Herramientas Personales

The regulation of the conduct of parties and candidates in the election process forms the focus of the Parties and Candidates topic area. Important issues include campaign financing, government neutrality, media exposure, and freedom of speech. For more general information on this topic area, please select Overview.

The section on Guiding Principles looks at issues of fairness and 'genuineness' in the electoral process exploring topics such as: What is a level playing field? or participation? or transparency? Issues regarding the administrative requirements for managing political parties and candidates, and the financial implications of this administration are discussed in Administrative Implications and Cost Implications, respectively. A review of issues regarding Election Campaigns discusses codes of conduct, advertising, access to public broadcasting and campaign expenditure rules and limits.

Major topics within Parties and Candidates:

Regulating Parties and Candidates

Political Parties and the Electoral Process

Party and Candidate Registration

Party and Candidate Financing

Election Campaigns

Breaches and penalties

Please use the feedback option to forward suggestions, commentary and additional information that will enrich the topic area. Enjoy!

Overview

Although it is fashionable among some scholars and commentators to point to the decline of political parties, there is little doubt that they still have a fundamentally important role in modern elections. The regulation of parties, together with the regulation of candidates (who are often, though not always, nominated by parties), is therefore a topic of vital significance.

The central objective of the files in this section is to give guidance about practical questions ¹, relating to the regulation of parties and candidates, such as:

How is campaign finance in other countries regulated, overseen, etc.?
Are there any laws pertaining to foreign firms making contributions to a campaign?
What are the rules and regulations, as well as pros and cons, of giving free air time to presidential candidates?
How do you ensure government neutrality in an election, including equal access to government-controlled media?
What are political party and media codes of conduct?

This section will also address even include broader matters, such as:

Are there supranational standards in elections and democracy?
What is the role of elections in a democracy?

Four introductory points should be made about such questions and the way they are addressed in the section of this guide on Parties and Candidates:

First, while it is hoped that the files will be useful to legislators, party officials, and electoral observers, they should also be relevant to scholars and students. It is not until scholars appreciate the practical realities of democratic government that they are in a position to make authoritative academic and theoretical judgements.

Second, while some practical questions are capable of technical answers, many of them raise questions about underlying values and political theories. For instance, the question in the above list about 'equal access' to government-controlled media raises the question of what is the meaning of 'equal'? For a thorough discussion of the principles underlying party and candidate regulation, see Guiding Principles, Level Playing Field, Fairness, Freedom of Speech, Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices, Political Participation, Encouraging Internal Party Democracy, Ensuring Openness, Transparency, Accountability, and Checks and Balances.

Third, in general, the files in this section will not aim to put forward definitive opinions about what constitutes 'good practice.' Many of the issues under consideration are too controversial for that. Instead, the broad aim is to provide a range of options, with examples of each.

Fourth, competitive elections are contests held according to laws and rules. It is essential that all (or virtually all) of the main candidates and parties should feel able to accept these rules. If a significant political party, candidate, or faction feels, and has good reason to feel, that the laws and rules are unreasonable, then it is less likely to accept the results of the election. Political stability will suffer. An understanding of the problems and options relating to the regulation of political parties and candidates is thus likely to contribute to the quality of democracy.

Draft Only

Guiding Principles

Introduction

Elections must not only be free, they must also be fair and 'genuine.' This is set out, albeit in brief and broad terms, in a number of international instruments, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21), the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 25), the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (Article 23), and the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Article 13).

The primary requirement of these documents is that governments should be chosen by free elections in which the right to vote is universal and equal. The term 'free' refers to the formalities of the electoral process. Candidates should not be subjected to violence or coercion by the governmental authorities; voters should not be physically restrained from casting their votes.

However, many of the most important international instruments require that elections must also be 'genuine' or fair. The term 'genuine' is included because it is possible for an election formally to be free (as far as polling and other procedures are concerned) but, nevertheless, to be grossly unfair. For example, a governing party may use restrictions on newsprint as the excuse to limit the circulation of opposition newspapers or literature. The governing party may use corrupt means to raise an abnormally large campaign fund. Or, the governing party may unfairly use its control over television to prevent or restrict opposition parties from presenting their messages to voters.

The simple conclusion is that the formal 'freedom' of electoral procedures is necessary but not sufficient. The principles that underpin fairness and genuineness will be the concern of this section and its sub-sections.

While words such as 'fair' and 'genuine' appear at first sight to be simple and obvious, their meaning is actually complex. Disputes about their meaning are not merely a matter for theoretical discussions by ivory tower academics; they vitally affect practical decisions relating to the regulation of parties and candidates.

The practical importance of debates about the meaning of 'fairness' is seen in the range of interpretations of what constitutes a 'fair' distribution of broadcasting time to different parties in the campaign preceding a national election. Does 'fairness' mean an equal allocation of time to all parties regardless of their size? In other words, is it 'fair' to provide as much time to the smallest as to the biggest parties? Is it 'fair' to give newly-formed parties an especially large allocation of time on the grounds that they require longer to make their policies known to the public than established parties? Is it fair to give the largest amounts of time to the parties with the largest shares of the vote in the previous election? And so forth.

Some Guiding Principles

Some of the conventional guiding principles of genuine elections follow.

Level Playing Field

The idea of fairness is basic to democratic practice. Yet the term may have a number of different, contradictory meanings. They include:

equality of outcome (e.g. all parties should have the same allocation of free television time);
fairness as a bias towards opposition or small parties (e.g. the small parties should have especially large portions of free television time since they need it most); and
fairness based on the extent of each party's political support (e.g. free television time should be proportional to each party's share of the vote at the last election), see Level Playing Field, Fairness.

Freedom of Speech

Democratic debate cannot take place unless citizens and politicians are allowed to express what is on their minds. But there are arguably legitimate limits on free speech. For instance, should citizens be allowed to make libellous accusations? Should they be permitted to preach violence and race hatred? Should political debate intrude on the personal lives of politicians and their families? See Freedom of Speech.

Prevention of Fraud and Corruption

Cheating and bribery undermine the democratic process, see Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices.

Participation

According to one common view, the quality of democracy depends upon the extent to which voters use their rights to vote and to take part in public life. It is healthy if memberships of political parties are large and active, and if attendance at political rallies is high, and so on. According to an alternative view, it does not matter whether citizens actually participate in politics, but it is vital that they should have the right to do so, irrespective of whether they choose to use it, see Political Participation.

Internal Party Democracy

According to one view, it is important that political parties run their own affairs in a democratic manner, giving due powers to members over their leaders, see Encouraging Internal Party Democracy.

Transparency

Arguably, secrecy breeds corruption. The finances of political parties and candidates, as well as other aspects of party affairs, should therefore be open. A contrasting view is that citizens are as much entitled to privacy in their financial payments to the party or candidate of their choice as they are in their voting choices. After all, voting itself is now secret, see Ensuring Openness, Transparency.

Accountability

It is of little value to have standards of behaviour concerning the organization of parties and elections if there are no means of checking whether the politicians and the parties have adhered to them, see Accountability.

Checks and Balances

There should be some built-in pluralism within the political system so that there are incentives for one party to bring to light abuses by an opposing party, or for the press to act as a check on the politicians, see Checks and Balances.

Conflicts between Principles

Policymakers in the real world are constantly faced with problems resulting from contradictions between different aims and principles. It is immediately obvious that some of the principles that have been listed are likely to clash with each other, see Broadcasting Time, Allocation of Time/Resources Issues, and Fairness vs.Freedom of Expression. This is illustrated by several examples.

Political Participation versus Avoiding Corruption

Corruption, fraud, intimidation, and other forms of misconduct will damage the election process. The control of corruption frequently requires strict control measures. However, the by-product of these measures will be to control, and thus to limit political participation. If corruption and fraud appear to be minor problems, then it will be sensible to have a relaxed regulatory regime that presents as few barriers as possible to political participation. By contrast, if corruption and fraud are widespread, or risk becoming prevalent, then tight controls will be justified, even if they make participation more difficult.

This problem is sometimes referred to as the conflict between 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' regulatory regimes.

In an 'inclusive' regime, the rules governing the nomination of candidates will be relatively relaxed. Where there is confidence that the lists of names supporting a nomination form are genuine, there will be little need for electoral administrators to make exhaustive checks on them. The timetable for making nominations can then be drawn up to permit nominations until shortly before the date of the poll.

In an 'exclusive' regime, the rules governing the nomination of candidates will be tighter. The election timetable will provide greater opportunities for electoral officials to make much more thorough checks of the lists of names of voters supporting each nomination to ensure that signatures have not been forged.

Political Participation versus Transparency

According to a common argument, donations to political parties and to candidates should be publicly declared, also see, Desirability of Disclosure of Political Donations. The need for financial disclosure and transparency applies with special force, according to this view, to 'large' donations. The policy of requiring financial transparency is justified by the argument that it will prevent or discourage corruption and 'special influence.' Also, it will provide information to voters about the financial forces behind each candidate and each party. This information may influence voting choices.

However, imposing rules requiring financial disclosure will come at a cost. If potential candidates are required to make public their income tax returns and their private business affairs, if they are required in addition to open the affairs of their spouses and of other family members to public gaze, this may act as a powerful disincentive. Excessively harsh disclosure rules may deter many people from becoming candidates.

Similarly, potential donors to political parties may wish, for good reasons, to avoid having their political gifts placed on a public list. Transparency rules may therefore limit this form of political participation.

Freedom of Speech versus Level Playing Field

Freedom of speech involves not only the right to converse with family, friends, and neighbours, but also the freedom to organize and address public meetings, and to produce and circulate political literature and propaganda.

It does not cost money to talk with family members or neighbours. However, many forms of free speech do incur expenses. If a political activist arranges to visit another area of the city or country and to spend time speaking to voters, there will be costs of travel, board, and lodging. Public meetings may require expenditure for hiring a suitable hall, and publicity. And it will not be possible to print political literature without paying for it (or without accepting what is effectively a political 'contribution-in-kind' from the printer).

Since the exercise of free speech often requires money, the parties and candidates with the largest financial resources will be able to reach the voters more effectively than the poorest parties and candidates. Arguably, the richest candidates gain an unfair advantage. In order to eliminate or to reduce this unfairness, and create a 'level playing field,' regulations have commonly been introduced to restrict the role of money in elections. Sometimes (as in elections for federal offices in the United States), there is a legal ceiling on the amount an individual may contribute; sometimes (as in France or Canada), there is a cap on the amount a party or a candidate is permitted to spend.

Limits on financial contributions, and on spending by parties and candidates, are designed to promote a level playing field. But they have the undoubted effect of limiting freedom of speech. Policymakers must balance two valid, but mutually contradictory, principles.

Summary

The complexities of the guiding principles are summarized in Level Playing Field, Fairness, Freedom of Speech, Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices, Political Participation, Encouraging Internal Party Democracy, Ensuring Openness, Transparency, Accountability and Checks and Balances. Apart from differences in judgement about how conflicts between principles should be resolved, the principles themselves are open to interpretation and debate.

It will be argued that:

(a) of the eight guiding principles under consideration, three are basic. They are: 'Level playing field, fairness', 'Freedom of speech', and 'Controlling fraud, corruption and unfair practices'. Though uncontroversial in themselves, some of them are not wholly without ambiguity or without limitations. In particular, 'fairness' may have a number of different meanings and is therefore cited as a battle cry by advocates of conflicting practical measures. Freedom of speech is clearly subject to a number of limitations, although there is legitimate disagreement about their nature and scope.

(b) Two of the guiding principles are controversial. It is open to argument that they should not be included in the list. They are: 'political participation' and 'encouraging internal party democracy'.

(c) The three remaining guiding principles are instrumental. They are not necessarily desirable in themselves but arguably are needed to achieve other objectives. Refer to Ensuring Openness, Transparency, Accountability and Checks and Balances.

Draft Only

Level Playing Field, Fairness

The term 'level playing field' has become common in modern English, to refer to fair competition, particularly in the United States of America. It is a reference to a football field, where neither side has the advantage of running downhill against opponents who are handicapped by having to run uphill. A parallel term, found in Article 21 of the (West) German Basic Law of 1949 is Chancengleichheit (equality of opportunity).

In practice, 'fairness' may have a variety of different, contradictory meanings.

Fairness as Equality of Outcome

Arguably, one way to ensure that each party and each candidate is treated fairly is to provide precisely the same opportunities and financial resources to each, irrespective of their size and popularity. The argument for giving all parties and all candidates an equal share of free television time, or financial grants, is that they all require an equal opportunity to put their case to the voters.

This is the principle followed in granting free postal facilities to British parliamentary candidates. Candidates nominated by major and minor parties, as well as independent candidates, have equal entitlements.

By contrast, it can be argued that equal treatment for major parties and for fringe groups is both impractical and unjust. It is arguably unjust and unfair to give a fringe party the same public benefits and the same financial aid as a major party. For a fringe party, that may have only a handful of members, the chance to obtain even a few minutes of free time on television represents a huge benefit. By contrast, the same few minutes will be inadequate for the major parties. Where there are dozens, or hundreds, of competing parties, a policy of allocating precisely the same amount of time to each inevitably results in near chaos, as voters are confronted with a multitude of different messages.

Moreover, such an 'equal time' policy may conceal a strong bias against the main opposition parties. The governing party will normally have separate opportunities to project itself. If the main opposition party receives the same small slice of free television time as dozens of insignificant parties, it will receive a wholly inadequate opportunity to present its message, which will help the government. The unsatisfactory results of the policy of equal television time for large and small parties have been seen in founding elections in several of the previously Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Positive Discrimination

It may be argued that 'fairness' demands positive discrimination in favour of new or small parties. According to this interpretation, the major political forces in any society already have ample chances to express themselves. Extra opportunities need, therefore, to be provided to the political outsiders to organize themselves and to put forward their views to the voters.

An example of an application of this compensatory ideal of 'fairness' is the scheme introduced in 1975 in the British House of Commons, whereby financial subsidies are given to the opposition parties represented in the lower chamber. The governing party does not receive a subsidy. The rationale for the arrangement is that the governing party receives the benefit of the advice of the civil service. It is only the opposition parties that need funds to employ staff to prepare their arguments.

Fairness Based on Political Support

This involves the principle that small parties and fringe candidates should receive less support than the main ones. This idea may apply to the allocation of time for free electoral broadcasts on television and radio. It may apply also to financial subsidies. For example, it may be argued that only the principal candidates in a presidential election should be expected to debate with each other on national television, or that the large parties should be given more time slots for party political broadcasts than small ones.

This principle has common sense and justice behind it, but it also has problems. The common sense argument for fairness as an allocation pro rata to the support enjoyed by each contestant is that it avoids the situation where dozens, or even hundreds, of trivial candidates and parties set themselves up, merely to gain the free publicity that results if all legally recognized contestants are given the same exposure. It is simply not practical for voters to digest so many different messages. In the slang of political scientists and diplomats, there are (especially in newly formed democracies) 'sofa parties', parties so small that all their members can be seated on a single sofa.

The argument of justice is that it is unreasonable for a party or candidate representing a sprinkling of supporters to have the same opportunity to broadcast to the voters as a major party.

The above considerations provide a strong basis for the argument that 'fairness' should mean the proportionality of state aid to each contestant's support. However, the application of this principle produces problems.

The first problem is whether the extent of each party's support should be measured according to its past performance or according to its current performance. The easiest and apparently most objective measure of support is the percentage of the vote gained by each party at the most recent election. This is the main basis for state funding of party organizations in Germany. The weakness of this allocation system is that it may support existing parties at the expense of newly formed ones, or ones that have increased their popularity (as measured by opinion polls or other means) since the last election. In some countries (Namibia, for example), funds are allocated according to the number of votes obtained in a national election, but only to parties represented in Parliament. Parties failing to win a seat in the legislature are thus at a disadvantage.

The second problem is whether the extent of support should be measured by votes, or by some other indicator. It could be argued, for example, that public financial subsidies should match the membership, or the private financial support, for each party rather than its votes.

Fairness between Political Parties and Pressure Groups

Systems of regulation and of subsidy affect not only the balance between contesting parties, but also the balance between political parties as a group and other forms of political expression. If a system of regulation restricts political parties, it may have the effect of favouring other, unregulated channels of political communication.

Conclusion

The level playing field is an important principle, but it has so many different meanings that different political parties and candidates will frequently disagree as to what is 'fair'. Naturally, they will each tend to favour a definition of 'fairness' that accords with their self-interest.

Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech is obviously essential to any credible electoral process. If politicians are not able, or not allowed, to express themselves freely, or if voters cannot engage in political discussions, how can there be fair elections? In particular, governments should not use their powers to stifle criticism. They should permit a free press and, equally important, should give opposition forces a reasonable chance to express their case on national television.

Yet, there are legitimate limits to freedom of speech. Five reasons to restrict freedom of speech are considered here.

Protecting National Security

Especially in time of war, it is reasonable to restrain politicians from discussing public affairs in a manner likely to betray military secrets to the enemy. Even in peacetime, some matters must remain confidential. Unfortunately, governments will often be tempted to appeal unreasonably to the needs of national security in order to avoid scrutiny and criticism.

Curbing the Freedom to Incite Violence and Hatred

In all societies, especially those fractured by ethnic tensions, unrestricted free speech proves dangerous when anti-democratic, violent elements decide to use their freedom to incite violence and hatred. It is a difficult problem for democracies to decide how far they must tolerate extremist rhetoric, and to what extent they must permit potentially violent public meetings.

An argument for maximum tolerance is that it is all too easy for the government of the day to use the alleged need to maintain law and order to restrict legitimate expressions of dissent. In order to preserve the rights to legitimate dissent, it is also necessary, it may be argued, to permit even those who seem extreme and anti-democratic to express themselves too. But there are also arguments for restraint.

A classic example of the discussion about restraints of free expression would be the Skokie, Illinois case in the United States about whether Nazi groups should be permitted to express themselves by marching through largely Jewish suburbs. The traditional Protestant marches through predominantly Catholic areas in Northern Ireland have raised similar issues.

Protecting Politicians from Libellous Accusations

It is open to argument whether those who engage in public life, as well as their families, should be protected from untrue accusations by their opponents, or by the press. In the United States, commentators and political opponents are given a great deal of freedom to make comments about those in public life, even if they are blatantly false. In order to obtain protection for libel in the American courts, public figures need to demonstrate not only that statements about them are false, but also that they were made maliciously (something very hard to prove). This freedom to insult, and to make false statements about public figures, stems from the view that politics is a tough business. Consequently, those who choose to participate in public life should expect to open themselves and their families to scrutiny and to attack. In contrast, the libel laws in Britain afford considerably greater protection to political figures.

Protecting Politicians from Invasions of Privacy

Should freedom of the press extend to the right to make comments on the personal lives and sexual habits of politicians and their families? Laws and conventions differ from country to country. In France, the law seeks to protect politicians from intrusions into their private affairs.

