the fundamentally different election observations done by the U.S. Republican and Democratic affiliated observation groups provided political ammunition for the 1996 U.S. presidential race. Sending, or not sending, an international election mission can also be seen as political leverage for change. However, for this to work, the government holding the elections must value the participation of international observers.
Standards to Judge ElectionsDespite attempts to quantify observation reporting and to make it more objective, coming up with a statement that characterizes the process, that all observers can agree to, is difficult. There is a generally agreed upon set of principles that must be met for an election to be deemed free and fair, including: equal voting power for all citizens, freedom to organize for political purposes and to campaign for office, right of access to political information, and holding elections regularly that are decided by the freely cast vote of the majority. (For more see Guiding Principles) But missions and their observers bring with them their own expectations, experiences and perspectives which provide a subjective filter in assessing the process and making a judgement. Which standards to use? Applying the concept of free and fair can be difficult in practice, especially in a transitional election where parts of the process may have gone well, but other parts had serious flaws. If one candidate is denied media access, but the rest of the process went well, is that free and fair? If the process went well, but a prominent politician boycotted, are the results acceptable? The difficulty in coming up with a universal standard to judge elections is evident in this IDEA discussion:
In exploring alternatives to the 'free and fair' criteria, some participants referred to the protocol in the European Convention on Human Rights dealing with elections which states that they must be 'free, secret, universal and direct.' Other organizations assess elections on the basis of whether they served as a credible expression of the 'will of the people' or signified a step forward in terms of the country's progress toward democracy. Fair application of standards Even if agreement could be reached on a universal standard and its components, is it fair to apply them to every election? Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, in What Makes Elections Free and Fair, argue that international observers need to take into consideration the broader democratic transition of the country in their assessment of the elections:
Observers should also evaluate the election in the context of the specific democratic-transition process. Will the election-- despite possible 'technical' shortcomings-- stimulate further democratization by increasing respect for political freedoms, strengthening adherence to the election law, enhancing political contestation through broader access to relevant resources, involving more people in the political process, or improving the quality of the political debate? However, some argue that standards should not be lowered for countries in transition, as explained by Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso:
'The view that elections in the continent (Africa) cannot be judged on the basis of any universal standard, as one Kenyan opposition leader put it, is repugnant to many Africans and served as the basis of the 1997 reform movement in Kenya. This view is buttressed by the paradox that the burgeoning number of international observers and monitors of elections in Africa are more inclined to endorse the results of a flawed, 'second hand' electoral process that their domestic African counterparts.' 324 In some countries, different standards have been applied to subsequent election because of their political context. In Haiti, for example, Dr. Henry Carey states:
By applying a lower standard for democratic elections, foreign observers in 1990-1991 taught Haiti's political society that electoral transparency and enforcement of election rules can be ignored. Then, by over emphasizing the problems that arose during 1995 and 1997, they encouraged Haitian political society to construe most of the country's electoral shortcomings as deliberate fraud.325 For more on the discussion on standards see Lessons Learnt: International Election Observation (IDEA).
Code of Conduct for International ObserversMost of the issues discussed in Integrity in International Observation, involve the ethics of the mission itself. In addition to this, there is the issue of the ethical conduct of the individual observers. Most organizations which field international observers have adopted an internal code of ethics for the ethical conduct of the observers. In some systems, there is a binding code of conduct that is part of the accreditation process. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has developed a generic Code of Conduct: Ethical Observation (IDEA). The fundamental principles are: recognizing and respecting the sovereignty of the host country; non-partisan and neutral observation; comprehensive coverage; and transparent and accurate observation. Among the IDEA principles:
Enforcement of Election Integrity'Corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion. When the size of the bribe is large, the chance of being caught small, and the penalty if caught meager, many officials will succumb.' 327 Corruption of the electoral process is a breach of public trust and an illegal act. Enforcing the legal framework is essential to maintain electoral integrity. Without enforcement, the best legal framework or electoral systems can be bypassed or ignored. As explained by the Director of the U.S. Elections Crime Branch (Department of Justice): 'When elections are corrupted, arbitrary and corrupt government inevitably follow. Rooting out corruption in the electoral process, and bringing those responsible for it to swift and sure justice, is an important national law enforcement priority.'328 Enforcement serves as a deterrent to future fraud as well as a mechanism to stop and expose current problems. Enforcing election integrity and its legal framework is done by different institutions and mechanisms according to the legal infrastructure of each country. In some systems, Enforcement Agencies have complete institutional independence, especially the institutions dealing with criminal justice. Others may work under a common institutional umbrella with the elections policy or management body. But regardless of the individual variations, enforcement requires:
For enforcement to be effective it must be active, impartial and timely. Investigative agencies and their investigators must have enough independence so they can initiate and throughly investigate allegations of election fraud or other related illegal activities. Investigators must be objective and professional, and there should be no political interference with their work. These issues are discussed in Duties and Ethical Conduct of Investigators. Integrity also requires that the rights of whistle-blowers, witnesses and the accused be protected. Defendants must have access to legal representation to ensure that their rights are protected. They must have access to the information that has been gathered against them, and to be able to present an adequate defense. These protections are discussed in Rights of Individuals in Investigations, and Rights of the Accused. Prosecutors are often government employees or elected officials who can be very aware of public opinion and the politics involved in the problem being investigated. Prosecutors most often have discretion in determining if the evidence warrants a prosecution and, if so, who will be prosecuted. Subjective or unlimited discretion can have integrity consequences. Courts and juries make the determination of guilt or innocence and must be impartial and separate from the prosecution. A judgement made with integrity is done on the basis of factual evidence and the legal context, not because of political affiliation, discrimination or unsubstantiated rumors. A fair hearing is usually facilitated by an independent judiciary. The enforcement process can be subject to internal and external pressure and difficulties. Having transparent systems with checks and balances can protect the integrity of the enforcement process. These issues are discussed in Monitoring of Enforcement and Investigating in Difficult Circumstances.
InvestigationsThere are many different types of investigations. The Media often undertakes its own investigations when reporting on allegations of voter fraud or other electoral problems. NonGovernmental Organizations and national election observers (see National Election Observation) also investigate problems and gather evidence. They then either publicize the problem or give the evidence over to a government prosecutor. Citizen groups and the media can play an effective role in ensuring integrity issues are investigated, especially if a lack of political will or resources is preventing an official investigation. For example, upon receipt of a complaint that appears to be valid, the U.S. NGO, the Voter Integrity Project (VIP), will conduct an investigation. 'VIP plans to recruit a national network of retired criminal justice professionals qualified and willing to perform citizen training and lead fraud investigations when needed.'329 These nonofficial investigations, however, must respect the rights and privacy of individuals and not interfere with any ongoing official investigations. Official investigations Each country has a system for investigating election-related criminal complaints. This system is usually detailed in its legal and regulatory frameworks. A specific agency, or agencies, are mandated to handle these issues. In many systems, the official investigative mechanism is the police department which works with the election management body or oversight agency. In other systems, it can be a specific election office. In Canada, for instance, this is handled by the Commissioner of Canada Elections. In federal systems, the investigative body that will handle the case depends on which law has been broken. For example, in the U.S., there is an office within the Department of Justice for federal election crimes, but individual states handle state-law violations. And the national-level Federal Elections Commission investigates campaign finance law violations. Official investigations are undertaken with the purpose of determining if a crime has been committed, uncovering the facts surrounding that crime, and whether the facts indicate who is responsible. If the investigation leads to a reasonable assumption of guilt by a particular person or organization, the information is handed over to the prosecution. The prosecuting agency usually determines whether or not the evidence warrants further action, and who should be charged with what crime (see Decision to Prosecute). Investigating with Integrity Election related investigations must be done with the same high standards of integrity that are expected of electoral managers and participants. In general, maintaining integrity in an investigation requires:
In Canada, for example,
to maintain the confidence of the public in the neutrality of the Office of the Commissioner, Special Investigators must not engage in politically partisan activities at the federal level. Special Investigators must not work for or on behalf of any federal political party, candidate for federal office, nor any person, body, agency or institution with partisan political purposes or objectives; nor any federal referendum committees; and must not actively or publicly support or oppose the election of any federal political party or candidate for federal elective office; nor actively or publically support or oppose any option on a federal referendum.330
As explained by Craig Donsanto, from the U.S. Department of Justice: 'Most voting fraud investigations require that individual voters be interviewed concerning the circumstances under which they voted or didn't vote... such interviews should generally not be conducted immediately prior to an election or while voting is taking place. This is because having federal agents interview citizens about the circumstances under which they voted (or did not vote) can easily 'chill' lawful voting activity by the interviewees, as well as voters similarly situated. This is not an appropriate result.'331 Noninterference in Elections It is important that an investigation not interfere with the conduct of an election or with the election results. For instance, U.S. investigators are told that: overt federal investigation of election fraud matters should be held to a bare minimum necessary to preserve evidence and elicit the evaluative facts until the election in which the alleged 'fraud' occurred has been certified. Once a federal criminal investigation is conducted openly in a matter concerning an as yet unresolved election, the investigation will inevitably become a central feature in the election's outcome.332
Duties and Ethical Conduct of InvestigatorsThe investigators' mandates are usually based on those of their organization and their duties within that organization. Ensuring the duties of investigators are clearly defined in the organizations' personnel and procedural manuals can avoid some of the integrity problems associated with under- or over-zealous investigators. Most systems also have a written and binding code of conduct/ethics for investigators as their ethical conduct is an essential part of ensuring integrity in enforcement. Protecting integrity in the fulfilment of duties Investigators must ensure that they fulfil their duties with honour and integrity. This usually includes:
Supervision Investigators usually work within the chain of command of their organization. A head investigator usually manages the investigative resources of the agency and is responsible for the planing, organization, execution and monitoring of the investigative process within the agency.335 Adequate supervision is essential to ensure investigations are done and done with integrity. It also ensures that investigators follow the procedures and work within the system. Code of conduct/ethics The ethical behaviour of investigators is critical. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement also applies to the conduct of investigators. This is also discussed in Security.
Making a ComplaintMost investigations result from a complaint from an individual or through the oversight mechanism (see Monitors of Election Integrity). In systems where investigators are not police officers, investigators are not usually authorized to initiate an investigation without a sworn complaint or other authorization. For instance, this is the case in Canada where Special Investigators cannot start an investigation without the approval of the Commissioner or the Counsel to the Commissioner. 336 A complaint process that is nonthreatening and easily accessible to the average citizen can facilitate the reporting of integrity problems. Citizens should not be afraid of making a valid complaint or deterred from doing so because of cumbersome or intimidating procedures. In general, integrity requires that:
Making complaints public Making a complaint public, or keeping it secret, can raise integrity questions. Does the public have a right to know of significant criminal actions in the electoral process? And if so, at what point? If a complaint is made public, suspects may realize that they are under investigation and destroy evidence. A complainant may also be at risk for having made the complaint and want his/her identity protected. Whether a complaint will be made public during the investigatory phase usually depends on the system and the nature of the complaint. For instance, in Canada, the policy is to 'neither confirm nor deny the existence of a complaint and investigation and to not comment publicly on the identity of a complainant.' 337 Other systems may confirm the existence of a complaint but not comment on the ongoing investigation. Whichever approach is used, a balance needs to be found between the transparency of the enforcement process and ensuring the integrity of the investigation. Decision to InvestigateWhen a complaint is received, or an alleged crime reported, a decision must be made whether to investigate. Whether a valid complaint is investigated is an integrity issue, as is investigating complaints that might be unsubstantiated and are pursued for political reasons. To ensure integrity in the complaint review process, and in the decision on whether to investigate, complaints need to be reviewed in an objective and timely manner. These reviews look at the credibility of the complaint, if there is sufficient and reasonable grounds to suspect that a law has been broken and if it is probable that an investigation will determine the culprit. Most systems develop standard operating procedures and criteria to determine whether a complaint is valid and should be investigated. In Canada, for instance, only cases that meet a 'Threshold Test and Standard' are investigated. Canadian policy determines where that threshold is placed. The current policy is 'whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or seriousness of the alleged offence would justify committing investigative resources' along with consideration of 'public interest factors.' 338 Integrity issues can arise if the review procedures are discriminatory or allow for too much individual discretion. In these cases, the review could be used to either dismiss a valid complaint or to go after someone for personal or political reasons. Valid complaint For enforcement to work as a safeguard of electoral integrity, the review process must be able to identify valid complaints and determine whether they merit investigation. Some of the factors which are used to determine whether a complaint is valid, and which agency would have jurisdiction over the investigation, include:
In order to support a criminal investigation, a complaint must be reliable as well as sufficiently fact-specific to provide logical leads by which a ... preliminary investigation can confirm or disprove that a ... crime may have occurred... As most of these offences deal with frauds that are aimed at defects in individual registration or voting acts, the incoming facts in a complaint should normally provide leads to the detection of specific corrupted voting acts. If the facts contained in the complaint fail to meet these standards, the complainant is normally told that (s)he has not sufficient information to allow evaluation and is encouraged to obtain and provide the additional factual details needed for preliminary evaluation.340 Most systems have developed detailed procedures for the evaluation of a complaint, including a time line for responding back to the complainant. Following well-thought out procedures can help ensure that integrity standards are met. In most systems, complaints are usually dismissed if:
Mistakes are usually not prosecuted and are handled through the supervisory procedures of the election management body, by the oversight body, or through a civil proceeding. A mistake that made a significant impact on the outcome of a close election are usually challenged by the losing candidate through the Complaints and Appeals process. Policy considerations Policy plays a large role in determining which cases will be investigated and which will be dismissed. As a result, public Policy for enforcement should strive to be fair and nonpartisan. For example, as discussed above, Canada has a 'Threshold Test and Standard' which determines which cases merit investigations. This standard is set by policy but has objective indicators to determine whether a complaint merits investigation. However, it also includes the subjective indicator of what is in the best interest of the public. These 'public interest' factors include:
Subjective indicators can allow for more discretion in the handling of complaints; allowing investigators to weigh the individual merits of each case. However, some systems, such as Mexico's, deliberately limit discretion as one of their checks and balance mechanisms. Prioritizing cases Policy also determines the priority of an investigation. Investigating allegations of voter fraud are labour and time intensive. Some investigative agencies do not have the human or financial resources to investigate every valid complaint. Integrity issues can arise if prioritization is not done on the basis of objective criteria, but is left to the discretion of the individual investigators or enforcement managers. This can be used to bury politically sensitive cases or to bring other less deserving cases to the forefront. These types of integrity issues can be addressed through effective monitoring and oversight of the enforcement process as discussed in Monitoring of Enforcement. InterviewsA proper investigation cannot be done if the investigator is denied access to witnesses, suspects and relevant documents. Timely, unhampered access is essential to the integrity of the investigation. At the same time, investigators need to ensure that they investigate with integrity so that the rights of individuals are protected (see Rights of Individuals in Investigations and Rights of the Accused)and that evidence collected is not tainted and can be admissible in a court of law. Most systems use the following mechanisms to ensure integrity during the investigative process: Standard operating procedures Complaints accepted for investigation are usually processed according to the standard procedures of the enforcement agency. Developing good procedures, and ensuring that all investigators follow them, can help ensure that integrity mechanisms are in place for each stage of the process. Using standard procedures also limits the discretion of individual investigators for arbitrary or discriminatory actions-- which can be the source of many integrity problems. Accurate written reports Accurate files and reports are an integrity essential. Complaints are usually assigned a case number and a written file is kept for each complaint with all of the information and documents collected. Written reports enable the case to be handled by the judicial system, as the evidence collected and analysis done by the investigative agency will be used by other parts of the enforcement system-- such as prosecutors who rely on the investigator's reports. Comprehensive written reports include the specific offences believed to have occurred, the name of the offender and other information gathered during the preliminary review. Other information which is generally required can include:
...an outline of the objectives of any proposed investigation or enquiries; the scope and focus of the various phases and steps of the proposed investigation or enquiries; the name of the individuals to be interviewed; the information and evidence which are required, and from whom and any other appropriate follow-up measures which could be considered ... in the decision on how to address each specific alleged offence.342 It can be very difficult for a prosecutor to win a valid case if the information collected during the investigation is incomplete or inaccurately reported. Differentiating between witnesses and suspects Procedural rights are rights guaranteed by the legal framework, court decisions and enforcement agency regulations. These rights must be respected or integrity of the enforcement process can be jeopardized. Procedural rights usually differentiate between a witness and a suspect. A witness is a person who has personal knowledge of facts relating to the crime under investigation, and who will testify to those facts in a court. A suspect is a person whom the investigator has reasonable grounds to believe was involved in a violation of the law. Before the investigator starts to gather information, s/he usually decides whether the person is a witness or a suspect. This is to ensure the appropriate procedures are followed and the person's rights are protected. (Rights are discussed in Rights of Individuals in Investigations) Appropriate interviews The purpose of an interview is to obtain information and evidence from witnesses and suspects. For the information collected to be admissible in a court of law, the procedural requirements that protect evidence and the rights of individuals must be respected. This means the tone of the interview is professional with the interview focused on the issue. For example, the Elections Canada Manual for Special Investigators requires Investigators to:
... exercise careful judgement in deciding on the most appropriate and effective techniques for the conduct of interviews, having regard to the ethical obligations to act with dignity, fairness, moderation, thoroughness and political impartiality. Special Investigators must avoid personal or private discussions with interviewees which would bring in disrepute the administration of Justice and refrain from asking questions solely to embarrass, insult, abuse, belittle or demean an individual.343 Interviews are usually conducted during business hours and in an appropriate place. An appropriate place is generally not a bar, a home of one of the candidates or in the investigators car.344 To protect the rights of minors, guardians are usually included in those interviews. Care is usually taken to ensure respect for persons of the opposite sex, and these kinds of interviews are not done in secluded areas.345 To avoid misunderstandings, and to be sure that the person being interviewed understands why they are being questioned and who is doing the questioning, investigators usually show proof of identity and explain why they are talking to that person. It is common courtesy to tell the interviewee approximately how long the interview will last. Most systems require consent for interviews, unless the person is a suspect. (For more see Rights of Individuals in Investigations.) Successful interviews are usually prepared in advance, with a list of written questions for the investigator to refer to so that s/he does not inadvertently forget to ask a pertinent question. A good interview is an important step in building a good case that is can go to court and win a conviction. Many systems, such as Canada's, tell interviewers to rely on 'gentle persuasion, effective inter-personal skills and professional experience to obtain cooperation' of witnesses.346 For suspects, investigators are told to avoid conduct that could be interpreted as 'oppressive or as offering any perceived inducement of favours in exchange for their cooperation. The existence of either can affect the admissibility of any relevant evidence in court because of doubts concerning the voluntariness of such evidence.' 347 Most systems require suspects to be read their rights and knowingly waive them before a statement is taken. Otherwise, in these systems, the statement is inadmissible in court. This could result in a guilty person going free because there was not enough other evidence to convict. Suspects also usually have the right to have an attorney to be present during an interview. (For more see Rights of the Accused.) Investigators evaluate witnesses as to their bias in the case. This helps the investigators evaluate the validity of the information collected. According to Elections Canada:
Independent witnesses usually have no personal concerns as a result of any investigation or subsequent legal proceedings. With no affiliation to the individual or political party being investigated, they may be considered more impartial and can therefore be viewed with greater credibility. Sworn statements The successful prosecution of voter fraud cases can require that critical witnesses (including voters whose voting acts have been co-opted) be examined under oath before criminal charges based on their testimony are filed. Signed statements can benefit both the witness and the investigator, as written questions and answers protect against misinterpretations and misrepresentations of the interview. It also provides a check on what witnesses say in court if they change their testimony. Most rules of evidence allow a witness to be questioned on inconsistencies with previous statements. A sworn statement can be entered as evidence in most judicial proceedings and is a good idea if the witness is critically ill or may not be available for the trial. Accurate interview notes A written record of information obtained during the interview is essential, especially if a signed statement is not taken. The notes from the investigation may be used as evidence for what a person said, what they say they saw, and what they said they did. In court, the defence counsel usually has a right to review and inspect the investigator's notes if the investigator refers to the notes in testimony. Accurate notes are essential for the integrity of the interview. Accurate notes are complete, with as much full conversation as possible recorded. Notes recorded during, or immediately following, an interview are usually more accurate than notes written later from memory. Most interviewers record exact phrasing, but when this cannot be remembered, they indicate this by using phrases such as 'or words to that effect' to show that it was not a quote. Notes should not be 'sanitized' 349 and most systems require that the original handwritten notes be kept even if they are later computerized. Some interviews may be recorded electronically, either with a voice or video recorder. This is much more accurate than handwritten notes, but can raise integrity questions if not handled properly. Was written permission for the taping of the interview obtained? Some systems do not allow for taping without permission or a warrant. Does the recording of the interview intimidate or inhibit the interviewee? Would an unrecorded interview have generated more information? Legal seizure of physical evidence Obtaining physical evidence to substantiate a case is an important part of the investigation. However, the proper procedures must be followed so that the procedural rights are protected and that any evidence collected is admissible in a court hearing. For a suspect, the investigator must first advise the person of their rights (see Rights of Individuals in Investigations). Because most legal systems give suspects the right to protect against self-incrimination, they do not have to provide any information or evidence to the investigator. If the suspects understand their rights, and voluntarily provide the requested documentation or information, the investigators should ensure that the suspects sign a statement that they knowingly waived their rights. This ensures that the suspect understands his/her rights, at the same time as it protects the investigators from a suspect later saying they had not been read their rights. To ensure the integrity of the documents collected, they are usually marked for identification purposes. Most systems give the owner of the documentation an official receipt, and the owner has the right to keep a copy of any papers taken. If a suspect refuses to provide information, Search Warrants could be requested from a court to enable the investigators to search for the evidence. Investigators usually seek the cooperation of a witness, rather than relying on intimidation or threats to obtain evidence. Witnesses are usually more inclined to cooperate if they understand the purpose of the investigation and why a document is required. This can be explained by the investigator. Falsehoods should not be used. In most systems, witnesses can not be compelled to provide any documents or information without a court order. If a witness refuses to provide the information, the investigators can request a court order to obtain that information. Protection of electoral records Electoral records include the voters registry, absentee ballot requests, tally sheets or any other document used in the elections. This can also include the personnel records of the electoral management body, time-sheets, official vehicle log books, warehouse inventory books or other documents used to manage election administration. The problem with seizing electoral records is that they are usually needed to hold the elections. There could be a conflict between the need to collect evidence and the need to keep these records to finish the electoral process. A decision would have to made on whether to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and hold off on the collection of records, or whether the needs of the investigators were more important. This kind of decision is usually made by a court. In the U.S., for example, 'seizing or subpoenaing official election records into federal custody may deprive state authorities of materials they may require to tabulate, canvass and certify the results of elections. No action should be taken that deprives the state of records it needs to perform this state activity..' 350 In other cases, courts or other officials, might determine that the alleged complaint was so serious that the entire electoral process had been compromised. In these kinds of cases, the need to ensure the integrity of the process through an immediate investigation might take priority over the continuation of the elections. Rights of Individuals in InvestigationsIndividuals have political and civil rights that must be respected during an investigation. These rights are enshrined in the Constitution, the legal framework or Bill of Rights of each country. Although they may vary according to the different political and legal systems, most basic procedural rights of an individual in an official investigation include:
Because democratic countries value the rights and freedoms of individuals, infringements of procedural rights might render any evidence obtained as inadmissible a court of law, or could lead to a dismissal of the case. Search WarrantsA search warrant is a protection against unreasonable search and seizure. For a search to be 'reasonable', most systems require a warrant be issued by a judge or court of law, based on 'probable cause.' This written order, issued under oath, describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and authorizes the investigator to seize that evidence. To obtain a warrant, the investigator must fill in an application and swear to a judge that the information provided is accurate.
The information must contain a detailed description of the things to be searched for and seized, and the offence in respect of which a search is to be made; believing on reasonable grounds that the said things are in a specific place or dwelling together with the complete address of the premises. It must also state whether other alternative sources of the information exist and whether they have been exhausted.351 For example, Election Canada advises its Special Investigators that search warrant applications must:
Handling of EvidenceProtecting the integrity of evidence collected is an important factor in enforcement. If the integrity of the evidence is questioned, it could jeopardize its use in prosecution, and perhaps ruin the chances of bringing a guilty person to justice. In countries with a history of the rule of law, a complex framework of rules and procedures has developed for the collection, use and preservation of evidence. For evidence to be admissible in court, these rules must be followed. Procedural rights protect the rights of the accused and ensure that evidence is not tampered with in order to manipulate the results of the investigation or trial. It is very important to the integrity of law enforcement that anyone who handles evidence during an investigation be familiar with the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence and comply with those rules. Protection of evidence Good procedures for the handling and storage of evidence can help ensure that evidence is not tampered with, lost or replaced with false evidence after it is taken into custody. These procedures usually include documenting the continuity of possession of that evidence. Some of the good-practice procedures generally used to protect the integrity of evidence while in official custody:
Investigator's AnalysisThe investigator must make a determination whether the information uncovered during the investigation substantiated the complaint, and if the complaint and file should be turned over to the prosecutor for further action. This is an important responsibility and should be done objectively, based on the merits of the case and the evidence obtained. Having a biased or sloppy analysis of the information can have serious integrity consequences, such as recommending prosecution of the wrong individual, or allowing a guilty persons to go undetected. Some of the steps which investigators can take to ensure integrity in the analytical process: Thorough and objective analysis A comprehensive analysis of all of the evidence collected can help determine the facts of a case. A cursory or sloppy review can overlook pertinent facts or result in an incorrect rush to a judgement. As part of this analysis, investigators usually check:
For spoiled ballots, investigators usually check:
Substantiated findings Part of the analysis of evidence is to determine whether a crime was committed, and whether a recommendation can be made for prosecution. This assessment requires an objective review of the facts, but, in some cases may require a subjective judgement by the investigator. Because the analysis will be used to determine whether a prosecution will be initiated, it is very important that the investigator substantiates his/her findings in a written assessment. This enables the prosecution, and others in enforcement, in making an informed decision based on factual information. As a result, these kinds of reports generally include a summary of the alleged infraction, details on the identity of the suspect and the complainant, the status of the investigation, a list of the events cross referenced with the supporting evidence, and a summary of each offence and the linkage to the suspects. The report also usually includes the investigator's recommendation on whether the investigation should be continued or stopped, and an assessment of the availability, credibility, competency and reliability of potential court witnesses and any other extenuating circumstances.355 If the investigation found that the allegations were unsubstantiated, that there was no apparent criminal intent or motive, and that continuing the investigation would turn up no new leads, the investigations are generally closed. If the investigation found that the allegations were substantiated, it is generally turned over to the prosecutor's office. One of the checks on inaccurate or unsubstantiated analysis can be a review of the assessment done by the investigator's supervisor, before the report is given to the prosecution. To ensure integrity, and to avoid the situation where a supervisor could bury a case ready for prosecution, each system should have a mechanism for a higher level review if there is disagreement between the investigator and the supervisor on the recommendations. Safeguarding the secrecy of the vote When investigators examine electoral documents, including the voter registry, absentee ballots and tally sheets, special care is usually taken to maintain the privacy and secrecy of the vote. This is especially true when investigating a crime such as voter fraud through the use of absentee ballots. For example, Elections Canada uses the following Safeguards and Methodology for the Inspection of Spoiled Special Ballots:356
In order to minimize the extent of the violation of the right of secrecy of the votes, the Chief Investigator shall restrict communicating any information, with respect to the manner in which a ballot paper has been marked, to the Special Investigators where required for the purpose of investigations, Counsel to the Commissioner, Commissioner, agent retained in a prosecution and, where directed to do so, opposing counsel.357 Confidentiality Reports and information from ongoing investigations are usually kept confidential. This is to protect the privacy of witnesses and avoid the destruction of potential evidence which would hurt the effectiveness of the investigation and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.358 Leaking inside information on an investigation could also affect the election results if it became known before the elections that a certain official or group was suspected of election fraud. For integrity purposes, the following information is generally not disclosed:
Decision to ProsecuteThe decision to prosecute is generally made by the prosecution agency or office. This is usually a separate office or institution from the investigatory agency and the separation serves as part of the checks and balances to protect citizens against arbitrary police action. Integrity in the enforcement of election integrity requires that the decision to prosecute is done objectively based on a thorough review of the case, the weight of evidence and the jurisdiction of the prosecution. Objective review In deciding what cases to prosecute, prosecutors usually undertake a thorough and objective review of the case. This review can take the following factors into consideration:
However, in some systems, prosecutors are elected officials. This can mean that prosecutors are very aware of public opinion and the politics of particular cases- especially election fraud cases that might involve high profile individuals. Although the public interest can affect a prosecutor's subjective judgement, it also provides them with a different accountability mechanism than the police or investigators, who may be civil servants. If the voters decide they do not like a prosecutor's style or record, they can vote him/her out of office in the next election. Despite the need to satisfy public opinion, prosecutors should strive to be impartial and enforce the laws fairly and evenly. Their review of the complaint file and findings is supposed to result in an objective determination of whether a prosecution is warranted and if it is in the best interests of the public. Prosecution that is not fair or warranted can be remedied through the Monitoring of Enforcement or through the appeal process (see Prosecution and Judicial Proceedings). Public interest factors As discussed in Decision to Investigate, some systems use a determination of what is 'in the best interest of the public' in their determination of whether a case will be prosecuted. This can be a subjective decision and is affected by the Social and Political Context of each system. For example, for Elections Canada a decision to prosecute includes: the seriousness or triviality of the alleged offence, the significant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the suspect's alleged degree of responsibility for the offence, and the effective alternatives to prosecution, the prosecution's likely effect on public order or public confidence in the integrity of the Acts, the need for general and specific deterrence, the limits on available resources, the time limit to prosecute has not expired, and where a section of the Acts is found unconstitutional in a province, the appropriateness to apply the decision uniformly across the country.359 In the case of the U.S.:
prosecutors should keep in mind that our society tolerates behaviour in election campaigns that it does not tolerate in commercial, personal or government relations. Thus, as a general rule, the federal crime of 'voter fraud' embraces only organized efforts to corrupt the election process itself: i.e. the registration of voters, the casting of ballots and the tabulation and certification of election results.. This definition excludes all activities that occur in connection with the political campaigning process, unless those activities are themselves illegal under some other specific law or prosecutive theory such as stealing opponents campaign property, breaking into opponents headquarters.. or illegal acts under campaign finance laws... most things that candidates do or say about each other on campaign trail are not appropriately remedied through criminal prosecution.360 In these cases, prosecutors consider whether administrative action or other measure might be a better alternative to prosecution. National or local prosecution In legal systems the jurisdiction of a case is determined primarily by which laws have been broken. In a federal system, where there are national, state and local laws, an election-related offense could involved a violation of both the national and state laws. Integrity issues can arise over which court handles the case. Will a politically sensitive case be treated more objectively at the national or local level? Will local prosecutors want to get involved in a politically sensitive case that has the potential for severe repercussions? According to Craig Donsanto,
Voter fraud matters are always politically sensitive and very high profile endeavours at the local level. Local prosecutors (who are usually themselves elected) often shy away from prosecuting them for that reason.361 The U.S. Federal Elections Commission agrees: The defendants in voter fraud cases are apt to be politicians- or agents of politicians- and it is often impossible for either the government or the defendant to obtain a fair trail in a case that is about politics and is tried to a locally drawn jury. The federal court system provides for juries to be drawn from broader geographic base, thus often avoiding this problem.362 These issues need to be taken into consideration when determining which agency will prosecute the case, and which agency is best placed to ensure the prosecution is done with integrity. AuditsAudits can be a very useful integrity protection mechanism. They are used as both part of the routine oversight and supervision of the electoral process by the Official Oversight agency, as well as an investigative tool when malfeasance or corruption is suspected. Audits can help ensure that election managers and political parties receiving public funds comply with the law and are held accountable for their actions. Audits increase transparency by opening records and making audit reports public. The underlying principles for an audit363 are that the persons and institutions entrusted with the handling of public resources are responsible for applying those resources efficiently, economically and effectively to achieve the purposes for which the funds were given. They must also comply with the applicable laws and regulations that come with public funding. Public officials, and others managing and spending public resources, are responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls to ensure that the appropriate goals and objectives are met; that resources are safeguarded; laws and regulations are followed; and that reliable data is obtained, maintained and fairly disclosed. These persons are also accountable to the public, and to other levels and branches of government, for the use of the public resources, and, as part of this accountability, must provide appropriate reports on a timely basis. The type of audit to be conducted depends on the objectives of the audit. It can be a performance audit to assess the performance of election authorities or it can be a financial audit to look at the accounting books to see how the funds were utilized. It can be a combination of the two, or it can have a specific purpose such as looking at internal control mechanisms. Performance audits independently assess the performance of election managers in order to improve public accountability and facilitate decision-making by those with the responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action. Audits can help provide credibility to the management, systems and reporting of election managers as they objectively verify and evaluate manager reporting and performance. Audits of candidate and political party campaign finance reports can verify that the funds were used according to the requirements of campaign finance laws and were not spent for other purposes. Unless legal restrictions or ethical considerations prevent it, audit reports are usually made public. This helps increase the transparency of election management and its oversight. It also increases accountability through the wide dissemination of information so that the citizens, their elected representatives and the electoral managers can assess the integrity, performance and stewardship of the publically funded election activities. Performance audits A performance audit is an objective and systematic examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment of the performance of the election management or policy bodies, the agency that regulates campaign finance or other beneficiary of public financing, such as candidates and political parties. Performance audits provide information on how the process is working, identifies weaknesses or areas of noncompliance, and makes recommendations on how to improve the process. The facts uncovered by an audit, and the audits' evaluation and recommendations on integrity issues, can help direct election managers to correct their problems and to make the process more effective. Performance audits can include economy and efficiency, and program audits which determine whether the election management body, or other related agencies, are acquiring, protecting and using their resources (such as personnel, property and space) economically and efficiently. This is an important mechanism in combating corruption and mismanagement. Performance audits look at:
Program audits can include:
Financial audits Economic corruption can be a major integrity problem for an election management body. It usually has a large dispersed staff, hires thousands of temporary workers and procures millions of dollars worth of electoral equipment and materials. Pay may be low and workers unhappy. Lucrative contracts can attract offers of kickbacks or opportunities for embezzlement. Financial audits, especially those done on a regular basis, can detect and deter economic corruption and financial malfeasance. Financial audits determine whether the financial reporting done by the institution or candidate accurately presents its financial position, and that the accounting is done in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Financial audits can also determine whether:
To make these determinations, financial audits usually look at:
Accurate, written audit reports To serve its purpose as an integrity mechanism, audits should be done objectively, and without interference by other agencies or persons. (For more on this, see Integrity Issues in Oversight.) Audit reports must also be accurate and fairly present the significant findings for each audit objective. Including sufficient, competent and relevant information in the report can help the organization being audited, oversight agencies and policy makers understand the situation and determine the corrective action to be taken. Audits are carefully documented and a written report is made which is usually made public. These reports usually describe the objectives and scope of the audit and the methodology used. They also include significant findings and recommendations. Supporting documentation, which substantiates the report and its findings, is usually attached and is also made available for public inspection. Complete transparency of the audit's purpose and findings can help increase public understanding of the problems uncovered, or, on the other hand, help increase the credibility of the process if nothing significant is found. Complete transparency can also help limit the extent of misperceptions that can arise if a politician or candidate uses audit findings selectively or out of context as a campaign or political issue. Effective audit reports include recommendations on how to correct problem areas and improve operations. They can also include recommendations on how to improve compliance and management controls. In addition, audit reports usually:
Whether auditors reports are used as evidence in a criminal case depends on the system. For example, in Israel, auditors reports cannot be used in legal proceeding but are admissible as evidence in a disciplinary proceeding.365 Other systems allow the prosecution to use of audit reports in a court proceeding. Prosecution and Judicial ProceedingsA system of impunity fosters an atmosphere of unethical behaviour, fraud and corruption. Prosecution ensures that persons suspected of crimes are tried in a court of law and sentenced if convicted. The successful prosecution of criminals is an essential part of a society based on the rule of law. Prosecuting and sentencing offenders holds them accountable for their actions and serves as a deterrent for those who might be considering illegal activities. In most systems, prosecution is done under the criminal law system. These laws regulate the conduct of individuals, defines crimes and punishments. In criminal cases, prosecution is done by the government as, in most systems, criminal acts are considered violations against the public order. Where a case is prosecuted is determined by which law was broken and whether it was a local, provincial or national law. (See Decision to Prosecute.) A case must also be brought before a court or judicial body that has the jurisdiction or authority to hear and decide on the case. In criminal law, in most systems there are two types of offenses: felonies and misdemeanours. Misdemeanours are less serious offenses and can include such things as disorderly conduct, minor violations of codes of ethics and petty theft. Most misdemeanours are usually settled by a judge, without a trial or prosecution, and are punished with a fine or light jail sentence. Felonies, which are the more serious violations of law, usually require the formal proceedings of an arrest and trial. Integrity in the administration of justice It is very important in every system to have integrity in the administration of justice. This means laws are equitable and fair. Procedures follow the legal framework and protect the civil and political rights of those involved. Prosecutors, judges and juries follow the procedures and maintain the highest level of professional and ethical behaviour. And the accused are afforded their procedural rights. The protection of the rights of the accused, and ensuring that due process has been followed, are essential integrity principles. Integrity in the administration of justice ensures that police and enforcement powers are not used for political or personal reasons, and that those accused of a crime are provided with a fair opportunity to present a defence. In general, integrity in the prosecution and the administration of justice includes the following steps: Lawful arrest and arraignment According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.367 Arresting and charging a suspect with a crime in most systems requires probable cause-- something to link the person being accused with the crime. Unless the police catch a person in the act of committing a crime, such as stealing election materials, arrests are usually require an arrest warrant. An arrest warrant is a court order that authorizes the detainment of the suspect. It is usually based on a sworn statement by the investigator that shows the judge that there is probable cause that the suspect committed the crime. The arrest warrant process is parts of the checks and balance mechanisms as it provides judicial oversight over the police, and protects suspects from arbitrary police action. In most legal systems, the accused are read their rights at the time of arrest--if not before-- and are asked if they understand these rights. (See Rights of the Accused). The accused are usually taken to a court within a reasonable amount of time to have the formal charges read against them as prepared by the prosecutor, at which time they normally enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. This process is called an arraignment. A speedy arraignment can be another safeguard against arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention or unethical police tactics. An arraignment also lets the accused know what charges have been made against them so that they can prepare their defence or challenge the legality of their detention. The judge, or court, usually determines the need for the accused to remain in custody until trial or if they could be released on bail or their own recognizance. Most legal systems are based on the assumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person should not have to serve prison time until convicted of that crime. Unless it is a serious felony or violent offence, most defendants are allowed out on bail, with the deposit of funds serving as a guarantee that the accused will appear in court for the trial. This gives them the freedom to prepare their defence and continue their work and family life. Some systems have a separate safeguard mechanism that enables the suspect or his family to challenge the lawfulness of an arrest or detention. One of these mechanisms is the writ of habeas corpus, which requires law enforcement to bring the prisoner before a judge and show the probable cause for their detention.368 Pretrial disclosure To help ensure a fair trial, most systems allow the defendants and their attorneys access to the evidence that will be used against them in court. In some systems, the defence has a right to have access to all evidence collected, whether or not it will be used by the prosecution. Information that can be kept from the defence in most systems usually includes information on the identity of confidential police informants, information that could affect an ongoing police investigation, information on confidential police techniques (such as a type of monitoring device), and government classified information. All other evidence is usually disclosed. Witness protection The rights of the accused usually include the right to confront their accusers in court. This means that the witnesses show up in person and are available for cross examination. This can be a very public procedure. In countries with a history of violent conflict, or in countries with a serious problem such as organized crime, some witnesses may be afraid to testify. They may be afraid of assassination, retribution or other violent acts against themselves or their families. Witnesses in these conditions need protection. The ability of the different legal systems to protect a witness varies considerably. In Canada, for instance, witness identity may be protected in some cases.369 In the U.S., the witness protection system includes relocation of witnesses and identity changes. Other systems may provide witnesses with armed guards during the trial. In countries with fewer resources, or a weak administration of justice system, witness protection may be difficult. Avoiding trial by press There is a delicate balance between the public's right to know and the rights of the accused to a fair trial. Most nations do not censor the press, leaving them free to speculate on the merits of a case, the evidence, and the guilt or innocence of the accused. Sensational media coverage of a crime before a trial can make it difficult for the accused to have an impartial hearing. Jury members may have already decided guilt or innocence based on the press coverage. Active press reporting during the trial can also affect a jury's deliberations- one of the reasons some systems sequester juries during a trial. Fair trial Due process in most judicial systems requires that serious crimes (felonies) are tried in an open court before an impartial judge with jurisdiction over the case. Depending on the legal system, it could include an impartial jury which determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Defendants are usually given the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial conducted in accordance with established procedures of law. Trials are usually held in the location where the crime was committed, so that the jury understands the context of the crime. But trial venue can sometimes be changed if it is impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial because an impartial jury cannot be found. Most systems have an open system where the trial can be attended by the public and press. A public trial is seen to promote public confidence, and protects both the accused and the general public against a secret and abusive criminal justice system. Most legal systems require a speedy trial to protect the defendant against the uncertainties of a criminal prosecution and to make sure that the testimony of the witnesses is still available. Witnesses can move or their recollections can fade. Delays may be required, but these should not be prejudicial to the defendant. Generally, the prosecution and the defence each have a right to present their case in the trial for examination by the judge and jury. A fair trial gives the defence the right to confront and cross examine prosecution witnesses. This is a safeguard for the defendant against conviction based on faceless informers. It gives the defendants the ability to hear the testimony against them, to see the evidence submitted against them and to fully challenge the witness by cross examination through their attorney. The defence also usually has the right to call witnesses in their defence and to compel their attendance in court. The purpose of a trial is to determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime. The standard for determining guilt for a criminal offense is usually 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' The prosecution must persuade the judge or jury that the evidence provided proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Civil cases generally use a lesser 'preponderance of evidence' standards. For more on this see Civil Litigation). The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is to safeguard the accused against a dubious conviction and to allow the judge and jury to be as certain of the decision as humanly possible. Appropriate sentencing The accused is usually sentenced upon conviction. To be fair, the sentence matches the severity of the crime. Misdemeanours generally result in: a warning; a court order preventing such things as the holding of a demonstration or electoral advertising; disqualification of a candidate; or cancelling the registration of a party. Fines can also be levied or the restitution of damages required. Serious crimes can result in imprisonment. According to the offense, the convicted felon is generally kept in government custody for a set period of time. Electoral crimes can also result in the loss of voting rights for a specified period of time. For more on these issues see Sanctions for Specific Electoral Offences. Appeal The right to an appeal is part of the checks and balances within the judicial system. This mechanism protects the defendant against a biassed or flawed prosecution, and gives the losing party a last chance to argue errors of law or procedure. The grounds for appeal are found in the legal framework of each country and in the procedures established by their courts. Appeals can only be heard by a court authorized to review the decisions of inferior courts. In some countries, this would be a supreme electoral court which has the final appeal ruling on cases involving infractions of the election law. In other countries, this could be a constitutional counsel or a supreme court.
Rights of the AccusedThe rights of a person accused of a crime supplement the Rights of Individuals in Investigations by including the procedural protections of due process in a trial. These usually include:
Rights of those in detention and prison According to Amnesty International:
People held lawfully in detention or imprisonment forfeit for a time the right to liberty, and face restrictions on other rights such as the right to privacy, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly. Although detainees are to be presumed innocent until they have been convicted, both detainees and prisoners are inherently vulnerable because they are under the control of the state. International law recognizes this and places special responsibility on the states to protect detainees and prisoners. When the state deprives a person of liberty, it assumes a duty of care for that person. The duty of care is to maintain the safety and safeguard the welfare of people deprived of their liberty. Detainees are not to be subjected to any hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty.370 According to Amnesty Internationals' Fair Trial Manual, the rights of persons in detention include:
Civil LitigationCriminal law regulates individual conduct and is enforced by the government. Civil cases fall under the civil codes which regulate conduct between private individuals and parties. With civil litigation, the dispute is between private parties, but the government provides the forum for the settlement of the dispute. This may be a hearing in front of a judge, or a trial by jury. In civil litigation cases, investigators may receive a subpoena and be required to testify as a witness. In these cases, the investigators must give oral evidence, unless there is a lawful excuse, and they must answer questions to the best of their knowledge, recollection and ability. Evidence collected in the criminal case could only be used if obtained by a warrant. Civil cases are usually decided on a 'preponderance of evidence' standard that is a less rigid standard than the criminal 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard. In some systems, violations of the election law are brought before a civil court by the election management or policy body. This is the case in South Africa, where cases are brought by the Chief Electoral Officer.372 In other cases, civil suits can be brought by those harmed in some way by the electoral process. For example, a disqualified candidate could sue the election management body. A public interest NGO could sue on behalf of a group of candidates that might have been prevented from running or who received unequal treatment. Political party members could sue their party if they were unfairly prevented from running as a candidate by their party. Civil cases serve as part of the checks and balance system by providing a separate mechanism for an individual to be able to get to court and have a hearing.
Monitoring of EnforcementOne of the issues involved in election integrity is who monitors the enforcers of election integrity. As with any other part of the process, enforcement can become tainted by partisan politics, corrupted by money or power, be inefficient or make mistakes. To ensure enforcement plays its role in maintaining election integrity, it must be monitored and enforced- just as any other part of the process. Most legal systems have an internal control mechanism to ensure that the administration of justice functions as intended. Police departments have a department of internal affairs whose purpose is to investigate charges of police misconduct. This would also be true for most prosecution agencies. Some legal systems have judicial inspectors and a mechanism to remove judges from a case. Serious cases of judicial abuse or misconduct could result in the removal or impeachment of the judge. Impeachments are usually done by the legislative branch as one of their checks and balances. In serious cases of systemic abuse, where there is no existing credible mechanism to investigate complaints, an independent judicial commission could be established. The control mechanism within the law enforcement agency needs to keep track of complaints made against investigators, or an investigation, either by phone or in writing, anonymous or not. A supervisor can track the number of complaints and analyse their content. Was it against the methods used by a particular person, or was it against the investigation? Were rights of witnesses or suspects being abused, or was the complaint partisan in nature? Systemic problems are usually turned over to the department of internal affairs, Attorney General or other official oversight mechanism. Election observers and monitors also monitor the enforcement of election integrity. Observers can be present at all stages of an enforcement activity- to ensure an official investigation is being done-- that the investigators act impartially, and have the resources and ability to conduct an adequate investigation; that suspects are located, arrested and brought to trial; and that the rights of individuals are respected in the process. Having a public trial and monitoring of the trial, can help encourage judicial professionalism and impartiality. Lack of action by law officials, or the courts, can be investigated and reported on by an independent and responsible press. Monitoring can also cover the penalty phase to ensure that persons found guilty are punished and that the penalty given matches the crime. According to the Center for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 'civil society coalitions, by a synergy of effort, have the potential to effectively combat and eliminate instance of corruption of, and loss of impartiality in the judicial system.'373
Investigating in Difficult CircumstancesInvestigating cases of election corruption is not easy. The issues can be highly politicized, involve well-known politicians, and in some cases, be dangerous. Access to witnesses and suspects maybe difficult, documents may disappear, or the investigator can be working in an environment where the culprit may be a high ranking government official. The type of difficult circumstance will differ according to the Social and Political Context of each country, but these circumstances usually involve political interference, physical safety issues or the lack of a legal and judicial infrastructure. Political Interference Investigations of alleged offenses can involve high profile and powerful individuals. Powerful people usually have friends in high places to protect them and run interference. This is unethical and usually illegal, but unfortunately still exists in many places. This is one of the reasons why investigations can run into political interference and why transparency in aspects such as Campaign Financing is such an important integrity mechanism. Political interference can include:
These types of cases illustrate the importance of having an independent investigative agency as discussed in Integrity Issues in Oversight. Good Monitoring of Enforcement and as much transparency in the enforcement process as possible can help limit the degree of overt political interference. Lack of legal infrastructure Some of the countries undergoing a transition can lack the legal and judicial infrastructure required to support an investigation. There may be holes in the laws, so the investigator or prosecutor cannot find a law that has been broken even though it is evident that a crime has occurred. They may not have the means to conduct an adequate investigation because they lack personnel, resources or institutional experience. They may arrest someone and find the prison system is incapable of keeping that person in custody, or they may find the court docket is so full that the person remains in custody waiting for a trial longer than they would serve punishment for that crime. They may find that the court system is incapable of providing a forum for an impartial trial. For instance, in the 1998 Cambodian elections,
.. the National Elections Committee's (NEC) efforts to deal effectively with violence and election-law violations were largely a failure. Because the NEC had no law-enforcement or judicial capabilities, cases had to be referred to the government authorities. We had hoped that a few highly visible prosecutions would serve as a deterrent, but these never took place.
Building a national legal system and infrastructure is a long term process. Election authorities can start by ensuring their election law and related laws (see Legal Framework) provide the basis for free, fair and competitive elections and contain provisions for its enforcement. In some transition countries, where there is no history of an independent judiciary, an electoral commission with wide-ranging powers, of the type that would normally be exercised by legal institutions, may be the only way to counter the lack of a functioning legal system. 375 Culture of impunity In countries undergoing a transition, or coming out of a history of violent conflict, there may be a culture of impunity. This exists when crimes go un-investigated and persons known to have committed crimes and are not arrested or punished. It could also be a case where those without influence or power are arrested and convicted, but the powerful ones go free. In some nations, those in public office have immunity from prosecution. Transparency International found that 63% of its respondents in its 1999 corruption survey cited the impunity of public officials as one of the major reasons for increasing corruption.376 A culture of impunity breeds corruption and unethical practices because everyone knows a wrong-doing will not be punished. Laws that are not enforced weaken the integrity of the system and the respect for a rule by law. This cycle is extremely hard to break and takes a strong push from civil society and the political will to clean up government and systemic corruption. Arresting a big fish and providing a tough sentence can start to break a culture of impunity. It sends a clear message that unethical and illegal behaviour will not be tolerated and that lawbreakers will be arrested and punished- regardless of their position. Taking this first step, however can be extremely difficult. Part of the Framework for Preventing and Eliminating Corruption and Ensuring the Impartiality of the Judicial System recommends ensuring that national laws:
According to Robert Klitgaard:
When a culture of impunity exists, the only way to break it is for a number of major corrupt figures to be convicted and punished. Often there are many cases pending which have been set aside for reasons ranging from political sensitivity to corrupted justice officials. These cases should be pushed forward, or the Government should quickly attempt to identify a few big tax evaders, a few big bribe givers and a few high-level government bribe takers. Since a campaign against corruption can too often become a campaign against the opposition, the first big fish that are fried should be from the party in power.378 Physical safety In a culture of impunity, without a strong judicial system, honest investigators looking into corruption and criminal activities, can become a target for violence or intimidation. In countries with organized crime or drug lords, law enforcement can be a risky business. The protection of investigators requires a political will, but also the support of civil society. Safety mechanisms such as international observers or UN human rights missions, can provide some temporary support, but real change will have to come from within.
Sample MaterialsA Framework for Political Party Financing Cheating in Elections (Philippines) Code of Conduct: Election Observation, International IDEA Every Voter a Poll Watcher (NANFREL) List of Prohibited Acts During the Election Period (COMELEC) Campaign Receipts, Expenditures, 1998 California Election Follow the Dollar Reports (Common Cause) Soft Money Laundromat (Common Cause) Code of Conduct: Administration of Elections (IDEA) Code of Conduct: Political Parties (IDEA) National Integrity Systems (Transparency International) The Seattle Ethics and Election Commission The Fair Political Practices Commission (California) Law Enforcement Code of Ethics Guidelines: Election Broadcasting in Transitional Countries Election Observation Handbook (ODIHR) Guidelines: Determining Involvement in International Observation (IDEA) Types of Audits: US Auditing Standards Government Audit Standards (US) Audit Reporting Standards (US) Handling Allegations Against Senior IG Officials (US) Do's and Don'ts for Candidates (India) Principles of Ethical Conduct for Newsrooms (US) Code of Ethics for Journalists (US) Press Code of Ethics (Associated Press) A Framework for Political Party FinancingStriving for Equity, Accountability and Transparency
By Felix Ulloa
INTRODUCTION As the intensity of domestic and international debates over the financing of political parties increases, policymakers around the world consider a variety of proposals to make campaign and political party financing more equitable, accountable and transparent. Some countries have sought to eliminate corruption from their political and electoral systems by using public funds to finance political parties. Elsewhere, public funding arrangements have been discontinued in favour of private financing with stringent accounting and public reporting requirements CAMPAIGN FINANCING AS A FIRST STEP. As the sophistication and complexity of communications and other technologies needed to effectively compete for votes increases, so do parties' needs for vast resources to finance their electoral campaigns. This headlong pursuit of funding sources, fueled by campaign imperatives, has led many candidates and parties into a tailspin, as rules of conduct no longer respond to party principles or beliefs, but rather are increasingly defined by expedience and urgency (CastaÒeda Jorge. 'Three Challenges to US Democracy' Kettering Review [Summer 1997]:9-10) In some instances, laws have been passed to limit campaign spending. As early as 1905, US President Theodore Roosevelt understood the need to regulate this kind of spending. He urged the US Congress to pass legislation prohibiting donations from private businesses for political purposes. According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the campaign finance laws drafted between 1907 and 1966 were meant to 'limit the disproportionate influence of the wealthy and of special interest groups on the outcomes of federal elections. They also sought to limit disbursements to the campaigns of candidates for federal office and require public financial reporting of campaign funding in order to avoid abuses.' It was only in the wake of Watergate, however, that a breakthrough was reached in campaign regulation, with an eye toward realigning the influence of big contributors, PERMANENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT From my perspective, political parties should receive ongoing public funding that will enable them to carry out their regular activities. As permanent institutions in all representative democracies, they should receive government funding that is likewise permanent. Diane Schefold has observed, for example that
[h]istorically, in its original basic model, the party is conceived of as a form of free association without State intervention. This party model does not allow for funding regulations or controls [O]n the other hand, if the legal framework or the constitution, in particular, institutionalizes parties, then funding regulations arise as a natural consequence. In assigning certain functions to the parties, the state takes responsibility for seeing that they fulfill their tasks. (Schefold, Dian. 'Financiamento de los partidos Politicos: An·lisis comparado de los sistemas europeos'. In Partidos Politicos en la democracia, edited by Josef Thesing and Wilhem Hofmeister, p. 398, Buenos Aires, Argentina: CIEDLA, 1995. PRIVATE OR PUBLIC SOURCES It is worth noting recent court decisions in Germany, where political parties are characterized as groups that are freely established and deeply rooted in social and political conditions that presuppose independence from the state. In a widely read decision handed down in April 1992, the Constitutional Court of Germany recognized the constitutional authority of the State to fund political parties. The Court also established strict and precise limits on this funding in an effort to ensure that it would not undermine efforts to receive financial support from party members and sympathetic citizens. The Courts encouraged tax incentives for donations and party dues, while setting limits on these resources, particularly corporate funding. Another approach to campaign financing is the rise of self-funded candidates who use their personal fortunes to take their agenda to a broad-based public. In the landmark decision Buckley v. Valeo (No. 75-436 and 75-437), the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of Senator James Buckley when it found that limits could not be imposed on independent spending by persons or groups acting without the consent of candidates or their campaign committees. The Court also found that no limits on contributions to their own campaigns could be imposed on candidates or their families, except in the cases of presidential campaigns that accept public funding. I concur with jurist RamÛn Cotarelo that modern societies organize themselves as democracies of the masses, whereby representation, which takes the place of the popular participation found in direct democracies, has led to a broad consensus that there is 'consubstantiation between political parties and democracy itself' (Cotarelo, RamÛn, 'Partidos Politicos y Democracia', in Aspectos Juridicos del Financiamiento de los Partidos PolÌticos, P.46, Mexico D.F. II, UNAM, 1993) Thus, as political parties come to be viewed as indispensable in democratic systems, it is only natural that they receive public funding. FUNDING LIMITS. Political parties represent a means of channeling the interests demands and hopes of individual citizens, groups, and social sectors in multiparty democracies. Thus, concern for financing has spread from the confines of academia and the purview of election officials to become a major policy consideration. One need only take note of the recent Meeting of Government Representatives on Contributions to Electoral Campaigns, held by the Organization of American States, in Caracas, Venezuela. The agenda for the meeting focused on three thorny aspects of political contributions: their volume, their origin, and equity in the electoral process. Financial regulation of political parties was introduced in Mexico in 1993. Controls were placed on party revenues and spending, and penalties were set for those who violated the provisions. The system, generally geared toward public funding, regulates private donations from individuals an non-profit organizations, while barring funding from foreign citizens, religious officials, and private businesses. According to Agustin Ricoy SaldaÒa, the law provides for several kinds of support: campaign financing, the provision of funding to support the activities of representatives and senators from political parties, and funds for specific activities. According to Ricoy SaldaÒa, 'It is thought that political parties promote political culture and better train the party officials and supporters who make up their organizations. The Federal Electoral Institute reimburses them for fifty percent of all the document expenses generated by these specific activities.' Finally, under the heading of Political Party Development, support 'is granted to those political parties that fail to receive five percent of the votes in an election' (SaldaÒa, Ricoy. Enforcing Laws on Federal Elections Finance Law, in Proceedings of the Third Annual Trilateral Conference on Electoral Systems, May 8-10, 1996, p. 144 Washington, DC: IFES, 1996). CONTROL MECHANISMS: PUBLIC REPORTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY. In 1993, requirements for limits on campaign funding, for annual reports of party revenues and spending, and for reports on every campaign in which a party competes were also established in Mexico. These reports must list funding sources and spending levels in order to demonstrate whether or not limits have been exceeded. When these rules went into effect in 1994, fines were levied on five of the six competing parties. Sanctions are graduated and include economic penalties and fines, suspension of public funding, or revocation of the party's legal registration. Jacques Girard, former Director of Legal Affairs for elections Canada, describes the electoral system in Canada as being loosely regulated and allowing broad scope for funding. He asserts, 'I mean that there are no limits on the amount of money that can be donated to candidates, nor are there any constraints on the source of these funds. It is forbidden to accept contributions form citizens of other countries, but other than that, any individual, trade union, or company may contribute to a party or candidate' (Girard, Jacques, 'Enforcing Laws on Federal Elections Finance Law' in Proceedings of the Third Annual Trilateral Conference on Electoral Systems. May 8-10, 1996, p. 141 Washington, DC. IFES, 1996). Nevertheless, under Canadian accountability requirements, a candidate must open a separate bank account exclusively designated for campaign expenses and, when the candidacy is declared, make a deposit, half of which is refunded when the campaign expense report is delivered. These accountability requirements enable electoral authorities to examine funding sources and compliance with campaign spending limits Failure to turn in a report in a timely fashion will land the candidate in court. Violators risk being barred from running for office in the future. Funding is largely private in the US, but strict regulation at the federal and state levels provides for ongoing control over the financial structure of the parties. At the federal level, campaign committees and their financial backers, including the parties and Political Actions Committees (PACs), must present to the Federal Election Commission quarterly reports on funds raised and spent. This information is then made available to the public. While the Mexican system depends more on public funding, the US and Canada lean more heavily toward private funding. Both approaches, however emphasize the need to ensure transparency with regard to the sources of funding and public reporting of accounts by candidates, political, committees and parties.
Cheating in Elections (Philippines)CHEATING IN ELECTIONS Ding Tanjuactco
I. Registration 1. Registration of non-qualified voters This can also be called packing of voters' lists. To ensure that a candidate will have captive votes, he will haul in voters even if these voters do not meet the citizenship, age or residence requirements. Where the registration period has already lapsed, the same objective can be achieved through the manipulation of inclusion proceedings in court. 2. Disenfranchisement of qualified voters This is resorted to where a candidate believes that a voter or group of voters will vote for his opponent(s). It can come in the form of discouraging them from registering at all or, if they managed to register, to exclude them from the voters' lists through an ostensibly legal exclusion proceedings in court. II. Election Day 1. Vote buying a) with or with out chained balloting Some candidates will take the word of the bought voter. However, if he wants to be sure that he gets his money's worth, the candidate will employ chained balloting or 'lansadera'. At the start of the day, all the potential 'buyees' are gathered in one place and, as soon as the polls are opened, one of them is sent to the polling place. After the usual identification process, he obtains a ballot from the poll clerk, which he takes with him to the polling booth. At this point, everything is still fine and dandy. But what he does with the ballot becomes the heart of the illegal scheme. Instead of filling up the ballot, he puts it in his pocket and casts something that looks like a ballot into the ballot box. Thereafter, he presents the blank official ballot to the buyer who pays him an amount for his effort. The buyer then fills up the ballot himself and hands the same to the second voter. The second voter goes to the polling place and obtains a blank official ballot but does not drop this in the ballot box. Instead, he drops the ballot which was filled up by the buyer. He then turns over the blank official ballot to the buyer and the cycle is repeated.
b) with or without identifying marks Another way of ensuring that the bought voter will live up to his end of the bargain is to specify how that voter will fill up his ballot. The voter can be required to write the candidate's name in a peculiar way, e.g. first name last, with nickname, slightly misspelled etc. 3. Negative vote buying This is the simplest way of buying votes. Where a candidate is certain that a voter will not vote for him, he can pay him not to vote. Efficiency can be achieved by herding the voters together and getting them on a bus that will take them away for the rest of the day. A lot of times, the voters will be compelled to have their index fingers smeared with indelible ink. 4. Waylaying of voters a) through fraud or stealth This has the same objective as negative vote buying except that no financial benefit accrues to the voter. With the connivance of the Board of Election Inspectors, the voter's name is deleted from the list. This results in confusion resulting in the voter being disenfranchised. b) through intimidation or downright terrorism Disenfranchisement is also attained except that the means used are less subtle. 3. Stuffing of Ballot box with fake Ballots The ballots stuffed may or may not be faithful reproductions of the genuine ones. In either case, the fake ballots will have the name(s) of the candidate(s) written in the appropriate place(s). 4. Ballots written by only one person or group of persons This is usually employed in highly controlled or highly terrorized areas. The legitimate voters are driven away and the henchmen of the warlord are left to do the voting for them. 5. Voting by persons other than the registered voters Toward the end of the voting period, the list is scanned for those who have not voted yet. Ballots are issued to persons other than the registered voters and are filled up by the co-conspirators of the cheating candidate. As expected, it is his name that will appear in the appropriate place.
