Herramientas Personales

The media are essential to the conduct of democratic elections. A free and fair election is not only about casting a vote in proper conditions, but also about having adequate information about parties, policies, candidates and the election process itself so that voters can make an informed choice. A democratic election with no media freedom would be a contradiction in terms.

But the paradox is that, in order to ensure that freedom, a degree of regulation is required. Government media, funded out of public money, should be required to give fair coverage and equitable access to opposition parties, for example. Media often may not run reports - for example on exit polls or early results - before every vote has been cast. And so on.

Hence there is a fairly complex web of issues surrounding the formulation of regulations and a regulatory body that, with a light touch, will ensure a free media environment, which benefits the voter with his or her need for accurate information.

For further general information, go to Overview.

This subject area looks at the following issues:

Overview

It is a truism that the media play an indispensable role in the proper functioning of a democracy. Discussion of the media's functions usually focuses on their 'watchdog' role: by unfettered scrutiny and discussion of the successes and failures of governments, the media can inform the public of how effectively its representatives have performed and help to hold them to account. Yet the media can also play a more specific part in enabling full public participation in elections, not only by reporting on the performance of government, but also in a number of other ways:

by educating the voters on how to exercise their democratic rights.
by reporting on the development of the election campaign.
by providing a platform for the political parties to communicate their message to the electorate.
by allowing the parties to debate with each other.
by reporting results and monitoring vote counting.

The media are not the sole source of information for voters, but in a world dominated by mass communications it is increasingly the media that determine the political agenda, even in less technologically developed corners of the globe. Thus, election observation teams, for example, now routinely comment upon media access and coverage of elections as a criterion for judging whether elections are fair. In parallel, monitoring the media during election periods has become an increasingly common practice, using a combination of statistical analysis and the techniques of media studies and discourse analysis to measure whether coverage has been fair.

At stake are three interlocking sets of rights:

the right of the voters to make a fully informed choice.
the right of the candidates to put their policies across.
the right of the media to report and express their views on matters of public interest.

Of course, these rights, which are essentially all aspects of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, apply at all times, and not only when there is an election pending. But it is the very formality of the election process - the fact that it is conducted according to procedures that are clearly set out in law - that has stimulated the interest of those who are concerned with issues of media freedom. How far media freedom and pluralism are respected during an election period can be a fairly sensitive index of respect for freedom of expression in general - itself an essential precondition for a functioning democracy. Conversely, an election can be an ideal opportunity to educate both the authorities in their obligation to respect and nurture media freedom and the media in their responsibility to support the democratic process.

This topic area is primarily concerned with the responsibility of election administrators to develop a regulatory framework for media activities during election periods and to facilitate media freedom. However, much of it may also be of value to others, such as media practitioners themselves and political parties.

It begins by looking at overarching principles: the role of the media in a democracy and the development of international and comparative jurisprudence on media and elections. It also discusses how the different levels of economic development and pluralism of the media and differing professional standards will affect the nature and quality of media coverage of elections.

The central part of this topic area is a discussion of the different models for a regulatory framework for the media in elections, ranging from an independent electoral commission to a specialized media regulator, such as a broadcasting commission or a voluntary media council or press complaints body. It looks at the different obligations of the print media and broadcasters, as well as those between media that are privately owned and those that are funded out of public money.

The topic area goes on to look at the various issues arising out of media coverage of the successive stages of the electoral process, from the pre-campaign period of voter education, through the campaign itself, to voting day, the count and the announcement of results. It explores the different types of media coverage - such as voter education, direct access by political parties, news and current affairs and other types of special election coverage. It discusses a number of specialized issues such as professional standards for reporting opinion polls, how to distinguish between reporting the functions of government and the activities of incumbent office holders as candidates, and the legal and ethical obligations of the media when reporting provocative statements by political figures.

Guiding Principles

The single guiding principle underlying the role of the media in elections is that, without media freedom and pluralism, democracy is not possible. This has been underlined in the decisions of numerous international tribunals. It has also been stated very clearly in the recent past by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, who went on to elaborate a series of steps that governments should take to guarantee freedom of media during elections (see Obligation of Pluralism).

There are a number of different dimensions to media freedom that are of relevance in elections:

Freedom from censorship.
Freedom from arbitrary attack or interference.
Free access to necessary information.
A pluralism of voices in the media.

The last of these is especially important. It is often interpreted to mean that the media should be owned by a variety of different interests, resulting in a 'market-place of ideas'. This is important, but it is only one aspect. For countries emerging from authoritarian rule, usually characterized by tight state control over the media, ensuring pluralism within the publicly funded media may be equally important. This is because often it is only a government-controlled national broadcaster that has the capacity to reach all sections of the electorate.

In order to ensure that the publicly funded media are not, in practice, government-controlled, a clear regulatory intervention may be required. This is the central paradox of the management of media in elections - the frequent need to establish a fairly complex regulatory system in order to enable the media to operate freely and without interference.

There are, broadly speaking, three areas of media election coverage. Each operates according to different principles and requires a different role of the electoral supervisory body.

Editorial Coverage

This broadly refers to all aspects of news, features, current affairs and opinion coverage that are under the editorial control of the media themselves. Aside from some limited areas - such as the reporting of results, or a restriction on reporting opinion polls shortly before voting - the role of the supervisory body is to do no more than facilitate the free operation of the media.

Direct Access Coverage

There is a bewildering variety of possible systems for regulating political advertising or free direct access coverage. This refers to that portion of election coverage that is under the editorial control of the parties or candidates themselves. There may be obligations on some sections of the media to carry such material - there will almost certainly be conditions that they must abide by if they do.

Candidate debates and panel interviews, which are increasingly common in election broadcast coverage, fall somewhere between these first two categories and may sometimes be subject to a degree of regulation that would not apply to ordinary editorial material.

Voter Education

This subject area does not deal in detail with voter education, which is covered in detail elsewhere (see Voter Education). However, especially in a new democracy, the mass media may be a vital tool not only for keeping voters informed about the issues and candidates, but also for imparting basic information about how to vote and what the vote is for. Voter education, like direct access, will be subject to strict standards that ensure its impartiality.

Administrative Considerations

There are broadly two sets of administrative tasks associated with the management of the media in elections. In principle, these are unrelated, although in practice it is often the same unit of the electoral supervisory body that is responsible.

First, there is the function of regulating media coverage of the election - primarily focusing on issues such as allocation of direct access programming, but also with a mechanism for speedily dealing with complaints.
Secondly, there is the dispensing of material from the electoral supervisory body to the media - not necessarily on matters to do with regulation of the media.

To deal with the latter, the electoral supervisory body will need to have a press office under the direction of a public relations officer, preferably with active experience as a journalist. Depending on the size and complexity of the country, regional or local press offices may be needed as well. The function of these offices is the speedy distribution of information. The media are vital to the election administration in disseminating material to the public at large. This works best if a principle of maximum disclosure applies and a relationship of trust is built between media and election officials. If an effort is made to distribute all the information that it is possible to distribute, journalists will be more understanding about those areas where confidentiality must be maintained to secure the integrity of the election process.

The type of information that should be freely available to the media covers matters such as the details of the electoral process, the parties and candidates, electoral boundaries and demographics, and so on. It does not include information about the platforms of the individual parties or candidates, which they themselves will no doubt make available.

In administrative terms, the complexity of such an operation will depend upon the degree of media interest in an election - if media people are coming from all corners of the globe, then running a press office can be a major undertaking. But, whatever the size and complexity of the operation, there is much to be gained from preparation and pro-active distribution of materials. Early preparation of briefing packs and regular press releases and press conferences will create a workload that is easier for the press office itself to manage and minimize the extent to which it has to respond to media queries.

The first function - regulation of media coverage - is altogether more complex and is quite separate from the function of a press office. Some electoral commissions have a 'media unit' that does both, but it is important that the conceptual distinction is maintained.

The extent of the administrative burden will depend in part on what regulatory instruments already exist: have the criteria and mechanisms for allocating party election broadcasts already been set down in law, for example? Or will the electoral commission have to devise its own regulations?

A variety of different administrative bodies may be involved. It is not automatic that the electoral supervisory body is involved. It may instead fall under the aegis of the broadcasting regulator, for example, or a self-regulating committee of broadcasters. Or a wholly separate regulatory body may be established. Each approach has something to recommend it. It is important, however, that a dedicated unit exist, whether independently or as part of another regulatory body, to deal with these complex issues.

Cost Considerations

Enabling the media to play its vital public information role in elections is not an area where expense should be spared. But neither, fortunately, is it a particularly expensive matter for the election administration. The role of the electoral supervisory body - or any other authority with responsibility for regulating the media - is primarily to create an environment in which the media can operate freely.

Certain detailed aspects of this may be technically quite complex - such as working out formulas for allocating free broadcasting time to parties. But it is the sort of complexity that can be resolved by a small committee. In other words, its cost implications within the overall context of the elections are insignificant.

The most costly aspect of this process is likely to be monitoring media output during the election campaign and the voting process. The scale of this operation will depend, inevitably, on how many media are to be monitored - but also how likely it is that they will breach election regulations. The Media Experts Commission in the Bosnian elections of 1998 had a large complement of staff spread throughout the country, including a specialized media monitoring unit. Most supervisory bodies have nothing remotely approaching that. Media monitoring itself can often be entrusted to non-governmental groups, who have become increasingly active in this area. It will remain to the supervisory body to analyse the findings, reach its conclusions and oversee a complaints procedure.

A potential source of controversy, however, is the question of who foots the bill for any free direct access time allocated to political parties. (See Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties.) If such a system operates, then direct access slots are only 'free' to the extent that political parties themselves do not pay. However, the question of whether the time is in fact funded by the media themselves, the electoral authorities or some other public body is a matter of potential conflict on which a decision needs to be made in principle well in advance of the election.

A well-managed system of media regulation may actually offer considerable savings elsewhere in an electoral authority's budget. If the media are able to operate freely and have a cooperative and trusting relationship with the bodies organizing the election, they will play an invaluable role in relaying vital information to the electorate at no cost to the electoral administration.

Social and Political Context

Probably no aspect of the administration of elections is more determined by the political and social context than the functioning of the media. This is principally to be seen in two overlapping dimensions:

The level of social and economic development of the country, with its consequences for the structure of media audience and ownership - and where people get their political information from.
The extent to which the media have experience in reporting democratic elections - and how far media freedom has prevailed in the past.

It has become commonplace to talk about the globalization of information. Equally many bemoan the 'Americanization' of election campaigning - meaning the use of slick televisual images with little substantive content. Both these viewpoints, although apparently coming from different political standpoints, make the same assumption: that a certain type of media and certain type of campaign language prevail throughout the world. Yet this is far from the case. Very large numbers of voters are excluded from access to television through poverty. Many others are excluded from newspaper readership through a combination of poverty and illiteracy. (Although interestingly newspaper readership is higher than television viewing in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa.) So although the information order is no doubt more globalized than in the past - more than when Marshall McLuhan coined the term 'global village' in the 1960s - national particularities are still very important. And at no time are they more important than in elections, which are quintessentially national events.¹

Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule will often have in common that the publicly-funded media operate under tight government control. Elsewhere, in most of Western Europe for example, there is a strong history of public broadcasting being independent of government and enhancing media pluralism. But in countries with a weak culture of political pluralism, state journalists will not usually be bold or independent. This may require a greater degree of intervention from the regulatory body to ensure that they discharge their public service functions properly.

Another similar circumstance in which the regulatory authority may be called upon to intervene more regularly is when there is a history of 'hate speech' and incitement to violence by partisan media representing different political or ethnic groups.

But in these circumstances, the role of the regulatory authority is to guarantee a plurality of voices in the media, not to silence anyone.

Some of the more practical questions may be more difficult to address in a new democracy than in a well-established one. For example, how do you decide how much free broadcasting time to give each party when there was no previous democratic election as a means of gauging their popular support? But even this difficulty - or difference - should not be overstated. Many advanced democracies - the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, for example - take little or no notice of previous election results when they allocate broadcasting time. They do it on the basis of equality between the parties. So for administrators from new democracies planning a regulatory system, there are a wealth of existing examples to choose from.

Historical Review

For as long as there have been mass media they have reported political events, but across most of the globe the central role of the media in elections is a very recent development.

In many countries, free elections are themselves a new phenomenon. For large parts of Asia and Africa that were once under colonial rule, free and sovereign elections are a development of the second half of the twentieth century, while for those countries in the former Communist bloc they are even more recent than that. Even the countries of Western Europe and Latin America only fully democratised in the years shortly before or after the Second World War with the extension of the franchise to women. The United States only finally ended limitations on the franchise in the 1960s. Latin America's democratic tradition was blighted by a history of military dictatorship, particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s, a development that was echoed in many countries of Africa and Asia. Some countries, particularly in Europe and North America, had a vigorous free press even when the franchise was limited. Others developed independent media only as they were struggling to install a system of elected government.

Europe, North America and Latin America evolved a theory of the media as a 'Fourth Estate', offering a check on the activities of governments. This approach has increasingly been incorporated into international law, although the practice has fallen short of the ideal. Generally, an independent press evolved in parallel with the more general development of political freedoms.

Until relatively recently, the printed press was the sole mass medium. It had a limited reach, simply because functional literacy only extended to a minority. Thus the development of broadcasting was potentially revolutionary in communicating political ideas to a mass audience. Yet in many instances the very potential of radio and television was frightening to those responsible for administering broadcasting. The British Broadcasting Corporation operated a '14-day rule' that prohibited coverage of any issue within two weeks of it being debated in Parliament. It was not until 1951 that the first party election broadcasts were screened. The compulsory blackouts of coverage in the days before an election that continue in countries like France are a relic of that period - when the media seemed to go out of their way not to influence the outcome of an election.

Times have changed. Received wisdom is that contemporary elections are dominated by television, a development that can be traced back to around 1960 - the date of the historic first television debate between United States presidential candidates. But this view is only partly accurate. The majority of the world's population do not watch television - they do not have electricity or they could not afford the set. Nor is this only a phenomenon of dictatorships - the world's largest democracy, after all, is India. For such countries radio remains the most important medium.

But even in countries where television dominates political debate, this has been a fairly recent phenomenon. In many West European countries, commercial broadcasting was only legalized in the 1980s and television coverage of elections remains highly regulated, as a legacy of the long years of state control of broadcasting.

For all the talk of 'spin doctors' and 'globalization', much of what passes through the media at election times would be readily recognizable to a previous generation of voters, accustomed to a style of political campaigning through public meetings and hustings. The American tradition of paid television advertising, drawing upon the most sophisticated techniques of Madison Avenue is an important one, but not dominant worldwide. The more regulated tradition of European broadcasting still enjoys wide adherence, at election time more than at any other. This tends to favour lengthier policy messages and debate over quick sound bites.

The 'medium is the message' according to a celebrated media theorist. But there is no doubt that during elections a variety of different types of message are communicated through the same medium. The most celebrated debates in American campaign history were between Kennedy and Nixon in 1960 and between Lincoln and Douglas a century earlier. The former was the harbinger of the age of television elections. But the striking thing is that the similarities between the two exchanges were greater than their differences.

Additional Resources

The various resources listed here are all online resources. Go to the Bibliography for a listing of books, pamphlets and reports on media and elections.

Law and standards

The following World Wide Web sites give information about the various international standards, laws, and widely accepted practices for media during election periods:

United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/mfro.htm. The essential source for global standards on media issues, including during elections and in transitional democracies.
ARTICLE 19, the Global Campaign for Free Expression: http://www.article19.org/. Non-governmental organization that has pioneered standards on media in transitional elections. Also many reports on media law and freedom issues and media monitoring methodology and reports.
Communications Law in Transition Newsletter: http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/transition/. An online journal of media and communications law in transitional democracies.
Freedom Forum's Media Studies Journal: http://www.mediastudies.org/contents.htm. Several issues have dealt with media and elections issues.
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/. Regional organization that has promoted standards for media in elections.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: http://www.osce.org/odihr/. Standards, election observer reports etc.
European Institute of the Media: http://www.eim.org/. Regional organization with strong Media and Democracy programme and many media monitoring reports.
National Council on Opinion Polls (United States): http://www.ncpp.org/. Guidance on opinion poll reporting.

Media Regulatory Bodies

This is just a small sample of the many media regulatory bodies. Their responsibilities in election periods vary greatly by country:

Independent Broadcasting Authority (South Africa): http://www.iba.org.za/. A pioneer in developing media regulations for a transitional democracy.
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission: http://www.crtc.gc.ca/.
Australian Broadcasting Authority: http://www.aba.gov.au/.
Federal Communications Commission (United States): http://www.fcc.gov/.
Broadcasting Standards Commission (United Kingdom): http://www.bsc.org.uk/. The statutory broadcasting complaints authority.

Media Monitoring

The following sites offer samples of media monitoring reports from elections and, in some cases, also guidance on how to monitor:

ARTICLE 19: http://www.article19.org. As above.
European Institute of the Media: http://www.eim.org. As above.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elecrep.htm. As above.
Memo 98 (Slovakia): http://www.memo98.sk
Media Monitoring Project (South Africa): http://www.sn.apc.org/mmp/.
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe: http://mmpz.icon.co.zw/.
Media Monitoring Project Tanzania: http://www.jeas-tanzania.org/.
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (United States): http://www.fair.org/.

Media Freedom and Protection of Journalists

The following are organizations that may not specifically work on media and elections but have a strong focus on defence of media freedom:

International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX): http://www.ifex.org/. A network of all the main media freedom organizations, international, regionally and nationally. An important source of links.
International Federation of Journalists: http://www.ifj.org/. Also a source for standards, training materials etc.
Freedom Forum: http://www.freedomforum.org/. Standards, training resources, discussion.
Committee to Protect Journalists: http://www.cpj.org/. Campaigns for journalists who are imprisoned or under threat.
Reporters sans Frontieres: http://www.rsf.fr/. International media freedom campaign.
Media Institute of Southern Africa: http://www.misanet.org/. Media freedom in Southern Africa, but also training, standards etc.
Commonwealth Broadcasting Association: http://www.oneworld.org/cba/. Grouping of mainly public broadcasters on broadcasting freedom, standards, training etc.
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters: http://www.amarc.org. Campaigning, training, standards.

Legal Principles

The role of media in elections is governed by a growing body of law, both at the national and international level. It is important to understand that this jurisprudence is directed overwhelmingly at regulating the behaviour of governments in relation to the media, rather than in regulating the media themselves.

The fundamental principles set out in international law embrace two aspects:

the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information
the right to participate in the government of the country, through elections

In their original form these are set out in Article 19 and Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. They are echoed in a number of UN and regional human rights treaties adopted since then. Decisions of the various treaty bodies, such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have further refined these principles making them an increasingly rich and applicable source of legal guidance.

A further source of international law on media and elections is to be found in the decisions of other types of international institution, such as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, who in 1999 laid out a number of important principles on the role of media in elections and the obligation of governments to guarantee media pluralism (see Obligation of Pluralism).

The approaches of other international bodies - such as UN administrations in internationally supervised elections - also provide a source of 'soft law'. That is, they have no binding power over UN member states, but they provide an important indication of prevalent international standards.

In addition to the international sources of law, many national laws and decisions of national courts provide a source of comparative law. In many countries, especially those with a common law system, decisions of other national courts may be invoked as a source of guidance and precedent. Again they have no binding power, but, depending on the seniority of the court whose decision is being cited, judges will take serious note of its reasoning and findings.

International Law

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 is the definitive statement of principle on human rights. It contains two Articles, 19 and 21, that are fundamental to the obligations of governments regarding the role of media in elections. The first of these, Article 19, guarantees the right to freedom of expression. The second, Article 21, guarantees the right to take part in periodic secret elections.

The UDHR imposes obligations upon all members of the international community. But, as a declaration, it is only what is termed customary international law. With the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, these same provisions were amplified and given the force of binding and enforceable law over all those states that ratified. Article 19 of the ICCPR states in part:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

Article 25 of the ICCPR states in part:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 [distinctions of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status] and without unreasonable restrictions:

...(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.

Taken together, these two provisions have been understood to impose an obligation on governments to ensure the diversity and pluralism of the media during election periods (see Obligation of Pluralism).

The main regional human rights treaties - the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights - contain a similar combination of guarantees of the right to freedom of expression and information and the right to political participation without discrimination.

The documents adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe go a step further. In the Copenhagen Document of 1990, the participating states of the CSCE committed themselves to ensure:

That no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process.

The CSCE documents are not treaties and therefore do not have the same binding force. But they have been accepted as part of customary international law and therefore impose obligations on participating states.

The decisions of both international and national tribunals give greater detail and substance to these broad principles on media and elections. They can be summarized as follows:

The media play a vital watchdog role in holding governments accountable and ensuring the effective functioning of a democracy (see Media and Democracy).
Governments are obliged to ensure the existence of a democracy that ensures media pluralism, especially in elections (see Obligation of Pluralism).
Freedom of political debate is a fundamental right (see Freedom of Political Debate).
Political parties and individuals have a right of access to government media during election campaigns (see Right of Access to Government Media).
Government media are obliged to publish opposition views (see Publishing Opposition Views).
There exists a right of reply, correction or retraction in response to wrong statements in the government media (see Right of Reply).
There may be limits on the legal liability of the media if they reproduce unlawful statements (see Limits to Liability).
Political expression may be restricted only for extraordinary reasons (see Restrictions on Political Speech).
There is enhanced protection for criticism of politicians and government (see Criticism of Politicians and Government).
There is enhanced protection for political opinions (see Protection of Political Opinions).
There is a right to an effective remedy for those whose rights have been violated (see Right to an Effective Remedy).
Governments are obliged to protect the safety of media personnel and institutions (see Protecting the Safety of the Media).

See International Treaties on media and elections for fuller texts of these international treaties.

Media and Democracy

It is the mass media that make the exercise of freedom of expression a reality.⁴

The words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights succinctly state a principle that is now universally acknowledged in international law. The exercise of freedom of expression in a democracy has little meaning if it can only be exercised on an individual level. Freedom of expression is not only about what you are allowed to tell your neighbour - or to hear from him or her. Crucially it is to do with the expression of facts and opinions and receiving of information through the media.

The international tribunal that has gone furthest in developing this approach is the European Court of Human Rights. It has concluded that media freedom is vital for keeping citizens informed:

Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the opportunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society.⁴

The media inform the public about matters of public interest and act as a watchdog over government:

it is ... incumbent on [the press] to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of 'public watchdog'.³

According to the European Court, then, there are two aspects to this democratic role of the media: to inform the public and to act as a watchdog of government. This role does not impose particular duties on any particular newspaper or broadcasting station. Rather it imposes a duty on governments to ensure that the media are able to carry out these functions. This principle clearly has practical implications in the election context.

Governments may regulate the technical aspects of broadcasting, according to the European Court. Frequencies should be allocated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. The media are subject to the law of the land - in matters such as defamation or incitement - but as a general rule governments may not restrict the contents of the media.

Obligation of Pluralism

The media in an election play a key role, not only as a means of scrutinizing government actions, but also ensuring that the electorate has all the necessary information at its disposal to make an informed and democratic choice. Governments have an important negative obligation not to impede the media in playing these functions. In addition, and at least as importantly, governments have a positive obligation to facilitate media pluralism in order to expose the public to the widest variety of sources of information. Indeed, the obligation contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of information, applies only to governments and certainly not to individual media organizations.

As the Human Rights Committee stated in its only General Comment on Article 19 of the ICCPR:

[B]ecause of the development of the modern mass media, effective measures are necessary to prevent such control of the media as would interfere with the right of everyone to freedom of expression.... ⁵

It was in a similar vein that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court concluded that the monopoly enjoyed by the parastatal Posts and Telecommunications Corporation was unconstitutional on grounds of freedom of expression. The court found that the protection of freedom of expression applies not only to the content of information, but also to the means of transmission and reception of such information. A restriction imposed on the means of transmission or reception necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information. Any monopoly that has the effect, whatever its purpose, of hindering the right to receive and impart ideas and information violates the protection of this right.⁶

Jurisprudence from countries as varied as Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago and Zambia underlines the twin points that media monopolies are an unacceptable interference with freedom of expression and that publicly-funded media have an obligation to convey viewpoints other than that of the government of the day. A number of these judgements (Zambia, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago) refer to the right of political opponents of the government to have their viewpoint heard in the public media. This right extends to other types of minority as well. The following recommendation is drawn from a UN report on minority rights:

Members of different groups should enjoy the right to participate, on the basis of their own culture and language, in the cultural life of the community, to produce and enjoy arts and science, to protect their cultural heritage and traditions, to own their own media and other means of communication and to have access on a basis of equality to State-owned or publicly controlled media.⁷

It is important to stress that the role of the media is not just as a vehicle for expression in the narrow sense. The media are important also - indeed, primarily - as a means to enable the public to exercise their right to freedom of information. The media play a role of watchdog over the activities of the government and other powerful institutions. Clearly they cannot play this role if they owe a narrow loyalty to the government or ruling party of the day. The most detailed guidelines produced by the United Nations reflecting best international practice on pluralism and access to the media were those issued by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (See Cambodia: Guidelines of UN Transitional Authority on Media and Elections). These stated:

An independent and free media should have a diversity of ownership, and it should promote and safeguard democracy, while opening opportunities and avenues for economic, social and cultural development.⁸

In the most definitive statement from a United Nations authority, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Abid Hussein, concluded in his 1999 annual report:

There are several fundamental principles which, if promoted and respected, enhance the right to seek, receive and impart information. These principles are: a monopoly or excessive concentration of ownership of media in the hands of a few is to be avoided in the interest of developing a plurality of viewpoints and voices; State-owned media have a responsibility to report on all aspects of national life and to provide access to a diversity of viewpoints; State-owned media must not be used as a communication or propaganda organ for one political party or as an advocate for the Government to the exclusion of all other parties and groups...⁹

The Special Rapporteur then went on to list a series of obligations on the State to ensure 'that the media are given the widest possible latitude' in order to achieve 'the most fully informed electorate possible':

There should not be bias or discrimination in media coverage;
Censorship of election programmes should not be allowed;
Media should be exempt from legal liability for provocative statements and a right of reply should be provided;
There should be a clear distinction between news coverage of functions of government office and functions as a party candidate;
Air time for direct access programmes should be granted on a fair and non-discriminatory basis;
Programmes provide an opportunity for candidates to debate each other and for journalists to question them;
Media should engage in voter education;
Programmes should target traditionally disadvantaged groups, which may include women and ethnic and religious minorities.

See UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999 for the full text of the Special Rapporteur's recommendations.

Freedom of Political Debate

Freedom of political debate has been recognized by international courts, other international bodies and national tribunals as being a fundamental right. The European Court of Human Rights noted in 1978: 'freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society'.¹⁰

Part of the importance of this is informing the electorate so that they can exercise their political choice. The UN Technical Team on the Malawi referendum of 1993, which chose between a single and multi-party system, stated: 'If voters are to make an informed choice at the polling station, then an active exercise of the freedom [of expression] is essential.'¹¹ The Enugu High Court in Nigeria made a similar observation:

Freedom of speech is, no doubt, the very foundation of every democratic society, for without free discussion, particularly on political issues, no public education or enlightenment, so essential for the proper functioning and execution of the processes of responsible government, is possible.¹²

And the Israeli Supreme Court stated:

Real democracy and freedom of speech are one. Freedom of speech enables each individual to crystallize his or her autonomous opinion in the decision-making process vital in a democratic state. The essence of democratic elections is premised on being able to reach informed opinions, evaluating them and exposing them to open debate ...¹³

Right of Access to Government Media

There is a growing weight of decisions by national tribunals on the right of opposition parties to access to the government media. There is a clear trend towards recognizing an obligation on governments to ensure such access. This was the approach taken by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in his 1999 report (see Obligation of Pluralism).

In 2000, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court made two rulings addressing this very issue. In January, the court instructed the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to broadcast advertisements and campaign material prepared by the 'No' campaign in the country's referendum on a proposed new constitution. The 'Yes' campaign, favoured by the government, had had its material broadcast at considerable length.¹⁴

On 13 June, a few days before parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court, ruling on an application from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, ordered the ZBC to stop its biased political broadcasting and to fulfil its functions under the Broadcasting Act to carry on TV and radio broadcast services impartially, without discrimination on the basis of political opinion and without hindering persons in their right to impart and receive ideas and information.¹⁵

A few years earlier, the High Court in Zimbabwe's northern neighbour, Zambia, had been called upon to rule on a similar issue. The point under dispute was a directive issued by President Kenneth Kaunda in the weeks before the country's first multi-party elections in 1991. This instructed the three government-controlled newspapers not to report statements by leaders of the main opposition party or to accept its advertisements. The court held that the directive violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression:

[S]ince the petitioners were not allowed to publish their views on political matters through the government newspapers, and by necessary implication even through the radio and TV, they were denied the enjoyment of their freedom of expression ...¹⁶

The court then made a more general comment on the proper role of publicly-owned media:

[I]n the case of newspapers they are supposed to be run on the basis of journalistic principles and ethics free from any outside interference. These principles dictate the coverage of all newsworthy events regardless of the source of such news. Anything less than this, and it is very easy for the general public to assess whether or not a given newspaper is working according to sound journalistic principles and ethics, is not acceptable from a publicly owned medium - print or other.¹⁷

The High Court of Trinidad and Tobago had earlier made a similar finding in relation to television. The state-owned television station had refused to broadcast a pre-recorded speech by an opposition member of parliament. The court ruled that this action violated the right to freedom of expression:

[W]ith television being the most powerful medium of communication in the modern world, it is in my view idle to postulate that freedom to express political views means what the constitution intends it to mean without the correlative adjunct to express such views on television. The days of soap-box oratory are over, as are the days of political pamphleteering ...¹⁸

International observer missions and supervisory and advisory groups have taken a similar approach in recent years. The UN observer mission at the 1989 Nicaraguan elections, for example, stated that it was necessary for 'all political parties [to] have equitable access to State television and radio in terms of both the timing and the length of broadcasts.'¹⁹ The UN Technical Team for the 1993 Malawi referendum made a similar recommendation:

In the case of government-owned media, it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides to put forward their arguments.²⁰'

(Note that in this case the recommendation was for 'equal' rather than 'equitable' access since this was a referendum where the choice was between two propositions rather than a number of political parties. See Direct Access in Referenda)

Likewise, in the UN-supervised elections in Cambodia in 1993, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was concerned to ensure fair access to the media, as set out in its election guidelines (see Cambodia: Guidelines of UN Transitional Authority on Media and Elections):

In the exercise of its responsibilities under the Agreement, UNTAC will ensure 'fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all parties contesting the election'.²¹

See Provisions for Public Media.

Publishing Opposition Views

The obligation on publicly-owned or government-controlled media to publish or broadcast the views of the opposition derives from the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of rights. This is strongly stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in other human rights treaties. It means that if the ruling party has an opportunity to exercise its right to freedom of expression through the government media, then the opposition must be given the same right.

The European Commission of Human Rights rejected an application by an association that had been refused air time during an election by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The Commission stated that although there was not, in its view, a general right of access to the broadcast media, political partiesshould be given such access on an equitable basis:

It is evident that the freedom to 'impart information and ideas' included in the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, cannot be taken to include a general and unfettered right for any private citizen or organization to have access to broadcasting time on radio or television in order to forward its opinion. On the other hand, the Commission considers that the denial of broadcasting time to one or more specific groups or persons may, in particular circumstances, raise an issue under Article 10 alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention [prohibiting discrimination]. Such an issue would, in principle, arise for instance if one political party was excluded from broadcasting facilities at election time while other parties were given broadcasting time.²²

Right of Reply

The idea of creating a legally enforceable right of reply or correction has never found much favour with freedom of expression campaigners, who fear that it would stifle free and robust expression - clearly something that is particularly needed in the context of elections. However, both international advisory bodies and some national courts have favoured such a mechanism, especially when the matter being replied to is in the government-controlled media, to which the opposition may not have ready access.

This is the guideline, for example, developed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (see also Cambodia: Guidelines of UN Transitional Authority on Media and Elections):

Media outlets should give parties, groups or individuals whose views have been misrepresented or maligned by a publication or broadcast the 'right of response' in the same media outlet.²³

The Indian Supreme Court recognized a right of reply that was specific to government publications, stating that 'fairness demanded that both viewpoints were placed before its readers, however limited be their number, to enable them to draw their own conclusions.'²⁴

The High Court and Court of Appeal in Belize found in favour of a right of reply in a case with a particular relevance to elections. The Belize Broadcasting Authority (BBA) refused permission to a senior opposition politician and the director of a television station to broadcast a series of programmes replying to government statements on the economy. The High Court ruled that the BBA had acted arbitrarily, stating:

[T]oday television is the most powerful medium for communications, ideas and disseminating information. The enjoyment of freedom of expression therefore includes freedom to use such a medium.²⁵

The Court of Appeal supported the High Court's ruling and held that the BBA's refusal to broadcast the programmes violated the applicants' constitutional rights both to freedom of expression and protection from discrimination. Political parties must be given the opportunity to reply on television to statements made by the government which 'provide information or explanation of events of prime national or international importance or ... seek the co-operation of the public in connection with such events.' Only where there was a 'general consensus of opinion' would the opposition not have a right of reply.²⁶

See Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements.

Limits to Liability

In his 1999 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression came down firmly in favour of exempting the media from liability for publishing unlawful statements made by politicians in the context of an election. The type of statements envisaged might include those that were defamatory or incited to hatred. This does not mean that there would be no liability for such statements - the person who made them would still be liable - but that the media would be free to reproduce them without, for example, having to review every party election broadcast or advertisement before transmission. See UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999.

The Special Rapporteur was offering a clear guideline on a matter that has been hitherto unclear and controversial. Thus, for example, the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia in its guidelines took precisely the opposite view, assuming that media would be legally responsible for statements that 'incite discrimination, hostility or violence by means of national, religious, racial or ethnic hatred'.²⁷

The Special Rapporteur was reflecting a growing trend in national courts and legislatures. The Danish Parliament passed a law exempting the media from liability for publishing statements inciting racial or national hatred, providing that they themselves did not intend to promote hatred. This followed the conviction of a journalist who had been convicted and fined for broadcasting a television interview with members of a racist gang. He applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, which ruled his application admissible.²⁸

The Spanish Constitutional Court similarly found that a newspaper could not be held liable for publishing a statement by a terrorist organization:

[B]oth the right of the journalist to inform and the rights of his readers to receive full and accurate information constitute, in the last resort, an objective institutional guarantee, which effectively prevents the imputation of any criminal will on the part of those who only transmit information.²⁹

This reasoning is important, because it stresses that the argument against applying liability to the media in such cases is primarily to do with protecting the public right to receive information.

See Media Liability for Reports of Unlawful Statements.

Restrictions on Political Speech

Freedom of expression is not an absolute right and it may be limited in certain circumstances. But such limitations must conform to clearly defined standards.

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides in paragraph 3 a number of grounds on which the right may be restricted. (See International Treaties on media and elections.)