The main argument in favour of restricting the rights of the press to report on the private lives of politicians is that public figures should be judged on the basis of their stances on political issues, and on their performances in public office. Whether a president or prime minister is an adulterer or a sexual deviant is irrelevant to his political capacities. His private finances are equally irrelevant.

The opposite view is that public trust and private morality cannot be separated. A politician who promises to be faithful to a spouse and who then commits adultery displays a lack of trustworthiness about which the voters have a right to be informed. Equally, the private financial affairs of a politician may reflect on his good faith and character.

A compromise view is that the private lives of politicians become relevant only if they have made a point of making a political issue out of matters of morality. For instance, a politician who campaigns against the evils of drug taking is reasonably open to investigation and to ridicule if he is shown to be a drug abuser himself.

Limiting Advantages of Wealthy Candidates and Parties

For a discussion of this question, see Guiding Principles.

Draft Only

Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices

Controlling fraud, corruption, and unfair practices is a fundamental objective of any system of regulating political parties and candidates. When an election has been held, it is essential to ensure that citizens at large, whether they have supported winning or losing parties and candidates, should have faith in the integrity of the process. Serious electoral fraud, corruption, and unfair practices bring the reliability of the electoral process into question. They thus undermine democracy itself.

In countries where free elections have not been held regularly in the past, or where elections have been rigged, a 'loser culture' is unlikely to exist. Even if an election is fairly conducted, the defeated candidates and parties are likely to call 'foul'. This happens in parts of Africa. In such countries, it is all the more important to ensure that the fairness of elections is beyond reasonable doubt.

Electoral Fraud

Conducting elections that are fair, and are seen to be fair, poses a variety of technical challenges. The official procedures must be reliable. Voters must be assured that only eligible voters have voted, that they have been given the chance to cast their ballots under circumstances that guarantee freedom from pressure, and that their votes have then been properly recorded.

An initial problem is drawing up an accurate register of eligible voters - a register that manages to include those entitled to vote, while excluding voters who have died, or who are otherwise unqualified. There must be checks against impersonation - those presenting themselves at polling stations must be the voters they claim to be. In many parts of Africa and elsewhere, a finger of each voter is marked with indelible ink to ensure against voting twice. Voters must be permitted to cast their ballots without feeling under threat of violence or under an obligation to support a particular candidate or party. There must be measures to ensure against the stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers other than those legitimately cast. Ballot boxes need to be sealed before being used, and when the voting period is over. If ballot boxes are transported from the polling place to a central location where the votes are to be counted, there must be a guarantee that the same boxes that have left the polling station are the ones that arrive at the vote counting location. Integrity of vote counting and recording must be assured.

Where there is significant inefficiency or deliberate cheating by the authorities responsible for administering an election, the whole purpose of holding an election is negated. It is because electoral fraud is such a risk in countries emerging from non-democratic rule that the practice of mounting international election observer missions has burgeoned.

In developing countries, party agents have a potentially important role in observing the process of voting and in attending the counting of votes. However, experience in Tanzania, Ghana, and elsewhere suggests that when foreign governments or international organizations provide grants for party agents, those agents may, in many parts of the country, be more interested in collecting a fee than in carrying out their duties conscientiously. See also Political Parties as Election Monitors.

Electoral Corruption

Corrupt electoral practices include bribery of voters, raising campaign funds by making promises of illegal benefits (such as favourable government contracts) as payoffs to donors, bribing opposing candidates to withdraw, and (where there are legal limits on permitted campaign spending) fiddling election expenses in order to exceed the limit.

Such practices were common in Britain until the late nineteenth century. Vote buying is reputed to remain common in some countries, such as Taiwan. The secret ballot is the main device to restrict vote buying. If voters cast their ballots in secret, there is no way for candidates and party organizers to be certain that they will vote in the way that they have promised to those offering the bribes. However, in some communities, the secret ballot has proved insufficient to stamp out vote buying altogether.

Unfair Practices: Negative Campaigns and 'Dirty Tricks'

Whereas electoral fraud and electoral corruption are clearly undesirable and illegal, 'unfair practices' are harder to define and more controversial. What is 'unfair' to some is merely 'robust electioneering' or 'negative campaigning' to others.

Obviously, candidates have an incentive to present their opponents in the worst possible light. How is it possible to prevent candidates from telling deliberate lies and maligning their rivals without restricting the freedom of speech, and without allowing the government to dictate the terms of public debate?

Though it may be impossible to regulate unfair electoral practices by law, there may be some moral value in codes of conduct. Such codes may be developed for electoral officials, political parties, and election observers. See also Codes of Conduct for Political Parties.

A famous example of unfair campaign practices emerged amid investigations into the Watergate Affair. In 1974 the inquiries led finally to the resignation of Richard Nixon as President of the United States. The Watergate Affair centred on allegations, later proved, that Nixon's 1972 presidential election campaign organization had arranged for a team to break into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee to plant eavesdropping equipment. This was not only unfair, but also illegal. Earlier in the presidential election campaign Nixon's supporters had set up a 'dirty tricks' team which carried out activities in the classic mould of unfair electioneering.

On behalf of Nixon, the incumbent Republican President, the 'dirty tricks' team set out to discredit the nomination of Edmund Muskie, the Democratic candidate, who was seen to pose the greatest threat to Nixon. Muskie later claimed - and was shown to be justified - that he had faced a 'systematic campaign of sabotage.' As reported by Herbert Alexander, this effort included 'theft of documents, middle-of-the-night phone calls to voters made by impostors claiming to be Muskie canvassers, false items in newspapers, and - the best known incident - a phoney letter, published by New Hampshire's largest newspaper less than two weeks before the New Hampshire primary, claiming that Muskie had humorously condoned an aide's use of the derogatory term 'Canuck' (a description of Americans of French- Canadian descent). This report²,was calculated to shock this group of New Hampshire voters.

Unfair Practices: Distribution of Television Time

Whereas 'dirty tricks' may be difficult to regulate, there are other forms of unfairness that should be easier to control. For instance, it is important to ensure that opposition candidates and parties are given a proper opportunity to present their case on national television. In the frequent cases where national broadcasting is a public monopoly, the government should not use its control over the airwaves to stifle free and fair debate during an election campaign. The question of what constitutes a reasonable allocation of broadcasting time is discussed later, see Broadcasting Time,Public Broadcasting Allocations and Formulas for Allocating Time.

Draft Only

Political Participation

It may seem to be beyond argument that political participation is a key objective of democratic institutions, yet there is room for legitimate disagreement about the extent to which the health of a pluralist policy can be judged by the extent to which citizens actually take part in activities such as voting, attending political meetings, joining political parties and making donations to them, discussing politics with their neighbours, and so forth.

Ensuring Opportunities for Political Participation

Citizens should, at the very least, not be prevented from participating in politics if they wish to do so.

There should be no artificial barriers denying voting rights to any group of citizens; hence the moral objections to the former South African system of apartheid, which limited the civil rights of non-whites. Citizenship should not unreasonably be denied to members of unfavoured ethnic groups. The restrictions on citizenship for ethnic Russians in some of the newly independent Baltic countries are a controversial example of such denial. Another possible example is the barrier against the naturalization of foreign 'guest workers' of long standing in Germany.

Apart from civil rights, citizens should not be denied the chance to join political parties. A landmark case before the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Democratic Party organizations in the (then) racially segregated Southern states of the U.S.A. were not entitled to prevent blacks from participating in the primary elections run by these party organizations.

Encouraging Compulsory Political Participation

According to one approach, it is so desirable and important for ordinary citizens to take an active part in political life that the state should encourage, and even oblige them to do so.

For example, some countries consider that it is vital to ensure that a high proportion of eligible voters cast their ballots. Accordingly, they make voting compulsory (as in Australia). An alternative device to encourage a high turnout is the rule (as in Finland) that permits voters to cast their ballots before polling day at any post office. This means that voters who are planning to be away from their homes on the official polling day (perhaps travelling abroad on business or on vacation) are able to vote without inconvenience.

In a number of countries (Cambodia and Namibia, for example), there is a tendered vote system. This allows voters who are away from their place of registration on election day to cast their vote at any polling station in another town or region.

Other 'active measures' to encourage participation include publicly-sponsored advertising campaigns to promote electoral registration, tax relief and matching grants for donations to political parties, state aid to political parties for 'political education' activities, etc. See also Tax Concessions and Matching Grants.

Limiting the Importance of Political Participation

It may be argued that, provided the system of laws and regulations permits citizens to participate in politics, they should not be encouraged or obliged to do so. Two separate lines of argument support this conclusion.

First, the objective of political participation needs to be balanced against other equally important objectives, particularly that of avoiding fraud, see Guiding Principles. If voters are required to identify themselves by showing a passport or some other form of official identity document, this may deter some of them from coming out to vote. But if there is no such requirement, then it will be easier to impersonate another voter. The objectives of ease of access to the polling booth, and of avoiding electoral fraud, are mutually contradictory.

Second, it is open to question whether the democratic ideal consists of a copy of the Agora of ancient Athens, or the town meetings held in some parts of New England (the northeastern states of the United States). According to this model, ordinary citizens take an active part in debates about the day-to-day affairs of government.

Not only is this form of direct democracy impractical in most modern circumstances, it may be argued that it is not necessarily desirable. If citizens wish to stay at home watching football on television rather than attending political meetings, what is wrong with that? According to one valid approach, a mature democracy is not necessarily one where there is frenetic political argument. The decision to abstain from voting, and from otherwise taking part in political activities, may reflect a voter's rational judgement that his future is safe in the hands of whichever candidate emerges as winner. What is important is the voter's reserve power to oust a government at a future election, should it seem necessary to do this.

In some circumstances, abstention may represent a positive act of protest. One experienced observer of elections in Africa reports that in parts of the continent, where multi-party democracy is a new concept, voters sometimes express disapproval of the government of the day not by voting for an opposing political party, but by refraining from voting altogether.

To give a comparison that illustrates this point, the low electoral turnout in the United States is, according to one interpretation, not proof of the poverty of politics but of stability. By contrast, the active (some would say over-active) political debates in a country such as Chile may be viewed as undesirable; they are possibly a sign of a fragile political culture and of the fear of political violence.

Draft Only

Encouraging Internal Party Democracy

Opinions differ about the desirability of internal party democracy.

Arguments for Internal Party Democracy

The logic that applies to the system of democracy should apply also, it is argued, to the internal affairs of the political party organizations themselves. The objective of democracy is that the people should have the right to choose. Through elections, they select and gain control over their political masters. Just as the citizens of a nation are entitled to cast ballots in elections, so the citizens of a political party - the members - should be entitled to select and to reject their leaders, office-holders, and candidates for public office.

Germany is one country where the value of internal party democracy is taken for granted in the Basic Law of 1949. On the subject of political parties, this mandates that '[t]heir internal organization shall conform to democratic principles.' (Article 21, para. 1.)

Internal party democracy was a key demand of the Progressive Party reformers in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century. They complained that corrupt 'bosses' of 'political machines' in many cities and states dominated political party organizations. The bosses stayed in power because they had previously won elective office, or because they controlled a group of office-holders; the office-holders then awarded jobs, public contracts, and other material benefits to their cronies. By this corrupt means, a ruling clique kept a stranglehold over power within the party organization (usually a party organization in a city). The party supporters stood to gain petty favours if they remained obedient to their ward and city leaders, but they had no chance to obtain a say in the affairs of the party.

Following the chaos at the 1968 Presidential Nominating Convention of the Democrats in Chicago, the party determined once again to introduce reforms that would increase the powers of ordinary Democrats, and diminish powers of 'bosses' such as Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago.

Reformers have introduced devices such as the following to improve internal party democracy.

1. Political parties have been required to run their internal affairs in accordance with procedures set out in laws passed by state governments, and subject to review by the courts.

2. There is the primary election. Its purpose is to deny the party leaders and office-holders the power to select the party's nominees as candidates for elective office (for mayor, state governor, U.S. Congressman, etc.) The regulations vary in their details from state to state within the U.S.A. They enable each party's citizens (usually defined as voters who have registered themselves as party supporters) to vote in an internal party election to choose the nominee. See also Regulating Nominations in Majoritarian Systems.

3. When it comes to the nomination of each party's candidate for a presidential election, the process is more complex, but also designed, since 1968, to allow ordinary party supporters to have a say. Delegates at a national convention nominate the candidate. A high proportion of these delegates are selected in their own states, either through a primary election, or through a set of local party meetings. These party meetings must be organized in a way to ensure that voters who are registered party supporters have due notice and are able to participate.

Arguments against Internal Party Democracy

There are two main arguments, one theoretical, the other practical.

First, it may reasonably be argued that the essential feature of democracy involves the choice between a number of political parties, and a variety of candidates. Provided the voter has this choice, the internal structure of each party is immaterial. If a voter does not like the way in which a party runs itself, he has the choice of voting for an alternative party. It is the threat of electoral unpopularity that is the best guarantee against dictatorial and corrupt behaviour by party leaders.

A comparison with economics will illustrate this point. Provided the consumer has the choice between several different shops, or between the services of several different companies, it does not matter how each shop or each company organizes itself. Rather than demand that a company's directors are accountable to its consumers, those consumers - if they are dissatisfied - have the power to take their custom elsewhere. Profiteering and other abuses can flourish only when consumer choice is restricted.

Second, there are practical considerations that make internal party democracy difficult to attain and open to abuse. Whereas a relatively high proportion of eligible voters is likely to participate in general elections, only a small, atypically enthusiastic minority will take part in internal elections such as primaries. Experience shows that those who participate in primary elections are not representative of party supporters in general. They are more ideological and more extreme.

As with some previous and later entries, this one does not attempt to come down on one side or another of what is a complex and continuing debate.

Draft Only

Ensuring Openness, Transparency

Discussions about the need for openness often presume that it is an objective in its own right. However, it is probably better to view it as a means to other ends. Transparency is not always desirable, and therefore does not have the status of an end in itself. In some cases, it may actually be harmful.

The casting of ballots is an example of transparency's harmfulness. The introduction of secret ballots in Australia, and then in other countries, was designed to ensure that voters could vote freely, and without pressure from their bosses. Secrecy was needed to promote the values of fairness and freedom of expression at the polling booth. The point of this illustration is that it shows that transparency is not desirable when it conflicts with more basic objectives.

In many cases, transparency is desirable because it is a guard against corruption. It promotes accountability and trust in the electoral process. It also applies to donations to political parties and candidates, see also Desirability of Disclosure of Political Donations, Disclosure Regulations and Campaign Expenditure Disclosures.

Improper rewards to donors are much less likely if political contributions have to be declared to the authorities and published.

A controversial openness issue is the personal lives of politicians and their families. To what extent should their tastes, finances, and sexual proclivities be respected as private? See Freedom of Speech.

Draft Only

Accountability

'Accountability' seems at first sight to be more technical, and less interesting than some of the other guiding principles. Yet, it is vital. Each candidate and party must have reasonable assurance that its rivals have obeyed the rules. Ordinary voters and the press also need to be confident of this. Confidence in the integrity of the electoral process requires efficient and accountable administration.

If electoral fraud is to be avoided, the authorities responsible for drawing up the electoral roll, for organizing the ballot on polling day, and for counting and collating the votes, need to be able to explain and justify their procedures.

If there are to be limits on the permitted campaign spending by each candidate, there must be regulations about the procedures to be followed, in order to ensure that the limits are not overstepped.

If public funds are given to assist political parties and candidates, there must be sufficiently rigorous accounting standards to create confidence that the funds have been properly used, see also Regulating Parties and Candidates.

If regulations require donors to parties and candidates to declare their gifts, mechanisms for recording contributions must be put into place.

Problems of Assuring Accountability

First, some regulations require complicated, expensive administrative mechanisms. For instance, a rule that requires political contributions above a certain threshold to be recorded and publicly listed will probably prove difficult to administer. These difficulties will face both the candidates and the political parties, and the authorities responsible for policing the regulations. See also Breaches and penalties.

In the United States, some of the regulations involving campaign financing have become so complex and difficult to administer that candidates have been obliged to employ additional accountants and lawyers. The regulations have posed special difficulties for fringe parties, and for candidates with small budgets and a limited capacity to employ professional staffs to ensure compliance with the laws.

When legislators consider legal reforms concerning parties and candidates, they need to be aware of the administrative consequences of any new laws. The logic of requiring high standards of accountability is that care should be taken to foresee, and to avoid, rules that are unnecessarily hard to comply with and to police.

A vivid illustration is the following example taken from a note sent in 1997 from the Australian Electoral Commission to International IDEA about the implications of a problem faced by foreign officials responsible for helping to administer elections in Cambodia. This resulted from the requirement

that each party should have 5,000 members who were registered voters:

...because of the volume of names involved - around 100,000 - computerized checking had to be used ... This, however, intersected with a second problem, the lack of a standard method of rendering a particular name in Khmer text, which meant that a name as captured on the list of voters might well be spelt differently in Khmer from the name of the same person as captured on a party's list of its own members. Of course, when the names are spelled differently, the computer is unlikely to find a match. This ... was very messy to sort out. The Cambodian case illustrates a principle...: it is one thing to have what looks on the face of it like a sensible legal requirement; it is quite another thing to be able to implement it in practice, and an unworkable or unenforceable law merely brings itself into discredit.

Second, accountability and free speech are likely to conflict with each other. This is illustrated by the strict expense limits on campaign spending by candidates in parliamentary elections in Britain. In theory, a candidate could evade the limits by arranging unofficially for friends to issue supposedly independent propaganda favouring him or attacking an opponent. In order to eliminate the possibility of such 'independent' expenditure, the law introducing spending limits also provided for a ban on independent spending. All spending must be authorized, either by the candidate or by an 'agent' formally appointed by the candidate. All campaign literature must bear the name of the person responsible for its production, so that there can be no doubt as to whether it has or has not been authorized by the candidate or the candidate's agent.

Yet, there is clearly a heavy price to pay for ensuring accountability for each candidate's campaign budget. Genuinely independent individuals and interest groups, that might otherwise wish to express their views by printing and distributing their own campaign literature, pay the price.

Draft Only

Checks and Balances

The principle of 'checks and balances' is, in one respect, similar to that of openness. 'Checks and balances' are not an end in themselves, but an instrument to assure other objectives, such as fairness, controlling corruption, and so forth.

In Lord Acton's famous words: 'Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.' Control over the administration of the electoral process bestows such a measure of power that it is dangerous to leave it unchecked. The abuse of power may sometimes be deliberate. Incumbent governments and legislators may consciously aim to bend electoral rules to their own advantage. Electoral administrators answerable to them may find it difficult to maintain their neutrality. In addition, even if those in power do not intentionally manipulate the rules, they will be tempted to do so unconsciously. As discussed in Level Playing Field, Fairness, there are so many alternative interpretations of what constitutes 'fairness' that office-holders will be tempted to use the interpretations closest to their partisan interest.