6. Misreading of Ballots This is a rather simple maneuver. All it requires is the blind albeit cooperative eyes of the Board of Election Inspectors and the complacency of the watchers. 7. Ballot/Ballot Box snatching or destruction Where a candidate is losing in a precinct, the snatching of the ballot box or its destruction (together with its contents) will deny his opponent the lead that the latter could have enjoyed in that precinct. 8. Ballot/Ballot box substitution This is a refinement of snatching or destruction. Not only does it deny the opponent of the votes he could have gotten - it also credits the cheating candidate, as many votes as there are substituted ballots. 9. Falsification (tampering) of Election Returns This is a very cost efficient way of cheating. After the counting is completed in the precinct, the votes are recorded in a document called the Election Return. The intercalation of a single digit can result in a hundred votes added in favor of a candidate. And this is so easy to do because by this time the level of awareness had been relaxed, the recording being anti-climactic to the counting. 10. Falsification of Statement of Votes or Certificate of Canvass in the Municipal or City Board of Canvassers And this becomes even more vicious when the manipulation is done at the level of the city or municipal board of canvassers. The results of all the precincts in a city or municipality are recorded in a document called the Statement of Votes which is prepared by the board of canvassers. Note that municipalities or cities have thousands, tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of voters. The insertion or intercalation of one or two digits can result in tens of thousands of votes undeservedly added. 11. Falsification of Statement of Votes or Certificate of Canvass in the Provincial Board of Canvassers The situation becomes fatal if the manipulation is done at the level of the provincial board of canvassers, given the number of voters in most provinces which can go up to a million.
Code of Conduct: Election Observation, International IDEACode of Conduct: Election Observation, International IDEA (PDF file)
Lessons Learnt: International Election Observation (NDI)Lessons Learned and Challenges Facing International Election Monitoring (1999) by the National Democratic Institute is located at: http://www.ndi.org/ndi/programs/electionprocesses/publications/electionlessons.htm Lessons Learnt: International Observation Russia (IDEA)Lessons Learned: International Observation of the 1996 Russian Presidental Elections by IDEA. Found at http://www.idea.int/publications/russian/rus5.htm Electoral Offenses (Mexico)Saldana, Augustin, Ricoy, Electoral Offenses, Third Annual Conference on Electoral Systems, IFES, May 8-10, 1996 Found on ACE-CD. File number F0106 The Federal Crime of Election Fraud (U.S.)Donsanto, Craig C. The Federal Crime of Election Fraud, Third Annual Trilateral Conference on Electoral Systems, IFES, May 8-10, 1999 Found on ACE-CD: File Number F0108 Every Voter a Poll Watcher (NANFREL)The Women's Election Watch article Every Voter, a Poll Watcher (found at www.kababaihan.org/wewatch98/fraud/fraud-tips.htm) explain's NANFREL's philosophy that 'every voter can act like a pollwatcher and help prevent electoral fraud.'
All About FraudEvery voter, a poll watcher
Because electoral fraud can be carried out at various stages of the electoral process--before, during, and after voting--it is important to learn from past elections how fraud can be attempted. Namfrel's philosophy is that every voter can act like a poll watcher and help prevent electoral fraud. On Election Day, you will spend anywhere from 20 to 45 minutes looking for your name and precinct, lining up to get your ballot, filling it out, and casting your vote. In some cases, you could spend more time depending on how large the crowds are at your polling place. During that time, you can protect your interest as well as that of other voters by keeping a protectie eye on the electoral process. Listed below are just some examples of what has happened in the past in the hope that we can learn from the past to create a better future. Fraud Before ElectionsBribery: Vote-buying; Buying abstentions (negative vote buying), paying people to stay home; Promise of jobs, loans, promotions, etc.; Paying members of Boards of Election Inspectors to keep them from properly performing their functions. Intimidation: Direct threats to voters to dissuade or prevent them from voting; Threats against the family of the voter; Threats against the business of the voter; Threats against members of the BEI not to assume their functions. Illegal use of indelible ink - to prevent a registered voter from casting his ballot, indelible ink is applied to the right forefinger of the voter before he goes to the polling place so he will not be allowed to vote. Kidnapping of voters and holding them in a place so that they cannot vote or far from their place of registration or residence. Assigning registered voters to places where they cannot vote or far from their place of registration or residence. Sowing fear and unrest to discourage people from voting. Spreading false reports about the withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate to confuse voters. Changing the numbering of polling places and precincts without notice to confuse voters. Changing the location of polling places without notice to confuse voters. Marking ballots so they will be considered spoiled ballots. Fraud During Voting Hours(7 a.m.-3 p.m.)Assuming identity of another voter and voting in his name. Accompanying a voter to the voting booth to influence a voter to cast a vote for a particular candidate. 'Lanzadera' - this is a form of vote-buying where a blank ballot form is stolen from a precinct and filled out in advance and given to a voter. In turn, when the voter receives his blank ballot from the BEI, he switches the ballots in the booth, returns with the pre-filled-out ballot, and exits with a new blank ballot. He turns over the blank ballot to a political party representative in exchange for money and the cycle repeats itself. Lanzadera can be difficult to spot because genuine ballots are used. However, in order to prevent it a poll watcher should make sure that the BEI checks ballot serial numbers at the time of issuance to the voter and then again before the completed ballot is dropped in the ballot box. The serial numbers are recorded in the Voter Registration Record book. The use of carbon or paraffin or a duplicating device to disclose the contents of a ballot to someone who is buying votes. Delaying delivery of ballots and other election materials to discourage voters from exercising their right to vote. Disrupting the means of transporation to polling places on Election Day. Delisting or transferring of voters from the voters' list at the last minute, preventing voters from finding their correct precinct assignment and voting. Accompanying illiterate or disabled boters and entering votes irrespective of their choice. Forcible taking or snatching of ballot boxes. Stealthily or surreptitiously substituting ballots during a simulated disorder designed to create confusion in the polling place. Theft or destruction of ballot, election returns, and other vital election materials. Bribery or intimidation of members of the BEI to influence their decision on challenges and protests made during voting hours. Stealing, tearing, smudging, or defacing the list of voters posted at each polling place to prevent voters from finding their names. Delivery of official ballots in excess of authorized quantities. The excess ballots may be used to 'manufacture' votes. Prematurely handing out ballots or applying indelible ink before the voters' proper time to vote. Flying or Multiple Voting - this occurs when one person tries to vote more than once, moving around to different polling places or even different municipalities and using different identities of Voter Registration Record numbers. In cases where the multiple listing is discovered in voting lists, flying voters can be prevented from voting by challenging them before the BEI. Another way of preventing flying voters is to check their right forefinger for indelible ink, a telltale sign that they have already voted. Fraud During Counting(after 3 p.m.)The counting of votes will take place in every precinct after voting hours close at 3:00 p.m. Usually, the BEI will take a short break and set up the room and materials for the counting. There are three areas to watch for consistency and proper entry of the results: (a). the accurate reading of names on the ballot, (b). the accurate tallying of the votes on the tally sheets pasted on the wall, and (c). the accurate recording of the results on the election returns, which are prepared in seven sets and signed by the BEI before they are sent to the Boards of Canvassers. There should be no inconsistency in the results of the three activities. In every precinct, there should be a summary or reconciliation of the valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and unused ballots at the end of the voting period. This should tally with the total number of ballots issued at the beginning of the voting period. There should be no discrepancy. At the municipal or city Board of Canvassers, the results of all election returns for that city or municipality will be entered into a Statement of Votes Cast. The sum of all Statements of Votes Cast will in turn be entered into a Certificate of Canvass. All the totals must tally with the supporting documents. Dagdag-bawas occurs when totals per candidate on the Statement of Votes Cast or the Certificate of Canvass do not match each other or that of the Election Returns. In these cases, numbers are added to some candidates and shaved or subtracted from others so that grandtotals for registered voters in the city or municipality remain the same. The scheme is repeated at the provincial board of canvassers to magnify the tampering and increase disparities between provincial certificates and election returns. To prevent dagdag-bawas, the following documents must be monitored closely: the Election Returns from the precinct; the Statements of Votes Cast and Certificates of Canvass per City and Municipality, and the Statements of Votes Cast and Certificates of Canvass per province. List of Prohibited Acts During the Election Period (COMELEC)
COMELEC, Philippines. List of Prohibited Acts During the Election Period. Found at: http://www.comelec.gov.ph List of Prohibited Acts During the Election Period: http://www.comelec.gov.ph/faqs/faq_elec.htm Election Code of the Philipinnes, http://www.comelec.gov.ph/faqs/faq_2oec_art22s261.htm Copenhagen Meeting (OSCE)Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSE (1990) is located at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.htm
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe SECOND CONFERENCE ON ________________ Copenhagen 5 June- 29 July DOCUMENT COPENGAGEN 1990 The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Copenhagen from 5 to 29 June 1990, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE contained in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE. The representative of eting was opened and closed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark Albania attended the Copenhagen Meeting as observer. The first Meeting of the Conference was held in Paris from 30 May to 23 June 1989. The Copenhagen Meeting was opened and closed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark. The formal opening of the Copenhagen Meeting was attended by Her Majesty the Queen of Denmark and His Royal Highness the Prince Consort. Opening statements were made by Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the participating States. At a special meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the participating States of the CSCE on 5 June 1990, convened on the invitation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, it was agreed to convene a Preparatory Committee in Vienna on 10 July 1990 to prepare a Summit Meeting in Paris of their Heads of State or Government. The participating States welcome with great satisfaction the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe since the first Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in Paris in 1989. They note that the CSCE process has contributed significantly to bringing about these changes and that these developments in turn have greatly advanced the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the other CSCE documents. They recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law. At the Copenhagen Meeting the participating States held a review of the implementation of their commitments in the field of the human dimension. They considered that the degree of compliance with the commitments contained in the relevant provisions of the CSCE documents had shown a fundamental improvement since the Paris Meeting. They also expressed the view, however, that further steps are required for the full realization of their commitments relating to the human dimension. The participating States express their conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation that they seek to establish in Europe. They therefore reaffirm their commitment to implement fully all provisions of the Final Act and of the other CSCE documents relating to the human dimension and undertake to build on the progress they have made. They recognize that co-operation among themselves, as well as the active involvement of persons, groups, organizations and institutions, will be essential to ensure continuing progress towards their shared objectives. In order to strengthen respect for, and enjoyment of, human rights and fundamental freedoms, to develop human contacts and to resolve issues of a related humanitarian character, the participating States agree on the following:
I (1) The participating States express their conviction that the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the basic purposes of government, and reaffirm that the recognition of these rights and freedoms constitutes the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. (2) They are determined to support and advance those principles of justice which form the basis of the rule of law. They consider that the rule of law does not mean merely a formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression. (3) They reaffirm that democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law. They recognize the importance of pluralism with regard to political organizations. (4) They confirm that they will respect each others right freely to choose and develop, in accordance with international human rights standards, their political, social, economic and cultural systems. In exercising this right, they will ensure that their laws, regulations, practices and policies conform with their obligations under international law and are brought into harmony with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles and other CSCE commitments. (5) They solemnly declare that among those elements of justice which are essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings are the following: (5.1) - free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure in practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the choice of their representatives; (5.2) - a form of government that is representative in character, in which the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or the electorate; (5.3) - the duty of the government and public authorities to comply with the constitution and to act in a manner consistent with law; (5.4) - a clear separation between the State and political parties; in particular, political parties will not be merged with the State; (5.5) - the activity of the government and the administration as well as that of the judiciary will be exercised in accordance with the system established by law. Respect for that system must be ensured; (5.6) - military forces and the police will be under the control of, and accountable to, the civil authorities; (5.7) - human rights and fundamental freedoms will be guaranteed by law and in accordance with their obligations under international law; (5.8) - legislation, adopted at the end of a public procedure, and regulations will be published, that being the condition for their applicability. Those texts will be accessible to everyone; (5.9) - all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law will prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground; (5.10) - everyone will have an effective means of redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental rights and ensure legal integrity; (5.11) - administrative decisions against a person must be fully justifiable and must as a rule indicate the usual remedies available; (5.12) - the independence of judges and the impartial operation of the public judicial service will be ensured; (5.13) - the independence of legal practitioners will be recognized and protected, in particular as regards conditions for recruitment and practice; (5.14) - the rules relating to criminal procedure will contain a clear definition of powers in relation to prosecution and the measures preceding and accompanying prosecution; (5.15) - any person arrested or detained on a criminal charge will have the right, so that the lawfulness of his arrest or detention can be decided, to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise this function; (5.16) - in the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone will be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law; (5.17) - any person prosecuted will have the right to defend himself in person or through prompt legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he does not have sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (5.18) - no one will be charged with, tried for or convicted of any criminal offence unless the offence is provided for by a law which defines the elements of the offence with clarity and precision; (5.19) - everyone will be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; (5.20) - considering the important contribution of international instruments in the field of human rights to the rule of law at a national level, the participating States reaffirm that they will consider acceding to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other relevant international instruments, if they have not yet done so; (5.21) - in order to supplement domestic remedies and better to ensure that the participating States respect the international obligations they have undertaken, the participating States will consider acceding to a regional or global international convention concerning the protection of human rights, such as the European Convention on Human Rights or the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provide for procedures of individual recourse to international bodies. (6) The participating States declare that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government. The participating States will accordingly respect the right of their citizens to take part in the governing of their country, either directly or through representatives freely chosen by them through fair electoral processes. They recognize their responsibility to defend and protect, in accordance with their laws, their international human rights obligations and their international commitments, the democratic order freely established through the will of the people against the activities of persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse to renounce terrorism or violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of another participating State. (7) To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the participating States will (7.1) - hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law; (7.2) - permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a popular vote; (7.3) - guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens; (7.4) - ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public; (7.5) - respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination; (7.6) - respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities; (7.7) - ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear of retribution; (7.8) - provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process; (7.9) - ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures. (8) The participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.
II (9) The participating States reaffirm that (9.1) - everyone will have the right to freedom of expression including the right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. The exercise of this right may be subject only to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are consistent with international standards. In particular, no limitation will be imposed on access to, and use of, means of reproducing documents of any kind, while respecting, however, rights relating to intellectual property, including copyright; (9.2) - everyone will have the right of peaceful assembly and demonstration. Any restrictions which may be placed on the exercise of these rights will be prescribed by law and consistent with international standards; (9.3) - the right of association will be guaranteed. The right to form and subject to the general right of a trade union to determine its own membership freely to join a trade union will be guaranteed. These rights will exclude any prior control. Freedom of association for workers, including the freedom to strike, will be guaranteed, subject to limitations prescribed by law and consistent with international standards; (9.4) - everyone will have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change ones religion or belief and freedom to manifest ones religion or belief, either alone or in community with others, in public or in private, through worship, teaching, practice and observance. The exercise of these rights may be subject only to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are consistent with international standards; (9.5) - they will respect the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country, consistent with a States international obligations and CSCE commitments. Restrictions on this right will have the character of very rare exceptions, will be considered necessary only if they respond to a specific public need, pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate to that aim, and will not be abused or applied in an arbitrary manner; (9.6) - everyone has the right peacefully to enjoy his property either on his own or in common with others. No one may be deprived of his property except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and consistent with international commitments and obligations. (10) In reaffirming their commitment to ensure effectively the rights of the individual to know and act upon human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to contribute actively, individually or in association with others, to their promotion and protection, the participating States express their commitment to (10.1) - respect the right of everyone, individually or in association with others, to seek, receive and impart freely views and information on human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights to disseminate and publish such views and information; (10.2) - respect the rights of everyone, individually or in association with others, to study and discuss the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to develop and discuss ideas for improved protection of human rights and better means for ensuring compliance with international human rights standards; (10.3) - ensure that individuals are permitted to exercise the right to association, including the right to form, join and participate effectively in non-governmental organizations which seek the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including trade unions and human rights monitoring groups; (10.4) - allow members of such groups and organizations to have unhindered access to and communication with similar bodies within and outside their countries and with international organizations, to engage in exchanges, contacts and co-operation with such groups and organizations and to solicit, receive and utilize for the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms voluntary financial contributions from national and international sources as provided for by law. (11) - The participating States further affirm that, where violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are alleged to have occurred, the effective remedies available include (11.1) - the right of the individual to seek and receive adequate legal assistance; (11.2) - the right of the individual to seek and receive assistance from others in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to assist others in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms; (11.3) - the right of individuals or groups acting on their behalf to communicate with international bodies with competence to receive and consider information concerning allegations of human rights abuses. (12) The participating States, wishing to ensure greater transparency in the implementation of the commitments undertaken in the Vienna Concluding Document under the heading of the human dimension of the CSCE, decide to accept as a confidence-building measure the presence of observers sent by participating States and representatives of non-governmental organizations and other interested persons at proceedings before courts as provided for in national legislation and international law; it is understood that proceedings may only be held in camera in the circumstances prescribed by law and consistent with obligations under international law and international commitments. (13) The participating States decide to accord particular attention to the recognition of the rights of the child, his civil rights and his individual freedoms, his economic, social and cultural rights, and his right to special protection against all forms of violence and exploitation. They will consider acceding to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, if they have not yet done so, which was opened for signature by States on 26 January 1990. They will recognize in their domestic legislation the rights of the child as affirmed in the international agreements to which they are Parties. (14) The participating States agree to encourage the creation, within their countries, of conditions for the training of students and trainees from other participating States, including persons taking vocational and technical courses. They also agree to promote travel by young people from their countries for the purpose of obtaining education in other participating States and to that end to encourage the conclusion, where appropriate, of bilateral and multilateral agreements between their relevant governmental institutions, organizations and educational establishments. (15) The participating States will act in such a way as to facilitate the transfer of sentenced persons and encourage those participating States which are not Parties to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, signed at Strasbourg on 21 November 1983, to consider acceding to the Convention. (16) The participating States (16.1) - reaffirm their commitment to prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to prevent and punish such practices, to protect individuals from any psychiatric or other medical practices that violate human rights and fundamental freedoms and to take effective measures to prevent and punish such practices; (16.2) - intend, as a matter of urgency, to consider acceding to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, if they have not yet done so, and recognizing the competences of the Committee against Torture under articles 21 and 22 of the Convention and withdrawing reservations regarding the competence of the Committee under article 20; (16.3) - stress that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture; (16.4) - will ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment; (16.5) - will keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under their jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture; (16.6) - will take up with priority for consideration and for appropriate action, in accordance with the agreed measures and procedures for the effective implementation of the commitments relating to the human dimension of the CSCE, any cases of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment made known to them through official channels or coming from any other reliable source of information; (16.7) - will act upon the understanding that preserving and guaranteeing the life and security of any individual subjected to any form of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment will be the sole criterion in determining the urgency and priorities to be accorded in taking appropriate remedial action; and, therefore, the consideration of any cases of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within the framework of any other international body or mechanism may not be invoked as a reason for refraining from consideration and appropriate action in accordance with the agreed measures and procedures for the effective implementation of the commitments relating to the human dimension of the CSCE. (17) The participating States (17.1) - recall the commitment undertaken in the Vienna Concluding Document to keep the question of capital punishment under consideration and to co-operate within relevant international organizations; (17.2) - recall, in this context, the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 15 December 1989, of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty; (17.3) - note the restrictions and safeguards regarding the use of the death penalty which have been adopted by the international community, in particular article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (17.4) - note the provisions of the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty; (17.5) - note recent measures taken by a number of participating States towards the abolition of capital punishment; (17.6) - note the activities of several non-governmental organizations on the question of the death penalty; (17.7) - will exchange information within the framework of the Conference on the Human Dimension on the question of the abolition of the death penalty and keep that question under consideration; (17.8) - will make available to the public information regarding the use of the death penalty. (18) The participating States (18.1) - note that the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has recognized the right of everyone to have conscientious objections to military service; (18.2) - note recent measures taken by a number of participating States to permit exemption from compulsory military service on the basis of conscientious objections; (18.3) - note the activities of several non-governmental organizations on the question of conscientious objections to compulsory military service; (18.4) - agree to consider introducing, where this has not yet been done, various forms of alternative service, which are compatible with the reasons for conscientious objection, such forms of alternative service being in principle of a non-combatant or civilian nature, in the public interest and of a non-punitive nature; (18.5) - will make available to the public information on this issue; (18.6) - will keep under consideration, within the framework of the Conference on the Human Dimension, the relevant questions related to the exemption from compulsory military service, where it exists, of individuals on the basis of conscientious objections to armed service, and will exchange information on these questions. (19) The participating States affirm that freer movement and contacts among their citizens are important in the context of the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. They will ensure that their policies concerning entry into their territories are fully consistent with the aims set out in the relevant provisions of the Final Act, the Madrid Concluding Document and the Vienna Concluding Document. While reaffirming their determination not to recede from the commitments contained in CSCE documents, they undertake to implement fully and improve present commitments in the field of human contacts, including on a bilateral and multilateral basis. In this context they will (19.1) - strive to implement the procedures for entry into their territories, including the issuing of visas and passport and customs control, in good faith and without unjustified delay. Where necessary, they will shorten the waiting time for visa decisions, as well as simplify practices and reduce administrative requirements for visa applications; (19.2) - ensure, in dealing with visa applications, that these are processed as expeditiously as possible in order, inter alia, to take due account of important family, personal or professional considerations, especially in cases of an urgent, humanitarian nature; (19.3) - endeavour, where necessary, to reduce fees charged in connection with visa applications to the lowest possible level. (20) The participating States concerned will consult and, where appropriate, cooperate in dealing with problems that might emerge as a result of the increased movement of persons. (21) The participating States recommend the consideration, at the next CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki, of the advisability of holding a meeting of experts on consular matters. (22) The participating States reaffirm that the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers have their human dimension. In this context, they (22.1) - agree that the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers are the concern of all participating States and that as such they should be addressed within the CSCE process; (22.2) - reaffirm their commitment to implement fully in their domestic legislation the rights of migrant workers provided for in international agreements to which they are parties; (22.3) - consider that, in future international instruments concerning the rights of migrant workers, they should take into account the fact that this issue is of importance for all of them; (22.4) - express their readiness to examine, at future CSCE meetings, the relevant aspects of the further promotion of the rights of migrant workers and their families. (23) The participating States reaffirm their conviction expressed in the Vienna Concluding Document that the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights as well as of civil and political rights is of paramount importance for human dignity and for the attainment of the legitimate aspirations of every individual. They also reaffirm their commitment taken in the Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe to the promotion of social justice and the improvement of living and working conditions. In the context of continuing their efforts with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights by all appropriate means, they will pay special attention to problems in the areas of employment, housing, social security, health, education and culture. (24) The participating States will ensure that the exercise of all the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out above will not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law and are consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and with their international commitments, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These restrictions have the character of exceptions. The participating States will ensure that these restrictions are not abused and are not applied in an arbitrary manner, but in such a way that the effective exercise of these rights is ensured. Any restriction on rights and freedoms must, in a democratic society, relate to one of the objectives of the applicable law and be strictly proportionate to the aim of that law. (25) The participating States confirm that any derogations from obligations relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms during a state of public emergency must remain strictly within the limits provided for by international law, in particular the relevant international instruments by which they are bound, especially with respect to rights from which there can be no derogation. They also reaffirm that (25.1) - measures derogating from such obligations must be taken in strict conformity with the procedural requirements laid down in those instruments; (25.2) - the imposition of a state of public emergency must be proclaimed officially, publicly, and in accordance with the provisions laid down by law; (25.3) - measures derogating from obligations will be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; (25.4) - such measures will not discriminate solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin or of belonging to a minority.
III (26) The participating States recognize that vigorous democracy depends on the existence as an integral part of national life of democratic values and practices as well as an extensive range of democratic institutions. They will therefore encourage, facilitate and, where appropriate, support practical co-operative endeavours and the sharing of information, ideas and expertise among themselves and by direct contacts and co-operation between individuals, groups and organizations in areas including the following: - constitutional law, reform and development, - electoral legislation, administration and observation, - establishment and management of courts and legal systems, - the development of an impartial and effective public service where recruitment and advancement are based on a merit system, - law enforcement, - local government and decentralization, - access to information and protection of privacy, - developing political parties and their role in pluralistic societies, - free and independent trade unions, - co-operative movements, - developing other forms of free associations and public interest groups, - journalism, independent media, and intellectual and cultural life, - the teaching of democratic values, institutions and practices in educational institutions and the fostering of an atmosphere of free enquiry. Such endeavours may cover the range of co-operation encompassed in the human dimension of the CSCE, including training, exchange of information, books and instructional materials, co-operative programmes and projects, academic and professional exchanges and conferences, scholarships, research grants, provision of expertise and advice, business and scientific contacts and programmes. (27) The participating States will also facilitate the establishment and strengthening of independent national institutions in the area of human rights and the rule of law, which may also serve as focal points for co-ordination and collaboration between such institutions in the participating States. They propose that co-operation be encouraged between parliamentarians from participating States, including through existing inter-parliamentary associations and, inter alia, through joint commissions, television debates involving parliamentarians, meetings and round-table discussions. They will also encourage existing institutions, such as organizations within the United Nations system and the Council of Europe, to continue and expand the work they have begun in this area. (28) The participating States recognize the important expertise of the Council of Europe in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and agree to consider further ways and means to enable the Council of Europe to make a contribution to the human dimension of the CSCE. They agree that the nature of this contribution could be examined further in a future CSCE forum. (29) The participating States will consider the idea of convening a meeting or seminar of experts to review and discuss co-operative measures designed to promote and sustain viable democratic institutions in participating States, including comparative studies of legislation in participating States in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia drawing upon the experience acquired in this area by the Council of Europe and the activities of the Commission 'Democracy through Law'.
IV (30) The participating States recognize that the questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning independent judiciary. This framework guarantees full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, the free expression of all their legitimate interests and aspirations, political pluralism, social tolerance and the implementation of legal rules that place effective restraints on the abuse of governmental power. They also recognize the important role of non-governmental organizations, including political parties, trade unions, human rights organizations and religious groups, in the promotion of tolerance, cultural diversity and the resolution of questions relating to national minorities. They further reaffirm that respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as part of universally recognized human rights is an essential factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy in the participating States. (31) Persons belonging to national minorities have the right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law. The participating States will adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose of ensuring to persons belonging to national minorities full equality with the other citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. (32) To belong to a national minority is a matter of a persons individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice. Persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will. In particular, they have the right (32.1) - to use freely their mother tongue in private as well as in public; (32.2) - to establish and maintain their own educational, cultural and religious institutions, organizations or associations, which can seek voluntary financial and other contributions as well as public assistance, in conformity with national legislation; (32.3) - to profess and practise their religion, including the acquisition, possession and use of religious materials, and to conduct religious educational activities in their mother tongue; (32.4) - to establish and maintain unimpeded contacts among themselves within their country as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States with whom they share a common ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage or religious beliefs; (32.5) - to disseminate, have access to and exchange information in their mother tongue; (32.6) - to establish and maintain organizations or associations within their country and to participate in international non-governmental organizations. Persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group. No disadvantage may arise for a person belonging to a national minority on account of the exercise or non-exercise of any such rights. (33) The participating States will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and create conditions for the promotion of that identity. They will take the necessary measures to that effect after due consultations, including contacts with organizations or associations of such minorities, in accordance with the decision-making procedures of each State. Any such measures will be in conformity with the principles of equality and non-discrimination with respect to the other citizens of the participating State concerned. (34) The participating States will endeavour to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities, notwithstanding the need to learn the official language or languages of the State concerned, have adequate opportunities for instruction of their mother tongue or in their mother tongue, as well as, wherever possible and necessary, for its use before public authorities, in conformity with applicable national legislation. In the context of the teaching of history and culture in educational establishments, they will also take account of the history and culture of national minorities. (35) The participating States will respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities. The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned. (36) The participating States recognize the particular importance of increasing constructive co-operation among themselves on questions relating to national minorities. Such co-operation seeks to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations, international peace, security and justice. Every participating State will promote a climate of mutual respect, understanding, co-operation and solidarity among all persons living on its territory, without distinction as to ethnic or national origin or religion, and will encourage the solution of problems through dialogue based on the principles of the rule of law. (37) None of these commitments may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any action in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other obligations under international law or the provisions of the Final Act, including the principle of territorial integrity of States. (38) The participating States, in their efforts to protect and promote the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, will fully respect their undertakings under existing human rights conventions and other relevant international instruments and consider adhering to the relevant conventions, if they have not yet done so, including those providing for a right of complaint by individuals. (39) The participating States will co-operate closely in the competent international organizations to which they belong, including the United Nations and, as appropriate, the Council of Europe, bearing in mind their on-going work with respect to questions relating to national minorities. They will consider convening a meeting of experts for a thorough discussion of the issue of national minorities. (40) The participating States clearly and unequivocally condemn totalitarianism, racial and ethnic hatred, anti-semitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds. In this context, they also recognize the particular problems of Roma (gypsies). They declare their firm intention to intensify the efforts to combat these phenomena in all their forms and therefore will (40.1) - take effective measures, including the adoption, in conformity with their constitutional systems and their international obligations, of such laws as may be necessary, to provide protection against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, hostility or hatred, including anti-semitism; (40.2) - commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect persons or groups who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, and to protect their property; (40.3) - take effective measures, in conformity with their constitutional systems, at the national, regional and local levels to promote understanding and tolerance, particularly in the fields of education, culture and information; (40.4) - endeavour to ensure that the objectives of education include special attention to the problem of racial prejudice and hatred and to the development of respect for different civilizations and cultures; (40.5) - recognize the right of the individual to effective remedies and endeavour to recognize, in conformity with national legislation, the right of interested persons and groups to initiate and support complaints against acts of discrimination, including racist and xenophobic acts; (40.6) - consider adhering, if they have not yet done so, to the international instruments which address the problem of discrimination and ensure full compliance with the obligations therein, including those relating to the submission of periodic reports; (40.7) - consider, also, accepting those international mechanisms which allow States and individuals to bring communications relating to discrimination before international bodies.
V (41) The participating States reaffirm their commitment to the human dimension of the CSCE and emphasize its importance as an integral part of a balanced approach to security and co-operation in Europe. They agree that the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE and the human dimension mechanism described in the section on the human dimension of the CSCE of the Vienna Concluding Document have demonstrated their value as methods of furthering their dialogue and co-operation and assisting in the resolution of relevant specific questions. They express their conviction that these should be continued and developed as part of an expanding CSCE process. (42) The participating States recognize the need to enhance further the effectiveness of the procedures described in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the section on the human dimension of the CSCE of the Vienna Concluding Document and with this aim decide (42.1) - to provide in as short a time as possible, but no later than four weeks, a written response to requests for information and to representations made to them in writing by other participating States under paragraph 1; (42.2) - that the bilateral meetings, as contained in paragraph 2, will take place as soon as possible, as a rule within three weeks of the date of the request; (42.3) - to refrain, in the course of a bilateral meeting held under paragraph 2, from raising situations and cases not connected with the subject of the meeting, unless both sides have agreed to do so. (43) The participating States examined practical proposals for new measures aimed at improving the implementation of the commitments relating to the human dimension of the CSCE. In this regard, they considered proposals related to the sending of observers to examine situations and specific cases, the appointment of rapporteurs to investigate and suggest appropriate solutions, the setting up of a Committee on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, greater involvement of persons, organizations and institutions in the human dimension mechanism and further bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote the resolution of relevant issues. They decide to continue to discuss thoroughly in subsequent relevant CSCE fora these and other proposals designed to strengthen the human dimension mechanism, and to consider adopting, in the context of the further development of the CSCE process, appropriate new measures. They agree that these measures should contribute to achieving further effective progress, enhance conflict prevention and confidence in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE.
* * * (44) The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the people and Government of Denmark for the excellent organization of the Copenhagen Meeting and the warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Meeting. (45) In accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE contained in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE, the third Meeting of the Conference will take place in Moscow from 10 September to 4 October 1991.
Copenhagen, 29 June 1990
ANNEX
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON THE ACCESS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDIA TO MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION The Chairman notes that the practices of openness and access to the Meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension, as they were applied at the Vienna Meeting and as contained in Annex XI of the Concluding Document of that Meeting, are of importance to all participating States. In order to follow and build upon those practices at forthcoming CSCE meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension, the participating States agree that the following practices of openness and access should be respected: - free movement by members of interested non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Conference premises, except for the areas restricted to delegations and to the services of the Executive Secretariat. Accordingly, badges will be issued to them, at their request, by the Executive Secretariat; - unimpeded contacts between members of interested NGOs and delegates, as well as with accredited representatives of the media; - access to official documents of the Conference in all the working languages and also to any document that delegates might wish to communicate to members of interested NGOs; - the opportunity for members of interested NGOs to transmit to delegates communications relating to the human dimension of the CSCE. Mailboxes for each delegation will be accessible to them for this purpose; - free access for delegates to all documents emanating from interested NGOs and addressed to the Executive Secretariat for the information of the Conference. Accordingly, the Executive Secretariat will make available to delegates a regularly updated collection of such documents. They further undertake to guarantee to representatives of the media - free movement in the Conference premises, except for the areas restricted to delegations and to the services of the Executive Secretariat. Accordingly, badges will be issued to them by the Executive Secretariat upon presentation of the requisite credentials; - unimpeded contacts with delegates and with members of interested NGOs; - access to official documents of the Conference in all the working languages. The Chairman notes further that this statement will be an Annex to the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting and will be published with it. Asian Monitoring Network Conference: Lessons LearntElection Monitoring Organizations, Lessons Learned and Future Directions (1998) from the Asian Monitoring Network Conference is located at: http://www.ndi.org/ndi/worldwide/asia/cambodia/1998/cambodia_amn_l01998.PDF Enrolling to Vote (New Zealand)
Voter Registration Form (New Zealand)From: Application for Registration as a Parliamentary Elector. Elections Commission of New Zealand.
Reporting Forms and Filing Information (US)Federal Election Commission forms for Candidates, Political Parties and Political Action Committees found at http://www.fec.gov/pages/infosub2.htm Reporting Form for Party Election Expenses (NZ)Forms from the Election Commission of New Zealand for Return of Registered Political Party Expenses.
Reporting Form for Candidate Election Expenses (NZ)Election Commission of New Zealand. Form for Return of Constituency Candidate Election Expenses and Election Donations.
Campaign Finance Guides (FEC)The Federal Election Commission (US) Guides for: Campaign Guide for Corporate and Labor Organizations Campaign Guide for Congressional Candidates and Committees Campaign Guide for Political Party Action Committees Campaign Guide for Nonconnected Committees Found at: http://www.fec.gov/pages/infosub2.htm Ink Question & Answer (CODE)Ink Issues, Code International Reprinted from Delivering the Vote Spring 1999
Ask CODE Inc. Question: We are finding the cost of purchasing ink quite expensive. It seems the price is on the rise and becoming almost prohibitive, is there any way we can reduce the cost? Answer: Many electoral commissions practice the method of marking fingers with indelible voter ink. The most common practice is to dip a voter's finger into a container of ink up to and including the fingernail. This method uses far more ink than other methods. To mark 500 voters using traditional dipping methods, each voting station requires at least two 80cc bottles of ink. When the ink is applied with an applicator, the same 500 voters can be marked with a 5cc bottle. The smaller bottle is a fraction of the cost and less expensive to ship. Sometimes the application of smaller amounts of ink is regarded as too time consuming. However, experience shows this is a misconception. Properly trained voting personnel can apply a smaller amount without any delay. Some commissions are marking the open palm of a voter's hand with indelible ink, a stamp pad and a rubber stamp of the commission's logo. This method is rapid and economical. Newly developed products, which use smaller quantities of ink and are less expensive, are also available. Indelible ink can be purchased in bottles with roll on applicators, and many invisible indelible inks are applied with a spray applicator. Commissions should try all the available options and decide what format is best suited to their needs. Campaign Receipts, Expenditures, 1998 California ElectionThe California Secretary of State (www.ss.ca.gov/prd/finance98_general_final/98gencandmainpage.htm) provides detailed information on Campaign Receipts, Expenditures, Cash on Hand and Debts for State Candidates and Officeholders. It includes analysis of spending by such things as incumbents vs challengers and winners vs losers. Follow the Dollar Reports (Common Cause)Common Cause is a non-profit, nonpartisan citizen's lobbying organization whose stated purpose is to promote open, honest and accountable government. One of the issues which Common Cause follows closely is campaign financing. The Follow the Dollar Reports located at www.commoncause.org provides information on campaign contributions, enabling U.S. voters to see who gave how much to which party or candidate. Soft Money Laundromat (Common Cause)Common Cause is a non-profit, nonpartisan citizen's lobbying organization whose stated purpose is to promote open, honest and accountable government. One of the issues which Common Cause follows closely is campaign financing. Common Causes' Soft Money Laundromat (http://www.commoncause.org/laundromat) is a searchable database of special interest soft money contributions to the Democratic and Republic national party committees. It shows who got what and 'what it means for our democracy.' Judgement on Campaign Finance Reporting (NZ)Judgement of the Court, Delivered by Thomas J. New Zealand Court of Appeals. On the case of Electoral Commission and Priscilla Tate. June 11, 1999
Code of Conduct for Public Employees (Australia)Code of Conduct for Public Employees in Southern Australia Reprinted at http://www.transparency.org/documents/source-book/c/cvC/c3.htm Ethics and Disclosure Act, WyomingWyoming Law on ethics. Can be found at http://soswy.state.wy.us/election/ethics.htm Code of Conduct: Administration of Elections (IDEA)
IDEA: Code of Conduct for the Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections. Can be found at http://www.idea.int/publications/conduct/admin/intro.htm Code of Conduct: Ethical Observation (IDEA)IDEA: Code of Conduct for the Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections. Can be found at: http://www.idea.int/publications/conduct/obs/intro.htm Disclosure of Donations (New Zealand)
Election Expenses for Political Parties (NZ)Electoral Commission of New Zealand. Guide to Election Expenses for Registered Political Parties, 1999 General Elections. Wellington, New Zealand. 1999
Election Broadcasting (New Zealand)Electoral Commission of New Zealand. Broadcasting at Parliamentary Elections: A Guide of Political Parties, Candidates and Broadcasters. Wellington, New Zealand. 1999
Candidate Information (New Zealand)
Registration of Political Parties & Logos (NZ)Electoral Commission of New Zealand. Guide to the Registration of Political Parties and Logos, Wellington, New Zealand. 1997
Code of Conduct: Political Parties (IDEA)
IDEA: Campaigning in Democratic Elections. Code of Conduct for Political Parties. Found at http://www.idea.int/publications/conduct/polparties.pdf The Internal Audit Law (Israel)Israel: F3: The Internal Audit Law, 1992. Reprinted at: http://www.transparency.org National Integrity Systems (Transparency International)Transparency International. National Integrity Systems, Executive Summary. Found at: http://www.transparency.org/activities/nat_integ_systems/country_studies.htm The Seattle Ethics and Election CommissionThe Seattle Ethics and Election Commission (SEEC) is a citizen's body that interprets, administers and enforces the Seattle Election Code, Code of Ethics and other related laws. Ethic procedures and standards (http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/ethics/ethics.htm) are listed as well as what to do if an ethics violation is witnessed. The Fair Political Practices Commission (California)The Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) is an independent agency that administers, interprets and enforces the provisions of the California Political Reform Act. Part of this Act is designed to ensure that elections are fair. The FPPC (http://www.fppc.ca.gov) provides overviews of California's conflict of interest law, ethics and lobbying rules, and other related information.
Law Enforcement Code of EthicsInternational Association of Chiefs of Police. Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. Reprinted at the University of Maine: http://www.ume.maine.edu/~pubsafe/txt/ethics.htm
The International Association of Chiefs of PoliceAs a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve the community; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the constitutional rights of all to liberty, equality and justice. I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all and will behave in a manner that does not bring discredit to me or to my agency. I will maintain courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed both in my personal and official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the law and the regulations of my department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided to me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty. I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, political beliefs, aspirations, animosities or friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise for crime and the relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities. I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the police service. I will never engage in acts of corruption or bribery, nor will I condone such acts by other police officers. I will cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their representatives in the pursuit of justice. I know that I alone am responsible for my own standard of professional performance and will take every reasonable opportunity to enhance and improve my level of knowledge and competence.
I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals,
dedicating myself before God to my chosen profession . . . Code of Conduct for Persons in Positions of Responsibility (SA)South Africa: A Code of Conduct for Persons in Positions of Responsibility. Reprinted at Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org/documents/source-book/c/co_conduct.htm) Training Documents for Neutrality, Cambodia
Application of Ink, NigeriaAPPLICATION OF INDELIBLE INK From the Nigerian Election Manual, 1998/99
The Poll Clerk will put the indelible ink on the left-hand thumbnail of each voter who has been issued with ballots. The Poll Clerk should check the voter's left thumbnail for any sign of ink, which would indicate that the voter has already cast a ballot. The Poll Clerk should wipe off any greasy substance on the voter's left thumb before applying the ink. The indelible ink should be applied using the small stick attached to the cap of the ink bottle. (This can be done with the help of an unused matchstick if the need arises.) The indelible ink should be applied to that place on the left thumb where the nail meets the cuticle (at the base of the nail). For voters who do not have a left thumb, the ink may be applied on the next closest finger on the left hand. The voter should not leave the table until the ink has dried. Click here for a PDF formatted document concerning the application of indelible ink. Inking Procedures (Various)INKING PROCEDURES From the 1999 Legislative and Presidential Elections in Nigeria (IFES) 'The poll official will mark the base of the nail and the cuticle of the left thumb (National Assembly election day) of the voter with indelible ink. (The right thumb on Presidential election day).' The Poll Clerk will put the indelible ink on the left-hand thumbnail of each voter who has been issued with ballots. The Poll Clerk should check the voter's left thumbnail for any sign of ink, which would indicate that the voter has already cast a ballot. The Poll Clerk should wipe off any greasy substance on the voter's left thumb before applying the ink. The indelible ink should be applied using the small stick attached to the cap of the ink bottle. (This can be done with the help of an unused matchstick if the need arises.) The indelible ink should be applied to that place on the left thumb where the nail meets the cuticle (at the bases of the nail). For voters who do no have a left thumb, the ink may be applied on the next closest finger on the left hand. The voter should not leave the table until the ink has dried. From the 2000 Municipal and Legislative Elections in Haiti (IFES) A voter must not cast 2 ballots. That is why he will be asked to ink his finger. He who refuses to ink his finger will not have his electoral card returned once he has cast his ballot. The vice president who is responsible of the inking procedures will shake the bottle before opening it. He will shake it every 30 minutes so that the ink keeps its stain quality all day long.
The vice president will ask that the voter, immediately after casting his ballot, to dip his right thumbnail to the base of the nail so that the whole nail is inked.
The vice president will ask the voter to let the ink dry on this thumb. From the 2000 Municipal Elections in Bosnia/Herzegovina (OSCE) Ultra Violet Light The PS Kit will include an ultra violet light that shall be used to illuminate the fingers of voters to see if there is evidence of the special ink, which would indicate that the person has already voted. The Polling Station Commissioner has to ensure that the ultra violet light is functioning and that the spare batteries from the Polling Station Kit are available. A diagram for fitting the batteries in inside the battery compartment. Ink Applicator The Ink Applicator contains a mild solution of silver nitrate. This chemical reflects UV light. It is non-toxic and not harmful, unless swallowed. The Ink Applicator is a pump spray bottle. The spray should be aimed at the nail of the right index finger. Silver nitrate is absorbed into the skin at the top of the nail (cuticle) and will remain there for at least 7 days. It can not be removed from the cuticle by washing. The silver nitrate is best seen when viewed in a darkened area. The Queue Controller will check the voters' fingers for ink stain. If invisible ink is detected, the person may not vote and must be instructed to leave the Polling Station. Incidents should be entered in the Poll Book. The Ballot Issuer applies the ink to the voter's right index finger at the base of the nail. (If the voter has no right index finger, the next available finger should be inked following the sequence: thumb, finger 3, 4, and 5. If the voter has no right hand, use the same sequence on the left hand. If the voter has no fingers, the ink requirement is waived. A voter who does not permit her/his finger to be stained relinquishes her/his right to vote). Instruct the voter to hold the finger up until the ink dries. This will take about 30 seconds. The Ballot Issuer issues then the ballot paper. From the 2000 Municipal Elections in Kosovo (OSCE) Same description of the UV lamp and the ink applicator as in the Bosnia Manual Same steps in the ink application by the Ballot Issuer. The ink as applied before the ballot paper is issued to the voter. 'If the voter refuses to allow the Ballot Issuer to spray her/her fingernail, s/he will be advised that s/he cannot vote and will be asked to leave the Polling Station. If the voter does not change her/his mind, the Ballot Issuer will ask the Chairperson to note the fact in the Poll Book and to annotate the FVL with the words 'No ballot' against her/his signature. Code of Conduct for Parties (South Africa)South African Election Commission. Administration Manual, Chapter 5, CORE. The Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties. Found at acewriter CD D503. Guidelines: Election Broadcasting in Transitional CountriesArticle 19: Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies. This manual can be found at http://www.article19.org/docimages/516.htm
GUIDELINES FOR ELECTION 	BROADCASTING IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES August 1994 (Reprinted April 1997) 	© ARTICLE 19
	ISBN 1 870798 12 0 Acknowledgements Notes on the Authors Abbreviations Background Note Preface CHAPTER 1 - THE CONTEXT OF ELECTION BROADCAST ISSUES IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIESIntroduction 1.1 Freedom of Expression in the Electoral Process 1.2 The Context for Exercising Free Expression Through the Media 1.3 The Varied Circumstances of Democratic Transitions 1.4 Differences in Country Conditions Affecting the Importance of the Broadcast Media CHAPTER 2 - PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE MEDIA'S ABILITY TO CRITICIZE, INVESTIGATE AND OPERATE FREELY IN THE ELECTION PROCESSIntroduction 2.1 Direct Government Censorship and Intervention 2.2 Intimidation, Attacks, and Failure of the Government to Protect the Media CHAPTER 3 - ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACCESS TO THE BROADCAST MEDIAIntroduction 3.1 Types of Access 3.2 Amounts of Time Allocated to Direct Access Programming 3.3 The Timing of Direct Access Programmes 3.4 Financing Political Party Broadcast Access 3.5 Criteria for Allocating Air Time 3.6 Implementation Concerns CHAPTER 4 - PROBLEMS WITH NEWS COVERAGE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNSIntroduction 4.1 Imbalanced Coverage 4.2 Failure to Distinguish Between Government Activities and Campaigning 4.3 Manipulation of Coverage 4.4 Special Information Programmes 4.5 Opinion Polls and Election Projections 4.6 Foreign Media and Cable Television CHAPTER 5 - VOTER EDUCATION AND SPECIAL ISSUESIntroduction 5.1 Voter Education 5.2 Special Importance of Election Broadcasting to Minority Groups, Indigenous Peoples and Women Voters 5.3 Local Elections 5.4 National Plebiscites and Referendums CHAPTER 6 - MECHANISMS FOR DEVELOPING BROADCAST POLICY CONCERNING ELECTION CAMPAIGNSIntroduction 6.1 Government Mechanisms 6.2 Self-Regulation 6.3 Media Monitoring and Citizen Action CHAPTER 7 - INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW AND STANDARDSIntroduction 7.1 International and Comparative Law 7.1.1 The Right to Political Participation 7.1.2 Freedom of Political Debate as a Fundamental Right 7.1.3 The Role of the Press in Informing the Public and Acting as Watchdog of Government 7.1.4 Freedom of Expression: The Rights of Political Parties and Individuals to Have Access to Government Broadcast Media During Election Campaigns 7.1.5 Non-Discrimination and the Duty of Balance: The Obligation of Government-Controlled Media to Publish Opposition Views 7.1.6 The Right of Reply, Correction or Retraction in Government Media 7.1.7 Limitations on Media Liability for Republishing Unlawful Statements 7.1.8 Political Expression May be Restricted only for Extraordinary Reasons 7.1.9 Enhanced Protection for Criticism of Politicians and Government 7.1.10	Enhanced Protection for Political Opinions 7.1.11 Right to an Effective Remedy 7.1.12 Government Obligation to Protect the Safety of Media Personnel and Premises 7.1.13 Special Measures Where Freedom of Expression Has Been Unduly Restricted Previously 7.2 The Practice of Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations CHAPTER 8 - GUIDELINES FOR BROADCAST COVERAGE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIESIntroduction The Guidelines in Summary Guideline 1 : Duty of Government Media to Inform the Public About All Matters Relevant to ElectionsGuideline 2 : Duty of Balance and ImpartialityGuideline 3 : Special Obligations Where Laws Restricting Freedom of Expression are in ForceGuideline 4 : Government Obligation to Punish Attacks Against Media Personnel and PropertyGuideline 5 : Limits on Prior RestraintGuideline 6 : Limits on Media LiabilityGuideline 7 : Replies, Corrections and RetractionsGuideline 8 : News CoverageGuideline 9 : Direct Access Programmes(a) Allocation of Time to the Parties (b) Decisions Regarding Amount of Time to be Allocated (c) Scheduling of Direct Access Broadcasts (d) Process for Assigning Time Slots (e) Financing of Direct Access Programmes Guideline 10 : Special Information ProgrammesGuideline 11 : Voter EducationGuideline 12 : Opinion Polls and Election ProjectionsGuideline 13 : Mechanisms for Regulating Broadcasts and Taking Action on ComplaintsGuideline 14 : Judicial ReviewGuideline 15 : Plebiscites and ReferendumsGuideline 16 : Local ElectionsAPPENDIX I Relevant Texts From Selected International Human Rights Instruments Regarding Electoral Rights and Freedom of Expression SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Please note that the web version of this document does not have all the endnotes contained in the printed version. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Return to contentsChapters 1-6 of this study were prepared for ARTICLE 19 by Patrick Merloe while on leave from his post as attorney with the law firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe in San Francisco, California. Sandra Coliver, ARTICLE 19's Law Programme Director, supervised the study and wrote Chapters 7 and 8, with assistance from Patrick Merloe. Special thanks for their comments on drafts of this study are extended to Edward Fouhy, Executive Producer, Concord Communications Group and a former Executive Producer in charge of the 1988 and 1992 presidential debates at CBS News; Larry Garber, who at the time was Senior Associate for Electoral Processes at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI); Alan Protheroe, CBE, Managing Director, The Services, Sound and Vision Corporation, and former Director of BBC News; and David Webster, Chairman of the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on European Broadcasting. ARTICLE 19 also gratefully acknowledges the advice and assistance of Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalasqua, a lawyer, journalist and lecturer at Yale University; David Hartman, President of Rodman Down, Inc. and formerly with ABC News; and Christopher Simpson, professor at the American University School of Communications. The International Human Rights Law Group and NDI provided valuable cooperation in making reports and other information available for this study. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the European Human Rights Foundation provided financial support for this project. The report was edited by Ann Naughton and Helen Darbishire. Elizabeth Schofield proofread the text and Susan York designed and typeset the report. Return to contents Sandra Coliver was the Law Programme Director of ARTICLE 19. She has written, edited and co-edited a number of publications for ARTICLE 19 on international and comparative freedom of expression issues. She has also written several journal articles on freedom of expression and other aspects of human rights law and has filed numerous amicus curiae briefs on international human rights law issues with US courts, courts of Commonwealth countries, and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. She has served as an expert at UN and Council of Europe colloquia on media freedom issues. She practised criminal, constitutional and international law for several years and taught international law and international human rights courses in San Francisco law schools. She currently serves on the Board of the US Section of Amnesty International. Patrick Merloe acted as Special Legal Counsel to ARTICLE 19 while on leave from his post as attorney with the San Francisco law firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe. He is currently Senior Associate at the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Washington. He completed graduate studies in public policy analysis at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC and has taught international human rights law at the University of San Francisco. Mr Merloe has published in the field of international human rights and private law and co-edited another of ARTICLE 19's publications, Press Law and Practice. He was pro bono counsel to the International Human Rights Law Group and to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and previously assisted the NDI on electoral law reform and civic development programmes and as an election observer. 	ABBREVIATIONS Return to contents
BACKGROUND NOTE Return to contentsBetween 1990 and 1992, more than 40 countries held multi-party elections for the first time in decades, and some for the first time ever. While the pace has slowed since that dramatic period, countries continue to plan for their first elections and, in countries that have already experienced their first landmark elections, the transition to democracy continues, often slowly and sometimes with serious setbacks. A major focus of those working for free and fair elections in transitional democracies is fair access to radio and television. GUIDELINES FOR ELECTION BROADCASTING IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, the first in-depth examination of election broadcasting, surveys the practice in a range of countries, including both transitional and well-established democracies, and highlights those practices that particularly impede and promote political communication. Drawing on international and comparative law and standards, ARTICLE 19 presents an authoritative set of guidelines addressing the obligations of governments and government media to ensure fair and equitable broadcasting in election campaigns. GUIDELINES FOR ELECTION BROADCASTING IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES is a practical and comprehensive resource book for governments, broadcasters, political parties, election monitoring and citizens groups, and all those concerned with the vital issue of free and fair elections. Authors: Sandra Coliver and Patrick Merloe 	PREFACE Return to contentsThis study is intended to contribute to a debate on the complex subject of election campaign broadcasting in transitional democracies. The growth of democratic movements around the world in recent years, from Albania to Zambia and numerous countries in between, often took governments and the international community by surprise. A key focus of the democratic movements' demand for free and fair elections has been their call for access to television and radio. Some of the countries in transition are returning to democratic rule after an interval of dictatorship. Some have well-established political parties accustomed to electoral contests and a press familiar with the role of free expression in promoting the electoral franchise. Chile, with its history of over 100 continuous years of constitutional democracy, disrupted by 16 years of military rule, exemplifies this category. Other transitional democracies have few democratic traditions and no history of multi-party elections. Mongolia is but one example in this latter grouping. Most transitional democracies fall between the ends of the spectrum. The differences do not necessarily make the transitions more or less difficult. They do, however, illustrate that there is no simple or uniform solution to any of the problems presented in democratic transitions. One point that is common to all of these countries is the central role of the broadcast media and of freedom of expression generally. Respect for freedom of expression, especially during campaign periods, is a touchstone for gauging the likelihood for success of a democratic transition. Transitional democracies face problems not faced by well-established democracies in seeking to ensure the fairness of broadcast coverage of election campaigns. In many transitional democracies, the need for voter education is greater. Voters may require stronger assurances about the secrecy of the ballot, as well as more technical information about how to register and vote. Television and radio is often under government control and may be run by managers and staff who owe loyalty or are sympathetic to the ruling party. Broadcasters may lack experience in covering elections, conducting rigorous interviews or orchestrating debates. It may be difficult to assess the relative electoral support for different parties and candidates, thus precluding allocation of air time based on proportion of popular support. Opposition parties, even major ones, may lack the resources to produce broadcasts that look as professional as those of the ruling party. Fear of physical or professional reprisal may deter journalists from broadcasting information that reflects poorly on ruling party candidates or may motivate them to give undue coverage to such candidates. These circumstances are not absent from well-established democracies, but they are likely to be more significant in transitional elections. The obligation of governments and government media to ensure that voters receive sufficient, balanced information to enable them to exercise informed choice remains the same regardless of the stage of a country's democratic development. However, because voters in transitional democracies are not as experienced with elections and because the mechanisms to ensure the transmission of adequate, balanced information are not yet institutionalized, more detailed guidelines are necessary to guide broadcasting in new democracies. This study draws from the experiences of both transitional and more mature democracies, as well as from principles of international law. The study arose in response to the interest expressed by political parties, broadcasters and non-governmental election-monitoring groups in transitional democracies, as well as by international election observers, in having a set of guidelines concerning broadcast coverage of election campaigns based on international law and practice. The guidelines were developed in consultation with, and reviewed by, several experts in elections and election broadcasting from a range of disciplines and countries. The study is by no means exhaustive, and points to areas where further examination, analysis and discussion are needed. The first six chapters of this study are based on a broad sampling of international election observer delegation reports from an array of respected organizations. Research was carried out in late 1992 and early 1993 of 92 reports of international observer teams from 31 organizations, covering 56 elections in 41 countries. These reports present valuable information on the historical and political context of the various elections as well as information concerning the status of freedom of expression and the role of the mass media. Although most reports did not address the role of the broadcast media at any length, we are confident that the size and breadth of the sample was sufficient to ensure representative data on the problems confronting broadcast media as well as to identify country practices that have consistently promoted or impeded fair coverage. We are confident also that reports from a sufficient number of organizations were examined to avoid any institutional biases that might have been present. Chapter 7 examines the international and comparative law, standards and jurisprudence that underpin the right to freedom of political communication, including the right of parties and candidates to express their views freely through the mass media and the right of the public to hear those views. It also addresses the right of citizens to sufficient, balanced information to enable them to participate fully in the election of their government. The chapter includes a brief review of the technical assistance and election monitoring initiatives undertaken by inter-governmental and non- governmental organizations. Chapter 8 consists of the Guidelines themselves, with commentary that references the most pertinent law, standards and practice from the preceding chapters. The Guidelines examine the obligations of governments and government media concerning three kinds of election broadcasts: (1) direct access programmes, over which the political party or candidate has complete editorial control; (2) interviews, debates, candidate forums, radio 'talk-back' shows, voter education programmes and similar formats; and (3) news coverage. The Guidelines address the obligations of governments to inform the public; abolish laws that restrict freedom of expression; refrain from censorship; bring to justice those responsible for any actual or threatened attacks on media personnel or offices; establish an independent body to monitor and regulate election broadcasts; and ensure that decisions affecting election broadcasts are subject to judicial review. The Guidelines also apply to public-service broadcasters -- media which are supported entirely or in part by government funds but are governed by boards that are independent of government and all political interests -- because they have the same obligations as government media by virtue of their funding. The Guidelines do not address private media because such media do not have obligations under international law. However, ARTICLE 19 urges private broadcasters to comply with the Guidelines as a matter of professional responsibility if they choose to provide broadcast coverage of elections. ARTICLE 19 hopes that this publication will assist governments, broadcasters and political parties involved in democratic transitions to establish effective mechanisms for ensuring fair and adequate coverage of election campaigns. It is intended also to assist those involved in monitoring elections and civic education. We hope that this publication may thereby contribute to the fairness of elections themselves. Frances D'Souza, Executive Director. July 1994. 	CHAPTER 1 	THE CONTEXT OF ELECTION BROADCAST ISSUES IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES Introduction 		Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. ... The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 			(Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) The right of every citizen to participate in government through free and fair elections is well settled under international human rights law. While Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the source most often cited for this point, numerous international instruments recognize electoral rights. 	 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant), the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), and the First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) all address electoral rights. These instruments also highlight the right of the public to receive information and ideas, as well as the right of the mass media to impart information and ideas. Governments have an obligation not to interfere with these rights. 	 Country practice underscores the international community's recognition that free and fair elections are a crucial component of civil and political rights. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of people exercising their democratic aspirations without effective participation in the electoral process. There is also a growing acceptance of the proposition that governments have a positive obligation to promote a diversity of viewpoints on matters of public interest in the media. This is especially true for issues under political debate. Further, where state-owned or state-controlled mass media exist, the government is obliged to ensure that there is no discrimination in programming, including on the grounds of political opinion. These obligations are applicable during election campaigns and help to ensure the conditions necessary for genuine, democratic elections. The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution on 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections,' stressed that 'periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the rights of the governed ...'. The resolution also stressed that the right to take part in government 'is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, embracing political, economic, social, and cultural rights...'. At the Paris meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in June 1989, a proposal was made that free and fair elections become a CSCE standard. This concept was incorporated into the CSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Document, which states that the participating states 'recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character.' The CSCE's statement underscores that political stability and respect for human rights are enhanced by popular participation in a country's political process, which is reinforced by the people exercising their right to vote in periodic and free elections. When properly conducted, elections provide the population with a decisive role in choosing the country's political leaders or in deciding important national issues through referendums. Elections, even when conducted in a relatively free and fair manner, may not of themselves secure a democratic transition. Election results, for example, are not always respected by the dominant political forces in a country. The 1989 elections in Panama, the 1990 elections in Burma (Myanmar), and the June 1993 elections in Nigeria prove this point all too graphically. Elections, even when their results are respected, represent one stage of an electoral process, and voting procedures on election day are not a sufficient indicator of the fairness of that process. The democratic character of an election must be considered in its context. Respect for human rights, including the freedoms of expression, association and assembly, as well as the right to be free from intimidation, are central to an effective electoral exercise. Elections, therefore, provide an occasion to evaluate how other institutions are functioning in a country to ensure and promote a spectrum of civil and political rights. A thorough analysis of the electoral process in any country must include the examination of a range of issues outside the scope of this report. Such issues include whether the military is neutral and acting as a professional body; whether the police and other security forces are acting to maintain order and to protect those seeking to exercise their rights in the electoral process; whether the judiciary is conducting itself impartially and whether the political parties and coalitions are free to build and spread their messages. Additionally, the degree to which the media is free to criticize the government and to report on the parties and events of significance in the election period are of crucial concern to the electoral process and are the focus of this report. 