The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights and reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Jurisprudence has established that freedom of expression under international law may only be limited by the application of a three-part test in order to establish that the limitation is:

Established by law - that is, that it must pre-exist in national or binding international law;
Serving a legitimate purpose - that is, one of the purposes contained in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR;
And necessary in a democratic society. This means, among other things, that the restriction should be proportionate to its purpose and that it should not detract from the essence of the right itself.

Article 20 of the ICCPR may also be relevant on occasions. This prohibits propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

The UN Technical Team on the Malawi Referendum applied these principles to national law governing a poll campaign. It stated that an restriction on freedom of expression:

should not be so vague or broadly defined as to leave an overly wide margin of discretion to the authorities responsible for enforcing the law, since uncertainty over legal boundaries has a dampening effect on the exercise of this right [to freedom of expression] and may encourage discrimination in ... [the restrictions'] application.³⁰

See Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation.

Criticism of Politicians and Government

International tribunals - and increasingly national ones as well - are clear that politicians and governments may be subject to greater criticism and insult than ordinary private individuals and that consequently the law will offer them less protection. This is, of course, the opposite of the situation that has so often prevailed, with government officials often invoking charges such as criminal defamation against critics.

However, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled unanimously that because 'freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society ... the limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards private individuals.' In addition, '[t]he limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician.' Penalties for defamation is such cases would only apply where the accusations are 'devoid of foundation or formulated in bad faith.' The court also stated:

While freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of an opposition Member of Parliament... call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.³¹

The civil law of defamation can legitimately be used to protect reputations against reckless and malicious allegations. But increasingly national courts have ruled that the scope of defamation law must be such that it does not prevent the media from carrying out their proper function - or stifle vigorous political debate. The historic judgement of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v Sullivan (1964) established the principle that there should be greater latitude in criticizing a public official, even to the extent of mistaken or inaccurate statements, provided that these were not made maliciously. The court pointed out that public figures had far easier access to channels of communication to counteract false statements.³² In recent years this approach has been adopted, in different ways, in a wide variety of other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Pakistan, India and Zambia.³³

Protection of Political Opinions

International law distinguishes between factual allegations and opinions. Political opinions may only be restricted in the most extreme circumstances. They cannot be restricted on the grounds that they are 'untrue' since, as the European Court of Human Rights observed, to require someone accused of defamation to prove the truth of an opinion 'infringes freedom of opinion itself'.³⁴

Right to an Effective Remedy

International law provides that any person whose rights have been violated shall have the right to an effective remedy in a national tribunal. When the body that decides the complaint is administrative (rather than judicial) in nature, then it should be separate from the body complained against. This would apply, for example, in the case of complaints against a broadcaster.

The UN Technical Team for the Malawi Referendum recommended that 'a recourse mechanism should be present providing for independent review of cases where restrictions on this right [to freedom of expression] have been applied.'³⁵

See Complaints Procedure.

Protecting the Safety of the Media

Journalism is a dangerous occupation. Statistics collected by media freedom organizations show that each year dozens of media professionals are killed or injured in the course of their work. Elections are not the most dangerous part of their work - but a tense and sometimes violent campaign will carry its dangers for those trying to report honestly and accurately.

The responsibility for protecting the physical security of everyone within its territory rests with the government, which has a particular obligation in relation to the media. It was in recognition of this that the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights resolved:

[T]he World Conference encourages the increased involvement of the media, for whom freedom and protection should be guaranteed within the framework of national law.³⁶

See Measures to Protect Journalists.

Media Environment

In an age of multinational media corporations we are constantly persuaded to believe that we live in a 'global village' - a single, undifferentiated information society. Undoubtedly the flow of information through the media is greater and faster than it was, say, in the 1960s when the term 'global village' was coined - still more by comparison with the age before mass broadcasting. Nevertheless, access to information by the mass of people - and the mass of voters in particular - differs enormously according to the national context. Globalization of information no doubt affects the rural African, Asian, Latin American or East European. But it does not mean that they have the same information sources as a West European or North American, or indeed their own urban compatriots.

The media environment will largely determine the role that the media play in an election. And that environment in turn will be decided by a variety of factors. The first of these is the level of economic development. In situations of severe poverty, most people will be unable to afford newspapers and probably unable to read them either. Often televisions will be prohibitively expensive and ownership and audience will be almost exclusively urban. Some of the poorest countries, such as Malawi and Tanzania, have only very recently established national television networks. Radio is likely to be the most important national medium of communication in these circumstances. But even so it is likely to be constrained by shortage of advertising revenue. A higher level of economic development is likely to mean a greater number of media outlets. Increasingly this even overrides the significance of constraints of political control over the media.

Economic development in turn may influence the ownership structure of the media. As a general pattern, poorer countries, including most in Africa, will tend to have a larger governmental media sector, because of the shortage of advertising. Independent media in these countries are likely to be owned by small, private business interests. In the larger economies of regions like Latin America, East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, media houses are more likely to be under the control of substantial national businesses (that are also likely to have political interests). Increasingly media in these countries and in the most industrialized countries fall under the control of multinational media companies, which again are likely to have their own political inclinations.

But wealth is not the only factor determining the structure of media ownership. Political and cultural traditions play a large part. Most European countries, for example, have a strong tradition of state or public ownership of broadcasting. See Public/State Media. France only legalized private broadcasting in the 1980s. The United States, by contrast, has almost no history of publicly owned broadcasting. Not surprisingly, countries with a history of military or single-party rule may have developed their own tradition of state control of the media. Clearly, the extent to which the government or public authorities are involved in owning or controlling the media is likely to have a direct impact on the role of the media in elections.

Another critical dimension of the media environment is the strength of the traditions of political freedom and respect for freedom of expression. Media with a long history of pluralism, freedom and independence will have developed a greater capacity to deal with political issues in a frank and forthright manner. They will also probably have developed higher professional standards (although the low ethics of some media in advanced democracies show that the correlation is not an exact one). Most importantly, a recent history of censorship or physical intimidation of the media is likely to loom as a constant threat over journalists and editors in their election coverage. See History of Respect for Media Freedom?.

The media environment is also to some degree a legal environment. Preferably the media will operate under the protection of strong constitutional and statutory guarantees of freedom of expression and access to information. See Journalism Training. Legal traditions differ greatly in this area. Common law countries tend towards an approach marked by an absence of explicit laws regulating the media. The assumption is that the media are free to do whatever is not explicitly prohibited by law. The civil law tradition, by contrast, usually requires statutory regulation of media activity. There are strengths and weaknesses in both approaches, although in practice they are tending to converge. Broadcasting is one area where differing legal traditions are seeking to find common solutions. Almost all countries demand some form of statutory regulation of broadcasting, even the traditionally unregulated United States, as a way of ensuring pluralism over the airwaves. The extent to which the allocation of broadcasting frequencies is a fair and transparent process is likely to have a significant influence on how the broadcasters discharge their responsibilities at election time. See Existing Media Regulatory Frameworks.

Where do People Get their Information?

The importance that is attached to the role of the media in a democracy suggests that they act as the main source of information for most voters. But this assumption is not automatically true. Even in an advanced, media-saturated democracy like Britain, between one quarter and one third of television viewers are estimated to switch channels when a party election broadcast starts. There used to be a convention that all channels would screen these broadcasts simultaneously so that there was no escape for the audience, other than making themselves a cup of tea. Perhaps as a result, a survey in 1968 found that party election broadcasts were the main source of information for undecided voters. Since 1987, however, simultaneous broadcasts have been abandoned and the audience has declined. And a 1990 survey found that party broadcasts were the least believable source of political information, apart from the Sun newspaper.³⁷

Before the rise of modern electronic media, political information was conveyed through the two mechanisms of the print media and direct personal contact. In those days newspaper readership was higher than today, but this still excluded a very large proportion of the population that was either too poor to afford a newspaper or that simply could not read. Hence direct personal communication assumed great importance. This would include public political meetings addressed by candidates or hustings, where the different candidates would debate and be questioned. It would also include door-to-door canvassing by the candidate or party activists, as well as leaflets and posters produced by the parties or candidates.

In industrialized countries with extensive electronic media, these methods have declined dramatically in importance. Elsewhere, however, the political meeting and personal contact with the candidates remains important. In rural Africa, for example, radio is usually the only accessible mass medium. The stations that broadcast to this rural audience are usually government-controlled and give little, if any, voice to opposition parties. Sometimes the obstacles to the communication of information are even more basic. Radio sets require batteries. These are expensive and unlikely to be a priority in communities that are on the breadline. So Personal contact remains important.

Yet, even in conditions of dire poverty the media still have a role in communicating political information. Even when rural communities do not have access to independent media, the information generated by, say, the private press will still go into general circulation and may reach the rural voters at some stage. So, although word of mouth may be the direct source of political information, the media will contribute importantly to the mass of information in circulation.

In rural Africa, like other parts of the world generally regarded as 'information-poor', the means for circulating information by mouth are quite sophisticated, and were often honed in the difficult conditions of colonialism and single-party or military dictatorship. Audiences became skilled at interpreting the highly controlled messages contained in the official media and relaying an alternative interpretation. They were assisted in this by cultural conventions allowing the oblique communication of sensitive information and views. For example, the Ngoni of Central Africa have a convention known as kukulawika - women's pounding songs that are able to convey explicit messages about sex, but without using obscenities. The Tonga have a similar mechanism. Under British colonial rule, African staff at the Central African Broadcasting Corporation in Lusaka would broadcast a type of political kukulawika, allowing them to convey hidden nationalist messages. This means of veiled political communication was especially useful during subsequent restrictive one-party rule.³⁸

The informal communication of political news is often described, disparagingly and not entirely accurately, as rumour. Colonial administrators used to call it the 'bush telegraph', while French-speaking Africans have invented a rather better term: radio trottoir or 'pavement radio'. Whatever name it is given, there can be little doubt that millions of people the world over form their political opinions on the basis of their own experience and what they learn personally from those whom they trust. Much of this information may originate in the media, but how much is difficult to determine. How far the media influence the behaviour of voters remains a great imponderable.

In Zimbabwe, for example, in a referendum and election in 2000, a majority of voters rejected the advice being offered by the most important media. The state enjoyed a monopoly of all broadcast media, which were under tight government control. In a referendum on constitutional reform, and then in parliamentary elections, the opposition was given minimal access to radio and television and the editorial line of both was shrilly in favour of the ruling party. Yet in each poll a majority of voters favoured the opposition. Perhaps the critical information placed in circulation by the privately-owned press was influential. But ultimately many people's voting choices seem to have been determined by other factors. An independent media monitoring group even suggested that last-minute broadcast propaganda in favour of the government may have influenced marginal voters in the referendum to vote for the opposition. Unfortunately the quality of audience research is not good enough to allow a clear answer.³⁹

Focus group studies in Ukraine suggest a similar popular scepticism towards the media, which were described as being 'not free' and therefore not enjoying the confidence of the citizens. They say that the media are 'short of analytical articles in the first place' and that the mass media play an 'insufficient' role in elucidating the issues in the campaign and preparing the public for the elections. The focus groups said that 'attempts of the mass media to shed light on political and economic developments in a timely and qualitative fashion cannot be successful'. See Where Do People Get Their Election Information? - Ukraine.⁴⁰

Even in industrialized democracies where the media occupy a very important place as a source of a political information, the answer to this question of media influence is not clear. In Britain, for many years, the largest circulation newspaper, the Sun, supported the Conservative party, yet the majority of its mainly working class readership supported the Labour party. Of course, the paper may have influenced a marginal but potentially significant section of its readership to change their vote. In 1997, the Sun shifted its allegiance to Labour and claimed the credit when that party won - even though public opinion surveys and the size of the Labour majority showed that there were much broader factors at work. In fact the paper probably had a greater influence on the new government than on the electorate. Labour leaders were anxious to be on good terms with the Sun's owner, Rupert Murdoch - an indication of the new globalized order where media houses are also powerful multinational corporations.

More generally Britain provides an interesting case study of the political influence of the media. A large majority of the press supports the Conservative party. If its influence over the electorate were decisive then there would never be a Labour government. Things clearly do not work like that. Yet the indirect influence of the media is more difficult to assess. Arguably, they influence the political agenda by emphasizing issues that are of priority to the right wing, such as law and order and restricting immigration. Hence a Labour government may adopt more conservative policies because it believes that the media influence the electorate in that direction.

History of Respect for Media Freedom?

How far a country's government has a history of respecting media freedom will have a great bearing on the capacity of the media to report elections. Often a country with little history of respect for freedom of expression also has little experience of elections, or at least of free and democratic ones.

The significance of this history is that, even where restrictions have been lifted - for example in a transition from autocratic to democratic rule - the media may still be influenced by the memory of past repression and be reluctant to report in a bold and independent fashion. Or the opposite may be the case: the media revel in a new-found freedom, but exercise it in an unprofessional and irresponsible way. The legacy of restrictions on media freedom may linger in the form of a state-owned and government-controlled broadcasting station that, even in the context of a newly democratic political system, is reluctant to act independently of government. Very often a mixture of all these elements is in play. In such a context, media regulatory authorities and electoral authorities have an important role to fulfil in creating a more favourable enabling environment that will allow the media to carry out the unfamiliar functions of election coverage freely and professionally.

There are a variety of means whereby governments can infringe media freedom. The most common include:

Physical attacks on the media and journalists. The most serious attacks on the media usually have the aim of silencing some critics and intimidating others. Journalists are beaten or even killed or 'disappeared'. Media premises are attacked, illegally raided or fire-bombed. Newspaper vendors may be targeted, with papers illegally confiscated or the vendors themselves beaten.
The use of extreme legal powers against the media. The most threatening of these is pre-publication censorship, whereby issues of publications must receive prior official approval. Licensing of publications, or of journalists, gives the authorities massive leverage over the media. A whole battery of laws may be used to restrict freedom of the media, often on grounds of national security. These are often used as the basis for criminal charges against journalists and media owners, which can lead to long periods of imprisonment. Sometimes a succession of sedition or criminal defamation charges are used against the media, even when cases are unlikely to come to trial, with the aim of intimidating journalists and draining their resources. Legal measures against printers and distributors are a particularly effective way of hampering the operation and the independent-minded media.
Tight regulation of the media. A total or virtual state monopoly of the media is a highly effective way of preventing critical voices from being heard. Although it is the deaths of journalists in the line of duty that grab the headlines, there can be little doubt that direct government control over the media has been - and continues to be - the commonest means for restricting what the public learns.
Even when independent media exist and are nominally free from legal constraint, government control of vital resources such as electricity, newsprint, printing presses, transmitters and computers can often be used to cow or silence independent voices.

It is in new or 'transitional' democracies that the legacy of these restrictions will loom largest. Often restrictive laws remain in place, even if they are not used as frequently as before. Their very existence may exercise what is usually known as a 'chilling effect' on media freedom. Sometimes, during a transitional period, violence against the media may actually increase, as repressive governments no longer have recourse to the same legal measures to control the media and resort instead to secret and informal means of repression. Most frequently the third set of restrictions - government control over a large section of the media - is likely to remain in place. Governments may also exercise tight control over the system of broadcast licensing, with the result that even 'independent' media are in fact owned by their close political allies.

But it is not only dictatorships that restrict media freedom. Even in long-established democracies there is tension between governments and the media. This is inevitable and not entirely undesirable - since, after all, the media are meant to act as a 'watchdog' over government (see Media and Democracy). But these tensions are not entirely healthy. Journalists in established democracies are less likely to face physical threats in carrying out their duties, but many have to contend with legal actions, for example to compel them to reveal confidential sources of information. Many of the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights that have laid down standards on governments' obligations to respect media freedom have arisen from cases where European journalists' rights have been infringed.

See Measures to Protect Journalists and Protection of Journalists' Safety.

Relative Importance of Different Media

A whole variety of economic, political and cultural factors determine which media are most important in different countries. It is widely claimed that the media - and particularly their role in election campaigns - has become 'Americanized'. Among other things this is generally understood to mean that television plays a dominant role as the medium of information. While this is increasingly true, it is not universally so. Also, what may be true for one section of a particular society may not be true for all. For example, those who are poorer or live in areas that are more geographically remote are less likely to have access to television than higher income or urban people.

Structure of Media Ownership

Who owns the media clearly has an enormous bearing on the way in which they will cover elections - or any other political issue. State-owned media are often under direct government control and will therefore tend to favour the ruling party. Privately-owned media may also serve the political interests of their proprietors, while in some countries the political parties themselves may own significant media outlets.

The structure of ownership is also likely to have a bearing on questions such as how far political advertising is permitted during elections. It is well known that the United States, with media that are almost exclusively in private hands, organizes direct access by political parties to the media by means of paid advertising. But that is not an isolated example. For example Finland, where commercial broadcasting developed rather earlier than in most of Europe, has a far freer approach to paid political advertising than most European countries. Countries like Britain and Denmark, with a stronger tradition of public ownership of the media, do not allow paid political advertising at all, but instead have a system of free direct access broadcasts.

Media ownership is sometimes seen as a simple reflection of political conditions: dictatorships or authoritarian regimes control the media directly, while democracies allow pluralism of ownership. There is a grain of truth in this, but it is clear that the reality is much more complex. Most Western European democracies, for example, had a state monopoly of broadcasting until relatively recently. Britain legalized private commercial broadcasting in the 1950s, but France, Germany and Denmark did not do so until the 1980s. Britain and France are particularly important examples because of their extensive colonial legacy - one that influenced the organization of broadcasting along with much else besides.

In Britain and France there was historically a strong distinction between broadcasting, with its strong public element, and the privately-owned print media. The argument for the involvement of the state in broadcasting - or at least in the allocation of broadcasting licences - has been that the frequency spectrum is a finite resource. Access should therefore be allocated impartially. However, in some long-standing democracies - for example in Scandinavia - there is a tradition of public funding of the print media, usually as a means of ensuring pluralism.

Conversely, the private media in Latin America were often closely identified with the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. Far from facilitating pluralism, these media houses advocated its suppression. Indeed, many would argue that the large corporations dominating the US media are not conducive to the expression of alternative political viewpoints. Whatever the truth of such contentions, it is clear that there is not a direct correlation between private ownership and pluralism.

Economics also play an important part in determining the structure of media ownership. The size of the advertising 'cake' varies according to economic conditions, but there is generally not much that individual media organs can do about it. All private - and some public - media are dependent upon advertising to make their business pay. One reason for the great weight of the public sector in the media of poorer countries is the small size of this cake - and in particular the fact that government advertising comprises a large proportion of it.

In African countries, for example, as well as parts of Asia and Latin America, this explains why national radio stations, broadcasting on medium and long wave frequencies, are almost entirely a publicly-owned phenomenon. Private advertisers are primarily interested in reaching an urban audience with disposable income - the type of audience served by private FM stations (most of which primarily broadcast music). Even when broadcasting regulations permit - and often they do not - neither private broadcasters nor advertisers have much interest in broadcasting to the entire nation. In this context, pluralism over the airwaves can only be ensured by developing a clear public service mandate for the state media.

The emergence of media such as satellite and cable television complicates this picture but, contrary to some of its most fervent advocates, does not change it fundamentally. Obviously those who can afford to subscribe to a pay channel will not be among the poorest - television owners seldom fall into that category anyway. Local cable and satellite providers are subject to the same political and economic constraints as those broadcasting on terrestrial channels. International broadcasters such as Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) can play an important role in breaching broadcasting monopolies. That is why many countries, especially in the Middle East have prohibited ownership of satellite dishes (a prohibition that was circumvented in one memorable North African case, by the widespread substitution of cous-cous pans). The Middle East has been fertile soil for satellite viewing because it shares a single language, Arabic. Few other regions of the world have a common language, with the result that English-language broadcasts from Atlanta or London will have only limited impact.

For the sake of simplicity the different types of media ownership can be summarized thus:

public or state-owned media, primarily in the area of broadcasting (see Public/State Media.
private broadcasters (see Private Broadcasters).
predominantly privately-owned print media (see Print Media).
community media (see Community Media).
media directly owned by political parties (see Party Media).

Public/State Media

A very large proportion of the world's media - especially radio and television - are owned by the public or the state. Three different terms are used that, in principle at least, have very different meanings:

Public media use public money to broadcast in the interests of the public as a whole. They are not partisan towards any particular party, including the incumbent ruling party.
State media are owned by the state (although of course the state is financed out of public money) and directly controlled by it.
Government media are owned by the government of the day (but still using that same public money) and are controlled by the government of the day.

Two models of public/state broadcasting developed in parallel. In Western Europe most broadcast media were initially under public ownership, but usually with strict legal guarantees of independence from the government of the day. At the same time, in the Soviet Union (and later in many countries that followed its lead) was a model of broadcasting under the control of the government, directed towards achieveing the objectives of the state.

The European public service model generally functioned well in its countries of origin but did not travel well. Colonial broadcasters on the British or French model enjoyed little of the independence of their metropolitan models, based as it was more upon convention than strong legal guarantees. After independence, post-colonial governments continued in the same tradition of broadcaster-as-government-propagandist. Hence the clear distinction in principle between government and public media has been largely lost in practice.

Yet the distinction is still important. Public service broadcasting was founded on a belief that still holds true in most of the world: the private sector alone cannot guarantee pluralism in broadcasting. The trouble is that government media have largely failed to do that too. In many countries, the advent of private broadcasting has made governments even more determined to cling onto editorial control of the public broadcaster.

In some cases there have been bold attempts to retrieve and modernize the public service ideal: for example, in South Africa where since 1993 the public broadcaster has statutory independence and even, at one stage, had its board members appointed after public hearings.

Public or state media may be financed out of one or all of three main sources:

A licence fee paid by television viewers
The government budget.
Commercial advertising.

In a few cases this may be supplemented by other income, such as the sale of programmes. These different revenue sources have potential implications for the broadcaster's day-to-day independence. A licence fee or commercial advertising may make it easier for the broadcaster to maintain a distance from government, although it will still depend on government mechanisms (often the postal service) to collect the fee.

Much of the discussion about 'regulation' of the media in elections - a term that creates nervousness among some freedom of expression advocates - is in fact to do with ensuring that publicly funded media operate with due independence of the government of the day, rather than trying to restrict the operations of media that already enjoy full editorial independence.

Public or government-owned media are usually broadcasters. But there are still many government-owned newspapers in existence. They do not enjoy the same economic rational as public broadcasters and often function as little more than government propaganda sheets. There are exceptions - Uganda's government paper, for example, has a reputation as a reliable and independent source of news. But often even innovative approaches to newspaper ownership end up in the same old pattern. Zimbabwe, immediately after independence, set up a Mass Media Trust to exercise public control over its main newspaper group. In practice this rapidly degenerated into direct editorial control from the Ministry of Information.⁴¹

Private Broadcasters

There is a wide range of different types of private broadcaster - from giant multinational corporations run by some of the richest and most politically powerful men in the world to small, local FM stations. The category is artificial, since what divides them is as great as what unites them.

What they do have in common, however, is that they are owned by private interests - usually a company that seeks to make a profit, though sometimes a non-profit making trust. In most cases, broadcasting will be under the terms of a licence granted on a periodic basis by a public authority. How prescriptive or restrictive are the terms of that licence will also vary. Sometimes a broadcasting licence will expressly prohibit the broadcasting of news. This is the case with the licence granted to the South African multinational M-Net, for example. M-Net is happy to provide pure entertainment channels, so elections, with their turmoil and debate, pass it by entirely.⁴²

More often, a broadcasting licence will lay down certain terms under which news or current affairs can be broadcast. Sometimes this will include prescriptions as to what election coverage should be carried. There may also be an explicit public service component to the licence - for example, obliging the licensee to carry public education programmes.

How important private broadcasting stations are as an information source for voters is a question that cannot be answered separately from the role of the public broadcaster. In the United States, at one extreme, public broadcasting plays a minimal role, so voters derive a very large part of their election information from private broadcasters. Paradoxically, a country like Tanzania, where television has only been introduced in very recent times, private commercial television has much greater weight than the public broadcaster. (This contrasts with most African countries where state television still dominates - and indeed with Zanzibar, the one part of Tanzania where television has existed for a long time.)⁴³

Private television is the fastest growing sector of the media in many parts of the world - not only in Western Europe, where it made a comparatively late start, but also Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. In many cases the owners of private broadcasting stations have explicit political and electoral ambitions. The clearest example is of Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, whose broadcasting stations successfully promoted his ambition to become his country's Prime Minister. A similar phenomenon can be seen in many countries of Latin America, as well as Russia.

Print Media

The print media display the greatest diversity of all, in both ownership and content. They range from daily to weekly newspapers, from news magazines to a range of special interest publications. For the purposes of this chapter we are primarily concerned with newspapers, although many of the observations and standards might also apply to other types of print media.

Even in situations where the state retains a large stake in broadcasting, the print media are usually in private hands. The main exceptions are likely to be authoritarian or dictatorial systems under which free elections are unlikely to be on the agenda. But there are also countries, such as some in northern Europe, where a public subsidy is paid to newspapers to ensure the political diversity of the press. In countries emerging from dictatorship, aid donors sometimes subsidize private newspapers with a similar aim. By and large, however, newspapers derive their income from advertising and sales revenue (with the former usually much more significant than the latter).

The ideal of the 'Fourth Estate' - the media keeping a check over government - is perhaps more effective in the print media than broadcasting. At least some newspapers in any country are likely to conduct serious news investigations and o comment in a reasonably sophisticated manner on political developments. The same is not always true of broadcasters.

But newspapers still have their own political agenda, which may not necessarily be a democratic one. A notorious example was the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, which campaigned against the elected government in 1973 and in favour of a military coup - a clear case where the press dismally failed to promote political pluralism. The usual argument, however, is that the existence of a variety of newspapers reflecting different viewpoints will ensure a better informed public and a free interplay of political ideas.

Community Media

In many parts of the world, community media are a rapidly growing phenomenon. Debates rage about who exactly are entitled to call themselves community media. Usually the definition includes something about being produced by the community, for the community. In other words, it is not just enough for it to be aimed at a small local area; it should be produced with the involvement of that community.

But then, what is a community? Traditionally it has been assumed to refer to a geographical community. But in South Africa, for example, with one of the widest networks of community radio in the world, the term is also used to refer to a community of interest, especially among disadvantaged sectors of society. Thus there might be a 'women's community', a 'gay community' or a 'community of people with disabilities'. There may also be community media aimed at people of a certain religious faith.⁴⁴

The media themselves will also vary. Community newspapers have a long history, but the last 20 years have seen the emergence of lower cost broadcasting technologies, accompanied by a liberalization of licensing regimes. This has facilitated the emergence in some countries of a vibrant community radio sector (and to a lesser extent television).

The significance of this for elections is immediately apparent. Community media, almost by definition, have a small but highly loyal audience. For purposes of voter education, community media will be very important, especially since they can reach sections of society that may be bypassed by more traditional media. See Cultural and Social Considerations.

Often the terms of community broadcasting licences prohibit explicit political campaigning. It will be particularly important for a regulatory authority to monitor compliance with the terms of a licence during election periods.

Party Media

It is a paradox, but those media that are directly owned and controlled by political parties are likely to be the most concerned about the outcome of an election - and at the same time fall entirely outside most systems of media regulation. If a newspaper is simply a campaigning sheet for the party that owns it, it is not effectively bound by any of the professional or legal standards that govern the behaviour of the media as a whole.

In many countries, political parties are not allowed to own broadcasting stations, since this is deemed to be an unfair allocation of a national resource - the frequency spectrum - to a narrow political interest.

Essentially, political party media will fall into one of three categories. It will be for the regulatory authority to decide which:

Propaganda sheets that do not fall under a media regulator, but may be monitored if, for example, they constitute campaign spending, which may be limited by law.
Conventional private media that just happen to be owned by a party. In that case, they will have to conform to the prevailing standards or regulations for other private media.
Government media, in a situation in which the ruling party and government has been intertwined. In that case, media using public funds should conform to the same standards as any other public media - which in practice probably means that they cannot campaign for the party at all.

'New' Media - the Internet

The Internet has been hailed as the next revolution in electoral communications, just as it is claimed to have revolutionized the global flow of information. Already opinion polls are conducted by Internet (though one hopes that the findings are treated with extreme caution) and the 2004 US presidential is being characterized as the first 'Internet election'.⁴⁵ Treating such assertions with due scepticism does not mean dismissing them out of hand - simply taking a sober approach to how the Internet fits into the overall media structure.

The first point is that the Internet is dependent upon telecommunications - for the most part still land lines rather than cellular telephony. Two further facts immediately underline the significance of this. First, there are more telephones in Manhattan than in the whole of Africa. Second, in South Africa, which has about the eighteenth highest level of Internet connectivity in the world, more than half the population have never made a telephone call.⁴⁶ Put simply, the Internet remains a communications medium for the relatively rich, rather than the mass of the world's voters. In this it is unlike radio, or even television, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, the Internet has rapidly become a vitally important means of political communication - witness the lengths that governments such as the Chinese will go to in order to limit access to 'subversive' Web sites. In a context where the conventional media are highly censored, the Internet can be an important means for small numbers of people to receive politically sensitive information that can then be more widely circulated. In other words, for most of the globe, the significance is more that the Internet will enable alternative ideas to be put into circulation rather than serving as a means of mass communication by parties, candidates or electoral authorities.

The 'convergence' between the technology of broadcasting and that of telecommunications is also likely to lead to a closer linkage between traditional media and the Internet. Certainly the major providers in one field can cross easily into the other. Telephony has moved towards the use of satellites, while broadcasting has moved towards the use of fibre-optic cable. The likely economic and social consequence is the growth of private media monopolies in the broadcasting and Internet field.

Even in the United States, where Internet use is most widespread, political parties have made surprisingly little and unsophisticated use of the Internet. The reluctance of modern politicians to engage in spontaneous interaction with the electorate perhaps explains this. Politicians' Web sites tend to be the same material that is available in other, more traditional formats repackaged for the Internet.

Where the Internet has developed faster in relation to elections has been in the material posted by non-governmental organizations. In the US this has included searchable online databases that allow the public to research campaign contributions to the different candidates - a development that can only enhance democracy.

A more problematic development, however, is the use of Internet reporting to subvert conventions that have been widely accepted by 'traditional' media - for example by reporting exit polls before voting has ended (see Reporting Exit Poll Findings - United States

Taken in conjunction with the conventional media, the Internet can only grow in importance. After all, many journalists now use the Internet as an important source of stories. Electoral authorities increasingly use a World Wide Web site as a means of publishing information. This will then be picked up by the conventional media and made available more widely. This is particularly important, for example, in publishing results. If the Web site can be linked to the results database of the authority's computer this will mean that results are publicly available immediately.

The Internet can also be an important way of distributing items such as packages for radio broadcast. This is a particularly effective way of making programming available to local or regional radio stations in large countries - Indonesia, for example, has experimented with this approach. This has a potential use for distributing voter education material or direct access slots.

Level of Professionalism

An important element in the media environment is the degree of professionalism and experience of journalists and other media practitioners. It is common that journalists in a country that has only recently emerged from a highly restrictive political system will lack many of the skills and professional standards of those in a country with a long history of media freedom.

Sometimes the media will be emerging from a situation in which journalism was not freely practised at all. In that case there may well be a tendency to abuse new-found freedoms with poorly-researched and inaccurate stories. Often journalists in these situations will simply not know what professional standards are expected of them: they will not have professional bodies or trade unions with codes of conduct. They will lack the basic skills for investigating, checking and writing or broadcasting stories. In particular, journalists who are approaching their first free election are likely to be unfamiliar with even the most simple aspects of the process. Often there will be no facilities for training journalists - or at least none that equips them with the skills that they need to play the 'watchdog' role of the media in a democracy (see Journalism Training).

However, the experience of an authoritarian regime may not be entirely negative. In many cases courageous independent journalism has played an important part in bringing dictatorships to their knees. Journalists who have successfully investigated and published sensitive stories in such a media environment will have developed professional skills that are unmatched by their colleagues in friendlier circumstances. In the context of an election, the professional challenge will be to bring these skills to bear on a new and unfamiliar set of stories to be reported.

Journalism Training

The standards of journalism will be determined in part by the existence of training institutions. This in turn will be influenced by two main factors: the political and economic climate.

In a situation where the media environment is greatly restricted, there is unlikely to be any academic or training institution that can teach journalists the necessary skills. It is unlikely also that professional bodies will be willing or able to provide such training. In poorer countries, providing journalism training is seldom seen as a priority. This is often to do with the low social status accorded to journalists.

In either circumstance, it may help to develop training facilities on a regional or even international level. International journalists' organizations such as the International Federation of Journalists have considerable expertise (including in the area of election reporting) and can provide training, especially in new or transitional democracies. (See International Federation of Journalists: Election Reporting Handbook.) Regional training institutions can provide a type of journalism training that is well geared to the experience of a journalist's home country, without the same political or economic constraints.

Legal Framework for Media

An important factor in determining the pluralism, independence and vibrancy of the media will be the legal context within which they operate. Journalists themselves often tend towards the view that the less the law has to do with them the better. Certainly the ideal is probably that the legal framework for the media is aimed at creating an enabling environment in which journalism can flourish, rather than regulating its every aspect.

The broad legal framework within which the media operate derives in the first instance from international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is customary international law, which informs the way in which all other law is interpreted. In Article 19, the UDHR provides a fundamental guarantee of the right to freedom of expression, which encompasses the freedom of the media. This is echoed and elaborated in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

This is a treaty, which is binding upon any state that ratifies it.

Further, there are regional treaties in Europe, Africa and the Americas, each of which contains similar guarantees of freedom of expression and media freedom. See International Law and International Treaties on media and elections.

At a national level, freedom of expression and of the media will be affected by laws at several different levels:

The Constitution - the basic or supreme law of the land (see Constitutional Protection for Media Freedom).
Statutes, passed by the legislature (see Statutes Affecting the Media).
Decrees, regulations or other statutory instruments, which will usually have lesser force than statutory law (see Other Statutory Instruments Affecting the Media).

In principle, of course, all these areas of law will relate to each other in a harmonious fashion. If a country has ratified the ICCPR or its regional human rights treaty, then its provisions will be reflected in the Constitution, which in turn will determine the content of subsidiary law. But life is seldom that simple.

In many legal systems, ratified treaties do not automatically find their way into enforceable national law. Constitutions may have been drafted long ago, before a treaty was ratified. Or the Constitution may reflect progressive developments in freedom of expression law, but other statutes may not have been amended to take account of this. In principle, ratified treaties may take precedence over the Constitution and provide the means for interpreting it. Or they may be deemed to be of equal status to it. Or they may still be part of the domestic law, but regarded as inferior to the Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution will usually be sovereign in relation to statutes, which will be deemed ineffective if they come into conflict with it.

All this, in turn, is contingent upon how far governments respect the rule of law in practice. Even in stable democracies, this is not something that can be taken for granted. A government can easily be irritated by what it sees an inquiring and interfering press and take illegal measures to try to stop its investigations - ranging from unlawfully seizing a journalist's notes to organizing death squads. In this area, as in any other, the vigilance of the judicial system and its readiness to confront the executive branch of government are vital.