One way to keep the temptations of governments and legislative majorities under control is to vest authority over electoral administration in the hands of civil servants with a strong tradition of political neutrality. An additional method is to ensure that the established power structure is subject to review and to criticism.

The two main 'balances' are:

political parties and candidates, and
a free media and press.

Political parties, and candidates for public office have the strongest possible incentive to make sure that their opponents play the political game according to the rules. For instance, if one candidate or one local party organization tries to cheat when it comes to including names on the electoral roll (perhaps by persuading supporters to include the names of former voters who have moved or died), then the opposing candidate or party should investigate the electoral register, and object to names which should not be included. Traditionally, the British system of electoral registration has relied to a considerable extent on political parties to act as detectives of unfair practices.

Similarly, on polling day in Britain, each party organization tries to organize a roster of members to stand outside each polling station. One function of these poll-watchers (who are usually local residents) is to check whether there is any indication of impersonation, or some other manifestation of electoral fraud. The training and deployment of poll-watchers by the competing parties is especially important when elections are being held in a new democracy. If fraud or undue pressure is likely to be observed and reported, then the chances are that there will be fewer attempts to cheat.

The existence of competing political parties is not always a guarantee that they will check each other. Sometimes, opponents will collude in breaking the law. In Britain, there is evidence that spending by candidates of all the main parties in partial elections was, at least until the 1980s, so blatantly above the legally permitted ceiling, that there was a conspiracy of silence. Accusations by one candidate risked triggering counter-accusations. In such situations, the task of blowing the whistle on illegal practices - of providing checks and balances - is left either to candidates of fringe parties or, failing this, to the press.

A free press is often the most important check against electoral malpractice. For instance, regulations about the disclosure of political donations depend for their effectiveness mainly on reports and comments in the newspapers on the information revealed in official documents and files.

Draft Only

Administrative Implications

Laws and rules involving political parties, candidates, and electoral systems may have profound administrative consequences. Therefore, administrative realities need to be taken into account when decisions about such regulations are being made. This applies especially, but not exclusively, to decisions about election timetables. Even if there are pressing political reasons in a country to hold early elections, an unrealistic timetable may be a recipe for chaos.

According to one view, considerations of fairness and efficiency require that the dates of elections should be fixed in advance, and should not be at the discretion of the government of the day. However, the practical and theoretical arguments about fixed versus variable election dates are not clear-cut.

Approaches to the Administration of Parties and Candidates

It is useful to contrast the traditional approach, which involved 'light' administration and minimal interference in the electoral process, and a more modern (though not necessarily better) approach that involves 'heavier' administration and far more detailed regulations.

In the nineteenth century, the state intervened relatively little in running elections. Certainly, the police were often needed to control the brawls and the drunkenness that accompanied the poll, especially as long as votes were public (as in Britain until 1872), and when candidates still plied voters with liquor and other 'treats'. The law courts were also involved in frequent litigation between rival candidates.

However, the main tasks of election management were still in the hands of the 'private sector'. Candidates and newly-emerging political party organizations took the main responsibility for registering voters and objecting to the registration of those placed on the list by their political opponents. Candidates (with occasional assistance from their party organizations) were liable for the heavy costs of running election campaigns; state aid for campaign costs was still well into the future. Candidates in some countries, such as Britain, were even expected to share between them the costs of the returning officers who ran the polling booths. The reasoning was that no election would have been necessary - and thus the costs of administering the poll would have been avoided - if candidates had refrained from presenting themselves to the voters. Therefore, the candidate should bear the responsibility for the costs of electoral administration. Finally, candidates who succeeded in winning seats in the legislature were expected to pay their own living costs; parliamentary salaries too were a thing of the future.

By the present time, public authorities in most countries are responsible for the tasks of registering voters, for running and paying for the administration of elections, for subsidizing the campaign costs of candidates and parties, for paying not only for the salaries of legislators but also for the costs of party groups and their staffs within the legislature, and in some places even for setting and enforcing rules about the internal organization and running of political parties. Scholars and commentators have even referred to the emergence in some countries of a 'party-state' - a system where political parties are so closely regulated and funded by the state that they cease, in effect, to operate as independent, voluntary bodies.

Contrasting Divisions of Responsibilities

Approaches to the administration of parties, candidates and elections depend not only on whether the regulatory system is 'light' or heavy'; they also vary in the way in which responsibilities are divided between central and local authorities, and between different institutions.

Local versus Central Administration

In countries such as Britain, the central authority responsible for administering elections (a government ministry called the Home Office) is inactive. Virtually all of the responsibility for tasks such as voter registration, and the running of polling stations, rests with district Governments, a low level tier of local authorities. By contrast, in Australia, there is a highly centralized electoral commission. This commission is not part of a government ministry, but is an indepedndent and powerful institution.

The United States is an example of a system with both centralized and highly decentralized elements. A special Federal Election Commission is an important body when it comes to administering regulations concerning the financing of federal elections. However, many aspects of party and election law are the responsibility of state governments.

Adversarial versus Bureaucratic Approaches

The 'adversarial' approach refers to a system such as that which existed until the 1990s in Britain, where it is usually left to candidates and to political parties to bring legal actions against opponents whom they suspect of infringing the rules. The 'bureaucratic' approach refers to a system, such as that of Australia or Canada, where there exists a powerful bureaucracy devoted specifically to the administration of election laws and to their enforcement, also see Approaches to Regulating Parties and Candidates.

Constitutional Provisions and Bills of Rights

It has become virtually standard practice for ordinary legislation in a country about political and electoral matters to be subject to principles - such as 'free speech' - set out in that country's constitution or in a specially-entrenched bill of rights. This may lead to legal challenges against electoral laws and party laws before the relevant constitutional courts. The United States, Canada, Germany, and Britain are examples of countries where there have been (or currently are) such challenges.

Administrative Implications: Specific Measures and Rules

Some rules and measures that may have especially significant administrative implications are:

The Electoral Register

Different methods of registration have vital administrative implications. In countries where the task of drawing up an accurate register is simply too onerous, it may be practical to adopt a 'second best' strategy of abandoning the effort, and relying instead on indelible ink to ensure that, at the very least, a person can cast only one vote. A problem with indelible ink, even if it succeeds in avoiding multiple voting, is that it may not ensure that those who are under age cannot vote. Where there are large communities of migrant workers who are citizens of another country, many of them may also be able to cast votes, although not entitled to do so.

The administrative complexity of voter registration may depend also on whether lists drawn up for other purposes are used for electoral purposes. In some countries of continental Europe, all residents must register with the local authorities. Such information (as well as the internal passports required in some former Soviet countries) may be usable with little trouble as a base for voter registration. In some countries, such a method smacks of the 'police state' and has proved unacceptable to the public.

Signatures Required for Nomination of Candidates

Regulations that require or allow candidates to secure a place on the ballot by collecting a number of voters' signatures are usually harder to administer than systems that require financial deposits. Moreover, the administrative task of checking that the signatures of those supporting a nomination are valid obviously becomes greater the more signatures that are required. Also see Signatures and Deposits and Signatures.

Rules Relating to the Disclosure of Political Donations

Administrative implications of such regulations depend largely on the threshold above which donations must be declared. If the threshold is high (as in Germany), only a few donations must be declared. Where the threshold is low - as in the United States and Canada - the list of donors will be much longer and will involve more administration. The administrative task will grow if the authorities are required to draw up lists in ways that make it easy for members of the public to search through them with ease - if, for example, the names and addresses of donors must be given, and the lists must be made available for computer-assisted searches (as is the practice of the U.S. Federal Election Commission).

Administrative Implications for Parties and Candidates

It is not only public bureaucracies that must face the administrative consequences of electoral rules and regulations. They may have a direct impact on parties and candidates. A frequent complaint in the United States is that the rules regarding campaign financing have become so complex and the possibility of innocent breaches so real that candidates are forced to spend a significant percentage of their campaign budgets on employing professional lawyers and accountants. This may deter candidates from new or small parties from presenting themselves for election, and may thus inhibit political participation.

Cost Implications

The cost implications of laws and rules relating to political parties, candidates, and elections are similar, but not identical to the administrative implications that have been outlined, see Administrative Implications. Broadly speaking, state intervention often involves heavy costs.

Particularly high costs are associated with electoral registration, and with the public financing of political parties and candidates' election campaigns. The costs of administering some types of regulations, such as those involving the disclosure of political donations, may also be relatively high.

Arguably, the 'bureaucratic' approach to administration (which involves the creation of special central election commissions) is generally more costly than the 'adversarial' system (where it is generally left to candidates and parties to bring legal actions against opponents), see Approaches to Regulating Parties and Candidates.

High Cost of Public Financing of Parties and Candidates

Levels of public financing of parties and candidates vary, see Costs and Public Responses. In Russia, public funding exists, but on an insignificant scale. By contrast, public financing has become the most important single source of political money in a number of countries, and, as a fair generalization, it is very costly. To give an extreme example, the overall amount spent in Germany on a whole variety of different forms of public financing is in the region of DM 1 billion a year. (This is higher than the total cited in Costs and Public Responses, which includes only limited categories of public funding.) Moreover, roughly the same amount is spent in election years as in non-election years. During the cycle between one federal election and the next, public financing of political activities of parties and candidates amounts to a total in the region of DM 4 billion. This is equivalent to some DM 70 (US$ 40) per voter.

When an official committee set up in Britain in the 1970s went to Sweden to investigate that country's system of public financing of parties, some members later reported that 'one distinguished Swedish politician told us, in what was intended to be a piece of helpful advice: 'Start small - you can always increase it later.'' This story encapsulates the suspicion of opponents of public financing of parties and candidates that it is an inherently expensive business. Nevertheless, such financing has become normal, see Direct.

Low Cost Regulations

Sometimes it is much cheaper to provide benefits in kind to candidates and parties than to make financial payments to them. The prime example of this is the regulation that exists in many countries permitting parties and candidates access to free broadcasting time on television and radio. Often the broadcasting networks are obliged to provide this facility as a public service. Indirectly, it is the broadcasting organizations, rather than the taxpayers, who must meet the costs of this broadcasting time or, at any rate, must forego the freedom and the benefits they would have received by using such time for their normal programmes.

Cost Implications of Electoral Management and Subsidy in Australia

The following statistics indicate the relative costs of different administrative items incurred in 1992-93 for the Parliamentary Elections by the Australian Electoral Commission. Figures are given in thousands of Australian dollars.

Salaries	20 828
Administrative Expenses	7 007
Property Operating Expenses	7 594
Electoral Roll Review	6 454
Public Funding of Political Parties	14 162

Total Expenditures from Appropriations 56,045

Source: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, p. 31.

Draft Only

Social and Political Context

The regulation of parties and candidates is greatly affected by the social and political context within which elections take place. It is useful to distinguish a wide variety of influences.

Social Influences versus Political Influences

There is a long-standing debate among political scientists about the relative influence of each country's political rules and social structure on the number of political parties and the way they operate.

For example, countries on the Continent of Europe have multi-party systems whereas Britain, the United States, and some countries in the former British Commonwealth have what approximate to two-party systems. Does this result from the political rules in these two sets of countries - namely, that the British and U.S. systems have been based on single-member, first-past-the-post electoral systems, while Continental European countries have tended to have systems of proportional representation? Or does Continental multi-partism result from social factors - particularly from the social fragmentation in these countries according to language, religion, as well as class divisions?

For the purposes of a study of the regulation of parties and elections, the details of this debate are less important than the common-sense conclusion that both social and political factors are important.

For example, in first-past-the-post systems, regulations will tend to involve individual candidates for legislative office rather than political parties. This is because elections take the form of a set of contests in single-member electoral districts. Under proportional representation, elections are primarily a contest between parties. Hence, parties will need to be registered, and their central and regional organizations will tend to have a greater influence over the selection of candidates.

Political institutions have other effects on the regulation of elections. If elections are held at fixed times, their administration will be different than if elections may be called at relatively short notice by the government of the day. For instance, the imposition and administration of spending limits on candidates and on parties will pose different problems according to whether or not there are fixed term parliaments. Obviously, regulation will also be affected by whether or not there are presidential as well as legislative elections. And so on.

There are also important social influences on the tasks of administration and regulation. Some of these are as basic as the question of population density. In Canada, parties and elections must be administered both in major concentrations of population, such as Toronto, and in the remote and vast areas of the far North, where one voter may live hours, or days, away from the nearest polling station. Other significant social factors include language (does the electorate consist of speakers of one language, or of several separate language groups?); and modes of communication (postage versus telephone versus broadcasting versus door-to-door canvassing as means of reaching voters and party members).

The simple conclusion is that regulations must relate to the political rules, as well as the social context of each country where they are to be applied. Regulations that work well in one country may not be suited to another.

Stages of Economic Development

Research by S. M. Lipset and others has indicated that democracy is more likely to exist and to work well in countries where the level of economic development is relatively high. Certainly, it seems reasonable to argue that democratic institutions are likely to operate more easily in countries in which levels of literacy and education are relatively high, and these tend to be the richer countries. See also Historical Review.

However, this argument needs to be treated with considerable caution. Neither an advanced economic infrastructure nor a developed educational system is necessary for a successful democracy. Nor are they any guarantee of democracy. Some of the twentieth century's greatest tyrannies have existed in 'advanced' nations - Hitler's Nazi regime in Germany is the most notorious example. By contrast, the world's largest democracy - India - is a poor country.

Apart from economic development, the social traditions of a country concerning such issues as tolerance are significant.

Violence and Ethnic Hatreds

The operation of democratic institutions is understandably much harder if there are deep-seated social divisions, and if there is an atmosphere of violence. To give a simple example, political parties are capable of playing important roles in the administration of elections by arranging for party representatives to be present at each polling station to report any possible breach of the rules or any cheating. Yet, it will be difficult for an opposition party to recruit poll watchers in districts where citizens fear for their safety and their livelihoods if they openly assist that party.

Similarly, laws about the disclosure of political donations are reasonable and arguably beneficial in many countries. But such laws will act as a deterrent to legitimate contributions in countries where citizens are, with good cause, frightened to identify themselves publicly as supporters of an unpopular party.

These examples are not intended to suggest that it is impossible, or that it is always wrong, to try to hold elections in violent situations. What they suggest is that rules in such conditions must be adapted to take account of them. For instance, if it is virtually impossible to devise a fair system to regulate political donations, an alternative regulatory strategy may be to ensure that the rival parties and candidates have fair access to television. In addition, conditions of deep-rooted conflict may call for codes of conduct see Codes of Conduct for Political Parties, or international assistance.

Social Conditions and Electoral Fraud

The social conditions that prevail in a country are likely to influence decisions about anti-corruption measures versus measures to encourage political participation. If the dangers of electoral fraud are believed to be insignificant, then it is rational to take decisions about electoral registration and similar matters that will promote a maximum degree of participation.

For instance, 'election day registration' (i.e. rules that permit electors to vote even if they have not been included on the voters' rolls beforehand) will allow people to cast their ballots who would otherwise have been unable to do so. The problem with 'election day registration' is that it is hard to check the credentials of those turning up at a polling station and claiming the right to vote. Certainly, it becomes impossible for representatives of political parties to enter objections to particular would-be voters and for the administrative authorities to rule on the objections. Therefore, 'election day registration' is poorly suited to conditions where there are realistic suspicions about the possibilities of significant voting frauds.

The impact of social conditions on electoral administration is seen in the variations between the rules within the United Kingdom governing elections in Northern Ireland - an area affected by violence, ethnic tensions, and a reputed history of electoral frauds - and elections in England, Scotland, and Wales. Here, fewer precautions are seen to be necessary.

Using Appropriate Technologies

Some technologies are easily applied in virtually all countries. A conference held in Manila in January 1997, and jointly organized by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), demonstrated that some advanced technologies were already in use in relatively 'undeveloped' nations. In 1997, for instance, the computerization of electoral registers was more advanced in the Philippines than in Britain.

Nevertheless, some other Western technologies are inappropriate. For instance, the postal services within a considerable number of countries are unable to reach the entire population or even a high percentage of it. An overseas consultant who visited a West African country and lectured political party officials on the use of direct mail techniques of communication and fund-raising developed in Western countries, was told by one local official that 'if I write a letter to my mother who lives 100 miles from the capital, it may take four months to reach her.' In much of Africa, as well as parts of the Caribbean, the application of modern computer techniques still proves impractical. Many communities lack electricity, telephones, and even radios. In another, possibly mythical case, an Asian development agency gave a set of fax machines to political organizers in a territory in the South Pacific. Upon discovering six months later that these machines had remained unused, members of the donor agency made inquiries and discovered that the faxes had not been used because the islands to which they had been sent did not have any telephone services.

Draft Only

Historical Review

In the nineteenth century elections and political parties developed the form that is recognizable today. It was during that time that the franchise - the right to vote - steadily expanded in a number of (mainly European and North American) countries. See also Political Organisations.

There had, of course, been elections before that time, but the number of voters had usually been so small that candidates could appeal to them on a more or less individual basis, and without the necessity of party organizations. Also, there had been political parties before the nineteenth century, but normally they had consisted of factions within the legislature. It was only with the growth of electorates that the need arose for extra-parliamentary party organizations to help to run the new, extended election campaigns. The widening of the franchise also meant that it became more difficult for candidates to campaign as independents; a party label became a key to success at the polls.

The Spread of Democratization

Since the nineteenth century, democracy has spread in two main ways. First, it has spread within those countries that were already partly democratic. Second, it has spread to a large number of new countries. It is nevertheless a mistake to view the flow of recent history as a simple progress towards a democratic nirvana. Democracies have been destroyed as well as created. Noble experiments in popular self-government have been accompanied by the worst tyrannies in history, and by some of the most pernicious doctrines of all time - most notably those popularized in Hitler's Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Richard Katz cites statistics to illustrate the deepening of democracies within the countries from which democracy initially emerged. He shows that, even in countries where competitive elections already existed, it took a succession of developments during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to establish the principle of the United Nations of a universal right of adult citizens to the vote. In most countries, voting rights were initially restricted to male property-owners. In Britain, a series of Reform Acts extended the franchise in 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928, and 1948. The percentage of the total population entitled to vote in some of the pioneering democracies is shown in the following table (the figures do not approach 100 percent since they include children as well as adults).

	1840	1900	1930	1950	1980
Belgium	-1	22	30	65	70
Britain	-4	16	66	68	75
France	-0.4	29	28	61	67
Netherlands	-4	12	51	56	72
Norway	-8	-9	57	66	74
Sweden	-7	-8	61	66	74

(Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, table 13.3.)