1.1	Freedom of Expression in the Electoral Process Return to contentsDemocracy depends on all contesting points of view being fairly and equitably communicated so that the people may make informed choices. The ability to express views freely in opposition to the status quo is essential to an effective electoral exercise. The ability of the opposition, in addition to the ruling forces, to avail itself of the mass communications media is critical in this regard. There cannot be meaningful and vigorous debate of fundamental issues facing a country without a means for expressing views. The mass communications media provide that vehicle in many instances. It is at this point that the freedom of expression recognized in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (as well as in numerous other international instruments) and electoral rights intersect. Article 19 acknowledges not only the right to hold opinions without interference but also the right 'to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.' Three sectors of the population have critical free expression rights to consider in the electoral context: potential voters as part of the general population, the news media, and the political forces that seek to compete for elected positions or otherwise to affect the outcome of the vote. Voters, of course, depend upon the right to receive full and accurate information. The media depend on their right to question and criticize the government, the candidates, and the otherwise contending forces, free of censorship, intimidation or political pressures. The political parties and coalitions depend on the ability to present their messages freely without distortion or manipulation and with sufficient time for their messages to be understood. 1.2	The Context for Exercising Free Expression Through the Media Return to contentsAnalysis of freedom of expression for political parties in elections must include the extent to which the parties are free to organize and convey their messages to the public. It must also include the degree to which the government takes steps to eliminate inequities affecting the ability of the parties to communicate these messages. This latter factor is particularly important in countries in transition from military or one-party rule to democracy. Factors including whether the parties are free to organize rallies, mass meetings, door-to-door canvassing and are generally free to communicate with potential voters affect the relative importance of the mass media for conveying political messages. Problems facing the parties in these areas may also indicate the types of pressures being placed on the media. Material resources of the parties, including those used to finance communications with the public, are also important. Access of political parties to the mass media, through free public service time and purchased time, is usually a critical campaign resource. While absolute equality between parties in campaign resources is rarely possible, the degree to which the government acts to ensure the availability of equitable campaign resources is central to its ability to hold free and fair elections. When approaching the role of the mass communications media in this regard, the legal and regulatory framework should be examined as well as the degree to which freedom of expression is respected in practice. While press freedom generally may be constitutionally and legally guaranteed, it may be undermined in practice by violence, intimidation, corruption or more subtle mechanisms. The degree of regulation of the mass media and the independence of the regulatory body may be important in determining the actual conditions under which the media operate. Whether the media are government-owned or controlled is also significant. If the media are in private hands, it is necessary to know whether the owners are aligned with one or more political tendencies. It is also necessary to determine whether owners respect editorial independence. The recent historical context of press freedom is also a relevant factor in evaluating free expression in an election. Some countries have a tradition of a relatively free and robust press even though they are presently in a democratic transition. In this regard, one branch of the news media may be more reliable than others. In Pakistan, leading up to the 1988 elections, for example, the print media were viewed by international observers as being amongst the most uninhibited amongst developing countries, while the broadcast media were completely government-controlled. In Chile, leading up to the 1988 national plebiscite on the return to civilian rule, radio provided considerably more balanced treatment of the two competing sides than did television or the printed press. Other countries may have recently experienced restrictions on press freedoms. The Republic of Korea's 1987 presidential elections, for example, were conducted under the shadow of repression, which included the firing of 683 journalists in the 1980 'Purification Movement'. Also, until just six months before the elections, the government issued daily press 'guidelines' dictating how the news was to be covered. The nine-year state of siege in Argentina continued throughout the campaign period leading to the 1983 national elections. In Zimbabwe a state of emergency was still in force during the 1985 elections. Extra-governmental forces may also affect the functioning of the press and its role as a vehicle for political parties to communicate their messages. In the year prior to the 1990 elections in Guatemala, for example, a television station was bombed, the offices of a periodical were destroyed by unidentified persons, the owner of two radio stations was assassinated and, less than two weeks before the vote, the founder of an opposition paper suffered an assassination attempt in which his wife was killed and he was seriously wounded. 1.3	The Varied Circumstances of Democratic Transitions Return to contentsDemocratic transitions take place under varied conditions. A country may be returning to democracy after a relatively short, if nonetheless dramatic, break from long-established democratic traditions. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay provide such examples. While national differences were significant, each had the advantage of well-organized political parties, developed news media, relatively advanced economies, and populations well-schooled in democratic processes. Prior to their recent transition processes, countries such as Albania, Ethiopia and Mongolia had few democratic traditions, no history of multi-party elections, weak opposition parties, almost no truly independent news media, and relatively poor economies. Until Guatemala's democratic transition in 1985, the country had experienced more than 30 years without democratic rule, and more than 60 per cent of the voters were under 30 years of age. In some countries the democratic transition is achieved quickly and is relatively smooth, as demonstrated in Czechoslovakia in 1989. The transition in other countries may be tortuous, including many set-backs, as Haiti's experience illustrates. In many countries the first election in the transition process serves as a referendum on whether to reject the former or present regime. The 1986 elections in the Philippines, the 1990 elections in Bulgaria, and the 1992 elections in Kenya fall into this category. In contrast, by the time the 1990 elections were held in Hungary, the transition had advanced to the point where the question was not whether to reject the past, but which direction to go in the future and at what pace. 1.4	Differences in Country Conditions Affecting the Importance of the Broadcast Media Return to contentsThe importance of news media in an election campaign may be increased where there is little time to conduct the campaign. This may be even more crucial where the amount of time is so short that the opposition has little opportunity to form political parties and select candidates known to and respected by the people. In Malaysia's 1990 elections, for example, the campaign period was restricted to two weeks due to what the government claimed were security precautions. Albania's 1991 parliamentary elections also were considered by international observers to be too brief for political parties to establish themselves or adequately present their messages to the voters. The importance of the broadcast media can also be heightened by such factors as the limited availability of newspapers and materials published by political parties. National distribution systems may be inadequate to deliver printed materials outside large cities, or the incumbent political forces may be unwilling to deliver independent or opposition publications. This was a problem, for example, in Romania's 1990 elections. The print media may not be independent and objective, thus restricting distribution of certain parties' messages, especially those of small parties. There may be shortages of newsprint, ink, or inadequate printing or distribution facilities. The price of newspapers also may be prohibitive, as happened in the 1990 elections in Bulgaria. Only two newspapers had a national circulation, and each was associated with just one political party. Illiteracy may also increase the importance of the broadcast media in certain countries. In the 1989 Namibian elections, for example, it was estimated that 60 per cent of the population was illiterate. This heightened the importance of radio, which was estimated to be the main source of news and information for up to 90 per cent of the people. In Guatemala's 1985 and 1990 elections, illiteracy was estimated to be 50 per cent nationally and 70 per cent among indigenous peoples. Access to radio and television sets also can affect the importance of the broadcast media, as happened in Kenya's 1992 elections. It was estimated that Kenya's approximately 25 million people had access to only 82,000 televisions and two million radios. By contrast, in Taiwan's 1989 elections it was estimated that over 90 per cent of families owned television sets, and almost all owned radios. An estimated 80 per cent of the population had access to television in Chile at the time of the 1988 national plebiscite and the 1989 general elections. In addition, television was the only mass medium that reached all of the geographic regions of the country. PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE MEDIA'S ABILITY TO CRITICIZE, INVESTIGATE AND OPERATE FREELY IN THE ELECTION PROCESS Introduction The media's right to function freely during the electoral process is circumscribed by restrictions on their ability to criticize activities or inaction by the government and the political parties, to investigate corruption and to operate independently of political pressures. In a significant number of transitional democracies, broadcast and print media face government intervention through direct censorship and threats of censorship. They also face government-sponsored or government-tolerated physical threats and attacks. In these circumstances, censorship may significantly inhibit free and fair election campaign broadcasting. Censorship includes a range of government-supported actions from direct censorship to murder. The term 'direct censorship' refers to improper and unlawful prior restraints on publication. It also is used to refer to communications from government officials that explicitly or implicitly threaten direct censorship or some other consequence for publishing items unfavourable to the government. Government action or inaction that places journalists in fear for their personal safety or the safety of their professional equipment constitutes a form of censorship which, though 'indirect', is often even more powerful than the measures which are more traditionally viewed as censorship. Often measures of intimidation are coupled with more direct forms of censorship, such as detention of journalists, in order to drive home their meaning. Media outlets that are subject to, or threatened with, measures of direct censorship or intimidation are likely to exercise a degree of what could be termed as self-censorship in order to avoid the sanctions of government or the violence of government-tolerated groups. Such self-censorship is not exercised willingly. Self-censorship also may be exercised by media outlets which are controlled by interests that are closely allied with the government and which impose censorship within their media outlets owing to support for, rather than fear of, the government. 2.1 	Direct Government Censorship and Intervention Return to contentsCensorship by Government-Controlled Media Censorship may take a number of forms in the election context. In Zambia's 1991 elections, for example, political advertising was allowed, but the government-controlled Zambian National Broadcasting Company (ZNBC) refused to air the opposition's advertisements, apparently on grounds that they violated advertising ethics and could put ZNBC at risk of an action for libel. The Zambian High Court issued an injunction ordering ZNBC to run the advertisements but reversed its decision several days later. The opposition then agreed to delete portions of the advertisements which ZNBC considered inappropriate. Former United States President Jimmy Carter criticized ZNBC for censorship at a press conference in Lusaka six weeks before the elections, stating: 'I can understand why [ZNBC] will not want to publish advertisements that [are] scurrilous in nature or might encompass a slander or would have immoral or filthy words in them ... . But they are also maintaining to have the right to decide what is truth and what is not truth in a heated political campaign.' The Zambian Voting Observation Team (Z-Vote), an international election observer delegation of which Jimmy Carter was a member, reviewed transcripts of the advertisements and deletions provided by ZNBC. The team argued in a letter to the ZNBC that its deletion of the claim that the ruling party had engaged in '27 years of mismanagement' appeared indefensible and that such claims clearly were legitimate campaign issues. Censorship by Government Agencies The 1991 Taiwan election provides an example of government censorship of political broadcast advertising. Taiwan's Central Election Commission officials reviewed television campaign advertisements in advance and prohibited references to the independence issue. In the 1986 Philippine election, broadcast advertising was censored, and the opposition was forced to petition the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board before their unpaid advertisements were allowed. Banning Access for Certain Political Parties During the 1991 election campaign in Bangladesh, the Jatiya Party, and other parties that took part in the 1988 election, were excluded from coverage by television and radio. They also were not allowed to present a half-hour political broadcast, an opportunity which was granted to other parties. Media Closures Censorship, including closure of media outlets, was part of the context of the 1989 Panamanian elections. All three daily opposition newspapers (La Prensa, El Extra and El Siglo), were closed by the government in 1988 and remained closed during the election campaign. Three radio stations (Radio KW Continente, Radio Noticias and Radio Mundial), which had been shut down by the government, remained closed during the campaign. Television Channel 5, which was owned by President Delvalle, was closed when he was ousted from office in 1988, although it later reopened under pro-government leadership. One month before the vote, Channel 4, the most independent television station, received a notice that it faced prosecution for US$2 million in back taxes. The station interpreted this as an attempt to pressure it to reduce the access it provided to opposition parties. Government Confiscations and Sedition Charges In the period leading up to the December 1992 elections in Kenya, the government seized publications that were particularly critical of its activities and imprisoned journalists. The government also used the law of sedition to harass media critics. On 5 January 1992, for example, police officers impounded over 30,000 copies of Society magazine and obtained a permanent injunction against its distribution on grounds that statements alleging government complicity in the murder of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko were seditious. In April five Society journalists were detained for nine days on sedition charges and in August the editor of Finance magazine was held for 13 days on sedition charges related to allegations of government involvement in tribal violence. These actions helped to create an atmosphere of self-censorship affecting all media. Threats of Censorship During the 1989 election campaign in El Salvador, officials at the Ministry of Culture and Communications reportedly made threatening telephone calls to journalists who ran stories that were not to the government's liking. These actions reinforced the climate of self-censorship. A state of siege existed in El Salvador for most of 1980 to early 1987. During that period freedom of expression was curtailed, and journalists feared violent reprisals from political extremists, including death squads. Although the situation for the press had improved by the 1989 election campaign, a high degree of repression remained. Government political pressure on the broadcast media in an election period is often more subtle than direct censorship. The Republic of Korea's 1988 elections illustrate these circumstances. Television and radio outlets were all controlled or restricted by the government. A week before the elections, the General Federation of Korean Broadcasters Organizations (GFKBO) was formed with members from the government-owned Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), the government-controlled Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS). The GFKBO called for an end to outside pressure and intervention during the election period. In addition, six days before the election, more than 20 reporters at the Pusan KBS outlet initiated a boycott of news operations, charging that their reports on the election campaign had been distorted when broadcast. Without such actions, it could have been difficult to detect government pressure on the broadcast media. Martial Law and States of Siege Governments may make use of, or threaten to make use of, extraordinary powers to censor the media during election campaigns. A blatant example of censorship was demonstrated by the 1990 elections in Burma (Myanmar), where martial law imposed by the government permitted it to censor or forbid communications by political parties and candidates simply by labelling criticism of the government or defence forces as divisive. The political parties were only allowed one 10-minute television slot and one 15-minute radio slot. Even then, their statements required the government's prior approval. Applications to the Election Commission were required, together with a copy of the script of the speech at least seven days in advance. Both the script and the tape of the speech were reviewed before a permit was granted. The shadow of the military loomed over the 1983 Argentinian elections because a nine-year state of emergency continued throughout the campaign. While the state of emergency was suspended the day before the vote, the government gave no assurance that it would not be reimposed following the elections. Further, the absence of a specific commitment to the transfer of power added to the uncertainty surrounding the elections. 2.2 	Intimidation, Attacks, and Failure of the Government to Protect the Media Return to contentsAttacks on journalists or media offices are a powerful form of censorship. Such attacks may be committed by government agents or by non-governmental entities which may even include other competing political parties. In all cases, the government is obliged to thoroughly investigate the crimes, prosecute the perpetrators and punish those found to be guilty -- the same obligation that it owes to all people within its jurisdiction. In addition, the government arguably has a particular duty to condemn, prosecute and punish such crimes because of the injury they inflict on media freedom. While direct methods of censorship violate Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other provisions of human rights treaties which protect freedom of expression, a government's support for, or failure to prosecute, attacks on journalists in addition violates the rights to security of the person and to an effective remedy guaranteed by all of the general human rights treaties. Government Attacks on Journalists Domestic and foreign journalists were intimidated and attacked by security forces during Haiti's 1987 election campaign. The incidents included an army attack on a radio station; the confiscation of cameras, film and tape recorders; and the detention, beating and shooting of journalists. According to foreign observers, in a period of two months 14 journalists fell victim to such incidents. Detention of Journalists Intimidation sometimes takes the form of the arrest of journalists. During the 1984 Uruguayan election campaign, for example, two journalists and the publisher of a newspaper were detained by police approximately eight weeks before the election and questioned about a story they published on torture of political prisoners, which cast the government in a negative light. During the election campaign period in Kenya, police seized thousands of copies of Finance magazine from its printers in November and again in December 1992. Police detained the magazine's editor on charges of sedition in December, less than three weeks prior to the elections. Earlier that month, the police detained the editor of another opposition magazine on sedition charges. Prosecution of Journalists Threats, violence and the effect of government prosecutions and economic pressures on the media all contributed to the climate of intimidation in the campaign leading to Chile's 1988 national plebiscite. During 1987 and 1988, at least 30 journalists faced prosecution on charges such as 'insulting the armed forces'. Some charges resulted in imprisonment. The heads of independent and opposition media, including radio and the press, were among those subjected to such intimidation. Threats, including death threats, from unidentified groups believed to be linked to the military were common. In the 15 months between the October 1988 national plebiscite and the December 1989 general elections in Chile, international observers reported a decrease in censorship and harassment of the media but that a continued atmosphere of intimidation prevailed. Cases against journalists abounded in the military courts, as did violent acts and death threats by unknown groups. In the month before the general elections, for example, a journalist who had received death threats and an editor of an opposition weekly were the target of arson attacks. Failure to Protect Journalists from Attack During Pakistan's 1990 election campaign, political parties attempted to intimidate the press through threats and disruption of distribution. The police often failed to protect the press. Attacks on the press usually occurred after negative stories appeared concerning particular parties or party leaders. In Korea's 1987 election campaign, the offices of Don-A Ilbo, an independent daily newspaper, were attacked by supporters of the ruling party a week before the vote. Romania's 1990 election campaign was marred in both January and February by organized groups of coal miners and other government supporters attacking opposition political parties and their press. No prosecutions resulted from these attacks. Such actions undoubtedly hinder broadcast coverage of election campaigns. At a minimum they contribute to a chilling of the media's freedom to investigate government abuses as well as to criticize the actions and omissions of the political forces at play in the country. During the 1985 elections in Guatemala, intimidation over the preceding years created by numerous death threats and murders of journalists -- 47 journalists were killed between 1978 and 1985 -- constituted the most powerful form of censorship. Not only did the government fail to investigate or prosecute these attacks, but it was widely believed that government forces had encouraged or supported them. In the face of such conditions, it is imperative to counter invidious actions against the media in order to ensure and promote internationally-recognized standards protective of freedom of expression as well as the security of the person. Election campaign broadcasting standards must address such serious human rights abuses as part of an effort to secure the broadcast media's role in promoting transitions to democracy. The government's failure to protect the media or to hold accountable those responsible for such abuses undermines the potential for free and fair elections. CHAPTER 3 Return to contents ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACCESS TO THE BROADCAST MEDIA Introduction The role of election campaign broadcasting may be divided into three broad categories. The first encompasses political party and candidate access to the people through direct communications, sometimes referred to as political advertising. The second category includes the manner in which the broadcast media cover candidates, parties, and issues of importance to the election in news and special information programming. The third category concerns voter-education information regarding the voting process, voter participation and related civic issues. Direct access communications may take the form of candidates or party representatives presenting their political programmes to the voters. Such communications may be aired either as free public service programmes or as advertisements. 3.1	Types of Access One of the first issues presented in election campaign broadcasting is the type of direct access time to provide. Broadcast access may take the form of allowing political party representatives or candidates to appear live or in taped programmes. Such programmes usually cover the candidate's or party's manifesto and allow potential voters to compare the views of the political contestants. Direct access programmes also allow the potential voters to form an opinion of the character of the presenting candidate. Direct access programming may provide a number of relatively short time slots or may provide larger blocks of time for the parties or candidates. The format may be uniform (for example, to cover the manifestos of the contenders) or may allow the candidates and parties broad latitude in what they present and how they present it. What is common to each format is that the parties and candidates are able to communicate directly with the public. There were many examples of straightforward direct access programming in Namibia's 1989 election. Television air time was reserved for two political parties to present their campaign statements each night for the last six weeks of the campaign. In Bulgaria's 1990 election campaign, the contesting forces were allotted television slots three times per week. In Bangladesh's 1991 campaign, a 30 minute slot was aired simultaneously on radio and television for each qualified party. In Malaysia's 1990 campaign, party manifestos were presented on radio following regularly scheduled news programmes. 3.2 	Amounts of Time Allotted to Direct Access Programming A second major issue in providing political parties and potential voters with direct access programming is the amounts of time to allow. This issue concerns both the total amount of time and the types of time slots provided. The problem here is to provide adequate time for each of the contesting forces to present their messages effectively. This problem may be complicated by the number of electoral contenders, the number of issues central to the election, the number of other effective communication vehicles, and the public's relative voting experience. Only one 10-minute television slot and one 15-minute radio statement were permitted in the 1990 elections in Burma (Myanmar). In Malaysia's 1990 elections, parties were not given free access to television, and political advertising was denied on both radio and television. In the week before the Malaysian vote, manifestos of the 40 contending parties were aired free of charge in brief radio broadcasts. In the circumstances, as in Burma, the opposition political parties did not receive adequate amounts of time to impart their messages. Similarly, in Chile's 1989 elections, the 20 minutes of legally-mandated time divided by the number of legislative candidates resulted in each candidate receiving only a few seconds to communicate his or her message. In Chile's 1989 elections, presidential candidates each received six-and-a-half minute television slots daily. Presidential candidates in Korea's 1987 election were allowed up to five slots, not to exceed 20 minutes each, during the course of the campaign. In Paraguay's 1989 elections, for two months preceding the vote, the three main parties received 15 minutes per day on state radio, a grouping of three other parties received 15 minutes shared among them, while other parties did not receive any time. In each of these circumstances the amounts of time allotted to qualified parties and candidates were generally perceived to be adequate for the effective communication of political messages. Czechoslovakia's 1990 elections provided a positive example of both the total amount of time allotted and the types of slots provided for direct access programming. Each party participating in the elections received four hours of free television time to communicate campaign messages. This time was divided into one 30-minute block, eight 10-minute slots, 12 five-minute slots, and 70 one-minute slots. The times for the contending parties were amalgamated into two-hour viewing blocks aired during the campaign. Such a combination of time slots allowed the potential voters to receive a significant amount of information about each party's manifesto and allowed the parties a variety of presentation formats. Both the amount and diversity of potential formats undoubtedly benefited the free flow of political information, although the two-hour blocks eventually resulted in reduced viewer levels. 3.3	The Timing of Direct Access Programmes In addition to deciding the amounts of time to be allocated for direct access programming, determining when the programmes are to be broadcast is a significant issue. It is important to air the programmes at times when voters are receptive. Two elements are crucial: (a) when in the campaign the programmes are broadcast, and (b) at what time of day the programmes are aired. The length of the campaign period and the amount of advance notice of the election are important factors. A related matter is the degree of organization of the parties immediately prior to the campaign. In transitional democracies, where the political parties are well-established and where the issues of national importance are clear, direct access programming may not be needed over long periods of time. Where parties and/or candidates are relatively unknown to the people, larger amounts of programming may be needed over longer periods in order to provide a fair opportunity for the parties to communicate their messages. This may be the case in countries where unexpected democratic breakthroughs occur, such as in Romania's 1990 elections. The effect of direct access programmes may be diminished if they are shown at hours that are inconvenient for potential voters. In the period leading up to Chile's 1988 national plebiscite, the two sides were provided free television access. The programme was aired at 10.45 p.m., well beyond prime time for most viewers. Due to the high interest in the plebiscite, however, a large number of people watched the programme despite its late hour. Opposition parties complained during Romania's 1990 elections that their television access slots appeared in the early hours of the morning and at other inconvenient times. Contrary to such cases, there are numerous examples of governments in democratic transition providing prime-time slots for access broadcasts. 3.4 	Financing Political Party Broadcast Access Broadcast time, whether on radio or television, costs money. Direct access for political parties must be paid for either by the government, the broadcast outlets themselves, or the political parties. The issue then becomes the fair and proper allocation of campaign resources, which may be complicated by lack of national resources. Purchase of air time has been permitted by governments in a number of democratic transitions. While this may be a desirable addition to time provided to the parties free of charge, it cannot by itself offer an adequate opportunity for parties to present their messages to the people in transitional settings. Opposition parties rarely have sufficient financial resources to purchase adequate amounts of broadcast time. In addition, the opposition may have been prevented from participating in political life and from communicating their messages, thus increasing the importance of free broadcast access. Often the broadcast media are state-owned or state-controlled, which places opposition parties at a distinct disadvantage in an election campaign. Even where broadcast media are privately owned, the owners may favour the ruling powers and may be averse to providing access to the opposition. Direct access programmes for the political parties afford the public their right to receive information necessary to exercise their electoral franchise. Such access also allows those who have formed the parties to exercise their free expression rights in the election context. It is proper, therefore, for a transitional government to expend national resources to pay for air time on the broadcast media. Political Advertising Not all transitional democracies have allowed political parties to purchase time on radio and television. Among the countries that did not allow such time were Bangladesh in 1991, Malaysia in 1990, the former Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia in 1990 and Namibia in 1989. Others have allowed political parties to purchase air time during election campaigns. Such time has taken the form of short slots of a few minutes each as well as blocks of longer duration. In some instances live broadcasts were permitted; in others, broadcasts were taped. Several problems have emerged in transitional democracies when political parties were allowed to purchase air time. One problem is that the advertisements are sometimes censored. In the 1991 Zambian elections, for example, the Zambian National Broadcasting Company (ZNBC) refused to run the opposition's advertisements. In Taiwan's 1989 election, opposition advertisements were rejected by television authorities as not being sufficiently factual. The Cost Factor A more pervasive problem in allowing purchase of air time is that some parties, particularly the ruling party, may have distinct financial advantages over their opponents and, thus, the ability to purchase disproportionate amounts of time. Campaign finance controls could be used to lessen this discrepancy, but they often are not in place during a country's transitional process. In Zimbabwe's 1985 elections, parties were permitted to place paid advertisements on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), but only three parties, including the ruling party, could afford to buy air time. Opposition parties all faced significant financial constraints. In Mongolia's 1990 elections, the opposition parties protested that although advertising time was available, only the ruling party could afford it. Another example is provided in Paraguay's 1989 elections, where political advertising time was available, but the cost was prohibitive to the opposition parties (many of which had only recently formed). Again, only the ruling party had the financial resources to purchase the time. The prohibitive cost of advertising may be addressed by direct subsidies to the parties through campaign financing arrangements, as was done in Paraguay's 1991 elections, or through government-mandated discounts for purchasing time on government and privately-owned broadcast media, as was the case in Panama's 1989 elections. In Korea's 1987 election, the government paid for the first of five allotted broadcast presentations by presidential candidates. Political Favouritism Another significant problem faced in allowing parties and candidates to purchase air time is that broadcasters sometimes give discounts to the party or parties they favour. This problem can be addressed by strict regulations that require advertising access on the same terms for all contending parties and candidates. The legal principle of non-discrimination requires such regulations. In the 1984 Uruguay elections, opposition parties claimed that government-controlled television and radio provided advertising air time to the party identified with the military government on more favourable terms than to other parties. In Guatemala's 1985 election, a presidential candidate who owned a daily newspaper arranged advertising trades that allowed him to appear frequently on radio and television. In that country's 1990 elections, the owner of two television channels allegedly gave large amounts of free advertising time to his political favourites, while not providing the same opportunity to other contenders. In the 1989 Panamanian elections, the two television stations not explicitly identified with the government allegedly provided advertising access to opposition parties at a discount of up to 60 per cent, while regulations provided for a discount of only 25 per cent. Political Advertising in Several Established Democracies A study of advertising in 19 countries published in 1991 by an Australian Senate Committee showed that paid political advertisements are permitted on the electronic media during election campaigns in only five of the 19 countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany and the United States. Paid political advertising is not permitted at all in the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and is not permitted during election campaigns in Austria, France, Israel and Japan. A separate study adds that paid political advertising is also prohibited in Ireland and Spain, but is permitted in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. Paid political advertising recently was authorized in Italy. One expert on European election broadcast law recommends that '[i]f paid advertising by political parties is ever allowed in a particular country, it should be suspended at the time of elections.' In the US, where campaign broadcasts are subject to less regulation than in virtually any other liberal democracy, all candidates for federal office are entitled to reasonable access to air time free of charge or else to purchase it from broadcasting stations at a non-discriminatory and reasonable rate. This has been ruled to be compatible with the First Amendment. A number of the issues raised by paid political advertising were discussed in the course of debate concerning a 1991 amendment to Australia's broadcasting law that prohibited all paid political advertising on the electronic media. The High Court (Australia's highest court) invalidated the amendment on the ground that various provisions violated the constitution's implicit protection of freedom of political communication, in particular, by providing for the allocation of free air time to parties in such a way as to give unfair advantage to incumbent candidates and parties with representation in the preceding legislature. No provision was made for organizations and associations to have access to air time (whether paid or unpaid). The amendment thus impermissibly favoured the status quo. The Court indicated that a prohibition on paid political advertising would probably be found constitutional if alternative measures to ensure fair access for all political players were available. France's Constitutional Court recognized that limits could be placed on paid political advertising that would both respect the right to freedom of expression as well as the principle of equality of opportunity for media access. It did so by upholding the constitutionality of a provision of the 1986 law permitting advertising by political parties outside election campaigns on the ground that the Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel could adopt rules that would prevent richer parties from taking advantage of the opportunity for air time. 3.5 	Criteria for Allocating Air Time There are two important requirements concerning the fair allocation of time for direct access programming: the establishment of clear and impartial criteria for parties to qualify for direct access air time, and the creation of a fair and impartial method for allocating air time. The principal dilemma is in finding a way to allow broadcast access to all of the genuine political contenders, while recognizing that flooding the air waves or dividing limited time between too many contenders may adversely affect the electorate's ability to make an informed choice. Flooding the air waves with messages from contenders with little or no chance of winning seats, or in a parliamentary election parties with little or no chance of playing a significant role in forming a government, dilutes the effect of the messages from the main contenders. A proliferation of messages may also serve to confuse rather than assist potential voters. Dividing limited direct access air time between too many contenders may result in time slots that are not adequate for any of them to effectively present their messages. This generally places the opposition at a disadvantage, because the ruling powers have been able to use the media to communicate their messages over a longer period of time. If a relatively small number of parties or candidates are contesting the election, allowing all registered contenders to qualify for time and then dividing the allotted time equally between them may an effective approach. In Chile's 1989 presidential election, for example, broadcast access time was shared equally between the three candidates. In Namibia's 1989 election, air time was shared equally between 14 political parties. There is, however, an upper limit to the number of parties or candidates that may be accommodated effectively by dividing access time equally. In Romania's 1990 elections, for example, more than 80 parties registered, due to Romania's extremely liberal threshold of 251 signatures to qualify as a party. The proliferation of messages was seen by international observers as working to the advantage of the incumbent political party. Qualification Thresholds and Allocation Methods In a country's first multi-party elections, allocation of air time on anything other than an equal basis poses great difficulty because the two most objective indicators of support -- the political party's performance in past elections and the number of seats held in parliament -- are unavailable. In circumstances where there are many contending parties, some type of qualification threshold and/or allocation method is usually employed to provide broadcast access to the political parties. In national elections, qualification thresholds may take into account the parties' geographic strength in a sufficient number of districts or regions to show that the party is more than a local phenomenon. Qualification thresholds may also be based on past electoral performances, including the number of seats held in the legislature or percentages of the popular vote received. In some instances parties are allocated air time based on a political agreement among the contending forces. Political agreements among parties to allocate broadcast time in transitional settings are often the result of round-table negotiations. In Bulgaria's 1990 elections, for example, round-table negotiations led to an agreement to allocate 20 minutes of free television broadcast time three days a week for the last two months of the campaign period to the ruling party and the main opposition coalition; 15 minutes to the next largest party; and smaller amounts to other parties. Such a system may be subject to criticism as favouring parties involved in the round-table negotiations, although it enhances the opportunity of the main contenders to present their message. In Nicaragua's 1990 election, the contending parties reached a political agreement to change the allocation formula from one based on performance at previous elections to one which provided equal access to all registered parties and alliances. The 1991 elections in Bangladesh provide an example of using a geographically-based method for allocation. There were 70 registered political parties in the contest. Broadcast access, however, was limited to those parties with candidates standing for office in more than 30 constituencies. Even such seemingly objective criteria, however, can be slanted to the benefit of one or more political parties, rather than serving to limit the access of insignificant contenders. In Chile's 1989 election, for example, broadcast access time was allocated according to the number of regions in which the largest party in an electoral coalition was registered, rather than by the sum of each of the parties. This resulted in rightist parties, which were registered in fewer regions, receiving significantly more time than the opposition. A third method is to base the qualification and allocation of time on performance in prior elections. Such a method generally favours well-established parties and may not be appropriate where a democratic breakthrough necessitates the formation of mostly new parties or where there are few known and respected individual candidates. An electoral performance method may be appropriate after the first election in a transitional democracy, if the first election was considered to be free and fair and if the political forces are relatively established. In Bulgaria's 1991 election, the national legislature established a formula recognizing the parliamentary parties automatically, while other parties and coalitions with lists of candidates in at least 11 of the country's 13 regions were granted broadcast access. In Israel, the Broadcasting Authority is required to allocate a basic time slot of 10 minutes to each party, and parties that are represented in the national parliament are entitled to three additional minutes for every member of parliament. Survey of Campaign Broadcast Policies A 1991 survey of campaign broadcasting in European and other democracies disclosed that in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania an equal amount of time was allocated to all registered political parties. By contrast, in Poland's first multi-party election, air time was allocated based upon the support received by parties as evidenced by the number of signatures on forms required for registering candidates. In nearly all Western countries surveyed, time was allocated to parties on a proportional basis. In Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Switzerland the time allocated was proportional to the number of seats held by parties in parliament. In the UK (where there are three main parties nationally) and Australia (where there are two main parties), most of the time was allocated to the main parties with small amounts given to minor parties. In France and Germany, where several parties hold a significant number of seats in parliament, parties that form the ruling coalition together receive approximately the same amount of time as those that form the opposition; parties without parliamentary representation may receive a small amount of time. In Spain, parties contesting at least 75 per cent of the constituencies are allocated time proportional to their success in the previous election. In Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, time was allocated on an equal basis, although in Ireland and the Netherlands time was allocated only to parliamentary parties. New Parties and Independent Candidates New parties and independent candidates may not be able to meet geographic qualifications, may not be represented in political negotiations between the main forces in the country, or may not have seats in the legislature. Nevertheless, such contenders may be significant to the electoral process. Public confidence in the elections may be affected by the treatment of such contenders, which may be viewed as a sign of the relative openness of the democratic transition. In addition, such parties and candidates, as well as small parties that have a longer history, all have recognizable political rights to be considered. A useful approach to accommodating new parties, independent candidates and small parties, may be to establish a qualification and allocation method that divides direct access time into categories. One category would then be divided equally between all registered contenders, giving each a minimum amount of time to present a message. The other category would then be allocated upon a formula that considers the relative strength of the parties, thus allowing the major contenders to sharpen the electoral debate. Method of Assigning Specific Times In addition to establishing a method for qualifying and allocating amounts of access time, it is necessary to select a method for assigning specific time slots. In Romania's 1990 elections, for example, opposition parties complained that their messages appeared at non-peak viewing time which have low audience levels. To avoid such charges, some governments have employed an alphabetical rotating system or a computer-generated random assignment method. Whatever method is used, effort should be made to ensure the equitable and impartial assignment of broadcast time slots. 3.6 	Implementation Concerns No matter which methods of qualification and broadcast time allocation are formally adopted, implementation problems may emerge. The most obvious concern is to ensure that the formulas devised to qualify parties for access time, allocate time, and assign slots are applied in practice. There have been numerous examples, some noted above, where opposition parties complained that these methods were not implemented properly. Another inequity that may occur concerns access to production facilities. In Taiwan's 1991 elections, for example, the opposition complained that the ruling party had more expert assistance from broadcast technicians, which resulted in that party's ability to air more effective messages. In Romania's 1990 elections, the opposition noted that the incumbent party had access to state-owned production facilities to produce its messages, while the opposition did not. Facilities available to the opposition were not professionally equipped. Such a situation can be ameliorated by ensuring that the same facilities are available to all contenders. The order in which broadcast productions are made should be assigned by an impartial method similar to that used to assign time slots. The assignment method should ensure that certain parties do not enjoy preferential treatment in the timely production of their messages or in the technical quality of their production. Direct access time cannot be completely separated from broadcast media coverage of the government, political parties and issues of significance in the election campaign. Direct access programming can help to level the playing field in order to create a fair electoral contest. Biased broadcast campaign coverage, however, can shift the balance of political forces even where direct access programming has been relatively fair. In the assessment of international observers, such circumstances were presented, for example, in the 1986 election in the Philippines. CHAPTER 4 PROBLEMS WITH NEWS COVERAGE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS Introduction Free and fair elections depend to a significant degree upon the ability of the news media to function in an impartial and professional manner. Adherence to the standards of accuracy, objectivity and balance in news and other information programming is essential. Departure from these standards can deprive the public of a balanced picture of the contending parties as well as of important issues raised in the election campaign. Upholding the standards of professional journalism is difficult in the election campaign context under any conditions. Objectivity may require reporting facts that are detrimental to one contender or another. Accuracy may demand reporting a story differently from the political contestant's perception of the circumstances. Balance is difficult to achieve in any one report but must be strived for over a range of broadcasts. While some transitional democracies may have the advantage of an experienced media steeped in the traditions of independent journalism, this often is not the case. Even where government interference or pressures on the media are slight, news media inexperienced in independent journalism are bound to have difficulty in fulfilling their roles in election campaign coverage. Even more striking are cases where the government and the media endeavour to present a biased picture to the people in order to perpetuate the control of the ruling powers. While election campaign coverage problems are varied, most revolve around the central issue of whether the incumbent powers approach the electoral process in good faith. 4.1 	Imbalanced Coverage The most prevalent problem concerning broadcast coverage in transitional settings is imbalanced coverage of the political parties and candidates both quantitatively and qualitatively. Most often, the governing party receives considerably more coverage than the opposition. At the same time, the governing party may be presented in a disproportionately favourable light, while the opposition is presented negatively. 	 A positive example of taking steps to prevent unfair coverage or manipulation is provided by the 1991 election in Bangladesh. A formula was drawn up for television evening news, which provided that when one of the two major political alliances was featured in the lead story, the next broadcast would feature the other. Both radio and television received instructions from the government to be impartial in covering the parties and candidates. In Czechoslovakia's 1990 elections, the state-controlled broadcast media were charged with bias favouring the political groupings that had come to power a few months previously as a result of the 'Velvet Revolution'. This criticism became particularly sharp after the media aired live broadcasts of two campaign appearances by President Havel. In response to formal complaints lodged by several parties, all of the parties that did not benefit from such coverage were awarded additional free advertising time. During Kenya's 1992 election campaign, the ruling party sometimes received more coverage than all other parties combined on the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) radio and television outlets. While the ruling party was usually covered in a positive manner, the opposition was usually presented in a negative light. The privately-owned Kenya Television Network (KTN) reportedly covered the opposition more often than KBC, but also covered the ruling party disproportionately more than the opposition. During the 1991 election campaign in Zambia, coverage was so one-sided in favour of the ruling party that the Press Association of Zambia temporarily obtained a court injunction banning the director of Zambia National Broadcasting Company (ZNBC) from supervising news reporting until after the elections. In issuing the injunction, the court noted the public's interest in receiving balanced reporting of the news but, despite this, the injunction was reversed two days before the vote. During the 1988 elections in Pakistan, government officials from the ruling party were the subject of wide and uncritical coverage on the government-owned national television and radio. In the 1990 elections, when that party was the challenger, its campaign events were extensively and positively covered by the government-owned television and radio, while the political alliance led by Benazir Bhutto's party received extremely limited coverage. 4.2 	Failure to Distinguish Between Government Activities and Campaigning A second major issue in the broadcast coverage area is the need for the media to distinguish between activities of government officials executing newsworthy government functions and those same persons conducting election campaign activities. Government officials carry out any number of newsworthy actions in their administrative or legislative capacities during the course of the election period. Indeed, officials often attempt to time such actions to gain coverage during an election campaign. Government officials also appear at campaign rallies and give campaign speeches at meetings of civic organizations and on other occasions during the campaign period. It is important for the broadcast media to distinguish between these types of activities. The line between them is not always clear, and the media may find that an official's categorization of an activity as a government function is not accurate. The problem in this instance is to give the public important information about its government, while avoiding the incumbent party's attempts to obtain additional campaign exposure. Broadcast media should also thwart subtle attempts to gain campaign advantages through what officials may characterize as governmental functions. In Guatemala's 1990 elections, for example, the symbol of the President's political party, rather than the national seal, was displayed following his television addresses. 4.3 	Manipulation of Coverage In some instances the degree of imbalance in broadcast coverage implies conscious attempts by the media to influence the outcome of the election campaign. This is most evident when standards of accurate reporting are violated to a degree that news and information programming appear to be aimed at manipulating the impressions of potential voters. During Albania's 1991 elections, television camera angles were manipulated to portray the ruling party's campaign rallies as larger than they actually were. There was extensive coverage of these rallies, including segments of the speeches, while opposition rallies received little coverage. When opposition rallies were reported, newsreaders delivered summaries of the speeches, rather than broadcasting the speakers themselves. Coverage of Kenya's 1992 election campaign also included footage of ruling party speeches wherever the speeches were delivered in the country, while reports of opposition speeches were aired with little or no footage. Such discriminatory coverage portrays the favoured party as a much stronger force. Repeated use of this tactic may cause viewers or listeners to favour the party speaking with an actual voice. In Namibia's 1989 elections, the broadcast media aired unsubstantiated reports of armed incursions into the country by SWAPO's military forces, but failed to cover hostile actions by the South West African Police Counter Insurgency Unit (Koevoet). Broadcasts lacked footage of SWAPO speeches, and coverage of SWAPO was overwhelmingly negative. Broadcast coverage of Korea's 1987 election campaign depicted Mr Roh, the former president, surrounded by large crowds, even on days when he did not make campaign appearances. He was always covered first in campaign stories, and his campaign activities received more detailed coverage. At the same time, opposition candidates were depicted with sparse crowds, often with only the backs of the candidates' heads being shown. Broadcast manipulation may also involve non-news programming. In Taiwan's 1991 election, for example, television stations invited ruling party candidates to host talk shows, to appear as guests on panel discussions, and to be guests on game shows. Some variety shows used the ruling party's slogans in their programmes. 4.4 	Special Information Programmes Special information programmes may take the form of interviews with candidates or party representatives, panel discussion programmes with several candidates or representatives from different parties, or debates between various election contestants. Such programming can be valuable in election campaign broadcasting both for informing the public about the positions of parties and candidates on issues of significance to the country and for allowing the contestants to speak directly to the public. Individual and Panel Interviews Interviews with candidates or party representatives allow the candidates to communicate their messages directly to the people. Interviews may be conducted by one interviewer or by a panel of journalists (or others). The audience might participate by asking questions from the studio or electronically from other locations. Such programmes should avoid interviewer bias favouring one party or parties over others. A panel of interviewers may comprise impartial news professionals or journalists identified with various political tendencies so that the panel as a whole is even-handed towards each party. In Zimbabwe's 1985 election, for example, a new television programme ('Face the Nation') conducted 40-minute interviews with the leaders of each of the political parties. Candidates for national office in Pakistan's 1990 elections gained access to voters during televised panel interviews. However, Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party rejected the invitation to be interviewed because her demands that the interview be broadcast live and that she be given some choice of interviewers in order to ensure an accurate and balanced broadcast were not met. Candidate Forums and Debates The broadcast media may bring together various candidates or party representatives in the same programme to exchange views. The advantage of such programmes is that they allow the listeners or viewers to compare the contestants' views and to form an impression of them 'in action' with their rivals. Such programmes may be conducted by a single moderator or a panel of moderators. As with interviews, it is also possible to include audience participation. Candidate forums usually allow the candidates or party representatives to speak, but not necessarily to debate with each other; debates usually are conducted in a more structured format. Either type of programme may deal with pre-agreed issues or may require the contenders to respond to the same questions. Moderator and questioner bias may occur in such programmes, and the number of contenders appearing on any one programme may also complicate the format. In any candidate forum or debate, the contenders should each receive exposure adequate to fairly convey a message to the audience. In Guatemala's 1985 elections, broadcast forums and debates involved presidential candidates as well as candidates for mayor of the capital. Four-way debates between 12 contending political parties were televised before Hungary's 1990 elections. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, a three-hour debate between leaders of the four chief contending political organizations was televised two nights before the 1990 vote. Mixed Programming Ideally a combination of special information programming would be broadcast during the campaign period. Each type of programme has its own advantages for the political parties to convey their messages and for the potential voters to receive information and form impressions necessary for making an informed choice between the parties and candidates. Nicaragua's election law provided free access to television during the 1990 campaign. It also provided for political advertising. The political parties participating in the elections received 30 minutes free of charge each weekday on the nation's less popular television channel. The broadcast time was divided equally among the parties, giving each party a 10-minute slot to present its platform. Later in the campaign, in response to opposition pressure, the government initiated a programme (Elections 1990) on the more popular television channel, which ran weekdays from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. The programme was divided into two equal segments; each featured a different political party facing a panel of journalists, with questions posed after an opening statement. The journalists were from both the pro-government and pro-opposition media, with a pro-government moderator. Later, the format was expanded to include questions telephoned in from viewers, and three times a week mobile units presented questions from individuals on the street. Eventually, the format included debates between two participating parties on two nights of the week, with journalists asking questions on subjects chosen by the parties. The Nicaraguan formula provided adequate amounts of time for parties to present their messages, a variety of settings for potential voters to observe the contenders interact, and addressed a range of issues of national concern. While no set formula is necessary, striking such a balance favours freedom of expression in the election campaign context. 4.5 	Opinion Polls and Election Projections Coverage of opinion polls concerning the relative chances for victory of the parties or candidates is a specialised issue in election broadcasting. These polls may be conducted throughout the course of an election campaign and include exit polls of voters on election day. In addition, projections concerning the likely outcome of the elections may be made on the basis of exit polls and/or on reports of partial vote tabulations. Opinion polls and projections may be conducted by independent non-governmental organizations, academic institutes, the political parties or the news media. Broadcast coverage of such information can, at times, be controversial. This is particularly true of polls and projections commissioned or conducted by a source that is not impartial. Polls and projections may have an effect on the vote itself, rather than simply reflecting public sentiments. For these reasons, broadcast coverage of opinion polls and projections warrants special attention to ensure balance, fairness and objectivity. The source of the opinion poll or projection should be included in the broadcast as well as its statistical margin of error, the time it was conducted, the number of people surveyed and other contextual information. If gaps between political parties or candidates fall within the statistical margin of error, this fact should be noted in the broadcast. Other reputable polls conducted around the same time should be reported together in order not to overemphasize the results of a single survey. Also, polling trends should be reported to make clear that the results of one survey do not give a definitive picture. The BBC, for example, generally will not give individual opinion polls great prominence because such results are not sufficiently reliable. Transitional democracies have paid particular attention to this type of coverage in the period immediately preceding the vote. Some countries have imposed blackouts on campaigning and news coverage related to the election in the 24 or 48 hours before voting begins and throughout the voting period. 4.6 	Foreign Media and Cable Television Foreign broadcasts, received on short wave and other radio frequencies, satellite television transmissions, and broadcasts on national media, can influence the opinions of voters. There are two elements to consider in this regard. One is the internationally-recognized right 'to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers'. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances that would justify government interference with this right in the election context, whether through direct censorship or indirectly by encouraging self-censorship. The second element is government action to limit political contestants from using foreign media to broadcast messages outside the national regulatory framework. While in many circumstances governments may choose not to regulate such activity, a few countries have restricted political parties and candidates from using foreign broadcasts to advertise their messages. In Albania's 1991 elections, for example, candidates were prohibited from appearing on foreign media during the election campaign. Foreign news media played a significant role in the Philippines' 1986 elections. President Marcos' decision to hold elections at very short notice, for example, was first carried on United States television transmissions. CHAPTER 5 VOTER EDUCATION AND SPECIAL ISSUES Introduction An analysis of election broadcasting is not complete without considering the role of radio and television in voter education. Such issues concern the government media's role in promoting civic values, the use of the broadcast media to reach groups with traditionally lower voting patterns in order to encourage them to vote, and the special considerations for broadcast coverage of local elections and national plebiscites. 5.1 	Voter Education Return to contentsThe broadcast media can be effective tools in advancing voter education by providing information to voters about how, when and where to vote, the secrecy of the ballot and the role and importance of voting. This function is often referred to as civic voter education. Another way to assist voter education is to provide the information needed for voters to understand the nature of the issues, the platforms and programmes of the parties as well as the character of the candidates. The latter function takes place through political party advertising, special information programmes, and news coverage. The relative importance of civic education through the broadcast media depends upon the degree of democratic traditions and experience with multi-party elections in any particular transitional democracy. A country with long democratic traditions and a brief interruption by authoritarian rule may need less voter education programming than a country with a long interruption from democracy or one with little experience in pluralist electoral contests. Educational programmes covering where, when and how to vote, as well as registration procedures, are important in every country. Programme spots encouraging voter participation can also be effective. Explanations about the secrecy of the ballot or equivalent voting procedures may be critical to establishing public confidence in the upcoming election. In some circumstances broadcasts may be useful to reassure the public that the personal safety of voters will be protected on election day. Education about electoral crimes and avenues for seeking redress could be broadcast to reduce the incidence of, or attempts at, voter intimidation. Effective voter education broadcasts may be relatively short, from 60 seconds to several minutes. They may be produced by the government body responsible for supervising the elections or by non-governmental civic organizations and aired either independently or on government media. In Romania's February 1992 elections, for example, the Pro-Democracy Association, a non-governmental citizens' organization, produced a one-minute voter education spot encouraging voter participation, entitled 'Romania Needs You', which was broadcast on national television. During Bulgaria's 1990 campaign, the Central Election Commission (CEC) assumed responsibility for government-sponsored voter education, while civic groups broadcast their own programmes. State-controlled television and radio broadcast 10-minute public service announcements that both explained and demonstrated the rather complicated voting procedures. The time slots also were used to address perceived voter concerns about potential ballot manipulation. The CEC was criticized by opposition parties for not emphasizing sufficiently the secret nature of the ballot. This omission was seen as working to the advantage of the ruling party, given Bulgaria's 43 years of one-party rule. Namibia's 1989 election campaign included voter education broadcasts produced by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) as well as government-produced programmes. UNTAG received five minutes on radio each day and ten minutes on television each week. The slots encouraged voter participation, provided general information on casting ballots in an informed manner, and addressed ballot secrecy. The Administrator-General's office conducted a voter education campaign, which included broadcast slots in numerous languages, with themes such as 'vote without fear' and 'your vote is your secret'. During Guatemala's 1985 election campaign, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in conjunction with an independent political studies institute (CEDEP), carried out a campaign in the broadcast and print media encouraging people to vote. 5.2 	Special Importance of Election Broadcasting to Minority Groups, Indigenous Peoples and Women Voters Return to contentsThe broadcast media can play a critical role in civic education and in increasing voter participation by groups that have not been well integrated into the electoral process. Women may have traditionally lower voting rates in certain countries. Some minority groups and indigenous peoples may have a higher illiteracy rate or speak languages that differ from the dominant demographic grouping in the country. They may also be geographically isolated. All of these factors heighten the importance of employing the government media to encourage such groups to exercise their electoral franchise. While the November 1985 elections in Guatemala were seen by international observers as an important first step in the transition towards democracy, the country's indigenous groups (estimated to make up over half of the population), were not well integrated into the electoral process and voter participation among indigenous women was particularly low. There is a high rate of illiteracy among these peoples, who also are rural, poor and many of whom do not speak Spanish. There are four main indigenous language groups in Guatemala, 22 languages and over 100 dialects. Some radio stations broadcast in indigenous languages, and several political parties ran advertisements on these broadcasts. International observers noted the need to bring the indigenous groups into the democratic process. The broadcast media, particularly radio, could play a special role in such an effort. Radio is particularly important in communicating political messages effectively to diverse populations. In Namibia's 1989 election, eight FM radio stations broadcast programmes in 13 languages, thus reaching most of the population, while television broadcasts were only in Afrikaans. Malaysia's 1990 elections provide another example of the importance of the broadcast media for reaching a country's diverse population. Radio Television Malaysia (RTM) broadcast mainly in Malay, but news and other programmes were also broadcast in English, Mandarin Chinese and Tamil. Radio Malaysia also aired regional broadcasts in the native languages of Sabah and Sarawak. 5.3 	Local Elections Return to contentsSpecial considerations for each of the problems presented in election broadcasting is required when approaching local elections. Qualification thresholds and time allocation methods may require modification for municipal and regional elections. Indeed, except in a very small country, the appearance of local candidates on the national broadcast media may be extremely time-consuming and confusing to the voters. Local television and radio outlets may be better suited to providing broadcast access and news coverage concerning local campaigns. When local elections are held simultaneously across the country, appearances by national political parties addressing their general programmes for local development and related issues are appropriate. This is particularly true where mayors and municipal council members are selected by voting for party lists. Direct election of mayors presents a slightly different circumstance, which could be addressed with the candidates for the principal cities appearing on the same date or time block. The schedule of times for the cities could then be publicized to maximize audience levels from these areas. In Paraguay's 1991 municipal elections, candidates for Mayor of Asunción, where television is a more important medium than in the rest of the country, appeared on television. The government authorized free access time on radio and also in the newspapers. In Bulgaria's 1991 legislative and municipal elections, all parties represented in parliament received equal access time on the broadcast media. Two local radio stations apparently did not follow the free access rule, highlighting the need for a speedy mechanism to address local implementation problems. Romania provided free access to parties and candidates for mayor in that country's nationwide municipal elections held in February 1992. 5.4 	National Plebiscites and Referendums 	 Return to contentsPlebiscites present a special circumstance in at least two respects. The vote is either yes or no and, therefore, broadcast time can easily be divided into two blocks. In addition, at least superficially, there is no personal candidacy at stake. Often, however, the future of the political personality or party presenting the issue for a vote depends on the outcome of the election. The question of who will receive broadcast time to argue in favour or against the issue may be complicated. More than one party may be lined up on each side. Each may claim a right to speak on the broadcast media. Qualification thresholds and time allocation within the time blocks devoted to each side then come into play. The full range of broadcast coverage issues applies to the activities of the parties campaigning for each side. The need for voter education also arises, as does the need for reliable broadcast policy and regulatory mechanisms. Chile's 1988 national plebiscite on a more speedy return to democracy provides a closely-monitored example of this type of electoral contest. The issues, though, can assert themselves in any referendum on a matter of national importance, such as whether to ratify a new constitution. CHAPTER 6 MECHANISMS FOR DEVELOPING BROADCAST POLICY CONCERNING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS Introduction Crucial to fair broadcasting coverage of election campaigns is the establishment of impartial mechanisms for setting broadcasting policy, monitoring fairness and dealing with complaints from political party representatives, candidates, journalists and the public. Without such mechanisms, public confidence in the electoral process is likely to suffer. Responsibility for overseeing election broadcasting may be assigned to a special legislative body, an administrative entity, or the judiciary. In some countries the responsible body formally consults with the political parties and candidates. The political contestants may play a major role in forming broadcast policy. Such policy may even be based upon agreements reached by the parties. The media sometimes play self-regulatory roles in election campaign broadcasting. In addition, citizens' groups may actively seek to influence broadcast policy and may conduct independent media monitoring. 6.1 	Government Mechanisms Return to contentsPrior to Bulgaria's 1991 elections, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) established the Parliamentary Committee on Radio and Television to oversee government-controlled television and radio. Each of these media has separate boards of directors appointed by the GNA. Upon adoption of the 1991 election law, the GNA promulgated regulations concerning allocation of broadcast time during the election campaign. In addition, the Central Election Commission (CEC), which is part of the executive, had power to interpret provisions of the regulations and the election law. CEC rulings were reviewable by the courts. The CEC took a limited view of its mandate in the 1991 elections, holding that it was to ensure implementation of measures set forth in the law and regulations. Bulgaria's 1991 mechanism was greeted as an improvement over broadcast regulation of the 1990 elections, and was seen as producing equitable access for the major political parties. In Uruguay's 1984 campaign, the Electoral Court, originally established in 1925, was reinstated and given responsibility for organizing the elections. The Court, an independent and autonomous body, was charged with administering the elections and interpreting the election laws. The Court had the power to hear and rule on electoral disputes concerning the political parties. It also had the power to carry out investigations concerning challenges to election results. In addition, the Court had the power to invalidate election results in whole or in part. Uruguay's tradition of fair elections is based in significant part upon the role of the Electoral Court. Such an independent body is in a strong position to consider complaints regarding election campaign broadcasting, including complaints about media abuses as well as complaints about attempts to pressure the media into providing slanted campaign coverage. In Nicaragua, the 1987 Constitution provided for the Supreme Electoral Council as a fourth branch of government, separate from the legislature, executive and judiciary. The Council held authority over most electoral matters in Nicaragua's 1990 elections, including the application of the mass media law concerning the election campaign and the administration of a rapid complaints procedure. The Council set up a Mass Media Department to negotiate changes in broadcasting practices that were the subject of complaints. The Department issued private admonitions in some instances and made its criticism public when the press organ refused to cooperate. The Council ordered the airing of one opposition programme when technicians from the state television channel refused to show it. It also sought court action against a newspaper that refused to cease using an acronym that linked the opposition coalition to the former government's National Guard. These examples illustrate the advantage of establishing an independent body to impartially oversee media policy and to administer an impartial and speedy complaint mechanism concerning election campaign broadcasting. Speedy recourse to judicial review and enforcement of the decisions of such a body are central to ensure the credibility of its actions. 6.2 	Self-Regulation Return to contentsIn Namibia's 1989 elections, the state-controlled South West Africa Broadcast Corporation (SWABC) invited 14 political parties to join a standing committee for consultations on election coverage policy. A schedule of televised campaign messages was established as a result of the consultations. It provided five-minute slots for two parties per night during the six weeks preceding the vote. The parties themselves agreed that the broadcast time would be allocated on a rotating alphabetical basis. While there were problems of slanted broadcast news coverage in the campaign, this mechanism proved valuable in addressing direct access issues. Hungary's 1990 elections provide an example of media and political party self-regulation in collaboration with a civic organization. The Independent Lawyers Forum assisted representatives of 12 political parties, the Hungarian News Agency and Hungarian Television in drafting a voluntary Electoral Code of Ethics. Adherence to the code included a pledge not to conduct negative campaigning. Thirty-three political parties, including all of the major parties, as well as most of the major news organizations, adopted the Code. While the Code's provisions were not complied with uniformly, its creation illustrated an advanced approach to self-regulation. 6.3 	Media Monitoring and Citizen Action Return to contentsThe establishment of a neutral body to monitor fairness of campaign coverage of news and information programming can be important in ensuring that a policy of fair and balanced broadcast coverage is implemented. Regular reports of a systematic nature provide an objective basis upon which broadcast media abuses can be identified. Such reports may also be a useful tool when attempting to rectify bias or in demonstrating that claims of bias are not well founded. Media monitoring can be performed most effectively by impartial, non-governmental organizations, such as citizens' groups, professional associations or international monitoring organizations working closely with local groups. Media monitoring has also been effectively carried out by inter-governmental organizations. For example, the United Nations Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) analyzed election-related broadcasts. Zambia's 1991 election provided an example of media monitoring by an international observer delegation. The Zambia Voting Observation Project (Z-Vote) initiated an independent review of mid-day radio news and nightly television news programmes on the government-controlled Zambian National Broadcasting Company (ZNBC). Z-Vote conducted four weeks of news analysis, considering (1) the amount of time given to each party's campaign, (2) the position the item occupied in the news, (3) whether television reports included footage or still photos of events and whether radio reports included interviews and speeches, and (4) whether the tone of the coverage was positive or negative towards each party. In Kenya's 1992 elections, the Professionals' Committee for Democratic Change (PCDC, a committee of The Association of Professional Societies of East Africa), established a unit to monitor, record and analyze the news and information broadcasts of the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC). The project considered whether KBC was providing independent and impartial broadcasting, as required under the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act. In Romania's September 1992 elections, Pro-Democracy Association, a non-partisan citizens' organization, conducted a media monitoring project. The project analyzed approximately four weeks of news coverage on the government-controlled central television. The analysis considered (1) the subject covered by news items, (2) the duration of items, and (3) the amount of time allotted to political parties and to the presidential candidates. Such efforts by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations can produce reliable information for use by regulatory bodies. Journalists benefit from such efforts because the information generated can provide an impartial basis upon which to appeal for adjustments in election broadcast policy. 	CHAPTER 7 	INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW AND STANDARDS Introduction The right of citizens to participate in government through genuine and periodic elections has long been recognized under international human rights law. Several leading international and regional treaties and other instruments articulate four elements that constitute the core of the right: universal and equal suffrage; voting by secret ballot; elections at reasonable, periodic intervals; and no discrimination among voters, candidates or parties.(1) However, despite its codification in numerous human rights treaties, the right to political participation only recently has been widely accepted as a fundamental right, and only in the past few years have issues regarding access to the media been discussed as an important element of the right. The rapid evolution of participation rights is the result of twin developments: first, the convergence of state views concerning the importance of democratic rights that accompanied the end of the Cold War and was reflected in documents adopted through the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and second, the elaboration of standards, especially since 1989, by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) coupled with states' willingness to accept those standards. (2) The UN has monitored a number of elections, initially as part of its role in decolonization; then, beginning with its presence in Nicaragua in 1989, under its peace-keeping authority; and, most recently, as part of its advisory and technical assistance programmes.(3) In the process, it has applied standards for free and fair elections that reinforce and better define the right to political participation as set forth in the international treaties and instruments. The OAS first observed elections in 1962, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has issued a number of statements of normative importance, including its insistence, first stated in its review of the 1990 elections in Mexico, that violations of participatory rights are a matter of international concern.(4) With the growing acceptance of the obligatory status of participatory rights, the UN and OAS standards may now be looked to as part of the normative process of further articulating these rights. The first section of this chapter discusses the international and comparative standards and jurisprudence that underpin the right to freedom of political communication, including the right of candidates to express their views freely through the media, and the right of the public to receive these views. The first subsection summarizes the right to political participation as articulated in the leading human rights treaties and instruments. Subsequent subsections discuss aspects of the right to freedom of expression and non-discrimination that provide firm support for the right of equitable access to government media for political parties and candidates during election campaigns. These subsections draw upon international and comparative law as well as standards developed by UN election monitoring teams. The second section offers a brief review of the technical assistance and election-monitoring initiatives undertaken by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. 7.1	International and Comparative Law Return to contents7.1.1	The Right to Political Participation Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights marks the first statement of the human right to political participation in the post-World War II era. Adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1948, the Universal Declaration is the pre-eminent elaboration of the human rights obligations set forth in the United Nations Charter. While at the time of adoption it was viewed as a statement of principles, it is now widely accepted as imposing obligations upon all 'members of the international community.'(5) The civil and political rights set forth in the Universal Declaration were codified and elaborated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in 1976. As of July 1994 127 states were party to the International Covenant, making it the most widely subscribed treaty guaranteeing the right to free elections. Article 25 of the Covenant provides, in relevant part: 	Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 [including political opinion] and without unreasonable restrictions: ... (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;... . Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (to which 28 countries are party) and Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights (25 state parties) guarantee the right to political participation in similar terms.(6) Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also sets forth the right, although in a more limited fashion. (7) The most detailed statements of participatory rights are to be found in three documents adopted by the CSCE, which now embraces 53 participating states. While the CSCE documents are not treaties and as such are not legally binding on participating states, they have come to be widely accepted as imposing obligatory rather than merely hortatory standards. Of the instruments discussed above, only the CSCE documents expressly recognize the right of access to the media for all political groupings and individuals as an aspect of the right to political participation. In the Copenhagen Document of June 1990, the participating states committed themselves to 'ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government' by, among other means, ensuring 	that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process. (8) Even though the human rights treaties do not expressly include the right of political candidates to disseminate their opinions through the media or the right of the public to have access to the opinions of political candidates, these rights are firmly anchored in the treaty-based rights to freedom of expression and non-discrimination. Whether the source of these rights -- indisputably crucial to any genuine election -- is the right to political participation per se or the rights to freedom of expression and non-discrimination is of no practical consequence. Since the right to political participation has for decades been considered controversial, most law on the matter has evolved under the rubric of freedom of expression. The following sections highlight statements of international tribunals and national courts that support the right of political parties to have access to government media, particularly government broadcasting media, on a non-discriminatory basis. Many of the statements are from the European Court or Commission of Human Rights (which interpret and apply the European Convention on Human Rights) due to the fact that the European tribunals have been the most active of the international tribunals in deciding cases involving freedom of expression. In light of the fact that the various international tribunals tend to rely on each other's jurisprudence, especially when interpreting similar provisions,(9) the decisions of the European bodies may be assumed to have more global significance. A number of references are also made to the decisions of national courts. Increasingly, international tribunals as well as national bodies look to trends in case-law, especially cases that interpret fundamental rights provisions, to inform their own jurisprudence.(10) 7.1.2	Freedom of Political Debate as a Fundamental Right Freedom of political debate has been recognized as an essential foundation of a democratic society by institutions and governments around the world. The European Court of Human Rights noted in a 1978 landmark decision, for example, that 'freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society'.(11) The fundamental importance of freedom of political expression rests in large part on the importance of an informed electorate to the functioning of a genuine democracy. The UN Technical Team in its report on the Malawi referendum stated: 'If voters are to make an informed choice at the polling station, then an active exercise of the freedom [of expression] is essential.' (12) The Enugu High Court of Nigeria similarly observed:
	Freedom of speech is, no doubt, the very foundation of every democratic society, for without free discussion, particularly on political issues, no public education or enlightenment, so essential for the proper functioning and execution of the processes of responsible government, is possible. (13) The Israeli Supreme Court declared: 	Real democracy and freedom of speech are one. Freedom of speech enables each individual to crystalize his or her autonomous opinion in the decision-making process vital in a democratic state. The essence of democratic elections is premised on being able to reach informed opinions, evaluating them and exposing them to open debate ... .(14) James Madison, a leading drafter of the US Constitution, was equally emphatic: 	A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.(15) 7.1.3	The Role of the Press in Informing the Public and Acting as Watchdog of Government Media freedom is essential if the public is to enjoy its right to freedom of expression and information. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated: 'It is the mass media that make the exercise of freedom of expression a reality.'(16) The European Court has recognized that media freedom is one of the most important mechanisms for developing an informed citizenry: 	Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the opportunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society.(17) The press is also recognized as playing a crucial role in informing the public about matters of public interest and acting as a 'public watchdog': 	it is ... incumbent on [the press] to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of `public watchdog'.(18) In sum, the press and, by extension, the broadcast media are recognized as having two public functions: to inform the public and to act as watchdog of government. These public functions do not impose duties on the media in the way that governments have duties to respect and ensure respect for fundamental rights. In particular, individual media organs are not obliged to serve either or both of the public functions. Rather, the recognition in international law that the mass media serve public functions imposes duties on the government to ensure that the media as a whole are able to fulfil their functions. In particular, governments are obliged not to interfere with editorial independence. Penalties against the press for publishing information and opinions concerning matters of public interest are intolerable except in the narrowest of circumstances, owing to the likelihood that they will 'deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of issues affecting the life of the community.'(19) Governments are also obliged to ensure media pluralism and to encourage a diversity of sources of information.(20) Except in extraordinary circumstances, this requires governments to allow private television and radio stations to operate freely.(21) The European Court has emphasized that 'the State is the ultimate guarantor ... of the principle of pluralism', and that pluralism is necessary if the media is successfully to accomplish its public functions: 'This observation is especially valid in relation to audio-visual media, whose programmes are often broadcast very widely.'(22) Moreover, while governments may regulate the technical aspects of broadcasting, frequencies must be allocated by a fair and non-discriminatory system and governments may not impose restrictions on the content of broadcasts beyond the narrow restrictions permissible on press freedom.(23) However, private stations are not a substitute for public service broadcasting and governments should establish public service broadcast channels which are adequately resourced and free from government interference in editorial decisions.(24) If the government controls or supports a broadcast station, the station is obliged to serve both of the media's public functions. 7.1.4	Freedom of Expression: The Rights of Political Parties and Individuals to Have Access to Goverment Broadcast Media During Election Campaigns The international standards and case-law make clear that governments have a negative obligation not to interfere with the imparting of information by the media or by willing speakers. While none of the international tribunals has directly examined the positive obligation of a government during a campaign period to broadcast views of political candidates on government-controlled channels, international norms discernible from a range of state practice confirm that this obligation is indeed widely-recognized. Several national courts have concluded that political parties are entitled to have access to broadcasting time as an essential aspect of the right to freedom of political communication, in light of the tremendous impact of radio and television on public opinion and the public service nature of government-owned media. For instance, the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago ruled that 'the fundamental right of free speech demands opening up of the television media to political broadcasts' subject only to reasonable limitations.(25) An opposition Member of Parliament had complained about the refusal of state-owned Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) to broadcast his pre-recorded political speech. In ruling that the station's action violated the right to free speech, the High Court observed: 	[W]ith television being the most powerful medium of communication in the modern world, it is in my view idle to postulate that freedom to express political views means what the constitution intends it to mean without the correlative adjunct to express such views on television. The days of soap-box oratory are over, as are the days of political pamphleteering ... . The Court concluded that the government could be compelled to enact broadcasting regulations allocating time for political broadcasts during campaign periods and even during periods between general elections. Both TTT and the Attorney-General appealed, and the appeal was settled by a consent order affirming the High Court's ruling.(26) The principal High Court of Zambia examined a directive issued by President Kaunda during the lead-up to the 1991 multi-party elections which instructed the three government-controlled newspapers not to give coverage to statements made by members of the leading opposition party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), or to accept MMD advertisements. (27) The Court held that the directive was unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The Court stated: 	[S]ince the petitioners were not allowed to publish their views on political matters through the government newspapers, and by necessary implication even through the radio and TV, they were denied the enjoyment of their freedom of expression ... . The Court commented on the proper role of publicly-owned media: 	[I]n the case of newspapers they are supposed to be run on the basis of journalistic principles and ethics free from any outside interference. These principles dictate the coverage of all newsworthy events regardless of the source of such news. Anything less than this, and it is very easy for the general public to assess whether or not a given newspaper is working according to sound journalistic principles and ethics, is not acceptable from a publicly owned medium - print or other. UN election observer missions, at least in recent years, have regularly called for 'fair' access to the media for all registered parties.(28) Thus, for instance, the UN's observer mission at the 1989 Nicaraguan election stated that it was an important component of a fair election for 'all political parties [to] have equitable access to State television and radio in terms of both the timing and the length of broadcasts.'(29) Similarly, the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum affirmed the importance of respect for freedom of expression to the fairness of the election. While not going so far as to state that equal access to government-controlled media was compelled by binding international law, the Team did declare that such access was customary. The implicit suggestion was that any deviation from the customary norm carries a presumption of non-compliance with the international norms: 	In the case of government-owned media, it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides to put forward their arguments.(30) The most detailed UN media guidelines were issued by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which aimed to 'promote the development of a free and democratic media' during the run-up to the May 1993 elections and thereafter.(31) The principle of fair access to media outlets for all parties contesting the election was a central concern.(32) 7.1.5	Non-Discrimination and the Duty of Balance: The Obligation of Government-Controlled Media to Publish Opposition Views The right of political parties and candidates to have access to government media receives powerful support from the strong prohibition of discrimination, including on grounds of political opinion, under international law. Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the International Covenant declares that governments are obliged both to refrain from discrimination and to ensure that private parties do not engage in discrimination concerning matters that would affect the enjoyment of fundamental rights: 	Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Other human rights treaties impose similar obligations.(33) Thus, if a government-controlled media outlet provides air time to the ruling party, either by way of time for direct statements or by way of news coverage, then it is obliged to devote equitable amounts of time to competing political parties on a non-discriminatory basis. The most relevant statement by an international tribunal on this matter was made by the European Commission of Human Rights in rejecting an application by an association that had been denied air time during an election campaign by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), pursuant to its policy of offering air time only to political parties. The Commission stated its opinion that, although Article 10 of the European Convention (guaranteeing freedom of expression) does not grant a general right of access to the broadcast media, at the least a political party or other entity is entitled to broadcasting time if other parties or entities are given such time: 	It is evident that the freedom to `impart information and ideas' included in the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, cannot be taken to include a general and unfettered right for any private citizen or organization to have access to broadcasting time on radio or television in order to forward its opinion. On the other hand, the Commission considers that the denial of broadcasting time to one or more specific groups or persons may, in particular circumstances, raise an issue under Article 10 alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention [prohibiting discrimination]. Such an issue would, in principle, arise for instance if one political party was excluded from broadcasting facilities at election time while other parties were given broadcasting time.(34)
The European Commission was not asked to decide, and thus did not address, the larger question of whether political parties have a right of access to the broadcast media during election campaigns as an aspect of the right to freedom of expression, independent of the question of equal access once access is granted to any party. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the election statute had to be construed in light of the fundamental principles of both freedom of speech and equality. Although the election statute prohibited the broadcast of election 'propaganda' (other than during times allotted for party statements), the Court ruled that this term had to be interpreted narrowly to apply only to 'speech whose dominant effect is to influence the voter'. Speech whose dominant effect, for example, was to impart newsworthy information (based on an objective viewer's standard) could not be excluded as propaganda; if such information was broadcast, the principle of equality required the broadcast of competing views.(35) The Report of the UN Technical Team on the Malawi referendum, addressing the duty of non-discrimination, urged that 'the information provided by the government-owned media should not be biased in favor of one or the other side'. 7.1.6	The Right of Reply, Correction or Retraction in Government Media Several national courts have ruled that their constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and non-discrimination require government-controlled media to publish replies by government critics to government statements on controversial issues. This obligation is all the stronger during election campaign periods when the right of the electorate to be well-informed requires that parties or candidates whose views have been misrepresented or attacked be given the opportunity to reply. Several courts have elaborated the particular duties of a government-controlled publication or broadcasting station to provide accurate, balanced information and an opportunity for opposing views to be aired. For example, in Belize, a leader of the opposition party (which had been part of the previous government) and the director of a television station in Belize City requested permission from the Belize Broadcasting Authority (BBA) to broadcast a series of monthly half-hour programmes.(36) The programmes would reply to the current government's statements about the economy, many of which were critical of the former government's policies. The BBA denied consent on the ground that the proposed programmes were party political broadcasts. In ruling that the BBA had acted arbitrarily, the Chief Justice of the High Court stated: '[T]oday television is the most powerful medium for communications, ideas and disseminating information. The enjoyment of freedom of expression therefore includes freedom to use such a medium.'(37)
The Court of Appeal, affirming the Chief Justice's statement, held that the BBA's refusal to broadcast the programmes was arbitrary and discriminatory and violated the applicants' constitutional rights both to freedom of expression and protection from discrimination. The Court made clear that political parties must be given the opportunity to reply on television to statements made by the government which 'provide information or explanation of events of prime national or international importance or ... seek the co-operation of the public in connection with such events.'(38) Only where there was a 'general consensus of opinion' would the opposition not have a right of reply. The Court concluded that the BBA was obliged to ensure that equal time was granted to broadcasts by opposition politicians. The Supreme Court of India also recognized the right of reply to political statements in the columns of a government-owned publication. A public sector agency republished in its house journal an article favourable to itself but refused to republish a rejoinder that had accompanied the article in the original periodical. The Court held that the agency's refusal was unlawful on the ground that, owing to the agency's status as an instrument of government, it had a duty of fairness to its readers. Moreover, 'fairness demanded that both viewpoints were placed before its readers, however limited be their number, to enable them to draw their own conclusions.'(39) The media guidelines issued by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) stated the duty of balance and impartiality in greater detail. Guideline 8 provides: 	Media outlets should give parties, groups or individuals whose views have been misrepresented or maligned by a publication or broadcast the 'right of response' in the same media outlet.(40) In Guideline 9, UNTAC 'strongly encourages' the media to 'present a balance of views, to solicit a wide spectrum of opinion from the Cambodian community and to publish as much information as possible about the history, finances and platform of a political party or candidate.' It also encourages the media 'to publish views and counterviews at the same time' and notes that, when 'opposing ideas are contained in the same broadcast or article, a `response' may not be necessary'.(41) 7.1.7	Limitations on Media Liability for Republishing Unlawful Statements No international tribunal has yet issued a decision on the merits of holding a media outlet liable for disseminating, without endorsement, unlawful statements (such as slander or incitement to hatred) made by a political party or candidate. International standards undeniably prohibit such statements, but leave open the question as to whether the media outlet should be held liable in addition to the speaker. UNTAC's guidelines follow a conservative approach by assuming that media outlets may be held liable for the broadcast (or publication) of statements which are defamatory, or which 'incite discrimination, hostility or violence by means of national, religious, racial or ethnic hatred.'(42) Holding media outlets liable for speech, even speech that violates international standards, requires editors to pre-screen all broadcasts and, owing to the vagueness of standards, to act as censors. During election periods when it is crucial that political parties be able to publicize their platforms, especially where the major broadcast media are controlled by the government, the various competing rights may be better balanced by holding liable only the political party or individual responsible for the broadcast. A growing number of governments and courts which respect freedom of expression are choosing not to hold the media liable for unlawful statements published by the media (other than statements made or endorsed by media personnel). The European Commission of Human Rights, for example, ruled admissible an application filed by a Danish journalist who had been convicted and fined for broadcasting a television interview with members of a white supremacist gang.(43) As a result the Danish Parliament passed a bill that would exempt from liability journalists (and their editors and employers) who publicize statements that incite racial or national hatred but who do not themselves intend to promote hatred. The Constitutional Court of Spain ruled that a newspaper could not be held liable merely for publishing a communiqué from ETA, a radical Basque separatist group, which defended its terrorist activities. The Constitutional Court invalidated the conviction of the newspaper's publisher on the ground that mere reproduction of a communiqué written by someone not associated with the newspaper was a form of expression protected by the right to freedom of information. The Court stated: 	 	[B]oth the right of the journalist to inform and the rights of his readers to receive full and accurate information constitute, in the last resort, an objective institutional guarantee, which effectively prevents the imputation of any criminal will on the part of those who only transmit information.(44) Similarly, in another case from Spain, a politician who represented Herri Batasuna (a Basque separatist coalition) was convicted for writing an article that attacked the government. The magazine that published the article was not prosecuted even though the government alleged that the article could provoke violence.(45) The reasons for not holding the media liable are all the stronger during election periods when timely dissemination is crucial given that concern over liability often delays or prevents the airing of political party programmes. Insistence on holding the media liable for campaign statements clearly promotes self-censorship by privately-owned media and de facto government censorship of government-controlled media. International law strongly disfavours prior restraint, especially where the information's value depends on timely dissemination. The American Convention on Human Rights (in Article 13(2)) expressly prohibits all 'prior censorship'. The International Covenant and the European Convention have been interpreted to prohibit administrative censorship except in extraordinary circumstances, and to require that any administrative order restraining publication be subject to speedy review by a court. The European Court, in the Spycatcher case, made clear that courts should authorize prior restraints only in exceptional cases. It emphasized that 'the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court' and that this is especially so as far as the press is concerned, for 'news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest.'(46) News and opinions in the context of election campaigns are extremely 'perishable' commodities; there are few other contexts where it is more urgent to publish matters promptly so that they may be debated and responded to before the voters decide how they will cast their votes. The above case-law and standards provide solid grounds for concluding that a policy of releasing the media from liability for election broadcasts which are beyond their editorial control promotes the free political debate necessary for a free and fair election. 7.1.8	Political Expression May be Restricted only for Extraordinary Reasons All of the major human rights treaties and other instruments either require by their terms or else have been interpreted to require that restrictions on freedom of expression meet a three-part test. First, any restriction must be provided by law. Second, in order to provide a legitimate basis for limitation, the restriction must serve one of the purposes stated in the treaty. The International Covenant permits restrictions only to protect 'the rights or reputations of others', 'national security', 'ordre public' (which in addition to public order includes the general welfare), 'public health or morals', 'propaganda for war' or 'incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence' on grounds of nationality, race or religion.(47) Third, any restriction must be necessary 'in a democratic society'.(48) To be necessary, a restriction does not have to be 'indispensable', but it must be more than merely 'reasonable' or 'desirable'. A 'pressing social need' must be demonstrated, the restriction must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and the reasons given to justify the restriction must be relevant and sufficient.(49) Where the information subject to restriction involves a matter of 'undisputed public concern' (which would include political debate during election campaign periods) the information may be restricted only if it appears 'absolutely certain' that its diffusion would have the adverse consequences legitimately feared by the state. (50) In addition to endorsing these standards, the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum noted that any restrictions on freedom of expression during an election campaign 'should not be so vague or broadly defined as to leave an overly wide margin of discretion to the authorities responsible for enforcing the law, since uncertainty over legal boundaries has a dampening effect on the exercise of this right [to freedom of expression] and may encourage discrimination in ... [the restrictions'] application.'(51) Accordingly, governments may prevent the dissemination of election broadcasts only where such dissemination would be certain to lead to a disruption of public order or a violation of some other interest that the government is legitimately entitled to protect. A strong argument can be made that government-controlled media, especially where they control the only or main channels in a region, may not refuse to broadcast political debate save in limited circumstances (elaborated in the following sections). 7.1.9	Enhanced Protection for Criticism of Politicians and Government International law makes clear that politicians and governments are required to sustain a higher degree of insult than are private individuals, and that elected officials and candidates are to be accorded a particularly wide latitude in voicing criticisms. The European Court ruled unanimously that because 'freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society ... the limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards private individuals.'(52) In addition, '[t]he limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician.'(53) The state authorities may adopt, 'in their capacity as guarantors of public order' penalties for defamation that are proportionate to the injury but only where the accusations are 'devoid of foundation or formulated in bad faith.'(54) The reference to public order suggests that government discretion to restrict potentially defamatory statements against the government should be limited to situations in which public order is threatened. In addition: 	While freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of an opposition Member of Parliament, like the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.(55) The above reasoning -- concerning the government's heightened obligation to refrain from interfering with the free expression rights of opposition Members of Parliament -- also holds true for candidates for elected office. 7.1.10	Enhanced Protection for Political Opinions Under international law, opinions (as opposed to factual allegations) concerning matters of political debate may be restricted only in extraordinary circumstances. In particular, they may not be restricted on the ground that they are untrue. To require a speaker accused of defamation to prove the truth of an opinion 'infringes freedom of opinion itself'.(56) Thus, for instance, the European Court ruled improper a journalist's conviction for defamation for accusing an Austrian party leader of making statements 'consistent with the philosophy and aims of the National Socialist Party' (a criminal offence in Austria). The accusation was based on the party leader's statement that family allowances for Austrian women should be increased by 50 per cent in order to discourage them from seeking abortions, while allowances paid to immigrant mothers should be reduced by 50 per cent. The Austrian court concluded that the journalist had not proved the truth of his accusation because the party leader's statement did not necessarily reflect a National Socialist attitude, and that the journalist had 'disregarded the standards of fair journalism by ... insinuating motives which [the politician] had not himself expressed.'(57) The European Court rejected the Austrian court's arguments, stating that the journalist could not be asked to prove the truth of his value judgment. 7.1.11	Right to an Effective Remedy International law provides that everyone is entitled to an effective remedy by a competent national tribunal for a violation of a fundamental right. For instance, each state party to the International Covenant undertakes, pursuant to Article 2(3): 	a.	To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 	b.	To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 	c.	To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.(58) There is good authority for the proposition that, where an administrative (as opposed to a judicial) remedy is the only remedy available, the agency that decides the complaint must be independent of the agency that is the subject of the complaint. The European Court has ruled that, because individuals are entitled under the European Convention to have access to information of vital interest to their private or family life, they furthermore are entitled to have any denial of a request for such information reviewed by an authority independent of the agency that refused the original request for information.(59) Similarly, the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum urged that 'a recourse mechanism should be present providing for independent review of cases where restrictions on this right [to freedom of expression] have been applied.'(60) The above precedents provide sound support for the contention that international law, bolstered by UN guidelines, requires establishment of a body to regulate election broadcasts that is independent of government as well as the media, and which is subject to judicial review. 7.1.12	Government Obligation to Protect the Safety of Media Personnel and Premises Governments have a general obligation to safeguard the physical security of all people within their jurisdiction.(61) In addition, various statements in UN documents support a heightened obligation of governments to protect journalists and media offices from physical attack. The members of the UN, at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (convened to mark the 45th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), among other matters, reaffirmed and strengthened their commitment to give effect to many of the fundamental rights set forth in the Universal Declaration. Paragraph 26 of the Vienna Declaration is particularly relevant: 	[T]he World Conference encourages the increased involvement of the media, for whom freedom and protection should be guaranteed within the framework of national law. [emphasis added] At its 1993 session, the UN Commission on Human Rights (comprising 53 government representatives) took the exceptional step of requesting the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression to promote this right and to protect 'professionals in the field of information' (including 'journalists, editors, writers and authors, publishers and printers').(62) The Commission, expressing 'concern at the excessive occurrence', inter alia, of 'violence or threats of violence and ... harassment' against such people, appealed to states to 'take the appropriate steps to ensure the immediate cessation of these acts and to create the conditions under which these acts may be less liable to occur'.(63) The appointment of a Special Rapporteur was justified, stated the Commission, because 'the effective promotion of human rights of persons who exercise the right to freedom of opinion and expression is of fundamental importance to the safeguarding of human dignity' and because 'the right to freedom of opinion and expression is interrelated with and enhances the exercise of all other human rights'.(64) For the above reasons and owing to the particular importance during election campaigns of protecting the security of the mass media, including those that publish controversial views, governments must be especially vigilant during election campaigns to condemn, investigate and punish attacks against media personnel and property. 7.1.13	Special Measures Where Freedom of Expression Has Been Unduly Restricted Previously Governments are under an obligation to bring national legislation which affects the right to freedom of expression and information into compliance with the international standards which set forth this right. In countries where freedom of expression has previously been restricted, it may be necessary to introduce special measures to ensure this right during election periods. However, such special measures in no way exempt the government from its obligation to guarantee the right to freedom of expression to all people within its jurisdiction at all times. As stressed by the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, special measures are required to ensure respect for freedom of expression during a campaign period 'where the exercise of the freedom of opinion and expression has been subject to undue restriction in the past'. The preferred approach, stated the Team, is to eliminate the restrictions outright; short of this, it is customary to incorporate special legislation that clearly takes legal precedence over previous restrictive laws and practice. Moreover, 'it is most often necessary for a clear statement to be issued from the highest level of Government to the implementing agencies concerned, drawing attention to the new standards in force for the election or referendum.'(65) 7.2	The Practice of Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations Return to contentsThe United Nations has devoted considerable attention to the principle of periodic and genuine elections. Several General Assembly resolutions have addressed the importance of the principle.(66) The Secretary-General has reported on the efforts of the organization to enhance the effectiveness of this principle.(67) At the request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General appointed a senior UN officer to act as the focal point for electoral matters and set up the Electoral Assistance Unit (EAU), a taskforce on these issues.(68) The UN Centre for Human Rights, the Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, and the United Nations Development Programme all provide assistance to member states concerning electoral matters. The OAS also has devoted attention and resources to the promotion of electoral rights. The OAS has observed elections since 1962, and its Permanent Council and its Ministers of Foreign Affairs have issued resolutions on representative democracy, the most significant of which was issued in June 1991.(69) The OAS set up a Unit for Democratic Development to address, among other matters, election monitoring.(70) The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the course of reviewing the 'authenticity' of a number of elections, has issued statements of a normative character.(71) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in its Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 21 November 1990, created the Office for Free Elections, which was established in Warsaw. The purpose of the office is to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information among participating states regarding elections. The Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions of 30 January 1992 assigned additional functions to this office and renamed it the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.(72) Member states of these organizations participate in the organizations' activities and help form the basis for articulating principles for achieving genuine elections. Further, states often invite intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations to observe and comment upon election campaign practices in their countries. The UN, OAS, and CSCE observe elections at the request of states as does the Organization of African Unity, the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Commonwealth Secretariat. A number of non-governmental organizations, both national and international, also have developed special expertise in election observing; one of them, the International Human Rights Law Group, drafted election observation guidelines in 1984 that continue to be used by IGOs, NGOs and governments. Increasingly, organizations are also monitoring media coverage. (74) The observations of IGOs and NGOs are welcomed by the requesting states as useful in their efforts to improve the fairness, and the appearance of fairness, of their elections and to gain recognition from the international community for successful advances towards democracy.(75) Election observer delegations thus help to define the normative character of electoral rights. ENDNOTES1. See Appendix I for the relevant texts. For a comprehensive discussion of the contours of the right to political participation under international law, see G H Fox, 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law', 17 Yale J of Int'l L 539 (1992). 2. See Fox, note 1 above, esp. at 607. This evolution can also be traced in the writings of legal theorists. For example, in 1988, Prof. Henry Steiner observed that the right to political participation functioned less as a model of conduct than as a 'weapon of rhetorical battle' through which 'each of the world's ideological blocs, infusing the right with its own understandings, attacks the others for violating those understandings.' H Steiner, 'Political Participation as a Human Right', 1 Harv Human Rights Yearbook (1988), at 77. In 1990, Prof. Thomas Frank opined that the legitimacy of the right suffered from its lack of determinacy. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), at 50-66. By 1992, however, Gregory Fox was able to make a compelling argument that such indeterminacy no longer existed. 3. See L Garber, 'A New Era of Peace-Making: United Nations and Election Monitoring', in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1993). For a discussion of international monitoring of elections in the decolonization context, see M Evans and D T Olidge, 'What Can the Past Teach the Future? Lessons from Internationally-Supervised Elections, 1920-1990', 24 Int'l Law & Politics (1992), at 1711-56. For a discussion of electoral rights as extensions of the right to self-determination, see D Padilla & E Houppert, 'International Election Observing: Enforcing the Principle of Free and Fair Elections', 7 Emory Int'l Law Review (1993) 73, 79-85. 4. Mexico Election Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1989-1990, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.77, rev. 1, Doc. 7 (7 May 1990), at 98-123, esp. at 118, para. 88 (the cases alleged electoral fraud; the Commission confirmed its competence to consider such issues concerning national elections of states parties to the American Convention). For a discussion of these cases see D Shelton, 'Representative Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere,' 12 Human Rights Law Journal (1991), 353-359. See also 'Human Rights, Political Rights and Representative Democracy in the Inter-American System', in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1990-1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79, rev. 1, Doc.12 (22 Feb 1991), at 525. 5. See The Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights at 4 para. 2, UN Doc. A/CONF 32/41, endorsed by the General Assembly in GA Res. 2442 (XXIII), 19 Dec. 1968; 23 GAOR, Supp. No. 18 (A/7218), at 49. In 1971, the UN Secretary-General observed: 'During the years since its adoption the Declaration has come, through its influence in a variety of contexts, to have a marked impact on the pattern and content of international law and to acquire a status extending beyond that originally intended for it. In general, two elements may be distinguished in this process: first, the use of the Declaration as a yardstick by which to measure the content and standard of observance of human rights; and, second, the reaffirmation of the Declaration and its provisions in a series of other instruments. These two elements, often to be found combined, have caused the Declaration to gain a cumulative and pervasive effect. 6. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has made clear that, pursuant to Art. 23, all candidates are entitled to conduct their election campaigns under the same basic conditions, and that elections should take place within the framework of 'necessary guarantees so that the results represent the popular will.' 'Human Rights, Political Rights, and Representative Democracy in the Inter-American System,' note 4 above at 525. 7. The African Charter does not mention such concepts as 'genuine periodic elections', 'universal and equal suffrage', 'secret ballot' or even the objective of 'guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors'. The relevant text of Article 13 is included in Appendix I. For an examination of the current and potential role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in promoting fair elections, see L Garber, 'The OAU and Elections', 4 Journal of Democracy (1993), 55-60. 8. Para. 7.8 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 June 1990, reprinted in Appendix I and in 29 Int'l Legal Materials 1305, 1308. See also The Charter of Paris, signed on 21 Nov. 1990 by the CSCE heads of state, endorsing democracy and reaffirming the principles set forth in the Copenhagen Document and the Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension (3 Oct. 1991). 9. See The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook: International and Comparative Law, Standards and Procedures (London: 1993), 45-46 citing, inter alia, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Adv. Opn. OC-5/83 of 13 Nov. 1985, Series A no. 5, reprinted in 7 Human Rights Law Journal (1986), 74 and in 8 EHRR 165. 10. Ibid. at 28-44. 11. Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, at para. 42. See also, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution 59(I), 14 Dec 1946: 'Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all of the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.' 12. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 26. 13. The State v. The Ivory Trumpet Publishing Co. [1984] 5 NCLR 736, High Court, Enugu, 31 Jan 1983, discussed in The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook, note 9 above at 56 and 129-30. 14. Zeveli v. Central Committee for the Elections to the 13th Knesset, and Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, HC 869/92 and 931/92; 46(2) Piskei Din, 692. 15. G Hunt (ed.), The Writings of James Madison (1910), 103. 16. Compulsory Membership in a Journalists' Association, note 9 above. 17. Castells v. Spain, Judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, para. 43. 18. Thorgeirson v.Iceland, Judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, para. 63; Castells v. Spain, ibid. at para. 43; The Observer and Guardian v. UK (Spycatcher case), Judgment of 26 Nov. 1991, Series A no. 216, para. 59(b); The Sunday Times v. UK(II) (companion Spycatcher case), Judgment of 26 Nov. 1991, Series A no. 217, para. 65. 19. Lingens v. Austria, note 11 above at para. 44. 20. See Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information, 29 April 1982, in which the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe declared that: 'states have the duty to guard against infringements of the freedom of expression and information and should adopt policies designed to foster as much as possible a variety of media and a plurality of information sources, thereby allowing a plurality of ideas and opinions'. Reprinted in Council of Europe DH-MM (91) 1. See also Geillustreerde Pers v. Netherlands, Commission Report adopted 6 July 1976, 8 D&R 5 (1976); G Malinverni, 'Freedom of Information in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', 4 HRLJ (1983), 443, 451. See also Art. 13 of the American Convention; and the UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Article 19, adopted by the Committee at its 461st meeting on 27 July 1983, UN Doc. A/38/40, 109. 21. See Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, Judgment of 24 Nov. 1993, Series A no. 276. In extraordinary circumstances, for instance where public broadcasting could not survive financially unless allowed to operate as a monopoly, a government monopoly may be permissible so long as the government offers a multiplicity of views on the government channels. However, of all the means of ensuring that pluralism is respected, 'a public monopoly is the one which imposes the greatest restrictions on the freedom of expression ... . The far-reaching character of such restrictions means that they can only be justified where they correspond to a pressing need' (para. 39). 22. Ibid. at para. 38. 23. See, for example, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, Judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 173, para. 61. Restrictions on freedom of expression are permissible, for instance under the International Covenant, 'only ... as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.' 24. The government is held more directly responsible for ensuring that the broadcast media serve their public function. This distinction in government responsibility between broadcasting and the press is generally attributed to the traditional scarcity of broadcasting and the large costs associated with television stations in particular. With the increase in availability of cable and satellite channels, as well as growing numbers of private broadcasters, many commentators feel that increasingly broadcasting should be treated no differently from the press. This, however, is not an issue that needs to be addressed in this study because most transitional democracies have only one or two national television stations. 25. Rambachan v. Trinidad and Tobago Television Co. Ltd and Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, decision of 17 July 1985 (unreported), excerpted and discussed in The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook, note 9 above at 58-59. 26. A Lester, 'Freedom of Expression: Relevant International Principles', in Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988), 30. 27. Arthur Wina & Others v. the Attorney-General (1990) HP/1878 (High Court: Lusaka), summarized, with excerpts, in The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook, note 9 above at 59-60. 28. Some UN guidelines were understood to endorse equal access to the media under the broader command of respect for freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, especially of political parties. For instance, the Haiti mission scrutinized, among other matters, respect for 'freedom of expression and freedom of political parties to mobilize', and noted with approval that the government permitted journalists to engage 'in the most violent diatribes' without interference (G H Fox, note 1 above at notes 246 and 256). 29. Establishment and Terms of Reference of the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), The Situation in Central America, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., 'Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives,' UN Doc. A/44/375 (1989), Annexe 1, at 3. 30. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 12 above at para. 27. 31. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992), pream. para. 4. See Appendix 1 for the relevant text of these guidelines. 32. See especially Guidelines 2, 4, 7-10. The other major concern was the protection of the physical security of all persons involved in publishing information or opinions, discussed in section 7.1.12 below. 33. See Appendix I for relevant texts, esp. Art. 1 of the American Convention, Art. 14 of the European Convention and Art. 2 of the African Charter. 34. X and the Association of Z v. the United Kingdom, European Commission on Human Rights, Admissibility Decision of 12 July 1971, App. No. 4515/70, 38 Collected Decisions 86 (1971). 35. HC 869/92 and 931/92, note 14 above. 36. Belize Broadcasting Authority v. Courtenay and Hoare, Court of Appeal, 20 June 1986; (1988) LRC (Const.) 276; 13 Common L Bull (1987), 1238, excerpted and discussed in The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook, note 9 above at 57-58. 37. Ibid., LRC at 284. 38. Ibid., citing Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edn, Vol. 8, para. 1134). 39. Manubhai Shah v. Life Insurance Corp. of India [1992] 3 SCC 637. 40. UNTAC Media Guidelines, note 31 above, reproduced in Appendix I. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. at Guidelines 17 and 19. 43. Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, decision on admissibility issued 8 Sept. 1992. The European Commission thereafter ruled on the merits that the journalist could not be held liable, but did so on narrow grounds, namely, that the journalist had intended to counter racism through its exposure and that the broadcast was indeed likely to create contempt for the racists. Report of the Commission, adopted 8 July 1993. The European Court has agreed to hear the case and it is hoped that it will address directly the larger issue of media liability for neutral reporting. 44. Egin case, STC 159/86, Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional 68, at 1447 para. 8, summarized, with excerpts, in The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook, note 9 above at 120. 45. The facts and rulings in Spain's criminal prosecution of Miguel Castells are summarized in the report of the European Court of Human Rights in Castells v. Spain, note 17 above at paras. 6-18. 46. The Observer and Guardian v. UK (Spycatcher case), note 18 above at para. 60. 47. Arts. 19 and 20 of the International Covenant. The American Convention includes a similar list of restrictions but it adopted the term 'public order' rather than the broader 'ordre public'. The European Convention uses the phrase, 'the prevention of disorder or crime'. In addition to the other restrictions stated in the International Covenant and American Convention, the European Convention includes restrictions necessary to protect 'territorial integrity or public safety', the confidentiality 'of information received in confidence', and 'the authority or impartiality of the judiciary'. 48. Art. 19 of the International Covenant; Art. 10 of the European Convention; and Art. 13 of the African Charter. See Compulsory Membership in a Journalists' Association, note 9 above at para. 46. 49. European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976, Series A no. 24, paras. 48-50; Sunday Times v UK, Judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. 62. 50. Sunday Times v. UK, ibid. at paras. 65-66. 51. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 12 above at para. 29. 52. Lingens v. Austria, note 11 above at para. 42. 53. Castells v. Spain, note 17 above at para. 46. 54. Ibid. at para. 46 (emphasis added). 55. Ibid at para. 42. 56. Lingens v. Austria, note 11 above at para. 46. 57. Oberschlick v. Austria, Judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, para. 13. 58. Art. 13 of the European Convention and Art. 25 of the American Convention set forth the right to an effective remedy by a competent court or tribunal in similar terms. Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares a 'right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals' for violations of 'fundamental' rights. 59. Gaskin v. UK, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 160. 60. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 12 above at para. 29. 61. For instance, Art. 9 of the International Covenant states that: 'Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.' Art. 2, quoted above, requires each state party 'to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant'. 62. Commission of Human Rights res. 1993/45 adopted 5 March 1993, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, Chap.II.A., at preambular para. 11 and operative para. 13. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/33, of 26 Jan. 1994, para. 1. 63. Ibid. at para. 7. 64. Ibid. at preamb. paras. 9 and 10. 65. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 12 above at para. 248. 66. See, for example, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, UN Doc. A/RES/46/137 (9 March 1992). 67. See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, UN Docs. A/46/609 and Adds. 1 and 2 (Nov. 1991). 68. Mr James O C Jonah, Under Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs was designated the United Nations official to act as the focal point, and Mr Horacio Boneo was appointed director of the EAU. 69. The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.P, AG/doc. 2734/91 (4 June 1991); Representative Democracy, OEA/Ser.P/AG/doc. 2739/91, RES. 1080 (XXXI-0/91) (4 June 1991). 70. See Unit for Democratic Development, AG/RES 1063 (XX-0/90)(8 June 1990). 71. See G H Fox, note 1 above at 566. 72. The mandate of the office was further defined at the CSCE's Moscow Meeting in the Helsinki Decisions of 10 July 1992, Section VI, The Human Dimension, at paras. 5 et seq. 73. International Human Rights Law Group (prepared by L Garber), Guidelines for International Election Observing (Washington, DC: 1984). 74. The European Institute for the Media based in Dusseldorf has monitored media coverage in a number of elections. ARTICLE 19, in cooperation with local partners, monitored the 1994 Malawi elections. See, for example, ARTICLE 19, Media Monitoring in Malawi, (weekly monitoring reports on broadcasting and intimidation in the May 1994 election campaign), and Freedom of Expression in Malawi: The Elections and the Need for Media Reform (July, 1994). 75. For a discussion of the importance of international election observer delegation standards in the interpretation of treaty norms see G H Fox, note 1 above at 571-596.
	CHAPTER 8 GUIDELINES FOR BROADCAST COVERAGE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES Introduction The following Guidelines concern broadcast coverage of election campaigns in transitional democracies. These are countries which have recently emerged from a period of non-democratic governance, characterized by, among other features, the absence of free and fair elections.(1) The Guidelines are intended to be directly applicable only to the period of the election campaign itself and only to the government broadcast media; they may, however, also be relevant to government-controlled press during election periods, and to government media coverage of political matters during non-campaign periods. The term 'government media' is used in these Guidelines to refer to broadcasting channels that are owned, operated or controlled by the government, as well as to channels that are managed by government appointees or that are governed by boards, a majority of whose members are selected by the government or ruling party. The Guidelines also apply to public service broadcasting channels, namely, media which are supported entirely or in part by government funds but are governed by boards that are independent of government and all political interests. Three kinds of election broadcast are discussed: (a) direct access programmes including advertising, over which the political party or candidate has complete editorial control; (b) interviews, debates, candidate forums, radio 'talk-back' shows, voter education programmes and similar formats, referred to in these Guidelines as 'special information programmes', over which the broadcaster has editorial control; and (c) news coverage, over which the broadcaster also has editorial control. The degree of government control of broadcasting varies between transitional democracies: in many countries, broadcast media operate under heavy government influence, while in a few, state-owned television and particularly radio have a substantial degree of editorial independence and a commitment to balance, fairness and even investigative reporting. The status of private media also varies: in some transitional democracies, especially during the first years, the government has a complete monopoly on the television media; in others, private stations may be licensed to broadcast regionally, and in a few (especially after several years), one or more national private television stations may be operating. Similarly, in some countries, the government controls all radio stations; in others, a number of private stations are authorized. Where private media do operate, they are often in the hands of strong supporters of the government and only rarely present views which differ from government media. Conditions vary among transitional democracies and even among different regions within the same country. The predominant vehicle for communicating political messages in some countries or regions is television; in others, radio, the press or other methods (such as leaflets, meetings, loudhailer messages) may be the predominant vehicle; and in some, two or more of these media are of approximately equal influence. These varying conditions do not affect the need for governments to implement these Guidelines; they may, however, require governments to undertake additional information initiatives to ensure that all citizens are fully informed and able to participate in the election process. In countries where radio and/or television are the predominant media for communicating political party and candidate messages, the obligation of the government media to provide the public with accurate, balanced information and to grant access to parties or candidates on a non-discriminatory basis is all the stronger.(2) First multi-party elections, both where the prior government remains in power and where some form of interim government has been installed prior to elections, present particular challenges and warrant special vigilance. To comply with international law, government media must fulfil the duties of impartiality and non-discrimination. As part of the transition to democracy, ARTICLE 19 strongly recommends that governments transform government broadcast media into public service media. As a first step and as a matter of urgency, editorial independence should be safeguarded. Several of the Guidelines are phrased in mandatory terms. These are based on principles of international human rights law derived from international treaties, case-law and evolving state practice.(3) Non-compliance with these Guidelines, regardless of various country-specific conditions, raises a presumption of unfair media practice which could taint the fairness of the election process. Other Guidelines are phrased as highly recommended or recommended based upon the experiences of both transitional and well-established democracies.(4) Non-compliance with these Guidelines calls into question the fairness, impartiality, balance and informative content of media coverage. Most of the Guidelines indicate required and recommended practice for government media during the election campaign period. These Guidelines are 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16. Other Guidelines concern the government itself and indicate what is required and what is recommended to ensure full enjoyment of freedom of expression for all media -- government and private, broadcast and print -- and for political parties and candidates, during the election campaign. These Guidelines are 3, 4, 5, 6, 13 and 14. Private media do not carry the same responsibilities under international law as do government media. Nevertheless, ARTICLE 19 encourages private broadcasters as a matter of professional responsibility to comply with the Guidelines which apply to government media. Such voluntary implementation of the Guidelines, including for example, the requirements of balanced and impartial news coverage and the granting of direct-access air time on a non-discriminatory basis would enhance the fairness of an election. ARTICLE 19 also encourages professional associations of journalists and broadcasters to adopt relevant Guidelines and to encourage their members to adhere to them. THE GUIDELINES IN SUMMARY The Guidelines address the duty of government media: *	to inform the public about matters relevant to the elections, including to provide voter education (Guidelines 1 and 11) *	to be balanced and impartial in their election reporting (Guideline 2) *	not to refuse to transmit an election broadcast unless it constitutes a clear and direct incitement to violence or hatred (Guideline 5) *	to be accurate, balanced and impartial in their news and current affairs programmes (Guideline 8) *	to grant parties and candidates air time for direct access programmes on a fair and non-discriminatory basis (Guideline 9) *	to grant equal time to both sides of a referendum vote (Guideline 15), and *	to comply with the above Guidelines also in local and regional elections (Guideline 16). They further address the obligation of governments: 	 *	to abolish any laws that restrict freedom of expression in breach of international law and standards (Guideline 3) *	to make special efforts to investigate threats and physical attacks on media personnel or offices and to bring those responsible to justice (Guideline 4); *	not to censor election programmes in any way (Guideline 5) *	to establish or designate an independent, impartial body to monitor and regulate election broadcasts (Guideline 13), and *	to ensure that decisions of this body are subject to judicial review on an expedited basis (Guideline 14). The Guidelines strongly recommend: 	 *	that the media be exempted from legal liability for unlawful statements made during election broadcasts by candidates or party spokespersons (Guideline 6) *	that parties and candidates be granted the opportunity to reply to or correct injurious statements or criticisms directed against them (Guideline 7) *	that government media should broadcast candidate forums and interview programmes (Guideline 10), and *	that any media outlet that publicizes the results of an opinion poll or election projection should also include any relevant information about the circumstances and significance of the poll or projection (Guideline 12). GUIDELINE 1: DUTY OF GOVERNMENT MEDIA TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT ALL MATTERS RELEVANT TO ELECTIONS GUIDELINE 1 During the period preceding an election, government media have a duty to inform the public about the political parties, candidates, campaign issues, voting processes, and other matters relevant to the election. 	Commentary: The government's obligation to ensure that 'Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without ... distinction [of any kind] ... to vote ... at genuine ... elections' obliges the government to ensure that electors have the necessary information to register and vote, and to make informed choices regarding matters that are the subject of elections. This obligation is particularly heavy where the electorate have not had substantial prior experience of voting in free and fair elections. The right to vote 'without distinction of any kind' encompasses the right of people who are illiterate or only minimally educated to have access to the necessary information. The government is obliged to broadcast election programmes unless it undertakes other information initiatives that would reach as many people as would broadcasting. 	The media are charged with the dual public functions of 'impart[ing] information and ideas on matters of public interest' and acting as watchdog of government.(6) No individual media organ is obliged to fulfil these twin functions; the obligation, instead, rests with the government to ensure that the press, radio and television collectively are able to do so. However, if the government controls or substantially supports a broadcast station, that station is obliged to fulfil these public functions. GUIDELINE 2: DUTY OF BALANCE AND IMPARTIALITY GUIDELINE 2 Government media have a duty to be balanced and impartial in their election reporting and not to discriminate against any political party or candidate in granting access to air time.
Guideline 2.1 This duty requires that news, interview and information programmes must not be biased in favour of, or against, any party or candidate.
	Commentary: The government's obligation of balance and impartiality derives directly from the fundamental rights of voters and candidates to freedom of expression and information, and non-discrimination,(7) in addition to the duty of government broadcasters to disseminate accurate information about matters of public interest (discussed in Guideline 1, above). 	Consistent with the international standards, guidelines of UN election missions provide that '[i]n the case of government-owned media, it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides' and that 'the information provided by the government-owned media should not be biased in favour of one or the other side'.(8) 	The recent experience of transitional democracies shows that the duty of balance is most often, and most seriously, breached in the coverage of news.(9) Criteria for determining appropriate news coverage are set forth in Guideline 8. GUIDELINE 3: SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS WHERE LAWS RESTRICTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ARE IN FORCE GUIDELINE 3 Any laws that restrict freedom of expression in breach of international law and standards must be abolished. 	Commentary: The existence of laws which restrict freedom of expression will limit political debate and hamper the media's ability to give full and free coverage to the election, thereby interfering with the fairness of the election process. It is recommended that such laws be abolished in good time before the election campaign begins. 	The UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum noted in 1992 that special measures are required to ensure respect for freedom of expression during the campaign period 'where the exercise of the freedom of opinion and expression has been subject to undue restriction in the past'. 	The preferred approach, stated the Team, is to eliminate the restrictions outright; short of this, it is customary to incorporate special legislation to protect freedom of expression that clearly takes legal precedence over previous restrictive laws and practice. Moreover, 'it is most often necessary for a clear statement to be issued from the highest level of Government to the implementing agencies concerned, drawing attention to the new standards in force for the election or referendum.'(10) GUIDELINE 4: GOVERNMENT OBLIGATION TO PUNISH ATTACKS AGAINST MEDIA PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY GUIDELINE 4 The Government must make special efforts to investigate all acts, or threatened acts, of violence, intimidation or harassment directed against media personnel, or any act of destruction of the property or premises of a media outlet, particularly where there is any reason to believe that the act was motivated by an intent to interfere with media freedom, and to bring those responsible to justice. 	Commentary: Recent UN declarations have stressed the obligation of governments to protect the media, and the UN's appointment in 1993 of a Special Rapporteur to receive and act upon complaints of attacks against media personnel underscores the special importance attached by the international community to their physical protection. This special emphasis is based upon the recognition that effective protection of media personnel, and the premises of media outlets, is a prerequisite to the ability of the media to serve its public function of informing the public about matters of public interest.(11) GUIDELINE 5: LIMITS ON PRIOR RESTRAINT GUIDELINE 5 There must be no government censorship of any election programme.
Guideline 5.1 The government should issue a clear statement to the public and all broadcast stations that the media are encouraged to broadcast election-related programmes, and that the media will not be penalized in any way for broadcasting programmes merely because they are critical of the government, its policies or the ruling party.
Guideline 5.2 The government or government media must not interfere with the broadcast of an election programme, unless it is absolutely certain that a restraint is necessary to prevent a substantial harm to a legitimate interest, such as an act of violence. Any decision to restrain a programme must be promptly reviewed by an independent body in order to determine whether the restraint was necessary or whether it constituted an act of censorship.
	Commentary: Pre-publication censorship, especially concerning matters of political importance, is prohibited under international law except in narrowly-defined circumstances.(12) Any restraint must be proportionate to a legitimate aim. Given the fundamental importance to a democratic society of free political debate during election campaigns, an election broadcast may be subject to prior restraint only where it is 'absolutely certain' that the broadcast would cause an immediate, irreparable and substantial harm.(13) 	The experience of transitional democracies is that governments and government media have improperly refused to broadcast programmes of opposition parties.(14) The risk to free speech posed by government prior censorship outweighs the risk that programmes will incite violence or irreparably damage interests that the government is entitled to protect. 	Broadcast channels are entitled to pre-screen programmes in order to ensure that they do not violate any law but this process should not be used as a pretext to delay transmission of any programme. In the case of government-controlled media, however, the internal review process often is tantamount to governmental pre-screening. This reality, coupled with the duty of balance and impartiality, imposes a strong obligation on government media not to refuse to broadcast election programmes. Guideline 5.3 The standards used by the government, or by government media, in determining whether or not to broadcast an election programme must not be vague or broadly defined.
	Commentary: Standards for prohibiting broadcasts must be narrowly drawn and clearly defined. The UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum urged that any limitations on freedom of expression 		should not be so vague or broadly defined as to leave an overly wide margin of discretion to the authorities responsible for enforcing the law, since uncertainty over legal boundaries has a dampening effect on the exercise of this right [to freedom of expression] and may encourage discrimination in ... [the restrictions'] application.(15) 	A number of courts have held that refusal to broadcast an election programme pursuant to vague standards was illegal. For instance, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruled that, while a station manager may refuse to broadcast an election programme that is a 'clear' violation of the criminal law, he or she may not refuse to broadcast a programme on the ground that its tone is hostile to the spirit of the Constitution; such a vague and speculative concern does not constitute a 'clear' violation.(16) Guideline 13 deals with the need for a speedy review by an independent body of any decision not to broadcast an election programme. Guideline 5.4 Any post-broadcast penalty must be proportionate to the harm inflicted. In particular, unless a broadcast actually and intentionally incites violence or hatred, a penalty must not include imprisonment or such an onerous fine as to force the political party out of operation; nor may it restrain all future broadcasts by the party or candidate.
	Commentary: The right of political parties to function is one of the most fundamental rights since it is based on the rights to freedom of expression, association and political participation. It is impermissible to force a party out of operation by imposition of excessive fines or other indirect means. GUIDELINE 6: LIMITS ON MEDIA LIABILITY GUIDELINE 6 It is strongly recommended that the media be exempted from legal liability for unlawful statements made by candidates or party representatives and broadcast during the course of election campaigns, other than those which constitute clear and direct incitement to violence. The parties and speakers should be held solely responsible for any unlawful statements they make.
	Commentary: This departure from the normal rules of liability is justified by the short duration of campaign periods and the fundamental importance to free and fair elections of unfettered political debate.(17) It is recommended that the media be exempted for all speech that does not directly incite violence on the ground that all other speech can be redressed reasonably (though not necessarily entirely) by a post-broadcast remedy. 	Neither defamation nor incitement to 'discrimination, hostility or violence by means of national, religious, racial or ethnic hatred' are included in this Guideline's list of kinds of speech for which the media should be held liable even though it is recognized that these forms of speech may be unlawful and indeed that various UN guidelines state that the media should be held liable for broadcasting such speech.(18) 	The recommendation that the media be exempted from liability for defamation is based upon considerable national case-law and experience supporting the conclusion that defamation in the political context is adequately, and perhaps even most effectively, redressed after publication, by a prompt reply, retraction or correction.(19) Publication of a reply, retraction or correction should preclude a lawsuit for all except the publication of knowingly false information. 	 	Incitement to hatred presents a highly complex problem. It is recommended that it be exempt from media liability during campaign periods based on the fact that, in practice, the ban on incitement to hatred is widely used by governments to suppress legitimate political expression including, in particular, calls for national, religious or ethnic autonomy or other rights. A study undertaken by ARTICLE 19 of the law and practice concerning 'hate speech' in 14 countries reveals that governments have often used the justification of banning hate speech to suppress the speech of only one side to a national, religious or ethnic conflict or else simply to silence government critics.(20) For these reasons it is recommended that, in the context of an election campaign, the media should not be held liable for broadcasting statements that constitute incitement to hatred or discrimination short of violence (so long as the media do not condone the incitement in any accompanying editorial content). Without an exemption, experience shows that the risk that legitimate debate may be discouraged or suppressed is unacceptably high. 	This Guideline does not relieve political parties and other speakers of liability for their statements. The often heated nature of political debate should be considered, however, when assessing liability for comments by political contenders about their electoral opponents. GUIDELINE 7: REPLIES, CORRECTIONS AND RETRACTIONS GUIDELINE 7 Any candidate or party that makes a reasonable claim of having been defamed or otherwise injured by a broadcast should either be granted the opportunity to reply or be entitled to a correction or retraction by the broadcaster or by the person who made the allegedly defamatory statement. The reply or correction should be broadcast as soon as possible.
Guideline 7.1 The reply, correction or retraction should be approximately the same length, and should be broadcast in approximately the same time period, as the allegedly defamatory statement. This duty may be discharged by the allocation of direct access time pursuant to the normal allocation process.
Guideline 7.2 It is recommended that an impartial body be entrusted with deciding complaints that a programme violated the general laws, including laws against defamation and incitement to hatred or violence. This body should be empowered to order a right of reply, correction or retraction, and its decisions should be subject to review by the courts. (See Guidelines 13 and 14 below.)
	Commentary: During election campaigns in democracies around the world, candidates and parties are afforded the right to reply to statements that misrepresent their views or activities.(21) The right of reply has also been endorsed by UN guidelines; in particular, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) recommended that '[m]edia outlets should give parties, groups or individuals whose views have been misrepresented or maligned by a publication or broadcast the `right of response' in the same media outlet.'(22) GUIDELINE 8: NEWS COVERAGE GUIDELINE 8 Government media must be particularly scrupulous in complying with their obligation to provide accurate, balanced and impartial information in their reporting of news and current affairs.
	Commentary: Of the various forms of election broadcasts, news coverage is generally accepted as the most influential. Accordingly, the duties to inform the electorate and to report with balance and impartiality are particularly strong concerning news programmes.(23) Guideline 8.1 The duty of balance requires that parties or candidates receive news coverage commensurate with their importance in the election and the extent of their electoral support. 	Commentary: It is recommended that a fair and equitable mechanism be established to determine the proportion of election news coverage to be allocated to the competing parties (which may correspond to the percentages assigned for direct access programmes) and that the broadcaster adhere scrupulously to the targets. If possible, agreement on the proportions to be allocated should be reached between the broadcaster and the political parties. If agreement is not possible, the proportions may be decided by an independent body.(24) 	During the three weeks preceding polling day in the United Kingdom (UK), for example, the BBC keeps careful count of the amount of news coverage it devotes to the competing parties and takes measures to ensure mathematical parity among the parties. Moreover, detailed rules narrowly restrict the amount of coverage of political figures that may be counted as non-election broadcasts. 	In Romania's 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections, a parliamentary commission determined the percentage of total election news time to which each party was entitled, and with which Romanian Radio (if not Romanian Television) generally complied.(25) 	At a minimum, comparable events should be given comparable coverage. If a station covers a speech or election rally of one party's candidate, for example, it must give comparable coverage to other parties' speeches or rallies. Comparable coverage includes comparable length and comparable kind of coverage and, for television coverage, involves comparable footage of events or speakers. (Broadcasting unimportant statements or summarizing statements is not comparable to broadcasting the highlights of a candidate's speech that received the most applause or broadcasting the speaker's actual voice). Guideline 8.2 Owing to the potential for editorial opinions to be confused with news, government media are urged not to broadcast editorial opinions at all. If a government channel broadcasts an editorial opinion, it is obliged also to broadcast the opinions of the major opposition parties. If a broadcaster presents his or her own views, these must be clearly identified as such, and it is recommended that they not be aired during news programmes.
Guideline 8.3 News coverage of press conferences and public statements concerning matters of political controversy (as opposed to functions of state) called or made by the head of government, government ministers, or members of parliament should be subject to a right of reply or equal time rules. This obligation acquires even greater force when the person making the statement is also standing for office.
	Commentary: Undeniably, broadcasters have greater editorial discretion in deciding what events to cover in news programmes and how to cover them than over allocation of time for direct access programmes. Nevertheless, they remain subject to overall obligations of balance and impartiality. The experience of transitional democracies, and indeed of some established democracies, demonstrates that principles of balance and fairness are most often violated in the context of news programmes. 	This is by no means always motivated by malicious intent. Various factors enter into legitimate decisions regarding news coverage. The reality is that the ruling party, by using the apparatus of state power, are more likely, and can more easily manoeuvre, to be part of newsworthy events than can non-incumbents. Despite the difficulties, broadcast policies requiring fairness and balance must be diligently implemented owing to the high credibility a large portion of the public attaches to information broadcast on radio and television. 	Precedent for regulation is strongest concerning news coverage of ministerial announcements and press conferences. In the UK, for example, an aide-mémoire representing an agreement among the parties and the BBC provides for an automatic right of reply by the opposition party to ministerial broadcasts on matters of prime national or international importance.(26) In practice, the BBC carries its duty of balance one step further by directly following any controversial ministerial broadcast with a response by the opposition, and then by a discussion among all major parties.(27) In France, a law introduced in 1986 grants the opposition a right of reply to declarations of government. 	Press conferences called by incumbents who are running for office often closely resemble government announcements in significant ways and thus it is important to adopt some form of a right of reply or correction to statements made at press conferences as well as to government announcements. 	The 1990 election in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, conducted during the Civic Forum-led interim government of President Havel, offers an impressive example of a new democracy's efforts to redress imbalance in news coverage by granting reply time. When the government television station devoted news coverage to President Havel (who was standing for election) during a campaign trip and at a party rally, several parties lodged formal complaints. The station compensated the parties with additional direct access time. 	The existence of a large number of political parties or of shifting coalitions, more common in transitional than in established democracies, poses clear difficulties for the implementation of right of reply or equal time rules. Nevertheless, in many, if not most, transitional democracies, a few parties or coalitions clearly are the leading contenders and in such cases replies to governmental statements and press conferences should be granted to them as a matter of right. GUIDELINE 9: DIRECT ACCESS PROGRAMMES GUIDELINE 9 Government media must grant political parties or candidates air time for direct access programmes on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. For the first multi-party election, it is strongly recommended that all major parties or candidates receive equal time. 	Commentary: International norms discernible from a wide range of state law and practice confirm that governments have an obligation to ensure that parties and candidates have access to government media to broadcast their views during election campaign periods. Such access is an essential aspect of the right to freedom of political communication in light of the tremendous impact of radio and television on public opinion and the public service nature of government-owned media. 	Direct access programmes have a number of features which justify requiring government channels in transitional democracies to broadcast them in the discharge of their duty to inform the public about the candidates and parties.(28) They provide an opportunity for political parties and candidates to express their positions in their own words; for small parties and independent candidates to broadcast their views; and for parties to respond to negative statements or comments made about them. Because of the candidates' or parties' control, direct access programmes convey the style and other intangible information about the candidates and parties as well as the flavour of unfettered political communication. 	Direct access programmes are particularly important where the media are in reality, or are widely perceived to be, under some measure of government control. In such circumstances, denying political parties the opportunity to present their own programmes runs an unacceptable risk of interfering with their right to communicate their messages and of undermining public confidence in the fairness of the election process. 	In virtually all Western democracies, public broadcasting channels are required to make time available for direct access programmes. Sweden is the major exception.(29) It may be argued that special information programmes are able to incorporate all the benefits of direct access programmes, or even that broadcaster-directed programmes, such as interviews and debates, are generally more informative than programmes produced by the political parties or candidates themselves, and that it is therefore legitimate to deny direct access programmes. However, this would only be possible if the channel is both in fact and perceived to be wholly independent of government and the ruling party, which is unlikely in a transitional democracy. 	Direct access must be granted on a fair and non-discriminatory basis to all parties registered for an election or to all candidates in the case of presidential elections. 	Allocation of more than 50 per cent of campaign broadcast time to the government or any other party constitutes a prima facie violation of the duty of balanced coverage. a) Allocation of Time to the Parties Guideline 9.1 All parties or candidates that are formally registered must be granted access to some amount of air time for a country's first multi-party election.
	Commentary: In the first election of a transitional democracy, it is particularly important that election broadcasts be perceived to be fair and inclusive, as well as to be so in reality. 	In a transitional democracy, particularly in the first multi-party election, allocation of air time to political parties on anything other than an equal basis poses great difficulty because the two most objective indicators of support -- the party's performance in past elections and the number of seats held in parliament -- clearly are unavailable. For that reason, equal air time for all major parties is strongly recommended. 	Romania's 1990 elections illustrate both the need for inclusiveness and its disadvantages. In those elections, several dozen political parties were registered, and all were given equal time. While the blocks of time for direct access programmes were announced in advance, the times for particular parties were not. Because the broadcasts of the major parties were buried among those of the smaller parties, many voters paid little attention to the broadcasts. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that equal time had the virtue of providing the opportunity for all parties to communicate their messages and promoted confidence in the fairness of the election process. Moreover, it was recognized that it would have been virtually impossible to have established a process and set of criteria for allocating different amounts of time to different parties that would have been widely viewed as fair.(30) Guideline 9.2 Following the first election in a transitional democracy, and if there are objective criteria for establishing the levels of support for the different parties, air time may be allocated on a proportional basis. All parties should receive some air time, unless the parties are so numerous that allocation of time to all parties would seriously dilute the broadcasts' effectiveness in informing the electorate about the parties that are likely to form the government. Guideline 9.2.1 It is recommended that the allocation of air time be carried out by an independent body in consultation with, and with the agreement of, all the parties. Guideline 9.2.2 Where air time is allocated on the basis of rough proportionality, some amount of time must be allocated to small parties, parties with strong support in only a few regions, parties without parliamentary seats, new parties and independent candidates. Guideline 9.2.3 If time is allocated on a proportional basis and the government media broadcast regional programmes, parties that have strong support in only a few regions should be given air time on regional programmes proportional to their strength in those regions.