Constitutional Protection for Media Freedom

The trend in recent years has been towards strengthening the role and supremacy of the constitution in law and government. Increasingly, notions such as the 'sovereignty of parliament' are being superseded by the idea that there should be a single supreme law that governs everyone. Even Britain, the home of the 'sovereignty of parliament' concept, with its supposed 'unwritten constitution', has now incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into its domestic law as a type of Bill of Rights. The United States, by contrast, has a long history of constitutional rule. The first amendment to the US Constitution famously provides that 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' - in other words the supreme law is set above the legislature.

More generally, older constitutions that provide a general protection of freedom of expression are now understood to encompass freedom of the media and a right to freedom of information: two of the most relevant aspects where media and elections are concerned.

The South African Constitution (1996) represents some of the most progressive modern constitutional thinking on media freedom, in its Section 16 on freedom of expression:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes - (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. (2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to - (a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.

The exceptions in Section 16(2) echo those in Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

When a strong constitutional protection of freedom of expression is introduced, a government may conduct an audit of existing laws to determine whether they conform to the constitution. Any that do not will have to be repealed or amended to bring them into line with the constitution.

But in many instances such an audit does not take place. The constitutionality of existing laws will then only be tested by litigation when the government tries to apply a law that may be outdated. It is in these circumstances that the existence of an independent judiciary that is prepared to enforce the constitutional protection of rights becomes especially important.

Under most constitutions the right to freedom of expression may be suspended or 'derogated from' in certain exceptional circumstances. According to international standards, this should only be when there is a lawfully declared state of emergency. The suspension of rights should only be for the duration of a genuine emergency threatening the life of the nation.

Statutes Affecting the Media

Different legal traditions have very different approaches to the role of statute law in relation to the media (or other aspects of national life). Countries with a civil law or socialist legal tradition tend as a matter of course to have a statute governing the media. Common law countries tend not to, instead assuming that the media are subject to the general law of the country except in narrowly specified areas (see Case Law Affecting the Media).

The variety of different systems makes it difficult to generalize about the laws in force relating to the media. The following, however, is a list of principles derived from various international standards that give some indication of what laws that permit a healthy degree of media freedom might look like:

Anyone is free to set up a media outlet, provided that they abide by the basic business law of the country. There will be no procedure for licensing the print media. Broadcast media may be licensed by a publicly accountable regulatory body according to publicly available standards (see Existing Media Regulatory Frameworks)
Anyone is free to practice as a journalist. There will be no legally prescribed qualification or registration process.
Defamation law will provide a civil remedy in the event of wilful harm to reputation - but will not be a criminal offence. Politicians and other public figures will be offered less protection by defamation law than private individuals (see Criticism of Politicians and Government).
'Sedition' laws will not penalize journalists or others merely on the basis of the reporting of facts or the expression of opinions. 'National security' provisions will be narrowly drawn and will only apply in the case of a genuine threat to the life of the nation - not in order to protect politicians or government agencies from legitimate scrutiny.
There will be a presumption that official information belongs to the public. It will only be protected in order to safeguard a legitimate national security interest or for a number of other closely defined reasons. Otherwise there should be mechanisms in place to ensure public access to official information.
Journalists should not be compelled to disclose the confidential source of information, except in very narrow circumstances - in practice only when this would impede a criminal investigation and where the information is not available from any other source.

Other Statutory Instruments Affecting the Media

Many statutes passed by the legislature will require the enactment of further detailed regulations to give them force. For example, the legislature may pass a broadcasting statute, but regulations will be drawn up to lay down the exact licensing procedure. Such regulations will usually be issued by the Minister responsible. This sort of statutory instrument is indeed a law, but it is inferior to a statute passed by the legislature. Should there be a conflict between the two, the statute will prevail.

Another type of statutory instrument is more problematic. Authoritarian governments will often rule by decree. A decree is also a law. Although most legal systems would take it to be inferior to a law passed by parliament, sometimes a decree may declare itself to be superior to other law, including even the Constitution. (The Nigerian military dictatorship, for example, enacted many decrees of this type.) In such difficult circumstances it will be the responsibility of the judiciary to assert the superiority of established law over the declarations of dictators.

Case Law Affecting the Media

The relevance of previous cases in interpreting law differs according to different legal systems. In general, common law systems work very largely on case law since the 'common law' is not written down anywhere and depends on judges 'discovering' it. A judge in any particular case will rely heavily on previous judges who have decided upon similar cases. Although precedence is naturally given to cases from the judge's own country (and from the more superior courts) this approach allows precedents from other countries with a similar legal system to be taken into account also.

Historically, civil law countries did not share this approach. However, the development of international law has provided new interpretative standards in many instances. Thus, for example, Spanish law requires the application of the European Human Rights Convention to be taken into account in interpreting its own constitution. The case law of regional human rights courts such as the Inter-American and the European cuts across distinctions between common and civil law jurisdictions and is intended to be invoked under either system.

In practice, common law systems have an increasing body of statute law, while civil law systems draw upon the approach in previous cases - including in both systems in relation to the media and elections. The two systems are undoubtedly growing closer together.

Existing Media Regulatory Frameworks

A vital part of the media environment - and one that will be of particular relevance during an election - is the existing regulatory system. These come in all shapes and sizes but, for the sake of convenience, can be broken down into three main types:

Broadcasting regulator: these will exist in some form wherever there is broadcasting. Their basic function is to allocate frequencies to the broadcasters. To some extent this will entail deciding who gets a licence to broadcast and who does not. It may also involve drawing up the terms of a licence to prescribe what type of content the licensee may or may not broadcast. It may also include a complaints mechanism. See Broadcasting Regulator.
Voluntary media council: this is a form of self-regulation that is very common among print media especially. Media councils may develop codes of conduct, consider complaints and conduct training of journalists. This is not, however, a mechanism for licensing journalists or determining who may practice. See Voluntary Media Council.
Other statutory regulator: a large variety of institutions fall under this heading. These range from constitutional bodies designed to ensure the independence of the media to state licensing authorities that control who may publish a newspaper or practise as a journalist. See Statutory or Constitutional Regulators.

The regulatory system will in many cases have a considerable influence on the independence and professionalism of the media. A system that is under tight governmental control is unlikely to promote pluralism and diversity among the media. A voluntary system, or one with strong legal or constitutional guarantees of independence, can safeguard pluralism in the media from government interference and can help to develop professional skills and standards.

An independent and trusted regulatory body can be important in an election, since it may take on some or all of the specialized functions involved in regulating the media during an election campaign. See Implementation Mechanism for Media and Election Regulations.

Broadcasting Regulator

The word 'regulation' is one that makes many journalists and broadcasters nervous, yet the reality is that in almost every country of the world someone decides who may broadcast and on what frequency. The main argument in favour of having such a body is that the airwaves are a finite resource. It is a matter of national policy how they are distributed - unlike newspaper publishing, for example, which can be largely determined by what the public chooses to read. If there were no statutory allocation of frequencies, then anyone with a large and strong transmitter could drown out a broadcaster with a weaker signal simply by broadcasting on an adjacent frequency. Hence broadcasting regulation, when carried out properly, is not a means of censorship but of ensuring that a variety of voices are heard.

There is a growing argument that in the age of satellite broadcasting, digital technology and convergence between broadcasting and telecommunications the old rationale for regulation has become redundant. Now, it is argued, there are enough channels for everyone to have their say. But the reality is that most of the audience for broadcasting still uses the old technologies - often a battery-powered or even clockwork transistor radio, or an ordinary terrestrial TV set. Satellite technology may be more widely available than before, but community and small private broadcasters (not to mention public national broadcasters) still depend on the old ways.

The frequencies available within any one country will be allocated, after negotiation, by the International Telecommunications Union. How they are then distributed to broadcasters within the country will vary enormously. An example of modern thinking on the issue comes from South Africa, where the Constitution provides for the existence of an independent regulatory body. The South African Communications Regulatory Authority (formerly the Independent Broadcasting Authority) has responsibility for regulating broadcasters in three sectors: public, private and community. It is unusual for a regulatory body to have authority over public broadcasting, but this has the advantage that it should allow the development of a coherent national broadcasting policy. The US Federal Communications Commission also has overall responsibility for frequency allocation, but that is in a situation where there is very little public broadcasting. In Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is answerable to Parliament, while a separate body, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, is responsible for regulating private broadcasting.

It is now generally recognized that broadcasting licences should be allocated by an independent publicly accountable body, according to pre-determined criteria. A regulatory body will often incorporate a complaints procedure, which may allow it to impose sanctions on broadcasters for breach of the terms of their licence. In extreme cases, the sanction would be to refuse to renew a licence after its term had expired, or even to revoke it before the term had ended.

All this is relevant in an election context, since a broadcasting regulator already carries out some of the functions that an electoral supervisory body may wish to assume in relation to the media. It may be more practical, therefore, for the broadcasting regulator itself to play that role.

Voluntary Media Council

Many countries have a voluntary media or press council, formed by the media profession itself. This is a regulatory body only in the sense that it may act as a complaints mechanism for members of the public who have a grievance about the way a newspaper or broadcaster has covered a particular issue. Clearly a voluntary body of this sort cannot fulfil functions such as granting broadcasting licences.

The value of voluntary media councils is that they may be a way of dealing with problems - such as public complaints - without resort to litigation. An informal solution, such as the publication of an apology or retraction, replaces a lengthy and costly legal process. The media often also adopt this sort of mechanism as a way of pre-empting statutory regulation that may interfere with their own independence.

The role of a voluntary media council may be broader. It may, for example, undertake training of journalists or formulation of codes of conduct. These are also activities that may be useful for election coverage. There are clear advantages in a media professional body organizing training, while a voluntary code of conduct may be a useful and non-confrontational way of introducing the necessary professional standards to journalists who are inexperienced in election reporting. The media council's own complaints mechanism would then be able to address the matter if journalists fall short of the required standards.

Statutory or Constitutional Regulators

Some countries have statutory or constitutional bodies that are charged with regulating the media, or some section of it. It is a type of structure that is more typical of civil law than common law systems. Usually what it entails is some system of registration of publications, as well as broadcasters, and sometimes of journalists as well. This type of approach is generally opposed by media practitioners, who take the view that only the profession itself is competent to decide who can practise. It is a short step from registering publications or practitioners to licensing them - with all the negative implications that that would carry for media independence and the right to freedom of expression.

However, constitutional bodies may sometimes be charged with protecting the independence of the media, including the publicly owned media, from the government of the day. This, for example, is the role of the National Media Commission in Ghana. Where a regulatory body genuinely does play this role, it may be well placed to help to supervise the media in elections.

Law or Regulations on Media during Elections

Many countries have nothing in their laws to govern the behaviour of the media during elections and see no reason why they should. Others see some measure of special media regulation during an election as being part of the process of 'levelling the playing field'. Still others are somewhere in the middle, with a system of voluntary self-regulation, whereby the media agree to adopt a series of self-limiting regulations because of the special demands of an election period.

Even in long-established democracies there are widely divergent views on how far the media should be subject to formal regulation in election periods. The US tradition is one of minimal regulation, while the European one tends more towards the establishment of enforceable rules. One reason for the difference is that Europe, unlike the United States, has a history of state involvement in domestic broadcasting. The implication of this is that the precious resources of broadcasting and the frequency spectrum should be used fairly to reflect the views of the different candidates and not improperly favour the ruling party. As in its broader approach to media freedom issues, the US view is generally that the 'marketplace of ideas' is most readily achieved by recourse to the economic marketplace. Thus the pluralism of many privately owned media is assumed in itself to ensure that the full spectrum of political views find their voice.

But whatever the differing political culture as regards media regulation, it is generally acknowledged that the media have a vital role to play in communicating information to the electorate. This makes it rather surprising that so few electoral laws deal to any great extent with the media. The absence of formal statutes or regulations might indicate a mature media environment in which there is a free interchange of political ideas in the press and over the airwaves and where every party has fair access to the media to get its ideas across. Or it might not.

Zimbabwean electoral law, for example, makes no mention of the media at all. In every election in the country's history the state has had a monopoly of broadcasting (which is under tight government control) and for most of that time a monopoly of the daily newspapers too. The absence of any specific regulation of the media in elections, far from 'levelling the playing field', has allowed the government to 'move the goal posts'. For example, the refusal of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to run opposition advertisements during a referendum in February 2000 prompted the opposition to seek a High Court order against the broadcaster. They succeeded in doing so, but arguably it should not have been necessary. In subsequent parliamentary elections the ZBC decided not to run political advertising at all - until election day when it broadcast advertisements for the ruling party, too late for other parties to respond. Under election law (though possibly not under Zimbabwean broadcasting law) the ZBC was entitled to do this.⁴⁷

In situations where large sections of the media are either publicly owned or under the control of one particular political interest group (this may in practice be the same thing) then it probably makes sense for the law to set out some basic rules for election coverage. These will often differ in their provisions for public and privately owned media. The areas that the law (or subsidiary regulations) may cover include the following:

how time or space will be allocated to candidates and political parties (see Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties)
whether political advertising is to be permitted (see Paid Political Advertising)
what duty the media have to carry voter education material (see Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?)
whether there is to be a right of reply to factual misrepresentation in the media (see 'mee08')

In addition, the regulations may deal with other more specific issues such as:

news blackouts or 'reflection periods' (see News Blackouts)
restrictions on reporting of opinion polls (see Opinion Polls)
policies on 'hate speech' and defamation (see Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation)

The law or regulations will probably create a statutory body with responsibility for oversight of the media during election, or will assign that responsibility to some existing body such as the electoral commission or broadcasting regulator. Included in the law there is likely to be some speedy mechanism for dealing with complaints about media coverage (Implementation Mechanism: Existing Media Regulatory Body).

Who Should Be Involved in the Drafting Process?

Laws are made by the legislature, so in principle the answer to this question is simple. In practice it is less so. Any law that 'regulates' the media is profoundly sensitive, even when the purpose of regulation is to ensure pluralism in the media and a full voice to different political viewpoints.

In any event, good legislative practice involves consultation and the following are the main stakeholders to be consulted in drafting laws or regulations on the media and elections:

The media themselves - directly, as well as through professional bodies and trade unions.
The political parties - since part of the purpose of regulation is to ensure that they have fair access to the media.
Any existing regulatory body, whether it be a broadcasting regulator involved in the distribution of frequencies or a media council responsible for the development and enforcement of professional standards.
Election administrators - many aspects of the media's work during elections depend on a close working relationship with those responsible for supervising and administering the election.
The electorate - since it is they whose information needs are ultimately at stake. To consult 'the electorate' as a whole is clearly problematic, but it should be possible to identify representative organizations, for example of those who may have special information requirements. These might include national or ethnic minorities, women, the illiterate or people with disabilities.

A Specified Campaign Period?

If there is to be some regulation of what the media may or may not do during an election, then logically this is likely to apply to a specified campaign period. There will be a given period of official campaigning during which the regulations will apply, while otherwise normal practice will prevail. Logical, perhaps, but not entirely unproblematic.

One issue is voter education. Information on issues such as voter registration will usually need to be communicated to the electorate well in advance of the official campaign. Regulations will be aimed to ensure that this information is communicated in an accurate and impartial manner.

There is no doubt also that voters are just as much influenced by what they learn from the media at an earlier period. Media monitoring teams, for example, would always start their work well in advance of the official campaign period.

Political wisdom (and experience prior to the 2000 election) in the United States has it that the candidate who is leading on Labour Day (in September) will win the presidential election (in November). So nothing that happens in the final two months of the campaigning (longer than most countries' official campaign period) has much influence. The American approach is to have no designated campaign period at all - indeed roughly two years out of every presidential term are taken up with campaigning. But this would not suit most countries.

The opposite extreme is represented by Israel, where the electoral law relating to media coverage covers a time frame of 150 days before the election - that is, nearly five months. During the 30 days immediately before the election no campaigning is permitted in cinemas or on television, although there are no such limitations on radio.⁴⁸

And few countries have election periods quite as closely defined as Estonia, where the law relating to the obligations of broadcasters in the election creates a clearly separated pre-election and election period, with the latter then subdivided into four further periods, each with its own different reporting rules: the application period, the election campaign, the voting period and the period of determining and publishing the election results (see News Blackouts). See 'mex09'.

But the application of such strict regulation presupposes that there will be a set date for the election. In many countries, particularly those that have an electoral system based on the British one, choice of the election date lies with the incumbent head of government. Alternatively, in most systems an election may be precipitated by an event such as parliamentary vote of no confidence. In such cases, it will be impossible to apply media regulations that extend beyond a fairly limited campaign period.

The best option perhaps is for the system of electoral media regulation to be well meshed with the general system of media regulation - ensuring that the media are pluralistic, vibrant, professional and free from censorship at all times, not just during campaign periods. .

Different Obligations of Public and Private Media

Media regulatory bodies in election periods usually draw some distinction between the obligations of those media that are wholly or partly funded out of public money and those that are privately owned. Among the private media, a distinction is often drawn between print and broadcast media, since the latter will usually have been granted their broadcasting licence by a public body.

What we refer to here as the 'publicly-owned' media covers a variety of different phenomena: from media that are under tight government control of their editorial content to those that are funded out of money raised from taxes and licence fees, with a statutory guarantee of their total independence from the government of the day. Most probably lie somewhere in between. But what they have in common is that the media or election law usually treats them all similarly - and as distinct from the private media, which are held to have different obligations.

Public media, by virtue of their source of funding, are a resource for the entire electorate. It is generally accepted that they should not be politically partisan in their editorial coverage. This was the view set out by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, in his 1999 report, when he spoke of the obligation of the state-owned media to give voice to a variety of opinions and not to be a propaganda organ for one particular political party. Also, they have particular obligations to provide civic education, as well as to provide a platform for the different political parties. See UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999.

This point is fundamental. Use of a public resource for partisan political campaigning carries all the same legal and ethical implications whether the resource is funds, a vehicle, a building or a radio station. That is why there are so often clear laws or regulations protecting public media against government interference.

The obligations of the private media are far fewer. The essence of a free media environment is that broadcasters and journalists are not told what they may or may not say or write. The best guarantee that the variety of political ideas are communicated freely and accurately is often understood to be for the media to be allowed to get on with their job unhampered. But this does not mean that private media have no obligations at all. Professional journalistic standards will demand accurate and balanced reporting, as well as a clear separation of fact and comment.

Broadcasting stations usually have their licences allocated by a public body. This will often come with terms attached about whether they are allowed to support any political party, what, if any, news coverage they are allowed to broadcast, as well as other conditions such as whether they have an obligation, for example, to broadcast public service announcements such as voter education slots.

Likewise, any general laws or regulations relating to media reporting will probably apply equally to both public or private media: for example, provisions relating to 'blackout' periods before the vote or the coverage of opinion polls. Similarly, general legal provisions such as the law of defamation - although they may be somewhat modified in their effect during the campaign period - will still apply equally to both public and private media.

Provisions that Affect Both Private and Public Media

Although the regulatory system will probably make some distinction between the publicly and privately-owned media, a number of aspects of the law or regulations governing the media in elections are likely to affect both sectors. These may include:

an expedited procedure for hearing complaints by the public or political parties against the media. See Complaints Procedure
any regulations relating to the reporting of opinion polls. See Opinion Polls
policies relating to 'hate speech', defamation, media liability for the statements of politicians and other related issues. See Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation.
any policy on news blackouts before or during the election. See News Blackouts
journalists' right of access to election events. See Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events.
accreditation of journalists. See Accreditation.
provisions to ensure the safety of journalists. See Measures to Protect Journalists.

The regulatory authority may place different obligations on the private and public media over matters such as whether they carry voter education or direct access materials. But the usual practice is that where the private media carry such coverage - even when they are not obliged to - they should conform to the same standards of equity and impartiality as the public media.

Implementation Mechanism for Media and Election Regulations

One of the most important practical aspects of the law or regulations on media in elections is who is responsible for implementing it. There will often be much greater day-to-day contact between editors and the regulatory authority responsible for media during elections than there would normally be with, for example, a broadcasting regulator. The relationship is likely to be (or at least should be) a collaborative one.

There are several possible approaches that can be taken:

An existing regulatory body may be given responsibility for the specific issues that arise during election periods. (See Implementation Mechanism: Existing Media Regulatory Body.)
The media may set up their own regulatory body, possibly in collaboration with the political parties themselves. (See Implementation Mechanism: Media Self-Regulation.)
The existing electoral supervisory body, such as an electoral commission, may take on this responsibility, sometimes through a specialized sub-committee. (See Implementation Mechanism: Electoral Commission.)
A specialist body may be set up specifically to regulate the media during elections - an unusual solution that was adopted, for example, in South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994. (See Implementation Mechanism: Specialist Body.)
The responsibility may be assigned to the judiciary. (See Implementation Mechanism: Judiciary.)

This presentation is inevitably a little schematic. It is quite common for different aspects of electoral coverage to be regulated by different bodies. In Poland, for example, regulating the broadcasting of free direct access slots is the responsibility of the State Electoral Commission, while responsibility for campaign coverage rests with the usual broadcasting regulator, the National Broadcasting Council.⁴⁹ The advantage of such an approach is that it separates areas where the regulator may have to develop strict and binding rules from those matters of professional practice that are best left to the media themselves to determine. The disadvantage is that two different regulatory bodies are operating in two closely related areas, with the danger that they may step on each others' toes.

Whatever system is adopted, the media (and anyone else affected, such as an individual complainant) will have a right of appeal to a higher independent body, usually a court of law (see Complaints Procedure).

Implementation Mechanism: Existing Media Regulatory Body

It may often be the case that an existing regulatory body will take on the function of supervising aspects of media coverage of elections, either on its own or in conjunction with the election administration itself.

This was the approach taken, for example, in the South African elections in 1999 - although in the 1994 elections there had been an entirely separate institution, the Independent Media Commission, devoted exclusively to the media and elections. In 1999, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the constitutionally mandated body that regulated all public, private and community broadcasting, issued regulations governing a series of issues:

Advertising and election broadcasting
Timing of election broadcasting
A formula for allocating election broadcast time to different parties
General observations on the quality of coverage expected.

The latter section includes this general observation:

Every broadcaster who transmits news or current affairs programmes in respect of the elections shall do so in an impartial and objective manner and in a manner which treats all parties fairly.

In an annex to the regulations, the authority went on to elaborate what were the responsibilities of broadcasters (and the role of the IBA):

The Authority does not intervene in the news and programming operations of the broadcasters. Broadcasters' role during elections does not differ from their normal journalistic role during non-election periods. Normal ethical considerations will continue to apply. A distinguishing feature of the election period is the obligation to achieve equitable coverage of political parties without abdicating news value judgements.

See South Africa: IBA Guidelines on election coverage and South Africa: IBA Formula for allocating party broadcasting

Italy is another country where the existing media regulators have principal responsibility for supervising media coverage of elections. In that case there are two separate bodies: a parliamentary commission that has responsibility for public broadcasting and a Guarantor for radio, television and the press, who is responsible for the privately-owned media. Both institutions make regulations governing coverage by the respective media sectors in elections (see An Existing Regulatory Body - Italy).

Implementation Mechanism: Media Self-Regulation

Many in the media would see a system of self-regulation in elections as an ideal solution. This clearly works best where there are well-entrenched independent media and a long tradition of democratic elections, so that the solutions adopted to the problems of election coverage are sanctified by long-established practice.

Perhaps the best-known example of this approach is in Britain, where direct access Party Election Broadcasts are allocated by a joint committee of broadcasters and political party representatives. This is a strange hybrid solution, since the requirement for Party Election Broadcasts is established in law. The broadcasters then use the rough division of direct access broadcasters as a guideline for measuring their own allocation of time to the different parties in the course of news programmes. (See Self-Regulation - United Kingdom.)

Denmark also has a self-regulating system. The law forbids paid political advertising but says nothing about how (or whether) other forms of direct access broadcasting should be allocated. In practice, the public Danmarks Radio has allocated direct access slots equally between all parties running for parliament. This approach has been reinforced by decisions of the Ombudsman and Supreme Court, but is essentially voluntary. Danmarks Radio also traditionally broadcasts a panel debate involving all political parties. Also, the last day before the election, television has been kept free of election broadcasts. However, the advent of private independent television has led to some changes in this tradition: the new TV2 also held a pre-election panel debate, but excluded some smaller parties, while it also introduced election coverage the day before the vote.⁵⁰

However, it has not only been long-established democracies that have adopted a self-regulatory approach. Before the independence elections in Namibia in 1989, the state-controlled South West Africa Broadcasting Corporation (as it was then known) invited political parties to join a standing committee to consult on election coverage. The committee agreed on a schedule of direct access slots, although it was not able to address the problem of biased news coverage.⁵¹

The state broadcaster in another Southern African country, Zimbabwe, also tried to adopt a self-regulating approach towards direct access slots. This was prompted by a series of highly controversial advertisements for the ruling party in the 1990 election, which many saw as being in poor taste. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation established a special committee before the 1995 elections in an attempt to avoid a recurrence of the problem. But, as in Namibia, it was not able to provide a serious solution to the problem of biased news coverage.

Hungary in 1990 also adopted a self-regulating approach. National television and the news agency, in collaboration with representatives of 12 political parties and the Independent Lawyers Forum, drafted a voluntary Electoral Code of Ethics. All the major parties adopted the code, along with most major news organizations.⁵²

The state-owned Polish Radio and Television have adopted an approach that is similar to the BBC. Allocation of direct access broadcasting is the responsibility of the State Electoral Commission, but in their campaign news coverage radio and television are answerable only to the National Broadcasting Council, the general regulatory body. The management of Polish Radio and Television have issued detailed guidelines to staff, including the following:

[Polish Radio and Television should] provide comprehensive coverage of the campaign and information about the candidates. News and current affairs programmes should provide extensive information about the parties, their election platforms and candidates, without any bias in favour or against any party and without promoting any set of political views. The main principle should be equality of access which puts channel controllers, programme departments and regional stations under an obligation to maintain records of the amount of airtime devoted to particular parties or candidates and to make sure that principle of equality is honoured. (See Poland: laws and regulations on election broadcasting)

Implementation Mechanism: Electoral Commission

In many instances, responsibility for implementing any regulations on the media during election campaigns rests with the main electoral supervisory body itself. This is often seen as an appropriate solution if the electoral supervisory body has sufficient guarantees of independence - but also the expertise to conduct the specialized work of media regulation.

In France for many years the Commission national de controle de la campagne presidentielle (CNCCP) was responsible for regulating broadcasts in the presidential election campaigns. However, this responsibility shifted with the advent of privately-owned television stations. A new Commission national pour des communications et des libertes was set up to ensure a continuing public service content in private broadcasting and it was to this body that regulation of broadcasting passed. However, the CNCCP retained responsibility for regulating election campaigns in the print media.⁵³

Malawi offers an extremely positive example of an electoral commission in a new democracy that, by an effective show of independence, was able to ensure that the different political parties and candidates received a fairer share of coverage from the government-controlled broadcaster. But it was able to do this not only through a display of political will, but also because it had established a specialized media sub-committee that had the experience and expertise to deal with the broadcasters (see Electoral Commission as Media Regulator - Malawi).

Using the electoral supervisory body may be a preferable option in a small country where a plethora of overlapping institutions is not an attractive or cost-effective choice. In Barbados, for example, it is the Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the body with overall responsibility for the election, that is also responsible for regulating media coverage. See Barbados: law on election broadcasting.

Nicaragua's 1987 Constitution established a Supreme Electoral Council as an independent branch of government - separate from the executive, legislature and judiciary. Its responsibility includes applying the mass media law during elections and administering a complaints procedure. It established a specialized Mass Media Department to deal with broadcasters, in particular trying to negotiate changes in practices that are the subject of complaints.⁵⁴

Implementation Mechanism: Specialist Body

A number of countries have opted to create a specialized body whose responsibility is to regulate media during election periods - that is, it is neither a general election administration body nor a general media regulatory body. This option has been seen most often in transitional elections in which the role of the media is expected to be particularly problematic for some reason.

Thus South Africa in 1994 established an Independent Media Commission in addition to a widely respected Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The law establishing the IMC went to some lengths to ensure the independence and competence of the commission through its membership. The chairperson was to be a judge or senior lawyer, while at least two other commissioners (out of a maximum of seven) were to have media experience - one in print and one in broadcasting. The commissioners were to be persons of high standing who 'when viewed collectively, represent a broad cross-section of the population of the Republic'. Various categories of people were disqualified from being commissioners, including state employees, office bearers in political parties and those with a financial interest in the media.⁵⁵ But it was a solution that was only adopted and retained for the one election. In subsequent South African elections responsibility has rested with a combination of the IEC and the Independent Broadcasting Authority.

The Media Experts Commission (MEC) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also a specialized body for regulating the media in elections. As in South Africa, it was only in existence for a short transitional period. Part of its rationale was that inflammatory material in the media of the former Yugoslavia had played a significant part in inciting violence, resulting in civil war and the break-up of the federal republic. Where the MEC was unique was that it was an international body, operating under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than being answerable to any Bosnian structure. The MEC was in existence for two years, from 1996 until 1998. See Specialist Media and Elections Regulator - Bosnia.

The Russian Federation has a specialized 'information court' - the Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes. This is not strictly speaking a body that is confined to dealing with media and election issues, since it also functions outside election periods. However, it was established in 1993 specifically because of the need for a body to resolve disputes that had arisen during election campaigns. See Complaints Procedure - Russia.

Implementation Mechanism: Judiciary

In some countries responsibility for administering elections may lie with a specialized branch of the judiciary. Uruguay, for example, has an Electoral Court that administers the vote, can rule on disputes between the parties and can investigate challenges to the election results. It may also consider complaints about election campaigning in the media, including attempts to pressure the media into biased campaign coverage.'mec03a05#1'

In most instances, whatever the precise mechanism that has responsibility for regulating the media in elections, there will be a right of appeal to a judicial body against the regulator's decisions. Such an appeal may come from the media organ itself, a political party, or an individual complainant. Like any such procedure during an election period, this is likely to be an expedited process. A well-considered judicial decision may not be much use if it is handed down after the election is over.

Complaints Procedure

An essential element of most media regulatory bodies, during election periods and at other times, will be a complaints procedure. This is the means by which the public, political parties and the media themselves can seek adjudication on alleged breaches of the law or regulations on election coverage. Since the election period is usually short, complaints mechanisms are usually geared towards a speedy resolution of a complaint. If, for example, it concerns a factual inaccuracy that may influence voters' intentions, there is little use in correcting the error once the election is over.

Complainants will always have the right to take whatever legal proceedings are laid down in the country's laws - a civil suit claiming defamation, for example. And there should always be a built-in appeal process that allows disappointed complainants or the media themselves to seek a higher judgement from an independent court of law. But in general the emphasis is likely to be on a speedy, no-cost, non-confrontational resolution of disputes. This may be particularly important in a situation in which hostility between parties or communities is great and there are likely to be many issues of dispute. For example, the complaints mechanism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), was able to deal rapidly with a whole series of complaints referred to it by the Media Experts Commission (MEC) in the 1998 presidential election. This helped to reduce tensions between the different communities, by not allowing disputes between their different parties and media to escalate. This was especially important in light of the significant role played by the media in instigating political violence in the former Yugoslavia.

The variety of complaints procedures is as great as the number of different types of regulatory body. There may not even be a single uniform procedure. Britain, for example, has a statutory Broadcasting Complaints Authority to deal with the electronic media and a voluntary Press Complaints Council with responsibility for the print media. Neither of these is confined to elections in its mandate. The advantage of a specialized election complaints body is that it will be geared to the need for speedy resolution of disputes. The Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council, for example, receives complaints and, through its Mass Media Department, issues private rulings to the media outlets against which findings are made. It only publicizes the ruling if the media organ fails to comply.⁵⁶ In Montenegro, by contrast, publicly-funded media are obliged to publicize any findings of the competent authorities 'about any infringement on the principles of equality and objectivity relating to informing citizens on agendas and candidates...' See Montenegro: law on state election broadcasting.

Few complaints systems are quite as elaborate as the Russian. The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes is not a specialized election complaints body, although it arose because of the need for a body to deal with disputes that arose during the 1993 parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum. Its predecessor was the Arbitration Court on Information Matters that had been set up specifically to deal with election disputes.⁵⁷ See Complaints Procedure - Russia.

News Blackouts

Some countries practice a blackout on all election news before or during voting. Usually, this is a voluntary arrangement. This is almost always preferable, since the alternative would be for the regulatory body to intervene to prohibit coverage if the rule were breached - a less than happy outcome. However, in those instances - most famously France - where a 'reflection period' is decreed by law, then the regulatory body is likely to have some responsibility for enforcing it. In Israel, for example, which has the most extensive prohibition on campaign news, the Independent Broadcasting Authority is required to police its observance. The implementation of this prohibition illustrates the dangers inherent in such restrictions: the IBA tends to interpret the application of the law in a particularly strict manner, to avoid being held responsible for its breach.⁵⁸

Estonian law divides its election campaign into four periods, with a blackout of election campaigning for three of them. The application (or nomination) period, the voting period and the counting and publication of results are all periods when campaigning is forbidden. In Barbados, the law requires that these be no direct access broadcast on the eve of the election, or on election day itself. See Barbados: law on election broadcasting.

The Media Experts Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Specialist Media and Elections Regulator - Bosnia) was an example of a regulatory body that vigorously enforced a blackout from 24 hours before polls opened in the 1998 presidential elections until the polls closed. It did this by issuing clear statements in advance of the blackout period and then relying on the findings of its own media monitoring unit. It concluded that most of the violations of the blackout were a consequence of uncertainty in applying the rules. One television channel, for example, when it broadcast film of candidates at polling stations mentioned the names of their parties - which it was not allowed to do. In one case regarded by the MEC as more serious, a station broadcast interviews with two political leaders. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe referred the case to the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), the complaints body, which struck nine candidates of the party from its election list. The MEC itself commented that most countries, in most conditions, would probably regard such an approach as draconian, unnecessary and an interference with media freedom.⁵⁹

For further information on the practice of news blackouts, see News Blackouts/'Reflection Period'.

Opinion Polls

Publication of opinion poll findings is a subject that arouses strong passions. Established democracies take quite contrary positions on the issue, with France, for example, continuing to prohibit publication in the period immediately before an election, while in the United States media coverage of opinion polls is regarded as an integral part of free speech in elections. The problem is that opinion poll results - like almost any other form of expression - are not just the reflection of people's views but may also shape the views of others. That is, people may be influenced in how they vote by what they have learned from an opinion poll... or what they think they have learned.

For this reason, laws or regulations on media coverage of elections may attempt to control how (or even whether) opinion polls are reported. In Montenegro, for example, publicly-owned media are forbidden to publicize the results of opinion polls or any other projection of the election results. On election day, it is even forbidden to publicize the results of previous elections. See Media Monitoring - Bosnia.

However, a total ban on reporting opinion poll findings, whether or not desirable, is scarcely practical. France has long had a ban on the reporting of opinion polls during elections (although not at other times). In the 1997 legislative elections some newspapers broke this regulation. They included Le Parisien and La Republique des Pyrennees. Liberation got round the ban by putting the findings of an opinion poll on its Internet site, which is linked to the Tribune de Geneve in Switzerland. France Soir followed this by publishing a poll before the second round of voting took place.⁶⁰

This seems a fairly clear case of a law becoming ineffective once it has fallen into disrepute - despite the fact that it had been respected for many years. In the UK, where there is a voluntary practice of not reporting opinion polls on the day of elections, this restriction is widely respected.