As far as the geographical spread of democracy is concerned, Joshua Muravchik has traced 'a gradual and ragged advance of democracy.' (Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1991, p.73.) When 'modern democracy' was born in the United States in 1776, the right to vote was restricted to less than one million white males who, in some states, were also required to be property owners. It took some time for democratic constitutionalism to spread. Beside the developments in Britain and its (mainly white) Dominions, the revolutionary spasm in Europe in 1848 led to a spread of democracy in much of Europe. In Latin America, too, there was some notable democratic progress in the decades before the First World War.

After a shaky period between the two World Wars, democracy resumed its advance from the time of the defeat of Hitler and his allies in 1945. Not only was democracy restored in Germany, Austria, and Italy, but it was created in Japan. The widespread breakdown of colonial rule, most notably in India, led to the creation of a new wave of democracies, although in some newly-independent states, one party rule and military dictatorship became all too common. In Latin America, too, dictatorships destroyed democracies in many countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1970s the emergence of democratic government in Portugal and Spain heralded what has come to be known as a 'third wave' of democratization. This includes the re-emergence of elective democracies in many Latin American, and some Asian and African countries, as well as the fall of the Soviet Union and its replacement by states committed to competitive elections. According to the New York research institute, Freedom House, 61 of 167 of the world's sovereign states, comprising about 39 percent of the world's population, lived in free, democratic states. (Muravchik, p. 80.)

The Development of Elections and Political Parties

The growth of political parties was, according to a conventional view of political scientists, a result of the spread of elections. Extra-parliamentary organizations became necessary to make elective democracy work. Political parties, at least those in Western democracies, came to fulfil at least six functions. These were:

Structuring the vote:

Voters came to base their voting choices less on the qualities of individual candidates and more on the image of the party under whose label or banner they presented themselves.

The integration and mobilization of the mass public:

Membership of political parties and participation in their activities came to provide an important form of civic involvement by citizens, and thus helped to strengthen civic values; political parties also played the main role in the organization of election campaigns.

The recruitment of political leaders:

The selection of candidates for parliament and, if a party won office, for the top government positions was a party function.

The organization of government:

When a party won power, it could normally expect its supporters in the legislature to vote on party lines to ensure that its policies were accepted.

The formation of public policy:

Party organizations, especially their research departments, were a significant source of new policy ideas that then became government policy.

The aggregation of interests:

In order to win votes, parties had to persuade voters to support them on a variety of issues. In this respect, parties differed from 'single issue' pressure groups.

It is vital to bear in mind that this list refers to the roles of parties belonging to multi-party systems. Organizations called 'political parties' also existed in non-democratic systems - the Nazi Party, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were examples. 'Parties' were prominent, too, in the one-party states common in Africa following independence from colonial rule. Non-democratic parties have sometimes fulfilled one or more of the above functions. Yet, they are essentially different from democratic parties: they are much closer to the apparatus of the state, and they do not have to compete against other parties in free and fair elections.

The Growth of Media-Centred Electioneering

Since the 1960s, observers have remarked ever more frequently on the gradual decline in the importance of political parties in competitive democracies. The 'decline of party' thesis need not mean that parties have become unimportant. However, it does suggest that they have become considerably less important than before. The decline of party is evident in their decreasing memberships in many countries. There is evidence too that voters are no longer as loyal to party labels as they once were; the qualifications and images of individual candidates have become more significant. This is especially the case in some countries with a majoritarian electoral system.

Social and technological reasons have been given for this apparent decline of party loyalties. When a high proportion of voters worked in factories, the divide in the work place between workers on the one hand, and owners and managers on the other hand, led naturally to a divide of political loyalties along class lines. While class loyalties remained the main basis of allegiance to political parties, voters were likely (it is argued) to remain loyal to a single party. However, social changes have meant that ever fewer people work in heavy industry. Class lines have fractured and, with them, automatic party loyalties. These social changes have affected much of the industrialized world. Ethnic factors are strong determinants of party allegiance in many developing countries and in some economically advanced societies too.

The main technological development is the advent of television. In the past, electoral success depended to a large extent on the efficiency of local party organizers. They were (again, according to commonly accepted, but possibly exaggerated arguments) the main link between the party leaders and ordinary voters. Now that television has come into almost every home, party leaders no longer need the services of local party organizers. The essential skills in modern elections are those of media advisers, opinion polling experts, and advertising men. This is certainly the case in many industrialized countries. The extent to which similar skills are applicable in less developed nations is a matter of controversy.

The decline of traditional party organization and the growing importance of political marketing have made election campaigns more costly. This is one reason why politicians have arranged in a large number of countries for subventions to parties from public funds. As with the other trends outlined above, there is considerably less evidence about trends in political financing in less developed countries than in industrially advanced countries.

Draft Only

Additional resources

Organizations

The Anti Corruption Resource Centre - ACRC, focused on Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. http://www.transparency.org/acrc/index.htm

Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Germany. http://www.fes.de/

The GRC Exchange, hosted by the Governance Resource Centre, UK. http://www.grc-exchange.org/g_themes/politicalsystems_parties.htm

International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), USA. http://www.ifes.org/

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Germany. Internet site in English, French and Spanish. http://www.kas.de/

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), USA. http://www.ndi.org/

Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Netherlands. http://www.nimd.org/

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). http://www.osce.org/

Organization of American States (OEA). http://www.oas.org/

Transparency International (TI). Internet site in English, French, German, Portuguese and Spanish. http://www.transparency.org/

Westminster Foundation for Democracy, UK. http://www.wfd.org/

Electoral Management Bodies

Australian Election Commission. http://www.aec.gov.au/

Elections Canada. http://www.elections.ca/

UK Electoral Commission. http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/

US Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov/

Journals

Comparative Political Studies. http://www.sagepub.com/journal.aspx?pid=84

Comparative Politics. http://www.jstor.org/journals/00104159.htm

Democratization. http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/dem.htm

Electoral Studies. http://www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

Journal of Democracy. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/

The Journal of Politics. http://www.jstor.org/journals/00223816.htm

Party Politics. http://www.partypolitics.org

Political Studies. http://www.politicalstudies.org/

Regulating Parties and Candidates

There are compelling reasons why parties and candidates need to be regulated, but equally strong reasons why the complexity, burden, and cost of the regulations should be limited.

The Need for Regulations: Basic Considerations

First, political organizations such as parties, as well as individual candidates for elective office, are, and need to be, subject to the ordinary laws of the land. If a party official steals money from party funds, or if a candidate commits a physical assault, they cannot be immune from the ordinary laws relating to theft and to violent behaviour. Similarly, political parties are subject, like other organizations, to the relevant laws and regulations relating to the payment of taxes.

Second, in countries where parties have a special role in the electoral process - as in those with list systems of proportional representation - the status of parties needs to be regulated.

Third, the fact that parties compete in elections means that confusion is likely, unless each party has a right to protect its name and (if relevant) its logo or symbol from imitators. Such protection is the equivalent in the field of competitive elections to the protection given in the field of business to company trademarks and symbols. In the marketplace, lack of trademark regulation will result in the risk that consumers will accept shoddy goods that are packaged and marked to give the impression that they are the genuine article. In politics, unknown candidates and unpopular parties may - unless regulated - seek to gain votes by adopting the names, symbols, and colours of popular ones.

Fourth, where financial assistance, subsidies-in-kind (such as free access to television), or other special privileges are given to parties and candidates, it is necessary to define and to regulate the organizations and individuals to whom such benefits are given. For example, if donations to political parties have tax benefits, what is to stop all variety of organizations calling themselves 'parties' merely to take advantage of such provisions? The only way to enable genuine parties and candidates to receive public funding and other benefits is to define and to regulate them.

Basic Arguments against Over-Regulation

While some limited degree of regulation is vital, the freedom and vigour of political activity makes it desirable to restrict the scope of regulations as far as is practical.

First, even where regulations are intended to produce a level playing field, there is the underlying danger that they will benefit some parties at the expense of others. With the best will in the world, it is hard to devise neutral regulations. In fact, the ruling authorities of the day make the regulations, and these authorities (whether they consist of a dominant leader, a party, or a coalition of parties) will be tempted to devise regulations that have an appearance of fairness, but which actually work to their own advantage.

Second, regulations may be extremely costly. In some countries the public funding of political parties has reached alarming proportions. Electoral administration does not come cheap, either.

Third, and this point is more controversial, where parties are highly regulated and subsidized, they have a tendency to become excessively bureaucratic. In some countries, such as Germany and Austria, there have been complaints of a 'party-state'. In other words, political parties are so closely regulated, and so heavily subsidized, that they are more like government departments than independent organizations. They are more dependent on state subventions than the services provided by ordinary party members.

Extensive restriction on campaign practice, including penalties, while ostensibly to punish illegal activity and make elections fair, can be used (misused) to favour incumbent reelection by making it difficult for new candidates to get their name known to their voters.

Draft Only

Different Types of Regulation

Direct versus Indirect Regulations

Countries differ greatly in the extent to which political parties are recognized in their constitutions and their laws. In Germany, for example, Article 21 of the Basic Law (or Constitution) mentions the role of parties:

(1) The political parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization shall conform to democratic principle. They shall publicly account for the sources and use of their funds and for their assets.

(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality.

In the United States the internal operations of political parties are subject to detailed legal regulation, as well as to review by the Supreme Court.

In contrast to these examples of direct legal regulation of political parties, there are other countries where parties are not now - or have not been in the past - recognized by the law. Legally, they are no different from any other association or club. They are subject to the rules governing such voluntary associations. For instance, in Belgium,

[p]olitical parties are de facto associations and do not have legal personality; hence their accounts are not subject to any fiscal control.

In Ireland,

[p]olitical parties are generally regarded as unincorporated associations or private voluntary organizations and their existence is not regulated by law.

The situation is similar in Luxembourg³.

Categories of Regulations

Regulations relating to parties versus regulations relating to candidates for office.

The campaigning activities of candidates are normally subject to election laws. The regulation of political parties may also be subject to the same laws but, in addition, there may be separate parties' laws.

Regulations relating to election campaigns versus regulations relating to the routine activities of political parties.

Regulations relating to party groups with the legislature versus rules concerning extra-parliamentary party organizations.

Regulations concerning politics and broadcasting.

How to Find Existing Regulations

The country's electoral laws are the first place to look for regulations relating to political parties and candidates. But the search should not stop there. In many countries laws mentioning parties are found in several different parts of the statute book.

The need to search in a variety of places - including unexpected ones - for party-related laws is illustrated by the recent situation in Britain⁴. For example:

The restriction on paid political advertising on television is laid down in the Television Act, 1954, s 3(1).

The special restrictions on donations to political parties by trade unions and employers' associations derive from Trade Union Acts from 1913 onwards.

Special requirements relating to the disclosure of donations to parties and to other political payments by companies derive from Companies Acts from 1967 onwards.

The legal status of the Conservative Party was defined only by the Courts as the by-product of an obscure legal case in which the Conservative Central Office appealed against the inspector of taxes for the right to pay income tax rather than corporation tax on its investment income.

The legal definition of 'political party' was given in the equally obscure Finance Act, 1975, part 1 (11)(2) which defined the conditions under which exemptions from capital transfer tax (i.e. inheritance tax) could be claimed for bequests to political parties.

Draft Only

Approaches to Regulating Parties and Candidates

It is convenient to distinguish between two different approaches: the 'adversarial model' and the 'bureaucratic model.' Until 1997, the regulation of British elections was based on the 'adversarial model.' Canada, Australia, and the United States are examples of the 'bureaucratic model.' In practice, the distinctions are not absolute, but they are nevertheless real enough.

Britain

In Britain, there has been relatively little legal regulation of the internal workings of political parties. Decisions concerning procedures for the selection of candidates for parliamentary and local government elections have normally been left to the parties themselves. Moreover, it has usually been up to the rival candidates and parties to initiate legal proceedings against each other if they feel that the laws concerning candidates' election expenses have been violated, or if they are convinced that their opponents have been guilty of other matters involving illegal or corrupt practices.

Under this tradition, the Home Office, the government ministry responsible for the conduct of elections, has been relatively inactive. Only a very small staff at its London headquarters is assigned to take care of such issues. Therefore, the day-to-day responsibility for electoral management has been left to local government officials. But neither have they normally taken the initiative in bringing prosecutions for alleged offences of the electoral laws. They have relied on aggrieved rivals to do this. However, candidates and political parties have sometimes been deterred from challenging their opponents because of the heavy costs involved in bringing cases before the courts.

There is normally a special office responsible for administering elections in countries following the 'bureaucratic model.' The office is well staffed. It is far more pro-active. Typically, the electoral office issues 'advisory opinions' and guidelines about unclear matters of electoral law so that candidates and parties will know in advance what is or is not permitted. The electoral office is also likely to be more active in bringing legal charges against candidates and parties who appear to have committed offences. This relieves opposing candidates of the responsibility and cost of doing so.

Under the bureaucratic model, administration may be highly centralized or less centralized. In the less centralized versions, there are independent electoral bureaucracies at the sub-national level (as in Canada). In other versions, the national electoral office has wide-ranging responsibilities for managing a set of regional and local offices.

Advantages of the Alternative Approaches

The advantages of the 'bureaucratic model' are that it offers clarity to candidates and parties, and that it takes away from them the cost and the burden of bringing legal cases against their opponents. Arguably, it also produces more thorough and more effective administration. In addition, the adversarial model is hardly to deal with legislation, concerning, for example, national limits on party expenditures. Legislation of this kind makes it necessary to establish some system of centralized control of parties, and thus makes the bureaucratic model more suitable.

Disadvantages of the Alternative Approaches

The 'bureaucratic model' also has disadvantages:

A free-standing agency devoted to electoral administration is likely to acquire a bureaucratic momentum of its own and to try to increase its staff beyond an optimal size. This may prove costly for taxpayers.

The electoral agency is subject to political pressures. It faces the threat that if it initiates prosecutions that are unpopular among leading members of the legislature, the legislature may restrict its funds. Moreover, the appointment of senior officials of the agency may become a bone of contention among politicians. If a compromise is reached about these appointments - with a share going to each main political party - the decision-making process within the agency may be politicized.

Though guidelines and advisory opinions may be helpful to candidates and to party organizers, they may also be highly detailed and technical. This will make it hard for candidates and parties to comply with the regulations without employing teams of expensive lawyers and accountants. Moreover, bureaucratic complexities will hurt small or new parties.

Overcentralization of electoral management may also hinder experimentation.

Draft Only

Common Problems in Regulating Parties and Candidates

There are common problems in the process of drawing up regulations and implementing them.

Some Common Problems concerning Rule-Making

The problem of controlling the use of governmental powers to gain unfair electoral advantages for the ruling party, see Election Campaigns.

Even if opportunities to show party political advertisements are fairly allocated among the rival parties, the government will often be able to use its influence or control over state-owned media to ensure that it has unfair advantages when it comes to news reports, current affairs programmes, and other types of broadcasts.

When it comes to allocating public contracts, or major expenditures on social welfare, the government may use its prerogatives to concentrate economic benefits on key political areas.

There is considerable scope for any government to gain indirect electoral advantages by using its powers for partisan purposes. It is hard to devise rules concerning elections, parties and candidates that can deal effectively with this problem.

Allocation of broadcasting time to rival parties and candidates.

In view of the great importance of television as a medium of political communication, it is essential to provide fair opportunities for both the governing party and opposition parties to put forward their policies and to present their leaders. It is also important to strike a balance between the rights of large and small, old and new parties. See Level Playing Field, Fairness, Broadcasting Time, Allocation of Time/Resources Issues, Public Broadcasting Allocations and Formulas for Allocating Time.

Fairness versus freedom of expression.

If regulations are to succeed in assuring that rival candidates and opposing political parties have equal financial resources to spend on electioneering ('fairness'), then it will be necessary to restrict the campaigning activities and expenditures of interest groups and other non-party organizations - for these groups may favour one side. Thus it will be necessary to limit freedom of expression in order to guarantee fairness; alternatively, it will be necessary to sacrifice fairness for freedom of expression. This conflict of principles has led to a series of cases tried before constitutional courts in Canada, the United States and elsewhere. See Guiding Principles, Freedom of Speech, Fairness vs.Freedom of Expression, Regulating Campaigns by Interest Groups.

Desirability of disclosure of political donations versus the rights of individuals and institutions to privacy, see Desirability of Disclosure of Political Donations.

Loopholes and unanticipated consequences.

It is extremely difficult to draw up regulations, especially concerning the financing of candidates and political parties, that loopholes can not render ineffective. In country after country, the introduction of new regulations has been followed by the development of new loopholes and new methods of financing politics that escape existing rules. Moreover, regulations frequently have unanticipated consequences. They are like strong drugs with unforeseen side effects: the side effects are sometimes more damaging than the ills the drugs are designed to alleviate. See Regulating Campaigns by Interest Groups.

Common Problems: Implementation of Regulations

Administrative complexity. Democratic elections are inherently burdensome to administer. If for no other reason, this is because they must permit all (or virtually all) adult citizens to participate. In this respect, the implementation of rules relating to elections are somewhat like those concerning taxation, see Administrative Implications.

High costs.

Some common measures regarding candidates and political parties - such as the financing of their activities from the public purse - can be very costly, see Cost Implications.

Sanctions and punishments.

Good laws are of little or no value if they can be flouted with impunity. Implementation of regulations concerning the conduct of elections and the punishment of misdeeds by candidates and parties pose great difficulties. This is, first of all, because the regulations can often be breached in ways that are subtle and hard to detect. Second, the fact that competitive elections involve powerful people and weighty interests means that investigative bodies are under pressure not to investigate too diligently, and enforcement agencies are under strong pressure not to bring prosecutions. This is a crucial and, unfortunately, common difficulty.

Draft Only

Broadcasting Time

Is it fair for a small, fringe party to receive the same allocation of free broadcasting time to put forward its case as a large, popular party?

The guiding principles involved in this difficult question are discussed in an earlier entry, see Level Playing Field, Fairness. Examples of such allocations are given in two later entries, see Public Broadcasting Allocations and Formulas for Allocating Time.

Draft Only

Allocation of Time/Resources Issues

The problem of how the state should allocate subsidies in kind between different candidates and different parties is illustrated by what is usually the most important such benefit in modern elections - free time on television and radio.

Equal Shares

If competitive elections are being held for the first time after a period of non-democratic rule, the only practical and fair way to divide the available free time on television and radio may be to give each party the same share. This is because none of the emerging parties will have a track record, and it will be difficult to establish criteria to judge some to be more significant than others.

Nevertheless, 'equal shares for all' has both theoretical and practical disadvantages as a method to divide broadcasting time, and it can be no more than a temporary expedient. The disadvantages of 'equal shares for all' are:

there may be such a profusion of small political parties that they will be able to obtain no more than a brief amount of time each. It will therefore be almost impossible for electors to distinguish and understand their many messages.
the system will encourage the establishment of minor splinter parties.
the system is likely to benefit an existing regime, whose case is likely to be well known, since the opposition case will be fragmented.