	Commentary: In subsequent elections where a small number of parties compete, the continued allocation of air time to the major parties on an equal basis poses little problem and is recommended. However, where a large number of parties compete, granting equal time to all may dilute the messages of the parties that are most likely to form a government. For this reason, allocation of an equal amount of time to each of the leading parties and of a lesser amount of time to each of the smaller parties may improve the informative value of the broadcasts while maintaining the public's confidence in the fairness of the allocation process.(31) Allocation of time on a proportional basis may be appropriate in transitional democracies where the first election was held to be fair and therefore give a good approximation of the relative strengths of the parties or where there is general agreement as to which are the leading parties (even if there is dispute about their relative strengths). 	It is important that, if possible, allocation on a proportional basis is achieved with the agreement of all parties as such agreement lends considerable legitimacy to the system of election broadcasts. It is recommended that an independent body be responsible for this allocation. 	If agreement cannot be reached, at least among the major parties, or if the first multi-party elections were not regarded as giving a good indicator of levels of support, continued allocation of air time to the major parties on an equal basis is recommended. Whichever approach is taken, all parties and independent candidates should receive air time which is adequate to communicate their central policies to the electorate.(32) 	The proportional approach was taken during Bulgaria's first multi-party elections held in 1990, whereby the parties which were generally conceded to command the greatest support reached agreement about the amount of time to be allocated to them.(33) In Germany, the Parties Law requires that small parties with representation in the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) be given the opportunity to use 50 per cent of the broadcast time allotted to the larger parliamentary parties. 	In nearly all Western countries surveyed in a 1991 study of election broadcast policy, time was allocated to parties on a roughly proportional basis.(34) While most allotted some time to non-parliamentary parties, they applied varying criteria for determining which parties qualified for air time. The German Constitutional Court has devoted more attention to the question than any other;(35) it concluded that even small parties participating in elections for the first time are entitled to some broadcast access.(36) Factors to be considered include the length and continuity of the party's existence, the size of its membership, the extent and strength of its organization, and its representation in government at both the state and federal levels.(37) The Court gave its view that the number of candidates fielded by a party is irrelevant since it is relatively easy for a party to nominate candidates.(38) 	 	As one expert observed, 'the approach of the German courts strikes a nice balance between the demands of fairness and equality of opportunity on the one hand, and a sensible appreciation of the functions of elections on the other. ... [D]isparate treatment ... [may be] explained in terms of the interests of the electorate in greater exposure to the arguments of the groups which might form a government.'(39) 	In the UK, by contrast, parties may be entirely excluded from direct access and debate programmes if they have not fielded candidates in a certain number of constituencies or polled a certain percentage of the vote in a preceding election.(40) 	The Swedish experience directly confirms the importance of air time for non-parliamentary parties. Although party direct access programmes have not been allowed for several years, parliamentary parties previously were entitled to air time. When parties without parliamentary representation but with significant support over the years were also granted air time, several of them won seats in parliament. b) Decisions Regarding Amount of Time to be Allocated Guideline 9.3 The amount of time allocated to the parties or candidates must be sufficient for them to communicate their messages, and for the voters to inform themselves about the issues, party positions, and qualifications and character of the candidates. 	Commentary: The amount of time required for effective communication is influenced by a variety of factors, including the number and importance of the offices at issue; the number of candidates; the familiarity of the population with the parties, the candidates, and elective politics generally; the length of the campaign period; the amount of time devoted to special information programmes; and the number and complexity of pressing issues. c) Scheduling of Direct Access Broadcasts Guideline 9.4 Direct access programmes should be aired throughout the campaign period and at times when the broadcasts are likely to reach the largest audiences. The government media violate their duty of balance if they air the programmes of some parties or candidates at hours (such as past midnight or during the working day) when it is inconvenient for large segments of the population to view or hear them. 	Commentary: The primary purpose of direct access programmes is to allow political parties to communicate their messages to the electorate. Thus, in furtherance of the government's obligation to inform the population about election matters, the government media are obliged to take reasonable measures to ensure that the largest audiences are reached.(41) 	 d) Process for Assigning Time Slots Guideline 9.5 Time slots for direct access programmes must be assigned to each of the registered political parties or candidates pursuant to an equitable process.
	Commentary: Once the amount of time to be allotted to each party for direct access programmes has been determined, there remains the question of how to assign specific time slots to the various parties. Clearly, slots during prime viewing or listening time are preferable. Where there are a small number of parties, it may be possible to assign prime-time slots to all of them but this may not be feasible where a large number of parties compete. It then becomes crucial to have a fair process by which slots are allocated. The preferred method is to incorporate some form of rotation (so that every party has the same number of prime-time slots). A random element may also be incorporated in allocating the first slots.(42) Random assignment may play a larger role where there is no agreement as to which slots fall within prime time and which fall outside it.(43)  :e) Financing of Direct Access Programmes Guideline 9.6 Whatever air time is available to a political party or candidate, it must be made available on financial terms equal to those granted to other parties or candidates. At least for the first several elections of a transitional democracy, the government media must provide an amount of time adequate for effective political communication to registered parties or candidates free of charge or else for a nominal sum. Guideline 9.6.1 If parties or candidates are to be allowed to purchase additional air time, they must be allowed to do so on equal terms. Rates for such time and the amount of time that may be sold to any one purchaser may be regulated in order to limit the advantage that richer parties clearly have in this area. Stricter regulation may be warranted during the first several elections of a transitional democracy, especially where opposition parties had previously been proscribed and thus did not have the opportunity to raise party funds. 	Commentary: In most established democracies, public broadcast channels make some amount of time available to registered political parties free of charge for direct access programmes.(44) In most of these countries, paid political advertising is prohibited throughout the campaign period and, in a few, it is entirely prohibited. 	The prohibition, or strict regulation, of paid political advertisements during campaign periods is generally justified on several grounds, including that it is necessary: (1) to safeguard the integrity of the political system in light of escalating costs of buying air time and the concomitant increase in the susceptibility of candidates and political parties to corruption and undue influence by major contributors; (2) to help create a `level playing field' for parties regardless of resources;(45) and (3) to end the trivialization of political debate resulting from the transmission of very brief political advertisements. 	Those who support paid political advertising during campaign periods urge that its prohibition violates freedom of expression and that less onerous means are available to promote interests such as those listed above. 	The imposition of limits on charges that may be levied for air time and the amount of time that may be sold to any one party or candidate should strike a reasonable balance between freedom of expression on the one hand and equality of opportunity for media access on the other.(46) GUIDELINE 10: SPECIAL INFORMATION PROGRAMMES GUIDELINE 10 The media should broadcast programmes that provide an effective opportunity for journalists, current affairs experts and/or the general public to put questions to party leaders and other candidates, and for candidates to debate with each other.
	Commentary: Special information programmes include candidate forums and debates, interview programmes, and programmes that provide an opportunity for audience members to pose questions. Guideline 10.1 While broadcasters have greater editorial discretion in deciding which parties, candidates and commentators should appear on such programmes than on news broadcasts, their discretion is subject to the general obligations of fairness and impartiality. At the least, representatives of all major parties should be invited to participate in such programmes.
	Commentary: The German Constitutional Court, for example, upheld an order in 1990 that restrained a public channel from broadcasting an election debate which excluded the Green Party.(47) While the Green Party was not viewed as one of the three major parties, nevertheless it exercised influence in Parliament. The Court also considered the fact that the debate was to take place three days before the election. Guideline 10.2 Journalists, experts and other questioners should be selected so as to ensure balance among the questions.
Guideline 10.3 Special information programmes should be aired during prime viewing or listening hours.
	Commentary: These Guidelines are based on the duty of the media to inform the electorate and to provide information in a balanced fashion.(48) At least several hours of national television time should be devoted to debates among presidential candidates or other party leaders. It is generally most effective to invite experts on various campaign issues (especially independent experts commanding respect among the public) to formulate some of the initial questions and ask follow-up questions. GUIDELINE 11: VOTER EDUCATION GUIDELINE 11 Government media are obliged to broadcast voter education programmes unless the government has undertaken other information initiatives which are likely to reach as many voters as would the broadcast programmes.
Guideline 11.1 The programmes must be accurate and impartial and must effectively inform voters about the voting process, including how, when and where to vote, to register to vote and to verify proper registration; the secrecy of the ballot (and thus safety from retaliation); the importance of voting; the functions of the offices that are under contention; and similar matters.
Guideline 11.2 The government media are obliged to broadcast programmes that will reach the greatest number of voters feasible. Broadcasts should include programmes in minority languages and programmes targeted for groups that traditionally may have been excluded from the political process, such as ethnic or religious minorities, women and indigenous groups.
	Commentary: The government's duty to inform voters about the process as well as the substance of elections is noted in the commentary to Guideline 1. Governments may discharge this obligation by distributing leaflets and posters with voting information, or by other methods (such as model voting stations and simulation techniques), if these other methods can reach as many voters, and can be as readily understood, as programmes broadcast on radio and television. However, it is not reasonable to assume that people with low literacy can be adequately informed about the voting process solely through printed materials. Thus, if other feasible methods would not be as effective in educating the public, the government media are obliged to broadcast voter education programmes. The government is free to pursue additional methods of education, and in fact would be obliged to do so if the broadcasts would not be expected to reach all potential voters.(49) GUIDELINE 12: OPINION POLLS AND ELECTION PROJECTIONS GUIDELINE 12 If a broadcaster publishes the result of an opinion poll or election projection, it should strive to report the results fairly and, in particular, to publish all readily available information that would assist the listeners in understanding the poll's significance.
Guideline 12.1 A broadcaster which publishes the results of an opinion poll should identify the organization that conducted the poll, the organization or party that commissioned and paid for the poll, the methodology employed, the sample size, the margin of error, and the fieldwork dates. In addition, the broadcaster should state that the poll reflects public opinion only at the time that the poll was taken. 	Commentary: Opinion polls can have a significant impact on voting patterns, especially where their significance is not adequately understood. Thus, as part of the duty to inform voters, media channels that broadcast the results of opinion polls are obliged to furnish sufficient information for their significance to be understood. In the UK, for instance, BBC staff are instructed to remind viewers and listeners that polls are a snapshot of opinion on the day the fieldwork was carried out, and that they are not a reliable predictor of future opinion or voting.(50) 	There is debate about whether opinion polls should be published right up to election day. Some observers have expressed concern that the impact of polls is greatest in the days immediately preceding election day and that, for instance, a prediction that one candidate will win by a large margin may incline voters who are primarily concerned about that one candidate to stay home and not participate in other votes on the same ballot. Similarly, voters may decide to vote for the apparent favourite, on the theory that it is better to side with a winner, especially if voters are not convinced about the integrity of the ballot's secrecy. For these and other reasons, several Western and Central European countries prohibit publication of the results of opinion polls during the last several days before an election including: Bulgaria (1990 election - eight days), Czechoslovakia (1990 election - seven days), France (seven days), Hungary (eight days), Italy (one day), Poland (seven days), Spain (five days), Sweden (one day), UK (voluntary abstention on election day).(51) 	In other countries, however, it is believed that such restrictions would constitute an unacceptable interference with the free flow of information about the election campaign. In the US, for example, there are no guiding policies with regard to publishing polls and only in recent years have the broadcast media agreed not to publish early election returns from the East Coast before polling stations close (three hours later) in the West. GUIDELINE 13: MECHANISMS FOR REGULATING BROADCASTS AND TAKING ACTION ON COMPLAINTS GUIDELINE 13 Election broadcasts must be monitored and regulated by an independent, impartial body.
Guideline 13.1 This body should be responsible for allocating time to political parties or candidates. It should also hear and take action promptly on complaints concerning broadcast-related violations by the media, and by political parties and candidates. The body should receive complaints from parties, candidates and citizens. It should be empowered to order prompt rectification, retraction or a right of reply and to seek enforcement of its orders, including through the courts.
Guideline 13.2 The body must make all of its decisions promptly. In particular, any claimed violation that has the result of preventing or delaying the airing of a direct access programme must be reviewed with due speed.
Guideline 13.3 If there is a regularly constituted broadcast-monitoring body that is independent of government, it may carry out these functions; otherwise, a body should be established especially to handle election-related matters.
Guideline 13.4 This body may include representatives or appointees of government and political parties, but it should not be able to take decisions only upon the strength of the votes of the appointees of the government or of one party. If any parties are represented, it is recommended that the body include representatives of at least all major parties. It is recommended that the body include independent media professionals.
	Commentary: Central to the integrity of the election process is the existence of a body to monitor and regulate broadcasts that is both perceived to be and is, in fact, impartial.(52) It must act promptly and fairly, and its decisions must be subject to prompt review by the courts. Recognizing this obligation, the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum noted the importance of 'a recourse mechanism ... providing for independent review of cases where restrictions on this right [to freedom of expression] have been applied.'(53) 	A practical model is provided by the Party Political Broadcasting Committee of Great Britain which comprises representatives of the three major political parties, the two Nationalist parties (of Scotland and Wales), and the two (independent) broadcasting authorities. It regulates election broadcasts and allocates air time based on criteria it has established. Where the parties cannot agree, as happened concerning allocation of air time for the 1987 general election, the broadcasting authorities make the decisions themselves.(54) The Federal Republic of Germany has followed a similar approach whereby broadcasters make decisions in agreement with the political parties. 	In Australia, Sweden and Switzerland, the broadcasting authorities, which are independent of government, make decisions regarding election broadcasts.(55) Several countries (including Italy and Luxembourg) have entrusted regulation to parliamentary commissions, although in Italy this system has not worked well.(56) Guideline 13.5 It is recommended that the election broadcast regulatory body monitor all campaign-related broadcasts to assess their compliance with laws and regulations.
Guideline 13.6 Government media should facilitate media monitoring by non-governmental, non-partisan organisations, including by making tapes of election broadcasts available free of charge or at minimal cost.
	Commentary: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play a crucial role in promoting the fairness of election broadcasts by monitoring the amount of air time devoted to, and the nature of coverage of, election programmes. Monitoring broadcasts systematically and documenting perceived violations is, however, often prohibitively expensive for NGOs, because of the high cost of recording and other necessary equipment. The broadcast media, which have such equipment, should make available tapes of election programmes on request either for free or at cost.(57) Guideline 13.7 The election broadcast regulatory body should be empowered to recommend, subject to judicial review, that an election be postponed, suspended or annulled if it can be established that there have been breaches of international or national law which might significantly affect or have affected the outcome of the election.
GUIDELINE 14: JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDELINE 14 Actions and decisions of a body charged with regulating election broadcasts must be subject to judicial review, which must be carried out on an expedited basis. Guideline 14.1 Any decision that has the effect of prohibiting the transmission of a direct access programme must be reviewed in a particularly speedy fashion.
	Commentary: Judicial review of the decisions of election broadcast bodies is important to the reality as well as the appearance of fairness. In Italy, for example, where decisions of the Parliamentary Commission are not reviewable by the courts, this absence of accountability has enabled the Commission to exclude minor parties and independent candidates from air time and has been the subject of considerable criticism.(58) GUIDELINE 15: PLEBISCITES AND REFERENDUMS GUIDELINE 15 In plebiscites and referendums, where the voters have the choice only of voting 'yes' or 'no' to a particular proposition, equal air time must be allocated to each side. This formula stands even if more parties support one side of the issue than the other. Guidelines 1-14, to the extent relevant, are also applicable.
	Commentary: Equal allocation of air time is required in order to meet the duties of balance and fairness. Sound reasoning in support of this proposition was provided by a Scottish court of first instance in a case concerning a referendum on devolution. The court ruled that time was to be allotted equally between the two sides, even though three of the four parties supported devolution.(59) GUIDELINE 16: LOCAL ELECTIONS GUIDELINE 16 The preceding Guidelines should be appropriately modified and applied by local and regional government media in local, municipal and regional elections.
	Commentary: Local elections are important elements of democratic transitions. True democracy may be experienced most directly at the local level. Political parties should be provided with broadcast time to present their programmes for local development and other important issues affecting localities throughout the country. Local broadcast media should make time available for direct access programmes, and should broadcast news and special information programmes. Their coverage should be monitored to ensure implementation of election regulations and policies.(60) ENDNOTES 1. See Chapter 1 above for elaboration of the varied circumstances of transitional democracies. It should be noted that the transitional phase can last for a number of years, even decades.2. The Guidelines refer to 'parties or candidates' to take account of the type of election (parliamentary or presidential, for example) and the electoral system. 3. For sources of international law, see Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and Section 7.1.1 above. For an examination of relevant international and comparative law and practice, see Chapter 7 generally. 4. Most of the examples in this chapter of the practice of well-established democracies are drawn from European countries. This is due to the availability of information and not to a devaluation of the democratic experience in other parts of the world. 5. Art. 25 of the International Covenant, and language (in brackets) from Art. 2, reproduced in Appendix I. See discussion of the pertinent international standards in Section 7.1.1-.2 above. 6. European Court of Human Rights in several judgments, quoted in Section 7.1.3 above. 7. See Section 7.1.5 above. 8. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov 1992), para. 27, quoted at greater length in Section 7.2 above. See also UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992) also discussed in Section 7.2, and reproduced in Appendix I. 9. See Chapter 4 above for a survey of problems encountered in news coverage of election campaigns. 10. UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 8 above at para. 28. See Sections 2.1 and 7.1.13 above for relevant discussion. 11. See Sections 2.2 and 7.1.12 above for further discussion of these points. 12. See Section 7.1.7 above. 13. See Section 7.1.8 above. 14. See Section 2.1 above. 15. UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 8 above at para. 29. 16. 47 FCC 198 (1978). 17. See Section 7.1.4 above for a discussion of relevant international law principles. 18. See Section 7.1.7 above. 19. See Sections 7.1.6 and 7.1.9 above and Guideline 7. 20. ARTICLE 19, ed., Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination (London: 1992). 21. See Section 7.1.6 above for a discussion of international law and national cases that support this point. 22. Media Guidelines for Cambodia, note 8 above at Guideline 8. See Appendix I for relevant text. 23. See Guidelines 2 and 9. See Section 7.1.4-.5 above for a discussion of the duty of balance under international and comparative law and Chapter 4 above for a discussion of the problems encountered in news coverage of election campaigns in transitional democracies. 24. For factors that may be relevant in assessing electoral support, see commentary to Guideline 9.2. 25. European Institute for the Media, The 1992 National Elections in Romania: Coverage by Radio and Television (Manchester/Dusseldorf: 1992); interview with Dragos Seuleanu, Programs Department, Radio Romania, regarding radio coverage. 26. E Barendt, Broadcasting Law: A Study of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Oxford University Press, 1993) at note 63. 27. Ibid. at note 68. 28. See Guideline 1 and Sections 7.1.1-.4 above. 29. In Sweden, where public broadcasting is controlled by a body independent of government, no direct access broadcasts are allowed and the only exposure of candidates is on interview and debate programmes. K Jakubowicz, 'Electoral Campaigns on Radio and Television: General Principles', in A Pragnell and I Gergely, eds, The Political Content of Broadcasting (Dusseldorf: European Institute for the Media, 1992), 54. A substantial amount of the country information provided in the commentaries to these guidelines is based upon the results of this highly informative study. 30. The proliferation of parties stemmed from the very low qualification threshold of 251 signatures to register a party. 31. See Sections 3.5 and 3.6 above for relevant discussion. Factors relevant in assessing a party's support may include the party's performance in past elections; the number of seats held in the parliament; length and continuity of the party's existence; size of its membership; extent and strength of its organization; and its representation in government at federal, regional and/or local levels. The number of regions or constituencies in which the party is contesting the election may also be a relevant factor; however, it should not be given significant weight in countries where it is easy for a party to put up candidates in regions even where the party has little support. 32. See Guideline 9.3 below. 33. See Section 3.5 above. 34. See Pragnell and Gergely, note 29 above. 35. See Barendt, note 26 above. 36. 48 FCC 271 (1978). 37. 14 FCC 121 (1962). 38. Ibid. 39. Barendt, note 26 above at 176-7. 40. Lynch v. BBC [1983] 6 NIJB 1. See also Barendt, note 26 above at 177. 41. See Section 3.3 above for relevant discussion. 42. As noted by the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum: 'Once the spots allocated for [direct access programmes] are identified, most legislation prescribes a random choice for the allocation to each side.' Note 8 above at para. 42. 43. See Section 3.5 above for relevant discussion. 44. See, for example, Jakubowicz, note 29 above at 54, regarding Western democracies. 45. As stated by the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum: 'In the case of commercial, privately-owned media, it is ... customary to prescribe that there should be no discrimination in the case of paid advertising.' Note 8 above at para. 27. 46. See Section 3.4 above for further discussion. 47. 82 FCC 54 (1990), discussed in Barendt, note 26 above at 173. 48. See Guideline 1 and Sections 7.1.4-.5 for a discussion of the relevant international law principles. See also Section 4.4 above for further relevant discussion. 49. See Chapter 5 above for further relevant discussion. 50. Letter from Alan H Protheroe, CBE, former Assistant Director General of the BBC, dated 31 Aug. 1993. See Section 4.5 above for further relevant discussion. 51. Jakubowicz, note 29 above at 50. 52. See Section 7.1.11 above for further discussion. 53. See Report of the UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum, note 8 above at para. 29. 54. Barendt, note 26 above at note 12. 55. Jakubowicz, note 29 above. 56. Ibid. at 52-53. 57. See Section 6.3 for further relevant discussion. 58. Barendt, note 26 above at note 13. 59. Wilson v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, 1979 SLT 279. 60. See Section 5.3 above for relevant discussion.
	APPENDIX I Following are relevant texts from selected international human rights instruments regarding electoral rights and freedom of expression. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Article 19 Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 	 Article 21 1. 	Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 2. 	Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 3. 	The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS Article 1 1. 	All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 	.... 3. 	The State Parties to the present Covenant ... shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 19 1.	Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. 	Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. 	The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 	(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 	(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Article 25 Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 [distinctions of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status] and without unreasonable restrictions: 	(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 	(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; 	(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN Article 7 State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right: 	(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies.... CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN Article I Women shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination. Article II Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION Article 5 In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in Article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: 	.... (c) 	Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections -- to vote and to stand for election -- on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service; 	 (d) 	Other civil rights, in particular: 	 	.... (viii) 	The right to freedom of opinion and expression ... . DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MASS MEDIA TO STRENGTHENING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, TO THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO COUNTERING RACISM, APARTHEID AND INCITEMENT TO WAR (Proclaimed by the General Conference of UNESCO at its Twentieth Session in Paris, 28 November 1978) Article 1 The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding. Article 2 2. 	Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end journalists must have the freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information. Similarly, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of the peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information. 	 	.... 	 4. 	If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession. Article 11 For this Declaration to be fully effective it is necessary, with due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and the other obligations of Member States, to guarantee the existence of favourable conditions for the operation of the mass media, in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the corresponding principles proclaimed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966. AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS Article 9 1. 	Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 	 2. 	Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law. Article 13 1. 	Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law. 	 2. 	Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country. 	 	.... Article 20 1. 	All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. ... AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN Article 4 Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever. Article 20 Every person having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be honest, periodic and free. Article 32 It is the duty of every person to vote in the popular elections of the country of which he is a national, when he is legally capable of doing so. AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Article 13	Freedom of Thought and Expression 1. 	Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 	 2. 	The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: 	a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 	b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 3. 	The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. ... 	 Article 23	Right to Participate in Government 1. 	Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: 	a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 	b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and 	c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country. .... EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS Article 10 1. 	Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 	 2. 	The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are proscribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. PROTOCOL (No. 1) TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS Article 3 The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) DOCUMENT OF THE COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION .... The[] [participating States] recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law ... . The participating States express their conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation that they seek to establish in Europe.... (5)	They solemnly declare that among those elements of justice which are essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings are the following: (5.1) 	- free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure in practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the choice of their representatives; 	 	.... (6)	The participating States declare that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government. The participating States will accordingly respect the right of their citizens to take part in the governing of their country, either directly or through representatives freely chosen by them through fair electoral processes ... . (7) 	To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the participating States will (7.1) 	- hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law; 	 	.... (7.8) 	- provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process; 	 	.... (9)	The participating States reaffirm that (9.1) 	- everyone will have the right to freedom of expression including the right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. The exercise of this right may be subject only to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are consistent with international standards. In particular, no limitation will be imposed on access to, and use of, means of reproducing documents of any kind, while respecting, however, rights relating to intellectual property, including copyright ... . MEDIA GUIDELINES FOR CAMBODIA, DRAFTED BY THE INFORMATION/EDUCATION DIVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) [UNDER THE UNTAC MANDATE, SECTION D 'ELECTIONS,' PARAGRAPH 3(f): 'ENSURING FAIR ACCESS TO THE MEDIA, INCLUDING PRESS, TELEVISION AND RADIO, FOR ALL POLITICAL PARTIES CONTESTING IN THE ELECTION,' UN Doc. A/46/608 [ANNEX 1]; S/23177 [ANNEX 1] (30 October 1991)] .... 2.	Cambodians should enjoy the benefits of freedom of expression and opinion through all media administered by existing administrative structures as well as other media. 4.	An independent and free media should have a diversity of ownership, and it should promote and safeguard democracy, while opening opportunities and avenues for economic, social and cultural development. 7.	In the exercise of its responsibilities under the Agreement, UNTAC will ensure 'fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all parties contesting the election'. That means UNTAC will assure all registered and/or provisionally registered political parties the freedom and security to publish, print and broadcast their views. 8.	Media outlets should give parties, groups or individuals whose views have been misrepresented or maligned by a publication or broadcast the 'right of response' in the same outlet. 9.	UNTAC strongly encourages the various media to present a balance of views, to solicit a wide spectrum of opinion from the Cambodian community and to publish as much information as possible about the history, finances and platform of a political party or candidate. A democratic media seeks to publish views and counterviews at the same time, in order to address all aspects of an issue. When opposing ideas are contained in the same broadcast or article, a 'response' may not be necessary. .... 11.	The UNTAC Division of Information/Education will determine the specific implementation of fair access of political parties to radio and television. 12.	UNTAC will encourage the development of a free and open media through a diversity of ownership of media outlets in Cambodia. 13.	Existing administrative structures should facilitate the profusion of publications and broadcast stations by, for example, the processing without undue delay of any necessary applications for registration or assignment of broadcast frequencies. If an application has not received an answer within one month, UNTAC encourages the automatic approval of that application. 14.	Existing administrative structures should not restrict distribution, sale or importation of broadcast or printed material, whether produced within or outside Cambodia, except material that incites hatred or offends public morals. 15.	Recognizing that not all limits on free expression are purely political, UNTAC will assist the Cambodian media in identifying specific economic or technical barriers to free expression. UNTAC will assist in coordinating with the international community and a Cambodia Media Association to remove those obstacles where feasible. 16.	In bona fide pursuit of their professional duties, journalists should have free access to records and documents of existing administrative structures. UNTAC will, however, restrict access to materials it deems essential to the security of Cambodia or to prevent the unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 17.	Media outlets may not harm the reputation or rights of individuals by publishing or broadcasting false material or allegations. In democracies, public figures, however, enjoy less stringent protection. Media outlets may not knowingly disregard the truth in publishing material about public figures. 18.	Journalists should protect confidential sources of information. 	SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS AND BOOKLETS ARTICLE 19, Press Law and Practice: A Comparative Study of Press Freedom in European and Other Democracies (London: 1993). ----- The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Handbook: International and Comparative Law, Standards and Procedures (London: 1993). ----- Media Monitoring in Malawi - Weekly Reports (weekly monitoring reports on broadcasting and intimidation in the April/May 1994 election campaign) ----- Freedom of Expression in Malawi: The Elections and the Need for Media Reform (July, 1994). Australian Senate Select Committee on Political Broadcasts and Disclosures, 'Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune' [a report of political advertising regulation in 19 countries], Report on The Political Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Bill 1991, Appendix 5 (Canberra: Nov. 1991). E Barendt, Broadcasting Law: A Study of Regulation in Europe and the United States (Oxford University Press, 1993). Council of Europe, Handbook for Observers of Elections (Strasbourg: 1992). Euromedia Research Group, The Media in Western Europe: The Euromedia Handbook, (London: Sage Publications, 1992). European Institute for the Media, The Political Content of Broadcasting, (Manchester: 1991). ----- (A Pragnell and I Gergely, eds), Freedom and Control: The Elements of Democratic Broadcasting Services, European Institute for the Media (Manchester: 1990). ----- (G K Roberts), Access to Political Broadcasting in the EEC, (Manchester: 1984). International Human Rights Law Group (L Garber), Guidelines for International Election Observing (Washington, DC: 1984). National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (L Garber and E Bjornlund, eds), The New Democratic Frontier: A Country by Country Report on Elections in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992). ----- Nation-Building: The UN and Namibia (Washington, DC: 1990). ARTICLES, ESSAYS AND MONOGRAPHS British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Opinion Polls During a General Election,' BBC Editorial Policy Advice, Mar. 92(1) (BBC 1992). A E Boyle, 'Political Broadcasting, Fairness and Administrative Law,' Public Law 562 (1986). Commonwealth Secretariat, 'Guidelines for the Establishment of Commonwealth Groups to Observe Elections in Member Countries' (1992). G H Fox, 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law,' 17 Yale Journal of International Law 539 (1992). T M Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,' 86 The American Journal of International Law 46 (1992). L Garber, 'A New Era of Peacemaking: United Nations and Election Monitoring,' (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1993). N Gorelick, 'The Media: Building Confidence in the Electoral Process (January 1992)', in Evolving Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Election Monitoring: A Training Seminar for the Organization of African Unity (African American Institute and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992). OAS Secretary General, 'Observers' Guide: Observation of Electoral Process, Nicaragua, 1989-1990' (OAS, 1990). D Padilla & E Houppert, 'International Election Observing: Enhancing the Principle of Free and Fair Elections,' 7 Emory International Law Review 73 (1993). D Shelton, 'Representative Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere,' 12 Human Rights Law Journal 353 (1991). H J Steiner, 'Political Participation as a Human Right', 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook 77 (1988). D Webster & B Wenham, 'Broadcasting and Election Coverage: Some Observations', Paper for Evolving Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Election Monitoring: A Training Seminar for the Organization of African Unity (The African American Institute and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992). Election Observation Handbook (ODIHR)The ODIHR Election Observation Handbook is found at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/guidelines/election_handbook/index.htm
Table of contents
3. The OSCE commitments 4. The ODIHR conditions for effective election observation 5. The Observer Code of Conduct 6. The Needs Assessment Mission 7. The OSCE Special Co-ordinator 8. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission
8.2 Administration and Deployment Officer 8.3 Other Core Staff Members
b. Voter and Civic Education c. Voter Identification and Registration d. Registration of Candidates and Political Parties e. Election Boundaries f. Ballot Design and Security g. Special Voting Provisions h. Tabulation, Aggregation, and Verification Process i. Complaints and Review Process
b. Checklists c. Campaign Observations
b. Polling Station Activities c. Polling Station Questions d. Polling Station Observations e. Military Voting f. Voting in Hospitals and Prisons 12. Extended post-election phase: the Long-Term Observer
12.2. Complaints and Review Process 12.3. Closing Down the Mission
12.5. ODIHR Mission Archives 14. ODIHR post-election assistance in the implementation of recommendations 15. Annexes 1. INTRODUCTION In recent years, observation of elections and referenda has emerged as an important task in support of democratic transition and universal human rights. The expansion of election observation efforts is directly related to the corresponding global trend toward democratisation. The conduct of a transparent and open election process in accordance with established legislation is fundamental to a democratic society. The right of political participation is important not only for the immediate election process, but also presupposes adherence to other basic human rights such as the right to freedom of expression, movement, peaceful assembly and association. Election observation is therefore more than just a technical exercise, as it can contribute directly to the promotion and protection of universal human rights. Elections are a celebration of fundamental human rights. Observation can prevent violations of human rights associated with the election process through the very presence and visibility of observers, as the correctness of the election process itself is assessed. As the practice of sending election observer missions to assess elections has developed rapidly in the OSCE region, there has been a need to establish a more structured ODIHR election observation methodology. The ODIHR Election Observation Handbook addresses this need by outlining the general methodology of ODIHR election observation in addition to providing a set of practical guidelines for the conduct of an election observation mission. ODIHR's Mandate For Long-Term Election Observation As a result of the Budapest Summit in December 1994, the ODIHR's mandate is now more comprehensive and aims to achieve long-term observation of the election process. The ODIHR's enhanced mandate for long-term observation is the result of an increasing realisation that election observation is not a one-day event. An informed assessment of an election process cannot be made on the basis of election day observations only. The ODIHR has therefore expanded its activities towards the pursuit of longer-term observation of the election process, rather than limiting them to short-term observation on and around election day. This more complete approach requires a long-term observer presence in the country, through various stages of the election process necessary for a meaningful and democratic exercise. When evaluating an election process, observers must take into account the entire election cycle, from the media, the registration of voters and candidates, through the campaign, the final voting and counting stages, the public declaration of results, and the installment into office of those elected. As a consequence, the practical field-tasks of an ODIHR election observation mission can be divided into four distinct phases: the pre-election phase, the election day, the immediate post-election phase, and the extended post-election phase. Long-term observers cover all election phases, while the short-term observers mainly cover the election day and the immediate post-election phase. The objective of the long-term observation is to gain an in-depth knowledge of the various phases of an election cycle. The objective of the short-term observation is to meet the more 'classical' duties of election observation, providing a broad presence throughout the country to assess the closing days of the campaign, election day and the vote count. The structure of the Handbook reflects this distinction and separate chapters address the roles of both the Long-Term Observer (LTO) and the Short-Term Observer (STO). The principal advantage of this dual approach is to elaborate the tasks of observers throughout the election process, while defining the distinct but complementary roles of both categories of observers. Co-operation between the ODIHR and other international bodies As the field of election observation has developed in the OSCE region, it has become increasingly clear that the various organizations involved in election observation should seek to send a consistent message as they assess the conduct of elections. At the same time it is recognized that international organizations can achieve more if they work together on follow-up to recommendations emerging from election observations. The Budapest Summit Declaration stresses the need for enhanced co-operation between the ODIHR and other international organizations. With these considerations in mind, a Co-operation Agreement was signed in September 1997 between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) and the ODIHR. The Agreement defines procedures for enhanced co-operation between the OSCE PA and the ODIHR in the following aspects of election observation missions:
2. THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, recognises the integral role that transparent and open elections play in ensuring the fundamental and universal right to democratic participatory government. All election observers, regardless of their own nation's political system and election process, are bound together in their task by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21: 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures. The role that periodic, free and genuine elections play in ensuring respect for political rights is also enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. 3. THE OSCE COMMITMENTS The OSCE commitments, agreed upon in Copenhagen at the second meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in 1990, also emphasise the central role of elections in securing the citizen's right to participate in the government of his or her country. All observers should be familiar with the OSCE election-related commitments (see Annex A). In addition, the Copenhagen Document states that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the integrity of the electoral process. Election observation has thus become accepted as an effective and invaluable service that is provided among OSCE participating States to promote and strengthen democratic governance. As such, participating States invite observers from any other OSCE participating State to observe the course of their respective election proceedings. Observers are asked to assess elections for their compliance with the OSCE commitments. The OSCE commitments should be clearly reflected in the legal framework for the election, including the Constitution and the statutory provisions (election law, political party law, media law, criminal code, rules of procedure). The ODIHR would not be inclined to observe an election in which the OSCE commitments are not clearly reflected in the governing legislation and regulations. The legal framework should be drafted in an open and inclusive manner, in order to secure broad confidence among the competing political parties, candidates and voters. Significant changes in the legislative framework, that are introduced shortly before the election and are repeated from election to election, can create an unstable and unpredictable environment in which political parties compete for election. The OSCE commitments can be summed up in seven key words central to democratic tradition: Universal, Equal, Fair, Secret, Free, Transparent, and Accountable. The principle of universality is understood to secure access to an effective, impartial, and non-discriminatory registration procedure for both voters and candidates alike. Citizens who have reached a qualifying age and meet the criteria for registration should be given the right to vote. The principle of equality requires that one's vote be given equivalent weight to that of the other voters in order to ensure equal representation. Under the majority voting system it requires that the size of the electorate among constituencies should not vary by more than approximately ten percent (10%). Under the proportional representation system, the size of the electorate may vary but the number of representatives for each district should be proportional to the size of the electorate. Voters should have equal and effective access to polling stations. The principle of fairness should ideally assure a level playing field for all participants in the election process, but at a minimum it should ensure the voter's exposure to basic information about all the contestants in the election and the fundamental issues that they represent. The principle of secrecy can only be assured if the voter casts the ballot alone, in the privacy of a secure voting booth, and in a manner that the marked ballot cannot be viewed before it is deposited in the ballot box. The principle of freedom should ensure a citizen's ability to cast his/her ballot free from intimidation and secure in the knowledge that his/her rights of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly will be upheld throughout the entire election process. The principle of transparency requires that the election be carried out according to due process of the law, and according to legal ground rules that are established in an inclusive and open manner. A transparent process limits the possibility for election fraud, and thus the vote count should be visible and verifiable from the level of the polling station, to any intermediate levels of the election administration, and finally to the national election authority. The principle of accountability requires that those elected are duly installed in office and recognise their accountability to the electorate. 4. THE ODIHR CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE ELECTION OBSERVATION In accordance with the mandate given to the ODIHR for long-term observation, it is the responsibility of the participating States to notify the ODIHR at least three months in advance of an election. In the absence of a timely notification, the ODIHR may not be able to respond positively to an invitation to observe. The ODIHR does not subscribe to the view that the mere presence of observers adds legitimacy to an election process. It is the observers' methodology and the resulting conclusions that will form the basis of opinion on the election. In order to make this assessment, the ODIHR expects assurances from the inviting government, according to accepted international standards, that the ODIHR election observation mission will be able to carry out its duties, and specifically to:
5. THE OBSERVER CODE OF CONDUCT Listed below are some general principles and rules, which all observers are required to follow:
6. THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION In order to prepare for a long-term observation, a needs assessment mission will normally be initiated several months before an election. The needs assessment mission will be conducted by the ODIHR Election Advisor and, if already identified, with the presence of the designated Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission, the Deputy Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission and the Administration and Deployment Officer. In addition, an OSCE PA representative may take part in such missions. The first objective of the needs assessment mission is to ascertain whether the legal framework governing the election process is in line with the OSCE commitments. Any previous ODIHR election observation or OSCE PA reports on the country concerned should be considered, including progress made on the recommendations. Such missions will also assess the extent, needs and context of the observation and should serve to establish an early dialogue with the national electoral authorities and other institutions involved in the election process. 7. THE OSCE SPECIAL CO-ORDINATOR The OSCE Chairman-in-Office may designate a political figure as a special Co-ordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observation mission. This political figure should normally be the President of the OSCE PA or an OSCE PA senior official recommended by the OSCE PA in consultation with the Chairman-in Office. The Special Co-ordinator will work closely with the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission and they will jointly deliver the preliminary post-election statement at a press conference organized shortly after the election. 8. THE HEAD OF THE ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION A Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will be designated to represent the ODIHR and to support the activities of long- and short-term observers. He/she will conduct an on-going assessment throughout the observation as to whether the conditions for effective observation are being respected by the host government. Likewise, the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will be responsible for ensuring that the ODIHR Observer Code of Conduct is honoured by all observers. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will work closely with the OSCE Special Co-ordinator on the short-term observation and Preliminary Statement. The responsibilities of the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will be carried out under the direct supervision of the ODIHR Election Section/Warsaw. The Head of the mission will travel to and from the post via Warsaw for briefing and de-briefing. He/she will liaise with the ODIHR/Warsaw regularly throughout the observation and will submit weekly update reports to the ODIHR Election Section on all matters, including continuing progress with the implementation of previous recommendations. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will also consult with OSCE participating State embassies on site and with the OSCE mission of long duration, if such a mission is established in the respective country. The ODIHR's principal counterpart within the host country is the electoral commission or the authority designated to administer the election (hereafter called National Election Administration). The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will establish regular contact with the relevant election authorities and set-up a temporary office in the capital city. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will also maintain regular contact at the national level with relevant ministries, political parties, non-governmental organizations (including any domestic monitors and human rights groups), other relevant civic associations, the media and national minorities (if relevant). The information collected should be documented with the permission of the source, and may later be incorporated into the final report. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will issue a short press statement upon arrival in the country offering a brief description of the ODIHR long-term election observation mandate, and providing contact information. The Head of the mission will always stress the impartiality of the observer mission, and its willingness to receive comments about the electoral process or other human rights issues relating to the electoral process. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will support the activity of international observers by providing:
8.1. Deputy Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission The Deputy Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will assist the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission in all the above-mentioned duties throughout the mission and represent the Head of the mission in his/her absence. A primary responsibility of the Deputy Head will be to maintain regular contact with longterm observers (LTOs) posted in the regions, to receive and analyse their reports, and to provide this information to the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission. The Deputy Head of the mission should travel to and from the post via Warsaw for briefing and de-briefing. 8.2. Administration and Deployment Officer The Administration and Deployment Officer is specially designated to assist the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission with all issues related to administration of the observation mission including financial management, and in the development of the deployment plan for longterm observers (LTOs) and shortterm observers (STOs). The Administration and Deployment Officer should travel to and from post via Warsaw for briefing and de-briefing and collection of equipment. 8.3. Other Core Staff Members The ODIHR may also designate, as core staff members, the following experts to address specific issues regarding the functioning of an election observation mission on-site:
9. THE PRE-ELECTION PHASE: THE LONG-TERM OBSERVER Election observation is not a one-day event. The electoral process has to be seen as a film rather than an instant photo. Observers must take into account the various stages of the election cycle, from the registration of voters and the commencement of the campaign, to the final voting, counting and verification procedures, the processing of complaints and the resolution of disputes. In order to fulfil the ODIHR's commitment to long-term election observation, a core group of LTOs is requested from the participating States for a period of approximately two months prior to the election. The role of the LTO is to acquire first hand knowledge about the effectiveness and impartiality of the pre-election administration; the implementation of the election law and regulations; the nature of the campaign; and the political environment prior to voting day. LTOs are then responsible for assisting short-term observers (STOs) to place election day observations within an informed context. LTOs should monitor any discrimination in law or in fact during each stage of the election cycle, including during voter education and voter registration. In particular, LTOs monitor discrimination against minorities or women, such as exclusion or marginalisation in voter education programmes and under-representation in election administration bodies. LTOs should be prepared to arrive on a specified date for a briefing by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission. The briefing should cover the following points:
After receiving their accreditation, LTOs will be dispatched in teams of two to selected posts throughout the country. LTOs will submit interim reports based on their findings which will then be used to brief STOs and contribute to the final election report. LTOs are expected to attend periodic meetings that may be called by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission during the course of the observation. Without intervening in the election process in any manner, the LTOs will be responsible for maintaining contact with regional and local election and government authorities, political parties, non-governmental organizations (including any domestic monitors and human rights groups), other relevant civic associations, the media and national minorities (if relevant). LTOs should observe the following aspects of the pre-election cycle: 1) Election Administration:
2) Election campaign:
9.1. Election Administration a. The National Election Administration: Composition, Human Resources and Training, Material Resources Composition of the National Election Administration A National Election Administration, such as a Central Election Commission (CEC) or an equivalent body, is usually assigned to administer an election. Occasionally the judiciary may oversee the election process. Whichever body is constituted to administer the election, its work should be independent, impartial, and transparent. The administering body should be independent and immune from politically motivated manipulation. Its independence could be assisted if composed of well-known, respected, neutral and experienced individuals. It should be able to implement the election legislation and regulations without any undue interference, intimidation or impediment to its duty. Alternatively, the administering body could be made up of a balance of political party representatives appointed by their respective parties. The balance of clearly identified party representatives is intended to serve as a check on the system, through multi-party representatives, with equal representation at all levels of the election administration. If political party representatives constitute the election commissions, they should be prohibited from campaigning. They should not be subject to removal by their party based on their decisions concerning the election administration. It is preferable if the administering body is a permanent body, or at least with a standing executive committee. If it is not a permanent body, its independence can be further guaranteed if the members have a fixed tenure and the right of return to their previous employment. If a judicial body is charged with administering the elections, its independence must be assured through transparent proceedings. Judicial appointees should be immune from the authority of those standing for office. It is imperative for the administering body to act impartially. It must enforce the rights of freedom of expression, association, assembly, non-discrimination and due process of the law. Any partial treatment or abuse of authority may pose serious threats to an election's legitimacy. The transparency of the election administration can be greatly enhanced, contributing to public confidence in the system, when meetings of the National Election Administration are open, and when there are recorded minutes of each meeting. Various ministries, other central public administration bodies, prefects or other government representatives at district level, local council mayors and town hall staff may be directed to support the National Election Administration by carrying out the administrative and logistic operations of preparing for and conducting the elections. They may have responsibility for preparing and distributing the electoral registers, ballot papers, ballot boxes, polling booths, official stamps and all other required material, as well as determining the arrangements for storage, distribution and security. Observers should be informed of the role of all relevant ministries and local authorities in organising the election process. Human Resources and Training Adequate human resources, and specialised skills, are required to implement an election. Long-term observers should note what instructions have been issued to election officers, and if electoral officers are familiar with the tasks to be carried out on election day. Long-term observers should assess whether election commission members have received standardised training at all levels of the election administration. Such training should also be available to members of commissions appointed by political parties. LTOs should observe such training sessions for election officials whenever possible. Material Resources of the National Election Administration The independence of the election administration body is further guaranteed by a transparent, sufficient and independent budget provided from government resources. Long-term observers should establish whether the election administration has a realistic understanding of and adequate means to meet the material requirements for an efficient process:
b. Voter and Civic Education Observers should assess the extent and effectiveness of voter and civic education. Sufficient voter and civic education is needed to ensure that participants in the electoral process are fully informed of their rights and responsibilities as voters. These efforts can also generate knowledge and interest about the election process and build a climate for open debate. Voter education is focused on the particular election and should inform voters of when, how and where to vote. It is therefore essential that this information is provided in a timely manner, allowing voters sufficient time to make use of the information. Civic education is a longer term process of educating citizens in the fundamentals of democratic society and civic responsibility. It may focus on the choices available to the voter and the significance of these choices within the respective political system. While political parties and civic organizations may contribute to voter and civic education efforts, it is ultimately the responsibility of the government and the election authorities to ensure that voters receive objective and impartial information. It should be provided to all eligible voters, including traditionally disenfranchised segments of the population (e.g. minorities). Problems that can arise: Information about the election process may be received too late, information issued by the government could be biased e.g. 'information bulletins' showing a ballot paper filled in favour of a contestant, certain groups may not receive or understand information. c. Voter Identification and Registration The right to vote must be given to all citizens of the country on equal terms, provided they have reached a qualifying age. A national voter register is a public document that establishes the nation-wide list of all eligible voters according to the maxim 'one person, one vote'. Registration procedures and facilities should be readily accessible to the electorate. The voters list should therefore be posted well in advance of the election to permit complaints about incorrect inclusions or exclusions. There should be legal provisions governing the method of registration, registration timetable, qualification and disqualification in respect of nationality, age and abode, temporary absence, means of identification, registration form, format of the register, publication of a draft register, procedure for claims and appeals, publication of a final register, and availability and right to inspect registers. It is important that the implementation of the registration process be evaluated, to ensure that no unreasonable restrictions are placed on voter registration. Unreasonable restrictions are those based on race, gender, religion, ethnic origin, past political affiliations, language, literacy, property, or ability to pay a registration fee. Reasonable restrictions may include factors such as residence, citizenship, persons in legal detention, and those considered mentally incapacitated by the courts. In relation to these factors, persons may be barred in some countries from exercising the right to vote without the violation of universal principles. However, in regards to citizenship, those who have lived in the country as de facto citizens for a reasonable number of years should be given a fair chance to register to vote. The voter registration process is best assured by a permanent, well maintained and regularly updated national voter register. One comprehensive, computerised list can also assist the authorities in verifying the accuracy of the lists, thereby enhancing the integrity of the voter register. However, some countries may not have the capacity to generate a computerised voter register. Methods of registration, therefore, may vary from country to country depending on local circumstances. Each method requires a prescribed procedure for identifying and registering all qualified persons. It may be necessary to conduct a house to house, person to person canvass with completion of registration forms at the household. Persons may be required to attend a registration centre in their locality in order to have their names included on a register. A register may be generated from existing records such as census registration or other national registry details. Large scale emigration and internal migration or displacement can cause significant population shifts between elections. The difficulty of identifying and registering large numbers of voters who have moved is a substantial technical undertaking. Voters have to be crossed off lists according to their previous residence and added to lists in their new place of residence. Safeguards should exist to avoid multiple registration. If the voters receive special voter cards, there must be adequate security to avoid duplication or counterfeiting of the cards. Any system where special certificates can be issued on election day to enable eligible voters whose names do not appear on the voter register certainly broadens the possibility of voters to cast their ballot. But this is also a system that can be open to abuse. On such occasions when certificates are used, observers should ask voters where they were issued and who issued them. To avoid multiple voting, voters can also have their identification certificates stamped, particularly if there is no voter register. [Note. In some instances, a formal voter register may not exist, and voting may be allowed on the basis of a citizens' register. In such cases, the citizens' register should be equally well maintained and accessible. In exceptional cases there may be no formal registration, with voters being required to establish their identity and eligibility at the polling station on polling day. In these cases, special arrangements should be considered, such as the use of indelible ink, to guard against multiple voting.] d. Registration of Candidates and Political Parties Commitment 7.5 of the Copenhagen Document of 1990 guarantees the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination. Any arbitrary or discriminatory application of the law for the purpose of undermining certain political forces, contravenes the OSCE commitments. The same general principles underlying the right to vote apply for the right to be a candidate. All political forces and movements should therefore be able to nominate candidates on equal terms, and not be limited for reasons of race, gender, language, religion, political affiliation, ethnic or national origin, or economic status. Reasonable restrictions for persons wishing to become candidates may include a residency requirement in the country for a certain period of time before the elections, minimum support among voters, or having reached a higher age than the minimum voting age. The registration requirements should be clear and predictable, and not involve potentially discriminatory demands such as excessive deposits or an unreasonable number of names on registration petitions. A right of appeal must exist for the refusal of registration to a party or candidate. Problems that can arise: undue suspension of parties or candidates, inconsistent application of the law with respect to the registration of candidates, provisions in the election law that have the effect of discriminating against certain groups. e. Election Boundaries According to the OSCE commitments, all votes should carry the same weight to ensure equal representation. This means that each elected representative represents a similar number of registered electors. For example, in a majority voting system, the size of the electorate should not vary by more than approximately ten percent (10%) from constituency to constituency. Under the proportional representation system, the size of the electorate may vary but the number of representatives for each district should be proportional to the size of the electorate. The election law should provide detailed and uniform criteria for the drawing of electoral district lines, specifying considerations such as the number of voting population per district and natural, administrative and historical continuity of boundaries. The boundaries must be drawn in a transparent manner, and ideally by a non-partisan commission of experts assigned for this purpose. Otherwise it may be difficult to determine if the boundaries are elaborated on the principle of political neutrality, or in a selective, discriminatory and biased manner. f. Ballot Design and Security The complexity or simplicity of the ballot directly affects the efficiency of the voting process. The ballots should be easy to fill out for the voter. In order to safeguard the ballot, each of them should bear an official stamp specific to the polling station and/or the signature of an authorised person/s in the polling station. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission and the LTOs should determine who printed the ballots, where and how they were stored and distributed to the different regions, and at what time this was done prior to the elections. Where envelopes are used to authenticate a vote, similar observation should be carried out to ensure their security. Problems that can arise: In multilingual societies, observers should note whether the election administration has made an effort to facilitate voting of those citizens who may not speak the language of the majority. g. Special Voting Provisions In cases where voting is permitted by mobile ballot boxes and absentee voting, or in military barracks, prisons and hospitals, such special voting procedures should be closely observed. Mobile Ballot Boxes and Absentee Voting Providing mobile ballot boxes and absentee voting broadens the participation of the electorate. However, these are provisions that can be open to abuse and therefore can jeopardise confidence in the election process. LTOs should closely observe and understand such provisions, i.e. to which constituencies will absentee ballots be allocated. Although restrictions on these provisions may compromise the right to vote for part of the electorate, legislators may be convinced to accept such limitations as a necessary step to increase overall public confidence in the election process. Voting in Military Barracks, Prisons and Hospitals In such cases where voting is permitted in military barracks, prisons and hospitals:
h. Tabulation, Aggregation, and Verification Process Before an election, the National Election Administration should explain the counting, reporting and transportation process to the electorate, parties and the media. They should describe the process openly, ensuring the transparency of the system, and give preliminary results according to a specific schedule. LTOs should assess this process, and ensure that it is conceived in a transparent manner. The counting process should be transparent and easily verifiable. Candidates' proxies or agents, domestic and international observers, and the media should have the right to observe the whole vote count including, where applicable, the tabulation of votes. Candidate proxies or agents, domestic and international observers, and the media should all have the right to receive copies of the official results of each polling station (or 'protocols') which should also be made available to the general public by posting in a public place. The process of aggregating results should be open to inspection, from polling station level to regional authorities and/or to the National Election Administration, and documented in relevant laws and protocols. Transportation of the ballots should be transparent and secure. If authorities transmit the results by computer, then observers should have access to the process and be allowed to monitor it. i. Complaints and Review Process The right to appeal to an independent, impartial national legal body must be ensured for all involved parties in the electoral process. A complaints and appeals procedure should be established as a review mechanism, which can serve as the final arbiter of disputes. Observers should pay particular attention to the selection and composition of the review authority, its terms of tenure and its institutional autonomy, as the integrity of the election process can only be upheld if the review mechanism is independent and impartial. Complaints concerning the election process that are submitted by candidates or voters alike, must be dealt with equitably and according to due process of law. Procedures and deadlines should be clearly enumerated in the election code. There must also be accessible and adequate facilities for filing complaints with the judicial authorities nominated for this purpose by the electoral law. Response should be provided in a timely manner, and all rulings should be recorded and made public. The complaints that are registered during the campaigning process can serve as indicators of the issues that should be further investigated by the LTOs. Problems that can arise: 'shelving' of complaints until after the elections, failure of a representative of the National Election Administration to turn up at the court hearing, lack of transparency in the rules of procedure, or insufficient and misleading information given to potential applicants. 9.2. The Election Campaign a. The Political Campaign The OSCE commitments require political campaigning to be conducted in an environment that assures freedom of expression, assembly and association. These rights must be safeguarded at all times, to allow political organising and campaigning, and to inform citizens about the candidates and issues. Adequate security measures must be provided, but not in a manner that compromises the above-mentioned commitments. The government is responsible for ensuring that the ground rules for the campaign enjoy broad support from the contestants and effectively comply with the regulations. The contestants may adopt a Code of Conduct to ensure responsible behaviour, and should not use any means of violence or intimidation to further their cause. Candidates must have the freedom to convey their programmes to the voters without disruption of campaign meetings, and with no geographic infringement imposed by government 'no-go areas.' There must be a well defined process for issuing permits for conducting public rallies, political meetings, and fund raising activities. There must be judicial recourse in the case of unreasonable delays or refusal in granting such requests. The observers should note the availability of venues for rallies, access of all candidates and parties to places and audiences of their choice, distribution of campaign materials, and the effective freedom of assembly, association and expression for all competing political forces. Particular attention should be paid to the use of intimidation or violence to inhibit campaigning. b. Campaign Resources An effective campaign needs sufficient financing. Campaign costs can include salaries, transportation, office expenses, the purchase of space in print and electronic media, and the printing and distribution of campaign materials. While it is understood that elections do not always take place on a completely level playing field, an equitable and unbiased formula should be agreed upon to ensure some financing to all contestants. This may be regulated by the election law or separate legislation dealing with public financing if these funds are to be provided by the State. It is the responsibility of the government not to abuse State resources, both human and material, in support of the ruling party?s or parties? own candidates. For example, government vehicles, office space and telecommunications should not be used for partisan purposes unless equal access can be provided to the other contestants. Time is also an important resource for a meaningful election campaign. The duration of the campaign must provide enough time for the contestants to convey their policies to the electorate. The right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, if not previously secured on a permanent basis, must be ensured in sufficient time to allow effective political organization and campaigning. Observers must ultimately consider whether any disparity of resources between the contestants meant that voters were not well informed about their available choices and whether this substantially affected the outcome of the election. Problems that can arise: rules on campaign financing which obstruct efficient campaigning. c. Media The OSCE commitments call for unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis. The very basis of democratic governance requires that the electorate be able to make informed choices. This demands that all contesting points of view be fairly and equitably communicated, particularly in the media financed from public funds. State sponsored broadcasters indeed carry a special responsibility for providing balanced coverage of the election campaign. In this respect, government regulation of the media is of crucial importance to a meaningful election campaign. While larger and better financed parties and candidates may be able to purchase more media time or space, an equitable formula should be reached to permit all contestants reasonable access to print and electronic media. This may require the donation of State media time/space or some formula for public financing. However, editorial coverage is also important to an election campaign, and consideration should be given as to whether editors cover the campaign from an independent perspective covering all issues and events. Additionally, while the incumbent may get media coverage concerning State affairs, campaign events should not be confused with issues of State. This should be taken into account when evaluating the media by its degree of independence in informing the electorate about the candidates and issues. The media should be assured by the government of:
While long term observers should pay attention to the media, it may be necessary to co-operate with specialised agencies in order to have a precise and scientific analysis of the media. Problems that can arise: defamation of candidates by State-owned media, exclusion of particular parties or candidates from State-owned media coverage or coverage only at times of low penetration, intimidation or harassing of media in the context of the elections, manipulation of paper and ink supplies, interference with distribution networks for printed media. d. Conduct of Security Forces Throughout the campaign and voting process, security forces have a duty both to prevent intimidation of voters and candidates by others, and not to intimidate themselves. Intimidation can have an insidious effect on candidates and voters alike, particularly when perpetrated by security forces. While intimidation may be difficult to quantify, widespread trends in intimidation, particularly by security forces, become readily apparent. 10. ELECTION PHASE: THE LONG- AND SHORT-TERM OBSERVER Shortterm observers (STOs) normally arrive shortly before election day, and are deployed to provide a broad presence throughout the country on election day. The election phase can be broken down into three stages: the closing days of the campaign; election day; the vote count and tabulation of results. 10.1. Closing Days of the Campaign a. The Briefing It is particularly important that the observer is well informed about the electoral process. The observer needs to be informed on the procedural and legal aspects of the election, in addition to the political and social context within which the election is being organised. Prior to deployment, the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will therefore organise a briefing, which will cover the following issues:
Information to be provided will include a translated copy of the national election law and relevant regulations, general logistical information and emergency contact numbers, map of the country delineating constituencies, the ODIHR Election Observation Handbook and checklists. An additional briefing may be organised for Parliamentary delegations wishing to cooperate with the ODIHR election observation mission. In particular, the ODIHR will assist the OSCE PA with such a briefing, if requested. b. Checklists The main method of analysis for an ODIHR election observation is both qualitative and quantitative. For statistical analysis, observers will be asked to fill in standard forms to be adapted as required on a countrybycountry basis (see annex B). Completing the forms in polling stations provides a basis of analysis of election day and serves as an aide memoir for the observers. Although a quantitative analysis may not always be possible given that the total number of polling stations visited may be too limited, checklists do ensure that all aspects of the election day process are monitored and reported. A quantitative analysis may be possible whenever the basis of analysis is drawn from at least 500 polling station forms and from a representative sample of the polling stations throughout the country. c. Campaign Observations STOs are often in the country in time to observe the closing days of the campaign. Preelection questions should include:
Observers should be encouraged to observe campaign meetings and rallies on site and through media reporting. In reference to the code of conduct, observers may not speak at campaign events or make any public comments. Observers should not display any partisan symbols or banners. Observers must always carry their official accreditation. 10.2. Election Day a. Deployment The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission will offer a deployment plan developed in cooperation with the OSCE PA delegation, other international observation groups and local embassies. The deployment is intended to avoid duplication of observer efforts, and to ensure that teams of observers cover a representative sample of the country on election day. The deployment plan should ensure a balanced sample, covering both urban, rural, and socially diverse areas. The deployment plan should also ensure that some observers are designated to visit regional election commissions. In instances where voting is conducted in military barracks, prisons or hospitals, the deployment plan should also ensure coverage of these special voting sites. Observers should be deployed in teams of two persons. Depending on geographic conditions and on what is found at polling stations, a team of observers may visit between 10 20 polling stations during the day. Observers should be reminded that election observation is not a race to visit the greatest number of polling stations, and sometimes it can be equally beneficial to visit fewer polling stations for a longer period of time. b. Polling Station Activities The basic aim of observing the elections at the polling station level is to verify whether voting and counting is implemented in an orderly manner and in accordance with the electoral procedures. When arriving at the polling station, the observers should show their accreditation to the Chairman of the Polling Station Commission and an effort should be made to ensure that the purpose of the mission is well understood by the officials. Customarily, observers arrive at a polling station prior to the official opening to observe the opening procedures. This will allow observers to examine ballot boxes before they are sealed, and to see if polling is beginning on schedule. Observers should be aware of any unusual tension that exists upon entering the polling station. It may be those first few minutes that are crucial for an immediate and realistic impression of the situation in a polling station. However, more time may be required to assess the situation, and observers should certainly plan on spending at least thirty minutes in each polling station visited. At the close of the polls, observers should be present to ascertain that the procedures for closing are followed and they should stay to observe the count. Observers should refrain from giving advice unless requested to do so by local officials, and even then should be very careful not to exceed their competence. They may draw problems to the attention of local officials, allowing these officials to address any problem themselves. Observers should record all irregularities. The debriefing will eventually disclose whether such irregularities represent recurring patterns or if they are isolated events. If there are concerns about serious irregularities in a particular polling station, observers may wish to spend more time there to see if problems are addressed, or consider returning later in the day. In the event of serious irregularities, observers should bring them to the attention of a superior election commission. Observers should recognise that some mistakes made by election officials may be because of inexperience rather than due to any deliberate intention to compromise the integrity of the process. c. Polling Station Questions There are three groups of persons that observers should speak with at the polling station. These include the polling station officials, voters, and if present domestic observers (party affiliated, candidate affiliated, and nonpartisan). All opinions should be considered as long as their credibility is assured. Observers should remember that some persons may try to manipulate information given to observers for their own purposes, and observers should use their judgement in ascertaining a balanced assessment of a situation. Observers should speak to a crosssection of people from each group wherever possible. The Polling Station Officials Observers should confirm that all persons working as election officials or handling ballots are duly appointed members of the polling commission. Relevant enquiries to address to members of the polling commission may include:
Voters Observers should talk to voters to judge their mood and confidence in the process. For example, when perfect conditions for a secret ballot do not exist, an observer should consider whether the voter believes that his or her vote is secret. Were voters well informed about their choices and familiar with the voting procedures Domestic Observers Commitment 8 of the Copenhagen Document supports the presence of domestic observers in the polling stations. Domestic observers include party affiliated observers, candidate representatives, or nonpartisan civic observers and all should be permitted access to polling stations and all stages of the process. It is important to note that the ODIHR election observation mission will organise its activities fully independently from domestic observer groups in order to safeguard the clearly separate roles reserved to the two groups of observers within the electoral process. International observers should note whether domestic observers are present at the polling stations, and whether they have been restricted or hindered in any way from carrying out their observation duties. Their comments may offer additional insights into the voting environment at the polling station and the performance of the Polling Station Commission. Discussions with voters and domestic observers should be in confidence and with discretion, beyond the sight of the election authorities if necessary. d. Polling Station Observations Observers should note the following observations and record them by fillingin the checklists provided by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission:
Problems that can arise: restricting the right of eligible voters to cast a ballot, demanding unnecessary forms of identification, incorrectly telling voters they must vote in another location, telling potential voters that they have already cast a ballot, family voting, proxy voting (unless specified by law), multiple voting and ballot stuffing, unscreened voting booth, unsealed ballot box, campaign material and political party propaganda in the polling station, presence of military or security forces (unless accounted for in the election law), failure to check the voter's identity, unregulated use of mobile ballot box, eligible voters who have not been registered, absence of necessary voting materials, excessive delays in administering the polling, intimidation. e. Military Voting The military voting process should be followed by some observers, as soldiers who vote can be vulnerable to intimidation, particularly when they are required to vote in barracks. For example, troops may be required to vote in front of their officers, and in some cases officers may even instruct their troops on how to vote. f. Voting in Hospitals and Prisons In some countries, voting is permitted in hospitals and prisons. Where this is the case, some observers should be assigned to visit these special polling stations as well. Hospital patients and prisoners also constitute a segment of the electorate that may be particularly vulnerable to intimidation. 10.3. The Count a. Vote Count Observations Accredited observers are entitled to observe the count. Although observers are normally fatigued by the time the vote count begins, this is a crucial stage in the election and should be observed to the end. This provides the opportunity to spot check whether ballots are counted accurately, reflecting the choices expressed by the voters. The first stage in the vote count should be organised in the polling stations. Any counting system in which the ballots are not counted in the polling station but transported to a central counting location produces significant extra problems of visibility and verification. An observer team should accompany any transportation of ballot boxes. The results should be made available at the polling station level, and should be freely available for record. The transparency of the process is enhanced when all party and candidate representatives sign and are given copies of the result sheets, or 'protocol'. Nonpartisan domestic observers should also be able to get a copy of the results in the polling stations. The tabulation of results should be verifiable and transparent at all levels of the election administration. This is applicable both in the polling station and as the results are aggregated at each level of the election administration. The results from particular polling stations constitute a sample of verified results that can be matched at district or regional level, and later with the overall published results. The results from polling stations can be checked one by one against the official tabulation. This is a process that should also be encouraged for domestic observers and party agents. Findings and results can be documented with the assistance of checklist forms and with copies of the protocols with results. It is important for observers to note the response to the following questions:
b. Levels of Vote Count The results of the polling station count are normally transmitted to a regional election commission, where the regional results are aggregated and transmitted to the national level. Observers should make sure that they have fully understood the manner for transporting and calculating the results and that the calculation is verifiable from the polling station to the national level. Observation of the vote count at each level of the election administration is essential, from the polling station, to regional election commission, and finally to the National Election Administration. Observers should maintain a presence at each vote tabulation level, working a shift system or by deployment of teams specifically assigned for this purpose. In some cases electoral authorities may use computers or email to transmit results. In order to ensure transparency of the tabulation exercise, the software shall be made available so that its correctness may be verified. Additionally, in these cases observers should have the right to monitor the process, and if possible to receive copies of a printout signed and stamped by the relevant authority as the information is sent. Problems that can arise: disorderly counting procedures, ballot stuffing, ballot box switching, arbitrary invalidation of ballots cast, loss of ballot papers or ballot boxes, dishonest counting or reporting of the ballots, insecure storage of unused ballots, inconsistent regulation of invalid ballots, inadequate number of counting staff and supervisors. 11. IMMEDIATE POST-ELECTION PHASE: LONG- AND SHORT-TERM OBSERVERS 11.1. De-briefing and Reporting A de-briefing will be organised by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission within 24-48 hours following election day, which the Special Co-ordinator will normally attend. The de-briefing should provide an opportunity for all observers to share and report their findings on the election process, and to try and reach a common conclusion on how the elections were administered in relation to the OSCE commitments and the legal framework of the country concerned. The debriefing is closed to the press and to the general public. The input of observers should concentrate on a factual summary, with particular emphasis on recurrent trends noted during election day observation. Conclusions are drawn form the collective findings of observers, and impressions based on a limited observation experience should be avoided. The debriefing of the observers can be organised by teams or in the regions by the LTOs or in a central location with the attendance of all observers. For those observers who logistically may not be able to return in time for the debriefing, arrangements should be made to receive reports by fax or telephone. 11.2. Preliminary Post-election Statement A preliminary post-election statement is issued by the Special Co-ordinator, if appointed, and by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission within 24-48 hours after the election. A press conference may be organised in country to present the post-election statement, which will be delivered by the OSCE Special Co-ordinator, and by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission. All post-election statements will be sent for final review and approval to the ODIHR Election Section in Warsaw. The statement will be concise and will reflect the most significant findings and concerns of the pre-election period as reported by long-term observers, as well as the election day findings of the long- and short-term observers. The statement should be factual, to the point, and provide a preliminary assessment of whether the OSCE commitments were upheld and how well the domestic election law and regulations were implemented. It is important that the findings of the observation be reflected in a joint statement, rather than individual observers giving their personal comments. Observers must refrain from making any statements or individual comments on their observation. There are serious risks in the publication of partial or incomplete conclusions. It should be clearly stated that the post-election statement is a preliminary statement and that additional post-election findings can significantly change the overall observation findings and will be reflected in the final report. Recommendations are normally reserved for the final report except in cases where there is a second round of voting; issuing recommendations in the preliminary statement may then improve the quality of this second round. 12. EXTENDED POST-ELECTION PHASE: LONG-TERM OBSERVERS 12.1. Final Verification and Announcement of Results The majority of STOs may not be able to remain in the country until the final verification of the results and their public announcement. LTOs should remain in place, along with the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission, until the announcement of the final result. Official publication of complete results by polling stations in a set period of time after election day enables a detailed verification process and can enhance public confidence in the outcome of the election. Any undue delay or discrepancies concerning the aggregation, verification and the announcement of the final result should be noted. Problems that can arise: unbalanced supervision of the aggregation, verification and final result tabulation; denial of access to this process; denial of access to authorised persons; failure to publish the results at district and precinct level; discrepancies between election day records of the number of ballots casts and the final results. 12.2. Complaints and Review Process Observers should follow all judicial and other processes regarding complaints filed about the election process and any possible reviews specifically called for. The right to appeal to an independent, impartial national legal body must be ensured for all parties involved in the electoral process. A transparent complaints procedure should be established as a review mechanism which should serve as the final arbiter of disputes. Complaints concerning the election process that are submitted by candidates or voters alike, must be dealt with equitably and according to due process of law. Voters and candidates should have access to the appropriate documentation that they may need in order to present their case. There must also be accessible and adequate facilities for filing complaints with the judicial authorities nominated for this purpose by the electoral law. Any response to such complaints should be provided in a timely manner, and all rulings should be recorded and made public. Problems that can arise: The competence of or access to the review board or judicial body may be limited, which could prevent a complete examination of the entire process. 12.3. Closing Down the Mission When closing down the Mission, it is imperative that the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission should make a final courtesy call to the National Election Administration, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to any other local authorities or organizations which have been in close contact with the Observation Mission. 12.3.1. Extended Observation When the Mission closes down, the electoral process may not be complete in its entirety. The Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission should then leave a small team to follow election procedures to the finish. The mandate of such a post-election team must be very clear. This team must enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations as the election observation mission, of which it is an integral component. This team must focus on outstanding issues and take other initiatives only if instructed so by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission or the ODIHR headquarters. Daily liaison with Warsaw on progress must be ensured. 12.4. The Final Report The Final Report should reflect detailed and cumulative findings of both LTOs and STOs. The report will be based upon opinions expressed during the debriefing and upon the data collected on the checklists. The aim of the report is to arrive at a conclusion on the election process according to two standards: (1) the OSCE commitments, in particular the 1990 Copenhagen Document, and (2) the domestic legal framework governing the election process and its implementation. The conclusion must be based on verifiable data and be presented in a concise yet comprehensive manner, and include recommendations for improvements in the election process. The report should contain agreed upon recommendations from both the ODIHR and the OSCE PA. While the observation mission's cumulative findings will be reflected in the final report, this report will ultimately be the responsibility of and prepared by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission. It will be reviewed, edited, and finally approved by the ODIHR Warsaw before submission to the OSCE PA for comments. The report should be distributed to relevant organizations and national authorities concerned with the elections, and to observers upon request. The report should include:
12.5. ODIHR Mission Archives Some information should be compiled by the Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission and sent to the Warsaw Office for archiving. The main documents should include:
13. THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT Assessing the election process requires reference to both the OSCE commitments and the domestic laws and regulations governing the election process. An election within the OSCE region may not meet the ideal standard as set out in the commitments. An election process can always be subject to imperfections and irregularities. While isolated infractions are serious and should be noted, a pattern of recurring and systematic irregularities may indicate a serious threat to the integrity of the election process. In the case of newly democratising States, the OSCE commitments may not initially be fulfilled to the same extent as in long established democracies. However, all OSCE participating States are committed to do their utmost to ensure that these principles are upheld. Moreover, the perfection of the election process itself may not be immediately attainable. But it will certainly not be achieved without a good faith intent on the part of the authorities to see that the OSCE commitments are effectively implemented. Observers should be aware that there are instances where the letter of the law is not breached, but the spirit of the law is clearly violated. Therefore, when assessing an election process, a relative determination must be made as to whether any irregularities materially affected the integrity of the election process. Poor organization does not necessarily indicate manipulation. The principle of free elections can only be fulfilled if the citizens of a country are informed about the election process, free to cast their ballot without intimidation, and thus have the freedom to choose effectively their leaders. Ultimately, any election process is a celebration of human rights. It is hoped that election observation, as detailed in this handbook, is an effective tool in supporting these fundamental human rights as outlined in the OSCE commitments. 14. ODIHR POST-ELECTION ASSISTANCE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS The ODIHR does not play the role of a judge, ruling on whether the OSCE should 'approve' an election. Rather, the ODIHR supports States in democratic institution-building in line with OSCE commitments. ODIHR election observation reports, when critical, are not meant to condemn, but offer a balanced assessment of the entire process and recommendations for reform. Participating States are encouraged to contact the ODIHR for assistance in implementing the recommendations that may result from an ODIHR election observation and which are contained in the Final Reports. The ODIHR will increase its efforts to further improve the follow-up to the recommendations. In this context, the ODIHR intends to work closely with other inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary bodies, in particular the OSCE PA. 15. ANNEXES ANNEX A: DOCUMENT OF THE COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE CSCE (29 June 1990) [The Copenhagen Document does not contain any references to the Office, since the institution was set up at the Paris Summit in November 1990. However, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe states that the Office for Free Elections - later renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - 'will foster the implementation of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting'. Therefore, the relevant paragraphs are reproduced here below.] ...