With opinion polls, more than most other issues, much hinges on how professionally the findings are reported. The Montenegrin position of imposing a total ban on the public media's reporting opinion polls might find some favour in a situation where distorted reporting could materially affect the outcome of the elections. Generally, however, this is an issue that is best addressed by applying a light touch and encouraging the media to develop their own standards for reporting. The British Broadcasting Corporation, for example, has clear internal guidelines on reporting opinion polls that have been applied effectively for many years. (See Voluntary Guidelines on Reporting Opinion Polls - United Kingdom and United Kingdom: BBC guidelines on election coverage.)

For further discussion, see Coverage of Opinion Polls.

Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation

No issue is more problematic for those concerned with media freedom than the issue of 'hate speech'. The term is generally used to refer to advocacy of national, racial, religious or other hatred. The issue, in essence, is how far it is proper or acceptable to limit the right to freedom of expression, when the views being expressed support the limitation or infringement of the rights of others.

One of the problems is that this may just be a matter of point of view. One person's 'hate speech' will be another's legitimate point of view. Hence there is a general reluctance to impose restrictions on what may be said.

This dilemma becomes even more acute in the circumstances of an election. This is for two reasons:

An election is precisely the moment when a variety of political views should be expressed. To limit expression of some of these views potentially limits not only rights of free speech but also rights of democratic participation.
On the other hand, the highly charged atmosphere of an election campaign may be precisely the moment when inflammatory statements are likely to have the effect of inciting people to violence - thereby infringing the democratic and free speech rights of others.

These issues become even more acute in a country with a history of communal or ethnic violence, where the media are known to have played a role in fanning hostilities. That is why, for example, the matter of 'hate speech' was given so much attention in the Bosnian elections of 1998 - the media on all sides had played a considerable role in inciting the wars that led to the break up of Yugoslavia.

The issue of defamation is a similar problem to that of hate speech in one respect: it is an area where freedom of expression may legitimately be limited for the protection of the rights of others. Yet it does not have the some collective implications in an election campaign. Vigorous - and even sometimes insulting - debate is part of the substance of democratic campaigning. International and comparative jurisprudence has established clearly that politicians - especially government politicians - must have thick skins. They should have less protection than the ordinary citizen, not more (see Criticism of Politicians and Government). From the standpoint of the media in an election campaign, the clear similarity between defamation and hate speech lies in the issue of who will be held liable for any unlawful statement: the media or the person whose words they report.

International and Comparative Law

Neither international law nor the experience of various national courts offers any definitive answer on how to balance freedom of expression and protection of other rights. Precisely because it is a balance, the answer will be determined by national and local circumstances, as well as precise context.

International treaties provide a clear basis for criminalizing advocacy of hatred or discrimination. In extreme circumstances, such as the case of Radio television libre des mille collines in Rwanda, where a radio station incited genocide, journalists have been convicted before an international tribunal for crimes against humanity (see Hate Speech - Rwanda).

However, the general trend in interpreting this balancing act has been towards promoting many voices to counteract the effect of hate speech, rather than banning those voices that express obnoxious or unpopular views. Experience has shown that laws prohibiting hate speech are often used far more broadly than for their ostensible purpose. The country with the largest battery of laws prohibiting advocacy of racial hostility was apartheid South Africa. Invariably the victims of these laws were black.

The practice in most jurisdictions where this issue has been considered tends towards prohibiting hate speech only when it constitutes a direct incitement to violent activity. That may not itself be a very easy concept to define. But it contains the idea that no one in election campaigns will be penalized for the expression of opinions - only for interfering with the rights of others. See International and Comparative Law on Hate Speech.

Media Liability

Discussion of hate speech and the media in elections is really about two separate issues:

The media reporting advocacy of hatred by campaigning politicians;
The media directly advocating hatred themselves.

On the former issue, the international consensus is coming down firmly on the side of absolving the media from liability for reporting the remarks of politicians, within the limited time span of an election campaign. (See Limits to Liability.) This means that a journalist or media house would not be open to either a civil or criminal suit for reporting remarks by a politician that constituted advocacy of hatred. But this would not absolve the journalist from a professional responsibility to balance such statements with countervailing facts or voices.

Attempts to Regulate

When the media themselves directly advocate hatred - especially in circumstances that could constitute incitement - they clearly cannot expect to be absolved from liability. In these circumstances the regulatory body would be expected to monitor the media's output closely. But this in itself creates practical and ethical problems. For example, how is it possible to distinguish between poor or irresponsible reporting of violent statements and active endorsement of those statements? See 'mec03d03c'.

As in much else, the distinction between editorial and non-editorial content is important. Non-editorial content - primarily direct access material of various sorts - is beyond the control of the media themselves, generated as it is by the political parties. The regulatory body will have to determine how far, if at all, it chooses to vet the content of direct access items. See Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?.

Right of Reply

Granting a Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements to those who have been wronged or misreported is not a popular option among either journalists or freedom of expression advocates. Their argument is that in a free media environment these things will balance themselves over time. Unfortunately within the confines of an election campaign, there may not be the time for this natural balancing process to take place. Hence most regulatory systems have some provision for balancing or correcting, even if only on a voluntary basis. The process of balancing conflicting views, along with an opportunity to reply or correct errors or distortions of fact, may often prove the most effective way of neutralizing the effects of hate speech without having to resort to banning it.

International and Comparative Law on Hate Speech

International standards on the issue of 'hate speech' are determined by a balance of Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The former guarantees:

the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers...

Article 19 then outlines possible restrictions to this right, including 'for respect of the rights or reputations of others'.

Article 20 states:

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

The American Convention on Human Rights requires states to declare advocacy of hatred on national, racial or religious grounds a criminal offence. The European Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights do not require hate speech to be prohibited by law, but they permit that it should be.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has an even broader prohibition. Article 4 requires all states who are party to the treaty to declare a criminal offence 'all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination,... the provision of any assistance to racial activities' and participation in 'organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination.'

See International Treaties on media and elections.

In a case that related to participation in elections (but not to the media) the European Commission declared inadmissible an application from a Dutch right-wing political leader who had been imprisoned for two weeks and had his name removed from the electoral lists for advocating the repatriation of non-white guest workers.⁶¹ However, in a case that did relate to the role of the media, the Commission admitted an application from a Danish journalist who had been convicted for broadcasting a television interview with members of a white supremacist youth gang. Danish law was changed as a consequence to exclude liability for journalists unless, by publishing racist ideas, they intended to 'threaten, insult or degrade'.⁶²

This distinction is an important one: the attitude of the law (and the regulatory authorities) will be different depending on whether the media are actively advocating hatred or violence or they are simply reporting the advocacy of hatred or violence by politicians and others. The point is fundamental, although this does not avoid the problem of grey areas (see, for example, Hate Speech - Operations of the Regulator).

Decisions of National Courts

The Israeli Supreme Court has found that freedom of expression may be infringed only infringed when there is an imminent probability that the statement will cause damage to public order. It ruled, as a consequence, that the Broadcasting Authority had violated the rights of the leader of an extreme anti-Arab political party by reviewing his statements before broadcasting them.⁶³

In Sweden, the Freedom of the Press Act prohibits the expression of threats or contempt against racial, ethnic or religious groups. The provision is rarely used, but in 1991 a newspaper editor was prosecuted for publishing a letter from a reader expressing racist opinions. The editor's argument was that such views should be allowed to surface, in order that they could be debated. The jury acquitted the editor.⁶⁴

The Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional a provision of the law on incitement to hatred. The provision made it an offence to

insult or humiliate the Hungarian nation, or a group of the population based on religion, race or similar features.

The court observed:

Freedom to express ideas and opinions, including freedom to express unpopular or unconventional ideas, is the fundamental condition for the existence of a truly vital society which is capable of self-improvement...

Freedom of expression protects statements of opinion regardless of the their implicit value or truth.

⁶⁵ .

Media Liability for Reports of Unlawful Statements

The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion has strongly stated that the media should not be held legally liable for unlawful statements that they report in the course of election campaigns (See Obligation of Pluralism). This has been a controversial issue in the past, with other international authorities, such as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, taking the contrary view. The assumption that the media may not be prosecuted in a civil or criminal suit for reporting the words of politicians reinforces a trend that was laid down by, among others, the Spanish Constitutional Court (see Limits to Liability). This approach stresses the right of the public to be informed about what politicians say - even if it is unlawful and potentially incites violence. It must be stressed that this is different from a situation in which the media itself deliberately incites violence. See, for example, Hate Speech - Rwanda.

This removal of liability has implications for both news coverage and direct access programmes. It means, for example, that the newspaper or broadcaster may not refuse to run direct access or advertising material from a party on the basis that it may expose the media organ to prosecution. The constitutional court in Germany, for example, decided that that was a matter for the courts to decide, not the media (see Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?). But it is only reasonable to put the media in that position if they are definitely not liable. If a media organ might be prosecuted for the contents of a direct access broadcast, then they must have the right to refuse to run it. However, since that is not a satisfactory position, being clearly open to abuse, the position advocated by the UN Special Rapporteur is clearly the correct one. See UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999.

Hate Speech - Operations of the Regulator

There are several possible ways in which a regulatory body may address the problem of hate speech.

Prior Approval of Direct Access Material

The regulatory body may require that all direct access material be submitted to it in advance to ensure that it conforms to certain legal or voluntary agreed standards for political speech. Whether such an approach is taken is likely to depend on whether the country has an immediate history of inflammatory speech as a serious political problem. The drawback in principle to such an approach is that it may be seen as an interference in political speech and smack of prior censorship. The difficulty in practice is that it imposes an additional administrative burden on the regulator. See Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?.

Codes of Conduct

However no such possibility presents itself in relation to news coverage: international law and practice entirely rejects 'prior restraint' or pre-publication censorship. The problem of inflammatory speech will therefore have to be addressed primarily at source - that is, with the political parties and candidates themselves. This would be best achieved with a code of conduct agreed between the parties in advance of the election campaign. Sometimes, as in South Africa and Cambodia, such a code will have the effect of law. (See Code of Conduct in South Africa and Code of Conduct in Cambodia)

Complaints

The problem of unprofessional or biased reporting of statements by politicians will have to be addressed primarily through the complaints mechanism established by the regulatory - whether this be a media regulator or an election authority. The most effective remedy will be to allow correction of inflammatory material through a right of reply (see Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements). There are useful examples of this from Bosnia and the United Kingdom. (see The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Bosnia and The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - United Kingdom).

Promoting Professional Standards

The most important measure that the regulator can take to promote balanced and unprovocative reporting of inflammatory statements is to ensure adherence to professional standards among the media. In doing this, collaboration with the journalists' own professional and trade union bodies will be vital. See, for example, Tanzania: Media Code of Conduct. The regulatory body may also wish to engage in training of journalists in election reporting.

Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements

A right of reply is not popular with the media, but it has found increasing favour with tribunals and other standard-setting bodies internationally (see Right of Reply). Journalists may have to accept that this may be the least-worst option. The alternative to balancing views may be to be held responsible for endorsing the opinions of one candidate or another.

The best way of avoiding an enforced right of reply is clearly to ensure balance in coverage. Even the generally unregulated US media have been obliged to comply with a Fairness Doctrine in election reporting that ensures that all the main parties get a say in news and current affairs programmes. Broadcasting stations are obliged to offer 'reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views'.⁶⁶ The wording is important: 'reasonable' rather than equal. Coverage is not measured with a stopwatch. It is simply that all sides of the debate get heard.

Sometimes this general approach of fairness is not adequate. The personal attack rule under the US Communication Act requires that if an attack is made on the personal qualities or character of an individual, then that person should be notified and given an opportunity to respond.⁶⁷

In the South African election of 1994 there was a provision, slightly broader than the US personal attack rule, but based on the same principle. This is a common rule in election laws and regulations and provides a sensible opportunity to achieve balanced debate. It stated that if a criticism were levelled against a political party without that party being given the opportunity to respond at the time, or without its view being reflected, then the broadcasting licensee was obliged to give the party a reasonable opportunity to respond to the criticism.

If within 48 hours of the beginning of the vote a broadcaster intended to broadcast a programme in which a particular political party was criticized, then the broadcasting licensee should give the party the opportunity to respond within the programme, or as soon as possible afterwards. These provisions only apply to coverage under the editorial control of the broadcaster and not to party election broadcasts or political advertisements.⁶⁸

Brazil has a right of reply provision that applies specifically to knowingly making false statements in the course of direct access broadcasts. In this case the offended party can appeal to a judge. If the application is successful the complainant wins an amount of free time for rebutting the false statement that is then subtracted from the amount of free time granted to the offender. See Brazil: law on election broadcasting.

Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events

The media cannot cover elections properly if they are unable to gain access to relevant events and places. This is obvious enough, but unfortunately many countries that are embarking on democratic elections for the first time may have little experience of the culture of media freedom. The purpose of laws or regulations on the media in elections - and the function of the regulatory body - is to create an environment in which the media can go about their business freely. Election campaigns are not state secrets to be winkled out by dedicated investigative journalists; rather they should be conducted in the public eye. There is thus an argument of principle that journalists should be given the fullest access to election events. But for the body organizing the election there is also a pragmatic consideration. If the media are present at all relevant events, then it will be much easier for the electoral administration to convey its messages and concerns to the public.

In order to ensure access to some aspects of the election - for example, the count - it will be necessary for the electoral administration to operate some form of Accreditation. In principle, however, this should not be necessary for all events, since the ultimate responsibility for determining who is or is not a journalist should lie with the relevant professional bodies, not the state.

It is important that access should be non-discriminatory. It would be unacceptable, for example, if journalists from certain media organs were excluded from rallies by certain political parties. It should be an explicit element of the parties' code of conduct that they allow free access of all media to all their public events (see Measures to Protect Journalists). It would be worse, however, if the electoral authorities themselves were to exercise any discrimination in which media were given briefing materials or invited to a press conference.

This right of access by journalists flows directly from the freedom of information principles that underlie the role of the media in a democracy (see Media and Democracy). Accreditation procedures cannot be used to limit this access, either by being applied in a discriminatory manner or by being made a universal requirement for attendance at all election-related activities. Except in very limited circumstances when the security of the election process is at stake, accreditation is an administrative tool, not a principled means of determining who may or may not report on the election.

Freedom of information means, among other things, that the media are entitled to investigate and report critically on the efficiency and probity of election organization. This may not always be welcomed by election administrators, but essentially they have no choice on this matter. This scrutiny is not an interference with the organization of the election but facilitates and ensures efficiency. This is true as a matter of broad principle, but also as a matter of practicality. If the media have good access to those organizing the elections, then they will convey their concerns rapidly to the public. This functions as an effective, no-cost method of voter education.

Accreditation

The question of who is or is not a practising journalist is one best left to journalists' organizations - although many governments, through the Information Ministry or similar body, have a system for accrediting journalists. Whatever the merits of these different systems, however, some accreditation system is required for journalists in elections. This is because the media will be entitled to attend events - such as the voting itself or the count - that will not be open to ordinary members of the public.

The preferable system for accreditation of journalists in elections is one that is conducted by the electoral supervisory body or the media regulatory body (if they differ) in conjunction with each other. Accreditation should be available to all representatives of local, national and international news organizations on production of credible identification (see also Foreign Media). The accrediting authority should have no discretion to refuse credentials to any bona fide news representative.

The nature of the credentials issued should be agreed upon with the police or any other body responsible for security in the elections, as well as with electoral staff. These credentials would usually consist of a laminated photocard, clearly identifying the bearer as a media representative. These arrangements should also be made known to the political parties, who would be expected to ensure that their members and supporters facilitated (and did not impede) access by anyone bearing these credentials (see also Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events and Measures to Protect Journalists).

When the approximate date of an election is known in advance, accreditation of most local journalists can be organized well in advance to avoid last-minute delays. There should be no limit on the number of media personnel issued with accreditation. News organizations have no obligation to limit the number of journalists who are accredited, although it would be reasonable for organizers of an event to limit the numbers from a particular news organization if that is necessary to secure access for the widest range of media.

Although a photocard - visible evidence of accreditation - is no doubt useful at many public events connected with elections, this should only be required as a precondition for attendance in two circumstances:

when the security of the electoral process is at stake - as at the voting or the count
when logistics determine that only a limited number of journalists can have access.

In the latter case, it will be up to the journalists themselves to operate a pool system, whereby they will select which of their representatives attend an event and they then share the information gathered.

In other words, accreditation is for the most part an administrative tool that only very occasionally has a security dimension. In general, the principle that anyone can have access to the public electoral process and write or broadcast about it is the paramount one.

Foreign Media

Everything that has been said about the Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events and the process of Accreditation applies with equal force to any foreign media who are present. It is important to stress that this is a matter of principle. The fundamental sources of the right to freedom of expression - the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - explicitly define this right as entailing the communication and receipt of information 'regardless of frontier'.

In most instances there will be foreign correspondents resident in - or at least accredited to - the country on a long-term basis. Since these journalists will invariably have some form of accreditation as a condition of their residence in the country, their further accreditation to cover the election presents little problem in principle or practice. A problem is more likely to arise if the election is a matter of some international interest (as elections do tend to be), with the attendant possibility that large numbers of foreign media staff will arrive at the last minute expecting to be able to cover it.

Precise arrangements will need to be coordinated between the body ordinarily responsible for accrediting foreign media and the organizers of the election. For immigration reasons all foreign journalists will need to be accredited, but as with domestic media personnel neither the government nor the electoral administrators have any discretion to decide who may or may not come to report the election. Accreditation is an administrative measure, not a means of keeping people out.

Common sense suggests that a measure of prior planning is needed, with an assessment of how many foreign media staff are likely to want to cover the elections. Not only can accreditation be planned in advance, but also other facilities such as the necessary telephone links from the media centre.

A measure of mutual patience and understanding is required. Elections are organized for the benefit of the electorate, not the international media (a fact that the latter sometimes need reminding of). International media do not directly benefit the electorate by scrutinizing the process and the politicians (although the growth of international broadcasting stations and Internet news outlets is changing this). But international accountability is part of the process of organizing free and fair elections and, to this extent, foreign media play a similar role to that of external election observers. It is therefore in the interests of democracy and the election process itself that they are allowed and enabled to do their job.

Measures to Protect Journalists

When election campaigns turn violent, journalists are likely to be in the thick of it. Unfortunately, danger is often part of the job for reporters, but it is the responsibility of governments and those organizing elections to ensure that that danger is kept to a minimum.

Any physical attack or interference with a journalist is likely to be a crime under the ordinary law of the country. However, in view of the particular importance of the media in elections, some countries create specific offences related to attacks on journalists during elections. For example, Section 8 of the South African Electoral Act penalizes offences against media workers with fines of up to R200,000, imprisonment and disqualification from further participation in the election.

The corollary to this is that laws restricting media freedom and the safe conduct of journalism should be repealed in advance of the election. Part of the safety of journalists is not being at risk of arrest for normal professional activities. This would include, for example, police or judicial powers to compel a journalist to divulge confidential sources of information.

However, just as important as what the law says is the message that is clearly communicated to all those taking part in the elections. Journalists' organizations, such as the International Federation of Journalists, usually recommend that governments (and electoral authorities) give a clear public statement at the start of the election campaign, informing all parties and the law enforcement agencies that the media are an essential part of the democratic process - and that anyone preventing them from going about their business will be dealt with using the full force of the law. Of course, the danger to journalists does not come only from over-enthusiastic party activists - often they are at risk from law enforcement officials trained in the ways of dictatorship. Hence the importance of clear public instructions - with the essential follow-up that any attacks are fully investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice.

Codes of conduct for political parties are a device sometimes used in situations where violence is likely. These too should include a clear statement on the importance of the media to the election process and the need to refrain from attacks on them.

Physical protection of journalists may be more difficult, since an intrusive police presence may interfere with the media's freedom to gather information. However, law enforcement officials should also be under instructions about the responsibility to protect journalists against attack, physically if necessary.

The International Federation of Journalists has good practical advice on this issue. See International Federation of Journalists: Election Reporting Handbook.

Provisions for Public Media

In most systems different regulations will apply for the publicly and privately-funded media. In addition to the ethical obligations attaching to all journalists and broadcasters, public media are also accountable to the electorate, who are their funders and, ultimately, their owners. Hence it is usually assumed - and this assumption is clearly based on international law - that the public media should be politically impartial.

There are other obligations that may attach to the public media alone. In most systems there is no legal requirement for private media to carry direct access broadcasting or advertisements from political parties during an election campaign. Yet, for the public media there usually is such a requirement. Much of this section is devoted to the issues that flow from this:

will direct access be through Paid Political Advertising or free party election broadcasts?
how will the amount of time be allocated between the parties or candidates? See Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties.
at what time of day will direct access slots be broadcast? See Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots.

This section also looks at how far it is appropriate for the regulatory body responsible for the media in election times to regulate the editorial content of the public media - that is, those parts of the media's output that are normally under its own editorial control.

Another aspect of the responsibility of the public media flows from the government's obligation to inform and educate the electorate on how to exercise their rights in an election - voter education.

The obligations of public media have been well summarized in a series of guidelines developed by the freedom of expression group ARTICLE 19. First elaborated in 1994 to address the problem of ensuring fair coverage in state broadcast media that may have no history of impartial reporting, these guidelines have been widely disseminated and adopted since then. See ARTICLE19 Election Reporting Guidelines.

Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties

Almost invariably the public media are thought to have a duty to publish or broadcast election statements by competing parties. It is generally accepted that the publicly funded media have some obligation to allow parties and candidates to communicate directly with the electorate.

Beyond that, however, there are many issues to be determined.

Paid Advertising, Free Access, or a Mixture of the Two?

It will have to be determined whether direct access by political parties will be free or paid or, as is often the case, a mixture of the two. Different rules are often adopted for print and broadcast media. Sometimes all parties are allocated free direct access but can top this up with paid advertising. See Paid Political Advertising.

How Is the Time or Space Divided?

In a system of paid advertising this may not be an issue - time is simply allocated to those who can pay. (Many would argue that this is why paid advertising is an unfair option.) But if direct access broadcasts are to be allocated by a regulatory body, how will this be done? What criteria have to be taken into account to divide up the available time? Is it to be done on the basis of equality - so that every party gets the same time - or equitability (fairness), whereby parties are allocated time according to the degree of popular support they enjoy. If the latter, then how is that determined? Should time be allocated on the basis of past electoral support (the number of seats currently held in parliament), opinion polls, the number of candidates standing - or some other criterion or a mixture of all of them? Different countries have adopted widely varying systems. See Equal or Equitable Direct Access Coverage?, A Formula for Allocating Direct Access Slots - South Africa and Criteria for Allocation of Direct Access Time.

Timing of Slots

Will there be regulation about the times that slots are broadcast? If everyone is to get a chance to broadcast in peak time, how can slots be allocated? What order will the parties be allowed to broadcast in? See Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots.

Who Pays - and Who Makes the Programme?

Will the party be responsible for making its own broadcast or will facilities be made available by the public broadcaster? And who foots the bill? See Who Pays for Direct Access Broadcasts? and Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?.

Who Decides What is Broadcast?

Does the regulatory body have any say in the content of direct access broadcasts or political advertising? Can the parties say what they like? What are the limits? See Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?.

Equal or Equitable Direct Access Coverage?

One of the fundamental decisions to be made in organizing direct access broadcasts by the parties is whether slots are to be allocated on the basis of equality or equity. Equality, clearly, means that every party or candidate gets the same access. Equity means that everyone gets fair access - the idea being that a party with large popular support should have more airtime than one that does not.

The Argument For Equality

Everyone gets an opportunity to put their point of view to the electorate. It will be the electorate that chooses, rather than a broadcaster or an electoral regulator. This is a simple system to administer and everyone can understand it. It is particularly attractive in a first democratic election when there is no sure way of knowing how much support the different parties have.

The Argument Against Equality

Equality gives a built-in advantage to the incumbent party, which has many other opportunities to convey its policies through the media. What equality does is to promote the no-hope opposition parties at the expense of those with a genuine possibility of ousting the ruling party. Equality may also mean that there is simply too much material being generated for the electorate to absorb. They will get bored and the direct access process may become a waste of time. Again this is likely to favour the incumbent.

Another argument against automatic equal access is that it will encourage frivolous candidates who are only interested in the free publicity.

The Argument For Equity

If direct access is allocated on a fair (or equitable) basis, this ensures that all parties are given an opportunity to speak to the electorate, roughly in proportion to their popular support. This means that the electorate gets to hear the arguments between the main contenders for office, while parties with less support also get a say (but a smaller one).

The Argument Against Equity

This system is an obstacle to the emergence of new parties, since it is always based on what support they achieved last time. And what if there was no last time? How is popular support determined in a first democratic election? The system could thus be open to abuse.

And the Answer?

There is no right or wrong answer to this problem, as can be seen by the variety of solutions in both well-established and new democracies. But the different approaches may suit different political systems better. Here are some further considerations:

Equality may work better when there are fewer parties or candidates. When there are too many then the 'cake' may have to be cut into impossibly tiny slices, or made so large that there is too much election broadcasting for anyone to take in.
Equality may work better in a new or 'transitional' democracy. This perhaps contradicts the previous point, since new democracies often have many parties (and ruling parties in new democracies may encourage this). But the point is that if there has been no previous democratic election, then there will be no commonly agreed measure of how much popular support each party has.
Conversely, equity may work better in an established democracy where there are clear measures of past electoral support. Or are the equality advocates right, and does this just obstruct the emergence of new political alternatives?

But even these considerations are only pointers. Many established democracies - France, Italy, Denmark - allocate direct access broadcasting in the public media on the basis of equality (in at least some elections) - see Equal Access for All Parties?. And many new democracies - South Africa, Brazil, Namibia - have allocated time on a proportional or equitable basis - see Equitable (or Fair) Access for Political Parties?.

Whichever approach is adopted, its success will depend in large measure on the credibility and impartiality of the regulating body that allocates the broadcasts. This is a very strong argument for having the political parties themselves involved in drawing up the regulations governing media and elections (see Who Should Be Involved in the Drafting Process?). Parties are more likely to be committed to a process in which they have been consulted and have contributed to designing the system.

All these arguments clearly apply primarily to Criteria for Allocation of Direct Access Time - that is, direct access broadcast programmes that are available free to parties. Paid political advertising, where it is allowed, will usually be on the basis that parties can have as much direct access time as they can afford (or as they are allowed within Political Advertising and Campaign Spending Limits). But this may not always be the case. And if limits are to be applied to paid advertising, then the same considerations of equality and equity may apply.

Equal Access for All Parties?

Many countries have allocated direct access broadcasting time on the basis of equality between the different political parties or candidates. Even so, there may be certain differences in the way that these systems work. Sometimes, for example, there may be a qualification criterion that must be met before equality applies.

France

The formula for allocating direct access broadcast time in the French presidential elections is one of equality for all candidates, who usually number about 14. If no clear winner emerges there is a second round run-off between the two leading candidates, and again air-time is allocated equally between them.⁶⁹

Denmark

Denmark allocates equal time to all political parties in parliamentary elections, so long as they satisfy certain basic criteria: they must have been registered with the Ministry of the Interior, which requires that they will have collected signatures equivalent to one in 175 of the votes cast at the last election. ⁷⁰

Norway

In Norway, time is allocated equally, but again certain criteria must be met. Parties must have been represented in one of the last two parliaments, have a national organization and be fielding candidates in a majority of districts. Smaller parties that do not meet this threshold nevertheless have a short programme. ⁷¹

Italy

The state broadcaster, RAI gives equal time to all competing parties in an election. However, private commercial broadcasters have no such obligation. ⁷²

Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia's first democratic election, all parties received the same allocation of broadcast time - a total of four hours over a campaign period lasting 40 days. The slots were then divided up into slices of different time lengths. The exact schedule was then determined by lots. ⁷³

Armenia

Armenia gave equal access to each party, but the amount was limited to five minutes for each candidate or party. This avoided the problem of Poland - information overload - but perhaps created an opposite problem. Was this really enough information for the voter?

Japan

Japan has a system of equal access but with a minimum qualification threshold. In order to receive equal broadcasting time a party must field at least 12 candidates. In the Upper House, however, all candidates receive five and a half minutes of free broadcasting time. See Formulas for Allocating Time.

Netherlands

The Netherlands, like Japan, has a system that is a sort of modified equality. In principle all parties have equal broadcasting time. However, the regulatory body, the Media Commissariat, may allocate extra time to parties running candidates in all electoral districts.⁷⁴

Equitable (or Fair) Access for Political Parties?

If the approach of equality is abandoned, there is clearly a wider range of approaches that can be adopted in order to achieve a fair or equitable distribution of broadcasts between the parties or candidates. The main considerations are likely to be:

a party's strength in previous elections
the number of candidates it is fielding

There is usually a minimum allocation of time to all parties, or at least to those fielding a certain number of candidates. This is an attempt to address the criticism that an 'equitable' approach is not very fair to new parties.

These calculations are more difficult to make in a presidential election, where a candidate may be standing for the first time. In Brazil, this is overcome by allocating broadcast time in the presidential election on the basis of a party's strength in parliament. In the second-round run-off, time is allocated equally.

These issues are examined in greater detail in A Formula for Allocating Direct Access Slots - South Africa. This section contains a review of some of the different approaches adopted.

South Africa

Broadcasting time is allocated on the basis of a combination of criteria: a minimum allocation to all parties, a portion on the basis of the number of candidates standing and a portion on the basis of past support. The latter is ordinarily measured on the basis of the number of seats held in the outgoing national and provincial legislatures. However, the Independent Broadcasting Authority may take account of opinion polls if it chooses. See A Formula for Allocating Direct Access Slots - South Africa for a more detailed examination of the formula used and 'mex21' for the full text of the formula.

Greece

The three largest parties in the previous Parliament are entitled to at least thirty-eight minutes weekly on televised programmes. Smaller parties with members in the previous Parliament are entitled to eight minutes weekly. Parties with no representation in the Parliament, but with a list of candidates in seventy-five percent of the electoral districts, are entitled to five minutes weekly. In addition, each of the three largest party is entitled to one forty-five minute broadcast. See Formulas for Allocating Time

Spain

Parties that did not win seats in the previous election have ten minutes' broadcasting time. Parties that won less than five per cent of the vote have 15 minutes' broadcasting time. Parties that won up to 20 per cent have 30 minutes and those that won more than 20 per cent have 45 minutes' broadcasting time. See Formulas for Allocating Time.

United Kingdom

The formula for allocation of broadcasting time is reviewed by a committee of broadcasters and political parties at each election. It is roughly as follows: all parties fielding 50 or more candidates are allocated one free broadcast. The two main parties receive equal broadcasting time - usually about five ten-minute broadcasts. The third main party receives slightly less - usually four ten-minute slots. ⁷⁵

Israel

All parties contesting an election are given a basic allocation of 10 minutes broadcasting time. Parties that were represented in the outgoing Knesset (parliament) receive an additional three minutes for each seat they held. ⁷⁶

Turkey

All parties contesting the election are entitled to ten minutes broadcasting time. Parties with parliamentary representation may receive an additional ten minutes. In addition, the governing party is entitled to an additional 20 minutes, and the main opposition party to another ten minutes. ⁷⁷

Criteria for Allocation of Direct Access Time

Applying criteria for allocating direct access broadcasts is primarily an issue when some consideration of equitability is applied, rather than simply allocating slots on an equal basis. However, in systems of 'modified equality', such as in the Netherlands, the regulatory body may have some discretion to allocate additional time to the major parties.

In any system, the first criterion to be established is whether there is a qualification threshold. Even some equality-based systems (such as Denmark, Norway and Japan) require some form of qualification - such as number of seats contested or a minimum of public signatures.

Equity systems will also have to decide on a qualification threshold. In new democracies it is more likely that the threshold will be set low, because of the difficulty of knowing what level of popular support each party enjoys. Thus in South Africa, for example, all parties receive a minimum allocation. In long established democracies the threshold is often higher. The threshold should usually be determined by the number of seats contested, rather than the number previously held, since the latter would be a great obstacle to the emergence of new parties. Hence in the UK, for example, the threshold is 50 contested seats - roughly seven per cent of the total.

Once the threshold has been established, the other two criteria that are usually taken into account in allocating direct access broadcasting are:

How many seats are the parties contesting (or how many candidates are they fielding)?
How much popular support have they enjoyed in the past?

In answering the first question, it is immediately clear that this will be determined to a considerable extent by the nature of the election and the electoral system. Presidential elections, for example, are likely to be far more equal in the allocation of broadcasting because they are generally based on a more individual competition than simply a difference of parties. Hence France allocates broadcast time in its presidential elections on a purely equal basis, although Brazil has done so on the basis of the level of parliamentary support for the candidates' parties.

In parliamentary elections, the nature of the voting system clearly determines how significant smaller parties are likely to be to the outcome, which may in turn determine what time allocation they receive. In a first-past-the-post system, a party that wins 10 per cent of the vote nationwide is likely to be completely marginal (and possibly unrepresented in parliament), while the same party in most proportional representation systems could be an important player. Thus the allocation of broadcasting time under the latter system is likely to tend towards greater equality, or at least a lower threshold for qualification.

But strangely, the classic first-past-the-post model, the United Kingdom, makes a conscious effort to compensate for the inequities of the electoral system in its allocation of time. Thus the third national party, the Liberal Democrats, which consistently receives parliamentary representation much lower than its share of the popular vote, nevertheless receives a time allocation that is actually higher not only than its number of parliamentary seats, but also than its vote.

An interesting recent approach is that developed in South Africa, a new democracy where the media regulatory body has devised a formula that:

Gives all parties some access
Allocates time on the basis of seats contested and presumed popular support
Takes into account the fact that national and provincial elections are held simultaneously.

See A Formula for Allocating Direct Access Slots - South Africa.

Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots

The timing of direct access slots is clearly of paramount importance. A broadcast when everyone is asleep or at work will be of little use to anyone. As with commercial advertising, everyone will aim for 'prime time'.

All this is obvious, yet it is surprising how often it is overlooked. In the 2000 Zimbabwe referendum campaign, the Yes vote campaign (supported by the government) almost invariably received slots at around the time of the main evening news. The No campaign had to go to court to get its own broadcasts aired - yet the ruling did not specify when these were to be aired, so they received less advantageous times.⁷⁸

The issue may not only be when a slot is broadcast, but also what is on the other channels. In the 2000 presidential elections, Serbian television tried to reduce audiences for broadcasts by opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica by scheduling them simultaneously with a popular soap opera.

Yet the issue can be exaggerated. In Chile's 1988 plebiscite, broadcasts were deliberately put out at obscure off-peak times in order to dampen down political enthusiasm. But a population denied any active political debate for 15 years was not to be deterred and watched them eagerly.⁷⁹

The key point is equality of access to the best slots, whenever these may be. A popular way of achieving total equality is by drawing lots - an approach that is most common when there is also equality in the amount of time allocated.

A mechanism that found favour in the past was the simultaneous broadcast of party election broadcasts on all channels. (In Britain this reputedly created great strain on the national power grid, as everyone took the opportunity of simultaneous political broadcasts to switch on the kettle to make tea.) This approach has something to recommend it, but has been generally abandoned in favour of a philosophy where viewer choice is sovereign. In practice the proliferation of television channels in many countries made it unenforceable.