Proportional System

Where a political system is already established, and where changes in public opinion are only gradual, a fair method of dividing time may be on the basis of the proportion of votes gained by each party at the previous general election. However, even this is open to controversy, as discussed in a previous entry, see Level Playing Field, Fairness.

Other Allocation Methods

Where democratic elections have become established, but where there are sharp changes in the shape of public opinion, and possibly newly emerging political parties, an attachment to an allocation of time based on previous electoral performance may unduly handicap parties which are new or which have greatly increased their appeal (as seen in partial elections or in opinion polls or in some other way) since the previous general election.

Israel and Britain (see Formulas for Allocating Time) use allocation methods that take account of such changes.

In Israel, the allocation of broadcasting time is based on a compromise between the status quo and the new situation.

[e]ach party, including those which were not represented in the previous parliament, has been given ten minutes and each party already represented in the outgoing parliament receives three additional minutes for each member in the parliament.⁵

In Britain, the initial process is less formal. A committee is formed from representatives of the broadcasting authorities and of the political parties. The committee tries to agree on a fair allocation. In the past, this has consisted of a number of elements. First, the two main parties have received equal shares. The share of the third party - the Liberal Democrats - has been based partly on the result of the previous election, and partly on its subsequent performance in partial elections, local government elections, and in the polls. Moreover, the formula has usually given the third party a share which is, on the one hand, smaller than that of the main parties, and on the other hand, larger than its pro rata share, as measured either by its previous or current political showing.

The formula that has normally emerged has, therefore, reflected a compromise between a number of conflicting ideas of 'fairness'. Moreover, it has reflected the fact that the broadcasting authorities have the final authority to decide on what they consider to be a reasonable allocation, if there is no agreement between the political parties. Finally, if the broadcasting authorities make a decision in the wake of disagreement between the parties, it is open to any of the parties to take the matter before a court of law. It will then be up to a judge to decide what is 'fair'.

This system of bargaining in a committee has normally worked fairly well. But it is uncertain whether it could be duplicated successfully by countries with different political cultures, see Public Broadcasting Allocations.

Draft Only

Fairness vs.Freedom of Expression

Freedom of speech (see Guiding Principles and Freedom of Speech) involves not only the right to converse with family, friends and neighbours, but also the freedom to organize, and address public meetings, and to produce and circulate political literature and propaganda. It costs no money to talk with members of one's family or with neighbours.

However, many forms of free speech do incur expenses. If a political activist arranges to visit another area of the city or country, and spend time speaking to electors, there will be costs of travel, board, and lodging. Public meetings may require hiring a suitable hall and on publicity expenses. And it will not be possible to print political literature without paying for it (or without accepting what is effectively a political 'contribution-in-kind' from the printer).

Since the exercise of free speech often requires money, the parties and candidates with the largest financial resources will be able to reach the electors more effectively than the poorest parties and candidates. Arguably, the richest candidates gain an unfair advantage. In order to eliminate or to reduce this unfairness and in order to create a 'level playing field', often regulations have been introduced to restrict the role of money in elections. Sometimes (as in elections for federal offices in the United States), there is a legal ceiling on the amount an individual may contribute; sometimes (as in France or Canada) there is a cap on the amount a party or a candidate is permitted to spend.

Limits on financial contributions, and on spending by parties and candidates are designed to promote fairness. But they have the undoubted effect of limiting freedom of speech. Policymakers must balance two valid, but mutually contradictory, principles.

Draft Only

Desirability of Disclosure of Political Donations

It is commonly taken for granted that the disclosure of political donations (see Encouraging Internal Party Democracy) is always desirable. Although such disclosure is probably beneficial in most circumstances, it should not be taken for granted that disclosure is always in the public interest.

Arguments for Disclosure

First, the electors are arguably entitled to know as much as possible about the different political parties and candidates for whom they are being asked to vote. Information about each party's financial backers is something that may reasonably influence electoral choices, since it shows something about its likely policies, activities, and political style.

Second, disclosure of political donations makes it easier to detect (and thus to avoid) possible political corruption. If a business magnate makes a large political contribution to the winning party and then gains a favourable governmental contract, it will obviously be easier to raise questions about the possible link between the political donation and the contract if the facts about the donation are in the public domain.

Arguments against Disclosure

The general argument is that disclosure rules are an unjustified infringement on individual privacy. After all, it is now accepted that the old system of voting, where votes were cast in public, inhibited free electoral choice, since electors came under pressure to cast their votes according to the instructions and the interests of their landlords and their bosses. Freedom necessitated a secret ballot.

On the same lines, it may be argued that free participation in politics is liable to be inhibited if donors are forced to declare themselves. Wherever donors to political parties are obliged to reveal their payments, they are forced at the same time to declare their political allegiances. The principles of the secret ballot are negated.

There are three particular circumstances where potential donors may have a legitimate reason to avoid making their political gifts known to the authorities or to the public:

public officials such as judges, civil servants, members of the armed forces, local government officers, and head teachers are expected to maintain a stance of political neutrality, even though they are entitled to vote and to contribute to political parties. Disclosure requirements are likely to inhibit them from making donations.

businessmen may feel that they will be discriminated against when it comes to the award of local government contracts if they are known to have supported an unpopular political party or candidate.

most important, disclosure rules will inhibit contributions to opposition parties and candidates in countries where there is a dominant ruling party, where political violence is rife and where opposition is barely tolerated. In these (all too common) circumstances, citizens will hardly dare to come out in open support of opposition candidates. Disclosure will strongly favour the governing regime.

Comment

A compromise view that has been accepted in a number of countries is that the right to privacy should prevail when political donations are relatively small, but large donations should be disclosed. The threshold above which donations are to be disclosed varies, also see Disclosure Thresholds.

Draft Only

Loopholes

Loopholes in regulations, especially those concerning the funding of politics, arise only in part from careless legal drafting. They are inherently difficult to avoid. It is therefore important, not only to examine particular loopholes, but also to understand the basic reasons why they occur, and the choices between incompatible objectives that policymakers are obliged to make.

Why Loopholes are Hard to Eliminate

The flow of money into the political arena may be compared to water running down a hill into a number of rivers. If one river is blocked, the flow is likely to carve out a new channel. In the same way, the introduction of new laws to restrict or control contributions to political parties or to campaigns may merely have the consequence of diverting the money through alternative or unexpected routes.

There are many examples of this 're-channelling' process. In the 1960s, the German constitutional court imposed various restrictions on the funding of political parties. It ruled that public subsidies could be given only for the parties' campaign activities; it was not permitted to subsidize their routine organizational activities between elections. This constitutional decision was easily evaded. Public subsidies for such routine activities were given to 'party foundations'. These bodies were legally distinct, and were therefore not covered by the restrictions on parties. In practice, each foundation was closely linked with its parent party. The distinction between 'party' and 'party foundation' was little more than a legal fiction, see Political Foundations.

The 'party foundation' technique has been copied frequently. In the United States, political research organizations (known as 'think tanks') are not covered by the same laws as political parties. A business corporation is not permitted to make a payment to a political party, but it may contribute heavily to a 'think tank', even if the think tank is closely connected with one particular political family.

More generally, there is a whole range of interest groups, religious organizations, and media actively involved in public affairs and in partisan debate. Since they do not present candidates for electoral office, they are not legally defined as 'parties'. The existence of this variety of bodies presents a dilemma for legislators seeking to control the use of money for political purposes. On the one hand, it seems to make little sense to regulate parties alone without also attempting to regulate these other organizations as well. On the other hand, any attempt to expand the scope of regulation to cover not only parties and candidates for electoral office, but also pressure groups, media, and religious organizations will lead to intolerable limits on the freedom of speech and on individual liberties.

The problem is illustrated by a British example ⁶. In the British general election of 1992, the two main parties - Conservative and Labour - spent approximately the same on their campaigns. However, many Labour party supporters complained that almost all the national newspapers with the highest readerships supported the Conservatives. What use was the relative equality of spending by the party organizations - it was argued - if public opinion was manipulated by a few pro-Conservative multi-millionaire newspaper proprietors? Some argued that there should be limits on the way in which newspapers are permitted to report on election campaigns. To others, such a drastic limitation on press freedom would be too heavy a price to pay, even if the objective was to assure that the messages of the opposing parties were fairly heard, see Interest Groups: Third parties.

Examples of Loopholes

Examples are legion. Some examples are given in other entries.

If regulations apply to political parties and to candidates for public office, but do not apply to the political activities of pressure groups or to personal funds collected by politicians, then there will be a tendency to evade the rules by re-directing money from parties and candidates into these allied, uncontrolled bodies, see Interest Groups: Third parties.

Donations of 'contributions in kind' instead of financial payments. For instance, putting cars, apartments, offices, telephones at the disposal of a party or candidate, see In Kind Contributions.

Bogus business ventures of political parties. A political party may provide a service for which the donor pays above-market rates, thereby disguising what are essentially political contributions. Common examples are party yearbooks and publications in which corporations and individuals purchase advertising space, or 'consultancy' and advisory services provided by party officials. Or multiple purchases of party newspapers, literature, and political paraphernalia such as buttons, rosettes, ties, and so forth, see Profits from Party-Owned Business Activities.

Evasion of disclosure regulations. If political donations by an individual or by a corporation must be declared if they are above a certain threshold, they can be evaded by arranging for a series of contributions, each of them slightly below the amount at which the requirement for declaration takes effect. If the disclosure barrier is DM 20,000, then contributions of DM 19,999 can be made by a husband, wife, several children, employees, and by each of several companies owned by the donor family, see Disclosure Regulations.

Bans against foreign contributions to elections are easily evaded. In some cases, parties wishing to receive foreign contributions have established 'independent' 'non party' foundations to receive the money. In other cases, payments have been made through domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies, see Bans Against Certain Kinds of Contributions.

Strategies to Restrict Loopholes

A combination of approaches is likely to prove most effective. The laws themselves must be carefully drafted and not over-ambitious. Sanctions must be introduced as part of the regulations, and they must be enforced.

In addition to the legal apparatus of control, it is important to achieve, whenever possible, a cross-party consensus and public backing for the regulations. Public disapproval of behaviour by politicians that breaches the letter or the spirit of the law is a greater deterrent than the possibility of a fine or some other penalty. Also, one political party will be more inclined to obey the laws if it feels that its opponents will do likewise. Education, consultation, and even codes of conduct may therefore prove beneficial.

An example of the role of informal pressures and agreements is the success of the regulations introduced in Britain in the Illegal and Corrupt Practices Act of 1883, to limit spending by candidates for the House of Commons. It has been pointed out frequently that the limits introduced by the Act had important loopholes. In particular, they applied only to local election campaigns, and not to the expenditures of the parties' central headquarters. However, the fact is that the new law did work, insofar as it produced a decrease in the overall costs of campaigning. This was almost certainly because the new law embodied the wishes of politicians from the main parties in the House of Commons who all wished to see an end to the escalation of costs which had been so difficult for them all to bear.

Draft Only

Regulating Campaigns by Interest Groups

The main actors in electoral contests are the rival political parties and their candidates. Naturally, the central task of electoral administration is to regulate them. But they are not the only actors. Groups not wishing to put forward candidates themselves, or to declare their support for one political party, may nevertheless seek to influence the electoral debate. Religious groups may seek to affect the policies of the politicians on such issues as abortion, marriage laws, education, or a variety of moral issues. Single-issue groups interested in workers' rights, law and order, the environment, animal welfare, or a host of economic issues and non-economic issues may spend money on ensuring that the candidates and the voters hear their voices.

These activities pose a problem for the regulation of elections. On the one hand, it would seem unreasonable, indeed undemocratic, to seek to silence these groups. They are entitled to have their say. On the other hand, it may prove impossible to ensure fairness between parties and between candidates if pressure groups are free from regulation too. For example, what is the point of restricting election spending by political parties and by candidates if interest groups have no spending limit on advertising their views, and on attacking (either openly or by implication) one party or one group of candidates?

The choice between a narrow, and therefore ineffective, system of control, and a wide, and therefore oppressive one, is posed in a number of the entries on Parties and Candidates, see Interest Groups: Third parties.

Draft Only

Political Parties and the Electoral Process

As political parties are primarily organised to be competitors in the electoral process, theoretically they would not have a role in the organising of elections as one of their objectives. Furthermore, there is a basic difference between parties - which are themselves contenders in the elections - and electoral administration bodies.

It is important to avoid a conflict of interest between the regulated (the parties and the candidates) and the regulators (the electoral management bodies); and therefore extremely important for the political parties to develop a commitment to and confidence in the transparency and fairness of the elections. Transparency, confidence, and efficiency (therefore the legitimacy and proper conduct of the election) are better served when parties are present in all stages of the process than when the conduct of the elections is left to election management bodies with little or no contact whatsoever with political parties. Most importantly, political parties must know all aspects of the policies and process that affect them directly or indirectly, and must have input into the decision process.

Five main mechanisms exist for the inclusion of party or candidate representatives in the electoral process, both in well established and in new democracies.

The first is multiparty involvement in the drafting or revising of electoral legislation.
A second option is the inclusion of party representatives as members of the electoral policy-making body, such as the electoral commission, either in a full time capacity, as non-voting observers, or participants during electoral commission meetings.
A third, less common method, is to involve parties in the actual implementation of the elections, either as staff members of an election management body, such as polling officials, or as being responsible for specific elements of the process, such as voter education or registration.
Most common is the invitation of parties and candidates to nominate their representatives to observe/monitor the electoral process; especially key functions such as registration, polling, and the count itself.
Fifth is a highly recommended method of inclusion, namely the formation of a 'consultative' committee of all parties/candidates for briefing and/or guideline discussions on a regular (weekly) basis throughout the run up to the elections.

In both the new enactment of electoral legislation, as well as the amending/reviewing of existing electoral enactment, it is common practice for multiparty involvement - both through informal consultation with opposition parties, and through the inclusion of prominent opposition members of parliament in the select committee reading process. Similarly, parties are often included in sensitive boundary delimitation committees.

The deliberate inclusion of party representatives in the electoral process is particularly useful as a check or balance when the existing administrative structures (bureaucracy), which control much of the supply and infrastructure necessary for the organization of the elections, are seen to be partisan to the governing party. Party involvement within the electoral process at the policy or guideline level may also be desirable when contentious electoral innovations such as campaign finance provisions are being introduced. In both cases, transparency and inclusion at an early stage can assist in party acceptance of the outcome of elections and decisions by the electoral bodies.

This contrasts with practice in countries with a long history of democracy, where the trend is towards an 'administrative' approach to the organising of elections, reflecting a confidence in the non-partisanship of electoral officials and a lower perceived threat of electoral fraud.

Parties are often seen as the keenest 'electoral police' because they have a vested interest in ensuring that their opponents do not cheat. At the same time, political parties cannot always be relied upon to blow the whistle on malpractice by their rivals. For instance, in Britain, it has been found that a political party has been in collusion with another party in exceeding the legal spending limits and both parties have agreed not to submit a complaint about the other, to avoid investigation and possible prosecution.

In a best case scenario, a reduction in the overall costs of the electoral process may be a side benefit of the inclusion of political parties in the process. If parties have confidence in the legitimacy of the elections, because of their own involvement in the process, this can reduce the need for introducing other complicated and expensive procedures, such as security ballot papers, and elaborate security measures surrounding the transport and warehousing of the electoral materials. On the other hand, sometimes intensive party involvement has the opposite effect of a demand for more stringent measures from a belief that the other parties will take advantage of their knowledge of the process for undue advantage.

One example of how the inclusion of parties and candidates as stakeholders, monitors, and defenders, and not just as contenders, helped ensure stability was demonstrated in a 1994 Mozambique election. Party representatives were included in every aspect in the run-up to the elections. They were functioning as members of the electoral commission, as members of the secretariat organising the elections, and as monitors (observers) of every step of the electoral process. Inclusion took place not only at the national level, but also at the provincial and district level commissions (policy-making) and technical secretariats (implementation). While the deliberation of almost every issue made the decision-making process a cumbersome, as well as perhaps a more costly one, nonetheless, with such widespread involvement, parties ultimately had little premise on which to dispute the final election results.

By contrast, in the contextually similar 1992 Angolan elections, the inclusion of parties was less extensive. While the governing MPLA, the opposition UNITA, and other opposition parties were represented on the election commission, strong criticism was directed at the organisation of the elections, handled by existing structures which were identified as being close to the governing party. When the results favoured the governing party, the opposition party accused the elections of being rigged. They ultimately withdrew from the elections and returned the country to war.

Whether formally or de facto, it is crucial that political parties are present throughout the entire process, from registration of voters, to the register of voters' lists, the current operation of the electoral management body, the polling stations, and the counting of the ballots. Political parties are important co-stakeholders in any election, and they are fully entitled to know and help in the preparations of the conditions under which the game is going to be played. If parties do not play a role in some aspect of election implementation, there is a strong argument to be made for weekly or regular meetings with the party representatives that can significantly contribute to building trust. This becomes particularly important when last minute changes, however justified, are made (for example, the late addition of polling stations, voters list alterations, or revised boundary delimitation). In some countries, like Namibia, this practice is obligatory.

It is the acceptance by the parties of the electoral conditions, as well as of the results of an election that constitute the definite test of the goodness/quality/legitimacy of the election.

Parties in Election Policy Bodies (Commissions)

Election policy-making bodies (election commissions, etc.) can legitimately be composed in a non-partisan way, in a multi-partisan way, or through a mixture of both. The same holds true for boundary delimitation committees. The advantage of including party representatives on the commission, especially if decisions are taken by consensus, is that the competitors within the electoral process perceive the umpires to be fairer, and more balanced. Oftentimes the watchdog nature of multi-party electoral bodies is considered enough of a 'checks and balances' guarantee.

A multiparty body ensures that there are strong and direct links to the parties that can assist negotiations when problems or disputes occur, often pre-empting later challenges to the elections results.

However, there are disadvantages inherent within partisan commissions. Bodies that make decisions by consensus can be cumbersome and time consuming. The quality of the nominations may not be on par with those of an independent 'expert' approach. Party nominees may often be obliged to put party interests first before common good interest. Such obligations can cause polarisation and conflict of interests when decisions are made. Nominees have been known to boycott meetings on party instructions. Partisan commissions may be unable to agree on how to change rules, thus leaving practices in place that are widely discredited and that undermine public confidence in the political system. From the perception of smaller parties there can be worries that larger parties will collude to have their agreed initiatives passed at the policy making level thus leaving the smaller parties with no effective voice. Furthermore, in situations where there are a very large number of registered political parties, the size of the commission can become unwieldy and cumbersome.

The 1994 Mozambican elections were an example of a largely partisan commission, governing by consensus, which, while contentious to a certain extent, nonetheless ultimately helped ensure successful and legitimate elections. Similarly, in Liberia (1997), El Salvador (1993, 1997) and Nicaragua (1990, 1996), all emerging from civil war, electoral commissions were party-based in order to pre-empt mistrust in the electoral process.