Related commitments of the Copehagen Document include: In order to strengthen respect for and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to develop human contacts and to resolve issues of related humanitarian character, the participating States agree on the following:
ANNEX B: OSCE/ ODIHR MODEL ELECTION DAY CHECKLIST
Organization of Election Observation Missions (OAS)The Manual for the Organization of Electoral Observation Missions has been requested from the OAS. Guidelines: Determining Involvement in International Observation (IDEA)
IDEA: Guidelines for Determining Involvement in International Electoral Observations Found at http://www.idea.int/publications/guidelines_for_determining.pdf Types of Audits: US Auditing StandardsComptroller General of the United States, Government Auditing Standards. Chapter 2: Types of Government Audits This manual can be found at http://www.gao.gov/govaud/ybhtml/doc2.htm
Purpose2.1 This chapter describes the types of audits that government and nongovernment audit organizations conduct and that organizations arrange to have conducted, of government organizations, programs, activities, functions, and funds. This description is not intended to limit or require the types of audits that may be conducted or arranged. In conducting these types of audits, auditors should follow the applicable standards included and incorporated in the chapters which follow.Financial Audits2.4 Financial audits include financial statement and financial related audits.a. Financial statement audits provide reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements of an audited entity present fairly the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.1 Financial statement audits also include audits of financial statements prepared in conformity with any of several other bases of accounting discussed in auditing standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). b. Financial related audits include determining whether (1) financial information is presented in accordance with established or stated criteria, (2) the entity has adhered to specific financial compliance requirements, or (3) the entity's internal control structure over financial reporting and/or safeguarding assets is suitably designed and implemented to achieve the control objectives. [NOTE 1: Three authoritative bodies for generally accepted accounting principles are the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the sponsors of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB). GASB establishes accounting principles and financial reporting standards for state and local government entities. FASB establishes accounting principles and financial reporting standards for nongovernment entities. The sponsors of FASAB--the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Comptroller General--jointly establish accounting principles and financial reporting standards for the federal government, based on recommendations from FASAB.] 2.5 Financial related audits may, for example, include audits of the following items: a. Segments of financial statements; financial information (for example, statement of revenue and expenses, statement of cash receipts and disbursements, statement of fixed assets); budget requests; and variances between estimated and actual financial performance. b. Internal controls over compliance with laws and regulations, such as those governing the (1) bidding for, (2) accounting for, and (3) reporting on grants and contracts (including proposals, amounts billed, amounts due on termination claims, and so forth). c. Internal controls over financial reporting and/or safeguarding assets, including controls using computer-based systems. d. Compliance with laws and regulations and allegations of fraud. Performance Audits2.6 A performance audit is an objective and systematic examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment of the performance of a government organization, program, activity, or function in order to provide information to improve public accountability and facilitate decision-making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action.2.7 Performance audits include economy and efficiency and program audits. a. Economy and efficiency audits include determining (1) whether the entity is acquiring, protecting, and using its resources (such as personnel, property, and space) economically and efficiently, (2) the causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical practices, and (3) whether the entity has complied with laws and regulations on matters of economy and efficiency. b. Program audits include determining (1) the extent to which the desired results or benefits established by the legislature or other authorizing body are being achieved, (2) the effectiveness of organizations, programs, activities, or functions, and (3) whether the entity has complied with significant laws and regulations applicable to the program. 2.8 Economy and efficiency audits may, for example, consider whether the entity a. is following sound procurement practices; b. is acquiring the appropriate type, quality, and amount of resources at an appropriate cost; c. is properly protecting and maintaining its resources; d. is avoiding duplication of effort by employees and work that serves little or no purpose; e. is avoiding idleness and overstaffing; f. is using efficient operating procedures; g. is using the optimum amount of resources (staff, equipment, and facilities) in producing or delivering the appropriate quantity and quality of goods or services in a timely manner; h. is complying with requirements of laws and regulations that could significantly affect the acquisition, protection, and use of the entity's resources; i. has an adequate management control system for measuring, reporting, and monitoring a program's economy and efficiency; and j. has reported measures of economy and efficiency that are valid and reliable. 2.9 Program audits2 may, for example a. assess whether the objectives of a new, or ongoing program are proper, suitable, or relevant; b. determine the extent to which a program achieves a desired level of program results; c. assess the effectiveness of the program and/or of individual program components; d. identify factors inhibiting satisfactory performance; e. determine whether management has considered alternatives for carrying out the program that might yield desired results more effectively or at a lower cost; f. determine whether the program complements, duplicates, overlaps, or conflicts with other related programs; g. identify ways of making programs work better; h. assess compliance with laws and regulations applicable to the program; i. assess the adequacy of the management control system for measuring, reporting, and monitoring a program's effectiveness; and j. determine whether management has reported measures of program effectiveness that are valid and reliable. [NOTE 2: These audits may apply to services, activities, and functions as well as programs.] Other Activities of An Audit Organization2.10 Auditors may perform services other than audits. For example, some auditors maya. assist a legislative body by developing questions for use at hearings, b. develop methods and approaches to be applied in evaluating a new or a proposed program, c. forecast potential program outcomes under various assumptions without evaluating current operations, and d. perform investigative work. Government Audit Standards (US)Comptroller General of the United States, Government Auditing Standards. Chapter 3: General Standards This manual can be found at http://www.gao.gov/govaud/ybhtml/doc3.htm
Purpose3.1 This chapter prescribes general standards for conducting financial and performance audits. These general standards relate to the qualifications of the staff, the audit organization's and the individual auditor's independence, the exercise of due professional care in conducting the audit and in preparing related reports, and the presence of quality controls. General standards are distinct from those standards that relate to conducting field work and preparing related reports.Qualifications3.3 The first general standard is:The staff assigned to conduct the audit should collectively possess adequate professional proficiency for the tasks required. Continuing Education Requirements3.6 To meet this standard, the audit organization should have a program to ensure that its staff maintain professional proficiency through continuing education and training. Thus, each auditor responsible for planning, directing, conducting, or reporting on audits under these standards should complete, every 2 years, at least 80 hours of continuing education and training which contributes to the auditor's professional proficiency. At least 20 hours should be completed in any 1 year of the 2-year period. Individuals responsible for planning or directing an audit, conducting substantial portions of the field work, or reporting on the audit under these standards should complete at least 24 of the 80 hours of continuing education and training in subjects directly related to the government environment and to government auditing. If the audited entity operates in a specific or unique environment, auditors should receive training that is related to that environment.[NOTE 1: The qualifications standard and continuing education requirements place responsibilities on both the audit organization and individual auditors. Carrying out these responsibilities requires sound professional judgment. To assist audit organizations and individual auditors in exercising that judgment, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued Interpretation of Continuing Education and Training Requirements, April 1991, Government Printing Office stock number 020-000-00250-6.] Staff Qualifications3.10 Qualifications for staff members conducting audits include:a. Knowledge of the methods and techniques applicable to government auditing and the education, skills, and experience to apply such knowledge to the audit being conducted. b. Knowledge of government organizations, programs, activities, and functions. c. Skills to communicate clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing. d. Skills appropriate for the audit work being conducted. For instance (1) if the work requires use of statistical sampling, the staff or consultants to the staff should include persons with statistical sampling skills; (2) if the work requires extensive review of computerized systems, the staff or consultants to the staff should include persons with computer audit skills; (3) if the work involves review of complex engineering data, the staff or consultants to the staff should include persons with engineering skills; or (4) if the work involves the use of nontraditional audit methodologies, the staff or consultants to the staff should include persons with skills in those methodologies. e. The following qualifications are needed for financial audits that lead to an expression of an opinion. (1) The auditors should be proficient in the appropriate accounting principles and in government auditing standards. (2) The public accountants engaged to conduct audits should be (a) licensed certified public accountants or persons working for a licensed certified public accounting firm or (b) public accountants licensed on or before December 31, 1970, or persons working for a public accounting firm licensed on or before December 31, 1970.2 [NOTE 2: Accountants and accounting firms meeting these licensing requirements should also comply with the applicable provisions of the public accountancy law and rules of the jurisdiction(s) where the audit is being conducted and the jurisdiction(s) in which the accountants and their firms are licensed.] Independence3.11 The second general standard is:In all matters relating to the audit work, the audit organization and the individual auditors, whether government or public, should be free from personal and external impairments to independence, should be organizationally independent, and should maintain an independent attitude and appearance. Personal Impairments3.16 There are circumstances under which auditors may not be impartial, or may not be perceived as impartial. The audit organization is responsible for having policies and procedures in place to help determine if auditors have any personal impairments. Managers and supervisors need to be alert for personal impairments of their staff members. Auditors are responsible for notifying the appropri-ate official within their audit organization if they have any personal impairments. These impairments apply to individual auditors, but they may also apply to the audit organization. Personal impairments may include, but are not limited to, the following:a. official, professional, personal, or financial relationships that might cause an auditor to limit the extent of the inquiry, to limit disclosure, or to weaken or slant audit findings in any way; b. preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of a particular program that could bias the audit; c. previous responsibility for decision-making or managing an entity that would affect current operations of the entity or program being audited; d. biases, including those induced by political or social convictions, that result from employment in, or loyalty to, a particular group, organization, or level of government; e. subsequent performance of an audit by the same individual who, for example, had previously approved invoices, payrolls, claims, and other proposed payments of the entity or program being audited; f. concurrent or subsequent performance of an audit by the same individual who maintained the official accounting records;3 and g. financial interest that is direct, or is substantial though indirect, in the audited entity or program. [NOTE 3: For example, an individual performs a substantial part of the accounting process or cycle, such as analyzing, journalizing, posting, preparing, adjusting and closing entries, and preparing the financial statements, and later the same individual performs an audit. In instances in which the auditor acts as the main processor for transactions initiated by the audited entity, but the audited entity acknowledges responsibility for the financial records and financial statements, the independence of the auditor is not necessarily impaired.] External Impairments3.17 Factors external to the audit organization may restrict the audit or interfere with an auditor's ability to form independent and objective opinions and conclusions. For example, under the following conditions, an audit may be adversely affected and an auditor may not have complete freedom to make an independent and objective judgment:a. external interference or influence that improperly or imprudently limits or modifies the scope of an audit; b. external interference with the selection or application of audit procedures or in the selection of transactions to be examined; c. unreasonable restrictions on the time allowed to complete an audit; d. interference external to the audit organization in the assignment, appointment, and promotion of audit personnel; e. restrictions on funds or other resources provided to the audit organization that would adversely affect the audit organization's ability to carry out its responsibilities; f. authority to overrule or to influence the auditor's judgment as to the appropriate content of an audit report; and g. influences that jeopardize the auditor's continued employment for reasons other than competency or the need for audit services. Organizational Independence3.18 Government auditors' independence can be affected by their place within the structure of the government entity to which they are assigned and also by whether they are auditing internally or auditing other entities.Internal Auditors3.19 A federal, state, or local government audit organization, or an audit organization within other government entities, such as a public college, university, or hospital, may be subject to administrative direction from persons involved in the government management process. To help achieve organizational independence, audit organizations should report the results of their audits and be accountable to the head or deputy head of the government entity and should be organizationally located outside the staff or line management function of the unit under audit. The audit organization's independence is enhanced when it also reports regularly to the entity's independent audit committee and/or the appropriate government oversight body.External Auditors3.23 Government auditors employed by audit organizations whose heads are elected and legislative auditors auditing executive entities may be considered free of organizational impairments when auditing outside the government entity to which they are assigned.a. a level of government other than the one to which they are assigned (federal, state, or local) or b. a different branch of government within the level of government to which they are assigned (legislative, executive, or judicial). a. elected by the citizens of their jurisdiction, b. elected or appointed by a legislative body of the level of government to which they are assigned and report the results of audits to, and are accountable to the legislative body, or c. appointed by the chief executive but confirmed by, report the results of audits to, and are accountable to a legislative body of the level of government to which they are assigned. Due Professional Care3.26 The third general standard is:Due professional care should be used in conducting the audit and in preparing related reports. Quality Control
3.31 The fourth general standard is:
Each audit organization conducting audits in accordance with
these standards should have an appropriate internal quality control
system in place and undergo an external quality control review. [NOTE 4: Audit organizations should have an external quality control
review completed (that is, report issued) within 3 years from the date
they start their first audit in accordance with these standards.
Subsequent external quality control reviews should be completed within
3 years after the issuance of the prior review.] 3.34 An external quality control review under this standard should meet
the following requirements.5 a. Reviewers should be qualified and have current knowledge of the
type of work to be reviewed and the applicable auditing standards. For
example, individuals reviewing government audits should have a thorough
knowledge of the government environment and government auditing
relative to the work being reviewed. b. Reviewers should be independent (as defined in these standards) of
the audit organization being reviewed, its staff, and its auditees
whose audits are selected for review. An audit organization is not
permitted to review the organization that conducted its most recent
external quality control review. c. Reviewers should use sound professional judgment in conducting and
reporting the results of the external quality control review. d. Reviewers should use one of the following approaches to selecting
audits for review: (1) select audits that provide a reasonable cross
section of the audits conducted in accordance with these standards or
(2) select audits that provide a reasonable cross section of the
organization's audits, including one or more audits conducted in
accordance with these standards. e. This review should include a review of the audit reports, working
papers, and other necessary documents (for example, correspondence and
continuing education documentation) as well as interviews with the
reviewed organization's professional staff. f. A written report should be prepared communicating the results of
the external quality control review. [NOTE 5: External quality control reviews conducted through or by
the AICPA, National State Auditors Association, National Association of
Local Government Auditors, President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency, Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and
Institute of Internal Auditors meet these requirements.] [NOTE 6: The term 'report' does not include separate letters of
comment.]
Comptroller General of the United States, Government Auditing Standards.
Chapter 7: Reporting Standards for Performance Audits
This manual can be found at http://www.gao.gov/govaud/ybhtml/doc7.htm
Purpose7.1 This chapter prescribes standards of reporting for performance audits. The report 'contents' and 'presentation' standards also apply to some financial related audits, as discussed in chapter 5.Form7.2 The first reporting standard for performance audits is:Auditors should prepare written audit reports communicating the results of each audit. [NOTE 1: Audit reports may be presented on other media that are retrievable by report users and the audit organization. Retrievable audit reports include those which are in electronic or video formats.] Timeliness7.6 The second reporting standard for performance audits is:Auditors should appropriately issue the reports to make the information available for timely use by management, legislative officials, and other interested parties. Report Contents7.9 The third reporting standard for performance audits covers the report contents.Objectives, Scope, and Methodology7.10Auditors should report the audit objectives and the audit scope and methodology.Objectives7.12 In reporting the audit's objectives, auditors should explain why the audit was made and state what the report is to accomplish. Articulating what the report is to accomplish normally involves identifying the audit subject and the aspect of performance examined, and because what is reported depends on the objectives, communicating what finding elements are discussed and whether conclusions and recommendations are given.Scope and Methodology7.14 In reporting the scope of the audit, auditors should describe the depth and coverage of work conducted to accomplish the audit's objectives. Auditors should, as applicable, explain the relationship between the universe and what was audited; identify organizations, geographic locations, and the period covered; report the kinds and sources of evidence; and explain any quality or other problems with the evidence. Auditors should also report significant constraints imposed on the audit approach by data limitations or scope impairments.Audit Results7.17Auditors should report significant audit findings, and where applicable, auditors' conclusions.Findings7.18 Auditors should report the significant findings developed in response to each audit objective.2 In reporting the findings, auditors should include sufficient, competent, and relevant information to promote adequate understanding of the matters reported and to provide convincing but fair presentations in proper perspective. Auditors should also report appropriate background information that readers need to understand the findings.[NOTE 2: Audit findings not included in the audit report, because of insignificance, should be separately communicated to the auditee, preferably in writing. Such findings, when communicated in a management letter to top management, should be referred to in the audit report. All communications of audit findings should be documented in the working papers.] [NOTE 3: See description of the elements of a finding in paragraphs 6.49 through 6.52.] Conclusions7.20 Auditors should report conclusions when called for by the audit objectives. Conclusions are logical inferences about the program based on the auditors' findings. Conclusions should be specified and not left to be inferred by readers. The strength of the auditors' conclusions depends on the persuasiveness of the evidence supporting the findings and the convincingness of the logic used to formulate the conclusions.Recommendations7.21Auditors should report recommendations for actions to correct problem areas and to improve operations.Statement on Auditing Standards7.24Auditors should report that the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.Compliance With Laws and Regulations7.26Auditors should report all significant instances of noncompliance and all significant instances of abuse that were found during or in connection with the audit. In some circumstances, auditors should report illegal acts directly to parties external to the audited entity.Noncompliance and Abuse7.27 When auditors conclude, based on evidence obtained, that significant noncompliance or abuse either has occurred or is likely to have occurred, they should report relevant information. The term 'noncompliance' comprises illegal acts (violations of laws and regulations)4 and violations of provisions of contracts or grant agreements. Abuse occurs when the conduct of a government organization, program, activity, or function falls far short of societal expectations for prudent behavior.[NOTE 4: Whether a particular act is, in fact, illegal may have to await final determination by a court of law. Thus, when auditors disclose matters that have led them to conclude that an illegal act is likely to have occurred, they should take care not to imply that they have made a determination of illegality.] Direct Reporting of Illegal Acts7.30 Auditors are responsible for reporting illegal acts directly to parties outside the auditee in certain circumstances, as discussed in the following paragraphs. Auditors should fulfill these responsibilities even if they have resigned or been dismissed from the audit.5[NOTE 5: Internal auditors auditing within the entity that employs them do not have a duty to report outside that entity.] Management Controls7.34Auditors should report the scope of their work on management controls and any significant weaknesses found during the audit.Views of Responsible Officials7.38 Auditors should report the views of responsible officials of the audited program concerning auditors' findings, conclusions, and recommendations, as well as corrections planned.Noteworthy Accomplishments7.43 Auditors should report noteworthy accomplishments, particularly when management improvements in one area may be applicable elsewhere.Issues Needing Further Study7.45 Auditors should refer significant issues needing further audit work to the auditors responsible for planning future audit work.Privileged and Confidential Information7.47 If certain information is prohibited from general disclosure, auditors should report the nature of the information omitted and the requirement that makes the omission necessary.Report Presentation7.50 The fourth reporting standard for performance audits is:The report should be complete, accurate, objective, convincing, and as clear and concise as the subject permits. Complete7.51 Being complete requires that the report contain all information needed to satisfy the audit objectives, promote an adequate and correct understanding of the matters reported, and meet the report content requirements. It also means including appropriate background information.Accurate7.54 Accuracy requires that the evidence presented be true and that findings be correctly portrayed. The need for accuracy is based on the need to assure readers that what is reported is credible and reliable. One inaccuracy in a report can cast doubt on the validity of an entire report and can divert attention from the substance of the report. Also, inaccurate reports can damage the credibility of the issuing audit organization and reduce the effectiveness of its reports.Objective7.57 Objectivity requires that the presentation of the entire report be balanced in content and tone. A report's credibility is significantly enhanced when it presents evidence in an unbiased manner so that readers can be persuaded by the facts.Convincing7.60 Being convincing requires that the audit results be responsive to the audit objectives, the findings be presented persuasively, and the conclusions and recommendations follow logically from the facts presented. The information presented should be sufficient to convince the readers to recognize the validity of the findings, the reasonableness of the conclusions, and the benefit of implementing the recommendations. Reports designed in this way can help focus the attention of responsible officials on the matters that warrant attention and can help stimulate correction.Clear7.61 Clarity requires that the report be easy to read and understand. Reports should be written in language as clear and simple as the subject permits.Concise7.64 Being concise requires that the report be no longer than necessary to convey and support the message. Too much detail detracts from a report, may even conceal the real message, and may confuse or discourage readers. Also, needless repetition should be avoided.Report Distribution7.66 The fifth reporting standard for performance audits is:Written audit reports are to be submitted by the audit organization to the appropriate officials of the auditee and to the appropriate officials of the organizations requiring or arranging for the audits, including external funding organizations, unless legal restrictions prevent it. Copies of the reports should also be sent to other officials who have legal oversight authority or who may be responsible for acting on audit findings and recommendations and to others authorized to receive such reports. Unless restricted by law or regulation, copies should be made available for public inspection. Special Investigator's Manual (Canada)Commissioner of Canada Elections, Special Investigator's Manual
VIP Election Investigation ProtocolThe Voting Integrity Project (VIP) is a non-governmental organization who educates American voters so they can protect the integrity of the elections in their own community. VIP also investigates allegations of election fraud and their investigation protocol can be found at http://www.voting-integrity.org/about/who_prot.shtml Handling Allegations Against Senior IG Officials (US)Who Investigates the Inspector General?
US GAO (General Accounting Office) report on Handling of Allegations Against Senior OIG Officials Found at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/allege.pdf Resolving Electoral Disputes in the OSCETowards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System is found at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/docs/election-dispute00.htm Election Procurement, Open and Free (IFES)Connolly, Steve and Bruce Hatch. Election Procurement, Open and Free. How to establish an efficient, competitive election procurement system with integrity protections. Found at http://www.electionbuyersguide.org/procurement.htm Filing a Complaint (US)How to file a complaint and the complaint process for possible violations of US federal election campaign laws. This can be found at the Federal Election Commission, http://www.fec.gov/pages/complain.htm Do's and Don'ts for Candidates (India)Do's and Don'ts for the Guidance of Candidates. Found in the Handbook for Candidates, Election Commission of India, Appendix-X-A, Chapter 1v, para 17. This can be found at: http://www.eci.gov.in/handbook/candidates/cap10/cap10_1.htm
Principles of Ethical Conduct for Newsrooms (US)Gannett Newspaper Division: Principles of Ethical Conduct for Newsrooms. This code of conduct can be found at http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/gannettcompany.htm
GANNETT NEWSPAPER DIVISION I. PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR NEWSROOMS
WE ARE COMMITTED TO: Seeking and reporting the truth in a truthful way
Serving the public interest
Exercising fair play
Maintaining independence
Acting with integrity
II. PROTECTING THE PRINCIPLES
No statement of principles and procedures can envision every circumstance that may be faced in the course of covering the news. As in the United States Constitution, fundamental principles sometimes conflict. Thus, these recommended practices cannot establish standards of performance for journalists in every situation. Careful judgment and common sense should be applied to make the decisions that best serve the public interest and result in the greatest good. In such instances, journalists should not act unilaterally. The best decisions are obtained after open-minded consultations with appropriate colleagues and superiors - augmented, when necessary, by the advice of dispassionate outside parties, such as experts, lawyers, ethicists, or others whose views in confidence may provide clarity in sorting out issues. Here are some recommended practices to follow to protect the Principles.
This list is not all-inclusive. There may be additional practices - implicit
in the Principles or determined within individual newsrooms - that will
further ensure credible and responsible journalism.
Ensuring the Truth Principle 'Seeking and reporting the truth in a truthful way' includes, specifically:
Using unnamed sources The use of unnamed sources in published stories should be rare and only for important news. Whenever possible, reporters should seek to confirm news on the record. If the use of unnamed sources is required:
Handling the wires These Principles are intended to provide front-line guidance for locally
generated material. Wire-service material already has been edited professionally.
Gannett News Service observes these same Principles. The Associated Press
has its own standards for the use of unnamed sources. Other wire-service
standards may be lower. Additional scrutiny often is required, and further
editing is encouraged. Ultimately, an editor must make a sound judgment
about how to reconcile conflicts between wire-service and local-newsroom
practices. Whenever possible, these Principles should prevail.
Being fair Because of timeliness or unavailability, it is not always possible to include a response from the subject of an accusation in a news story. Nevertheless:
Being independent 'Maintaining independence' helps establish the impartiality of news coverage. To clarify two points:
Conducting investigative reporting Aggressive, hard-hitting reporting is honorable and often courageous in fulfilling the press' First Amendment responsibilities, and it is encouraged. Investigative reporting by its nature raises issues not ordinarily faced in routine reporting. Here are some suggested procedures to follow when undertaking investigative reporting:
Editing skeptically Editors are the gatekeepers who determine what will be published and what will not be. Their responsibility is to question and scrutinize, even when it is uncomfortable to do so. Here are some suggested practices that editors can follow:
Ensuring accuracy Dedication to the truth means accuracy itself is an ethical issue. Each news person has the responsibility to strive for accuracy at each step of the process.
Correcting errors When errors occur, the newspaper has an ethical obligation to correct the record and minimize harm.
Communicating standards Editors have a responsibility to communicate these Principles to newsroom staff members and to the public. They should:
Being accountable Because these Principles embody the highest standards of professional conduct, the Gannett Newspaper Division is committed to their adherence. They have been put in writing specifically so that members of every Gannett Newspaper Division newsroom know what the Division stands for and what is expected of them. The public will know, too. Code of Ethics for Journalists (US)Society of Professional Journalists. Code of Ethics. Found at: http://spj.org/ethics.asp Press Code of Ethics (Associated Press)Associated Press Managing Editors. Code of Ethics. 1995 This AP Code of Ethics is located at http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/apme.htm
Associated Press Managing Editors
These principles are a model against which news and editorial staff members can measure their performance. They have been formulated in the belief that newspapers and the people who produce them should adhere to the highest standards of ethical and professional conduct. The public's right to know about matters of importance is paramount. The newspaper has a special responsibility as surrogate of its readers to be a vigilant watchdog of their legitimate public interests. No statement of principles can prescribe decisions governing every situation. Common sense and good judgment are required in applying ethical principles to newspaper realities. As new technologies evolve, these principles can help guide editors to insure the credibility of the news and information they provide. Individual newspapers are encouraged to augment these APME guidelines more specifically to their own situations. RESPONSIBILITY The good newspaper is fair, accurate, honest, responsible, independent
and decent.
It avoids practices that would conflict with the ability to report and present news in a fair, accurate and unbiased manner. The newspaper should serve as a constructive critic of all segments of society. It should reasonably reflect, in staffing and coverage, its diverse constituencies. It should vigorously expose wrongdoing, duplicity or misuse of power, public or private. Editorially, it should advocate needed reform and innovation in the public interest. News sources should be disclosed unless there is a clear reason not to do so. When it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of a source, the reason should be explained. The newspaper should uphold the right of free speech and freedom of the press and should respect the individual's right to privacy. The newspaper should fight vigorously for public access to news of government through open meetings and records. ACCURACY The newspaper should guard against inaccuracies, carelessness, bias or distortion through emphasis, omission or technological manipulation. It should acknowledge substantive errors and correct them promptly and prominently. INTEGRITY The newspaper should strive for impartial treatment of issues and dispassionate handling of controversial subjects. It should provide a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism, especially when such comment is opposed to its editorial positions. Editorials and expressions of personal opinion by reporters and editors should be clearly labeled. Advertising should be differentiated from news. The newspaper should report the news laws without regard for its own interests, mindful of the need to disclose potential conflicts. It should not give favored news treatment to advertisers or special-interest groups. It should report matters regarding itself or its personnel with the same vigor and candor as it would other institutions or individuals. Concern for community, business or personal interests should not cause the newspaper to distort or misrepresent the facts. The newspaper should deal honestly with readers and newsmakers. It should keep its promises. The newspaper should not plagiarize words or images. INDEPENDENCE The newspaper and its staff should be free of obligations to news sources and newsmakers. Even the appearance of obligation or conflict of interest should be avoided. Newspapers should accept nothing of value from news sources or others outside the profession. Gifts and free or reduced-rate travel, entertainment, products and lodging should not be accepted. Expenses in connection with news reporting should be paid by the newspaper. Special favors and special treatment for members of the press should be avoided. Journalists are encouraged to be involved in their communities, to the extent that such activities do not create conflicts of interest. Involvement in politics, demonstrations and social causes that would cause a conflict of interest, or the appearance of such conflict, should be avoided. Work by staff members for the people or institutions they cover also should be avoided. Financial investments by staff members or other outside business interests that could create the impression of a conflict of interest should be avoided. Stories should not be written or edited primarily for the purpose of winning awards and prizes. Self-serving journalism contests and awards that reflect unfavorably on the newspaper or the profession should be avoided. Case StudiesVoter Identification in Australia Where Fairness Promises Little Freedom Integrity in Ballot Procurement Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity Civic Education for a Nonviolent Election Voter Identification in Australia
This case study reviews an ongoing policy debate in Australia concerning the identification requirements which should be imposed on persons seeking to register as voters for federal elections. Current requirements Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 as it currently stands, a person who is qualified to vote, and who has lived within an electoral division for one month, is entitled (and indeed required) to claim 'enrolment' by completing and lodging an electoral enrolment form. The form must be 'attested' by a witness who must be either an enrolled voter, or a person entitled to be enrolled. The form, once completed, may be lodged in person, through the post or by facsimile. The claimant is not required to provide any documentation in support of his or her claim. Australia does not have a single civil register or national identity card or number scheme which could be used for checking the validity of claims for enrolment. Recent debates In recent years, these arrangements have been criticised by a number of organisations and individuals who have argued that they place too few obstacles in the paths of those who might seek to create fraudulent entries on the rolls. The issue was considered on a number of occasions by the Australian Federal Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, which since 1984 has conducted an inquiry into the organisation of each federal election. In its May 1989 Report No. 3, on The 1987 Federal Election, the Committee observed that:
In relation to the quality of the rolls one submission alleged that large numbers of dummy enrolments were made before the close of rolls, then, on polling day those perpetrating the fraud legitimately appeared on the certified lists and were able to vote. The Committee notes that while individual cases have been cited no evidence of an organised scheme was presented to the Committee. The Committee also noted that:
While allegations of electoral fraud are at times rife they are infrequently supported by facts and in its Inquiry the Committee has been presented with allegations supported by nothing more than anecdotal evidence. The question of requiring prospective voters to provide documentary evidence of identity was also addressed by the Committee, as follows.
The requirements that persons wishing to enrol and/or vote provide some documentary evidence of their bona fides, such as driver's licence, Medicare card or passport, would be relatively easy measures to implement but would present some difficulties for the AEC [Australian Electoral Commission] in their administration. For example, people wishing to enrol would have to do so in person. The Committee is of the view that the need to provide documentary evidence would have a positive effect in minimising electoral fraud but it would also be a major discouragement to many people participating in the electoral process. At this time, it is likely such a requirement may generate sufficient voter irritation to negate the good that might be achieved. The Committee's public inquiry into the 1993 election attracted a significant number of submissions from members of the public who expressed concern about the ease with which enrolment could be effected. Many of those making submissions drew attention to the fact that a legal requirement for signatories of bank accounts to be subject to documentary identification - a measure designed to inhibit money laundering - had been imposed by the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988. It was suggested that the requirements of that Act could be an appropriate model for a similar requirement in the electoral field. The AEC, in response to this level of public interest, prepared a comprehensive submission to the Committee on The Practical Implications of Various Measures relating to the Integrity of the Electoral Process. The submission discussed a range of possible regimes for the identification of voters, including the following.
A point which the AEC emphasised in its submission, and which it explored in detail in relation to each possible scheme which it had identified, was the fact that any measures which had the effect of complicating the enrolment process in order to discourage fraudulent enrolment could also have the side effect of discouraging legitimate enrolment. It summarised its views as follows.
While some of the measures discussed in this Submission might reduce to some extent such potential as exists for electoral fraud, they would at the same time:
Some of the measures discussed in this Submission would also tend disproportionately to affect underprivileged or marginal members of society. The burden of inconvenience on voters could well serve to reduce the high level of voluntary compliance with compulsory enrolment and voting which has largely been forthcoming in Australia. Both of these factors would tend to diminish rather than enhance the legitimacy of Australian election processes. The Committee's November 1994 Report on The 1993 Federal Election expressed sharp differences of opinion, which reflected the Committee's party composition: members from the ruling Australian Labor Party, and from a number of the smaller parties represented in the Senate, were of the view that the Committee should not recommend that proof of identity be required for enrolment purposes, while members of the Committee from the opposition Liberal and National Parties, in a dissenting report, recommended that:
individuals claiming entitlement to enrolment should be required to provide the AEC with proof of their identity together with evidence of their citizenship by production of either a birth certificate, current passport or certificate of naturalisation. At the March 1996 federal election, there was a change of government in Australia, and that was reflected in the composition of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. The issue of identification of enrolees was again extensively raised in submissions to the Committee's inquiry into the election, and again the AEC lodged a detailed submission with the Committee. (This submission is available on the AEC's Web Page, at http://www.aec.gov.au/committee/lnet.pdf'.) The Committee's June 1997 Report of the Inquiry Into All Aspects of the 1996 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto (available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/elec/elec.pdf) made a number of recommendations for changes to the enrolment process, including the following:
that the AEC prepare a comprehensive implementation plan on the Committee's proposed measures to improve the integrity of the enrolment and voting process, and report back to the Committee by the end of 1997. The opposition members of the Committee dissented from each of these recommendations. Legislative change Subsequent to the Committee's report, the implementation study requested from the AEC was produced, and legislation was prepared by the government to give effect to some of the Committee's recommendations. The long-standing differences of opinion between the government and the opposition were reflected in the parliamentary debate on the legislation, and it was ultimately passed (in October 1999) with significant amendments made by the Senate, where the government was in a minority. The legislation provided among other things that in future, enrolment claims would have to be witnessed by another elector 'in a class of electors prescribed by the regulations', and that 'the identity of the person making the claim must be verified in the manner prescribed by the regulations, unless the [Divisional Returning Officer] is satisfied that the person has previously been an elector.' As at March 2000, these changes had not come into force, as the regulations in question had not been made. Since regulations are subject to disallowance by the Senate, where the government remains in a minority, the fate of the proposed changes to enrolment procedures is uncertain. Concluding comments The debate in Australia regarding identification of voters is now quite polarised, along lines which have been developing for some time. Those who favour more stringent registration requirements point to the risk of fraudulent enrolment, while those who oppose them note the burden which they may impose on certain voters, and their possible discriminatory effect. The debate also reflects different notions of 'integrity': for some, fraudulent enrolment is the primary threat to the integrity of the electoral process, while for others, the integrity of the process is equally if not more threatened by the imposition of unduly rigid enrolment requirements. Assisting VotersCase study being done by Michael Maley on assisting voters in Australian elections. Where Fairness Promises Little FreedomElections in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Sonja Valtasaari 9 May 2000 Executive Summary Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina ('Bosnia') tend to arouse more eager anticipation among international stakeholders, for whom they symbolize a near annual opportunity to quantify Bosnia's post-war progress towards sustainable democracy, than among Bosnia's approximately 2.5 million eligible voters, for whom elections with ever more technical integrity have largely failed to promote effective governance or personal well being. The international community's extraordinary investment in Bosnia's electoral administration has enhanced the fairness of Bosnian elections. Repeated electoral cycles have served as important developmental tools. They have precipitated the establishment of a national elections infrastructure and the training of a cadre of Bosnian professionals prepared to ensure the integrity of the electoral process. They have created important legal precedents to promote electoral transparency and accountability. Yet, Bosnian elections have not become exercises in freedom. Until resources are concertedly re-directed towards ensuring that rule of law, separation of powers and respect for civil liberties take root379, the politics of power and fear will continue to conspire against democratic consolidation. This report describes the management, oversight and legal instruments the international community has developed to safeguard electoral integrity in Bosnia as well as the pitfalls of its decision to embrace elections as a measure of peace implementation. Introduction The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' or DPA) brought a welcome but uneasy peace to Bosnia. The complex agreement was a product of political compromise: it created an integral state, but enshrined its decentralization (and de facto division) in a weak central constitution; it sought to promote ethnic reconciliation, but endorsed constitutional arrangements that deprived Bosnia's constituent peoples of equality throughout the country.380 Most importantly, it effectively turned the three national parties that had presided over Bosnia's disintegration into custodians of its peace. In no time, the international community-- eager to reduce its extensive commitment to Bosnia-- advertised elections as the best hope for knitting the country back together, undermining the power of nationalist regimes, and laying the foundation for representative government. Nearly five years and four nationwide ballots later381, the allure of elections is fading. Each year, elections have proceeded peacefully. Each year, the technical integrity of elections has improved. Each year, Bosnian professionals have taken on more responsibility for election administration. Yet, the political landscape remains fundamentally unchanged. Bosnia remains effectively divided. The power of wartime politicians remains largely intact. Progress towards democratic institution- building has proven limited. And, an 'indefinite' international presence is widely considered essential to continued stability. The Players Bosnia remains mired in a difficult, dual transition towards peace and democratic governance. This transition pits powerful internal actors determined to preserve their control over the state and its assets against the external actors mandated to stabilize the country through reconstruction and reform. Internal Actors Many of the factors that contributed to the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia-- including intensive, imperialistic interest on the part of neighbouring states; a lack of consensus on the basic nature of the state or its territorial boundaries; uneven, paternalistic distribution of resources; absence of rule of law; and an easily exploited legacy of inter-ethnic distrust382 -- have thwarted post-war democratic development. International efforts to enforce the DPA compete with the objectives of ruling nationalist parties whose predominance is ensured by the perception that they alone can offer resources, jobs, and protection from 'others' who vote along national lines; whose commitment to the creation of a tolerant, unified state is, at best, ambivalent; and who endorse structural reform only insofar as it does not threaten their continued control over public resources. Although the terms of political debate have evolved since 1995, with even formerly radical political parties publicly espousing DPA principles, nationalist leaders continue to seek the legitimacy conferred to them by elections to obstruct rather than to enforce the development of transparent and responsive, democratic government. External Actors At $5.1 billon, international investment in Bosnia has been extraordinary. Included among the key international actors in Bosnia are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through the Stabilization Force; the Office of the High Representative, a civilian coordinating institution unique to Bosnia; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; the United Nations through the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and several of its independent agencies; the World Bank; the European Commission and numerous bilateral development agencies. In the absence of more comprehensive indicators of reform, many of these organizations have used elections to gauge their success in promoting Bosnia's progress towards self-sustaining peace. No longer key to the international community's imminent 'exit,' elections nevertheless justify its ongoing, extensive engagement in the country. Defining Electoral Integrity
The DPA, signed in December 1995 by the then Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, called on its signatory Parties to ensure that conditions existed for the conduct of 'free, fair and democratic' elections in Bosnia no later than 14 September 1996. It requested the OSCE to 'certify whether elections could be effective under [existing] social conditions and, if necessary, to provide assistance to the Parties in creating these.' It also called on the OSCE to 'supervise the preparation and conduct of elections' for the Presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Representatives and cantonal assemblies of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency and National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and municipal assemblies throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, to that end, to establish a Provisional Election Commission.383 In March 1996, the OSCE Bosnia and Herzegovina Head of Mission (HoM) drafted an action plan for stimulating progress towards meaningful elections. Drawing on the DPA and its attached annexes384, the OSCE extrapolated 12 discrete preconditions for elections. These included the following four substantive conditions:
Eight additional administrative conditions included enforcement of:
Scant progress towards the four substantive pre-conditions over the next months called into question the wisdom and feasibility of adhering to the DPA timetable. Nevertheless, under strong political pressure from interested governments, the OSCE HoM elected to employ 'a rule of reason' to what he later dubbed 'unprecedentedly complex elections.' He emphasized that 'standards of free and fair elections as generally understood in long-standing democratic societies simply [could] not be reasonably applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina,'386 underlined that international military and civilian commitments to Bosnia had peaked, and urged that elections proceed on schedule. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office accepted the recommendation and determined that elections 'a first, small step in the long process of [Bosnia's] reconciliation and democratization' would take place in accordance with the Dayton timetable. 387 From the outset, elections in Bosnia were about more than creating a functioning, pluralist and participatory democracy. Bosnia became, in the words of a senior U.S. Government official, 'a litmus test for both American leadership and the effectiveness of the NATO alliance in the post-Cold War world.'388 Elections, in turn, became a litmus test for implementation of the peace agreement. Electoral integrity was therefore narrowly defined to administrative criteria that could be established through hastily drafted elections rules and regulations. The overall political environment, although key to ensuring that elections would launch a self-sustaining process of democratic consolidation, became a secondary concern. Technical Preparations Technical preparations for the 1996 elections were extensive. Equally importantly, subsequent elections in 1997, 1998 and 2000 benefited from hindsight. International controls over the 1997 elections were intensified in response to incidents of fraud in 1996; since 1998, international officials have concentrated on moving electoral administration into Bosnian hands. Election management The OSCE has established numerous bodies to prepare and oversee the conduct of elections.
The OSCE launched a Provisional Election Commission (PEC) in January 1996. Pending ratification of an Election Law and establishment of a Permanent Election Commission, the PEC has remained responsible for regulating the electoral process in Bosnia. To this end, it has published binding electoral Rules and Regulations, supervised all aspects of the electoral process, ensured compliance with its Rules and Regulations, and taken action to remedy violations of these rules.389 Presided over by the OSCE HoM, the Commission was originally comprised of a Bosnian Government representative, a Federation representative, and an RS representative, each appointed by the leading national parties; a designee of the High Representative; and 2 OSCE election experts. The OSCE established a separate public forum, the Political Parties Consultative Council, to allow opposition parties to comment on PEC activities. This compromise, however, failed to offer alternative voices adequate influence in the often-controversial electoral policy formulation process. In 1998, the PEC was therefore expanded to include a Bosniak390, a Serb, a Croat, as well as a representative of 'Others.' 391
Municipal Election Commissions -- comprised of individuals with judicial, legal, administrative or electoral experience, and appointed by competent municipal authorities together with the PEC -- have been created to ensure the efficiency and legitimacy of election administration within their jurisdiction. Municipal Election Commissions' specific responsibilities include updating and verifying the Voters' Register; assisting voters in obtaining documents; monitoring and reporting violations of PEC Rules and Regulations; informing candidates of their rights and obligations within the electoral process and the status of election preparation; designating polling stations; appointing and training members of polling station committees; ensuring proper conduct of the count; providing secure warehousing for election materials; and compiling election results from all polling stations. They also assist in the development and distribution of election information and voter education materials.392
Finally, polling station committees are held responsible for safeguarding the integrity, security and tranquillity of the voting process itself.393 Voting procedures have been designed to avert fraud and include detailed controls concerning the presentation of acceptable identification; the use of invisible ink (waived only if the voter has no fingers); signing of the Voters' register; ballot issuance and marking; and voter assistance.394 Oversight
The Provisional Election Commission established an Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) in May 1996 to investigate and adjudicate complaints involving violations of the DPA's elections provisions; PEC Rules and Regulations; amendments to the preliminary Voters' Register; polling and counting procedures; and issues referred to it by the Independent Media Commission (see below). The EASC has since presided over five post-Dayton elections.395 Considered a juridical body, the EASC is chaired by an international judge and includes 3 Bosnian jurists served by 4 legal advisors. The PEC has devolved to it the authority to receive complaints, plenary power to gather evidence and a wide range of sanctioning powers. The EASC's freedom to investigate and willingness to penalize violations of PEC Rules and Regulations have created a climate more conducive to electoral integrity. The EASC has exerted its authority in each post-war election to, inter alia, levy fines, remove candidates from the ballot, prohibit political parties, coalitions, or candidates from contesting elections, and decertify and remove elected officials from office. EASC deliberations are confidential and its decisions are final, binding, and not subject to appeal.396
In 1996, the PEC created a Media Experts Commission (MEC), chaired by the OSCE's Senior Advisor for Media Development, to organize systematic media monitoring throughout Bosnia and to enforce compliance with PEC standards of professional and ethical conduct for journalists, as well as Rules and Regulations concerning freedom of movement for journalists in pursuit of professional obligations, and full and equitable access for political parties and candidates during the campaign period. The MEC consisted of government representatives, independent and government media specialists, a designee of the High Representative, and OSCE Media and Human Rights Officers. Like the EASC, the MEC was empowered to investigate and sanction violations of media rules and regulations. The MEC's punitive powers were, however, limited to issuance of warnings, the power to compel media to publish or broadcast materials redressing substantiated violations free of charge, and referral of cases to the EASC or PEC for further action.397 Its influence on the media environment was negligible. In 1998, the High Representative replaced the MEC with a more powerful Independent Media Commission (IMC) mandated to establish a regulatory regime for broadcasting and other media in Bosnia. The High Representative charged the IMC with licensing all broadcasters, setting license fees and drawing up and ensuring adherence to Codes of Practice. The High Representative granted the IMC wide punitive powers, including the right to require media outlets to publish apologies, impose financial penalties, seize equipment and suspend or terminate licenses.398 Stringent political control of Bosnia's three segmented media markets has begun to give way to a more open media environment in which international standards of media conduct play a more meaningful role. The IMC's Code on Media Rules for Elections takes precedence over any contradictory existing legislation, is binding for all media in Bosnia, and will remain in effect until a Permanent Election Law is implemented. The code demands that media report 'factually accurate, complete, fair, equitable and unbiased' information; prohibits paid political advertisements on broadcast media; calls for all sponsors of printed political advertisements to be clearly identified; and creates a 24-hour silence period prior to polling. Further, the IMC's Guidelines for Equitable Access to Media in Election Periods require all broadcasters to provide free access for political announcements during the election period 'at times when the broadcasters are likely to reach the largest audiences.'399 Political spots may not be broadcast immediately before, during or after news broadcasts and shall have a maximum duration of 60 seconds. The total time for any political unit shall not exceed 4 minutes per hour or 15 hours per election period.400 Supplementary Supervisory Bodies for the 1997 Elections In addition to these bodies, two supervisory commissions were established to avert fraud during the 1997 municipal elections. A Citizenship Verification Sub-Commission determined whether individuals whose names did not appear on the 1991 census as adjusted for 1996 presented sufficient documentation to warrant their registration. Finally, a Future Municipality Sub-Commission assessed whether individuals who sought to exercise the option to vote in a place of future residence (rather than their pre-war or 1997 residence) demonstrated a compelling link to that location. Supervision and Observation OSCE election 'supervisors' have proved crucial to safeguarding Bosnian electoral integrity since 1996. Unlike traditionally neutral 'observers,' election supervisors have been tasked with intervening in the electoral process to monitor and assist in polling and counting. In 1996, the OSCE fielded 1200 supervisors in 600 mobile teams; each team oversaw balloting at seven of 4400 polling stations. In 1997, the OSCE increased the number of supervisors to ensure full supervision of registration, polling and counting at all locations. In 2000, the OSCE saw fit to reduce supervision to one supervisor for every 3 polling stations. The postwar years have also seen extensive election 'observation.' From 1996 to 1998, the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) produced independent evaluations of electoral cycles from registration through preliminary release of results. PEC Rules and Regulations also authorized accredited domestic representatives of political parties, coalitions, independent candidates, the media and citizen organizations to observe the entire electoral process. In 1996 and 1997, few Bosnians other than interested political parties and media took advantage of this right. In later years, however, elections have galvanized an otherwise politically tentative non-governmental community. In 1998, with assistance from international partners, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and membership associations in 4 Bosnian cities401 launched an unprecedented nationwide non-partisan monitoring effort in which nearly 2,500 volunteers assessed electoral operations in 57 municipalities. In 2000, the initiative to seize ownership of the electoral process gained momentum with 239 NGOs fielding over 5500 domestic observers to monitor and evaluate the elections. International and domestic 'observation' have played a central role in promoting confidence in the electoral process. Equally importantly, information culled from observer reports has hastened improvements to PEC rules and regulations as well as technical preparations for elections. Legal Framework Provisional Rules and Regulations As noted above, the PEC has regulated the electoral process pending successful implementation of an Election Law, and creation of an Election Commission, for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fulfillment of its mandate, the PEC has annually published comprehensive electoral Rules and Regulations concerning the registration of political parties, coalitions and independent candidates; candidate and voter eligibility; voter registration; establishment of election management and oversight bodies; the role of domestic and international observers; and codes of electoral conduct for political parties, coalitions, candidates, and election workers402. Existing laws have applied to matters not covered by the PEC. PEC Rules and Regulations have also addressed issues specific to Bosnia's post-war situation and evolved into an instrument for encouraging accountability and moderation among candidates for office. As a condition of registration, parties, coalitions and candidates must not only affirm in writing their commitment to the DPA, the Electoral Code of Conduct, and PEC Rules and Regulations, but must also submit platforms that clearly elaborate their positions on return of refugees and displaced persons, the economy, minority rights, reconstruction and development, education and social services. A committee comprised of members of the PEC Secretariat, the OSCE, the High Representative's Office and other international non-governmental organizations reviews these platforms and may deem them unacceptable if they contain inflammatory language, violate principles set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights, or do not cover the requisite issues (and are not completed within a 48-hour time period.)403 Further, the PEC prohibits any person who has been sentenced, or who has failed to comply with an indictment, by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from holding appointive, elective or other public office on Bosnian territory. Equally, persons removed from office or disqualified from the electoral contest for obstruction of peace implementation or violations of PEC Rules and Regulations are barred from office. Finally, no person who has failed to vacate real estate property to which a refugee or displaced person holds title or occupancy rights may stand as candidate for, or hold, municipal office.404 Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina The OSCE and Office of the High Representative initiated a process aimed at developing a permanent, progressive election law for Bosnia in 1998. The first draft, authored by a group of national and international experts and formally presented to the Bosnian Parliament in October 1999, introduced innovative electoral reforms designed to promote both reconciliation and accountability of publicly elected officials. Specifically, the draft preserved the voting rights of refugees and displaced persons; introduced an open list proportional representation system and multi-member constituencies for certain elected bodies, both to render candidates more accountable to specific constituencies; contained a preferential voting system for the Bosnian and RS presidencies to encourage candidates to seek votes outside their natural ethnically-determined constituencies; obliged candidates for the Bosnian presidency to obtain cross-entity support; contained safeguards for minority gender representation; permanently banned paid political advertising on broadcast media; and introduced a campaign spending ceiling.405 Although ratification of the election law is a prerequisite to Bosnia's admission to the Council of Europe, the Parliament has twice rejected the law.406 Objections to the law include criticism of constitutional constraints institutionalized in the DPA, more general concerns as to whether the law (and therefore the Bosnian Constitution) contravenes the European Convention on Human Rights or protects multi-ethnicity, as well as specific, politically driven, objections to several technical provisions including candidate eligibility and voter residency requirements. Precisely because implementation of a permanent election law will contribute to re-shaping Bosnia's political order, it remains mired in controversy resulting from the same divergent visions of the country's future that frustrate effective peace implementation. Pending resolution of the parliamentary impasse, PEC Rules and Regulations amended to reflect the more progressive provisions of the draft law will continue to govern the electoral process. Election Implementation The ruling parties' fundamental ambivalence towards democratic reform has drawn the international community deeply into election implementation. Procedural and political challenges have delayed the formation and obstructed the functioning of common central institutions as well as multi-ethnic local councils.