A second issue is the length of broadcasts. There are two competing trends here. Traditionally the purpose of law and regulations has been to ensure that slots are long enough for parties to get their message across.

But in the age of slick advertising and sound bites it is increasingly felt that the 10-minute election broadcast is a thing of the past. In the United Kingdom, for example, the main parties are allocated five 10-minute slots - but only actually broadcast for five minutes of each of them. If the rules permitted they would no doubt take 10 five-minute slots, but they do not. So the parties prefer to forego half their time allocation in order not to repel the voters by going on at too great length.

In the United States there are moves to ensure a minimum length for political advertisements in order to compel politicians to make appeals to the voters' reason rather than their emotions.

For their regulator there are two alternative approaches. One is to specify precisely the time slot available - say a five-minute broadcast - and then it is up to the party to fill it. If they choose not to then they lose the time not used. The second is to give an overall allocation of time that the party can then use as it chooses. The problem with the second approach is that it makes planning on the part of a public broadcaster almost impossible.

A third approach might represent a compromise between the two. Parties could be given a total allocation of broadcast time in accordance with an agreed system. That time allocation could then be broken into different length time slots, allowing parties a mixture of lengthy and reasoned argument on the one hand and snappy advertising messages on the other.

Who Pays for Direct Access Broadcasts?

Party election broadcasts, as distinct from political advertising, are usually described as 'free'. But all this means is that the parties themselves do not pay for the time that is allocated to them. This leaves unanswered two questions:

Who does pay for the time?
And who pays to make the programme itself?

In practice there are two possible answers to the first question: either the broadcaster is required to provide the time for free, or the government or electoral authority will purchase the time from the broadcasting company. For public broadcasters, the answers will almost always be the first. The charter or regulations governing the public broadcaster will require them to provide this service. In some cases a similar public service obligation might exist for private broadcasting licensees. But in the latter case it is more common that a supervisory body will buy the time on the parties' behalf. This is what happens in Mexico, for example, where the Federal Electoral Institute buys and allocates 15 minutes a month of television and radio time for each party.

The second question - who pays for the programme itself - is altogether more complex. Usually, the answer is the party, although this in itself may be constrained by legal limits on campaign spending. Costs can be kept relatively low by the use of sympathetic personnel - most famously the Hollywood film directors John Schlesinger, Hugh Hudson and Mike Newell, who have made party election broadcasts for the main parties in Britain (although in each case the saving on the director's fee was probably more than offset by the high production costs).

If the party makes its own election broadcasts, this clearly favours the richer parties. This led South Africa's Independent Broadcasting Authority to prohibit television slots in 1999 on the basis that smaller parties could not afford to make them. See South Africa: IBA Guidelines for broadcast licensees.

The alternative solution, of course, is for the public broadcaster to put production facilities at the parties' disposal. This was the approach in the early days of party political broadcasts, which were studio-bound and really just an extension of the old-fashioned ministerial address to camera. It has been revived in transitional democracies where new parties are unlikely to have either the funds or expertise to produce their own broadcasts. See Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?.

Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?

In Mozambique in 1994, a number of parties did not have the facilities to make their own election broadcasts and were unaware of the procedures for providing video cassettes to the broadcaster. The result was that their slots went out with a blank screen, or at most a caption urging viewers to vote for the party.⁸⁰

In the Polish elections of 1990, by contrast, state-owned Polish television provided facilities for the parties to produce their broadcasts according to strictly defined criteria. It made available a studio for recording, or a camera team consisting of three technicians and a journalist. (The parties could decide not to have the journalist if they felt that his or her presence would compromise their own editorial control of the broadcast.) The role of the team was purely technical:

Any technical assistance rendered by Polish Television staff which has a bearing on the substantive contents of the broadcast may take place only in the presence of a member of the candidate's staff. Proper note of this must be entered into the production log.

The candidate's staff were allowed to be present at any time during the recording, editing or post-production phases of preparing the broadcast.⁸¹

Direct Access in Referenda

In a referendum or plebiscite, many of the complex questions related to allocating of broadcasting time fall away. The choice is a straight yes or no. Since the question will not have been asked before, there can be no question of taking into account previous voter opinion on the matter. Equality and equity coincide: both sides should have equal time to put across their arguments.

This was the conclusion of the UN Technical Team on the 1993 Malawi Referendum:

In the case of government-owned media it is customary that equal access, both in terms of timing and length of broadcast, should be given to the competing sides.⁸²

Such also was the practice in, for example, the 1988 Chile plebiscite on the restoration of democracy.

However, things may be slightly more complex. Commonly, more than one party may line up on each side of the referendum debate - indeed sometimes parties may be divided among themselves. Who, then, has a right to speak for each side?

In 1979 a Scottish court had to determine just such an issue in a referendum on devolution of political power. Both the main UK parties were divided on the issue, with members campaigning for both sides in the referendum debate. Broadly speaking, three main parties in Scotland lined up in favour of devolution and one against. The court concluded, nevertheless, that the Yes and No camps should have equal time - party support was irrelevant.⁸³

Yet more complex issues will arise if different groups support the same proposition in a referendum but from a different perspective and organized in different campaigns. In that case, some of the normal allocation criteria used in elections will have to be brought into play to determine how much broadcasting time each group is allocated. However, the overall principle of equality between the two sides will not be affected.

Paid Political Advertising

Whether or not a country allows paid political advertising in broadcasting is likely to depend heavily on the traditions in its style and ownership of broadcasting and consequently the type of regulatory system that has evolved.

Some may regard it as curious that the issue of paid advertising for political parties or candidates in newspapers is scarcely controversial. The practice worldwide is almost universally the same: advertising is permitted, subject only to other limitations such as campaign spending ceilings and sometimes restrictions on content.

However, the fact that many countries have followed a different course with regard to political advertising on radio and television can be put down to two factors:

First, the cost of advertising on radio or, especially, television is usually much greater than in the print media.
Second, broadcasters are either publicly owned or receive their share of the frequency spectrum from a public body.

Of course, neither of these factors in itself automatically leads to a prohibition on political advertising over the airwaves. But they do perhaps explain why the approach has been different.

Broadly speaking, countries with a long tradition of public ownership of broadcasting, such as France, Britain and Denmark, have tended to be hostile to paid political advertising. Those with a stronger commercial broadcasting tradition - the United States represents the extreme - have tended to regard political advertising as natural (see Countries that Allow Paid Political Advertising). It is notable that the European country where commercial broadcasting is most dominant - Finland - should also be the one where unrestricted political advertising is permitted.

This is the rough tendency, but there are many exceptions. Canada, for example, which has a public broadcasting tradition similar to the British, has an approach to political advertising much closer to its southern neighbour. Nor is the issue necessarily to do with whether a public broadcaster accepts commercial advertising. The British Broadcasting Corporation has always maintained a strict prohibition on commercial advertising, but French public broadcasting has permitted it since the 1960s. Each maintains an equally strict embargo on political advertising.

A common pattern, of course, is for the public broadcaster to give free direct access slots according to predetermined criteria, while private broadcasters sell advertising slots to parties and candidates, often according to different criteria. This is the case, for example, in Germany, and was too in Italy immediately after the legalization of private commercial broadcasting.

The Argument For Political Advertising

The argument in favour of paid political advertising is a freedom of speech argument and finds its apogee in the United States. There it is generally assumed that the First Amendment to the Constitution - prohibiting Congress from passing laws 'abridging' free speech - protects paid advertising. Indeed, existing campaign contribution limits are often criticized as being in violation of the First Amendment.⁸⁴

The assumption behind this argument is that being allowed to spend money on advertising equalizes the debate between incumbent and challenger. This does not take account of the problem that being in possession of abundant campaign finance is not necessarily the same as having worthwhile political ideas. A party representing the aspirations of the poor and underprivileged may be at a disadvantage under such a system. It is also very much a First World argument, that does not readily transfer to countries where wealth is primarily generated by government office or political patronage. In many countries, the ruling party is the richest and can afford most advertising.

The Argument Against Political Advertising

The argument against paid political advertising is an equality argument: all parties or candidates should have equal or fair access to direct broadcasting regardless of the state of their campaign finance. Countries that favour an equal direct access system ('mec04a01a') almost always have a prohibition on paid advertising. But so do many, such as the United Kingdom, which operate 'equity' systems.

Another unrelated argument against paid advertising is that it increases the 'dumbing down' of political debate. It is clear that paid commercials are generally much shorter in length than free direct access slots and generally tend to sell a candidate or party (or denigrate the opponent) rather than developing an argument. The difference in length is striking: average length of paid advertising slots in Finland is 10-25 seconds and in the United States 30-60 seconds. In France, the United Kingdom and Denmark the length of free slots ranges from five to 10 minutes. ⁸⁵

What is striking, however, is the number of countries that have a mixture of paid and unpaid direct access broadcasting. Usually the approach will be to allocate parties a basic share of free direct access time, which can then be topped up with paid advertising if the party chooses to do so and can afford it (see A Mixed System of Advertising and Free Access).

Countries that Allow Paid Political Advertising

The general characteristic of systems in which there is political advertising is that advertising is unlimited - parties can buy as much as they can afford - whereas free direct access broadcasts are limited to a pre-determined share.

But this is not always the case, and a number of countries that operate a mix of paid advertising and free direct access limit the share of the former in proportion to the latter (see A Mixed System of Advertising and Free Access). Canada has a system in which a ceiling is set on the amount of advertising time that each party can purchase, on a basis that is closely akin to systems elsewhere for allocating free direct access time. (See Paid Political Advertising - Canada.)

It is, in fact, relatively unusual to find a system that is characterized solely by paid political advertising with no free direct access. For many years Finland was an almost solitary example in Europe, with most other examples to be found in the Americas.

Venezuela, for example, allows no political advertising on the two government broadcasting channels, but unlimited advertising on private commercial channels. Political parties generally appear to be prepared to pay the same rates as other advertisers. There is a state subsidy for spending on advertising. The electoral law authorizes the Supreme Electoral Council to contribute to parties' advertising campaigns. The way this has generally worked is that after the election the Supreme Electoral Council gives grants to parties that obtained at least 10 per cent of votes cast in congressional elections. In practice only the two main parties qualify.

An extraordinary characteristic of the Venezuelan system is that the incumbent administration is also allowed to buy advertising. The administration's commercials are not allowed by law to promote the ruling party - but the government's and the ruling party's commercials can be broadcast one after the other creating a strong argument in favour of the incumbent. In 1978, the government spent almost as much on television advertising as the two main political parties. Venezuela has an extremely high level of spending on political advertising - according to some estimates the highest per capita rate in the world. ⁸⁶

The United States is the best known example internationally of a system of paid political advertising. But contrary to first impressions, the US system is far from unregulated. Legislation on campaign financing (see Political Advertising and Campaign Spending Limits) has a particular impact on television advertising, which is by far the largest item in the campaign budget.

But that is not by any means the full extent of regulation. The Federal Communication Act of 1934 as amended requires broadcasters to offer to sell equal time to all candidates for federal office. This must be available at the lowest rate charged to non-political advertisers. Equal opportunity means that stations that sell time to one candidate must give the opportunity to others.⁸⁷ These are important principles, which ensure that political advertising does not entirely become the preserve of those with the biggest campaign war chests. They have been emulated in political advertising regulations worldwide:

Advertising is offered at the lowest rate.
If advertising space is offered to one candidate it is offered to all.

A Mixed System of Advertising and Free Access

A number of countries provide for a mixture of free direct access broadcasts and paid advertising. This may be an effective compromise between the 'freedom of expression' argument that will not allow prohibition of advertising and the 'equality of opportunity' argument that says that all parties or candidates should have a voice.

Barbados, for example, has just such a mixed system. Parties and non-party candidates are allowed to buy radio and television advertising to top up their allocation of free broadcasts. But they can only buy slots up to a predetermined number, calculated on the basis of the number of candidates they are fielding. The system for determining this limit is in fact different from that used to allocate free broadcasts, but has the same effect. There is also a time limit on each advertisement (30 seconds on radio and 60 seconds on television).

In Montenegro the regulations for state media in the elections provide for a mixture of paid and free advertising. Each electoral list is entitled to five minutes direct access time in total, of which two minutes are free and broadcast at times specified in the regulations. The remaining three minutes are purchased at market rates and their broadcast time is a matter of arrangement between the election list and the broadcaster. Presumably this means that variable rates would apply (as they would for commercial advertisers) depending on when the political advertisement was broadcast. (See Montenegro: law on state election broadcasting)

The Canadian system is also, in effect, a mixed one. Between elections there is an allocation of free party political broadcasts: 60 per cent for the opposition parties and 40 per cent for the governing party. The exact allocation of these broadcasts is generally made by the parties themselves (although the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation will make the allocation if the parties cannot reach agreement). In addition to these 'free time broadcasts' there are occasional ministerial and prime ministerial broadcasts. There is an opposition right of reply to the latter, but not the former. In election periods, however, this system is overlaid by one of paid political advertising. However, there is a given amount of advertising time available, which is allocated to the parties according to a formula that they agree among themselves. They are then allowed to purchase advertising time up to the limit of their allocation. See Paid Political Advertising - Canada.⁸⁸

Political Advertising and Campaign Spending Limits

An indirect form of regulating paid political advertising in many countries is a limit on campaign spending. Such limits apply widely and, since television advertising will usually be the largest item in the campaign budget, it is here that the most impact will be felt. In Canada, for example, spending limits mean that parties can never use up their allotted share of advertising time. Sometimes these limits are made explicit by law. In the 1994 South African election, for example, it was stated that all political advertising was subject to any legal limitations on campaign spending.

Venezuela, estimated to have the highest per capita spending on political advertising in the world, not surprisingly has no limit on spending. The United States, generally regarded as the home of political advertising, has a fairly complex system to regulate campaign financing, especially in presidential elections. The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (amended in 1974 and 1976) established equal federal financing of presidential elections and federal subsidy of primaries. It also set ceilings on what candidates could spend on TV advertising, although these were removed when the law was amended. In an important 1976 case - Buckley v Valeo - the Supreme Court upheld the principle of public financing but struck down limits on spending by 'political action committees' if these were independent from the presidential campaigns themselves. The court also decided that there would be no limit on spending by individuals.⁸⁹

The effect of this is to create routes whereby presidential campaigners can bypass the limitations. Donors can give money to parties or political action committees rather than to the candidates themselves - a function of the unusual US practice whereby the candidate stands independently of the party he or she represents. It also means that a wealthy individual, such as the independent Ross Perot in 1992, can stand without any spending cap at all.

All political advertisements in the United States must carry a disclaimer indicating who paid for them.⁹⁰

Japan is another country that makes the distinction between parties and candidates in its control of campaign spending. Candidates themselves are not permitted to buy broadcasting time. Parties on the other hand can buy advertising time, provided that their advertisements call for support for the party, not for specific candidates. See Formulas for Allocating Time.

Controls on campaign finance can be used as a means of giving opportunities to poorer parties in an environment of paid advertising. In Mongolia's first parliamentary elections, for example, each party was allocated the same amount of free and paid time. But the government subsidised the paid time of the smaller parties.

It is sometimes proposed that this 'topping up' option be used to equalize campaign spending - as a way of enforcing spending limits but not in a heavy-handed manner. The idea would be that limits are set. If one party exceeds them then the others would receive a top-up out of public funds.

Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?

The question arises whether the regulatory body should attempt in any way to control the format or the content of direct access programmes, whether they be free party election broadcasts or paid political advertising. There is a strong presumption against any such regulation, given the general hostility of international law to prior censorship of any kind. The arguments in favour of some sort of regulation fall into two categories:

Regulation of format - usually in order to ensure that a serious political message is conveyed.
Regulation of content - in order to prevent the broadcast of improper or illegal material

The latter argument clearly relates closely to the question of the policy adopted on issues of 'hate speech' (see Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation). It also relates to the question of how far the media themselves are liable in law for the content of political messages that they broadcast (see Media Liability for Reports of Unlawful Statements). It is often the media themselves who are most vocally in favour of restrictions on the content of political broadcasts if they fear that they will be subject to legal action as a consequence. They favour a system, such as that in Israel, whereby party broadcasts have to be approved by the Electoral Commission in advance of being aired.

In 1994 the South African Independent Media Commission addressed this issue in a slightly different way. The law laid down that a party election broadcast should not contain material that might reasonably be expected to expose the broadcasting licensee to legal liability. In other words, the onus was on the parties to ensure that their material complied with the law, even though the broadcaster could be liable if illegal material were broadcast.⁹¹

Barbados law (which is typical of that in a number of countries) sets out a number of specific prohibitions:

any matter in contravention of the laws of Barbados
any abusive comment upon any race, creed or religion
any obscene, indecent or profane matter
any malicious, scandalous or defamatory matter.

(See mex04)

The third of these opens up a particularly perilous area. Attempts to regulate on grounds of 'good taste' are notoriously difficult and, of course, highly culturally specific. Few countries, for example, would share the Finnish approach to direct access broadcasting, where negative campaign messages are strictly prohibited - yet party representatives appear on screen in the nude, within the traditions of Finnish sauna.⁹²

Clearly the distinction between regulation of form and content is a slightly artificial one. Some countries propose a minimum length for political broadcasts in order to ensure that there is a serious argument conveyed and not just an advertising message. But others prescribe a maximum limit: Barbados, for example, limits advertising to a maximum of 60 seconds.

Venezuela has, in most respects, an extremely unregulated system of political advertising. Yet the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) has the power to order the withdrawal of an advertisement that is not in 'good taste' or that significantly misrepresents the position of an opponent. The SEC has also prohibited the use of subliminal propaganda or other means of 'hidden psychological persuasion' in television political advertising. (This led in turn to an overall ban on subliminal advertising in Venezuela.)⁹³

France, which has a far greater degree of regulation in these matters than most advanced democracies, has various formal restrictions that are aimed at affecting the quality of the message conveyed. In the 1988 presidential election, for example, only one of the broadcasts allocated to each candidate could be filmed outside the television studio and only 40 per cent of each broadcast could contain archive film footage. The aim of these restrictions was to ensure that there was a high element of the candidate presenting policies to camera. The regulations also provided that candidate broadcasts could not use archival footage without the consent of those who appeared in them - clearly a way to forestall personal attacks on opponents.⁹⁴

Some countries follow the Finnish example and have an explicit prohibition on personal attacks. (Finland also prohibits product advertising in political broadcasts.)⁹⁵ In Costa Rica the Supreme Election Tribunal can order a negative political advertisement off the air if it comprises a personal or unverifiable attack. In one such case in 1990, an advertisement suggested that the incumbent candidate's law degree was acquired illegally. The Tribunal halted the broadcast of the advertisement after one showing.

The French have further regulations that are more content-related and aim, in particular to reduce the incumbent's advantage. For example, in 1988 presidential candidates were not allowed to use the flag or national anthem, or to show the places where they perform their official duties - in other words, the President would have to broadcast from a studio like his opponents and not from the Elysee Palace.⁹⁶

Probably no country has agonized over these matters more than Germany, with its history of 'hate speech' and extremist politics and its tight constitutional restrictions on certain types of political advocacy. Yet in political advertising it is accepted that certain types of false statements may be communicated. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated that these are not a basis for refusing political advertising.⁹⁷

It has been broadcasting stations that have tried to refuse material from some parties, especially neo-Nazis. The Federal Constitutional Court partially supported such an approach:

It is not within the power of a broadcasting station to deny an election slot with the argument that its contents appear unconstitutional, since the competence to decide upon the constitutionality of a party and its announcements lies only with the Federal Constitutional Court. The station has however the right to expect that the party uses its airtime only for legal campaigning, and in particular that no relevant and evident breach of criminal law will take place. The station is therefore entitled to control the content of the slot and - in the case of such a breach of law - to refuse transmission.⁹⁸

Government's Duty to Inform - Voter Information

International law and standards increasingly recognize the obligation of governments and publicly funded media to educate and inform voters about fundamental aspects of the electoral process.

These might typically include:

how and where to register as a voter
how and where to inspect the voters' roll
how to make a complaint about the voters' roll
what the election is for - who is being elected
what are the constituency boundaries
where to vote
how to vote
that the vote is secret

It is essential that all voters are in possession of the basic information that they need to exercise their democratic rights. The obligation on governments to ensure participation in democratic elections 'without discrimination' means that they are obliged to make a special effort to inform those who are at a particular disadvantage in exercising their democratic rights. Such groups may include:

women
racial, national or ethnic minorities
the poor, especially those who are illiterate
people with disabilities

One of the strongest arguments in favour of public ownership of sections of the media is that this gives the public authorities the means to conduct programmes of information and education. Voter information, voter education and civic education are among the most important examples of the public service role. National broadcasting stations, which are accessible to the illiterate and often to the relatively disadvantaged, play an especially important part in this.

However, this is also where the obligation on publicly-owned media to behave impartially becomes especially important. It is a fundamental principle of voter education that the information provided should be impartial and not favour any of the participants in the election.

For a comprehensive discussion of voter education go to Voter Education. For further information on the role of media in voter education, see Voter Information.

Balanced News Coverage

International law establishes the general obligation on publicly-funded media to report fairly on the election process (see Right of Access to Government Media and Publishing Opposition Views). In many countries this obligation will be set out in specific legislation such as the law relating to broadcasting or the electoral law itself. Elsewhere, there may be a general obligation of balance and fairness established in the founding legislation of the publicly-funded media, but how this works in practice is left up to voluntary self-regulation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation with its 'stopwatch rule' is an example of the latter approach. The corporation keeps a record of the time allocated in news bulletins to the different political parties, with the aim of keeping the balance in conformity with the proportional allocation of time for party election broadcasts. The principle of record-keeping is an important one: the public broadcaster (or any other, for that matter) should know exactly what it has broadcast in order to be able to answer any subsequent complaints.

Two transitional democracies are examples of countries that have taken a far more regulated approach towards the public broadcaster. The rationale for this is that the state broadcaster in a new democracy will have little experience of operating independently of government and requires more clearly defined rules to enable it to report in a balanced manner.

Malawi

In Malawi in 1994 the electoral commission set out very detailed guidelines, which dealt among other matters with news coverage by the publicly-funded (and government-controlled) Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). The MBC was

required to provide fair and balanced reporting of the campaigns, policies, meetings, rallies and press conferences of all registered political Parties during the period of campaigning and thereafter to provide news of the electoral process up to the close of poll.

The guidelines went on to extend this requirement of balance to other special election programming such as debates and phone-ins (see 'mee06b'). They set out extremely detailed provisions for the format and organization of these special programmes.

The guidelines imposed an obligation on the MBC to ensure that parties did not use other programmes to campaign. (In fact this did occasionally happen - for example, when football matches were used as an occasion for songs in praise of the incumbent president.)

And the guidelines contained a strict injunction to the staff of the public broadcaster:

MBC staff, as public service broadcasters, may not broadcast their own political opinions. Any commentaries or assessments must be clearly identified as such and carefully balanced to avoid bias.

See Malawi: Election Reporting Guidelines - Election Commission 1994 for the full guidelines.

Montenegro

Likewise the Montenegrin Assembly in 1998 agreed a resolution on the role of state media in election campaigns that established a general obligation on the staff of the public media:

Each editor or presenter of the political-news programs and special programs or columns in the public media founded by the Republic of Montenegro is obliged to independently and objectively present all election list submitters and their candidates throughout the election campaign and to ensure impartiality in relation to all political, social, ethnical/cultural and other agendas presented therein.

But the resolution goes beyond a general obligation to prescribe in some detail how this objectivity is to be achieved. As well as setting out standards for special debate programmes and reporting of opinion polls, the resolution removes certain call-in and panel discussion programmes from the regular schedule and obliges the public media to

observe the principles of professionalism and journalist ethics and abstain from inviting/hosting leaders or popular members of the parties to their regular and thematic programs.

The resolution states in great details how many reports the television, radio and state newspaper must carry. For example:

The Montenegrin Television network and Montenegrin Radio network are obliged to provide 5 footage and/or sound recordings respectively with excerpts from speeches of participants in the election rallies of election list submitters and this shall be increased for one footage and/or sound recordings each on every fourth election rally held.

And so on.

See Montenegro: law on state election broadcasting for the full text of the resolution.

This type of highly detailed regulation of content raises a genuine dilemma. The need for such prescriptions arises because of the history of bias and unprofessional reporting by state and government-controlled media. On the other hand, the impulse towards microscopic content-regulation is itself part of the legacy of political dictatorships. How far regulatory authorities should prescribe how the publicly-funded media report - and how far the media will best learn by making their own mistakes - is an imponderable question to which every new democracy will have to find its own answer.

Provisions for the Private Media

Most countries make a clear distinction between private and publicly-owned media in their regulatory systems, and in particular in the obligations that are placed upon them in election periods.

There are a number of different options, as well as a variety of different issues to be addressed.

Different System for the Private Media

One approach is for the private media to operate in elections under completely different rules. This will apply most often in the area of direct access broadcasting or political advertising. For example, when Italy first introduced private broadcasting the state broadcaster, RAI, continued with the existing system of free direct access broadcasting, while private broadcasters were allowed to carry paid advertising. These media also operated under a different regulator from the public media.

Venezuela similarly operates a system in which public media carry no paid advertising, but the private media do. Likewise, in the quite different, public-dominated Scandinavian broadcasting systems, the private media operate different rules on direct access.

Public Service Obligations in Certain Areas

Another common approach is to impose certain public service obligations on the private broadcast media as one of the terms of a broadcasting licence. This is the system that operates in the United Kingdom, for example. Thus a system of direct access programming that originated with the public service broadcaster is applied, without modification, to private broadcasters. In the UK these obligations apply to the older, terrestrial commercial channels but not to cable and satellite television.

Choice Whether to Assume Public Service Obligations

Also a popular approach is one that imposes no public service obligations on the private media. However, if the private broadcasters choose to run direct access slots, paid political advertising or voter education slots, then they must do this on the same terms as the public media

Role of the Regulator

Whichever of these options is taken, there is a role for the regulatory body in relation to any non-editorial material run by private media: that is, advertisements, direct access slots, voter education etc. The regulator will either be responsible for supervising adherence to any special rules affecting private media - if they follow the first option - or to general rules governing media (the second or third options). There does not exist the same basis for regulation of content in the private media as there is in the public (see Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?). Hence the regulator will not intervene with the private media to ensure Balanced News Coverage. However, the private media are likely to be obliged to adhere to the same Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation, as well as being subject to a Complaints Procedure.

In principle a pluralism of ideas and political viewpoints is best maintained by having private media that are unfettered and able to go about their business without interference (see UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999). The first responsibility of the regulatory body is to facilitate this. It is only when the private media behave in a manner that, through unfairness, obstructs the flow of information to the electorate, that the regulator will be empowered to intervene. And this will almost always apply in relation to non-editorial, rather than editorial, content.

Managing Media Relations

If a comprehensive law or regulations are in place governing specific aspects of media coverage of elections, then the practical operations of the electoral administration will be greatly facilitated as the campaign period approaches.

The work of the electoral authorities falls basically into two areas:

Ensuring the effective implementation of the laws or regulations. See The Role of the Regulatory Body - Monitoring the Process.
Informing the media about the progress of the election arrangements. See Keeping the Media Informed.

These functions are spread over four distinct periods of time:

Before the formal start of the campaign. See Pre-Campaign Issues.
During the campaign itself. See Campaign Issues.
While voting is in progress. See Election Day Reporting.
And after voting is over. See Post-Election Reporting.

Pre-Campaign Issues

The notion of 'pre-campaign issues' of course presupposes that there is a specified campaign period. Some countries, such as the United States, effectively impose no limits on the time of campaigning. (See A Specified Campaign Period?.) Of course, in many systems there may be little gap between different sets of elections: presidential, legislative, local or provincial - even, in the case of the European Union, international.

But under any electoral system there are issues that relate to elections and the media that occur, essentially, outside election periods. These are primarily:

Voter education
Discussion of the electoral system

In media coverage the two are clearly related. Informed debate about the workings of the electoral system can take place only in the context of thorough public education on how the system works.

The content of voter education is not the focus of this subject area (see Voter Education). However, pre-campaign voter education is likely to focus on a number of issues, depending on the electoral system and the political context:

Who is eligible to vote
Why it is important to be on the voters' roll
How to register to vote
Where to register to vote
How constituencies are divided up

For further discussion of how a voter education programme can utilize the media, see Voter Information.

Another important question is what systems exist for ensuring fair coverage and access by political parties outside election campaign periods. Many countries have systems that allow political parties regular opportunities to put their views to the electorate in direct access programmes. Many of the same considerations apply in devising such systems as are used in allocating direct access slots during elections (see Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties). These will, of course, be issues for legislators and broadcasting regulators more than for election administrators. But they do have an important bearing on the question of how level is the playing field when an election comes round.

Yet another fundamental issue - although again one for legislators and broadcasting regulators - is how far publicly-funded media are independent of the government of the day and the ruling party. The opportunity for direct access during an election campaign is helpful up to a point, but if the general tenor of broadcasting outside campaign periods is strongly biased then it is difficult to regard the playing field as level.

Campaign Issues

For the media themselves the start of the campaign period is when election coverage really takes off. By contrast the smooth operation of the regulatory process will depend very largely on the system that has been put in place before the elections. By this stage the fundamental questions should already have been answered, with the media and political parties clearly understanding their roles and responsibilities:

What laws or regulations govern media coverage of the campaign? (see Law or Regulations on Media during Elections)
Who is responsible for implementing these? (See Implementation Mechanism for Media and Election Regulations)
What are the regulations governing direct access broadcasting? (See Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties)
What are the regulations governing paid political advertising? (See Paid Political Advertising)
What are the Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation, and any miscellaneous provisions on issues such as News Blackouts or Opinion Polls?
What is the mechanism if any member of the public, a political party or the media themselves have a complaint? (See Complaints Procedure)

At this point the process of Accreditation of journalists can be started.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that these issues should be determined in advance of the campaign. Determining these important questions of policy on an ad hoc basis will diminish the authority of the supervisory body in relation to the media and create the impression that some media are not receiving equal treatment.

If this preparation has been completed effectively, the operation of the supervisory/regulatory body towards the media during the campaign period will be twofold:

To monitor adherence to the agreed laws, regulations and procedures, and to take whatever action is necessary to secure this (see The Role of the Regulatory Body - Monitoring the Process).
To provide the media with whatever information they need to report the electoral process and the campaign effectively and accurately (see Keeping the Media Informed).

The Role of the Regulatory Body - Monitoring the Process

The central function of the regulatory or supervisory body, once the campaign process has begun, is to ensure that the regulations or agreements put into place in an earlier period are complied with: that direct access time is distributed according to the rules, that voter education is impartial and meets the required standards and that parties and media are adhering to agreed practice on hate speech.

Very importantly, the regulatory body will also be on the lookout for any interference with the freedom of the media to cover the campaign freely, whether from the state or from any political party. It will need to convey information about any such interference to the appropriate governmental authorities, as well as issuing its own clear public condemnation. This is one of the most concrete ways in which the regulator acts as a facilitator and guardian of media freedom in the electoral process.

It is also during this process that the Complaints Procedure comes into play. It is vital that this mechanism is able to receive, investigate, hear and resolve complaints quickly during an election period - long-term, post-election solutions will satisfy no one.

However, in order to address complaints - as well as all these other functions - the regulatory body will need to have the capacity to monitor media coverage of the election. This will enable it not only to respond swiftly to complaints with reference to its own observation of media coverage, but also to initiate its own action if parties or the media have breached laws or regulations.

In many cases, regulatory bodies simply do not carry out this monitoring function, which puts them at an immense disadvantage when it comes to evaluating complaints - but also makes them unable to initiate action if, for example, direct access slots are not being broadcast as they should. A monitoring unit undoubtedly costs money - mainly in wages, since it is labour-intensive. The budget for a fairly substantial nongovernmental media monitoring project lasting three months in an African country in late 2000 was about US$250,000.

One common alternative in well-established democracies is for the media to be required to submit a copy of all relevant material to the regulatory body. Assuming such an agreement is complied with, this meets the need to have material at hand to evaluate complaints, but it does not allow the body to initiate its own actions, unless it has staff available to evaluate all material submitted.

A third alternative, which is becoming increasingly common, is for the regulatory body to work in conjunction with non-governmental media monitors (see Media Monitoring). Such a collaboration can be loose and informal or the subject of a detailed contract. In South Africa in 1999, for example, the non-governmental Media Monitoring Project was formally contracted to work with the Independent Broadcasting Authority. More often, the non-governmental monitors will submit their findings to the regulator body which will then decide whether further action is required.

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

Increasingly electoral supervisory bodies work in collaboration with non-governmental organizations of different sorts. This co-operation is a practical realization of the general proposition that an active civil society is needed to safeguard democracy. There are three main areas where this collaboration is likely to take place in relation to media coverage of elections.

Training of Journalists

The regulatory body itself will often not have the capacity to organize training of journalists in election reporting skills, yet it is very much in its interests that those skills be imparted. It will aim to work in collaboration with journalism training institutions - and with the media houses themselves when they have in-house training schemes. The Tanzanian National Election Commission in 2000 went further afield and contracted the British Broadcasting Corporation to provide training for journalists.

Media Monitoring

International non-governmental organizations such as ARTICLE 19 and the European Institute of the Media have acquired considerable expertise in media monitoring. In a number of national elections, domestic non-governmental organizations have worked in partnership with international groups and have themselves acquired skills that allowed them to monitor. Hence the Malawi Electoral Commission in 1994 relied heavily in its media work on the findings of a non-governmental monitoring project launched by local freedom-of-expression activists in collaboration with ARTICLE 19. In 1994, the South African Independent Broadcasting Authority contracted the non-governmental Media Monitoring Project to work with it. See Media Monitoring.

Monitoring Media Freedom

Non-governmental human rights groups, as well as professional media bodies and journalists' trade unions, will monitor respect for media freedom as a matter of course. The regulatory body, by developing a working relationship and an exchange of information with such groups, can lend its authority to condemnation of violations of media freedom. It can also use its powers over government and political parties to prevent such incidents or to hold their perpetrators accountable. See Protection of Journalists' Safety.

Media Monitoring

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of civic groups undertaking monitoring of the media - a practice that was virtually unknown before the 1980s. The aim of this is to monitor how well the media - especially the publicly funded media - adhere to the guidelines agreed by the relevant supervisory body, to general standards of fairness, or to some other set of criteria developed by the civic groups themselves. The practice of media monitoring has been seen especially in transitional elections in Eastern Europe and Africa.

If it is well done, media monitoring can be a very practical way of non-governmental groups contributing to the fairness and success of elections. At the minimum the published findings of media monitors may influence the quality of media coverage. Sometimes, as in Mozambique in 1994, the dialogue between monitors and journalists may go a step further. The news room of Radio Mozambique used to hold a weekly meeting to discuss the monitors' observations, decide whether they agreed with them or not and make plans for improvements. The improvement in the balance of radio coverage - away from heavy bias to the ruling party - was measurable over the campaign period. In other cases, as in Malawi in 1994, the electoral supervisory body (the Electoral Commission in that case) may take note of the monitors' findings and use their powers to try to make media coverage fairer. And in other cases, as in South Africa in 1999, the supervisory body may hire a non-governmental monitoring group to be its eyes and ears.