Party Liaison

Whether or not parties play a role in any aspect of election implementation, there is a strong argument to be made for weekly or regular meetings at all levels with party representatives to ensure a clear understanding and acceptance of the way the elections are conducted. This becomes particularly important when last minute changes, however justified, are made (for example, the late addition of polling stations, voters list alterations, or revised boundary delimitation). Meetings of this type also provide the parties with the opportunity to make comments and suggestions, air complaints and concerns, and 'let off steam'. This can serve to resolve situations before they become major issues as well as to develop mutual sensitivity and understanding between parties and electoral officials.

An 'advisory' or 'consultative' committee can be provided for in the Electoral law, as is the case in Lesotho. The law provides for the establishment of the grouping of one or more representatives from each party, specifies their regular meetings with the commission, and gives them certain rights (such as the inspection of documents).

Parties and Electoral Administration

Party or candidate representatives become involved in the actual organising and implementing of elections in some instances. However, whether politically nominated or otherwise recruited, election administration officials must commit themselves to non-partisanship, by oath or other agreement. An advantage of this approach is the sense of commitment to the elections that party representatives gain by actually working on administrative issues. A disadvantage is that party involvement in such areas can provide opportunities to manipulate or stall the elections for partisan gain.

Until recently (1997) Canadian political parties were involved in nominating the officials who carried out the door-to-door registration (enumeration) of voters. The two leading 'parties' in each electoral district (riding) provided the enumeration teams that worked in pairs, one from each party. The intention was to instill confidence in the registration process. Parties would serve as their own checks and balances while conducting their task. This same two-party approach continues in the administration of all polling stations in Canada on voting day with the poll supervisor and his assistant being 'party designates'. This does not preclude the participation of parties and candidates as agents of the polls.

In the USA it has been considered a responsibility of both the political parties and the state to organise voter registration drives. The same was true for Britain until early this century, when legislation made it a public rather than personal or party responsibility to conduct a house-to-house or other search for eligible voters.

Many countries allow party involvement in the transportation of elderly, disabled, or other voters to the polls and this is the case in the UK, El Salvador, and Canada. In Mauritius, each of the main parties arranges for a large number of cars to bring supporters to the polling station. In the 1998 by-election in Flacq, Mauritius, the winning party reportedly had four hundred cars for a total electorate of 30,000.

In Mozambique in 1994 elections were implemented by a multiparty agency (STAE - the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections). The director of each of the levels of the electoral agency (national, provincial, and district) was from the governing Frelimo party. They in turn were flanked by two deputies, one, responsible for finance, from the opposition Renamo party, and the second from a coalition of the remaining parties. Lower level staff were also appointed in a balanced partisan way, complemented by external United Nations personnel who constituted one-third of the lower level officers.

In Eastern European elections it is common for political parties to be represented on local polling station commissions such as in recent elections in Albania (1997), Armenia (1995), and Romania (1996). The chair of the polling station commission is usually a teacher or a mayor (non-partisan) while the remainder of the commission is made up of members usually recruited on the basis of one representative per party on the ballot. In addition to having voting duties they undertake the count at the station after the close of the poll.

Political Parties and Voter Education

The election administration task that is most likely to be conducted by political parties is voter education, see Social Capital. This can include explaining the importance of voting, the secrecy of the ballot, the procedures of voting, and, in general, reassuring voters of the 'freeness and fairness' of the process. On one hand, the nature of voter education should be non-partisan. On the other hand, it is the parties who, through their campaigning, often have not only the closest contact with the voters, but also a strong interest in motivating and instructing voters to use their vote correctly.

The ability of political parties to conduct such educational campaigns is of course resource related. In a country such as Liberia, parties do not have resources to even consider any 'extras' above and beyond their own activities. However, in some established democracies, such as Sweden and the US, and even newer democracies such as South Africa, parties are expected to conduct informative as well as motivational voter education campaigns. The onus for encouraging registration (US), or for increasing voter turnout is thought to be on the parties, with an expectation that this be done to a certain extent 'generically'; that is, regardless of how the citizen will vote.

There is a difference between the kind of training and voter education one might expect a party organization to arrange and that of a neutral authority devoted to public education. The main job of a party is to try to win votes and its educational efforts should not be devoted to general 'civics', but rather to train its members and activists in their campaigning tasks: how to address public meetings, how to conduct a house to house canvas, how to present the party's policies, how to mark a ballot correctly in their favour, etc. In other words, the parties are involved in training in partisanship, whereas general education in civics will be about non-partisan matters such as the virtues of voting, etc.

Parties conducting voter education will usually concentrate on educating voters in those aspects of electioneering that that will win them votes. For instance, they may encourage their potential supporters to register and to ensure they are correctly entered on the voters list; or, where there is a complicated ballot, or illiteracy, parties may train their supporters in the mechanics of filling out their ballots (i.e. vote for the bull symbol, or vote for numbers 13 and 17, etc.). In addition, they may well concentrate their motivational campaigns in areas or among constituencies deemed most likely to be supportive.

Training Party Representatives

In new democracies it is important that party representatives be trained in understanding the intricacies of the electoral system in place. Political parties and candidates are the primary actors in the elections and it is important that they have a full understanding of electoral procedures and policies to avoid distrust or objections. The higher the levels of complexity, of the vote count for example, the greater the need for training.

Training may be required for some or all of the following:

main provisions of election law,
criteria for voter registration,
criteria for party registration,
criteria for nominating candidates,
election law offences,
campaigning,
polling procedures,
vote counting procedures,
observation procedures and code of conduct.

The responsibility for this kind of training may be on the parties themselves, or may be on the election management body. Many international organisations, such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and others, have conducted wide-spread training programmes to aid party officials to perform their mandate in a professional way, both as contestants in and as monitors of the elections. In many African countries party agents/monitors are trained simultaneously with the polling officials. Such an approach promotes trust building and the fairness of elections.

Political Parties as Election Monitors

An important responsibility of political parties is to act as watchdogs during the election process, to protect the party's interests by closely monitoring the correctness of the procedures used during registration, [polling], and the count. The crucial role of party representatives is to witness the entire procedure and to check for fraud. This requires the presence of the parties during the registration process, during the voting process, when the ballot boxes are sealed, when they are opened, when votes are counted, and when ballot boxes are transported.

A task normally expected of parties during registration, see Political Parties and Interest Groups and Gathering Changes to Preliminary List, is to ensure their supporters are included and to object to the registration of those they feel are not entitled to be on the register. The public authorities leave it to the rival parties to conduct the policing of the register (voter's list) on the assumption that their local organisations will have local knowledge and that it will be in their self-interest to object to the inclusion of electors placed on the register by their political opponents. [In order to allow this 'policing by party' the system in many countries (Britain, Bosnia, Namibia for example) is to provide a draft or provisional register; followed by a period of complaints and objections, only after which the final register comes into force.]

Monitoring the transport of ballots and sensitive election equipment is done either by party monitors (Mozambique 1994), or, in many cases, police or other security personnel, or by the use of tamper evident bags or seals (used in most new elections). In established democracies, such as Sweden, sometimes a high trust level can result in no monitoring of the transport whatsoever.

One of the most difficult and yet essential parts of the process to monitor is the vote count. Mechanisation, or a complex count, may lead to suspicion on the part of the party monitors. A clear understanding of procedures is essential to present proper challenges to inaccuracies or unfairness at the count, see Challenging Results.

The presence of agents of candidates and parties is a strong anti-fraud device. However, this depends on the ability of each party to recruit and train the necessary number of local representatives. In Ghana for example, in the 1996 elections, or in Cambodia in the 1993 elections, it was difficult for parties to recruit poll watchers in areas where they were politically weak. In countries with strong tribal traditions or where for other reasons (in Cambodia's case, polarisation in the aftermath of the war) a single party predominates in an electoral district, opposition parties may not be able to fulfil the poll watching task properly.

The opposite problem can also occur. In a 1998 by-election in Mauritius, for instance, with over 40 candidates each entitled to two agents, the counting places reportedly became overcrowded with dozens of such agents.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) Handbook on monitoring elections cites the following regarding partisan election monitoring: 'Even in countries with long-standing democratic traditions, political party representatives are assigned to virtually all voting sites on election day. In addition to discouraging electoral manipulation, the presence of party pollwatchers demonstrates a party's organisational strength to prospective voters, which may accrue psychological benefits for a party engaged in a closely contested election. Party pollwatchers also provide political parties with an important and timely source of information regarding voter turnout after the polls close. Party pollwatchers, however, represent partisan electoral contestants. In the event of a dispute or irregularity, these pollwatchers have a natural tendency to protect the interests of their party, candidate or issue. In a polarised political environment, the information collected by political parties may be challenged as biased and untrustworthy.' ⁷.

Party and Candidate Registration

Candidates

Though it is now difficult to imagine the old days of elections, there was a time when voting was not only public, but ballot papers did not yet exist. It was in the British colony of South Australia that what came to be known as the Australian ballot was first introduced in 1856-7. Names of candidates were printed on an official ballot paper, and voters cast their votes in secret. Much later, voting machines replaced the paper ballot in some parts of the world.

With the advent of official ballot papers, it became necessary to determine which names should be included, and how they should be listed. An electoral timetable is a prime requirement of a ballot system. A date, time, and place must be set for the completion of formalities concerning nominations. There must be enough time for the printing of the ballot papers. Responsible administrators for the election must have time to check that nominees are eligible (for instance that they meet any qualifications concerning age, citizenship, and so forth). The administrative authorities must also have time to check that the signatures of those supporting the nomination petition (where such signatures are required) are genuine, see Signatures and Deposits and Signatures.

There also needs to be a set process by which candidates for parliament, for presidential elections, or for local government are nominated.

Political Parties

While the need for procedures for nominating individual candidates is evident, it is less obvious that there need to be formal procedures for registering political parties. Indeed, there are still countries - including Britain - where parties are not registered (although the situation is due to change in the near future). There is good reason for not requiring the registration of political parties. The essence of electoral competition in a free society is that it should involve individuals and organizations that are voluntary and independent of unnecessary control by the public authorities.

According to one approach, the very fact that political parties may be of great importance makes it desirable for them to be left to determine their internal affairs. For example, if an existing party splits into two factions, each wishing to use the party name for its candidates, the state should not attempt to step in and set internal party rules to decide the rights of the rival factions. If one faction is determined to take legal action against another, it should be on the basis of the law that applies to everyday private organizations, such as sports clubs or stamp-collecting societies.

Another view is that set regulations laid down by law should govern the way in which parties - both nationally and locally - must run their affairs. Parties should therefore have a legal status and the organizations wishing to gain the privileges of this status should be compelled to register as parties in accordance with a formal registration procedure.

Whether or not parties are subject to special laws depends in considerable measure on the country's culture. For instance, both Britain and the United States have majoritarian, candidate-based electoral systems, but differ in the extent of legal control over internal party affairs. This is far greater in the United States than in Britain.

Cultural factors apart, the question of whether or not parties are required to be registered depends also on several institutional factors.

Systems of proportional representation are associated with party registration. Under this set of voting systems, voters normally vote for a political party, rather than for a group of individual candidates.

A legal status for political parties is associated with systems where extra-parliamentary party organizations receive funding from the state.

The case for party registration becomes more pressing if party labels are used in misleading ways by candidates. In Britain, for example, candidates are currently free to use any six words on the ballot paper to refer to their affiliations. It is possible for a candidate to attempt to obtain votes by using a misleading form of words that it clearly calculated to imply that they represent another, more popular political party. In a much-discussed British case, the Liberal Democrats complained that they had lost crucial votes to an independent candidate who claimed the affiliation of 'Literal Democrat' (i.e. one single letter different from 'Liberal Democrat').

For these reasons, a party registration acts somewhat like the registration of a corporate trademark.

Effects of Party Registration

One argument is that registration need have few or no effects on the internal affairs of a party. It is a simple formality, which, among other things, assures existing parties that their name (and thus their support among voters) will not be stolen by other parties.

An alternative view is that legal requirements such as registration tend inevitably to undermine the voluntary character of parties, and to lead to their centralization and bureaucratization.

Whatever the merits of these positions, the trend to public funding of party organizations, as well as other developments, are leading to the spread of formal party registration.

Examples of Registration Requirements

Australia: 500 members or one member in the existing Parliament.

Canada: 50 candidates in the forthcoming election.

Japan: A system of registration was introduced in 1994 in order to determine which entities would be entitled to receive a portion of the newly introduced public subsidy. A party that does not intend to claim a financial subsidy (the Japan Communist Party, for example) need not register. In order to register, a party must have five or more members in the Diet or have obtained more than two percent of the total votes in the most recent national election. This percentage may be based either on a party's share of proportional representation votes or on its share of votes for electoral district.

Namibia: Signatures and particulars of 500 supporters, registration fee, details of party constitution and members of the executive. The Electoral Commission may refuse to register parties that violate the principles of the Namibian constitution or which discriminate against any persons on grounds of race, ethnicity, gender or economic status.

Draft Only

Registering Candidates for Presidential Elections

Presidents are directly elected in only a minority of the established democracies. Since voters throughout the nation choose a single person in these elections, special barriers are needed to ensure that the ballot paper includes only 'serious' contenders, and does not confuse the voters with a profusion of names.

This entry summarizes:

the processes by which political parties choose their presidential nominees, and

the legal barriers imposed on those who wish to have their names included on the ballot.

Political Parties' Selection of Presidential Candidates

Austin Ranney's study of candidate selection includes this summary of conclusions based on a review of the selection of presidential candidates in five countries: Colombia, Finland, France, the United States and Venezuela:

[P]residential candidate selection is generally much more fluid, changing and ad hoc than is the selection of parliamentary candidates. Party organizations are less important, and candidate-centred organizations are much more important. The selection of controversial candidates by the victory of one faction over another is more likely to result in open party splits and secessional candidacies. Many of these differences no doubt stem mainly from the special visibility of the presidential office (which in every presidential country is far greater than that of any legislator) and from the close attention paid by the mass media to contests for presidential nominations.⁸

It is necessary to consider both the ways in which individual parties go about agreeing on a presidential nominee, and also the ways in which political parties in multi-party systems negotiate with each other. Since there are only two significant parties in the United States, negotiations between parties are usually unnecessary: the Republican nominee contests the choice of the Democrats. However, it is different in multi-party systems, such as that in France. Here there is a strong incentive for a group of parties to agree on a single candidate, as a candidate representing a block of parties stands a good chance of defeating a divided set of rivals bearing the standards of individual parties.

As far as the choice of the nominee within parties is concerned, the normal methods involve either a nominating convention at which officials of local party organizations are represented, or a system of primary elections, or a mixture of the two. In African countries, political parties normally nominate their respective presidential candidates, generally during party congresses.

The United States is an example of the mixed use of a nominating convention and primaries. The candidate is chosen at a national nominating convention. However, the delegates are selected by a variety of means. Some are office-holders of state party organizations, but many others have been chosen in special primary elections held in most states to select delegates who are then committed to vote for a particular contender. Selection of delegates through primaries appears to be a more democratic method than selection of office-holders of state party organizations, and avoids the legal quarrels about the validity of delegate selections when they are decided in ordinary party meetings.

However, the method of selection of delegates through primaries has been criticized on the grounds that only a small, unusually strident proportion of party supporters votes in primaries. Also, selection through primaries is criticized for removing party office-holders of the party - those who have greatest experience and the greatest stake in the future electoral success - from authority over the selection process. It other words, primary elections foster a candidate-centred, rather than a party-centred method of selection, and thereby weaken the party structure.

Finland and France illustrate the process concerning methods of negotiation between potentially allied parties in multi-party systems. In Finland, individual parties elect delegates to a cross-party nominating convention. There, bargaining takes place among the parties, and politicians who hope to win must seek the support of delegates of parties other than their own.

In France, there is a two-ballot system of presidential elections. This allows rival candidates from within the political right, or the political left, to put themselves forward in the first ballot. The first ballot thus functions as a sort of national primary election in which a single champion will emerge from both left and right, and these champions will then participate in the second ballot.

Requirements for Nominating Presidential Candidates

In the United States, presidential contests must also follow the rules restricting access to the ballot by candidates of parties other than the Republicans and the Democrats. In practice, this makes access especially hard for presidential elections, since the independent candidate will need to work to meet the requirements of each separate state, see Signatures.

In other countries, access to the ballot involves greater barriers for presidential candidates than for legislature candidates. In Russia,

[a]n electoral association, electoral block or initiative voters' group which has nominated a candidate for the office of President ... must collect no less than one million voters' signatures in his/her support, with no more than seven per cent of the required total number of signatures falling on one subject of the Russian Federation...

In the event the election of President of the Russian Federation is conducted early, the number of voters' signatures to be collected ... shall be reduced by one half.

The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation within ten days from the day of receipt of documents shall review and decide whether the procedure of nomination ... meets the requirements of this Federal Law and make a decision on the registration of candidates or a reasonable decision of refusal to register, within 50 days.⁹

For more information see also Processing of Nominations.

Draft Only

Registering Parties/Candidates for Elections

This entry summarizes the legal requirements concerning registration of parties and candidates. The procedures by which parties select their candidates are considered elsewhere, see Registering Candidates for Presidential Elections, Regulating Nominations in Majoritarian Systems and Regulating Nominations in PR Systems.

Registering Parties: the Australian Example

Party registration is not the practice in all countries, see Party and Candidate Registration. Australia illustrates the objectives, procedures, advantages, and disadvantages of party registration.

Australia does not require parties to register. However, if they fail to do so, they cannot claim a number of privileges. The privileges of registered parties are:

their candidates may be identified on the ballot paper with the party label

they are entitled to receive election funding from the public purse; this is calculated on the total number of votes obtained, and is given only in respect of its endorsed candidates and Senate groups who obtain at least 4 percent of the formal first preference votes

they are entitled to a free copy of the latest edition of the electoral roll and other specified computerized roll products, which include 'sensitive and private data'.

In order to qualify for these privileges, parties have some obligations. These are intended to ensure that their internal administration is sufficiently developed to ensure their ability to comply with various regulations, especially concerning the party's financial disclosure obligations. The main obligations are:

the party must possess a formal internal constitution containing certain minimum features

the party must appoint a number of officials with specific responsibilities; they are the party secretary, the party agent, the registered officer, and deputy registered officers; in addition to the national party agent, there must be an agent for each State or Territory branch of the party, including unregistered branches

the party must submit a list of 500 members in order to qualify for registration; there is no set fee to qualify for membership, but the procedure for recording membership is highly formal, in order to ensure that those listed have consented to be members

the party accepts that all its organs, national and local, will comply with legislation regarding the disclosure of accounts and of donations.