As a result, the Office of the High Representative involves itself heavily in the central institutions' administrative and legislative agendas; the international community as represented by the Peace Implementation Council has empowered the High Representative to impose domestic legislation and to dismiss officials judged to have failed the public by pursuing anti-Dayton or extra-legal activities. 407 The OSCE, in turn, has developed a two-step certification process for municipal-level elections. Preliminary 'technical certification' involves the PEC's certification of the accuracy of results for each electoral unit. In his capacity as PEC Chairman, the OSCE HoM grants 'final certification' to each of Bosnia's 146 municipalities upon implementation of election results. Implementation monitored by a series of bodies established for that purpose is understood to include the convening of a first session within 30 days after technical certification. At least one representative of each elected political party must attend this session, which must conclude in the election or appointment of all council officers, executives and committees as provided for in municipal statutes. The OSCE HoM retains the discretion to revoke certification should elected councilors be denied access to municipal buildings or fair representation among appointed bodies, face threats, harassment or financial discrimination; be prevented from establishing municipal residency or deprived of office space; or should the council fail to convene regular, secular, and effective sessions. Municipal election implementation proved a long and arduous process in 1997, with several councils falling subject to final and binding arbitration by the OSCE HoM and High Representative in response to their repeated failure to meet Final Certification requirements. Implementation of the 2000 municipal elections remains underway. The Path Towards Electoral Integrity The international community's extensive involvement in Bosnia's electoral administration has immeasurably enhanced the technical integrity of Bosnian elections. The Provisional Election Commission and its subordinate bodies have managed increasingly more orderly elections each year. Preparations for the 1996 elections were fraught with political and operational difficulties exacerbated by the rigours of the DPA timetable. The discovery of 'electoral engineering' (massive fraud perpetrated by the authorities to consolidate territorial gains through manipulation of voter registration) led to postponement of the municipal ballot until late 1997. General balloting, however, took place calmly and peacefully. Polling was conducted professionally at 97% of polling stations. Observers did not consider technical difficulties with the Final Voters Lists, absentee and out-of-country voting, or the counting process substantial enough to have jeopardized election outcomes. The ODIHR Co-coordinator of International Monitoring concluded that although 'problems associated with registration, the media, the campaign, and freedom of movement were assessed as serious shortcomings to the overall process there was no pattern of recurring infractions or organizational incompetence that seriously compromised election day.' 408 Since 1996, the OSCE and PEC have annually reviewed and refined election rules and regulations to provide increased safeguards for electoral integrity. Procedural as well as political concerns including the appropriate makeup of election commissions and polling station committees have been reviewed each year to generate confidence in the fairness and transparency of the electoral process. In 1997, the OSCE introduced a complete voter registration, 100% supervision of registration and polling, improved voter education, and the above-described 2-phase municipal certification process. The OSCE and EASC also took early action against authorities found responsible for systemic voter registration fraud. In 1998, the PEC introduced financial disclosure requirements and enhanced the presence of women in politics through rules protecting minority gender representation, while the OSCE initiated a transition of electoral administration into Bosnian hands. In 1999, the OSCE shifted its attention to transferring 'ownership' of the electoral process to an emerging indigenous elections infrastructure. The OSCE focussed on the professional development of its national staff, transferred Out of Country Voting administration to Sarajevo, and orchestrated the launch of an Association of Election Officials. Open-ended registration was introduced, and a nation-wide voters register developed to underpin an enduring voter registration system. Conclusion Repeated electoral cycles have served as important developmental tools. They have allowed for the training of a cadre of Bosnian professionals prepared to take responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process. They have provided campaign planning and management experience to a wide range of political actors who have benefited from targeted instruction in message development, media relations, voter contact, strategic planning, and volunteer recruitment. Finally, they have created important legal precedents to promote electoral transparency and accountability.
Elections have grown more competitive as moderate opposition parties have begun to make significant regional inroads, and fissures within the ruling parties have widened political space for new leadership. Yet, in the current political and institutional environment, even fair elections promote little freedom. Political parties retain control over security organs, the economy and the courts. Lingering ethno-nationalism, stoked by the ruling parties to consolidate their strength, continues to encourage collective identification, insecurity, and distrust. The absence of rule of law undermines effective governance and curtails individual liberty. In the interest of accelerating crucial reforms, the international community has inserted itself into domestic political processes in a manner that builds dependency. Highly visible international interventionism allows elected authorities to evade political responsibility for difficult decisions and discourages voters from turning to their elected leadership for genuine solutions. Despite their increasing technical integrity, elections have therefore failed in their fundamental task of promoting self-sustaining democratic consolidation and increasing meaningful Bosnian ownership of the broader political process. They will continue to do so as long as orderly elections, rather than focussed strategies of structural liberalization, remain central to the reform effort.
Electoral Reform and Integrity in BeninCase study being done by Linda Trudel on reforms made in Benin to ensure electoral integrity. Ballot Fraud in CanadaCampaign Law Enforcement in Canada- A Case Study being done by Greg Tardi of Elections Canada Political Party Consultations and Election Law IntegrityA case study is being done by Belinda Bernard on political party consultations and the electoral law for the 2000 Haitian legislative elections. Integrity in Ballot ProcurementEssential to Election Integrity by Steve Connolly This case study examines the ballot procurement process in the 1995 Haitian elections. This was a procurement essential to the integrity of the elections, but was subjected to tremendous pressure in an effort by some to subvert the electoral process. But as this case study will show, using fair and transparent procurement methods, prevented the politicization of the award of the ballot procurement contract from derailing the electoral process. Importance of transparency While certain security measures taken together can greatly contribute to the integrity of an election (e.g. security ballots, tamper evident seals on ballot boxes, security ink, tamper proof envelopes) the transparency of the overall procurement process is an essential ingredient of any credible election. Without transparency it is impossible to demonstrate the integrity of the process. If the procurement process is in doubt, the credibility of the election is in question. The 1995 municipal elections in Haiti were nearly derailed by allegations of impropriety in the ballot procurement process. The president of the Provisional Election Commission (CEP) publically charged that the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the organization mandated to conduct the procurement of ballots, had decided to award the contract before the completion of the process, and that the entire competitive process was, therefore, a sham. These charges were made on national television and planted the seed of doubt about the integrity of the procurement process. As this study will show, the charges were unfounded, however for a critical time, it stymied the entire election preparation process. If the procurement had not been done accurately, and with transparency, these allegations could have derailed the elections. Ballot Procurement IFES was given a grant by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist the CEP with the organization, design, procurement and delivery of the ballots. This was a complex task, complicated by the fact that the elections involved over 10,000 candidates for more than 1,000 electoral races at both the national (Deputy, Senate) and local levels (Kasek, Magistrate). The national mood at the time of the elections was tense and uncertain, coming, as they did, shortly after the arrival of the UN and U.S. peacekeeping forces, and the restoration of civilian rule. In the United States, procurement with public monies is subject to a specific regulatory regime. U.S. law, USAID regulations and IFES internal procurement policies require open, competitive procurement. In organizing a complex procurement, such as ballots for Haiti, it was essential that planning be initiated well in advance of production and shipping. In addition to the technical challenges, the delivery and reception in Haiti of such material presented serious logistics challenges and security concerns. Bidding Process To start procurement, IFES began assembling a list of companies in the US, Europe and Haiti with an interest in receiving a Request for Bid (RFB). Ballot specifications were drafted by experts hired by IFES. Care was taken to ensure that the specifications respected the requirements of the Haitian electoral code and the CEP. As a check to make sure the specifications were complete, and made sense, IFES contacted an independent printer technician from a large printing facility that would not be involved in the bidding, to review the specifications. This extra step helped ensure that the specifications were accurate and that a firm could understand the requirements. The final specifications were then presented to a committee in Port-au-Prince for review and approval. This committee consisted of members of the CEP, which had the mandate to conduct the elections, IFES, an advisor from the UN Elections Assistance Unit (UNEAU), which was providing technical assistance to the CEP, and USAID, the agency funding the ballots. This committee also reviewed and approved the bid review criteria and weighting that would be used to select the winning bid. The final specifications and the changes incorporated and approved by the CEP review committee were reviewed one last time by the independent technical advisor to ensure they were complete and comprehensible. This outside check on specifications and bid language was an important integrity mechanisms to ensure that the printer selected would print ballots according to the right specifications. The RFB was developed and released to a total of 15 firms in North America, Haiti, and Europe. Numerous bids were received before the closing date, set at two weeks from the date of the RFB. Review and Approval of Bids On the date and time specified in the RFB no further bids were accepted. A bid review committee consisting of IFES in-house program managers and the outside technical adviser met to open and review the bids. For transparency reasons, companies submitting bids were invited to attend the opening, although none of the firms did. Seven submissions were received. Each member of the bid review committee had a day to rank the bids according to the pre-approved objective criteria. Once this was completed, they met again as a committee to consolidate their individual findings and to select the most responsive bid. The committee looked at the total number of points awarded to each bid, the review of each bid and the results of an earlier investigation by IFES into the capacity and performance information available on each bidder. The bid review committee determined that most of the respondents were technically capable of satisfying the requirements of the ballot procurement and, ultimately, price became the determining criteria. As the prices submitted by the 2nd and 3rd ranked bidder exceeded that of the 1st ranked by a factor of two and three times respectively, the choice was, in the final analysis, quite simple. The review process and recommendation were documented for presentation to the CEP committee for final approval. IFES presented the results of the bids and review process to the CEP committee along with the resulting recommendation. The lowest qualified bidder was an offshore firm. However, as the CEP respresentative expected a national firm to obtain the contract even if it was not the most cost-effective proposal, the Provisional Electoral Council rejected the IFES recommendation and accused it of pre-determining the winner. A stalemate ensued while the CEP pressed for award to a national firm. To ensure everything was in order, the entire procurement process was reviewed by the USAID Regional Legal Advisor who found that the process had been properly conducted and that the most reasonable choice had been made. Delays in the procurement of the ballots began to affect not only the election timetable, but the cost of the procurement as there were problems with the availability of paper at the time, and reduced shipping times. In the end, the Haitian Government was unable to fund the ballots from its own resources., and as the U.S. Government procurement regulations required award of the bid to the most responsive bidder, the results of the competitive bid process were respected. Award of Contract The bidders were notified of the results of the bid review and a contract was drafted. This contract was approved by the funding agency (USAID) as required by U.S. Government regulations. It was then signed by all parties. Unfortunately, the delays in approving the winning bid meant that once the contract was finally signed, the price validity had expired. The printer advised IFES that due to the lack of market availability there would be an increase in the cost of the paper. As this was beyond the control of the printer, and the caution had been included in the successful bid, an upwards adjustment was made to the contract price. Printing of Ballots In order to ensure maximum transparency and to provide assurances to political parties and candidates during the printing of the integrity of the ballots, IFES arranged for a representative from the CEP to be on site at the print facility throughout the printing process. This proved to be useful as there were frequent changes to the candidate list submitted to the printer which necessitated numerous changes in the plates and the ballots. The on site CEP representative was able to approve each plate as it was produced and inspected all resulting subsequent ballot print runs for accuracy and quality. Despite the late and frequent changes, the printer was able to mobilize the necessary resources and complete the job according to schedule. On completion of the printing, the plates were destroyed as a security measure. Shipping the ballots Shipping and receiving arrangements had been made when the printing process was initiated. In addition to logistical and cost factors, physical security of the ballots was a major concern, given the political and security environment in Haiti. Because of delays in awarding the contract, and the frequent changes to the candidate list, shipment of the ballots now required two transport aircraft, rather than going as previously planned as sea freight. A warehouse, adjacent to the airport and adequate for the reception, storage, and eventually the consolidation for shipment to polling stations, was made available to the CEP by the U.N. Round the clock security was provided by the UN peacekeeping troops and the Interim Police Force. The ballots were airlifted to Port-au-Prince arriving according to the schedule determined by the contract with the printer. The shipment was received by the CEP with international observers present on the tarmac in Port-au-Prince. Staff organized by the CEP and the UNEAU assisted in off-loading the materials and consolidating them in the warehouse. These persons were identified by photo ids for security purposes and the contents of each pallot was checked against the shipping documents and the contract. Keeping a good paper trail of the ballot movement is an important integrity mechanism. Ballot Payment Payment was not made to the printer until the arrival of the shipment was confirmed by IFES and the CEP. Payment of the printer was done by a separate office within IFES-- separate from the procurement office. This separation acts as a check and balance on the procurement process to make sure the process followed the regulations and competitive bid process. Conclusion Despite the intense desire by the CEP for a national printer, the open and competitive bidding process, ensured that the most responsive and cost-effective printer had been chosen. Ultimately, all involved parties, including the CEP agreed that the printer, which had been selected through a transparent and competitive process, had been able to deliver the ballots on time and according to specification, despite the many delays and changes in candidate lists. An essential factor of this realization was that the procurement process had been truly transparent. Ensuring the transparency of the entire process from development of the specifications to distributing the request for proposals (RFP) and awarding the contract, resulted in a procurement that withstood politically motivated criticism and allowed the elections to be held as scheduled.
Domestic Monitoring and Election IntegrityA Case Study of the 1999 National Election in Indonesia
by Tim Meisburger Introduction The resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998 began Indonesia's remarkably rapid retreat from autocracy, and stunning rebirth as the world's third largest democracy. Although 'elections' had been held regularly during Soeharto's 32 years in power, they were closely managed by the state bureaucracy to ensure an appropriate result, their primary purpose being to provide Soeharto and GOLKAR (his party) with a thin veneer of legitimacy. The history of managed elections, and the fact that the election administrators were still largely unchanged from previous elections, led many to suspect that the transitional elections scheduled for June 7, 1999 would not be free and fair. In the event, they were undoubtedly the freest and fairest in Indonesia's history, an outcome in large measure attributable to the role domestic observers played in ensuring the integrity of the election process. Under Soeharto, Indonesia's election administration had been designed to ensure the government could control the outcome of each election. According to IFES's Indonesian Election Law Assessment:
Rather than providing transparency or 'checks and balances,' this system served to obfuscate lines of authority and insulate government control over the election process. In particular, Panwaslak the supposed supervisory and semi-judicial authority became a black hole for complaints and a legitimizing decoration for the government-run structure.409 Shortly after Soeharto's resignation, in an effort to stem public unrest, the interim government of President B.J. Habibie announced that elections would be held the following year, and that the existing election administration structure would be replaced with an independent election commission, and a more transparent election procedure. The Election Law The process of drafting the new law involved much backroom discussion and political horse-trading, as the various parties sought to gain a structural advantage. As would be expected of legislation resulting from political compromise, the law that eventually emerged from this process did not describe procedures in great detail, and lacked some internal coherence, but it was not all bad. According to IFES, 'the new General Election Law inspires neither great alarm nor great confidence'.410 Of course, the drafting of the law did not take place in a vacuum, and throughout the process student groups, NGOs and the international community were advocating for features that would improve the transparency and fairness of the election. This advocacy, and the desire on the part of the drafters that the law be viewed as credible both domestically and internationally, led to several important improvements in the new law. To increase the transparency of the process, officially accredited foreign and domestics monitors were allowed to observe each stage of the election. Although the new law did not describe the polling and counting processes in great detail (specifically assigning that responsibility to the election commission), it did mandate that voters be marked with indelible ink, to deter multiple voting. Unfortunately, the long drafting process meant that the law was not passed until January 1999, only five months before the election. This left very little time for setting up the new commission, drafting detailed rules and procedures, and hiring and training new staff. The Election Administration Structure The new election commission, called the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) in Indonesian, was finally established in March 1999, 86 days before the election. In the structure set out in the new law the KPU was only responsible for setting policy, while actual implementation was to be the responsibility of a subordinate body called the Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia (PPI or Indonesia Election Committee). When it became clear that the KPU and PPI would have difficulty preparing for the election in the time available, a third body was added to the administration structure, called the Secretariat. Since the Secretariat was made up from the same local officials who had administered past elections, many felt this was an effort to subvert the independence of the commission. It was intended that the Secretariat would work under the direction of the PPI to implement the new process, under the overall control of the KPU, but this complex system soon fell apart. The polling officials received little or no training in the new procedures, and the communication system between the PPI and the Secretariat broke down (or was never established). With tremendous political pressure to have the elections on time, the election officials in the field pressed ahead, but without clear guidance from above, they tended to fall back on the systems and procedure they knew. The result of this lack of training and effective control was that the 1999 transitional elections were administered in much the same, deeply flawed, fashion as previous elections had been. The KPU had a hugely difficult task. In a few short months it was expected to create a new organization and hire 2.7 million pollworkers, who would administer more than 300,000 polling stations for 121 million voters, scattered across and archipelago of more than 3000 inhabited islands. But civil society faced a challenge similar in scope, with far fewer resources. Student groups and NGOs had been in the forefront of the effort to topple the Soeharto regime, and as the election approached, they were eager to see the democratic transition continue. They recognized the weakness in the legislation, and saw that much of the election administration was controlled by a single political faction, and worried that their remarkable accomplishment might be stolen at the last moment. Many decided that close monitoring of the process was the best way to help ensure a free and fair election. The Election Monitoring Organizations Prior to the 1999 election, there was only one NGO election monitoring organization (EMO) in Indonesia, the Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (Independent Committee for Election Monitoring, or KIPP). KIPP was set up prior to the 1997 general election, but in that election the process was so 'managed' that few were interested in observing it, and KIPP was only able to field 9000 unaccredited (therefore unofficial) observers on election day. In the words of KIPP's founder, Mulyana Kusumah 'The government pretended to have an election, and we pretended to monitor it.' In contrast to the '97 election, interest in the first post-Soeharto election was very high, and in the year prior to the election several other national monitoring groups were created, as well as numerous regional ones. KIPP, formed as a coalition of NGOs, expanded its volunteer base by recruiting both individuals and new coalition partners. The student groups, who had been instrumental in the struggle to bring down Soeharto, formed a university based observation network called UNFREL. Another group tapping the universities for volunteers was the Rector's Forum, organized by university rectors. The last two national groups, JAMPPI and the JPPR, were organized around Islamic religious organizations. In total, the national groups, KIPP, Rector's Forum, UNFREL, JAMPPI, and the JPPR, fielded over 600,000 observers for the 1999 election, and average of two per station. Only one of the national groups (the JPPR, or People's Voter Education Network) was formed for a purpose other than election monitoring. Although each of these groups were formed spontaneously, they all received significant technical and financial support from the international community. The Asia Foundation, in particular, made early and frequent efforts to encourage coordination among the EMOs. The Foundation also encouraged the development of a standard monitoring methodology that would allow the aggregation of results from different groups, to provide a more comprehensive picture of the entire process. Direct financial support for domestic election monitoring was provided by USAID, The Asia Foundation, The American Center for International Labor Solidarity (which recruited, trained, and managed a relatively small contingent of long-term domestic observers). The European Union, and seven countries (led by Japan and Australia)also provided substantial support for monitoring through a UNDP-managed Trust Fund. There were significant problems in accrediting these observers at the local level, primarily because election administrators were overwhelmed by their own task. As the election loomed, a political accommodation was reached whereby organizations rather than individual would be accredited, and organization identification would be sufficient to enter the polling station. Registration Process The voter registration process was wildly unorganized. Registration officials were inadequately trained in the new procedures. In many instances in the outer islands officials failed even to receive written instructions on the procedure. Essential materials and funds to pay staff arrived late, or never. In areas where it was impossible to conduct a proper registration, officials fell back on the voting lists from the 1997 election. Lack of official accreditation, lack of financial resources, and a lack of adequate preparation among the EMOs meant that in most instances, quantitative and organized monitoring of the registration process did not take place. Several organizations were, however, able to spot check the process, and their reports tended to confirm the general impression of chaos during the registration. The Polling and Counting Processes The lack of time for preparation, and the use of the existing election administration infrastructure, meant that the polling process used in 1999 was essentially unchanged from that used in previous elections. The only major changes in the process were the addition of indelible ink (supplied by the international community) to mark the voter's fingers to prevent multiple voting, and provision in the legislation for the presence of non-partisan observers. The process itself (which had been used in previous elections)was simple and transparent. The polling stations were set up in the open, under an awning made of canvas or other locally available material. Because there were no walls, local people as well as observers could watch the entire process. In the morning the ballot box was shown to be empty and then sealed. As people arrived their names were checked on the voter's roll, they received a ballot, marked the ballot behind a screen, then dropped it in the box. At the end of the day, in full view of the observers, party agents, and crowd surrounding the station, the ballot box was opened. As the ballots were counted, each was held up so the crowd could see the mark, and the choice was recorded on a large blackboard. At the end of the count, marks are tallied up, and the final result for that station posted on a board. The Role of Domestic Observers in Ensuring the Integrity of the Process The over 600,000 organized domestic observers who monitored and reported on the election undoubtedly contributed to deterring fraud and other forms of electoral abuse throughout the process, but it is likely that their most important contribution was made in ensuring the integrity of the counting process. Because party agents, domestic observers, and ordinary citizens could all observe the polling and counting processes at the polling station, there was little opportunity for cheating there. Except for cases of multiple voting (controlled in 1999 with indelible ink), this had been true in previous elections as well. In fact, there had been no need for wholesale rigging at the polling station, because the desired result could easily be constructed when the polling station results were aggregated at sub-district and district levels, out of sight of prying eyes. Since the non-transparent procedure for aggregating results remained unchanged in 1999, observers believed that the most serious attempts to subvert the election would most likely take place during the aggregation phase. To forestall cheating during this vulnerable period, several EMOs independently decided to conduct a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) by separately aggregating the results from polling stations covered by their observers. Two PVT strategies were used. The first, adopted by Rectors Forum, was to conduct a statistical quick count, sampling the results from about a thousand randomly selected polling stations, and from that data projecting the final results. Technical assistance for this PVT was provided by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). The second strategy, adopted by all of the other groups, was to conduct what could be termed a comprehensive PVT, where the observation group attempts to collect and aggregate the results from most or all of the polling stations in a particular constituency. The feeling was that although a quick count could be accurate, the procedure was non-transparent and complex, so it would be less effective in convincing people of the integrity and credibility of the count. The process of collecting the information for the PVT (and other monitoring data)and sharing it among the various EMOs was facilitated by a jointly-developed procedural manual and report form developed and published with technical financial assistance from the Asia Foundation. These strategies were spectacularly successful. By recording and separately aggregating the results from polling stations, the EMOs were able to determine with a high degree of accuracy the expected outcome in any constituency. Since the EMOs were much more credible in the eyes of the population than the election administrators, there was no question that doctored results could be accepted as accurate. Although the aggregation of the data took a remarkably long time (even for the quick count), its mere existence, and the knowledge that it would eventually be aggregated and made public, seems to have been effective in deterring malfeasance. For seven weeks after the election the national election commission delayed announcing the official outcome, claiming that they were still waiting for results from some districts. Some suggested that a desperate search was on to find a way to modify the results in favor of entrenched interests, but if so, the attempt was unsuccessful, and the official results that eventually were announced matched very closely those provided by the EMOs. Political Party Monitors and Citizen Observers The election law allowed the participation at every polling station of one monitor from each competing party. Because of the literal transparency of the polling stations, ordinary citizens could also observe the process, but for several reasons, neither groups contribution to ensuring the integrity of the process matched that of the non-partisan domestic observers. The political parties were able to observe effectively in areas where their party was strong, and by carefully aggregating these results, they generally had a pretty good idea of the number of seats they had won well before the official results were out, but since their was little or no sharing of information between the parties, they had much less an idea of what had occurred outside their strongholds. The agents, because they were overtly partisan, were also less credible that non-partisan observers when making complaints or allegations against other parties. Most of the foreign observers of the Indonesian election were struck by the excitement and enthusiasm of ordinary citizens as they gathered to watch the polling from beginning to end. There presence in such large numbers graphically demonstrated public support for a fair election process, and their impact in ensuring the overall integrity of the process should not be discounted. Nevertheless, by their presence, they did not obviate the need for organized observation. Because the procedure was simple and transparent, ordinary, engaged citizens could ensure that the process at their polling station was honest and fair. Unfortunately, without an organized system for collecting and compiling information, they had no way to determine if the final result delivered by an aggregation process that took place far from prying eyes would accurately reflect the results generated at their polling station. Conclusions and Lessons Learned From a traditional point of view, there were simply not enough safeguards in the election process to ensure a fair election, yet the Indonesian National Election of 1999 is viewed by many as one of the freest and fairest transitional elections of the entire decade. If the integrity of the election was not assured by the legislative framework, judicial oversight, or neutral election administration, how was it assured? In my opinion, the credibility and integrity of the election rests on three pillars:
Dispute Resolution MechanismsDispute Resolution Mechanisms in the 1998 Cambodian Elections Introduction By 1993, Cambodia seemed well on the road to electoral democracy. The 1991 Paris Accords had brought peace between the warring Cambodian factions. The country was temporarily placed under the control of the United Nations, which conducted elections generally considered free and fair in September 1993. A coalition government was formed between the two largest rival parties, the United Front For an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) under First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh, and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) under Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The next national elections were scheduled for 1998. Hopes for stable democracy in Cambodia faded, however, when the always-fragile coalition government collapsed. Hun Sen ousted his co-Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh in violent clashes in July 1997. Ranariddh and other opponents of the CPP fled the country and their parties effectively ceased operations in Cambodia as political violence surged. Nonetheless, with strong urging from the international community, preparations for the 1998 elections began to take shape, though widespread concern persisted over whether they could be free and fair. After lengthy negotiations involving the international community, Ranariddh and other opposition leaders were able to return to Cambodia and begin campaigning. The election, run by Cambodians this time, proved to be another transitional election in many respects. Democracy had not yet been firmly implanted. The election was conducted with a technical proficiency which drew wide praise from international and domestic observers, while at the same time, the Cambodian government and CPP were criticized for violence and intimidation affecting the election process. Balloting safeguards were numerous. These included voter photo identification cards, a centralized and computerized voter registration list, metal ballot boxes with locks and tamper-resistant numbered seals, forgery-resistant ballots, indelible ink applied to voters' fingers, and extensive monitoring of the voting and counting by foreign and domestic observers and local political parties. By some benchmarks, the election to this point was a considerable success: over 90% of the eligible population registered to vote; and of those, over 90% actually cast their ballots in a peaceful and orderly fashion.411 Serious administrative shortcomings were few. The CPP was the apparent winner, but with less than a 2/3 majority in the National Assembly, had to seek a coalition partner. If election day was a moment of triumph, it was soon followed by disaster. Insisting that their numerous complaints about the voting, counting, and results had been unfairly dismissed by the election authorities, FUNCINPEC and other opposition parties rejected the announced results and launched weeks of protest demonstrations, which were met by force from the authorities. Civil discord persisted for months, until FUNCINPEC agreed to form a new coalition government with the CPP. The 1998 elections nevertheless remained tarnished by post-election violence in question because of the post-election violence and lingering suspicions about the validity of the dispute resolution process. Post-election dispute resolution had proved to be the most critical phase of the entire election. Unfortunately, it was the phase for which all sides were least prepared, organizationally and politically. Cambodian Election Dispute Resolution Mechanisms The Cambodian National Assembly Election Law, adopted in December 1997, provided extensive, even elaborate, dispute resolution mechanisms. Two bodies were charged with election dispute resolution. The first was the National Election Committee (NEC), which, per the election law, was to be an independent and impartial panel charged with organizing the elections. The NEC was granted responsibility for resolving most election disputes in the first instance. Under the law, the NEC was to be composed of eleven distinguished citizens. The Chair and Vice Chair were to be distinguished professionals; each of four political parties represented in the National Assembly was to have one representative; the Interior Ministry would have two representatives; two 'citizens' representatives' and one representative of the non-governmental organizations were also designated. Under the law, the list was to be proposed by the government and approved by the National Assembly. This formula for NEC membership was agreed between FUNCINPEC and CPP representatives in an apparent effort to accomplish two contradictory aims: political balance and impartiality. However, FUNCINPEC and other opposition parties objected strenuously to the actual final list of NEC members, which, it maintained, had been stacked with a majority in favor of the CPP by the government and National Assembly, both of which the CPP dominated. Similar concerns about bias were expressed about the NEC's subordinate bodies, the Provincial Election Commissions (PECs) and the Commune Election Commissions (CECs), which under the law were named by the NEC and empowered to resolve election disputes within their respective territories. The second key body with responsibility for election dispute resolution was the Constitutional Council (CC). The 1993 Cambodian constitution provided that 'members of the Constitutional Council shall be selected among the dignitaries with a higher education degree in law, administration, diplomacy, or economics and who have considerable work experience.' Among other tasks, the Cambodian constitution assigned the CC authority to resolve national assembly election disputes. The election law elaborated on this authority by giving the NEC original jurisdiction over election disputes, while the CC retained final appeals authority. The CC was composed of nine members: three appointed by the King, three by the National Assembly, and three by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, the governing body for judges. Like the NEC, the CC was hounded from the start by accusations that its membership was biased in favor of the ruling party, since both the Supreme Council of the Magistracy and the National Assembly were widely considered to be dominated by the CPP. Formal Dispute Resolution Procedures Formal dispute resolution procedures were elaborated in the election law and procedures. Regarding registration, a registrar's decision to register or deny registration to anyone could be appealed to the Provincial Election Commission, then to the National Election Committee, and finally, to the Constitutional Council. The NEC was authorized to hold public hearings. Voters had three days to make their complaints or appeals; and the PECs, NEC, and CC had five days to resolve them. With respect to disputes concerning the voting, counting, and results of the elections, the procedures were more complex. Complaints were supposed to be filed on the spot at the voting station by party representatives. The polling station president was to resolve them immediately; objections were to be noted on the appropriate form and conveyed to the Provincial Election Commission, which in turn would send them to the National Election Committee for resolution. (The law was not explicit about complaints concerning the counting, which was done at commune-wide counting stations, but a parallel process was employed.) In fact, few official complaints were registered at the polling or counting stations. The NEC permitted complaints to be submitted directly to its national headquarters within 72 hours after the polling. Under the election law, if the NEC found that there were 'serious irregularities that affect the results of the election', it must refuse to recognize the results and hold new elections in the affected area within eight days. Otherwise, it would announce its recognition of the results. In addition, the parties were allowed under the law to appeal against the provisional results announced by the NEC within 72 hours. The NEC was then given 48 hours to rule on the appeal; if it found that the complaint had reasonable grounds, it must hold a public hearing. A final appeal could be made to the Constitutional Council within 72 hours of the NEC's decision. The Constitutional Council was granted 10-20 days by the election law to decide on the final appeal. In addition to the formal dispute resolution mechanisms described above, there were various informal channels for resolving disputes which proved highly important in view of the new and untested character of the election law and procedures and the contentious, politically charged nature of the process. Some issues were resolved through direct lobbying of the NEC or individual NEC members by political parties, local non-governmental organizations, or government representatives. The opposition parties reinforced their complaints by frequent statements of protest soliciting national and international support and by intermittent threats to boycott the election unless their concerns were satisfied. The foreign diplomatic and donor community was extremely active in raising issues affecting election fairness with the NEC in weekly meetings as well as in individual contacts. Members of the international diplomatic community often acted as intermediaries between the NEC, government and the opposition parties, seeking solutions acceptable to all sides so that the election process could go forward and meet accepted international standards. At the local level, some Provincial Electoral Commissions held informal weekly meetings with the political parties, election observers, and others in order to resolve disputes in a timely and informal fashion. The Provincial Election Commissions even received training in conflict resolution from a local non-governmental organization. Dispute Resolution in Practice Most of the disputes during the election process consisted of complaints by the opposition parties against actions by the government, the CPP, or the NEC and its subordinate bodies. There were some 6,000 voter registration complaints, mostly alleging that persons ineligible to vote had been improperly registered. The process for submitting complaints about registration was explicit and required the use of specific forms. The complaints were largely raised by opposition political parties rather than individuals, and most complaints were submitted contrary to the election law directly to the NEC rather than to the relevant Provincial Election Commission. The reasons most often advanced for this deviation from procedure were that the opposition parties felt they would receive fairer treatment from the national NEC than from local bodies, which were considered more biased; voters and voter registrars were not well-informed about appeals procedures and the registrars were not helpful; and opposition supporters feared retaliation if they challenged local authorities, mostly CPP, directly. The NEC was able to respond to many of these complaints. In the two-month period between the beginning of voter registration in mid-May 1998 and the elections on July 26, 1998, the NEC canceled the registration of 1,793 voters it determined were ineligible. 412 Public hearings were held in some instances. Most of those whose registrations were canceled were ethnic Vietnamese deemed ineligible to vote and presumed to be sympathetic toward the ruling CPP. The NEC dealt with a far broader spectrum of complaints than the technical issues revolving around registration, voting, and counting. Indeed, few aspects of the election law, procedures, and NEC decisions went unchallenged by the opposition parties. For example, although the election law provided for counting ballots at the polling station, the opposition preferred counting at the commune or even provincial level because it felt that counting at the polling station would be more subject to intimidation or violence and less amenable to effective monitoring. The NEC was unwilling to change the counting location on its own authority, which it arguably could have done, but NEC members urged the foreign diplomatic community to raise it with the government. The government in turn obtained an amendment to the election law by the National Assembly to move counting to the commune level, which nonetheless did not satisfy some opposition figures. With respect to other complaints on matters such as equitable access to media by political parties and counting procedures, the NEC was responsive to the opposition on some issues, and not on others. For instance, at the urging of local non-governmental organizations, the NEC scheduled free television and radio spots for all political parties for noon and evening hours when a large audience would be available, rather than during morning hours as it had originally proposed. The NEC did not, however, eliminate the ruling CPP's strong advantage over the opposition in broadcast news time. The NEC was less successful in responding to complaints about activities outside its own operations, such as allegations of intimidation and violence by government and ruling party officials. Although the election law banned vote-buying, intimidation, and other offenses, the NEC had no law enforcement powers or resources, and had to request investigation and action by the government, which were not always forthcoming. The NEC complaints about violence and intimidation in other ways, such as dismissing the odd local election employee and reprimanding a few local government officials. The NEC also drew up a security plan for the elections, which was successfully implemented by the military and police, and participated in the training program for thousands of these election security officials through a local non-governmental organization. Finally, the NEC prepared and promoted a nationally distributed message, in both written and audiotape form, by the widely revered King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, in which he appealed for peaceful and honest elections and urged people to vote. Voting and counting ran smoothly, so much so that they are counted as the NEC's greatest achievement. In contrast, the resolution of complaints following the election was the NEC's moment of disaster. Political tension at this point was extremely high, as the political parties awaited the results. The first returns showed the CPP as victor. The opposition parties then launched a blizzard of formal complaints, eventually numbering about 800, directly with the NEC, and later, to the CC on appeal.413 The complaints dealt with a variety of alleged offenses in the voting, counting, and tabulation of results, including, among the more serious allegations, the denial of the parties' right to have sufficient observers at the voting and counting; deliberate miscounting of votes; other forms of fraud; and intimidation of voters. (Most of these complaints were not supported by the observations of the approximately 800 foreign and 21,000 domestic election observers, but some observer groups did call for a full examination and resolution of the complaints.) The opposition parties presented related demands: that a full reconciliation of ballots take place; that recounts be held in about 800 of the over 1600 counting centers; that new elections be held in select areas; and that the method of calculating the distribution of legislative seats among political parties revert to one the NEC had published earlier, but subsequently revised a month before the election. The earlier method would have given fewer legislative seats to the CPP. The NEC maintained with some credibility that the first method contained an error which it had simply corrected when it republished the regulations. But this explanation was regarded with deep suspicion by the opposition parties. As a demonstration of their resolve, the main opposition parties rejected the election results and vowed not to permit the convening of the National Assembly until their complaints were satisfactorily addressed. The NEC informally and quietly resolved a few of the post-election complaints, but overall its complaint resolution process utterly failed to satisfy the opposition parties. The complaints process unfolded in at atmosphere of extreme rhetoric. Charges of massive fraud and coverup were leveled. The NEC conducted recounts of the results for eight counting centers considered by the opposition to be among the most suspect. The recounts varied only trivially from the original counts. However, the recounting was abruptly stopped at that point, far short of the 800 counting centers demanded by the opposition. Shortly thereafter, the NEC summarily dismissed all of the opposition parties' complaints without hearings as unsubstantiated or baseless. The opposition responded with demonstrations. The opposition parties immediately appealed to the Constitutional Council in an episode marked by a great deal of confusion and acrimony over filing deadlines, procedures, and the proper form for making complaints. Citing technical deficiencies in the submissions, the Constitutional Council declined to consider all but 17 of the approximately 800 complaints presented. These 17 it investigated and then dismissed. Although permitted by law to conduct public hearings, the CC did not do so. The opposition parties rejected the Constitutional Council's decision and intensified their street protests. After initially tolerating the demonstrations, the police forcibly dispersed them, with injuries and loss of life resulting. After months of stalemate, the largest opposition party, FUNCINPEC, agreed to join a coalition government with the ruling party in November 1998. FUNCINPEC received a number of Ministries but dropped all its election-related complaints. The other major opposition party, the Sam Rainsy Party, did not join the government and did not renounce its electoral complaints. Successes and Failures of the Dispute Resolution Process The resolution of complaints preceding the 1998 Cambodian elections can be termed reasonably successful. Not all the NEC's decisions pleased the government or the opposition, but they were grudgingly accepted de facto and the election process proceeded. Although the registration process started chaotically in some areas and generated numerous complaints, the month-long registration period was time enough to allow the NEC to take corrective measures, and gain experience and confidence. Appeals were dealt with, though rarely within the tight time frame provided by law. On broader policy issues such as violence, intimidation, and media access, the NEC had little in the law or elsewhere to guide it, and did not fully satisfy the concerns of the opposition parties. Still, the mix of lobbying from all sides, foreign advice and the NEC's own spirit of problem-solving enabled the NEC to make compromises tolerated by all sides. The relatively open, methodical, professional and impartial handling of pre-election complaints by the NEC lent credibility to the election process to that point. In contrast, the NEC's dismissal of the post-election complaints did not put an end to them but rather added fuel to the fire. The NEC's inadequately prepared, disorganized, closed and unresponsive dispute resolution process was seen by the opposition as unfair and partisan. The credibility of the election process was compromised at the precise moment when the public demand for absolute integrity was at its zenith. Inadequate Administrative Preparation The most obvious reason for the failures of post-election dispute resolution was inadequate administrative or technical preparation. The NEC and the CC and indeed the political parties themselves were ill-prepared for this phase of the process. The parties were not well trained or prepared to draft and file complaints in a timely and correct fashion. They had great difficulty in gathering the necessary information quickly to formulate their complaints. For their part, the NEC and CC were unable to deal effectively with the flood of 800 complaints which reached them after the elections, as they had neither resources nor staff to do so in the time allotted by law. They were also unprepared procedurally. The NEC subcommittee charged with the resolution of post-election disputes was not even formed until the election was over. Detailed procedures for dispute investigation and resolution were not in place. These procedures were finally written on the fly after the elections, even as improvised solutions such as selective recounts were already underway. The procedures for submission and resolution of post-election complaints were neither clear nor well-publicized. Many complaints were rejected for missing deadlines or incorrect formats. A further factor not to be discounted was that all those involved in the election election authorities and party officials alike were exhausted and short-tempered by the time the post-election disputes arose. In sum, those involved in the elections did not recognize the importance of the post-election dispute resolution. Relatively little preparation had been made for this phase of the process, in contrast to the enormous attention paid to organizing the voting and counting. The post-election dispute resolution was not, as the Cambodian election authorities might have imagined, a mere denouement or tying up of loose ends: it was the climax of the process, the election's decisive moment. Shortcomings in the Election Law In certain respects, shortcomings in the election law worsened the organizational and administrative problems of post-election dispute resolution. Parts of the law were better suited to well-established democracies than transitional situations. The election law's deadlines for submission and adjudication of complaints often 48 or 72 hours were unforgivingly strict in a country where communications are poor and personnel inexperienced. The political parties and the NEC were put under intolerable time pressure. They simply did not have time to deal properly with the huge number of complaints that arose in the time allotted. In addition, the election law specifically foresaw only one remedy for defects in the election process a new election in the affected area, whereas a wider array of methods, including recounts or simply invalidating the results in some areas might have been specifically envisioned. Competence, Neutrality and Impartiality of Election Bodies Some of the problems of the election dispute resolution process in Cambodia's 1998 elections went beyond the purely technical and administrative. One such was the nature of the responsible election organs the NEC and the CC. While the NEC was composed of accomplished individuals, most had little or no experience in election administration. This was understandable and unavoidable, since the 1998 Cambodian elections were the first real polls run by Cambodians in many years. The lack of experience was partly compensated for by the dozen or so expert foreign advisors assisting the NEC. The Constitutional Council had a similar problem. The Cambodian constitution of 1993 allowed appointments to the CC of persons with university degrees in economics, administration, or diplomacy, as well as law. However, the CC's main task was to perform complicated legal analysis and interpretation, a task which proved daunting for the non-lawyers who were a majority on the CC. It would have been preferable to require all CC members to have an extensive legal background. This admittedly would be difficult to impose in contemporary Cambodia. There were few lawyers before 1975 and their ranks were decimated by the Khmer Rouge regime. With more experience and training, both the NEC and CC can be expected to acquire greater skill over time. A more fundamental question raised in the 1998 Cambodian election was the impartiality and independence of the NEC, its subordinate bodies, and the CC. These requisite qualities were written into the Cambodian election law. In practice, they proved difficult to achieve. In Cambodia's highly polarized political scene, the truly impartial were hard to find. Additionally, complete independence is difficult to achieve where, as in Cambodia, one faction is dominant, the legal system is weak, offering little protection against the powerful, and the use of threats or force in politics is common. Under such circumstances, formally independent institutions or individuals can be vulnerable to pressure despite their own best intentions. In reality, the NEC came closer to the ideal of neutrality and impartiality than might have been expected. Most NEC decisions were technically appropriate and provided little evidence of bias. Intense public scrutiny, pressure from the international community, and the members' own ethos of public service were a counterweight to partisan pressures. Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of the opposition, the NEC (and the CC) were fatally flawed from their first day because their membership had been constituted in a way which apparently favored the government and the ruling CPP. Hence the opposition's constant suspicion of the election authorities and eventual rejection of the unfavorable election results were, if not inevitable, at least predictable. The perception of bias on the part of the NEC and CC was as damaging than any actual bias. Remedying bias or perceived bias in the election organs would not have been easy. The election law and the formal process of selection of NEC and CC members were accepted by all sides, yet proved insufficient to ensure impartiality or political balance. Because of Cambodia's weak legal system, the actual selection of members was readily subject to manipulation. Some of the manipulation was perfectly legal using constitutional bodies (dominated by the CPP) and processes to produce an outcome which favored one side. Other acts alleged to have been committed, such as bribery, pressure, and misinterpretation of the law, may have been extra-legal. But the absence of meaningful institutional checks and balances meant that such manipulation could not easily be prevented. The international community could have been a countervailing force with regard to the manipulation of NEC and CC membership, but did not exert itself. Ironically, its restraint may have been due to too much respect for the law: the formation of the NEC and CC had, for the most part, followed due process and the full NEC membership roster was approved by the duly authorized constitutional authority, the National Assembly. Nonetheless, the membership list was considered unfair and unacceptable by the opposition. A simpler and better approach to election bodies in transitional situations might lie in requiring the membership lists to be agreed by a consensus of all major factions, instead of inventing complex formulas which attempt to guarantee impartiality or political balance or a combination of the two. Such formulas, as shown above, can be circumvented.414 Following the Law is not Enough Since in established democracies elections are a matter of following prescribed legal procedures, it may seem surprising to assert that following the law is often not enough in transitional elections like Cambodia's in 1998. In such instances, the law itself may have little force and little meaning or importance to many of the participants. The election law is likely to be new and untested, and may contain unsuspected flaws. It may be neither understood nor respected. The parties may have little faith in the technical safeguards the law and procedures provide and little trust in the election authorities and each other. This may be combined with a keen sense of when they are being disadvantaged and insistence that the situation be rectified regardless of the letter of the law. Thus the rote application of the law may not resolve conflicts but rather inflame them. In the Cambodian case, it may, for example, be argued that the NEC was acting correctly and according to the letter of the law when it dismissed all post-election complaints. But in the real political world, dismissal was profoundly mistaken: it simply reinforced the opposition perception of NEC unfairness and prejudice. The NEC and CC, under pressure from the CPP, rushed to wrap up the election results, with disastrous consequences. The election authorities would have been wise to have gone the extra mile to persuade all sides of the fairness of the dispute resolution process. A more open, public, collaborative, measured, flexible and negotiated approach to solving post-election disputes indeed to the entire election process might have led to a less explosive conclusion. This course would have been far from easy, given that the other players in the election were using pressure and intimidation, emotional public appeals, and confrontation in order to try to get their way. It may be that the losing parties, whoever they were, were simply unprepared to accept its loss in the election, however legitimate the process, at least without putting up a struggle. Transitional Elections are Different Many of the problems with Cambodian election dispute resolution stem from a single and fairly simple observation. Transitional elections are very different from those in well-established democracies. The structures and forms which satisfactorily govern elections in many places are backed by real and accepted authority. They are applied vigorously, neutrally, and effectively. A high degree of trust exists in the election process and between the participants. In contrast, in transitional situations such as Cambodia's, deep mutual distrust and partisanship on all sides is the rule; the idea of adhering to the laws and regulations may have little meaning or value to participants; the rule of force may predominate over the rule of law; and winning by any means may be the objective. Transitional elections may look more like one battle in a no-holds-barred struggle for power than a well-established and agreed system for determining who governs. In Cambodia's case, the formal mechanisms and procedures for resolving election disputes were basically well designed, but took relatively little account of the fact that this was still very much a transitional election with dynamics quite different from those in established democracies. The dispute resolution mechanisms in place did not anticipate the magnitude of the conflicts that would arise nor how crucial they would prove. Accordingly, insufficient attention was devoted to preparing in advance for the dispute resolution phase of the elections. But even an administratively improved dispute resolution system would not have been enough in itself to ensure an orderly and accepted outcome of the process. Institutional weaknesses, an all-or-nothing style of politics, and participant attitudes inconsistent with the spirit of democratic elections would still have made an orderly outcome uncertain. Only the most sensitive and statesmanlike actions by the NEC and Constitutional Council or greater restraint by the political parties might have saved the Cambodian elections from its bloodstained and ignominious conclusion, but in the heat of crisis, these were not forthcoming.
Civic Education for a Nonviolent ElectionEnsuring Neutrality of Security Forces
by John Lowrie In the period following the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accord and the administration of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), many Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were formed in Cambodia: Cambodian Institute of Human Rights (CIHR), the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) and the Cambodian Association for Human Rights and Development (ADHOC), to name a few. Prior to this time there was little civil society activity and few Cambodian NGOs. Cambodia had been at war with itself and with its neighbours for more than three decades, and was just beginning to grasp the concept of replacing guns and bullets with ballots. The situation improved rapidly from 1993, with the mushrooming of the number and variety of NGOs combined with the resurgence of the national religion, Buddhism, after its demise during and after the Pol Pot era. This case study focuses on a non-violent training instituted by CIHR designed to promote the neutrality of the security forces in the 1998 parliamentary elections in Cambodia. CIHR's training is a good example of an NGO work which planted the seed for the gradual attitudinal, behavioural and institutional changes that are necessary to transform a society that has grown accustomed to a violent culture into a democratic society. Background
In 1997, two violent events happened and created a huge setback for democratic gains since the signing of the Paris Peace Accord. In March, there was a grenade attack on peaceful political demonstrations led by the leader of the Khmer Nation Party Sam Rainsy outside the National Assembly. In July, an armed confrontation took place between supporters of the two main political parties, the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) and the royalist Funcinpec Party (http://www.funcinpec.org/). This violent confrontation ended the uneasy coalition government that had formed after the 1993 UNTAC organized elections. This factional fighting of July 1997 overthrew First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh, split his Funcinpec Party, and resulted in more than 100 extra-judicial killings. The violence and break-up of the coalition government placed in serious doubt the prospects for parliamentary elections in July 1998. The Cambodian security forces that were supposed to have been integrated into one national force following the 1993 elections and new constitution, had divided along old party lines. Their old loyalties had emerged and many were not neutral. Given a choice between having an imperfect election on the schedule required by the Cambodian Constitution or no election at all, most Cambodian political parties and NGOs agreed, it was better to go ahead with an imperfect process, rather than postpone and risk losing the possibilities for democratic improvements indefinitely. Due to the exposure to violence over the last 30 years, Cambodians had become accustomed to the use of violence for political purposes. If Cambodia were to have free, fair, and credible elections, it was essential for the security forces to remain neutral and ensure a safe election environment. Groundwork: 'Neutrality' as a key theme of CHIR's Education and Training Initiatives
Since 1991, human rights NGOs in Cambodia, together with assistance from the international community, promoted democratic development and civic education. These advances offset, to some extent, the faltering political climate which continued the uneasy alliance between the two former combatant parties. Having organized civic education training for six years, the Cambodian NGO community had grounds for some optimism. Human Rights NGOs with the Cambodia Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) had undertaken several initiatives in recent years to train members of the security forces in aspects of democracy and human rights. The Cambodian Institute of Human Rights (CIHR) (http://www.ned.org/grantees/cihr/index.htm), a Cambodian NGO, is an educational organization promoting human rights, democracy, free and fair elections, good governance and a culture of peace. CIHR was the leading members of the Coalition of Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL), a collection of 100 local NGOs involved in voter education and election monitoring. CIHR's Deputy Director was the President of COFFEL, and CIHR's Director had been seconded to be the Vice-Chairman of the National Election Committee (NEC). CIHR worked closely with two other Cambodian election monitoring group--the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL) and the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC)--and other NGOs, which all worked for the same cause: free, fair, credible and peaceful elections. Neutrality had been a key theme in all of CIHR's civil society education and training initiatives. Neutrality was a principle feature of CIHR's good governance training program for government officials. Usually short seminars were held, but one of CIHR's ideas was very innovative and popular. This idea took the form of televised Human Rights Quizzes involving teams from all security services throughout the country. Cambodia's security services consist of (1) the armed forces, (2) the national police force, and (3) the gendarmerie. The numbers of the armed forces were large given the unrest in the country over the last 30 years. The gendarmerie is modeled to some extent on French lines. They remain part of the armed services but have military police and some powers in relation to civilian matters. Personnel of all three services are usually seen in Cambodia, whether on duty or not, in uniform and carrying weapons. In the pre-election period, co-operative relationships already existed between the CIHR and the senior officials of the two ministries involved: the Ministry of Defence (MOD) which was responsible for the armed forces and gendarmerie and the Ministry of Interior for the police service. CIHR was confident that IT could co-operate again for the training of security forces in their roles and responsibilities for the National Assembly elections. Pre-Election Neutrality Training
No one at the time knew how many serving personnel there were in the security services. However all three services--the armed forces, the national police force, and the gendarmerie--had command structures. CIHR believed that if it were able to work through these structures, it would be possible to convey essential messages to all ranks. Consultations were made with the senior officers in all three services with whom CIHR had worked previously. All agreed the idea was good. They readily sought the authority of their superiors to proceed. And it was received in a remarkably quick time. CIHR then had to overcome financial and time constraints in designing and implementing an effective training program to promote the neutrality of the security forces. Time and money
It was difficult for CIHR to obtain funding on a timely basis because the donors who were interested had either already allocated their election assistance funds to other programs or did not have the funds available in a timely enough manner for the program to proceed. The $27,000 needed to implement the training was eventually approved at the end of June, with less than a month before the election. The project was subject to severe time limitations, and in addition all three services had full operational commitments. The cascade effect
The purpose of the CIHR's Training in Neutrality, Human Rights, Democracy and Elections was to reach as many serving officers in the security services as possible before polling day. How could hundreds of thousands of serving personnel be reached in less than three weeks? The only way to convey the most essential messages in such a short time to so many officers was by operating a cascade effect. CIHR started with 30 master trainers from all three services: the armed force, the police, and the gendarmerie. They were trained by CIHR staff and senior commanding officers with the expertise needed. These 30 would then go on to train 1,300 trainers, selected from senior officers in the three services, and they would then repeat the training with operational units throughout the country. Obviously the quality of training would be degraded in the double transfer, but with careful attention to content design and training materials, CIHR felt that the loss of quality could be minimized. Even if CIHR had months available and vastly greater sums of money, it believed there was still a major benefit to be gained from adding last minute cascade training to the longer-term programs that should have been going on. In an ideal situation, such last minute cascade training would be refresher training, but in the case of the 1998 Cambodia election, it was the only pre-election non-violence training available to officers in the government security forces. What to say and what to leave out?
What were the most essential messages and how could they be presented in the most effective manner to be assimilated and acted upon? There were two major difficulties in designing effective non-violence training for officers. One was to devise the best way of conveying the most important principles of neutrality and avoidance of excess force to large groups of officers, many of whom were not highly educated. Another is a problem special, but not unique, to Cambodia. Translation and interpretation from English to Khmer is not straightforward, and it was important not to lapse into a higher-level academic language not familiar to ordinary people. In the end CIHR settled for three comparatively simple sets of information (See Training Documents for Neutrality, Cambodia):
The master trainers were provided with a good grounding in each of these areas, so that they would be fully confident in presenting them to the next level of trainers. They were also given guidance in use of participatory learning methodology in order to have maximum impact with the next level. The focus was to ensure that the knowledge and techniques could be effectively replicated at the third and final level. The cascade begins and then Election Day was set for July 26. The first 30 master trainers started training on July 8 and completed it on July 13. The following week they embarked on the second level of training. This took them out of the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and into Cambodia's 23 provinces. The 30 master trainers decided to work in pairs rather than individually, as originally planned, because, they argued, two might make for better training. CIHR acknowledged that two would add authority and confidence, so the arrangement was approved. This required a hasty recalculation of the budget to confirm that the extra travel and allowances could be covered. This, added to the poor quality of Cambodia's war-damaged transport infrastructure and the distances involved, meant the second level activities were being done perilously close to the third and final week. Despite these problems, training seemed to be on course. The 30 master trainers were completing the second level of training for 1,300 persons. CIHR felt its second-level trainers would be well placed to complete at least 1,300 one-day third level sessions by Election Day. Some trainers would do 3 or 4 sessions, each with 100 security personnel present. However, just as CIHR began to believe the messages would reach the majority of security personnel in active service, a totally unforeseen event occurred. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) issued orders to their trainers to stop training. This action took CIHR by surprise, for CIHR had been careful to ensure ministerial approval from the outset. A possible reason for why the MOD cancelled the training was that a large-scale plan of briefing thousands of security personnel could be misinterpreted as mobilization preparations and could frighten the public unnecessarily. The pre-election atmosphere was tense with many rumours, one of which was that political parties had contingency plans for a military take-over should they lose. The MOD's unexpected decision had a valid point and was understood by CIHR. If there had been more time before the elections, CIHR could have brought in its colleagues from COFFEL, COMFREL, and NICFEC. By this time, these election monitoring organizations had mobilized 20,000 national observers to monitor the elections. They were in virtually every village in the country. CIHR could have arranged for them to witness the neutrality training and confirm that nothing untoward was going on, but there was not enough time. The MOD instruction did not apply to the police service which was located under the Ministry of Interior. In addition, since it took some time for these orders to be transferred through the command structure, some third level training continued to take place. It was not possible to determine how many third level sessions were completed, but CIHR thinks that there were probably many more than could be acknowledged given the order to stop. Despite the stop in training for the military forces, the civil society monitoring networks were used to distribute the neutrality training manual and the NEC guidelines to military and police stations. The election monitor network was able to distribute over 22,000 copies of each manual to every unit where they were needed. This would not have been possible through the military operational command structures which had other priorities, namely ensuring security for polling. Election Day and Vote Counting
Given the insecure environment that had led up to the elections, no one had dared to predict that it would be peaceful. The prospects for an election to be organized and to take place on time were dim. Yet Cambodians, with international help, overcame many problems and defied the odds. The election was held on time. Over 90% of registered voters cast their votes. There was no significant evidence to suggest the results did not reflect the will of the majority of voters. Former US Senator Stephen Solarz, who observed the polling, described the polling as the 'Miracle of the Mekong'. Election Day, followed by the count came and went peacefully. Proof of the pudding?
An old English saying is 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating' meaning that if the cook has prepared a good pudding, it will taste good. The phrase is applied elsewhere to demonstrate success, that objectives have been achieved. We at CIHR could claim that this neutrality training was successful. The days before and after Election Day were peaceful, apart from a few incidents. The conduct of security personnel appeared to be impeccable. The neutrality training alone did not lead to the professional conduct by the security services, but it was surely a significant factor. The 1,330 master and secondary level trainers constituted a significant number of senior officers. They were deployed all around the country in all three services. More than 22,000 copies of the neutrality manual reached almost every unit. The first level master trainers course in Phnom Penh and several second level training courses (including the one for the trainers in Phnom Penh Municipality) were aired on national TV and Radio. These shows reached most of Cambodia's 11.4 million population, most of whom are known to tune in to radio regularly.
Another major factor that contributed to the professional conduct of the security forces was political will for the elections. If there had been widespread interference by the security services in the election, its very credibility would have been in question. Everyone, up to that point, wanted the election to be credible to pave Cambodia's way back into the international community. The election security environment protected by the neutral security forces meant that the people felt safe to go to vote and enjoyed voting. The election turned out to be a genuine national exercise in democracy and a cause for celebration. Violent End to Post-Election Demonstrations
Together, the Funcinpec party (http://www.funcinpec.org/) and Sam Rainsy Party (http://www.samrainsyparty.org/) won the majority of the votes. Unfortunately, these parties had not learned the lessons from opposition parties the world over. Although the majority of those who voted cast their votes against the incumbent Cambodian People's Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen, the majority votes were divided between the opposition parties, giving the CPP the plurality of the votes and a slight majority of seats in the National Assembly. Rather than accepting this fact, the losing parties challenged the results. Their complaints, whether legitimate or not, were not investigated fully. There were allegations that some votes were disregarded and not counted and that the result was not representative of what the people wanted. (The dispute resolution process for these elections is discussed in the case study Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ) The post-election situation declined rapidly. Thousands of protesters crowded the streets of Phnom Penh claiming the voting was not free or fair. For several weeks, these post-election demonstrations and sit-ins were tolerated by the authorities. The security forces kept a careful watch, staying neutral and restrained. But in the end, patience was lost and the security forces were ordered to end the demonstrations. No one knows the true extent of the violence that followed, but the UN reported that two demonstrators were killed and 50 disappeared. Sixteen bodies were later found that were believed to have been the result of extra-judicial killings. The human rights NGO community and the international donor community were greatly disappointed by the continued use of security forces for political purposes. And they shared the same sense of collective failure over the violent suppression of the demonstrations. Nevertheless, there are lessons learned from CIHR's experience with education for a nonviolent election and a basis to build on for the next elections. CIHR hopes that the next time, the NGO and international donor communities may be able to improve key aspects of the electoral process, including ensuring the neutrality of military personnel and public officials. One of the great achievements of the 1998 election was the massive voter education campaign on political rights and responsibilities. NGOs, the National Election Committee (NEC), and even state institutions and the media, can take credit for the fact that the population received considerable information about their rights and what they can reasonably expect from politicians. One of these expectations is peace. Cambodia is just starting to enjoy relative peace for the first time in over three decades. Peace requires a smaller, professional and more neutral security force. CIHR continues to help Cambodia advance in this direction by not only continuing but also expanding its neutrality training. The next exercise in democracy in Cambodia will be the commune elections planned for late 2000/early 2001. These elections will be the first local elections in Cambodia. The communes make up the first level of administration, grouping villages together. There will be 1,600 formerly appointed posts that will now be elected. CIHR and the other Cambodian NGOs are already involved in plans and activities for these elections, applying lessons learned from the 1998 national elections. One of these will be to continue and expand the neutrality training for national security forces, for public officials at national and local levels, and for all personnel involved in security at commune and village level. Moreover, neutrality training will include a section on peaceful conflict resolution to avoid the kind of post-election problems seen in 1998. CIHR's aim is to do neutrality training well in advance, in a planned structured way that is transparent to all, and with better supporting documentation. Conclusions and Recommendations: transition from culture of war to culture of peace
Democracy and democratic elections take time to be established, and for everyone to understand the processes. The events of the 1998 elections in Cambodia revealed the different perceptions, expectations and opportunities of the different participants. These differences have to be minimized. Everyone must play the game according to the same rules. There must be common understanding amongst politicians, party workers and agents, election officials, security personnel, and civil society. The process needs to be more technical and less politicized. The verdict of the people has to be accepted and respected. The time to start is now, not as happened in 1998, just six months before an election. Basic education and training should not be left to the last 2 to 3 weeks. That period should be used for refresher training and to cover essential points that need to be known on the day for voting and the count. Such education should be a continuous process and be featured in school curricula. Children should grow up knowing about good citizenship. There is good will amongst all echelons of the security services to be professional, neutral, and respected. Whilst the Royal Government of Cambodia shoulders the main responsibility to allocate national resources to education generally and in-service training for security forces, the international donor community through local NGOs should maximize every opportunity to support activities that promote neutrality and the observation of human rights. The fact is that Cambodia will suffer revenue shortages for years to come, and without external help, such education will be limited. Security personnel have been operating in a culture of war for years, and they need help in the transition to a culture of peace. Cambodia is still polarized. State institutions need to be strengthened. Loyalty should be to the nation, whether as public servants, judges, or members of security services. Those institutions that exist as 'checks and balances' are most crucial in all aspects of public service. For elections, the National Election Committee and the Constitutional Council must be able to act impartially to be able to address complaints properly. This will prevent the situation arising where the only way aggrieved parties can protest is by demonstrations. Where there are large public demonstrations, there is always the propensity for peace to break down and security forces to be deployed. It is better to avoid this situation.