The intellectual origins of media monitoring are to be found in the development of academic media studies, such as the work of the Glasgow Media Group. Academic media analysis, which is primarily geared to the sophisticated media of developed industrial societies, tends to focus in large measure on what it calls 'discourse analysis'. This is primarily concerned with the hidden messages conveyed by the language selected - or the visual language of television and the subtle or subliminal impact that these can have on the viewer's understanding or interpretation of a subject. Discourse analysis is certainly an element of media monitoring in elections. But usually the emphasis will be on two other standards that are easier to apprehend and then to measure. These are usually described as 'quantitative analysis' and 'qualitative analysis'. The first is the simplest, the least controversial and often has the greatest impact. It simply entails counting and measuring election coverage in the media - number and length of items devoted to different parties, length in column inches, timing and number of direct access programmes and so on. The amount of coverage each party or candidate receives is usually the first criterion that will be looked at in order to evaluate allegations of bias.

'Qualitative analysis' is, as the name suggests, an approach that measures the quality of the coverage that parties and candidates receive. This applies primarily to news coverage, although it should also be applied to voter education. A qualitative evaluation will look at the language used and the message conveyed - not the hidden messages of discourse analysis - and use this to 'qualify' the quantitative measure. It may not be very useful to say that Party X has received a certain percentage of news coverage, if a large part of that coverage is biased in its content. Inevitably the measurement of bias is more subjective than simply counting the minutes, seconds or column inches accorded to each candidate. But there are ways of minimizing potential bias on the part of the monitor. One is to count and attribute the sources of a story.

Some media monitoring projects have their origins in initiatives by international NGOs, such as the European Institute for the Media in Central and Eastern Europe and ARTICLE 19, primarily in Africa. Sometimes these international initiatives are carried out in partnership with local groups. They will, of course, always require local personnel, since understanding of local languages and politics is an essential qualification for a media monitor.

Media monitoring projects that involve local groups are likely to have a more activist approach, trying to improve the quality of media coverage as the election campaign progresses. This will usually mean that the project reports its findings to the public on a regular basis before the elections. Other projects may not publish conclusions until the election is over. Their aim would be rather to contribute to an overall evaluation of whether the election was free and fair.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of media monitoring since its purpose may vary. Some of the factors that determine the effectiveness of monitoring may be beyond its control. In Malawi in 1994, for example, the media monitoring project contributed to a measurable improvement in balance on the state broadcaster in the course of the campaign. In 1999 - after five years of democratic governance - a similar project had little impact. The difference was that in 1994 there was a strong independent Electoral Commission that was prepared to act on the project's findings, whereas five years later there was not. But this did not mean that media monitoring was a waste of time. The project's final report contained valuable evidence of government manipulation of the media, which was used by the opposition in a legal challenge to the election results. See Media Monitoring - Malawi.

For media monitoring methodology, see ARTICLE 19: Media Monitoring Manual.

Media Monitoring Methodology

The ways in which non-governmental media monitoring projects go about their business varies greatly, both in methods of organizing the project and publicizing the findings, and in what is monitored and how. In many cases media monitoring projects have been put in place in transitional democracies to determine how well the publicly funded media are meeting their obligations to report fairly and provide equitable direct access programming. In that case, the standards against which the monitors judge the media are derived directly from national electoral law or from international guidelines. But increasingly media monitors are looking at both publicly and privately owned media. The obligations of the private media may derive in part from law, but are based primarily on the ethics of journalism.

To be credible, media monitoring must be thorough and comprehensive. In practice this will mean that all news, current affairs and other election programming should be covered, as well as the equivalent material in the print media if they are being monitored too. The team doing the monitoring will have to be familiar with all the languages being broadcast, as well as understanding the politics of the country - including political nuances in coverage that most outsiders would not grasp. This means, in practice, that the monitors must be nationals of the country. But at the same time they must be impartial - and be seen to be impartial. This is especially difficult in a transitional democracy. Young and highly motivated monitors - and they will have to be that because the process is long and tedious - are likely also to have strong political sympathies. (In one media monitoring project in a transitional democracy, the young monitors would switch on their tape recorders and then rush off to take part in rallies and demonstrations.) But this type of political activism must be abandoned for the duration of the project.

Print monitoring is relatively straightforward because the newspapers can be read at leisure. Broadcast monitoring poses more serious logistical problems because it must be captured at the moment it happens. This will usually be done live, although monitors will always record all the items monitored and retain the tapes for the duration of the project. This allows them to verify their findings later, but it is also a way of monitoring broadcasts at awkward times of the day and night.

Each item monitored - a news bulletin or an issue of a newspaper - will be recorded on a form. Increasingly the information recorded on these forms will then be stored in a computer database. (See 'mey32' for sample inputting forms.) This clearly speeds the process of generating graphs and statistical tables. It also makes it possible to search to find out, for example, what emphasis different media have given to different parties or issues. Or it can be used to find out what (and how many) sources different media use.

The monitors are looking at three main areas:

Quantitative analysis: this means simply measuring the number of items devoted to each party or candidate, as well as how long they are (whether in time or in column inches). It can also involve counting and identifying the sources of stories. This is important as an objective measure of balance. Monitors might also count the number of items on different issues: the economy, constitutional reform, crime, political violence - whatever are the relevant issues of the day. In the case of direct access programming, monitors will not only be looking at whether parties are receiving their correct allocation, but also at the time of day when these are broadcast. The timing of news items is also important - has the opposition leader's big rally been relegated to a graveyard slot in the small hours of the morning?

Qualitative analysis: counting alone will not adequately explain the strengths and weaknesses of media coverage. It is not enough to complain that the ruling party is receiving more media coverage than the opposition - there may be good reasons for this, for example in terms of their public support. But equally, simply counting the number of items may conceal the fact that some parties' 'quota' of coverage may include items that show them in a bad light. For example, in South Africa before the 1994 elections the state broadcaster kept its own statistical record of party coverage, which showed that the African National Congress, then in opposition, was receiving extensive coverage. Yet this proportion included much negative coverage, such as the reporting of Winnie Mandela's trial for kidnapping. Hence the bare statistics do not tell all.

Statistics on sources say something about balance, but not automatically about bias. A one-source story is unbalanced, but it need not be biased. If the governor of the central bank announces a rise in interest rates, no other voice is required because it is a straight news item. (Good journalistic practice might suggest that a comment from the political parties and independent experts would be helpful.) On other hand, coverage of political violence that only quoted from one party would probably be biased.

Monitors will also analyse the content of voter education material to ensure that no party political message is being conveyed. Often they will wish to compare the treatment of the same stories in different language services. In Africa especially, there is often a quite different content to broadcasts in the colonial language - English, French or Portuguese - and indigenous languages. The former will, to some extent, be for external consumption. Broadcasters and politicians often assume that no independent monitor is paying attention to what they say in their own languages. Hence one of the benefits of media monitoring.

To some extent all analysis of bias is subjective. However, various methods can be used to obtain as objective an assessment as possible. Media monitors will measure bias by comparing media reporting to their own understanding of events derived from a variety of sources. One way of doing this is 'source monitoring': the media monitors themselves attend an important newsworthy event such as a political rally or a press conference, in order to see how media coverage compares with their own perceptions. The Internet has made it easier for monitors to compare domestic coverage with international reporting on their country. The two sometimes bear little relation to each other.

Discourse analysis: evaluating the implicit messages contained within media coverage is at the same time important, difficult and highly contentious. Under this heading comes all the subtleties of language and visuals that convey a message that is understood by the audience, but sometimes not in a conscious manner. This can be most clearly shown in the use of words, whether in print or broadcast. For example, pro-government media may have the President 'stating' something, while his opponent only 'alleges'. Reporting does not have to be inaccurate to be an improper influence on the audience's perceptions. In South Africa before the 1994 election, for example, monitors noticed that reports of ANC demonstrations always mentioned the amount of litter left behind by the participants. The message was that the ANC was disruptive and irresponsible. Foreign news items can be used to encourage a particular interpretation of domestic news. In Malawi in 1994, coverage of opposition parties on the state broadcaster was placed alongside news of the Rwandan genocide. The subliminal message was that an end to one-party 'stability' would lead to bloodshed.

Television has a whole complex visual vocabulary. Figures who are regarded as authoritative - such as incumbent politicians - may be portrayed at an upward angle, while others are filmed at a level angle or from above. Figures in authority will more often address the camera directly, while others will address an unseen interviewer to one side of the camera and thus will not address the viewer directly. Ordinary interviewees - opposition members, trade unionists, the public - will usually be interviewed in the open air. Government members will be seen in their office, often shuffling papers and apparently engaged in some urgent and important activity. An office background tends to emphasise the authority and expertise of the interviewee. And so on.

Even the graphics and logos that accompany a news broadcast may convey a message. The graphic on South African television for the running story of political negotiations in 1993 showed two white men and one black man. This was later changed to one white man, one off-white woman and one black man. Neither of these reflected the actual composition of the negotiations. More blatantly, in the Zimbabwean 2000 elections, a special current affairs programme that run through the campaign period had as its logo the tower at the Great Zimbabwe ruins - exactly the same as the symbol of the ruling party.⁹⁹

An essential part of the methodology of media monitoring is how the findings are reported. Practice varies from project to project. A common model is to report after the election is over, in the manner of many ordinary election monitoring projects. The big drawback of this approach is that, although it may provide ammunition for later disputes about whether the election was fair or not, it will have no influence on the actual coverage. Monitoring projects that report while the campaign is in progress will hope to have a positive impact on the quality of journalism. The exact intervals between reports will vary. Once a week is a common one, but a monitoring project in Kenya in 1997 began monthly well in advance of the election and then went weekly as the campaign hotted up. In Zimbabwe in 2000, reports initially came out weekly and then daily in the last two weeks of the campaign. In every case, however, monitoring projects will produce final reports when the election is over setting out their overall findings.

See ARTICLE 19: Media Monitoring Manual for fuller details of media monitoring methodology. Media Monitoring - Malawi and Media Monitoring - Bosnia illustrate different media monitoring approaches in practice. Russia: EIM Report 2000, Tanzania: Media Monitoring Report, 2000 and Zimbabwe: Media Monitoring Report, 2000 are different recent examples of media monitoring reports.

Professional Associations and Trade Unions

Professional and impartial campaign coverage is not something that can be imposed by a regulatory authority, whatever legal powers it may be endowed with. In effect, no authority can try to interfere with the editorial content of the media without undermining the whole basis of the media role as a public watchdog. Yet there is also clearly a public interest in encouraging coverage that meets the highest professional standards.

The key to this is the role of the professional bodies of the journalistic profession itself. Preferably representatives of these bodies should have been involved in drafting the regulations governing media election coverage in the first place (see Who Should Be Involved in the Drafting Process?).

Professional bodies come in a number of different types:

Journalists' or broadcasters' associations
Journalists' or broadcasters' trade unions
Voluntary media councils
Training institutions.

Voluntary media freedom groups may also fall into a similar category in some instances.

These professional bodies may have a role in accrediting journalists; they will almost certainly have a role in promoting their interests and professional standards.

In a number of instances professional bodies have developed codes of conduct that are specific to election issues. Once a code has been adopted, this will give a basis for action to be taken through any complaints or disciplinary mechanism that exists within the professional body.

The Tanzanian Media Council, for example, a voluntary association of media organs, convened a conference with the National Electoral Commission in advance of the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections. This meeting drew up a code of conduct (see Tanzania: Media Code of Conduct), which not only provided guidance for journalists in a country with only a short experience of democratic electioneering. It also provided a baseline against which the media could be monitored - and indeed the Media Council, along with two other non-governmental organizations initiated a media monitoring project.

In Zimbabwe in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the procedure for drawing up a code of conduct was slightly different. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network was a grouping of NGOs supporting the electoral process in a variety of ways - voter education, monitoring etc - but also including the Electoral Supervisory Commission. A special committee of organizations with a media interest convened and drew up an election reporting handbook (see Zimbabwe: Code of Conduct and Reporting Handbook), which as well as including proposed guidelines on election coverage by the public broadcaster, also contained a code of conduct. The organizations endorsing this included the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists. See Code of Conduct - Zimbabwe.

Keeping the Media Informed

In a well-managed election the supervisory body has every interest in ensuring the maximum flow of information to the media. There are fundamentally two reasons for this:

First, because informing the media is informing the public - and a constant flow of information enables the electorate to exercise their democratic rights, as well as retaining their confidence in the whole election process.
Second, because the media will write about the election, whether the supervisory body likes it or not. It is in everyone's interest if the material that appears in the media is as accurate as possible.

Consequently, the electoral supervisory body will have to devote some resources to information management, above and beyond the role that it plays in media regulation.

The fundamental principles of media management in an election situation are these:

The election administration will make available the maximum amount of information, barring only that information whose disclosure would compromise the integrity of the election process.

All information that the election administration releases will be accurate, to the best of its knowledge.

Information will be released on a non-discriminatory basis to all media, regardless of their ownership or political loyalty.

The significance of these principles is that if they are breached, the objectives of informing the electorate and maintaining its confidence in the process will be damaged, sometimes irreparably. In new democracies, with a history of tight government censorship or control over the flow of information, these principles may represent a break with old habits. But the temptation to hold back information, or to provide it selectively to favoured journalists, is one that electoral officials must resist.

A practical problem, whether in a new democracy or an old one, is ensuring the consistency of information emanating from the electoral supervisory body. The appointment of a press officer, or creation of a media department, will be a way of ensuring both that the authority speaks with a single voice and that the media know where to go to find the information that they need.

The main techniques that can be used to keep the media informed are these:

Journalist Training

Especially in a new democracy where journalists have little experience of election reporting, it may be worth the investment of time and effort for the electoral supervisory body or the media regulatory body (if they are different) to carry out training of journalists. This could be done in conjunction with an established journalism training institution in the country or regionally, or with a professional or trade union body.

Ideally training will be conducted by the appropriate professional body, with contributions invited from the electoral body, in the form of guest lectures or materials. However, in a transitional situation the electoral body itself may want to take the initiative to ensure that training takes place.

The advantage to the supervisory body of this training having taken place is that it will speed the later flow of information to the media, without basics having to be repeated. It will also be an opportunity to inform journalists of the practical arrangements that will be in place for the election. It will be an occasion to tell them what they can and cannot do, both by law and by professional standards, in the course of an election.

The outcome of all this, it is to be hoped, will be an improvement in the quality of coverage, but also a clear understanding on the part of everyone involved of the distinction between those aspects of election coverage that are under the editorial control of the media - news, current affairs, debates etc - and those that are not, including advertising, direct access slots and most forms of voter education.

Press Releases

The press release is old technology par excellence, but can scarcely be bettered, even in the days of the Internet. Indeed, often the Internet (whether through a web site or an email listserver) is nothing more than a sophisticated means for distributing an old-fashioned press release.

From the point of view of the electoral authorities the value of the press release is that they have control over what is being distributed to the media and can therefore determine its accuracy. For the media, of course, it has the same advantage - while in addition they have no excuse for later misreporting.

Press releases are obviously particularly useful for conveying information such as statistical data, verbatim statements or lists of candidates - information that is tedious to relay in any other way, and where there is a danger that errors could creep in if the information were relayed orally.

Press releases can be distributed by a variety of means: hand delivery, fax, post, or posting on the notice board of a media centre. They may often accompany press conferences as a way of ensuring that detailed information is recorded accurately.

There is a delicate balance in how often to issue press releases. The danger of too many is that the media will lose interest. The danger of not enough is that the press officer will be left constantly responding to questions. The precise balance will be a matter for his or her judgement.

Writing a Press Release

This is why you need a press officer - and why he or she should be a trained journalist. The technique of a press release is essentially the same as that for a news story in a newspaper. Journalists in most countries are trained to write stories in an 'inverted pyramid' style, starting with a lead paragraph that conveys the essence and essential fact of the story, which is then developed in detail in subsequent paragraphs. Aside from making it clear to the reader from the outset what the story (or press release) is about, this also allows the item to be cut from the bottom upwards, without losing its essence. And that is how a press release should be too.

Like a good news story a press release should be presented in plain language, not jargon. The average journalist does not necessarily have an attention span any longer than the average newspaper reader, so it is not safe to assume that they will read the press release come what may.

But the major reason for writing a press release like a news story is to have a written record. There also is a hope that it will be used directly in the newspaper. For this reason, keep the release short (and print it double-spaced so that there is room on it for sub-editor's marks). In poorer countries, where editors often scramble to fill their papers each day, they may be grateful for a ready-made piece of well-written copy.

Media Briefings or Press Conferences

A press conference is a means of conveying more information than can be carried in a single press release. It is also a way of occasionally utilizing senior officials in the election administration and putting them before the public (in the form of the media) to explain the electoral process.

Broadcasters like press conferences, of course, because a press release will only give them 'white copy' - that is a story with no picture or sound. At a press conference broadcasters will be able to record and film. If a customized 'mee02e' is available then this will make the practical requirements of broadcasters easer to meet. Otherwise, the organizers of a press conference will have to allow for the needs of television and film crews, radio journalists and photographers.

The usual format for a press conference is for a representative of the electoral authority to make a statement, which is then open to questions from journalists. The press conference should be chaired by someone other than the official making the statement. It helps to establish a clear time for the conference (and to start promptly - journalists have deadlines). The chairperson should ensure that journalists from a variety of different media, with different political viewpoints, have a chance to ask questions. Broadcast journalists will insist on the chance to ask their question (because they will want it broadcast). That is reasonable, but no one should be allowed to hog the questioning. Sensitive and balanced chairing will create a trust between the media and the authority holding the press conference.

A media briefing is usually something rather different. This will normally not be for broadcasting and sometimes is completely 'off the record'. If the latter, then the strict rule is that the person doing the briefing may not be identified. Politicians brief 'off the record' the whole time. It is scarcely possible to envisage any circumstances where it would be proper or appropriate for an electoral official to do so. With detailed briefings, as with other information for the media, invitations should be issued to all media, regardless of political persuasion or ownership.

Briefing Packs

Preparing a package of basic information for the media can be an immense time saver, as well as helping ensure that their reports are accurate. Journalists need to know a mass of background information: the number of registered voters (per electoral district, if that applies), the names of the candidates, the offices being contested, the results last time, the number of broadcast slots and their timing and so on. Foreign journalists may need even more basic political, institutional and demographic information. In addition, all journalists will want to know what regular facilities are at their disposal: a media centre, regular briefings, facilities for the count and so on.

Much of this information can be compiled in advance of the campaign. All of it is readily available to a moderately well-organized electoral authority and can be put together by a competent press officer without enormous effort or expenditure. Some of the material may double up with information that is made available to others, such as election observers.

See Indonesia: sample press materials from election authority and 'mex30' for examples of the contents of briefing packs.

Media Centre

The practicability of having a media centre, and the facilities that are put into it, will depend entirely upon the resources available to the electoral authorities. There is no doubt that if the finance is available to provide such a centre, then the quality of media coverage will improve. Gathering the media in a single centre makes many of the basic functions of media management - press releases, press conferences, briefings etc - much simpler. For many electoral authorities it is simply beyond their capacity.

A media centre could include some or all of the following:

Telephones, faxes and internet connections
Computers for media use, but also linked to a results service
Television monitor screens
Radio and television studios.

Internet

The Internet enables electoral authorities to do many of the things that they do traditionally in their relations with the media in a much more rapid, efficient and cost-effective manner. The potential of the Internet is constantly extolled, but for the purposes of media management in elections its utility is fairly straightforward.

Through email, the electoral authority can distribute press releases, statements and other material at very low cost. By maintaining a web site, the authority can create, in effect, a virtual Briefing Packs. Moreover, it is one that can be constantly updated by the addition of new material as it becomes available. It will also be possible to run a results service through the web site.

Where the electoral authority is generating its own broadcast material - such as voter education slots - these can be made available through the web in digital format. However, anything that is available in digital format should also be available in hard copy.

Voter Information

One important function of the media during a campaign period will be a constant process of voter information. This includes formal voter education material, but might be said more broadly to encompass most of what the media do during an election.

Voter education is addressed at length in a separate subject area (see Voter Education). Voter education through the mass media can be very expensive and consequently may assume a low priority where cost is a major consideration. However, on occasions the media themselves may undertake to produce their own voter education materials or to offer their services at cost price to the electoral authorities. The scope of these materials can extend beyond more traditional methods - advertisements telling people how to vote - to educational soap operas.

Voter education will need to be targeted at those who are traditionally disadvantaged and therefore less likely to register to vote and to participate in elections. These may include women, racial, ethnic or national minorities, or people with disabilities. With special programming, such as in minority languages, the media (especially broadcasters) can play a vital role in this area.

However, voter information extends more broadly than voter education. This is the rationale for the investment of time and resources that the electoral administration should make in keeping the media well briefed on developments (see 'mee02'). However, the media also have a proper role to play in scrutinizing the election arrangements and exposing any shortcomings. This is an important aspect of the transparency and accountability of the election process.

Protection of Journalists' Safety

The safety of journalists is a paramount consideration. If the media are not able to go about their work freely, they will be unable to gather the news and keep the electorate informed. Violence at political events, for example, has an impact not only on the right of candidates and parties to express their views peacefully, but also the right of the public to hear these views through the media.

Election reporting does not sound like an especially hazardous occupation. For journalists in many countries it is safe and routine. Yet elections can become an intense focus of political hostilities. In Zimbabwe in 2000, more than 30 opposition supporters died in a campaign of targeted political violence by supporters of the ruling party. The leading independent daily paper was the victim of a bomb attack, while journalists were on occasion abducted by party militants. Attacks on the media were encouraged by frequent anti-press rhetoric from senior figures.¹⁰⁰

Journalists organizations will undertake their own measures to try to protect their members' safety. The International Federation of Journalists has developed a set of detailed guidelines to help journalists report elections safely (see International Federation of Journalists: Election Reporting Handbook). Journalists in Zimbabwe, for example, adapted these to their own conditions (see Zimbabwe: Code of Conduct and Reporting Handbook).

But this is not primarily a matter for the media themselves. At issue is not just the right of journalists to go about their business without threats or violence, but also the right of the electorate to be informed. Therefore the responsibility for ensuring journalists' safety lies with the electoral and governmental authorities - see Protecting the Safety of the Media. The following are some of the principal measures that can be taken:

Repeal laws limiting media freedom . This will not only minimize the chance of journalists being the victims of state-sponsored violence. By removing provisions such as the requirement that journalists reveal confidential sources of information, this also makes it less likely that the media will be a target of attack from party supporters.
Agree codes of conduct with the political parties that expressly prohibit not only violence against each other, but also against the media.
Issue clear public statements about the importance of the media to the election process.
Take swift legal action against anyone responsible for violence against journalists.

Promoting Professional Coverage

The responsibility for promoting professional coverage of elections in the media lies primarily with media organizations themselves. The role of the electoral administration is mainly to create an environment in which this can happen.

However, there are a number of aspects of editorial coverage where there may be specific regulations covering what the media may or may not say and consequently the direct involvement of the regulatory body. These areas include:

Coverage of Opinion Polls

Many countries have explicit regulations governing how opinion polls may be reported - indeed in some cases, notably France, reporting of opinion poll findings is prohibited altogether. However, as France is discovering, total prohibition of opinion poll reporting is no longer a practical proposition. The argument in favour of some form of regulation is that, especially in a new democracy, the public may not be aware of the limitations of opinion polling and be unduly influenced by their findings. On the other hand, developing professional coverage in this area is probably best achieved by disseminating guidelines on how to report opinion polls (see Questions to Ask About Opinion Polling) rather than by prohibiting their misreporting.

Special Information Programming

The one area of coverage where some form of regulation is usually considered necessary is 'special programming' - usually consisting of candidate debates and panel interviews. Some countries with a long history in this area have developed standard formats for this sort of programme without any external regulation. Others, especially newer democracies, have developed detailed rules to ensure that all participants in the debate have fair access.

Government Activities and Campaigning

One way in which election coverage is commonly abused is by manipulation of government functions for campaign purposes. Hence, senior officials standing for re-election contrive to place themselves in the public eye through their official functions. This happens in democracies the world over and is, to a large extent, a matter that should be left to the good professional judgment of the media themselves. However, especially where the public media are accustomed to slavish reporting of government Ministers' every function, it may be necessary to establish guidelines to prevent abuse.

News Blackouts/'Reflection Period'

Many countries operate a statutory or voluntary blackout on election news at some point. Most often this take place once voting has started, to avoid misleading and abusive last-minute campaigning. But sometimes the blackout can extend for some days before the election to create a 'reflection period' when voters can digest all the information they have received during the campaign.

Coverage of Opinion Polls

Used properly, opinion polls can be an important way of measuring what voters think about particular issues, parties and candidates. Newspapers and broadcasters often commission their own polls to give them information about voters' intentions. An opinion poll can also be a way of finding out what voters think about a particular issue - or what they think the important issues are. These might not be the same as the issues that seem important to politicians. Arguably, opinion polls help to enhance democratic choice. For example, in a first past the post system they may assist those who wish to vote tactically to ensure that a certain candidate fails.

The danger with opinion polls is that they are subject to manipulation at many levels: choosing the questions, choosing the sample, choosing the time to ask the questions and so on. This is quite apart from the normal margin of error in any opinion poll - which in a closely fought election may be greater than the margin that separates the parties. A well-conducted poll is usually remarkably accurate. It is reckoned that a sample of 1,000 can accurately reflect the views of more than 200 million US adults to within a few percentage points. But their limitations must be clearly understood too. That is why media reporting of opinion poll findings demands the highest professional standards. It is also why, arguably, reporting of opinion polls should be subject to regulation by the electoral supervisory body to make sure that the media are not communicating deliberate falsehoods.

In the United Kingdom, internal guidelines remind British Broadcasting Corporation staff to downplay the significance of opinion poll results and to emphasize that they represent only a snapshot of opinion at a particular moment. (See 'mey24'.) Accuracy is clearly improved if media report the result of all opinion polls, especially if they then average the results, hence minimizing the impact of 'rogue' polls, which can occur even with the most professional of polling techniques.

Professional coverage of opinion polls means asking a number of key questions about how the survey was conducted - and telling the audience the answers:

Who conducted the poll? Are they reputable and independent?
How many people were interviewed?
How were they chosen?
Are the published results based upon the answers of all those interviewed?
When was the poll conducted?
What is the sampling error?
What questions were asked - and how were they worded? In what order were they asked?
How do the results of this poll compare with other findings?

See Questions to Ask About Opinion Polling and 'mey29'.

Questions to Ask About Opinion Polling

Who conducted the poll? Are they reputable and independent?

If the organization that carried out the poll is not independent of all political parties, then its findings may be biased. It is important to know who commissioned the poll - was it a political party, a media organization or some other body?

How many people were interviewed?

The size of the sample is obviously important. If it is too small then the result is less likely to be accurate. But if the sample is well selected, a relatively small number may still yield important results.

How were they chosen?

A reputable pollster will publish the sampling method. Clearly who is chosen is going to determine the result. If the poll is conducted by telephone it only reflects the views of telephone users. In some countries that will be a fair proportion of the population, while in others it will be a tiny minority. A proper sample will reflect the variety of geographical or population groups in the country.

Are the published results based upon the answers of all those interviewed?

An easy way of manipulating poll results is to leave out the answers that you do not like. That is unprofessional, for both a pollster and a journalist.

When was the poll conducted?

People's views change, especially during an election campaign. A poll that is a month old may not be a reliable guide to how people will vote tomorrow.

What is the sampling error?

This means simply, how far out are the poll results likely to be? No poll can predict the result with total accuracy, but a professional one should get within a few percentage points.

What questions were asked - and how were they worded? In what order were they asked?

Professional media reporting will reflect exactly what the questions were, to avoid the danger of 'interpreting' the results in the most politically convenient way. It is important to know what all the questions were, because answers may have been contradictory. For example, respondents may say that they feel that Candidate X has been doing a good job - but then express a view that is in disagreement with his major campaign platform. Most importantly of all, the public must know that the questions were asked in a balanced way, not leading respondents to give a particular expected answer.

How do the results of this poll compare with other findings?

If there are several polls carried out by reputable organizations, then averaging out the findings might help to reduce the overall margin of error. Alternatively, if the results of one poll are way out of line with others - a 'rogue' poll - it would be interesting to know why. Is it just a badly conducted poll? Or does it show some important change in public opinion?

Special Information Programming

The most common form of \'special information programming' during election campaigns is the candidate debate. A variant of this is the panel interview.

These special formats are unusual in that they fall somewhere between regular editorial programming and direct access slots. Indeed, in some countries the only form of direct access available comes as an interview or debate.

This unusual and hybrid nature of 'special programming' means that in most places where they are conducted a special set of rules has emerged. Sometimes these rules are established by law, sometimes by self-regulation and sometimes by custom and practice. See Debate Formats.

The most famous examples of this type of programming have been the presidential debates in the United States, dating from 1960 when a perceived debate victory by John F. Kennedy has always been credited with securing a narrow election win over Richard Nixon shortly afterwards. (One of the peculiarities of these events is that the participants are always anxious to claim victory in the debates, while pundits score them, rather like judges in a boxing contest. To the lay audience it is not always so clear who has won.) Received wisdom now has it that Nixon, with his five o'clock shadow, looked shifty and untrustworthy - a judgement that at least has the support of subsequent history. But those who listened to the debate on the radio thought that Nixon had won - it was his appearance that was decisive. This was caused at least in part by the fact that he was in pain from a knee injury.

In the United States the rules governing these debates have evolved by convention. However, the broadcasters must still abide by the equal opportunities rule made under the Federal Communication Act. This stipulates (among other things) that a broadcaster may choose which candidates are invited to take part in a debate, but that those candidates who are chosen must then be afforded equal opportunities. Effectively this allows broadcasters to exclude minor candidates from debates, which are usually confined to the two main Democrat and Republican presidential candidates. This has led, in 2000, to two other candidates announcing plans to take legal action after they were excluded from televised debates.

Not everyone agrees that candidate debates are a good thing. The main arguments against them are these:

Debates can create artificial discord - perhaps a significant consideration where countries have recently emerged from violent strife.
Political discourse becomes too personalized - head-to-head debates underline the 'horse-race' nature of political campaigning, all style and no substance.
Candidates will not agree on the need for a debate - challengers are always more likely to favour them than incumbents.

None of these arguments is overwhelming. It is not acceptable to refrain from vigorous discussion just because this spilt into violence in the past. And 20-second advertising slots do more to degrade the quality of political discourse than a lengthy live debate.

Nevertheless, many countries manage happily without them. The debate is particularly suited to presidential campaigning. Broader campaigns in legislative elections do not lend themselves to that type of format, although there will often be other forms of special programming in which leading candidates will be questioned about their policies.

Candidates are often interviewed, sometimes in a special formalized setting. Sometimes, as in the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe, special interviews are almost the only opportunity that parties have to speak directly to the electorate about their policies. In these circumstances it is advisable o have an agreed forma, although this would not normally be set down in laws or regulations. The aim would be to have a balance of political allegiances among the journalists conducting the interview, as well as a balance of issues that did not reflect the agenda of one or other party.

Often broadcasters will have phone-in discussions in which the electorate can address questions directly to politicians. Such programmes can suffer the deficiencies of all phone-ins - rambling, self-important and ill-informed callers. But they can also offer sensationally effective examination of politicians' policies. No British Prime Minister, for example, has dared to submit him or herself to such questioning since 1983, when Margaret Thatcher was interrogated with great forensic skill on the British sinking of an Argentinian warship in the South Atlantic. The caller, a Mrs Gould from Bristol, not only infuriated the Prime Minister by exposing the inconsistencies in her explanation. She also shamed the professional journalists whose job was to hold government accountable.

Debate Formats

The format of candidate debates is almost always subject to some form of regulation, whether voluntary or by external rules.

Denmark has a strong history of panel debates, regulated essentially by tradition. The public broadcasting station runs 10-minute direct access slots from each party, following which the party leader is subjected to a 30-minute interview by a panel of journalists. Shortly before the polling day there is a three-hour broadcast debate. On the public broadcaster this has traditionally involved all parties, although commercial broadcasters have confined it to the main parties.

Newer democracies have often felt the need to manage the form and content of debates more closely. This might be necessary in situations where there is a long history of government control over the media and a consequent fear that opposition views might be disadvantaged in the debate.

Estonia

In Estonia the management of special election programmes is closely controlled by law. The regulations on election coverage for the state radio and television even sets out seven topic areas that the debates should cover, as well as specifying the number of representatives each party can have in the debates depending on how many candidates they are fielding. (See 'mex09')

Malawi

In Malawi in 1994, the Electoral Commission did not specify the topics for debate - but it had rules for almost everything else. There were to be six debates, three each in each of the main cities. The eight political parties would be equally represented in one debate in each city - in other words, four parties took part in each debate and each party took part in three debates. These were public debates and the Electoral Commission guidelines even set out procedures for allocating tickets. Each debate was also broadcast twice.

Questions were posed by a panel of six journalists. Timings for the debate were extremely precise: one minute for each question, one and a half minutes for each response, two minutes summing up time and so on. There were five questions in each debate. (See Malawi: Election Reporting Guidelines - Election Commission 1994)

Government Activities and Campaigning

Incumbent candidates for elective office will usually try to use their official position to their own advantage. A president up for re-election will schedule an important international summit to underline his importance as an international statesman. This is an inevitably, if slightly unsavoury, aspect of democratic campaigning.

However, there is a line to be drawn. If a government minister were to use his official telephone or car for campaign activities that would be denounced (and perhaps prosecuted) as an abuse of public funds. Sometimes the media, wittingly or unwittingly, may abet a minister or other official in using official functions as a means of campaigning.

Often the corrective action should be directed against the official rather than the media. Journalists rather need to be educated into making judgements about what is the real news value of Minister X opening a new pig farm - or whatever. In the case of the state media - funded out of public money - a firmer hand may be needed. This is perfectly appropriate. It is not censorship or an interference in editorial freedom, but ensuring the proper use of public funds.

Montenegro, for example, has laid down specific rules for coverage of official functions during an election campaign:

Contact programs or special programs featuring state officials or using their engagements for the purpose of election campaign shall not be produced prior to the termination of the election.

The reporting on the activities of state officials performing their regular official engagements shall not be used for a party's election campaign. (See Media Monitoring - Bosnia.)

In the Malawi elections of 1999, the High Court made an important judgement relating to broadcast coverage of presidential functions. It found that this was a perfectly normal and proper role of the public broadcaster, but that if campaign messages were included in such broadcasts then the broadcaster was duty bound to give equivalent opportunity to the opposition to convey its views on the air. See Government Activities and Campaign Reporting - Malawi.