It may reasonably be argued that the advantages of this registration system are that it avoids misleading party labels by candidates, that it helps to ensure compliance with the rules concerning financial aid and financial disclosure, and that the barrier of 500 members is reasonable for a national party since it eliminates 'sofa parties' but makes the system relatively open to newly-formed or small parties.

Disadvantages

At the same time, there are possible drawbacks. First, the registration process itself is fairly lengthy. Not only must a would-be party complete the formalities of recording the names, addresses, and signatures of 500 members, but it must then wait a considerable time for the Australian Electoral Commission to process the application. This takes six to seven weeks. However, it is likely to last longer during the period preceding an election. It is also likely to last longer if there are any objections to the registration application, and if the matter must be referred to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Moreover, once the writ for any federal election or partial election has been issued, 'no action is permitted to be taken in relation to any application for registration of a political party.'

A second possible disadvantage is that the required formalities, simple though they are intended to be, are sufficiently onerous to lead to the centralization and bureaucratization of party organizations.

A third objection relates to the rules regarding party names. They are certainly likely to succeed in avoiding confusion between party names, but they arguably give unfair advantages to existing parties. For instance, factions that break away from an existing party are not permitted to refer to themselves by the title of 'Independent' combined with the name of the party from which they have split. The breakaway faction must choose a completely different name, thus losing the electoral advantage of a name that indicates its roots in the 'old' party ¹⁰.

Registering Nominations: the British Example

The nomination paper must state the candidate's name and home address. There are detailed rules, supported by legal precedents, about the definitions of both 'name' and 'home address'. Questions about surnames and first names cover the question of when a change of name is permitted.

A candidate may give up to six words on the nomination paper by which he wishes to be described on the ballot paper. If a candidate wishes to describe himself by a party name, he may do so without restriction: 'There is no copyright in such descriptions; there is nothing to stop an unofficial candidate of a political party describing himself in the same way as the official candidate.' If two candidates use the same party label,
the election publicity of the better known candidate will need to draw the electorate's attention to the similarity, in case they mistakenly vote for the wrong candidate ¹¹.

the nomination must include the names of ten voters: a proposer, seconder, and eight assenters

the nomination paper must be delivered in person to the district electoral officer by the candidate, proposer, seconder, or agent

a deposit of £500 must be delivered to the district electoral officer in the form of cash or a draft

there are timetables both for the delivery of nomination papers and for objections to nominations

Draft Only

Independent Candidates

In countries such as Britain, all candidates submit nominations on an individual basis. The rules for candidates nominated by political parties are no different from other candidates in the procedures they must follow. In some other countries, registration procedures for 'independents' differ from those for party nominees.

For example, in Australia, independent candidates and candidates nominated by unregistered political parties are not permitted to have a label or description appended to their names on the ballot forms. Also, they are not entitled to state financial aid towards their election expenses, see Registering Parties/Candidates for Elections.

In countries such as the United States, there are special barriers that independents and members of small parties must overcome before their names are included on the ballot. Such candidates are required to collect a large number of signatures to support their nominations. Candidates of the two established parties - the Republicans and the Democrats - are free from this task, see Signatures.

In countries with proportional representation (PR), special treatment is needed for independent candidates, depending on the form of PR. For example, the German additional member system of PR provides for half of the seats to be won in contests in single-member constituencies, and the other half to be allocated according to the proportional principle. It is therefore open to an independent candidate to contest the former category of seat. By contrast, it is not possible for an independent to win seats in the second category, unless he creates a list together with a large number of other candidates, who together stand a chance of overcoming the threshold of five percent of the national vote. This is the percentage required to gain any seats in the second, proportional category.

Likewise, in Japan, independent candidates cannot stand for election in the PR districts in either the Lower or Upper House without party endorsement, for the ballot calls for the voter to write the name of a party, not a candidate.

In countries with a majoritarian electoral system, the law may prevent independent individuals from standing as candidates for elective office. This is the case in Tanzania, for example, where a political party must nominate candidates for the national Parliament. At the same time, there are stringent and restrictive laws relating to the registration of parties. The effect of this combination of regulations is to favour candidates of the ruling political party, which has held office ever since the country's independence from British rule. The ban on independent candidates handicaps challenges in specific electoral districts by individuals who are opposed to the government, and who may well be well-known and well-liked locally.

Draft Only

Regulating Nominations in Majoritarian Systems

In the words of the Lortie Commission,

[t]he selection of candidates by political parties is one of the most fundamental functions that parties perform. It distinguishes them from all other types of organizations that bring individuals together to promote common political ideas, interests and values ¹².

In majoritarian systems, candidates are normally selected to contest single-member constituencies. Questions that arise about the selection process are:

what are the relative powers of central and local party organizations?
how wide is the circle of party members involved in the selection process? (i.e. is the selection process participatory and 'democratic' or not?)
is the selection process regulated by law?

Central versus Local Party Control

In the past, there have usually been severe limits on the influence of central party organizations over the selection of candidates for Parliament, or for regional or municipal office. There have been several reasons for this. Local party leaders have often resented central inference in the selection function. National leaders have been careful to avoid obvious interference because the success of local campaigning has depended to a considerable extent on the keenness of the local organization, whose activists it has been unwise to offend. Moreover, local party organizations have had the ultimate power to break away from the national party and to put forward a candidate of their choice in competition with the candidate imposed from the centre.

In Canada, the Lortie Commission emphasizes local party influence over candidate selection. In Britain, too, central party leaders and organizers have traditionally found it difficult to place candidates of their choice in specific constituencies.

Britain is an example of a country in which central party organizations have at least a small say. It has been the practice to maintain a central list of prospective candidates, and to require that local selections be made from members of the approved list. In practice, local party associations have sometimes insisted on interviewing applicants - especially those with local associations - even if they have not been included on the official list. In these cases, the central party organization has tended to include such applicants on the approved list in order to avoid conflict with the local party association. In any case, the central list of approved candidates has tended to be long, and inclusion in it has been relatively easy.

There are signs that central influence over candidate selection has tended to grow. This has certainly been the case in recent years in the British Labour Party. Centralization of influence over candidate selection has been part of a wider process of the centralization of power. This has resulted from the decreasing membership of local party associations, the declining importance of local party workers in securing electoral support, and the increasing role of central parties in fund-raising.

A number of developing nations report a considerable influence over candidate selection by central party organizations. In many African states, candidates are identified at local, electoral district, and regional level, but require the approval of the central committee of their parties.

Participatory versus Non-Participatory Procedures

A common complaint about selection processes within local party organizations is that they place too much power in the hands of narrow, unaccountable groups of local leaders.

In the United States, a rebellion against what was (rightly) seen as political corruption stemming from selection of candidates by party 'bosses' led to the introduction of primary elections. Under a primary system, the right to nominate candidates who will contest elections using the party's name does not rest with party office-holders, but with a far broader group of ordinary voters. Those entitled to vote in a primary election in the United states include - depending on the state in which the election is held - all those whose voter registration indicates that they support the relevant party, or all registered voters (irrespective of their registered party affiliation).

In other countries, complaints have centred on the criticism that the circle of people involved in the selection has been too small. Typically, a committee of office-holders in the local party has been responsible for winnowing the initial list of applicants. A short list has then been presented to a somewhat larger group. However, the full local membership has often played no part in the selection.

The recent tendency has been for a 'democratization' of the selection rules, and the provision of a formal role for individual party members. The smaller party memberships have become, the greater the role of the remaining members in the choice of candidates. The development of votes by party members to select candidates along the lines of primary elections in the United States has been a recent feature of political organization in countries such as Spain.

Whether it is democratic to give ordinary members a fuller voice in choosing candidates is a matter of controversy. The argument for 'one member, one vote' in candidate selection is simply that it is fitting for political parties which participate in democratic elections to be democratic in the way they run their internal affairs, see Encouraging Internal Party Democracy.

However, selection of parliamentary candidates by votes of local party members is subject to abuse. Often, a local party organization will have few members, and its lists will be in disorder. It then becomes relatively easy for a local contender to recruit new members specifically for the purpose of asking them to attend the selection meeting, or to take part in the selection ballot. Such 'members' may have their subscriptions paid by the would-be candidate or his supporters, and they may have virtually no connection with the local party association.

Moreover, the turnout at primary elections or 'one member, one vote ballots' may be low. Critics argue that those who do vote will tend to be unusually ideological and atypical of party voters at large. Paradoxically, party bosses will be more likely to select candidates whose views are acceptable to the party's general supporters. This is because party 'bosses', in contrast to active party members, place great weight on choosing a candidate likely to perform well at the polls; activists will prefer candidates whose extreme views mirror their own, regardless of their electoral prospects.

Legal versus Non-Legal Rules

Legal controls over candidate selection are the exception. Selection methods are normally a matter for discretionary decisions by the parties themselves.

The two main examples of countries where the selection process is controlled by statute are the United States and Germany, see Party and Candidate Registration. In Germany, where the system is proportional, Parties Laws have been enacted which regulate the procedures used by party organizations. This is in keeping with the provision requiring internal party democracy in Article 21 of the Basic Law of 1949.

Draft Only

Regulating Nominations in PR Systems

Certain proportional representation (PR) systems tend to lead to the centralization of power within parties. One standard account gives the following summary:

In all countries with some form of party-list proportional representation, the candidates' positions on party lists are almost as important as their presence on them. In each constituency each party is entitled only to a number of seats proportional to its share of the popular votes, and those seats usually go to the candidates in sequence at the top of its list until its quota is filled. Hence each party list has some 'safe' slots at the top and a few 'marginal' slots just below them, and the rest are 'hopeless.'

In most parties in most such countries, the supervisory powers of the national or regional party agencies include the power to determine the final order in which the names appear on the party's list in each constituency. In parties with strong factions that must be appropriately represented, this process plays an especially important role in keeping the factions satisfied and the parties united ¹³.

Ranney gives the Likud Party of Israel as an example. In 1977, the party was an amalgam of three main factions, each of which had previously been an independent party with its own list. Under the Israeli system of PR, the entire country forms a single constituency of 120 seats:

Hence slots 1 through 40 were considered 'safe', slots 40 through 45 were considered 'marginal,' and slots 46 thorough 120 were considered 'hopeless.' After delicate negotiations among the three groups, the national leaders positioned the candidates thus: of the first 43 places Likud was given numbers 1 (Begin), 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, and 42; the Liberals received numbers 2 (Erlich), 5, 7, 9, 12, 18, 20, 23, 30, 34, 38, 41, and 43; and La'am was given numbers 3 (Hurvitz), 10, 15, 21, 28, 31, 36 and 40. Number 16 was allocated at the last moment to a leading member of the Liberal Party.

(p. 84.)

For more information see also PR Systems.

Draft Only

Signatures and Deposits

Unquestionably, democracies should encourage citizens to put themselves forward as candidates for election to public office. Yet, voters are also entitled to an assurance that those who present themselves for election do so in a serious and responsible spirit. Furthermore, it is undesirable for voters to be presented with such a large number of candidates that it becomes almost impossible to make an informed choice among them.

For these reasons, it is necessary to introduce measures to deter some individuals who might wish to abuse the system of competitive elections. Several real examples illustrated the problem of trivial or irresponsible candidates.

Examples of Irresponsible Candidates

First, some people may wish to put their names forward as a joke. In Britain, candidates have regularly been nominated by 'The Monster Raving Loony Party'. One of the most constant of fringe candidates has been a former pop-musician called 'Screaming Lord Sutch'. Since all candidates in a British parliamentary election are entitled to appear before the television cameras when the election result is announced, and since every candidate's name must (by law) be mentioned whenever there is a report on television or radio about the election campaign in the constituency, joke candidates gain publicity. In Poland, a Beer Drinkers' Party was created and, in fact, gained a considerable number of votes. The Mad Hatter's Tea Party of New Zealand was not to be outdone in the humour league with the nomination in 1972 of M. Mouse.

Second, groups with extreme political opinions may present candidates who have no hope of winning, but who ensure that their party has the entitlement to a free party political broadcast that is given in Britain to any party with at least fifty candidates. Since the election deposit is £500 per candidate, the cost of fifty deposits (£25,000) gives a 'party' the right to broadcast its views - a marvellous opportunity for groups which, for example, wish to present a piece of racialist propaganda at a bargain cost.

Third, the fact that individuals in Britain are permitted by law to change their names permits another form of 'joke' candidature. Someone may change his name so that it is exactly the same (or almost exactly the same) as that of a famous politician. The joke candidate may then stand for election in the same constituency as the famous politician. The voter will then find it hard to distinguish between the real Edward Heath (the former Conservative Prime Minister in Britain) and the one (or several) 'fake' Edward Heaths. This has happened in Britain, the United States, and, probably elsewhere.

Fourth, it was possible a few years ago in Britain for soldiers wishing to leave the armed forces to abuse a loophole in military regulations. Since it is undesirable to permit serving members of the armed forces to stand as candidates for the House of Commons, and since it is also desirable to allow soldiers to have full civil rights, special regulations allowed a soldier who wished to stand for Parliament to leave the army, even if his contract had a number of years to run. Suddenly, dozens of soldiers used the rule as an easy way to break their contracts.

These examples all illustrate the need to restrict 'fringe' candidates. This may be done in several ways. They include a requirement that candidates (apart from those representing established political parties) must obtain the signatures of a considerable number of voters in support of their nomination. The advantage of a system of signatures is that it may weed out fringe candidates without penalizing candidates who are merely poor and who may thus find it hard to raise a financial deposit. The disadvantage of a signature system is that it is hard to administer and open to abuse. It may not be possible for members of election commissions to check the accuracy of the signatures within the time available for nominations.

The alternative to signatures is a system of financial deposits.

Draft Only

Signatures

A system of signatures, like that of financial deposits, is intended to ensure that all those who present themselves as candidates for public office will do so in a serious spirit. Candidates who wish to be included on the ballot must, under the signature system, collect a given minimum number of signatures in support of their nominations. The practical effects of this will depend on the number of signatures that must be collected, the time available to would-be candidates to collect them, and the care taken by the electoral authorities to ensure that the signatures are genuine and valid.

In some countries, the requirement that a nomination must be signature-supported applies only to independent candidates, or to candidates representing a political party without a track record of support in a previous election. The reasoning is that candidates representing parties that have shown themselves in a recent election to be serious contenders are themselves likely to be serious, and should be permitted to run for office without hindrance. By contrast, barriers are needed to test the serious intent of independent citizens or representatives of new, untried parties who seek inclusion on the ballot. The 'track record' of a would-be candidate's party may be decided according to a variety of criteria. For instance, in Austria, the signatures of three members of the outgoing parliament are a substitute for the requirement of collecting several hundred signatures from ordinary voters.

The apparent advantage of requiring signatures, as compared with a financial deposit, is that it seems more democratic, insofar as it makes the qualification to stand for public office dependent upon public support, rather than on money. However, there are several drawbacks.

Disadvantages of Signatures System

First, those giving signatures do so in support of the nomination of a candidate - that is, the inclusion of his name on the ballot. Signatures need not signify that those who append their names commit themselves to vote for the candidate who is being nominated. Hence, there may be a tendency for voters to agree to sign simply to end the conversation with a canvasser who appears on their doorstep, so they can get back to their cooking or gardening or (more likely) watching the television. In other words, the collection of signatures may be a test of good organization rather than of public support. Moreover, good organization may be purchased with money: a candidate may pay supporters to collect signatures.

Second, notwithstanding the fact that signatures in support of a nomination do not automatically signify an intention to vote for that candidate, a signature system is open to criticism for being against the spirit of the secret ballot.

Third, if a considerable number of signatures are required, the system becomes complex, both for the would-be candidates and for the electoral administrators who must check the signatures.

In cases where elections are called at short notice, and there is a tight electoral timetable, the signature system may present an unreasonable barrier to those candidates who must collect them. This applies in particular if the required number of signatures is large. Representatives of political parties who are exempt from the requirement may then have an unfair advantage.

Examples of Signatures System

Austria: Petition of three members of the national parliament, or 200-500 voters, depending upon area.

Belgium: Signatures of three members of the national parliament, or 200-500 voters, depending upon area (e.g. Brussels - 500, Antwerp - 400).

Britain: Ten signatures.

Canada: Petition of twenty-five voters in the district. Written endorsement of leader is required for inclusion of party name on the ballot.

Denmark: Parties: representation in the outgoing Folketing, or petition of an equivalent of 1/175 of the total valid vote in the last election.

Finland: 100 voters.

Germany: Independents: 200 registered voters. Parties with less than five members of the outgoing Bundestag. For state lists: one per thousand voters in previous election up to a maximum of 2,000.

India: One qualified voter.

Italy: Chamber of Deputies: 500-1,000 voters. Senate 350-700 voters.

Poland:

The district (party) list of candidates for deputies should be supported by the personal signatures of at least 5,000 voters residing in the given electoral district.

This requirement is waived if an electoral committee (party) has already obtained 50,000 signatures for other districts or has obtained 5,000 signatures in each of five districts. There are special provisions for electoral committees representing national minorities.

Russia: Duma: Nominees of electoral associations or electoral blocs nominating a federal list of candidates - 200,000 signatures of which no more than seven percent may fall in one subject of the Russian Federation. Independent candidates

no less than one per cent of the total number of voters in the electoral district ...In the event the election of deputies is held ahead of time, this number of voters shall be reduced by one half ¹⁴.

The United States

The United States has regulations that are exceptionally burdensome to parties other than the Republicans and Democrats when it comes to access to the ballot. Katz describes the position as follows:

The two established parties are given preferential treatment, while third party and independent candidacies actively are discouraged... Although only North Dakota explicitly guarantees the Democratic and Republican parties access to the ballot by name, all states except Mississippi and South Carolina guarantee a place on the ballot to any party with a specific share of voter registration or of the vote at the previous election... [I]n 27 states the requirement is at least 5 percent of the total vote cast, and in 11 of those the requirement is at least 10 percent.

This means that small or new parties are obliged to obtain access to the ballot by a petition of signatures.

In comparison to other countries, ... American parties and candidates are required to secure many more signatures ... Moreover, American nominating petitions may be subject to a dazzling array of technical requirements ... And when, as in Florida, a verification fee of 10 cents per signature is added to the requirement of petitions signed by 3 percent of registered voters, it is easy to understand why ballots in the resulting elections rarely include more than the two candidates whose positions are secured by their parties' previous voting strength.

(pp. 260-61.)

Draft Only

Deposits

A system of financial deposits is intended to ensure that all candidates who put themselves forward as candidates for public office will do so in a serious spirit. Anyone who wishes to be included on the ballot must, under the deposit system, lodge a certain sum of money with the electoral authorities. This deposit is, under the most common rules, returned if the candidate succeeds in obtaining a vote above a certain threshold. The practical effects of this will depend both on the amount of the deposit, and on the threshold a candidate must overcome in order to obtain the return of the deposit.