Note: The following Appendices can be found in Training Documents for Neutrality, Cambodia: Documents for Masters of Training in Neutrality, Human Rights, Democracy and Elections, published by the Ministry of National Defence General Staff and Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Police in co-operation with the Cambodian Institute of Human Rights. (CIHR, July 1998) Curriculum for the initial 5 day Master Trainers Training held 8-12 July 1998 at the military academy at Russei Keo, Phnom Pen Distrust Breeds BureaucracyThe Formal Regulation of Electoral Governance in Mexico by Dr. Andreas Schedler Abstract Over the past decade, Mexico went through a successful transition from electoral authoritarianism to electoral democracy. Driven by pervasive distrust, political parties subjected the new, democratic electoral authorities to tight legal regulation. As the article argues, however, due to the peculiar nature of electoral governance, the reliance on a 'bureaucratic' mode of control was both more effective and less costly than current 'post-bureaucratic' approaches to public management would lead us to expect. Over the past 25 years, the 'third wave' of global democratization has washed over 70 countries to the windy shores of electoral democracy. Responding to this unprecedented move towards democratic rule, political science has developed a whole new subfield-- democratization studies. In this new subdiscipline, scholars have explored variegated explanations of either successful, failed, or flawed transitions to democracy. They have studied the influence of a wide range of variables, such as economic well-being, political culture, international pressure, pre-democratic institutions, political leadership, choice and contingency. However, they have failed to recognize one 'crucial variable for explaining the success or the failure of democratic transitions' (Pastor 1999b), namely, electoral governance. In general, political science has paid very scarce attention to the institutional foundations of democratic elections. In established OECD democracies, scholars could afford to ignore them because 'people take for granted the administrative dimension of elections' (Pastor 1999a: 76). As it seems, in the early transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and South America something similar happened. Those transitions took place in the context of 'usable' (Linz and Stepan 1996: 10 11) state apparatuses (such as in Spain and Argentina) or else, were able to resuscitate dormant traditions of reliable election management (such as in Uruguay and Chile). Issues of electoral governance did therefore not acquire much visibility but rather, remained in the background during the transition processes. It was only in later transitions that questions of electoral fraud and electoral integrity moved onto the center-stage of democratization. Above all, in transitions from 'electoral authoritarianism' that strove to overcome an immediate past of manipulative elections, the control of electoral fraud turned into the very axis of the transition process. Mexico, which experienced one of the most delayed and protracted transitions in Latin America, exemplifies the new salience of electoral governance in a particularly dramatic way. Less than a decade ago, the country's electoral institutions still worked as a machinery of fraud, subservient to the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Vote rigging as a mechanism of last instance to protect the ruling party from losing an election was certainly not the only, but nevertheless a fundamental pillar of the post-revolutionary authoritarian regime. Between 1990 and 1996, however, the country went through a series of negotiated electoral reforms which profoundly altered the infrastructure of political elections. Ten years ago, it was still the SecretarÌa de GobernaciÛn, the Ministry of the Interior, which was in charge of organizing federal elections. Today this responsibility lies in the hands of an independent, non-partisan administrative body, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). As a consequence, in contemporary Mexico, elections are now widely perceived to operate in a fundamentally democratic way as free, competitive, inclusive, clean, and even fair contests. How did electoral designers accomplish this remarkable transition from electoral fraud to electoral fairness? Which kind of institutional solutions did they put into practice in order to effect such a dramatic change. How did they manage to subject the Mexican Leviathan to democratic rules, despite its historic reputation of subverting or breaking formal rules at its convenience? The present article does not pretend to analyze the complex package of interlocking 'safety measures' reformers designed to keep the new Federal Electoral Institute under control. It limits its attention to one key instrument of restraint: bureaucratic regulation the enactment of a dense network of legal rules and regulations designed to minimize the discretion of election officials. After a brief introduction into the role of distrust in Mexico's transition process, the article describes three representative dimensions of bureaucratic regulation in Mexico's electoral code: the requirements of record keeping, identity controls, and time schedules. The analysis reveals a pervasive reliance on detailed formal restrictions that runs against the spirit of current 'post-bureaucratic' trends in public administration that put heavy emphasis on deregulation. Yet, as the article argues, the 'entrepreneurial' option was blocked by the prevailing levels of distrust towards the ruling party. Furthermore, the bureaucratic route was more effective than the 'post-bureaucratic' approach would suggest (since formal constraints were embedded in a comprehensive system of accountability and also, sustained by a new balance of power between government and opposition); and it was less costly than the new public administration school would expect (since the distinctive features of electoral administration mitigate many of the pathologies bureaucratic over-regulation tends to produce in other spheres of public administration). Democratization and Distrust The 'hegemonic party system' that reigned in Mexico until the late 1980s represented an unusual kind of authoritarian regime. It was a showcase of 'electoral authoritarianism' that legitimated itself through the regular conduct of non-competitive political elections (since 1916). These elections were not mere one-party rituals. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) did allow opposition candidates to run. Yet, the only genuine, even if weak and ineffective, opposition party was the conservative National Action Party (PAN), founded in 1939. All others were either short-lived PRI dissident movements or so-called satellite parties, ancillary parties of the PRI who were there to simulate a superficial appearance of inter-party competition. Opposition parties, however, were not supposed to win elections. Their function was to legitimate not to challenge the majority party. The 'possibility of a rotation in power [was] not envisaged' (Sartori 1976: 230). In order to reproduce its political hegemony at the polls, the PRI could rely on a vast array of undemocratic mechanisms. It could exclude political actors from electoral competition; it could try to co-opt or repress them; it could exploit its monopolistic hold on public resources; it could enforce the subservience of the mass media; but last but not least, it could resort to electoral fraud anytime it seemed convenient. Controlling the organization of election in a centralized fashion, the PRI was able to alter electoral results either to inflate its victories (cosmetic alchemy) or to 'correct' its defeats (decisive fraud). It is probable, thought, that the main function of vote-rigging was preventive. In its golden times of hegemony, the ruling party had little need to alter electoral outcomes. In many places it did not face any opposition at all, and until 1982, it never received less than three quarters of the vote at presidential contests. Still, the manipulation of electoral results always loomed in the background as a powerful 'mechanism of last resort.' Every actor in the political game knew about it and adjusted his or her expectations accordingly. Power, as we know, is at its strongest when it has to be used less. It is a sure sign of erosion when it has to make good on its threats. Accordingly, as the PRI's hegemony began to erode, it first reacted by stepping on the brakes of electoral fraud in order to halt the accelerating train of democratization. In the municipal elections of 1983, while the country was hit by its worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the PAN turned to more self-confident and confrontational strategies and actually succeeded to win several major cities in Northern Mexico. In response, president Miguel de la Madrid (1982 88) quickly decided that it was too risky to use the electoral arena as a safety valve for social discontent. In the remaining of his term, he tried to contain the emerging opposition through a mixture of electoral fraud and a reassertion of control over electoral administration. Privileging electoral control over electoral legitimacy, the PRI was able to hold its exclusive positions of power, excepting some local defeats, at all levels of government. But the perpetuation of power came at a price. The increasing reliance on electoral fraud provoked an escalation of post-electoral conflicts and ended up hollowing out whatever may have remained of the regime's procedural legitimacy. This self-reinforcing cycle of increasing competition, fraud, conflict, and discredit reached its culminating point in the 1988 presidential elections. In this highly competitive race, the official candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, defeated the conservative candidate Manuel J. Clouthier as well as the PRI breakaway CuauhtÈmoc C·rdenas in what is largely regarded 'the most egregious violation of norms for free and fair elections in modern Mexico' (Eisenstadt 1999: 84). The massive evidence of fraud pushed the country into a the dramatic uncertainties of a 'confusing postelectoral conflict' (Loaeza 1999: 24), laying open an acute crisis of legitimacy. President Carlos Salinas (1988 94) soon embarked on repairing his tarnished 'legitimacy of origin' by convoking parties to negotiate reforms to the electoral system. These as well as all subsequent reforms faced one central challenge: 'to redress an ancient distrust into electoral procedures' (Woldenberg 1999: 68). The antinomy of distrust and credibility came to represent the guiding distinction of a whole decade of electoral reforms. In the end, after four rounds of intensive inter-party negotiations, these distrust-driven reforms enacted in 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1996 led to a radical transformation of Mexico's electoral institutions. In order to subject the electoral Leviathan to credible restraint, political parties set up a comprehensive scheme of interlocking institutional constraints. Among other things, they wrote a new electoral law, the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE). They took the administration of elections out of the hand of the Ministry of the Interior, and established a permanent, non-partisan, and autonomous election management body, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). They designed a specialized judicial tribunal to settle electoral disputes. They formulated a catalogue of electoral crimes backed by harsh penal sanctions, to be enforced by a special persecutor. They revamped the electoral registry and issued new, high-tech and high-security voter ID cards. And they established a 'panoptic' regime of party surveillance, allowing political parties to monitor each step of the electoral process. It is no exaggeration to conclude that these and other 'confidence building measures' added up to a genuine refoundation of the country's electoral infrastructure. So, distrust bore many children, although the present article will limit its attention to only one of them: the impetus to reduce administrative discretion through tight and detailed bureaucratic regulation. It will document the 'baroque' density of formal rules that characterizes Mexico's electoral law by analyzing three classical areas of bureaucratic constraint: record keeping, identity controls, and time rules. Record Keeping The modern bureau, the modern office, is a warehouse of wood (in its processed form as paper). Bureaucratic rule, to paraphrase Lincoln, is the rule of the paper, by the paper, and for the paper. Forms and files are the souls of bureaucratic Leviathan, and the requirement to record and report everything official in writing represents one of its basic principles of action. Electoral administration in democratic Mexico is a neat case of bureaucratic organization based on record keeping. Here as anywhere else in the world of modern bureaucracy, the written form serves the main purpose of certainty and control. Red tape is, so to speak, the material basis of bureaucratic accountability. Hence, Mexico's electoral reformers drew up a complex network of interlocking pieces of paper documents, applications, forms, files, originals, copies, minutes, certificates, notifications, receipts, and reports in order to ensure that all administrative steps follow uniform, controlled, and, above all, controllable procedures that enable parties to trace eventual irregularities back to their original sources. As a consequence, Mexico's electoral law code turns each federal election into a gigantic paper mill. Four particularly paper-intensive processes may illustrate this point: voter registry, candidate registry, voting, and vote counting. (1) Voter registry Since the early 1990s, the construction and regular up-date of the voter registry in Mexico is a thoroughly computerized high-tech enterprise. For all its technological sophistication, however, the registration of voters still gives rise to considerable stocks and flows of paper. For instance, citizens, the main clients of the electoral bureaucracy besides political parties, have to fill out application forms to be included into the electoral list [143.1 and 148.1], submit documents that prove their identity [144.2], receive a receipt of their application [148.3], sign a receipt when being handed over their voter card [144.4], submit documents and application forms to up-date their personal data [146.4], fill in and submit forms to appeal against their eventual exclusion from the electoral list or against the eventual non-receipt of their voter card [151.6], and receive the notification of the corresponding rulings [151.7]. (2) Candidate registry The formal registration of electoral candidates follows the same principle as the registration of voters: Bureaucracies define the conditions under which external agents may gain recognition as official objects of administration (clients) and trigger internal decision-making processes (administrative acts). More often than not, the bureaucratic conditions for external communication include rigid demands for written documentation and standardized forms. To register candidates for elective office at federal level, political parties have to submit, for each candidate, an application with the candidate's personal data, a declaration of acceptance, a copy of her or his birth certificate, a copy of her or his voter card, and a proof of her or his place of residence [178.1 and 2], a written confirmation that the candidate was selected according to prevailing party rules [178.3], and a certificate that the party has registered the minimum number of candidates it is required to register for plurality deputies [178.4] and plurality senators [178.5]. (3) Voting While the preparatory steps of Mexico's federal elections such as the accreditation of electoral observers [5.3], the selection of polling station officials [193], the determination of polling station locations [195 6], the nomination of party representatives [202 4], and the delivery of the voting material to polling station officials [207 8] already involve extensive paper work, the requirements for record keeping are particularly tight at voting day. The comprehensive polling station file (expediente de casilla) [234.1] that electoral officials have to compile in the course of the day must contain the voting day file (acta de la jornada electoral) [212.4] composed of a detailed file recording the initiation of the voting process [212.5] and a another one reporting on the closure of the voting process [225]; a file that states the results of vote counting and computing (acta de escrutinio y cÛmputo) [232.1]; and eventual reports on public disorders [220.2] or other incidents [221] as well as eventual notes of protest submitted by party representatives [199.1.f and 234.1.d]. Once these documents are put together, political party representatives (who are free and in some cases even obliged to sign all of them) receive a 'legible copy' of the complete file, against the obligatory receipt [235.1]. The formal requirement of legibility, of course, is symptomatic for the surviving assumption of bad will towards electoral officials who in the past displayed a considerable capacity of subverting formal rules. (4) Vote counting If vote counting at district, state, and federal level constitutes the culminating event of the electoral process, it also marks the culmination of electoral paperwork. As before, COFIPE demands files and forms for everything: files to record the reception of voting materials from polling stations [238.6 and 242.2], forms to fill in the results computed at polling stations [243.1.c], forms to state the identity of polling station files and District Council files [247.1.a], files to document procedures and findings in case of altered electoral packages [247.1.d], files to report the aggregate results at district level [247.1.e and g], as well as detailed files to give a summary of vote counting at district level, including its results, eventual incidents, and declarations of validity and eligibility [247.1.i]. Since there are up to three federal elections at a time (for the presidency and the two legislative chambers) which furthermore are conducted on the basis of a mixed electoral system (that combines plurality formula with proportional representation for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), the paperwork associated with vote counting multiplies accordingly. At the end of the vote count, the whole process of large-scale paper production flows into a final, apotheotic act of bureaucratic ingenuity: the distribution of those files to different points in the system of electoral administration and dispute adjudication [see 252 and 253]. Identification
Any administrative apparatus, if it wants to make good on the bureaucratic promise of reliability, has to ensure clarity about and control over its basic units of operation (clients, files, and decisions). It has to define criteria of eligibility that allow to identify the beneficiaries (or victims) of its services. It has to set up systems of storage and communication that prevent files from getting lost, altered, or misdirected. And it has to issue documents that give some recognizable form to its final decisions. Given the country's history of electoral fraud, the organization of elections in Mexico reflects a particularly intense concern with establishing and safeguarding the identity of its main administrative objects. In accordance with the nature of the task at hand putting the democratic principle of 'one person, one vote' into administrative practice the federal electoral law focuses on two fundamental challenges: ensuring the identity of the its core clients (citizens) and guaranteeing the integrity of its core documents (ballots). The Identity of Citizens In the golden days of authoritarian PRI hegemony, the voter registry represented a renown major source of vote rigging. In essence, it worked as a mechanism of 'weighting' voting rights: It denied suffrage to those people 'shaved' from the list while multiplying the votes of those with various entries. While some of the inaccuracies may have had its origins in technical problems, opposition parties always suspected, and with good reasons, that the voter list's deficiencies were not randomly distributed but rather reflected a clear political bias over-representing regime loyalists while under-representing presumptive protest voters. As soon as questions of electoral cleanness (as different from issues of political representation) entered Mexico's electoral reform agenda in the 1980s, it was clear that the country was not to have clean elections without first setting up an accurate voter registry. It was clear as well that this was not to be an easy assignment - in a country where the State does a lousy job in identifying its subjects at birth, counting them in regular national censuses, and registering them for military service, the payment of taxes, or the provision of welfare services; as well as in a country where population mobility (internal and external migration), problems of personal identification (most people do not have a passport), problems of location in space (homonymous and anonymous streets), not to speak of sheer factors of size (numbers and spatial distances), pose formidable objective obstacles to any pretension of subjecting the population to the epistemological requirements of a modern state bureaucracy (see Scott 1998). This it not the place to recount the enormous efforts in terms of time, money, personnel, expertise, and technology both the IFE and political parties have invested since 1990 in order to set up and run a new fully computerized voter registry as well as to issue (twice) a new high-tech and maximum-security voter card (for an exhaustive review and analysis, see Luj·n 1997). Here, I would just like to list some of the formal rules the electoral code defines in order to prevent that voter lists and voter cards (as well as other related documents) be altered or misused. The law establishes that voter cards have to fulfill minimum standards of safety (which actual cards exceed by far) in order to render them forgery-proof [164.1 and 2], that non-utilized blanks of voter card will be stored in 'a place that guarantees their integrity' [144.5], that voter cards replaced for whatever reason have to be destroyed [150.2], that invalidated voter cards have to be destroyed [163.4], that District Councils must double-check whether the official voter list corresponds to the list parties received for purposes of control [161.3], that the General Council may carry out further random checks in order to establish the identity of these lists [161.4], that polling station Secretaries mark the voter cards as well as the right-hand thumb (with indelible ink) of voters who have made use of the ballot [218.4], and that an 'institution of renown reputation' certifies the quality of the indelible ink before election day [208.3], while the General Council must carry out a random check of its remainders after election day to make sure that it had not been replaced or altered [208.4]. It may be useful to recall that numerous mechanisms of accountability that give parties as well as citizens a say in the prior stages of document production complement the provisions designed to protect the integrity of the official documents and materials that serve to identify the enfranchised citizenry. The Integrity of Ballots The elaborate safety measures the electoral law defines concerning ballots begin with their design. COFIPE determines the minimum information each ballot must contain [205.2 6], prescribes a paper design that allows to maintain full control over the number of ballots in circulation at any stage of the process [205.2.d], and asks the General Council to introduce any further security marks it should deem necessary [205.1]. Once printed, the law further stipulates, ballots cannot be changed anymore [206.1]. About three weeks before election day, IFE has to distribute the ballots to District Councils. Naturally, the electoral Code contains detailed provisions for safeguarding the integrity of ballots throughout their delivery and subsequent storage [207]. 'Authorized personnel' of the Institute must deliver the ballots at some pre-established day, hour, and place [207.2.a]. A detailed file of reception must record the quantity of ballots delivered, the way they are packaged, and the names and positions of the officials witnessing the act [207.2.b]. The District Council must then safeguard the material at some pre-established place, guarantee its integrity through wrappers stamped and signed by all persons present, and again record the whole process in writing [207.2.c]. The next day (at latest) the Council must recount the ballots, stamp them, and group them in packages to be delivered to polling stations the week before election day [207.2.d]. And so forth. This pre-electoral stream of bureaucratic activities planning, filing, counting, sealing, stamping, signing, storing, and recording aims at retaining control over the number of ballots in circulation as well as at preventing the falsification, manipulation, and destruction of ballots before voting day. During voting day, transparent ballot boxes [209.1] fulfill essentially the same function. In addition, party representatives carry the duty to certify the authenticity of all election day files through their personal signatures [200.2, 214.1, 233.1, 216.3, 220.2, and 225.2]. They may even sign ballots if they wish, both before voting day [207.3] and at the initiation of the voting process [212.3], as well as the whole package of documents and materials polling station officials put together at the end of the voting day [233.1]. Incidentally, this must be considered a sweet irony of bureaucratic control: a bureaucratic apparatus, the archetypal expression of modern impersonal rule, making use of the signature, a typical manifestation of modern individual identity. Once polling stations close, complex counting procedures strive to ensure that ballots enter the electoral equation the way they should: one ballot, one vote. None lost, none added, none altered. The legal set of rules of vote counting includes rules about the sequencing of vote counts [228 and 229.1]; rules of distinction between valid and nil votes [227.2, 230, and 232.3]; an elaborate division of work and mutual controls between polling station officials [229.1]; the requirement of crossing out counted ballots and putting them into a special envelope [229.1.a], extensive requirements of reporting and record keeping [232.1 and 2]; and the continuing presence of party representatives until the end of the process [237.1]. After this operation, the ballots together with all other files and materials take their way from the polling station to the District Council where they are not just summed up to aggregate results but also double-checked and eventually recounted. In these later phases of vote counting, the electoral law does not lessen at all its firm grip over the ballots and all other electoral documents [see 234, 235, 238, and 242 63]. But at this point, tracing this long chain of 'identity checks' further, would only come at the unacceptable price of boredom. Time Rules As JosÈ Woldenberg, the President of the Federal Electoral Institute, rightly states, COFIPE, with all its detailed procedural regulation, represents more than just a legal framework for electoral administration. It rather resembles an exhaustive 'manual of procedures' (1998: 29). One of the most prominent aspects of procedural regulation as contained in the electoral code concerns time rules. These time rules are of diverse nature. They include rules of duration, rules of sequencing, rules of frequency, as well as rules of initiation and termination. But most of them are rules of timing that define schedules of administrative action, either by delineating periods or points in time when something may or must be done or by fixing deadlines up to which something may or must be done. Let us give just four instructive examples of aspects of the electoral process which are embedded in a dense network of formal temporal constraints: nominal lists, voter cards, candidate registration, and voting day. (1) To begin with, one of IFE's core activities which is thoroughly constrained by legal time rules is the management of the nominal voter list. Among other things temporal, the law stipulates a deadline for the annual delivery of nominal lists to District Juntas for public exhibition [156.1], a deadline for returning the lists from municipal authorities to District Juntas [157.1], another deadline for returning the lists from District to Local Juntas [157.2], an annual period when parties dispose of the nominal lists [158.1], a deadline for reporting eventual modifications made by the Institute [158.4], a time period during which parties may appeal against these changes [158.5], a day when IFE must deliver magnetic tapes of the nominal list to parties in election years [159.1], a day when it must deliver the hard copies [159.1], a deadline up to which parties may formulate their objections [159.2], a deadline to report about eventual ensuing modifications made by the IFE [159.3], a deadline for parties to appeal against these changes [159.4], a deadline for printing nominal lists with photographs [161.1], and a deadline for delivering them Local Councils [161.1]. (2) With regard to the distribution of voter cards, COFIPE determines deadlines for citizens to pick up their voter cards [144.1 and 163.1], a deadline up to which IFE has to hand over a list of cancelled voter cards to political parties [163.2], a period during which this list must be exhibited in public [163.3], a deadline for soliciting the replacement of lost cards [164.3], the requirement to immediately destroy replaced voter cards [150.2], a deadline for destroying the blanks of unsolicited cards [163.4], and a period during which IFE must store the data of those citizens who, for whatever reason, have their name taken off the voter registry [163.9 and 10].
(3) With respect to the official registration of candidates, the electoral Code defines a period for registering campaign platforms [176.2], periods for registering diverse kinds of candidacies [177.1], a maximum time for IFE to check whether candidates fulfill all legal requisites [179.1], the requirement of immediate notification to parties [179.2], a maximum time for parties to meet missing requisites [179.2] as well as to remedy eventual multiple candidacies [179.3], a maximum time for IFE Councils at all levels to session after these deadlines have passed [179.5], the requirement that Local and District Councils immediately notify the registration of candidates to the General Council and the other way round [179.6 and 179.7], as well as, finally, deadlines for replacing candidates [181.1 and 2]. (4) Another phase in the electoral process which is subject to tight temporal constraints is, of course, voting day. The law establishes the day and hour when polling stations must be installed [212.2], an express prohibition of installing them before [212.6], a contingency schedule for installing polling stations in different ways in case the normal procedure cannot be followed [213.1 and 213.1.f], the requirement of permanent presence of polling station officials during election day [212.7], the provision that general party representatives may remain in polling stations only 'the time necessary' to do their job [219.4], a requirement of immediate notification in case the voting process has to be suspended [216.2], the hour of closure of the voting process plus rules of exception [224], deadlines for delivering electoral results and all documentation to District Councils [238.1], and provisions about their eventual extension [238.2 and 5]. This illustrative list of time rules is, of course, far from exhaustive. The Code sets further temporal constraints for the up-dating of the voter registry [146.1, 147.1, and 151.2 and 3], the distribution of electoral propaganda [190.2], the publication of opinion polls [190.4], the multiple-stage random selection of polling station officials [193.1], the nomination of party representatives at polling stations [198.1 and 201 3], the determination of polling stations' physical location [195.1], the delivery of voting material to polling station officials [208.1], vote counting at district and state levels [246.1 2 and 255.1], and so forth. Basically, the electoral law attaches a deadline to any right and obligation it assigns. This fulfills two basic functions. On the side of obligations, time rules limit power. Decision-makers do not just have an abstract obligation to do something. They have to fulfill it within determinate time limits, and may be held accountable for it. On the side of rights, time rules legitimate power. If those who hold certain rights, be it political parties or individual citizens, do not make use of them within the time frame set by the law, the responsibility for forfeiting their rights falls back on them themselves. In other words, subjecting administrative agents to deadlines shifts power to their clients, while subjecting claimants to deadlines shifts power to administrative authorities. In both cases, the responsibility for any eventual failure to act in a timely fashion lays with the one who ignores the legally established time limit. Distrust and Bureaucracy The dense network of rules Mexico's electoral code spreads out is distinctively and classically bureaucratic in spirit. As such, it runs diametrically against the anti-bureaucratic or post-bureaucratic Zeitgeist of current public administration theory. The country's electoral law embodies everything the new 'managerial' public administration school abhors. Oblivious to the new discourse that hails flexibility, risk-taking, innovation, experimentation, empowerment, personal responsibility, problem solving, employee participation, worker motivation, voluntary compliance, competition, market mechanisms, product orientation, service and customer orientation, and so forth, the electoral code pursues with single-minded determination to establish a paradigmatic Weberian bureaucracy. Rather than assigning the distinction between politics and administration 'to the dustbin of history' (Altshuler 1992: vii), Mexico's electoral code strives to institutionalize it. Rather than adopting the (so to speak) administratively correct focus on results, it embraces 'the obsolete focus on rules' (Barzelay 1992: 125). Rather than empowering public officials, setting them free 'from the constraints that limit experimentation,' and accepting 'a calculated degree of risk' (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 203), it does everything to minimize their discretion. Rather than fostering an 'entrepreneurial culture' (Thompson and Riccucci 1998: 236) of innovation and creativity, it tries to build a machine-like apparatus that would work with maximum 'precision, constancy, discipline, tightness, and reliability, hence: calculability' (Weber 1972: 128). In sum, rather than 'reinventing government' (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), Mexico's electoral reformers set out to forge an old-fashioned iron 'cage of subservience' (see Weber 1988: 332). However, one may well ask: How else could it have been? How else, given the starting point a history of fraud and abuse that impregnated electoral governance with deep and pervasive distrust as well as the corresponding task at hand constructing electoral institutions subject to effective as well as credible restraints. After all, the Federal Electoral Institute was never thought to be a simple service organization but an 'agency of restraint' (Collier 1999). The reinvention movement in public administration rests on one pivotal assumption: We can (and should) trust public officials. Its central recommendation to free state employees from the bureaucratic bondage of rules and regulations makes sense only under the strong premise that public officials will not abuse their enlarged degrees of freedom. The 'post-bureaucratic paradigm' (Barzelay 1992) correctly perceives that the bureaucratic obsession with control, regulation, discipline, surveillance, and punishment flows out of a deeply distrustful attitude toward public officials. Rather than treating employees as 'trusted servants' it views them as 'potential criminals' (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 62). Trust, however, is a scarce resource that cannot be generated neither by administrative fiat nor by scholarly exhortation. To tell the participants in Mexico's electoral reforms: trust each other! would have hardly paved the way to clean and credible elections. Distrust, once it settles into a self-reinforcing 'equilibrium,' must be regarded a 'hard' social constraint that cannot be simply wished away. It works as a forceful 'social mechanism' (see Hedstrm and Swedberg 1998) that generates a limited set of consequences. Rational choice theory, the anthropology of distrust, has done a good job in specifying the possible answers to distrust. If I distrust you I may either stop dealing with you or else, constrain, monitor, reward or punish you. The bureaucratic elimination of discretion is just one of several plausible strategies to manage distrust. But it is one of the most common ones. Distrust, thus, breeds bureaucracy. As Thompson and Riccucci state, 'low levels of citizen trust in government encourage administrative approaches at odds with reinvention approaches based on rules, investigations, audits, procedural requirements, and control' (1998: 255). It is accordingly hard to see how Mexico's political parties could have chosen a trust-based strategy of loose 'post-bureaucratic' regulation, rather than their high-security strategy of watertight 'bureaucratic' regulation. The Embedded Bureaucracy If the prevailing level of distrust towards the PRI state left electoral reformers with little choice other than locking the new election management body into a bureaucratic cage of detailed rules and regulations, one may still wonder whether those formal constraints were actually effective in preventing fraud (and if so, at what price). As a matter of course, the effectiveness of formal rule changes cannot be taken for granted, and even less so in a context like the Mexican. Formal restrictions are 'frequently blunted, distorted, and subverted so that what remains is form rather than substance' (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 17). Also, altered formal rules often run against the padded walls of persisting informal rules. Furthermore, in the Latin American context, authors have argued that the region's new democracies represent 'informally institutionalized' polities whose everyday politics suffer from a 'visible and apparently increasing gap' between 'formal rules and actual behavior' (O'Donnell 1996: 35, 40 1). In Mexico, specifically, the pervasive 'rule of lawlessness' has been a recurrent topic in political and academic debate. Still, as they redesigned the institutional infrastructure of electoral governance, Mexican political parties displayed an enormous faith in legal regulation. Electoral law reform constituted the very axis around which the country's protracted process of political democratization revolved. But formal rule changes did not just provide an illusionary appearance of change. They represented an effective, powerful lever that allowed the democratic opposition to gradually lift the authoritarian regime out of its hinges. Today, most national as well as international observers would agree that these reforms indeed succeeded in bringing the age-old problem of electoral fraud under control; that elections in contemporary Mexico have been effectively transformed from manipulative authoritarian rituals to democratic contests free, fair, competitive, and clean (see, for example, Silva-Herzog 1999 and Loaeza 1999). How can we explain this successful transition from electoral fraud to electoral integrity? How can we explain the apparent effectiveness of the new set of legal constraints? The most obvious answer is: Formal changes were effective because they did not come alone. As we mentioned above, bureaucratic regulation is embedded in a comprehensive institutional architecture that comprises numerous interlocking mechanisms of restraint. Furthermore, the particularities of electoral administration (as we will analyze them below), above all, its cyclical nature, may help to render traditional instruments of bureaucratic control more effective than in other fields of public administration. But most importantly, in the course of Mexico's democratic transition, it were not just formal rules that have changed. The underlying realities of power, the prevailing correlation of forces between political parties, have undergone dramatic changes as well. Gone is the extreme asymmetry between state party and opposition that sustained the monopolistic control of electoral governance during decades. Today, opposition parties are not only able to win elections; they are also able to oversee and defend their victories. In Mexico, electoral fraud and electoral competition have evolved in an inverted-U-shaped curve. First, in the 1980s, as the party system became more competitive, the PRI responded with an intensification of fraud. Later, however, in the 1990s, the increasing competitive strength of the democratic opposition made vote-rigging a practice that was more and more difficult to sustain. Furthermore, it was not just opposition parties that came to act as powerful 'agents of accountability.' Over the past decade, civic associations and mass media, too, have developed impressive abilities to monitor electoral processes. The Distinctive Bureaucracy So far we argued that the bureaucratic regulation of electoral governance was quite inevitable given its primary function of providing credible restraint but also quite effective given its embeddedness in a wider network of restraint, enforcement, and monitoring. The question remains, however: How costly has the reliance on a bureaucratic mode of control been? In comparative terms, running elections has been seemingly more expensive in Mexico than in most Western European and Latin American countries (see LÛpez-Pintor 1999: 64 74). In part this reflects the fact that the Mexican electoral budget includes the costs of voter registration, a task which in most other OECD countries falls under the purview of general registration offices within the regular state administration. Also, the growing experience of the Federal Electoral Institute has been leading to considerable efficiency gains over time. It is unclear, however, how much cheaper the conduct of elections in Mexico would be if the electoral code would leave somewhat larger margins of discretion to electoral officials. But more importantly, it seems that in electoral governance, bureaucratic regulation does not generate the same kind of 'bureaucratic pathologies' as we have learned to know and to fear them in other spheres of public management. Electoral administration is different in at least in four regards which tend to reduce the costs of a bureaucratic mode of control by detailed formal rules. (1) The periodical task Complying with the strict and detailed set of rules the Mexican electoral code imposes on election officials may be complicated, burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive. But it's just once every three years. The bulk of the rules do not guide the everyday operation of a bureaucracy producing a permanent flow of homogeneous decisions. The Federal Electoral Institute does accomplish some continuous tasks, such as maintaining the voter registry, auditing political parties, monitoring the mass media, and educating the citizenry. But its main function, the organization of elections, is cyclical. A modern, representative democracy is based on regular elections, on the institutional expression of popular preferences at determinate intervals. It is not what Ernest Renan, in his famous definition, thought a nation to be: a daily plebiscite (Renan 1882: 307). Thus, much of the bureaucratic framework that regulates the organization of elections is effective only for specific tasks in delimited periods. As a consequence, it will hardly generate the same kind of costs as a permanent straightjacket of formal rules. Rather, it will tend to produce delimited and transitory 'pathologies' only. For example, it is hard to see how the citizen who happens to be chosen to work at a polling station, will develop, in the course of one day, the same blind routines and the 'bureaucratic personalities' that are said to afflict officials in other walks of bureaucratic life. (2) Citizens as agents Pursuing the Weberian ideal type of a rule-bound, neutral, and predictable administrative machine, the Federal Electoral Institute has been trying, since its inception (in 1990), to implement 'the quintessential reform in the history of public administration' (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 39): the professionalization of public officials through a merit-based civil service system. Polling stations, however, are not staffed with professional employees. Rather, to staff the over 100.000 polling stations the Institute sets up at each election, it selects ordinary citizens on the basis of a complicated two-stage random procedure. Accordingly, all the 'line agents' who do the face-to-face interaction with voters at voting day are not full-time bureaucrats but ordinary citizens. The numbers are impressive. At the 1997 mid-term legislative elections, more than 730.000 citizens (Becerra and Salazar 1999: 408) contributed to turn the contest into a 'great democratic party' (Ernesto Zedillo). This looks like an unusual degree of community control, as Vincent Ostrom demanded it more than ten years ago (1989) as a centerpiece of public administration reform. (3) The procedural product According to the reinvention school, public administration should abandon its 'obsolete focus on rules' (Barzelay 1992: 125) and concentrate instead on its 'mission.' Products, not procedures have to be the central concerns of the 'post-bureaucratic' public official. As Thompson and Riccucci synthesize, 'employees are to be freed from many of the rules that currently limit their discretion' in order to hold them 'accountable for the results of their activities' (1998: 236). In the realm of electoral administration, however, the procedures are the product. What are election management bodies supposed to deliver? Very simple: clean procedures. This is what we hold them accountable for: the correct and efficient implementation of a complex body of rules and procedures. They do not have a mission beyond. Election management bodies are not supposed to provide welfare, redemption, or entertainment. They are supposed to provide the procedural foundations of liberal democracy. It would be intelligible to election officials if we told them to focus on their 'mission' instead of worrying about the rules. In the organization of elections, privileging rules over substance is not a symptom of pathological 'goal displacement' (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 179) but the very condition of democratic success. Substituting (post-modern?) substantive legitimation for the modern 'legitimation by procedures' (Luhmann 1983) may be problematic in many spheres of public administration. In the realm of electoral governance, it is simply unthinkable. (4) The function of rules 'A multitude of rules and regulations appears to be the very essence of a bureaucracy' (Perrow 1986: 20). The corresponding idea, however, that detailed rules and regulations represent the core symptom of the bureaucratic disease, seems to derive from the plethora of existing rules that do not make sense. But rules may be more than meaningless noise. In general, 'rules protect those who are subject to them' (ibid.: 24). In the realm of electoral administration, legal rules translate political rights into political realities. Insofar they are visibly linked to this goal, they are rules that make sense. In Mexico, the function of electoral rules to empower citizens with voting rights as well as their context of pervasive distrust between parties provide tangible justifications for most provisions, even if the same provisions would look abstruse in a different setting characterized by lower stakes and higher trust. Conclusion The present article reconstructed the bureaucratic structure of Mexico's election code in three regulatory areas: record keeping requirements, identity controls, and time rules. In our concluding remarks, we would like to highlight the two main general hypotheses we put forward regarding the causes and consequences of bureaucratic regulation in electoral governance. On the one hand, looking at bureaucratic grids of detailed rules as a dependent variable, the article identified distrust as the central 'social mechanism' that makes plausible why political parties in democratizing Mexico devised a bureaucratic set of rules that strives to minimize administrative discretion, rather than opting for a less restrictive 'managerial' design of electoral administration. 'Post-bureaucratic' approaches that privilege responsibility over control presuppose a decision to trust public officials. Strategic actors who are stuck into low-trust equilibria would be foolish to take such a risky decision. They will always prefer security over trust. On the other hand, looking at bureaucratic regulation as an independent variable, the article concluded that Mexico's electoral code contradicts the widespread assumption that bureaucratic rules and procedures are 'not a very effective mode of control' (Przeworski 1999: 27). Moreover, as one starts to think about the distinctive nature of electoral governance, one is pressed to conclude that in this realm, a high density of formal constraints is less likely to generate the same kind of 'bureaucratic pathologies' as in other spheres of public administration. In sum, our explorative expedition into the under-researched terrain of electoral governance took us some steps towards the goal of 'specifying the conditions under which one management style might succeed or fail' (Thompson and Riccucci 1998: 254). Distrust breeds bureaucracy, we stated, and in new democracies, electoral governance is likely to be infected by the aggressive virus of distrust. Yet, at the same time, the field is also likely to be more resistant to the corrosive disease of bureaucratic pathologies. Mexico City, FLACSO, October 1999
Notes I am indebted to the Austrian Academy of Sciences for supporting work on this paper through the Austrian Program for Advanced Research and Technology (APART). Also, I would like to thank Carlos Santiso and Richard Snyder for valuable comments on an earlier version of this article. References Altshuler, Alan A. (1992), 'Foreword,' Breaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in Government, Michael Barzelay, with Babak J. Armajani (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. vii xii. Anechiarico, Frank and James B. Jacobs (1996), The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press). Barzelay, Michael, with Babak J. Armajani (1992), Breaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in Government (Berkeley: University of California Press). Becerra, Ricardo and Pedro Salazar (1999), 'La elecciÛn federal de 1997: una descripciÛn general,' 1997: Elecciones y transiciÛn a la democracia en MÈxico, ed. Luis Salazar (Mexico City: Cal y arena), pp. 43 75. Collier, Paul (1999), 'Learning from Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in Africa,' The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 313 30. Diamond, Larry (1999), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press). Eisenstadt, Todd A. (1999), 'Off the Streets and into the Courtrooms: Resolving Postelectoral Conflicts in Mexico,' The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 83 103. Foucault, Michel (1979), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage). Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast (1995), 'Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,' Explaining Social Institutions, eds. Jack Knight and Itai Sened (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 27 56. Hedstrm, Peter and Richard Swedberg (1998), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). Instituto Federal Electoral (1996), CÛdigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales y otros ordenamientos electorales (MÈxico, DF: IFE). Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins (1991), The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Loaeza, Soledad (1999), Incertidumbre y riesgo en transiciones prolongadas: La experiencia mexicana y el Partido AcciÛn Nacional, paper prepared for presentation at the conference 'Pathways to Democracy: Specifying Protracted Transitions', Mexico City, El Colegio de MÈxico, 19 21 May. LÛpez-Pintor, Rafael (1999), Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance (New York: UNDP), unpublished manuscript. Luhmann, Niklas (1983), Legitimation durch Verfahren (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp). Luj·n Ponce, NoemÌ (1997), TecnologÌa y procesos electorales en MÈxico (1988 1994): Entre la democracia y el control polÌtico (Mexico City: FLACSO), PhD Dissertation. Miller, Gary J. (1992), Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Morales M., Rodrigo (1995), 'La sociedad civil y las elecciones en MÈxico: Observadores e interventores,' La voz de los votos: Un an·lisis crÌtico de las elecciones de 1994, Germ·n PÈrez Fern·ndez del Castillo, Arturo Alvarado M., and Arturo S·nchez GutiÈrrez (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porra and FLACSO), pp. 87 98. Nohlen, Dieter, Sonia Picardo, and Daniel Zovatto (eds.) (1998), Tratado de derecho electoral comparado de AmÈrica Latina (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura EconÛmica). North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast (1996), 'Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England,' Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, eds. Lee J. Alston, Thr·inn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 134 65. O'Donnell, Guillermo (1996), 'Illusions about Consolidation' Journal of Democracy 7/2 (April): 34 51. Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler (1992), Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector from Schoolhouse to Statehouse, City Hall to the Pentagon (Reading: Addison-Wesley). Ostrom, Vincent (1989), The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press). Pastor, Robert (1999a), 'A Brief History of Electoral Commissions,' The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Pastor, Robert A. (1999b), 'The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for Policy and Research,' Democratization 6/4 (Winter): forthcoming.
Perrow, Charles (1986), Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (New York: McGraw-Hill), 3rd edition. Przeworski, Adam (1999), 'On the Design of the State: A Principal-Agent Perspective,' Reforming the State: Managerial Public Administration in Latin America, ed. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 15 39. Renan, Ernest (1882), 'Qu'est-ce qu' une nation?' Discours et confÈrences (Paris: Calmann-LÈvy). Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). Sartori, Giovanni (1976), Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Schedler, Andreas (1997), A Brief History of Electoral Reforms in Mexico (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies), unpublished manuscript.
Schedler, Andreas and Javier Santiso (1998), 'Democracy and Time: An Invitation,' International Political Science Review 19/1 (January 1998): 5-18. Scott, James C. (1998), Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). Silva-Herzog M·rquez, Jess (1999), El antiguo rÈgimen y la transiciÛn a la democracia (Mexico City: Planeta y JoaquÛn Mortiz). Thompson, Frank J. and Norma M. Riccucci (1998), 'Reinventing Government,' Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 1, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews), pp. 231 57. Weber, Max (1972), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriþ der verstehenden Soziologie, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (T¸bingen: Mohr), 5th edition.
Woldenberg, JosÈ, (1998), 'Votar en el extranjero: Hechos y preguntas antes un tema difÌcil,' EtcÈtera 288 (6 August 1998): 26 30.
New Zealand's Change to MMP
by Paul Harris Introduction All democratic voting systems create incentives and disincentives which affect the behaviour of political parties and election candidates. It is well-established that different types of voting system can affect the nature of democratic representation and the composition of government. For example, countries which use a voting system based on proportional representation are more likely to have smaller parties represented in their legislatures, to have a multi-party governments, and to have representation from a variety of social groups. On the other hand, smaller parties find it more difficult to win seats under a simple plurality voting system, there tend to be single-party majority governments elected under that system, and the make-up of the legislature tends to be less diverse than in proportional systems. However it is not only the type of voting system that is important. Variations within types of voting systems can also affect parties' chances of winning seats, and can affect the extent to which members of various social groups are present in the legislature. For example
The choices of the type and details of the voting system used to elect a legislature can thus raise significant integrity issues. But it must always be remembered that there is no perfect voting system. Although it is important that a democratic voting system should be fair, equal and transparent, those goals can be achieved in different ways. It is a matter for each country to judge which voting system will best achieve them in the context of its own history, culture and traditions. Integrity issues are also raised concerning the process by which decisions are made about changing from one type of voting system to another. For example:
In 1993 New Zealand changed its voting system for parliamentary elections from the First-Past-the-Post system (FPP) to a system of proportional representation based on the German model, known as 'Mixed Member Proportional' (MMP)416. This paper outlines the way that change took place. It is not intended that New Zealand's process and experience should be taken as the model which other countries should follow. Rather the New Zealand experience is presented as a case study of why one country decided to change its voting system and the process by which the decision was made. Why did New Zealand change to MMP? Why did New Zealand one of the world's oldest democracies make such a major change in its constitutional arrangements, from its well-established single-member plurality voting system to the MMP system of proportional representation? Three sets of circumstances help explain that change: 1. Election results New Zealand's FPP electoral system was finally established in 1913. After a period of adjustment, the Labour Party and the National Party had emerged by the mid-1930s as the two major political parties. However the well-known effects of the FPP voting system began to be felt from the mid-1950s when the Social Credit party began to gain significant electoral support across the country but without winning many seats. In the eight general elections from 1954 to 1975, Social Credit gained an average of 9% of the vote but won only 1 seat, in 1966.417 Mutterings about whether the FPP voting system was fair turned into wider grumblings after the 1978 election because the Labour Party won 10,000 more votes (0.6%) than the National Party but had 11 fewer Members of Parliament (MPs) than National in a House of 92. Social Credit won 1 seat with 16% of the vote. Labour's policy at the 1981 election was that there should be an authoritative re-examination of New Zealand's electoral system. Its concerns about the FPP voting system were reinforced after that election since once again National won more seats (4) than Labour even though Labour won 4,000 more votes than National. Such results confirmed Labour's suspicions that the way the FPP system was working in New Zealand was biassed against it and strengthened its resolve to review the electoral system as soon as it could. The 1981 election again underlined Social Credit's difficulties; it won 21% of the votes but only 2% of the seats. 2. Royal Commission on the Electoral System Labour's opportunity came after it won the 1984 election. In 1985 it established an independent non-partisan Royal Commission to conduct a wide-ranging inquiry into the electoral system.418 The Commission had 5 members: a High Court Judge as Chairman, a law professor, a political science professor, a retired Government statistician, and a Mäori woman who was a statistician and social researcher. The Royal Commission invited submissions from members of the public, and travelled around New Zealand to hear oral submissions. Members of the Commission also travelled to Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The Report of the Royal Commission was published in 1986. Two of its 69 recommendations were about the voting system that should be used to elect MPs: first, that FPP should be replaced by MMP, and secondly that the final decision should not be made by Parliament but by the people in a binding referendum after a period of public debate. Why did the Royal Commission recommend a change from FPP to MMP? It tested FPP and other voting systems against 10 criteria:419
(b) Effective representation of minority and special interest groups. The voting system should ensure that parties, candidates and MPs are responsive to significant groups and interests. To facilitate this, membership of the House should not only be proportional to the level of party support but should also reflect other significant characteristics of the electorate, such as gender, ethnicity, socio-economic class, locality and age. (c) Effective Mäori representation. In view of their particular historical, Treaty420 and socio-economic status, Mäori and the Mäori point of view should be fairly and effectively represented in Parliament. (d) Political integration. While the electoral system should ensure that the opinions of diverse groups and interests are represented it should at the same time encourage all groups to respect other points of view and to take into account the good of the community as a whole. (e) Effective representation of constituents. An important function of individual MPs is to act on behalf of constituents who need help in their dealings with the Government or its agencies. The voting system should therefore encourage close links and accountability between individual MPs and their constituents. (f) Effective voter participation. If individual citizens are to play a full and active part in the electoral process, the voting system should provide them with mechanisms and procedures which they can readily understand. At the same time, the power to make and unmake governments should be in the hands of the people at an election and the votes of all electors should be of equal weight in influencing election results. (g) Effective government. The electoral system should allow Governments in New Zealand to meet their responsibilities. Governments should have the ability to act decisively when that is appropriate and there should be reasonable continuity and stability both within and between Governments. (h) Effective Parliament. As well as providing a Government, members of the House have a number of other important parliamentary functions. These include providing a forum for the promotion of alternative Governments and policies, enacting legislation, authorising the raising of taxes and the expenditure of public money, scrutinising the actions and policies of the executive, and supplying a focus for individual and group aspirations and grievances. The voting system should provide a House which is capable of exercising these functions as effectively as possible. (i) Effective parties. The voting system should recognise and facilitate the essential role political parties play in modern representative democracies in, for example, formulating and articulating policies and providing representatives for the people. (j) Legitimacy. Members of the community should be able to endorse the voting system and its procedures as fair and reasonable and to accept its decisions, even when they themselves prefer other alternatives. The Royal Commission concluded that FPP rated well in relation to effective representation of constituents, voter participation, effective government, effective Parliament, and general legitimacy. In its view, however, FPP had 'severe weaknesses' in relation to fairness to major and minor parties, minority representation and Mäori representation.421 Having concluded that FPP was inherently flawed, the Royal Commission examined a number of alternative systems, particularly the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system; the Preferential Vote system used to elect the Australian House of Representatives; the system used in Germany, which the Royal Commission called the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system; and the Supplementary Member (SM) system.422 It concluded that MMP was the most suitable alternative to FPP, since it would be fairer to political parties and would improve voter participation, representation of Mäori423 or other groups, and be seen as more legitimate. The Royal Commission believed that MMP had 'comparable, though sometimes different' advantages over FPP in relation to effective government, effective Parliament, representation of constituents, effective parties, and political integration.424 Some of the basic provisions of New Zealand's electoral law have been 'entrenched' or 'reserved' since 1956 in that they can only be repealed or amended by a 75% vote of all MPs or by a majority of votes cast in a referendum held for the purpose. The matters protected in this way are the term of Parliament, the minimum age for qualification as an elector, the method of voting, and the membership of the independent body responsible for deciding electorate boundaries and the criteria it must follow in doing so. The Royal Commission concluded that fundamental matters concerning the constitutional framework of government should continue to be entrenched. It considered that some of those provisions should only be changed by referendum rather than by a vote of 75% of all MPs but concluded that the choice of the method to be used to change a particular entrenched provision should be left to political judgement.425 The Royal Commission's recommendation that a referendum should be held on whether FPP should be replaced by MMP reflected its view that a change to a country's voting system affects the most basic aspects of its democracy and is therefore properly a matter which the people should decide.426 3. The political context In 1986 the Royal Commission's recommendations on a change to MMP seemed the least likely to be accepted. Neither the Labour or the National parties supported a proportional voting system, although there were a few individual MPs in Labour (including the Deputy Prime Minister) and in National who did support a change. So how did the change to MMP actually come about? A number of factors were at work. A pressure group, the Electoral Reform Coalition, was formed in 1986 to promote the case for a referendum on a change to MMP. In a live television debate during the 1987 election campaign, one of the leaders of this group extracted an undertaking from the Prime Minister that Labour would hold a referendum on the issue. It later emerged that the Prime Minister had misread his briefing notes and had omitted the word 'not'.427 In 1987 Parliament referred the Royal Commission's report to a parliamentary select committee. That committee reported in 1988 and recommended that the FPP system should remain. However the Labour majority on the committee recommended that a referendum should be held on a change to the Supplementary Member (SM) system.428 The Labour Government agreed that FPP should remain, but did not agree that a referendum should be held on a change to SM.429 However despite the lack of enthusiasm among the major political parties, the issue of the voting system refused to go away. It seems that a crucial factor provoking change was the prevailing public attitudes to politics and politicians in the decade from the mid-1980s. There was a widespread public perception that the Labour governments elected in 1984 and 1987 had deceived the voters by failing to carry out their election manifestos and by imposing new models of economic and state sector management against significant public opposition. Many people and groups began to look for ways to reassert popular and parliamentary control over governments. They saw the recommendation of the Royal Commission that there should be a referendum on a change to a proportional voting system as a means of doing so. The strength of this public opinion was such that at the 1990 election all parties, major and minor, undertook to hold a referendum on the voting system. The 1992 referendum The National government elected in 1990 decided that the first electoral reform referendum would be held on 19 September 1992 coincidentally exactly 99 years to the day after women's' suffrage was achieved in New Zealand. This first referendum was held in order to establish whether there was a popular desire for a change to the voting system and if so which of four alternative 'reform options' discussed by the Royal Commission would be put to the voters at a second referendum Supplementary Member, Single Transferable Vote, MMP, and the Preferential Vote system. Although formally speaking the 1992 referendum was 'indicative' or 'non-binding', the National government pledged that if a majority of those who voted at the referendum supported a change to the voting system, a second binding referendum would be held with the 1993 election at which voters would be asked to choose between the FPP system and the reform alternative which received the most support at the 1992 referendum. The Government introduced a Bill to Parliament to authorise the holding of the referendum, to specify the form of the voting paper and the questions to be asked, to provide for the appointment of scrutineers to monitor the conduct of the referendum and the counting of the votes, to specify who was to declare the final result and how the result could be challenged, and to invoke certain provisions of the Electoral Act 1956 relevant to the conduct of the referendum. Public submissions were invited on the Bill, and Parliament passed an amended Bill in December 1991. There were no limits to the amounts that individuals or groups could spend on promoting particular answers to the referendum questions, although advertising and literature regarding the referendum had to include the name and address of the person who authorised it. An independent ministerial Panel chaired by the Chief Ombudsman was appointed and funded to carry out public education concerning the referendum. However its efforts to do so were hampered by the lack of an official statement about how each of the alternative systems would be implemented. The referendum resulted in a turnout of 55.2% of registered voters. The results were as follows:
I vote for the Supplementary Member system (SM) 5.6% I vote for the Single Transferable Vote system (STV) 17.4% I vote for the Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP) 70.5% I vote for the Preferential Voting system (PV) 6.6% The 1993 referendum The second binding referendum was held in conjunction with the 1993 general election. The government introduced two Bills into Parliament relating to this referendum which were passed after a select committee had considered submissions from the public. The law authorising the holding of the referendum was similar to that for the first referendum. However Parliament also passed a new Electoral Act to implement MMP430 which provided that the new electoral law would automatically replace the old electoral law if the official result of the referendum showed that a majority of those who voted in the referendum had voted for a change in the voting system. The select committee made a very important change to the Bill to implement MMP when it decided to insert a provision requiring a select committee to review the new system beginning in April 2000 and reporting to Parliament by mid-2002. That review would therefore come after the second scheduled general election under MMP.431 In addition to specifying a number of matters which the review committee must examine, the law required the committee to consider whether any further referendum should be held on changes to the electoral system, and if so what issues should be put to the voters and when such a referendum should be held. This provision reassured many people that a change to MMP at the 1993 referendum would not be an irrevocable step, although many also thought that a further referendum was guaranteed rather than just a matter which the review committee was obliged to consider. Once again, an independent Panel was appointed to carry out a government-funded programme of public education about the options at the 1993 referendum.432 Unlike 1992, the Panel had a detailed law to implement MMP and could therefore be specific on the details of both FPP and MMP. The 1993 referendum resulted in a narrow but decisive public endorsement of MMP, by 54% to 46%. Because the referendum was held in conjunction with a general election, the turnout (85.2%) was much greater than at the 1992 referendum. The transition to MMP, 1993-1996 Once the 1993 referendum had been carried, preparations for the new system had to begin in earnest. Two factors influenced the urgency of those preparations. First, because the number of electorate seats under MMP would be reduced from 99 to 65, an election under MMP could not be held until all the electorate boundaries had been re-drawn by the independent Representation Commission. That was completed in 1995. Second, four parties were elected to Parliament at the 1993 election and the National Party government had a majority of one. The preparations for the coming of MMP took place on several fronts. First, MMP would almost certainly bring coalition or minority government, which would in turn bring significant changes to the ways the public service carried out its responsibilities in relation to governments and to ministers. The State Services Commission and the Cabinet Office therefore began work on the nature and scope of those changes, including sending senior personnel to Europe to study the operations of the public service under different types of proportional system. Second, the Standing Orders Committee of Parliament undertook a major revision of Standing Orders to prepare for a multi-party Parliament elected by proportional representation. It too travelled to Europe to gain first-hand knowledge of the workings of different Parliaments elected by proportional representation. Third, MPs and parties also began to prepare for MMP. Once it was known that one of the glues holding the old parties together was to be weakened, some MPs left their former parties to join other parties or to form new ones. That affected New Zealand's governing arrangements for 2 years prior to the 1996 election, and during that period the country experienced all the forms of government that are possible within its type of constitution. These changes passed largely unnoticed by the public. These pre-MMP changes also provided the public service and Parliament with invaluable pre-MMP experience of a multi-party majority and minority government. Nevertheless the government survived in its various forms until the first MMP election was held in October 1996. The two MMP elections As expected, no party won a majority of seats at the 1996 election. Two parallel coalition negotiations took place for nine weeks after the election, one between National and New Zealand First, the other between Labour and New Zealand First. Contrary to many expectations, New Zealand First decided to form a coalition with the National Party. The coalition agreement between National and New Zealand First was signed on 11 December 1996, exactly 10 years to the day since the members of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System signed the letter of transmittal of its report to the Governor-General. Public opinion polling shows a marked public preference for FPP over MMP dating from about that time in 1996 until the 1999 election. The period from 1996 to the 1999 election marked another stage in New Zealand's transition to MMP. The National-New Zealand First coalition ended in August 1998, but National continued to lead the government to full term with the support of newly-Independent MPs who had been members of New Zealand First. These and other defections from parties provoked considerable public and political resentment. The 1999 election resulted in a change of government, with the new coalition between Labour and the Alliance being formed shortly after the election. There were signs of increased public support for MMP during the 1999 election campaign. Effects of MMP How has MMP fared against the Royal Commission's expectations?
However there are some areas of public concern. First, some people doubt whether New Zealand's multi-party governments since the first MMP election in 1996 have been as effective as the single-party governments it had under FPP since the mid-1930s. It is generally recognised that whether MMP remains will depend on whether the minority coalition government formed after the 1999 general election is regarded as successful. Second, some people say they are disappointed that MMP has not brought a new era of political consensus. That was never a realistic possibility since it overlooks the basic realities of democratic politics. MMP has certainly brought more political co-operation and dialogue between parties, but it has also brought more disagreements out into the open. Third, the change to MMP has meant increase in the total number of MPs from 99 to 120. A non-binding citizens initiated referendum held with the 1999 general election on whether the number of MPs should be reduced to 99 was supported by 82% to voters. The result of this referendum has now been referred to the special parliamentary committee which has been established to review MMP. Lessons from the change to MMP So what have been the lessons of New Zealand's change from FPP to MMP? The first lesson is that some of the important effects of a change to a different type of voting system take longer to emerge than many expected and longer than was the case with the only other major constitutional change in New Zealand in recent years the abolition of the appointed upper house in 1950. Adaptation to a new set of fundamental rules cannot be swift when many of the key actors have had long history and experience under the previous system and hence find it difficult to adjust quickly to the new rules and their incentives. For example, some parties' campaigning in 1996 was still focussed on winning particular electorate seats rather than on winning Party Votes across the whole country. In general, however, parties' campaigning in 1999 was much more focussed on winning Party Votes. Second, New Zealand's basic constitutional arrangements have been shown to be extremely flexible. Of course, a good deal of planning was done prior to the first MMP election, and the changes in the composition of government beforehand allowed some of those plans to be tested. On the whole, the processes of government and of Parliament have evolved to cope with the changed environment without themselves requiring fundamental change. The third lesson is perhaps the most important. The change to MMP has revealed that there is a general lack of public understanding among New Zealanders of their parliamentary democracy. For the first time in recent years, there were systematic attempts to promote public understanding among New Zealanders about their system of government. Those attempts revealed that New Zealand is similar to other democratic countries in having significant gaps in public knowledge about electoral and parliamentary matters (particularly among some groups in the population) and that many New Zealanders do not really understand the principles and values of democracy New Zealand-style. It seems too that there were similar levels of ignorance of the previous FPP system. Perhaps because FPP seemed so simple, New Zealand had not felt the need for many years to educate and inform people about constitutional and electoral matters in any kind of systematic and long-term way. Conclusion So how were integrity issues addressed in New Zealand's change to MMP?
The way in which New Zealand changed to MMP is not a blueprint for the ways other countries should embark on a similar change. The history, traditions and politics of New Zealand's parliamentary democracy heavily influenced that change, just as other countries' histories, traditions and politics influence the ways they go about making significant constitutional changes. Nonetheless, it is possible that New Zealand's example might offer some useful lessons for other countries which might contemplate changing their voting system.
Election Integrity in PeruAn integrity case study on the 2000 presidential elections in Peru is being written by Gerardo leCheavllier and Pat of the National Democratic Institute. A Gathering of CheatersA case study on integrity in the Philippine elections is being done by former MP Ding Tanjuatco. Election Integrity in Sierra LeoneA case study is being done by former Elections Commissioner Almami Cyllah on the elections in Sierra Leone. Election Integrity Endnotes
Special Considerations in Countries in Transition
Integrity in Election Administration
Avoiding Voter Registration Fraud
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud
Integrity Measures to Protect Against Fraud
Political Parties and Candidates
Codes of Conduct for Political Parties
Monitors of Election Integrity
Integrity in Domestic Observation
International Election Observation
Integrity in International Observation
Code of Conduct for International Observers
Enforcement of Election Integrity
Duties and Ethical Conduct of Investigators
Prosecution and Judicial Proceedings
Investigating in Difficult Circumstances
Where Fairness Promises Little Freedom
Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity
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ACE Website Version 1.0
> <a href='..../english/pi/piz.htm'>Copyright 1998-2003 > IFES, UN-DESA, IIDEA<br> Wed Dec 10 09:44:42 2003 UTC | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