Such regulations may also apply to direct access material. France, for example usually applies rules that prohibit presidential candidates from showing their 'usual place of work' in their election broadcasts. This is intended to stop the incumbent president from showing himself at the Elysee Palace or meeting visiting dignitaries.¹⁰¹

It might be felt that such prescriptions go a little too far. But few, whether in the media or in election administration, would want to go in the direction of Venezuela. There, there is specific provision for election advertising by the incumbent government. This is not allowed specifically to call for a vote for one party, but in practice these are scheduled alongside the advertising slots for the ruling party.¹⁰²

News Blackouts/"Reflection Period"

Many countries, whether by law or custom, have a period when no news of the election is reported through the media. It is very common for this to be the case once voting itself has started. This is analogous with the usual prohibitions on campaigning within the vicinity of a polling station. The United Kingdom, for example, has a customary and voluntary abstention from reporting election campaigning on polling day itself and many Commonwealth countries observe a similar practice.

Perhaps the best known example of an obligatory reflection period is France, where it lasts for seven days. Italy and Sweden are other countries where this news blackout is prescribed by law, in both cases for one day before polling. Denmark also has a one-day blackout before polling day, but in that case it is traditional and not legally binding.¹⁰³

Without question the country with the most extensive news blackout is Israel, where television (though not radio) is prohibited from showing political campaigning for at least 30 days before the election. The Independent Broadcasting Authority has interpreted this provision very strictly, cancelling current affairs programmes on political and social issues for about 10 weeks before election day. Effectively journalists must cover the campaign without showing politicians. One of the most extraordinary instances was in 1981, when Prime Minister Menachem Begin had a historic meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. This could not be shown on television news - although there was no restriction on his party including footage of the meeting in its own direct access broadcast. In another example, the Labour party chose Ephraim Katzir, the former president and an eminent scientist, to close their party list of candidates - a symbolic gesture since he clearly would not be elected. When he took part in a widely publicized international scientific convention during the election campaign, his presence could not be shown.¹⁰⁴

Election Day Reporting

Once the polls have opened, the role of the media changes from what it was during the campaign period - and specific rules may be devised to govern this shift. In practice, the shift may have taken place earlier (see News Blackouts/'Reflection Period'), with an embargo placed on political campaign reporting, opinion poll reporting, direct access broadcasts or advertisements - or all of these.

The issues posed by a ban on reporting during the poll become proportionally more complex depending on how long the voting takes, as well as how large the country is. In the later case, if the electorate is voting across several time zones, this poses especially complex issues since results in one zone may become available before voting has finished in another.

In essence there are two issues at stake:

Preserving the integrity of the electoral process and the security of the vote
Ensuring that the untimely release of information does not influence the vote in any way

The first of these is more straightforward than the second. It is usually not difficult to strike a balance between allowing the media some sort of special access to report on the voting process, but ensuring that voters' secrecy and security is not breached. See Media Access to Polling Stations.

However, ensuring the maximum transparency and flow of information without improperly interfering with the process is more difficult, and a greater variety of approaches have been adopted. See Reporting the Vote.

Media Access to Polling Stations

The question of media access to the polling stations themselves can sometimes be a cause of some tension - most of it unnecessary.

What the media require, for the most part, is fairly general access - film or still photographs of queues of potential voters, of people actually casting their vote and so on. Often journalists are given a degree of access that is not granted to the general public. Sometimes non-voters are excluded from polling stations altogether - an attempt to avoid last-minute intimidation - but journalists who can produce their Accreditation are exempt from this. However, it needs to be made absolutely clear to the media that, despite this privilege, they are subject to the same legal constraints as everyone else. Therefore nothing that they do inside a polling station (or anywhere else, for that matter) may constitute intimidation or influence on the election process. It should also be made clear that journalists' access to polling stations is only under the strict control and with the agreement of the election officer presiding.

It is vital to ensure that the precise policy on media access to polling stations is communicated in advance to presiding officials, as well as to the media themselves.

The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) (http://www.eisa.org.za) produced a useful list of 'do's and don'ts' for the media in the 1999 South African elections. Media workers could:

Show their press card to the presiding officer at polling and counting stations.
Take photographs and conduct interviews with the agreement of the presiding officer.
Take part in a 'pool' system where large numbers of journalists who want a photograph or an interview with a personality are represented by selected few.

The guidelines also pointed out that in sensitive areas some voters might not want to have their photograph taken or be interviewed.

What media workers were not allowed to do was:

Undermine the secrecy of the vote and orderliness of the election.
Publish false information with the intention of disrupting or preventing the election.
Publish information that caused hostility or fear to influence the outcome of the election.
Publish information that may influence the conduct or outcome of an election.
Publish the result of an exit poll during voting hours (see Exit Polls).

The EISA guidelines also pointed out that there were a number of general prohibitions that also applied to media workers, who could not:

Interfere with the independence and impartiality of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).
Force or persuade anyone to register or not to register to vote.
Force anyone to support or not support any political party or candidate.
Take part in illegal political activity.
Pretend to be a representative or candidate of a political party.
Pretend to be involved in the IEC.
Provide information about voting, counting of votes, or break the seal or open a ballot box in which there were voting materials.¹⁰⁵

Reporting the Vote

Aside from the question of what Media Access to Polling Stations the media will enjoy, there is the rather separate question of how they may report the vote as it proceeds. It is generally good practice to stop all direct access programming - party election broadcasts and advertisements - before the actual voting begins. The danger otherwise is of tactically targeted advertising based upon early assessments of how the vote is proceeding. That would be unfair and would offer no possibility of reply.

Some electoral laws or guidelines lay down specific restrictions on news coverage as well, on the basis that late coverage of campaign issues could have an undue influence. In particular, there is often a prohibition, voluntary or statutory, on reporting opinion poll findings.

The Montenegrin election reporting regulations prohibit publicly funded media from publishing either previous election results or 'any predictions whatsoever about the election outcome before the polling stations are closed on the election day'. (See Montenegro: law on state election broadcasting)

There are, of course, a variety of factors that may influence the vote as it progresses. Voter turnout is an important issue, since high or low turnouts are generally reckoned to favour one party or another. This may sometimes be the subject of some restriction.

In practice these issues can usually be resolved by professional practice and sensible self-regulation. The British Broadcasting Corporation offers these guidelines to its producers on election day coverage:

Polling day reporting at all elections must avoid any references to election issues and, until the close of poll, we restrict ourselves to factual news about the election. Public opinion polls and reviews of the morning papers may be included. So too may statements of news importance by the parties, but we must ensure that counter-statements by opposing parties are broadcast as well.

(See United Kingdom: BBC guidelines on election coverage.)

Promoting Professional Coverage of Results

Reporting results sounds in principle like the least complicated part of the whole election reporting process. Yet it is remarkable how often it is very poorly carried out. In the Zimbabwe referendum of 2000, not a single newspaper or broadcasting station succeeded in reporting the correct results as issued by the Registrar General's Office!¹⁰⁶

A major part of the problem lies with the media themselves - if they cannot correctly copy a column of figures, there is little that the election administrator can do about it. But there is much that can be done to promote accurate and professional results reporting.

Provision of a Media Centre will enormously facilitate media access to results. The mechanisms of counting will vary enormously between centralized and decentralized systems. For the purposes of media reporting, the significant point is whether results are released centrally or locally. If the latter, then media reporting is also likely to be decentralized.

When the latter system of local counts prevails, as in the United Kingdom, a massive media bandwagon has developed for projecting final results out of available results. Provided that no results or projections are released before the end of voting, this is essentially harmless fun (although dressed up in great statistical seriousness). The worst that can be said about it is that it encourages the treatment of an election as a horse race rather than a democratic choice.

What is particularly important, however, when results emerge gradually - especially true of a first-past-the-post constituency system - is that all results are reported promptly and accurately. This is a means of public scrutiny of the counting process and lessens the possibility of manipulation of the count. It is therefore a potentially important media function.

A rather different aspect of results reporting is media coverage of projected results in the form of Exit Polls and Quick Counts.

Exit Polls

The exit poll has developed primarily as a media tool - it consists of an opinion poll compiled by conducting interviews with voters 'exiting' from the polling station. Since clearly they are inherently unreliable, not being an actual record of how people voted, it is important that they be distinguished from 'mef03b'.

The exit poll is a species of opinion poll and the media would be well advised to exercise all the same caution with them. See 'mee05a'. The additional problem with exit polls is that they appear to give an indication of how people have actually voted, as opposed to how they intend to vote, so it would seem clear that any restrictions that applied to opinion poll reporting while voting was continuing would apply with even greater force to exit polls.

The usual practice is to use exit polls as an early taster in results programmes, before actual results are available. Morning newspapers, whose deadlines are often before any significant results are available will also make use of them. The issue can be more complicated in countries spread across several time zones, where early exit poll results might have an effect on later voting patterns. In the United States most media voluntarily refrain from reporting exit polls or early results from the East Coast.

Part of the problem with exit polls, of course, is whether people will honestly report how they have voted. This is likely to be a particular issue in transitional democracies or in situations where there has been widespread intimidation. Voter education should have stressed that each person's vote was secret. In the Zimbabwe elections of 2000, a South African organization, the Helen Suzman Foundation, designed a much more complex exit poll format to take account of the danger that people would not honestly state how they voted. But one of the results of this complexity was that it was not released until later. Its main purpose, in the end, was to provide some evidence for how intimidation might have affected the result. Unfortunately, since the exit poll findings were not available until after the actual result was known, it did not receive the media attention that it deserved. With the media, speed is everything.

Quick Counts

Unofficial quick counts are a parallel counting mechanism that it is important to distinguish from exit polls. A quick count is a partial count of actual results (whereas exit polls are simply a species of opinion poll), used to predict the actual full result. A quick count may often be used as a means of forestalling any manipulation of the results. For the media, of course, the interest is similar to an exit poll in that it enables them to run an early results story.

What they have in common with opinion polls, is the need for the media to report with precision what the count actually measures - in other words, what sample it draws upon and the degree of accuracy that can be expected.

See Quick Count of Voting Result for a fuller discussion

Post-Election Reporting

Media interest in an election does not stop with the announcement of the result. For them it is a continuing story, leading on to the inauguration of those who are newly elected, the selection of a new government and so on.

For the election authority, however, any formal regulation of the media ends with the announcement of the result. There is one area, however, where a formal media involvement may continue. If there are challenges to the results, this will be a legitimate story that media will no doubt cover. It should do this in accordance with the usual professional standards governing reporting of court proceedings.

An important twist, however, will be if the behaviour of the media itself forms a dimension of a challenge to results. This has been the case in some recent elections, such as Kenya in 1997. Findings of media monitoring projects may be used as evidence and the regulatory methods of the supervisory body may come under scrutiny.

Sample Materials Index

ARTICLE19 Election Reporting Guidelines (PDF file)

ARTICLE 19: Media Monitoring Manual (PDF file)

Australia - Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (PDF file)

Barbados: law on election broadcasting (PDF file)

Bosnia: media monitoring methodology (PDF file)

Bosnia: summary of complaints investigated (PDF file)

Brazil: law on election broadcasting (PDF file)

Cambodia: Guidelines of UN Transitional Authority on Media and Elections (PDF file)

Handbook on Electoral Coverage in Ghana (PDF file)

Indonesia: sample press materials from election authority (PDF file)

International Federation of Journalists: Election Reporting Handbook (PDF file)

Malawi: Election Reporting Guidelines - Election Commission 1994 (PDF file)

Montenegro: law on state election broadcasting (PDF file)

Poland: laws and regulations on election broadcasting (PDF file)

South Africa: Independent Broadcasting Authority monitoring report on 1999 elections (PDF file)

South Africa: IBA Guidelines on election coverage (PDF file)

South Africa: IBA Guidelines for broadcast licensees (PDF file)

South Africa: IBA Formula for allocating party broadcasting (PDF file)

Tanzania: Media Code of Conduct (PDF file)

Tanzania: Media Monitoring Report, 2000 (PDF file)

United Kingdom: BBC guidelines on election coverage (PDF file)

United Kingdom: Decision of Broadcasting Standards Commission (1) (PDF file)

United Kingdom: Decision of Broadcasting Standards Commission (2) (PDF file)

UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999 (PDF file)

International Treaties on media and elections (PDF file)

United States: guidelines on opinion poll reporting (PDF file)

Zimbabwe: Media Monitoring Report, 2000 (PDF file)

Zimbabwe: Code of Conduct and Reporting Handbook (PDF file)

ARTICLE19 Election Reporting Guidelines

(PDF)

ARTICLE 19: Media Monitoring Manual

(PDF)

Australia - Broadcasting Services Act 1992

(PDF)

Barbados: law on election broadcasting

(PDF)

Bosnia: media monitoring methodology

(PDF)

Bosnia: summary of complaints investigated

(PDF)

Brazil: law on election broadcasting

(PDF)

Cambodia: Guidelines of UN Transitional Authority on Media and Elections

(PDF)

Indonesia: sample press materials from election authority

(PDF)

International Federation of Journalists: Election Reporting Handbook

(PDF)

Malawi: Election Reporting Guidelines - Election Commission 1994

(PDF)

Montenegro: law on state election broadcasting

(PDF)

Poland: laws and regulations on election broadcasting

(PDF)

Russia: EIM Report 2000

(PDF)

South Africa: Independent Broadcasting Authority monitoring report on 1999 elections

(PDF)

South Africa: IBA Guidelines on election coverage

(PDF)

South Africa: IBA Guidelines for broadcast licensees

(PDF)

South Africa: IBA Formula for allocating party broadcasting

(PDF)

Tanzania: Media Code of Conduct

(PDF)

Tanzania: Media Monitoring Report, 2000

(PDF)

United Kingdom: BBC guidelines on election coverage

(PDF)

United Kingdom: Decision of Broadcasting Standards Commission (1)

(PDF)

United Kingdom: Decision of Broadcasting Standards Commission (2)

(PDF)

UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression: Report 1999

(PDF)

International Treaties on media and elections

(PDF)

United States: guidelines on opinion poll reporting

(PDF)

Zimbabwe: Media Monitoring Report, 2000

(PDF)

Zimbabwe media monitoring form

(PDF)

Zimbabwe: Code of Conduct and Reporting Handbook

(PDF)

Case Studies Index

Where Do People Get Their Election Information? - Ukraine

An Existing Regulatory Body - Italy

Self-Regulation - United Kingdom

Electoral Commission as Media Regulator - Malawi

Specialist Media and Elections Regulator - Bosnia

Complaints Procedure - Russia

Hate Speech - Rwanda

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Bosnia

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - United Kingdom

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Zimbabwe

A Formula for Allocating Direct Access Slots - South Africa

Paid Political Advertising - Canada

Media Monitoring - Malawi

Media Monitoring - Bosnia

Government Activities and Campaign Reporting - Malawi

Voluntary Guidelines on Reporting Opinion Polls - United Kingdom

Code of Conduct - Zimbabwe

Reporting Exit Poll Findings - United States

An Internet Election - Romania

Where Do People Get Their Election Information? - Ukraine

At the end of 1998 a series of focus group discussions were held in Ukraine, looking mainly at the media and politics - where people received their political information from.¹⁰⁷ This followed the legislative elections in 1998 and with the 1999 presidential elections in mind.

Some participants considered that there was a quantitative lack of information of any sort available, particularly to the rural population, because of the expense of newspapers and the frequent power cuts, which made access to television information more restricted. In their recommendations, many of the participants considered that publications needed to be cheaper and that some information should be available free. Participants in the focus groups were also critical of the fact that during election campaigns they were bombarded with information but at other times accurate information is singularly lacking.

However, of greatest concern in particular for urban participants was the lack of 'good quality' information. Domestic media were seen as totally financially and politically dependent. Many considered the mass media to be controlled by foreign interests such as Russian or American capital. The media are also unable to provide quality coverage because of censorship. Those who were most concerned to obtain reliable information looked to multiple information sources and particularly to the foreign press and radio, which are perceived to give more balanced reports. They looked to Russia and elsewhere for more accurate information, including from the BBC and Radio Liberty.

The participants considered that information was not presented in such a way as to be understandable to ordinary people. They were particularly critical of television which, despite being the most common means of obtaining information, provided little in the way of thoughtful, in-depth analysis, which was more likely to be found in the press and radio.

Opinions were sought on specific television programmes broadcast at the time of the election. There was a lukewarm but generally favourable response to the information programme on the electoral process put out by the government (Elections 98). Those who had voted were more favourably inclined towards this programme than non-voters, but that was to be expected as they had accepted its message of the importance of voting whereas the non-voters included in the groups had rejected it.

All the participants were favourable to a series of public service announcements presented by Alla Mazur, a well-known television announcer. They were impressed by the more professional presentation, with music and video sequences, as opposed to the formal presentation by the Central Election Committee Chairman chosen for the government programme. They liked the fact that the presenter was not someone who was identified with either the state or any political party and also that Alla Mazur was perceived as simply giving necessary information, and leaving the choice up to them of whether to vote or not. Voting sounded like fun. This contrasted with the government programme, which was seen as exhorting them to vote and had an off-putting effect on some people.

The same attitude came through in the participants' views of the TV commercials put out by political parties on which they were asked to comment. Political advertising in Ukraine is very new. In the 1994 election there was virtually none. The commercial put out by the Green Party was generally viewed favourably, in particular because of the non-partisan appearance of the commercial, even though they realized that party interests were behind it.

In similar vein, many people were put off by the emphasis on leaders, as opposed to policies, in an advertisement put out by the Social Democratic Party. They also favourably identified the more targeted approach of the Hromeda adverts (targeting those whose wages or pensions were in arrears.)

The participants suggested that the purpose of these political advertisements was much more basic than media reporting. The commercials simply reminded people of the existence of certain parties. Indeed, some said that it was only the advertisement that had made them realize that the Greens existed at all.

The overall conclusion was that political advertising helps voters reach a decision and, if done correctly (eg by aiming at target audiences), can mobilize electoral activity. This was despite the fact that political advertising was seen as being as irritating to the consumer as other forms of advertising. It was also despite the fact that campaign spending generally was seen as undemocratic and raised suspicions about the fairness of the electoral process.

The focus groups were asked to make recommendations to the Government as to how better to inform the public about issues facing Ukraine, the importance of voting and the process of voting. Many participants in these groups were negative and fatalistic as to whether anything could be done to improve matters. Those who provided positive suggestions emphasised, amongst other things:

the crucial importance of the freedom of the press and an end to censorship
the need for cheaper newspapers and essential political literature to be provided free of charge
the need to address the insufficiency of information in the rural areas
the need for an expanded network of district newspapers
the need for TV programmes to be targeted at the youth (because of particular concern at the lack of involvement of young people in the political process)
that central radio programmes need to be more interesting and spirited.

An Existing Regulatory Body - Italy

The Italian parliament in 1993 passed a law (no 515) concerning 'Discipline in the electoral campaigns for the election of the House of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic'. It governs access to the media by candidates, creating different procedures for the public and private media.

Public Broadcasting

The public broadcaster, RAI, is answerable to the Parliamentary Address and Surveillance Commission, which is composed of 20 members of each house of parliament. In 1994 the commission issued guidelines for RAI to guarantee 'equal opportunities for appearances for all the parties and movements participating in the electoral campaign'. It established a viewing centre that allows it to monitor all RAI output during the campaign period. The commission also formulated rules for direct access election broadcasts by the parties on RAI.

Private Media

A regulatory body known as the Guarantor for Radio, Television and the Press was created by the Italian press law. Its mandate was extended to radio and television in 1990. The Guarantor is appointed by the (non-executive) President of the Republic on the basis of parliamentary recommendations. Law No 515 gave the Guarantor additional powers in relation to elections. In summary these are to:

Ensure equal access by the political parties to the press and private broadcasters
Determine the maximum and minimum fees for political advertising.

He or she is obliged to issue a regulation governing electoral coverage.

The Guarantor is assisted by Regional Committees for Radio and Television. Again, these are pre-existing regulatory bodies. They play essentially a monitoring role, informing the Guarantor where the regulations and Law No 515 have been complied with.¹⁰⁸

Self-Regulation - United Kingdom

British broadcasters have long operated a system of self-regulation for election broadcasting. The law provides for non-paying party election broadcasts (and prohibits paid political advertising on the airwaves) but says nothing about the allocation of time. This is carried out by a Committee on Party Political Broadcasting, composed of the broadcasters and the major political parties. The broadcasting channels have taken the allocation of time as binding.

The system has come under criticism for favouring big parties over smaller, newer ones (which could be said to reflect the political representation on the committee). A different type of criticism is that, with the proliferation of different types of broadcasting - such as cable and satellite - the system will no longer work.

The public British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) uses the time allocation agreed by the Committee on Party Political Broadcasting as the basis for its own allocation of time to the political parties in its news coverage. In its internal guidelines to editors and staff, the BBC makes the following general point:

Over the period of a campaign, coverage of each of the parties in news and current affairs programmes programmes reflects broadly the allocation of party election broadcast to the major parties. In accordance with this principle the BBC undertakes to maintain balance, over the period of a campaign, in its recorded actuality of political speeches and in film, videotape, and studio contributions from politicians....

Editors must also be aware that the voices of the Nationalist parties fighting in Scotland and Wales should be represented in UK coverage.

News values continue to apply in covering election stories, whether national or local.

See United Kingdom: BBC guidelines on election coverage for a fuller text.

The BBC's method of enforcing this balance is the much-emulated 'stopwatch method'. All mentions of parties on news bulletins are timed and coverage is planned to ensure that by the end of the campaign the timings correspond to the agreed allocation of direct access time. From the 1950s until 1992, Independent Television News, which is the common news provider for the commercial television channels, also applied the stopwatch method. In the 1992 election it abandoned it in favour of unregulated 'news values'.

Electoral Commission as Media Regulator - Malawi

In the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections in Malawi, the electoral commission, by general consent, did an excellent job. These were the country's first multi-party elections for 30 years, so none of the Malawians involved in their organization had any previous experience. Yet one of the particular successes of the commission was in organizing media coverage.

The media environment in Malawi at the time was not an easy one. On the one hand the sole broadcaster was the government-controlled Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), accustomed to 30 years of uncritical reporting of presidential functions - and little else besides. On the other hand, the newly flowering private press was independent-minded but inexperienced and unprofessional.

The electoral commission did not hector or chastise the media. It acted as a resource, a trainer and a facilitator. When it did need to criticize media coverage - in particular the bias of the MBC towards the ruling party - it was generally listened to. The commission described its main activities as follows:

Facilitating training programmes for journalists
Issuing press releases on various electoral issues
Organizing press conferences
Preparing an information handbook on the elections
Identifying suitable radio programmes for disseminating campaign messages
Monitoring and managing campaign programmes to ensure equal treatment of all parties and compliance with the electoral code of conduct
Identifying suitable radio programmes to carry voter education messages
Establishing and managing press offices for disseminating information to the public
Managing the broadcasting of the poll results

Specialist Media and Elections Regulator - Bosnia

The Media Experts Commission (MEC) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established in 1996 by the Provisional Election Commission (PEC). The PEC in turn had been established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Dayton Peace Agreement had required the OSCE to do this as part of its mandate to organize elections. The PEC's mandate was one of 'supervising all aspects of the electoral process' and creating the structures to ensure 'free and fair elections'. The MEC was, essentially, a delegated body carrying out these functions in relation to the media. The PEC also established an Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), which considered complaints, including cases referred from the MEC.

The MEC's mandate was twofold:

To enforce media compliance with the PEC's election regulations
To campaign for journalists' freedom of expression.

The PEC's regulations required among other things:

Equitable access to the media for all political parties
A prohibition on inflammatory or hate language
Prompt correction of inaccuracies
An obligation on the media to present accurate and balanced information

The MEC also produced its own specific media guidelines. These provided that every media outlet had to provide fair coverage and equitable access to all political parties. Television and radio stations were also required to provide free direct access slots for political parties.

The MEC was initially composed of 12 members: two from the OSCE, three from the Republika Sprska, three from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, two from the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one from the Office of the High Representative and the chairperson, who was an international appointee. Thus the composition was eight representatives from the various Bosnian governmental structures and four international representatives. This was later expanded to 17, with two more international members and three from the local media.

The initial structure of the MEC was supplemented by three additional sub-structures:

Media Experts Sub-Commissions (MESCs) provided a local and regional presence for the MEC.
Media Monitoring Centre gathered basic quantitative and qualitative information on media output.
Media Access Support Teams (MAST) facilitated regular contact between media organizations and political parties.

In the 1998 elections, MEC had a central staff of seven. In addition the MMC had 41 monitors in the field and 25 attached to OSCE headquarters. The MESCs had six regional press officers and support staff, while MAST had 17 staff.¹⁰⁹

Complaints Procedure - Russia

The Russian Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes originated in an institution called the Arbitration Court on Information Matters, an ad hoc body established specifically for the 1993 parliamentary elections. The temporary body had proved reasonably successful as an impartial adjudicator of disputes during a controversial period. It was therefore decided to replace it with a permanent complaints body.

The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes is an independent state body 'under the President of the Russian Federation'. Its functions are to be carried out without interference from any other body. A number of these functions relate to the role of the media in elections, including:

helping to assure non-partisan and truthful media coverage of matters of public interest;
guaranteeing the principle of parity in the mass media;
helping to apply the principle of political pluralism through television and radio news and political talk shows;
issuing guidelines to correct mistakes in media reporting on matters of public interest.

Clause 8 of the regulations establishing the Chamber provides that it shall adjudicate on 'the disputes and other cases that involve the mass media'. The legal basis for resolving these disputes, aside from Russian law, is 'the universally accepted principles and rules of international law and requirements of the Russian Federation's international treaties', as well as the standards of journalistic ethics.

Although the body is described as a 'Judicial Chamber', its jurisdiction is explicitly separated from that of the normal courts. It can examine any matter within its competence 'except for the matters formally referred to in the jurisdiction of courts of the Russian Federation'. In practice, this means that a decision of the Chamber can be appealed in a court of law. But it also means that a complainant can take a matter to court instead of to the Chamber - a right guaranteed under the Constitution - or can file a separate court case after the Chamber has already heard the matter.¹¹⁰

Hate Speech - Rwanda

In May 2000, Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian journalist formerly with Radio television libre des mille collines (RTLM) in Rwanda, pleaded guilty to inciting killings during the genocide of 1994. At the time of writing, three more Rwandan journalists also face genocide charges at the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda.¹¹¹ This is hate speech at its most extreme.

The role of RTLM in the Rwanda genocide has been widely discussed. But how relevant is it for election administrators trying to wrestle with the problem of hate speech in an election campaign?

The first point to note is that RTLM was not an ordinary radio station reporting the extreme views of others. It was an instrument of Hutu extremists who planned and instigated the mass killings of Tutsi. Hence it is not directly relevant to the issue of campaign reporting, where extreme statements may be made and then relayed through the news media.

Second, RTLM played two quite distinct functions at different stages of its existence. In its early months, up until the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, it broadcast a form of subtle and entertaining anti-Tutsi propaganda. (The evidence for the proposition that it was entertaining is that the Tutsi guerrillas of the Rwandan Patriotic Front preferred listening to RTLM than to their own radio station.) But once the genocide started, the character of RTLM's broadcasts changed. Then it began giving details of those who were to be hunted down and killed - right down to individual descriptions and car number plates.¹¹² This was not so much hate speech as direct involvement in the killing. It is not exactly clear why Ruggiu pleaded guilty before the International Tribunal, but it is more likely to relate o the latter part than the former.

Thirdly, the Rwanda genocide was, of course, unique and its circumstances are highly unlikely to recur elsewhere. However, the experience of the radio in the genocide does hold an important lesson. In 1989, the Rwandan government embarked on a reluctant democratisation under international pressure. One of the many institutional reforms it failed to carry out was of the broadcasting system. Hence there was no independent publicly-funded broadcaster reflecting the views of all communities - instead there was the virulently pro-Hutu Radio Rwanda. There was no independent and transparent process for licensing private broadcasters. Instead the only private broadcaster was RTLM, with its propaganda for genocide. Of course, reform of broadcasting would not have stopped the genocide. But the existence of a variety of viewpoints over the airwaves would have helped to neutralize the effect of RTLM and Radio Rwanda. That is the most useful lesson of Rwanda for election administrators and broadcasters elsewhere.¹¹³

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Bosnia

The rules and regulations of the Provisional Election Commission for the 1998 election required, without any ambiguity:

Media and journalists shall not use inflammatory language, hate language, or language which could incite hate or violence.¹¹⁴

The Media Experts Commission (MEC) was empowered to impose 'appropriate' penalties for repeated violations of this provision. It was also empowered to refer violations to the media regulatory body, the Independent Media Commission.

The MEC and its local Media Experts Sub-Commissions dealt with a large number of complaints during the election campaign, many of them relating to the use of inflammatory language. The remedy provided in most cases was a requirement that a reply, retraction or correction be broadcast or published. The MEC's report of its activities suggests that these recommendations were largely complied with.

However, to the extent that the MEC was successful in minimizing the incidence of hate speech in the 1998 elections, it was probably through general standard-setting in advance of the elections. The fact that the MEC was also seen as a defender of journalists' freedom of expression helped its credibility. The MEC's own evaluation was as follows:

More was expected of journalists and more was provided to journalists. Consistently, journalists showed improved accuracy in reporting and greater restraint, particularly with regard to libellous, slanderous and defamatory reporting. Reporting in all media during the election period showed heightened professionalism. Equally noteworthy, journalists credited the MEC with raising the bar on professional standards for journalists. The MEC also made substantial progress in documenting violations of journalists' rights and in establishing this as a significant priority for future action in BiH.¹¹⁵

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - United Kingdom

In 1997 the Broadcasting Standards Commission in the United Kingdom - the body that considers complaints against broadcasters, including on election matters - received 76 complaints about party election broadcasts by the British National Party (BNP), an extreme far right group.

The complaints described the broadcasts as being racist and 'likely to encourage racial hatred or violence, in part because of the nature of the illustrative material used in the television version, and the use of sensational newspaper headlines'.

The responses from the broadcasters are an interesting illustration of the difficulties facing the media when they transmit extreme statements. The broadcasters sought prior legal advice on whether the broadcasts constituted incitement to violence and were assured that they did not. The voluntary guidelines for broadcasters on party election broadcasts (PEBs) indicated that the content of the broadcast was a matter for the party, which was not expected to be impartial. The British Broadcasting Corporation stated that the broadcasts promoted a party whose views were 'considered offensive by many, but it was not the function of the broadcaster to substitute its judgment for that of the electorate'.

The independent London Weekend Television said that it had been placed in an invidious position:

It was inappropriate and unreasonable to expect or anticipate that broadcasters should take what are essentially public policy decisions as to the propriety of those with racist views being accorded PEBs. Moreover the currently legitimate use of PEB by single issue pressure groups with minute support, propagating views found offensive by many and lowers the esteem with which viewers regard ITV [Independent Television]. However, refusing to transmit the BNP broadcast was not a valid option if society allows the BNP to function as a political party.

Another independent television channel, Channel 5, had required the BNP to make sure that no image was shown of any person who had not consented to being included in the broadcast.

The Commission praised the broadcasters for acting responsibly and did not uphold the complaints. It concluded:

The requirements of democracy, and the rights of free speech, especially in an election period, mean that PEBs are not programmes in the conventional sense. It is an inevitable part of an election campaign that things will be said which cause offence, as well as disagreement. The Commission fully understands the concern of those who were outraged or made fearful by the broadcast, but it considers that in an election period the balance of rights is tipped in favour of freedom of speech. Ultimately, the electorate makes its judgment on a party's policy at the ballot box.

See United Kingdom: Decision of Broadcasting Standards Commission (1) for the full text of the decision.

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Zimbabwe

The 2000 election campaign in Zimbabwe was marked by serious violence. According to independent violence monitors there were more than 3,000 incidents, with the ruling party responsible in more than 90 per cent of these.¹¹⁶ Yet the government- controlled daily newspaper, the Herald, reported just 36 incidents - of which 33 were blamed on the opposition and only three on the ruling party. The pattern on monopoly state-owned radio and television was similar. At this stage it becomes legitimate to ask whether misreporting in fact becomes calculated to cause violence.

For example, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation television reported the following story on 17 May of an incident in a Harare suburb:

One person was killed and property worth tens of thousands of dollars was destroyed by alleged MDC supporters as war veterans uncovered firearms they suspect belong to MDC.

The ZBC story quoted three war veterans (supporters of the ruling party) and one police officer. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was not quoted. One war veteran said:

A group of 700 MDC members came here and started attacking all the people that you see here. We are here for a purpose. We must be found protecting this place. There are people who have been injured from time to time by MDC members. So our presence here is to protect those who are injured including this area here.¹¹⁷

Three relevant facts were not included in the ZBC report:

The person who was killed was an opposition supporter.
The firearms were held legally for hunting purposes (according to police quoted in an independent newspaper).
The premises where the clash took place had been used by war veterans to imprison and torture opposition supporters - a number of them faced criminal charges as a consequence.¹¹⁸

Thus the television report managed to convey precisely the opposite of what actually took place, even though the true facts of the incident were a clear matter of public record. Is this unprofessional or is it incitement to further violence against the opposition?

This was clearly a matter for the regulatory body - unfortunately there was none. There is no independent broadcasting regulator, while the Electoral Supervisory Commission had been marginalized through a series of late pre-election legal amendments. Thus there was no means of setting the record straight. Regulatory bodies, complaints procedures, rights of reply - all these are onerous and irritating for the media. But the example of Zimbabwe shows that the alternative may be worse.

A Formula for Allocating Direct Access Slots - South Africa

The formula developed for allocating broadcast time in the 1999 South African election is simple in its conception, though complex in its detail, since it takes account of the fact that there are both national and provincial lists for the National Assembly elections - and that elections for the provincial assembly take place simultaneously. In addition, many radio stations only broadcast on a provincial basis, not a national one.

Direct access time was available only on radio, not television, on the basis that television broadcasting would favour richer parties that had the money to make well-produced and sophisticated campaign advertisements.

The underlying principles behind the formula are:

A minimum for all parties

All parties receive some allocation of time because of 'The need for all parties to be heard by voters who could vote for them'.

Weighting in favour of parties fielding more candidates

'In keeping with the general principle of equitability and in recognition of the fact that the interests of the South African public are paramount, the Authority has adopted the international convention that the public is entitled to hear more from and about political parties more likely to influence policy decisions affecting the electorate, nationally and provincially.'

Weighting in favour of parties with a stronger past electoral performance

This is an adaptation of the formula used in 1994, when most parties in South Africa had no electoral history. The weighting is based upon national and provincial parliamentary seats held. However, the Independent Broadcasting Authority has retained the discretion to use opinion poll findings to determine this element of the formula. This is presumably in case of the emergence of a significant new party that has not previously contested elections.

The Formula...

Points are allocated in relation to a number of factors. For national radio stations it is as follows:

Minimum allocation for all parties - 20
Current National Assembly seats - maximum 35
Candidates standing on the national list - maximum 15
Candidates standing on the regional list for the National Assembly - maximum 15
Candidates standing for the provincial assemblies - maximum 15

(A similar formula operates for the regional stations - see 'mey21') The points allocated are simply a way of ranking the parties and determining the share of the available broadcast time each may be allocated.

Some observations: the minimum points score for all parties is 20 per cent of the total possible score (which could be gained only by a party holding all seats in the National Assembly). In practice, it accounts for at least a quarter of the maximum possible score. In other words although the system gives more time to the larger parties, smaller parties get a disproportionately high share - the system is weighted towards them. Second, the system gives greater weight to candidacy than incumbency. In other words only a theoretical maximum of 35 per cent of points are awarded for the number of seats held, where 45 per cent are awarded for seats contested.

See 'mex21' for full details.

Paid Political Advertising - Canada

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission has devised the following rules for allocating time for paid political advertising:

There is a limited total amount of time to be purchased - set at six and a half hours in 1990.

Only parties properly registered with the election authorities are eligible to purchase time.

The CRTC then calls a meeting of the representatives of all eligible parties to divide the time among them. If the party representatives are unable to reach agreement the CRTC makes its own allocation. In the 1979 and 1980 general elections the formula agreed by the party representatives was composed of the proportion of the vote each party received in the previous general election; the number of seats held in the national House of Commons before dissolution and the number of candidates nominated in the previous elections, with the first two factors double-weighted. This method allows flexibility between elections so that, for example, a different formula could be utilised in the event of a new party fielding candidates at any particular election.
Once the total time has been allocated, each party is free to purchase as much of its allotted time as it wishes and to use that time as it wishes. However, the overall spending limits set on election spending mean that usually none of the parties is able to purchase its full allocation.¹¹⁹

Media Monitoring - Malawi

Non-governmental media monitoring projects were active in both Malawi's multi-party elections of the 1990s. Interest in monitoring the media systematically was stimulated by the strong bias shown by the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation in the referendum of June 1993, which was to determine whether the country would move from a single-party to a multi-party political system. Although the vote was in favour of change, there were fears that heavy bias in the public media would have an impact on the outcome of the multi-party elections scheduled for the following year. At the time the MBC was the only broadcaster in the country. However, the observation of bias was entirely anecdotal. Nobody had done the serious business of measuring - and thereby demonstrating - the alleged unfairness of the MBC's coverage. In particular, none of the United Nations team who were supervising the elections had any idea what messages were being conveyed in MBC's broadcasts in Chichewa, the national language.

ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, based in London, had been campaigning for freedom of expression in Malawi for many years. (See http://www.article19.org) The country had a particularly elaborate legal framework for censorship, most of which remained in place as the 1994 elections approached. The highly restrictive nature of Malawi's one-party regime meant that there had been no opportunity for civic activism, so there were no non-governmental or community organizations working on freedom of expression or human rights issues. ARTICLE 19 decided to set up a media monitoring project, recruiting a prominent Malawian human rights activist and former political prisoner, Edge Kanyongolo, in a senior position. He was one of the founders of a new human rights group, the Civil Liberties Committee, and the hope was that the expertise he acquired in the course of the project would be passed on to that body.

Kanyongolo taught law at the University of Malawi in Zomba and the monitors who were recruited were all students there. It was reckoned that they were among the very few Malawians with the experience of carrying out structured research activities. The fact that they were all in one educational institution made issues of organization and discipline easy to resolve. Monitoring was conducted in a language laboratory on campus. Most students lived on campus or within easy reach, so very few monitoring shifts were missed. ARTICLE 19 invited staff from the Media Monitoring Project in South Africa to train the monitors initially. (See http://www.sn.apc.org/mmp/) In time, however, it would become clear that media monitoring in South Africa and Malawi was a rather different matter. Whereas large swathes of the South African media were privately owned, often by multinational companies and their biases were complex and subtle, the Malawian media consisted in effect of just two sectors: a government-controlled broadcaster and daily newspaper and a profusion of new, privately owned newspapers. Most private papers were scrappily produced and appeared irregularly. They tended to emerge and then disappear with bewildering speed. The professional and journalistic standards of the Malawian media were almost uniformly low and the biases displayed were not, for the most part, very subtle or difficult to identify.

From the outset the media monitoring project produced weekly reports that were circulated to all relevant stakeholders: government, electoral commission, UN supervisory team, political parties, foreign diplomats and the media themselves. The latter reported on the project's findings, placing them in the public arena. Since the publicly funded media were so heavily biased in favour of the government, criticism from the monitoring project drew the inevitable response that the monitors were supporting the opposition. It was an allegation that could only be refuted by painstaking documentation of the monitors' findings.

Media monitoring in Malawi succeeded to some extent in achieving an improvement in the quality of coverage at the MBC. There were two main reasons for this. First, many broadcasters themselves were sympathetic to the new wave of popular democratic sentiment in the country, even though they had worked for many years as one-party propagandists. They wanted to change the way that they practised journalism and were happy to take the media monitoring reports as guidance. The second and decisive reason for the improvement was the independence and vigour of the electoral commission, which studied the monitoring findings closely and obliged the MBC to take note.

Five years later Malawi held its second multi-party elections. In the interim the first private radio stations had been licensed and a Communications Act passed that ostensibly guaranteed the independence of the MBC from the government of the day. NGOs in Malawi were hardly any stronger than in 1994 and ARTICLE 19 returned, after consultations with local partners, to revive the media monitoring project. The monitors' findings were disappointingly similar to the early days of the 1994 election campaign. The difference, however, was that there was no discernible improvement in fairness as the campaign progressed, as there had been in 1994. The new democratic government kept MBC broadcasters on just as tight a leash as the old one-party rulers had done. But there was no new democratic spirit abroad in 1999. And crucially, the government had dismissed the electoral commission only months before the 1999 polls, replacing it with members who were generally regarded to be more sympathetic to those in power. Certainly the new commission failed to act on the media monitors' findings as its predecessor had done in 1994.

This did not mean, however, that the media monitors had wasted their time in 1999. If the work of the project in 1994 played an important part in subsequent legal reforms allowing greater pluralism, the final report of the 1999 project may yet help to give substance to those reforms in practice. The 1999 report was able to document government use of public resources to spread disinformation about the opposition parties and was used by the opposition in a legal challenge to the election results. The findings caused considerable public disquiet that may be reflected in pressure on the government to liberalize the publicly funded media.¹²⁰

Media Monitoring - Bosnia

The Media Monitoring Centre was already engaged in monitoring before the 1998 election period, at that time providing news summaries that gave an overview of the political situation and monitored for inflammatory language and/or hate speech. Leading up to the election period, in addition to this, they began to provide daily data of a quantitative nature: the amount of time dedicated to political parties or personalities and the number of mentions.

During the election period itself both qualitative and quantitative monitoring was extended to measure the Provisional Electoral Commission's requirements that the media give 'fair coverage' and 'equitable access' to all political units participating in the elections. All the monitoring was undertaken to a standard format directed at these requirements and extended to seven day coverage to ensure a comprehensive picture was obtained.

Seven radio and television stations were monitored from 5.00 pm until midnight seven days a week for the three weeks leading up to the election blackout period one day before voting began.

The monitoring covered the following:

time share per political unit in news periods
time share per political unit in non-news periods
total number of political commercials in non-news periods
total number of mentions of political personalities only
total number of negative mentions of political parties and personalities.

The first three units of measurement were designed to address the requirement of equitable access by considering the amount of time given to political units and representatives. The fourth and fifth units of measurement were included to show which candidates were of topical concern. The latter two measures do not have the same statistical value as the first three but were included to give an overview of the prominence given to a politician or the severity of attacks. As the remit of the project was also to monitor inflammatory or hate language, the statistical information on the number of negative mentions was complemented by a transcript of those mentions, thus providing a check on the nature and level of inflammatory language used. Detailed guidelines were laid out to ensure uniformity in the monitoring process. For example, measuring the time share of any political units in a news period may appear straightforward and allowing little discretion. Examples of the guidelines highlight the possible areas of difficulty:

for mixed stories, all parties mentioned receive the whole time of the story (this was dictated by the difficulty of dividing reports covering groups of parties)
reports or clips of officials of parties count as time for parties
elected politicians carrying out their official duties inside BiH were not counted as campaign related
reports of sister parties in other countries were not counted as campaign related if BiH was not mentioned
reports on non-attendance of politicians or parties was not counted as time given to political units.

These elections presented particular problems for the monitors simply in terms of defining a 'political unit'. The elections were taking place at various levels simultaneously including Presidential, Parliamentary of BiH Federation, Presidential of Republika Srpska, Cantonal and Municipal. On top of this several parties had formed coalitions that varied in composition according to the level of the election!

The monitoring centres taped the core stations over the relevant periods. The monitors then watched in detail any programmes with political content. They then had to determine if the content had to do with campaigning for the elections, excluding reports of official duties of office holders. Having narrowed down the relevant material to be reviewed the monitored then completed tick sheets, timing the items and recording ticks for the number of mentions (positive, negative and neutral) of candidates or parties and noting the type of programme covering a political unity - for example, political advertising spots or debates. Data from the tick sheets was then inputted on to spreadsheets and depicted in daily and then weekly graphs.

Each monitor was able to monitor two or three stations per evening, with some tick sheet work being done as the programme was broadcast. The detailed analysis which required several reviews of the tapes. A statistics team then collated the data and produced the graphs.

The data were presented over seven-day periods to exclude distortion caused by the appearance undue prominence given to one party or personality as a result of newsworthiness on any particular day. The graphs were produced during the election period with the aim, successful in one instance, of modifying the bias towards one party or group of parties shown by individual stations.

The Media Experts Commission acknowledged that this model did not provide detailed qualitative analysis in any depth: that would have been impossible with the human resources available. Nevertheless the analysis provided served its purpose: it showed that all but one of the stations monitored had a significant bias in favour of one or another party and enabled the MEC to challenge those stations for their violations of the PEC Rules.

See Bosnia: media monitoring methodology for a fuller explanation of the media monitoring methodology in Bosnia.

Government Activities and Campaign Reporting - Malawi

In the Malawi elections of 1999, three opposition party supporters sued the Electoral Commission and the publicly-funded Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) over its practice of broadcasting live presidential election rallies - but not rallies by opposition candidates. The court dismissed the suit against the Electoral Commission (saying that it had done all that it could within its power) but found against the MBC.

The court accepted that there was an 'age-old' tradition of live presidential coverage in Malawi, but found that it was not acceptable in an election campaign to give a certain type of coverage to one candidate - the incumbent - and not others. This was in breach of those provisions of the Communications Act and the electoral law that provided that all political parties and election candidates be given equitable or equal treatment during the campaign period.

'To give live coverage to one party and its candidates is not only in breach of the above Sections but it is also discriminatory,' the court observed. This was in breach of the anti-discrimination provisions in the Constitution. The court concluded:

If campaign messages are broadcast live at a presidential function, then equal treatment means that campaign rallies of other political parties or... other presidential candidates be broadcast live. That would give [them] an opportunity to reply to some of the matters raised. That is what equitable treatment of political parties and elections candidates would entail....[E]qual treatment of all competitors is a component of free and fair elections.¹²¹

Voluntary Guidelines on Reporting Opinion Polls - United Kingdom

The British Broadcasting Corporation, as part of its own internal guidelines on election coverage, sets out clear rules to its editors on reporting opinion polls. The BBC notes the dilemma of a serious news organization in reporting such polls: if they are reported this may add to their credibility as an exact science, which clearly they are not. But if they are ignored, then an important news story may be missed and the audience denied relevant information in making their electoral choice.

The BBC resolves this dilemma by reporting the findings of reputable opinion polls, with a number of qualifications about the reliability of the information. These are the BBC's rules:

do not lead a programme or bulletin simply with the results of a voting intention poll
do not headline the result of a voting intention poll (unless reaction to it is so significant as genuinely to merit a headline and reference to the result is necessary o make sense of the reaction. This is likely to be a rare occurrence)
never rely on the interpretation given to a poll's result by the publication or organization which commissioned it: look at the questions, the data and the trend
never use language which gives greater credibility to the polls than they merit - results never 'prove' or even 'show', they simply 'suggest'
always report the expected margin of error, and where the gap between the two leading contenders is within the combined margin of error say so ('There's a three point margin of error on each figure so the apparent (Labour) lead of five points is within that margin')
always report the dates when the fieldwork was carried out, and be prepared to recall significant events which may have had an effect on opinion at the time or since
always say who commissioned and carried out the poll
always say if it was a telephone poll
reflect the seriously-conducted polls equally... never be tempted to single out one as more 'newsworthy'
except in the briefest of news summaries we should always report the trend... it is far more likely to be informative than the snapshot picture
on occasion it will be appropriate to remind viewers and listeners of the events of 1992 and for journalists to reflect in their questioning and their scripting due scepticism of the polls' reliability

The final guideline refers to the fact that in 1992 opinion polls almost uniformly predicted a victory by the Labour opposition - only for the incumbent Conservatives to win the only poll that counted. The media, including the BBC, were somewhat bruised by the experience, which helped to inculcate some healthy scepticism.

However, the BBC guidelines do reflect a genuine dilemma among media reporting opinion polls: however poorly conducted the poll might be, its impact on the campaign may be a news story in itself. But this area is so complex that it perhaps underlines the good sense in leaving these matters to the judgement of media professionals rather than legislators or regulators.

For further information on professional reporting of opinion polls, see Coverage of Opinion Polls and Questions to Ask About Opinion Polling.

Code of Conduct - Zimbabwe

The ethical standards drawn up by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network for the 2000 parliamentary elections were a result, in part, of the experience of the referendum earlier in the year, with the extremely poor standards of coverage in the government-controlled media. Since legal control over the editorial content of newspapers and broadcasting stations was neither possible nor desirable, a code of conduct provided a useful alternative. It could have provided the basis for complaints against journalists to their professional bodies. It also provided a standard against which the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe - one the drafters of the code - could measure the media's performance. (See http://mmpz.icon.co.zw/)

A number of elements in the code are common to such documents the world over: the obligation to report accurately, not to suppress essential information, to protect confidential sources etc. But it also had a number of provisions specific to elections:

A journalist shall report in a balanced manner. If a candidate makes an allegation against another candidate, the journalist should seek comment from both sides wherever possible.
As far as possible, a journalist shall report the views of candidates and political parties directly and in their own words, rather than as they are described by others.
A journalist shall avoid using language or expressing sentiments that may further discrimination or violence on any grounds, including race, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinions, and national or social origins.
When reporting the opinions of those who do advocate discrimination or violence, a journalist shall do the utmost to put such views in a clear context and to report the opinions of those against whom such sentiments are directed.
A journalist shall not accept any inducement from a politician or candidate.
A journalist shall not make any promise to a politician about the content of a news report.
A journalist shall take care in reporting the findings of opinion polls. Any report should wherever possible include the following information:
- who commissioned and carried out the poll and when
- how many people were interviewed, where and how were they interviewed and what is the margin of error
- what was the exact wording of the questions
In all media, there shall be a clear separation between fact and comment. News reporting should reflect the facts as honestly perceived by journalists. Comment may reflect the editorial line of the publication.

See Zimbabwe: Code of Conduct and Reporting Handbook for the full code.

Reporting Exit Poll Findings - United States

There was controversy during the primary elections for the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States when World Wide Web sites published exit poll findings while the polls were still open. The debate the ensued generally pitched the 'old' and 'new' media against each other.

Internet journalists argued that the exit poll data circulated widely among journalists and political insiders. All they were doing was making it available to the public.

Traditional media representatives argued, on the contrary, that journalists often held material that was embargoed on the understanding that they did not use it. The danger in publishing exit poll data while voting was still continuing was that it might influence some voters not to cast their ballot, either because it was unnecessary, with their candidate already winning, or futile, with their candidate not standing a chance.

Some Internet journalists described the traditional approach as paternalistic. Another was quoted as saying:

We're reporting on things that people tell us -- that's what journalists do. I think it's ridiculous that these goo-goo good government types don't trust the public with certain information. If knowing who's ahead deters some people from voting, I'm not sure they should be voting in the first place.¹²²

The traditional view on not reporting exit poll findings (or actual results) is on the basis that widely disseminated information of this sort could actually affect election results - aside from being inconsiderate to voters who have no yet cast their ballot. On the other hand, the Internet is different from traditional media in that a potential voter would probably have to seek out such information actively rather than accidentally seeing it on the television or hearing it on the radio.

In the US case, the offending Internet journalists backed down under the threat of a law suit but felt that they had made their point. But perhaps the only safe conclusion from this episode is that clearer guidelines are needed.

An Internet Election - Romania

The 2000 Romanian presidential elections gave a taste of the role that the Internet might play in an election - even when its use is not very widely developed. About 600,000 of the country's 23 million inhabitants are estimated to be Internet users, about half of them regularly. But this small number was reckoned to be significant, given low voter turnout combined with the fact that the mainly young, professional Internet users were among the most likely voters. So the Internet audience was seen as strategically significant.

Most online information on the election came not from the Web editions of the Romanian newspapers - these had very little Internet-specific information on their sites - but from Internet Service Providers, portals and dedicated sites launched by Romanian entrepreneurs. One such site was http://www.politics.ro, launched by Romania Online. This provided information on the seven main parties and their candidates - including a resume for each presidential candidate and his or her programme. The site also contained updated political news, opinion poll findings and online polls. On election day it provided data on voter turnout and exit poll results. (See Exit Polls.)

Another source of online information was the political parties' own Web sites. Here, the election got particularly dirty, with hackers from the rival parties sabotaging their opponents' sites. At one stage, surfers who tried to log into the site of one candidate were redirected to a pornographic site and later to the FBI's 'most wanted' list. Then they were redirected to a hostile political biography of the candidate. Similar dirty tricks are hardly unknown in the 'real' world, but a virtual election campaign seems to lend itself to such tactics.¹²³

Media and Elections Endnotes

Social and Political Context

1. See James Curran and Myung-Jin Park (eds), De-Westernizing Media Studies, Routledge, London and New York, 2000.

Media and Democracy

2. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Adv. Opn. OC-5/83 of 13 Nov. 1985, Series A no. 5, reprinted in 7 Human Rights Law Journal (1986), 74 and in 8 EHRR 165.

3. Castells v. Spain, Judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, para. 43.

4. Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, para. 63.

Obligation of Pluralism

5. Adopted by the Human Rights Committee at its 461st meeting on 27 July 1983, UN Doc. A/38/40, 109.

6. Retrofit (Pty) Ltd vs Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, Supreme Court, 1995(9) BCLR 1262 (2).

7. Positive ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities (Report by Special Rapporteur Asbjorn Eide), Addendum 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4, part II, paras 11 and 12.

8. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992).

9. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64 29 January 1999.

Freedom of Political Debate

10. Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, at para. 42.

11. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 26.

12. The State v. The Ivory Trumpet Publishing Co. [1984] 5 NCLR 736, High Court, Enugu, 31 Jan 1983.

13. Zeveli v. Central Committee for the Elections to the 13th Knesset, and Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, HC 869/92 and 931/92; 46(2) Piskei Din, 692.

Right of Access to Government Media

14. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A Question of Balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum, Harare, 2000.

15. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000, p.11.

16. Arthur Wina & Others v. the Attorney-General (1990) HP/1878 (High Court: Lusaka).

17. Ibid.

18. Rambachan v. Trinidad and Tobago Television Co. Ltd and Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, decision of 17 July 1985 (unreported).

19. Establishment and Terms of Reference of the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), The Situation in Central America, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., 'Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives,' UN Doc. A/44/375 (1989), Annexe 1, at 3.

20. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 27.

21. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992), pream. para. 4.

Publishing Opposition Views

22. X and the Association of Z v. the United Kingdom, European Commission on Human Rights, Admissibility Decision of 12 July 1971, App. No. 4515/70, 38 Collected Decisions 86 (1971).

Right of Reply

23. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992)

24. Manubhai Shah v. Life Insurance Corp. of India [1992] 3 SCC 637.

25. Belize Broadcasting Authority v. Courtenay and Hoare, Court of Appeal, 20 June 1986; (1988) LRC (Const.) 276; 13 Common L Bull (1987), 1238

26. Ibid., citing Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edn, Vol. 8, para. 1134).

Limits to Liability

27. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992).

28. Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, decision on admissibility issued 8 Sept. 1992.

29. Egin case, STC 159/86, Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional 68, at 1447 para. 8

Restrictions on Political Speech

30. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 29.

Criticism of Politicians and Government

31. Castells v. Spain, Judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236.

32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).

33. Joanna Stevens, 'Sullivan's Travels', Southern African Media Law Briefing, Vol.2 No. 1, April 1997.

Protection of Political Opinions

34. Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103.

Right to an Effective Remedy

35. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 29.

Protecting the Safety of the Media

36. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration, para. 26.

Where do People Get their Information?

37. Margaret Scammell and Holli A. Semetko, 'Political Advertising on Television: The British Experience', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

38. David Kerr, 'Ideology, resistance and the transformation of performance traditions in post-colonial Malawi', University of Botswana, Gaborone, 1993.

39. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

40. Gary A. Ferguson, Ukrainian Political Issues and Media Focus Groups: Summary of Findings, International Foundation for Elections Systems, Washington DC, 1999.

Public/State Media

41. Richard Saunders, Dancing out of Tune, Edwina Spicer Productions, Harare, 1999.

Private Broadcasters

42. Richard Carver, South Africa, in Richard Carver and Ann Naughton (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995, p. 91.

43. Richard Carver, 'Trends and Themes in African Broadcasting' in Richard Carver and Ann Naughton (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995, p. 5.

Community Media

44. Richard Carver, South Africa, in Richard Carver and Ann Naughton (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995, p. 93. See also http://www.amarc.org (World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters).

'New' Media - the Internet

45. Elizabeth Weise, 'Not Yet for the Net', Media Studies Journal</> Winter 2000, http://www.mediastudies.org/nq6.htm.

46. Sally Burnheim, The Right to Communicate: The Internet in Africa, ARTICLE 19, London, 1999. http://www.article19.org.

Law or Regulations on Media during Elections

47. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabawe. Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000, p. 11.

A Specified Campaign Period?

48. Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld, 'Overcoming Adversity and Diversity: The Utility of Television Political Advertising in Israel', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Implementation Mechanism for Media and Election Regulations

49. Karol Jakubowicz, 'Poland and the 1993 Election Campaign: Following the Line of Least Resistance', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Implementation Mechanism: Media Self-Regulation

50. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

51. Karen Siune, 'Political Advertising in Denmark', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

52. ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 38.

Implementation Mechanism: Electoral Commission

53. Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, 'The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

54. ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 38.

Implementation Mechanism: Specialist Body

55. Articles 4-6, Independent Media Commission Act.

Complaints Procedure

56. ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, 1994, p. 38.

57. Viktor Monakhov, 'Information Disputes Relating to Election Campaigning Via the Mass Media: The Experience of the Judicial Chamber in the 1999 Election Campaign, in IFES, The Media and the Presidential Elections in Russia 2000, Human Rights Publishers, Moscow, 2000.

News Blackouts

58. Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld, 'Overcoming Adversity and Diversity: The Utility of Television Political Advertising in Israel', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

59. Media Experts Commission, Final Report: Media in Elections 1998, 1998, pp. 33-34.

Opinion Polls

60. Helen Darbishire, 'Media and the Electoral Process' in Media and democracy, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1998, p. 96.

International and Comparative Law on Hate Speech

61. Glimmerveen and Others v. The Netherlands, App. Nos. D 8348/78 and 8406/78, 4 EHRR 260 (1982).

62. Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890?89, Decision of 8 September 1992.

63. Meir Kahane and Others v. Board of Directors of the Broadcasting Authority, Israeli Supreme Court, 41(3) PD 255 (1987).

64. H-G Axberger, 'Freedom of the Press in Sweden', in ARTICLE 19, Press Law and Practice, 1993.

65. Constitutional Court, AB Hatarozat, No. 30/1992 (26 May).

Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements

66. Robert M. Entman, 'The Media and U.S. Elections: Public Policy and Journalistic Practice', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995. .

67. Ibid.

68. Article 21, Independent Media Commission Act, 1994.

Equal Access for All Parties?

69. Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, 'The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

70. Karen Siune, 'Political Advertising in Denmark', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

71. Ibid.

72. Gianpiero Gamaleri 'Italy and the 1994 Elections: Media, Politics and the Concentration of Power', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

73. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries, Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

74. Kees Brants, 'The Blank Spot: Political Advertising in the Netherlands', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Equitable (or Fair) Access for Political Parties?

75. Brian Wenham 'The United Kingdom: Impartial broadcasters and a Partisan Press', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995. .

76. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

77. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 194.

Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots

78. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

79. ARTICLE 19, Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies, London, 1994, p. 16.

Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?

80. Diana Cammack, Election reporting: a practical guide to media monitoring, ARTICLE 19, London 1998, p. 4.

81. Karol Jakubowicz, 'Poland and the 1993 Election Campaign: Following the Line of Least Resistance' in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Direct Access in Referenda

82. Wilson v. Independent Broadcasting Authority, 1979 SLT 279.

83. Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), para. 27.

Paid Political Advertising

84. See, for example, Nadine Strossen, 'Freedom of Speech: Issues for a new election and a new century', Media Studies Journal, Winter 2000, http://www.mediastudies.org/nq5.htm.

85. Christina Holtz-Bacha and Lynda Lee Kaid, 'A Comparative Perspective on Political Advertising: Media and Political System Characteristics', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Countries that Allow Paid Political Advertising

86. Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

87. Robert M. Entman, 'The Media and U.S. Elections: Public Policy and Journalistic Practice', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995

A Mixed System of Advertising and Free Access

88. Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

Political Advertising and Campaign Spending Limits

89. Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

90. Robert M. Entman, 'The Media and U.S. Elections: Public Policy and Journalistic Practice', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Regulation of Content of Direct Access Material?

91. Article 29, Independent Media Commission Act, 1994.

92. Tom Moring, 'The North European Exception: Political Advertising on TV in Finland', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

93. Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

94. Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, 'The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995

95. Tom Moring, 'The North European Exception: Political Advertising on TV in Finland', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

96. Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, 'The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995

97. Helmut Druck 'Germany: Equality within the Constitution', in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

98. Cited in Ibid..

Media Monitoring Methodology

99. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabawe. Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000.

Protection of Journalists' Safety

100. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabawe. Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000.

Government Activities and Campaigning

101. Anne Johnston and Jacques Gerstle, 'The Role of Television Broadcasts n Promoting French Television Candidates', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

102. Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

News Blackouts/'Reflection Period'

103. Karen Siune, 'Political Advertising in Denmark', in Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

104. Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld, 'Overcoming Adversity and Diversity: The Utility of Television Political Advertising in Israel', in Ibid.

Media Access to Polling Stations

105. Raymond Louw, A Handbook on the Media and Electoral Law, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1999.

Promoting Professional Coverage of Results

106. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

Where Do People Get Their Election Information? - Ukraine

107. Gary A. Ferguson, Ukrainian Political Issues and Media Focus Groups: Summary of Findings, International Foundation for Elections Systems, Washington DC, 1999.

An Existing Regulatory Body - Italy

108. Gianpiero Gamaleri 'Italy and the 1994 Elections: Media, Politics and the Concentration of Power' in Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Specialist Media and Elections Regulator - Bosnia

109. Media Experts Commission, Final Report: Media in Elections 1998, 1998.

Complaints Procedure - Russia

110. Viktor Monakhov, 'Information Disputes Relating to Election Campaigning Via the Mass Media: The Experience of the Judicial Chamber in the 1999 Election Campaign, in IFES, The Media and the Presidential Elections in Russia 2000, Human Rights Publishers, Moscow, 2000.

Hate Speech - Rwanda

111. Richard Carver, 'Broadcasting and Political Transition: Rwanda and Beyond', in Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss (eds), African Broadcast Cultures: Radio in Transition, James Currey, Oxford, 2000, pp. 188-197.

112. International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda, The Prosecutor vs. Georges Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 1 June 2000; 'Blow for Rwandan journalists', BBC News Online, 19 September 2000.

113. ARTICLE 19, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994, London 1996, pp. 120ff.

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Bosnia

114. Provisional Electoral Commission, Rules and Regulations, Article 9.35.a, in Media Experts Commission, Final Report: Media in Elections 1998, 1998.

115. Ibid., p. 14.

The Operations of the Regulator on Hate Speech - Zimbabwe

116. Amani Trust, Summary of Political Violence in Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, May-June 2000.

117. As recorded by Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe.

118. Media Monitoring Project Zimbabawe. Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000, p. 45

Paid Political Advertising - Canada

119. Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

Media Monitoring - Malawi

120. ARTICLE 19, Malawi at the Crossroads: Final Report of the Malawi Election Media Monitoring Project, London/Lilongwe, March 2000, and at http://www.article19.org.

Government Activities and Campaign Reporting - Malawi

121. 'Malawi court orders fair election coverage', Southern African Media Law Briefing, Vol. 4 No. 3, August 1999. (http://fxi.org.za/Medialaw/fairelect.htm)

Reporting Exit Poll Findings - United States

122. http://ojr.usc.edu/content/story.cfm?id=341

An Internet Election - Romania

123. http://ojr.usc.edu/content/story.cfm/request/488/

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Bibliography

The following is a short list of books, pamphlets and reports relating to media and elections. Also look at Additional Resources for the many and varied online resources.

ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, Guidelines for election broadcasting in transitional democracies, London, 1994.

ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, Election Reporting: A Practical Guide to Media Monitoring, London, 1998.

ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994, London 1996.

Barendt, Eric, Broadcasting law: A Study of Regulation in Europe and the United States, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Bennett, W. Lance, The governing crisis: media, money and marketing in American elections, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Bonnah Koomson, Anthony K., A Handbook on electoral coverage for media practitioners, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Ghana Office, 1995.

Carver, Richard, 'Broadcasting and Political Transition: Rwanda and Beyond', in Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss (eds), African Broadcast Cultures: Radio in Transition, James Currey, Oxford, 2000, pp. 188-197.

Carver, Richard, and Naughton, Ann, (eds) Who Rules the Airwaves? Broadcasting in Africa, ARTICLE 19 and Index on Censorship, London 1995.

Cavanaugh, John W., Media effects on voters: a panel study of the 1992 presidential election, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995.

Coliver, Sandra, The ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression Manual: International and Comparative Law, Standards and Procedures, ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, London, 1993.

Coliver, Sandra, Merloe, Patrick and Naughton, Ann, (eds.), Press Law and Practice, London, ARTICLE 19, International Centre Against Censorship, 1993.

Darbishire, Helen, 'Media and the Electoral Process' in Media and democracy, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1998.

European Institute for the Media, The independence of the media, Dusseldorf, 1993.

European Institute for the Media, The Political Context of Broadcasting, Manchester, 1991.

Gary A. Ferguson, Ukrainian Political Issues and Media Focus Groups: Summary of Findings, International Foundation for Elections Systems, Washington DC, 1999.

Fletcher, Frederick J., Media, elections and democracy, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991.

Fox G.H., 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law,' 17 Yale Journal of International Law 539 (1992).

Iyengar, Shanto, Reeves Richard (eds.), Do the media govern? Politicians, voters and reporters in America, Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage, 1997.

Johnston, Carla B., Election coverage: blueprint for broadcasters, Focal Press, Stoneham, 1991.

Joslyn, Richard, Mass media and elections, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1984.

Kaid, Lynda Lee, and Holtz-Bacha, Christina (eds.), Political Advertising in Western Democracies, Sage Publications, London/Thousands Oaks, 1995.

Yasha Lange and Andrew Palmer (eds), Media and Elections: a Handbook, European Institute for the Media, Dusseldorf, 1995.

Lange, Yasha, Media and elections: handbook, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publications, 1999.

Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries, Washington, DC: July 1995.

Raymond Louw, A Handbook on the Media and Electoral Law, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1999.

Mancini, Paolo, and Swanson, L. (eds.), Politics, Media and Modern Democracy, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996.

Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, A question of balance: The Zimbabwean media and the constitutional referendum Harare, March 2000.

Media Monitoring Project Zimbabawe. Election 2000: The Media War, Harare, 2000.

Media Studies Journal Winter 2000, http://www.mediastudies.org/

Mickiewicz, Ellen, and Firestone, Charles, Television and elections, Queenstowne, MD, The Aspen Institute, 1992.

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Media Experts Commission, 1998 (Final Report).

Howard R. Penniman, Howard R. and Austin Ranney, 'The Regulation of Televised Political Advertising in Six Selected Democracies', Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, n.d.

IFES, The Media and the Presidential Elections in Russia 2000, Human Rights Publishers, Moscow, 2000.

Poynter Institute for Media Studies, Poynter election handbook: new ways to cover campaigns, St. Petersburg, Florida, 1996.

Pragnell, Anthony, Freedom and control: the elements of democratic broadcasting services, Dusseldorf, European Institute for the Media, 1990.

United Nations, Report of the UN Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992)

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Media Guidelines for Cambodia (1992)

United Nations, Positive ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities (Report by Special Rapporteur Asbjorn Eide), Addendum 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4

United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64 29 January 1999.

Valentino, Hank, 'Guidelines for Media, Political Parties and Contesting Groups During Official Campaign Period for Municipal and Local Government Elections', Elections Today, December 1994, 12-13.

Valentino, Hank, 'Establishing and Maintaining Balanced Media Support for Free and Fair Elections', Elections Today, December 1994, 5, 10-11.

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network

Herramientas Personales

Media and Elections Index

Media and Elections

Overview

Guiding Principles

Administrative Considerations

Cost Considerations

Social and Political Context

Historical Review

Additional Resources

Legal Principles

International Law

Media and Democracy

Obligation of Pluralism

Freedom of Political Debate

Right of Access to Government Media

Publishing Opposition Views

Right of Reply

Limits to Liability

Restrictions on Political Speech

Criticism of Politicians and Government

Protection of Political Opinions

Right to an Effective Remedy

Protecting the Safety of the Media

Media Environment

Where do People Get their Information?

History of Respect for Media Freedom?

Relative Importance of Different Media

Structure of Media Ownership

Public/State Media

Private Broadcasters

Print Media

Community Media

Party Media

'New' Media - the Internet

Level of Professionalism

Journalism Training

Legal Framework for Media

Constitutional Protection for Media Freedom

Statutes Affecting the Media

Other Statutory Instruments Affecting the Media

Case Law Affecting the Media

Existing Media Regulatory Frameworks

Broadcasting Regulator

Voluntary Media Council

Statutory or Constitutional Regulators

Law or Regulations on Media during Elections

Who Should Be Involved in the Drafting Process?

A Specified Campaign Period?

Different Obligations of Public and Private Media

Provisions that Affect Both Private and Public Media

Implementation Mechanism for Media and Election Regulations

Implementation Mechanism: Existing Media Regulatory Body

Implementation Mechanism: Media Self-Regulation

Implementation Mechanism: Electoral Commission

Implementation Mechanism: Specialist Body

Implementation Mechanism: Judiciary

Complaints Procedure

News Blackouts

Opinion Polls

Policies on Hate Speech and Defamation

International and Comparative Law on Hate Speech

Media Liability for Reports of Unlawful Statements

Hate Speech - Operations of the Regulator

Right of Reply to Criticism or Adverse Statements

Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events

Accreditation

Foreign Media

Measures to Protect Journalists

Provisions for Public Media

Allocation of Time to Candidates and Parties

Equal or Equitable Direct Access Coverage?

Equal Access for All Parties?

Equitable (or Fair) Access for Political Parties?

Criteria for Allocation of Direct Access Time

Timing and Length of Direct Access Slots

Who Pays for Direct Access Broadcasts?

Who Produces Direct Access Broadcasts?

Direct Access in Referenda