In Britain, both the level of the deposit, and the threshold of the vote required to avoid its forfeit, were traditionally set at sufficiently high levels to prune the number of would-be candidates. The deposit was a bulwark of the two-party system. Over several decades, inflation eroded the value of the deposit, which remained at £150. In 1985, the level of the deposit was finally raised, but to an extent that failed to restore its value to its pre-World War II level. Moreover, the new level of deposit - set in 1985 at £500 (US $ 800) - failed for two further reasons to create a real barrier against candidature. First, the level of deposit was not inflation linked; it was therefore due (in the absence of further legislation) to decline once again in real terms. Second, the threshold required to ensure the return of the deposit was greatly lowered, from 12.5 percent to 5 percent of the votes cast in the relevant constituency.

Richard Katz has recently published a study of the effect of the 1985 change in the law in Britain. The results of the change were as follows: under the new system, the main parties in Britain (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat/Social Democrat Alliance and Scottish Nationalists) lost virtually no deposits. Some of the other small parties (such as the Welsh Nationalists and the Greens) lost many deposits but were not deterred from presenting candidates. The rise in the deposit from £150 to £500 was merely regarded by these parties as an additional campaign expenditure. The only effect of the higher deposit was to limit the number of independent candidates and those representing fringe or joke parties¹⁵. Since the deposit is intimately connected with the 'Westminster model' it is not surprising that the decline in its importance in Britain appears to be a part of a wider trend.

The table below shows deposit levels in a number of countries. The statistics suggest that it is only in a few countries that the level of deposit is high enough to have a significant effect. As shown by the following list, the deposit is a device found especially in countries influenced by the British model of electoral administration.

Country	Level of Deposit	Conditions for return
Australia - Lower House	AU $250	4% first preference votes
Australia - Upper House	AU $500	Membership in group receiving 4% of vote
Britain	£500	5 %
Canada	CA $200	15 %
India	R 500	1/6 of the vote
Ireland	IE £100	1/3 constituency quota
Japan	Yen 2 million	House of Reps: 1/5 of the valid vote divided by the number of members to be elected
Malaysia	Ringgit 5000	12.5 % of votes cast
New Zealand	NZ $100	1/4 of votes of successful candidate
Namibia	N $1000

Draft Only

Special Initiatives

Some countries have taken special initiatives when aspects of the internal party candidate selection processes for parliamentary or municipal elections have proved controversial.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States, political reformers complained that powerful party organizers ('party bosses') exercised almost complete control over the selection of candidates. The party bosses frequently used this control for corrupt purposes. If candidates selected by the party bosses gained election, especially to senior offices in city governments, they become beholden to the bosses; the bosses would then require the office-holders whom they effectively controlled to make decisions that enriched the bosses by corrupt means (for instance, by the unmerited award of municipal contracts). For the reformers, a key to eliminating this corruption was to break the power of the party bosses over the candidate nomination process. The special initiatives they sponsored (which included the introduction of primary elections to nominate candidates) aimed to control corruption.

Most other special initiatives concerning the selection of candidates have had the aim of ensuring the nomination of members of under-represented groups. In the United States, there have been special efforts to ensure that blacks have been able to participate in the processes by which parties have chosen their candidates; there have also been attempts to ensure that larger numbers of blacks have succeeded in gaining nominations. Canada, too, has attempted to address the question of the under-representation of members of 'visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples' 'pcc06#1'. A method recommended here was the drawing of constituency boundaries to take account of demographic factors and thereby to produce ethnically distinct constituencies likely to adopt as candidates members of the predominant local minority group.

In Britain, efforts within the Conservative Party after the Second World War concentrated on the problem of the severe under-representation among its members of Parliament of politicians from working-class backgrounds.

More recently, some of the strongest campaigns in a number of countries have been to achieve a larger representation of women in the legislature.

Legal Initiatives versus Internal Party Measures

Special initiatives have sometimes involved non-legal campaigns within political parties. For instance, a rule introduced after the Second World War within the British Conservative Party imposed a strict limit on the amount of money a candidate was permitted to donate to his local constituency association. The rule was intended to remove the financial demands that resulted in the selection of rich, middle-class, and upper-class candidates, and which made it difficult for working-class Conservatives to secure nomination. (Though the rule affected the methods by which constituency parties financed themselves, it did not result in the selection of working-class candidates. It turned out that money was not the only barrier; social prejudices among local Conservative Party activists also seemed to lead to the virtual non-selection of working-class Conservatives as candidates for winnable parliamentary constituencies.)

By contrast, many of the reforms concerning nominations of candidates within parties in the United States have involved legislation, by state governments, as well as legal rulings by the Supreme Court. The internal affairs of political parties in the U.S. have been subject to legal regulation to an extent unknown in Britain until the present. The introduction of the system of candidate nomination by party supporters through primary elections was a notable U.S. innovation of the early twentieth century.

Quotas

Some reformers advocate an introduction of quotas to guarantee a better representation of members of disadvantaged social groups. Quotas may be introduced either through legislation, or through internal, non-legal party rules. For instance, some parties have set quotas for the percentage of women among their legislators.

The issue of quotas has given rise to spirited discussion. A review of the issue of quotas for women candidates appeared in the Final Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (The Lortie Commission) 'pcc06#1'.

International experience shows that the most powerful tools for increasing the representation of women would involve mandatory measures including quotas.

The Commission fought shy of recommending the imposition of quotas on party organizations, although it advocated financial incentives to encourage parties to select a quota of women as candidates:

We recommend that should the overall percentage of women in the House of Commons be below 20 percent following either of the next two elections, then: (1) at the two elections following the next election, the reimbursement of each registered party with at least 20 per cent female Members of Parliament (MPs) be increased by an amount equivalent to the percentage of its women MPs up to a maximum of 150 percent; (2) this measure be automatically eliminated once the overall percentage of women in the House of Commons has attained 40 per cent

(Volume 1, p. 273.)

A policy of quotas for blacks, women, and youth was the main plank of the reforms of nomination procedures in the Democratic Party of the U.S. recommended after the party's disastrous and violent presidential nominating convention in Chicago in 1968. The policy was part of a set of recommendations by the Fraser-MacGovern Committee designed to reduce the influence of party bosses such as Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago. The rules followed complaints about the entrenched racialist attitudes among members of local party elites (bosses of local party 'machines').

Quotas have been opposed on grounds of both theory and practice. The objection of grounds of liberal theories has been that the selection of candidates should be based on a consideration of individual merits, not on a potential candidate's race, sex, or age. Thus talk of the over-representation' or 'under-representation' of a given group demonstrates - according to this view - a misunderstanding of the nature of representation. Quotas, it is argued, submit to the racialist argument that race should be a key factor in candidate selection.

Practical arguments against quotas are that:

they create resentment, thereby increasing rather than decreasing racial prejudices
they sometimes lead to the ablest candidates' being passed over because they do not come from the correct group, and
quotas are incompatible with local autonomy over candidate selection. This last point needs to be considered further.

The idea of a quota is to produce a desired social mix at a national level. Where there is a system of single-member constituencies, it is obviously impossible to have a mix at the local level: for each local party organization, the choice is either to select a male or a female. It will therefore be open to a local organization to argue

we have selected a male for our constituency, but we favour the fair representation of females in other constituencies.

Reformers argue that the problem is that local party organizations all too frequently say this, with the result that they almost all favour fair representation (say of women) in theory, but rarely in practice.

The only practical way to deal with this problem is for the central party organization to lessen the authority of the local committees. For instance, a device intended to guarantee more female candidates in winnable constituencies within the British Labour Party has been for the national organization to dictate to certain local Labour organizations that they must choose from a short list of applicants, all of whom must be women. For better or for worse, special initiatives relating to the selection of candidates will normally entail the centralization of internal party structures.

Quotas and Proportional Representation (PR)

If constituencies each elect a number of members, as under systems of proportional representation, then it arguably becomes easier to impose a policy of quotas. For instance, a constituency party which selects a list of four candidates for four seats will be able to select two men and two women. The issue of fair gender representation is reportedly an issue of particular relevance to the application of PR systems in what are considered to be male-dominated societies in Africa. In Namibia, the Local Authority Act stipulates that five out of fifteen candidates for local authority elections conducted under the PR system, must be women. However, proportional representation alone does not guarantee the election of a high percentage of women to the legislature. The Lortie Commission reviewed the matter:

The most stringent measures and the highest proportion of women among elected representatives are found in the Scandinavian countries. Many have attributed [this] to their electoral system, which is based on proportional representation. International comparisons reveal, however, that the relationship is more complex than this.

Although some countries with proportional representation systems, including Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, have a higher proportion of women representatives, others, including Italy, Belgium, and Spain, have a smaller percentage of women representatives than countries with a plurality system.

(Volume 1, p. 111.)

Draft Only

Restrictions on Candidacy

Rules concerning the right to become a candidate for elective office often reflect a conflict between two opposing principles. On the one hand, according to the guiding principle of political participation, (see Political Participation) restrictions on candidacy should be as limited as possible. As an ideal, everyone who has the right to vote should have the additional right to stand for office (to use the British idiom), or (according to American terminology) to run for office. On the other hand, in view of the responsibilities of public office, the qualifications of candidates ought arguably to be more testing than those of ordinary voters. Moreover, there are some jobs which need to be held by those who are politically-neutral; those holding such positions should therefore be ineligible to stand for office.

Guy Goodwin-Gill has commented on the legal principles, such as those embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights, which concern restrictions on the right to stand for public office.

European jurisprudence recognizes a variety of conditions and exclusions [from the right to candidacy], including penal detention and residence requirements, but provides generally that they shall be prescribed by law and reasonably necessary in a democratic society. They must also not be arbitrary or violate the principle of non-discrimination ... to deny political rights merely on the basis of political opinion poses a direct challenge to the democratic process itself.

Examples of existing restrictions follow.

Citizenship

This is a normal, though not universal qualification. For elections to the European Parliament, candidates in any one country may be citizens of any other country within the European Union. In British and Jamaican elections, citizens of Commonwealth countries may be candidates.

In other cases, citizenship requirements are more stringent for candidates than for voters. In the United States, a candidate for the presidency must not only be a citizen but must, in addition, be a citizen by birth. There is a similar qualification for the Senate of Colombia, and for both legislative chambers in Bolivia. In the United States, nine years' citizenship is required for the Senate and seven years for the House of Representatives. In Argentina the figures for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies are six years and four years respectively; and in Uruguay, seven years and five years. In Zambia, the rules for presidential candidates are especially restrictive: not only must they be born in the country, but they must also be of Zambian parentage.

Residence

Special residence qualifications include: Costa Rica ten years (not necessarily in the constituency where the candidate is standing); Norway ten years (but not necessarily immediately prior to candidature), and for the presidency of the United States, fourteen years.

In the United States, a candidate for the U.S. Congress must be resident in the state in which he is standing. Candidates for the Philippines House of Representatives must have been resident in the district for which they are standing for a minimum of one year. In Ecuador, candidates must have been born or resident for three years in the province. In Namibia, twelve months of continuous residence in a local authority area is required to qualify both as an voter and as a candidate for the local authority.

Age

Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old (compared with the voting age of eighteen), while the minimum age for the Senate is thirty, and for the presidency thirty-five. In Namibia, a presidential candidate must also be at least thirty-five. Other age barriers include thirty-five for senators in Bolivia, Colombia, and the Philippines, and forty for senators in Belgium and Italy.

Finances

Bankruptcy or insolvency is an occasional barrier, especially in countries influenced by the Westminster Model: for instance, in Australia, Britain, Fiji, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka.

Criminal Record

Countries where those with criminal convictions are barred include: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Britain, Colombia, Fiji, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.

Mental Disability

Insanity or being of unsound mind is a bar in some countries, including Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Britain, Fiji, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Malaysia, Malta, Namibia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland (which also precludes 'feeble-mindedness' - something that cynics might suppose would disqualify a great many politicians), Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

Other Personal Disabilities

Bolivia and France - failure to have completed military service; Costa Rica, Italy, and the Philippines - illiteracy; Mauritius - inability to read and speak English; and Costa Rica - relatives of the President of the Republic.

Incompatible Offices

Current service in the armed forces and in civilian branches of the public service are the most important source of incompatibility with candidature for elective office. Among many examples are: Britain, Germany, Jamaica, India, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

Government contractors are barred from candidature in Australia, Ecuador, Fiji, India, Jamaica, Mexico, and elsewhere.

There is no shortage of more surprising or unusual types of disqualification. Practising lawyers and clergymen in Catholic orders are disqualified in Argentina, as are members of the Royal Family in Britain, university professors in Turkey, primary school teachers and keepers of brothels in Luxembourg, salaried Rabbis in Israel, registrars of mortgages in Greece, and legal representatives of foreign companies in Ecuador.

Ideology

It seems reasonable that candidates who advocate the destruction of the state, who are committed to terrorism, or who are opposed to democracy should be barred. Yet it is difficult to draw a line between banning those who wish to use democratic structures only to ruin them, and those who are followers of unpopular ideologies which should nevertheless be tolerated in a pluralist society. The limits of tolerance depend partly on the condition of the state at the time of the election. There can be a greater tolerance for seemingly extreme views in peacetime than during the emergencies of war.

There is always a danger that restrictions of the rights of allegedly disloyal, anti-democratic, extreme, or violent elements will be enforced in an unfair manner. Restrictions on candidatures on ideological grounds may serve as an excuse by an authoritarian regime to hamper opposition, or they may be applied unevenly. It is open to comment that restrictions in post-war West Germany on anti-democratic persons were applied with greater vigour to Communists than to those with Nazi records. The restrictions on Communists in the United States during the Cold War is another controversial matter. Richard Katz reports that Communist candidates are still banned in nine out of fifty U.S. states

Other examples of ideological tests are Indonesia, where candidates must be loyal to Pancasila as the basic ideology of the State, and Iraq, where candidates must uphold the principles and aims of the July 1968 revolution. (It may be objected that these examples, cited by Goodwin-Gill, are not of practices in pluralist democracies.)

Religion

According to the constitution, the Argentinean president must be a Roman Catholic. In Iran, candidates must either have a belief in and an active obligation to Islam, or must belong to a recognized religious minority.

The main sources of information in this entry are Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, especially Table 14.1. For the section on ideology, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1994, pp. 54-55. Additional information was supplied by Gerhard Tötemeyer.

Draft Only

Party and Candidate Financing

Democratic politics cannot proceed without financial resources. Political parties would be unable to organise themselves, politicians could not communicate with the public, and election campaigns could not be held if money was not collected. Therefore political funding is not only indispensable, it is also desirable.

Nevertheless, the financing of politics has led to severe problems in most democracies. The first lesson from Western experience is that there are no simple solutions to these difficulties.

Problems of Political Finance

Money lies at the root of several political evils:

(1) Corruption.

Politicians and parties may be tempted to give improper favours in return for political contributions. The search for funds has often led to corruption. See also Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices.

(2) Unfairness.

Money may lead to unfairness and may distort electoral competition. If one party is able to attract disproportionately large funds from some very wealthy supporters, it stands to gain a considerable advantage over an opposing party. A well funded campaign will be able to employ a larger staff and to pay for a greater number of posters and advertisements. It is hard to assess scientifically the extent to which superior resources win votes. A huge budget is no guarantee of success. Yet there are circumstances where the candidate with the largest budget has a clear advantage.

According to a sophisticated study by Professor Gary Jacobson, the size of the campaign budget has a vital effect on results of contests for the U.S. House of Representatives. In particular, a candidate who wishes to gain victory against an incumbent member of Congress has little chance without a large campaign budget. In 1972 and 1974, candidates who challenged sitting Congressmen gained an extra 1 percent of the vote for every $10,000 they spent on their campaigns. In view of the large sums spent in the elections, these results are striking. See also Level Playing Field, Fairness.

(3) Financial barriers against standing for political office.

If electoral success depends on access to money, citizens who are not rich may be deterred from putting themselves forward as candidates for public office. The health of democracy demands that members of every group - rich or poor - should be able to undertake a career in politics.

Recent Scandals

Events in Western countries show that these are dangerous problems. The verdict of the German scholar Professor Wildenmann on the position in his own country applies equally to others. German 'practices of party finance,' he wrote, ' are the dark spot of today's representative government'.

Some of the most serious political scandals of the 1980s and 1990s have concerned abuses and alleged corruption involving contributions to political parties. At worst, politicians have been charged with accepting money from criminals, either for their private benefit or for campaign funds.

The downfall of the Christian Democrats in Italy has stemmed largely from accusations of their financial connections with the Mafia. In Japan, the political crisis and the challenge to the ruling Liberal Democrats in the early 1990s also centred around a series of scandals involving payments to politicians for their (huge) election expenses. France is a third country where new regulations concerning the funding of politics have been introduced in the wake of allegations of corruption.

In Britain, the problems have been less serious. Nevertheless, charges in the national press against the Conservative party led in 1993 to an investigation by the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons into the funding of political parties. The Labour Government, which came into office in May 1997 is committed to introducing reforms. In November 1997, Prime Minster Blair asked a Committee on Standards in Public Life ('The Neill Committee') '[t]o review issues in relation to the funding of political parties, and to make recommendations as to any changes in present arrangements.'

In the United States and Germany regulations about political funding - originally introduced as a response to corruption - have produced new problems which have created a seemingly endless series of 'reforms of reforms'.

Leaders and parties of all political persuasions have been involved in scandals. In Belgium, the charges of misconduct relating to political funding concern the political Left, including Mr Claes. In Italy, the party most affected has been of the Right. In Germany, the most notable feature of the 'Flick Affair' of the early 1980s was the fact that senior politicians of all the main parties had allegedly disregarded the laws.

Types of Regulations

Since the Second World War, most of the Western democracies have introduced legislation designed to control the abuses related to political finance. Governments have attempted to regulate and subsidise political funding in a variety of ways:

Limits on expenditures. For example, ceilings on permitted spending by each candidate for parliament or by each of the national party organisations.

Contribution limits. Restrictions on the amounts an individual is permitted to donate.

Disclosure regulations. Mandatory declaration of the names of contributors to campaigns and to parties and disclosure of the amounts contributed by each.

Bans against certain types of contribution. For example, the regulation or restriction of political payments by business corporations, trade unions or foreign organisations and foreign citizens.

Bans against certain types of expenditure. For example, bans on bribes to individual electors, on drinks and meals for electors ('treating') and bans in some countries on the purchase of advertising time on television for party propaganda.

Measures designed to encourage donations: Tax reliefs, tax credits and other forms of tax remission on political donations.

Subsidies-in-kind: The provision of free or below-cost facilities for parties and candidates. For instance, free postage for election literature, free or subsidised facilities to parties for broadcasting on television or radio.

Public subsidies: Financial payments to parties or candidates from public funds.

Objectives of the Regulations

The purposes of legislation have varied from country to country depending on the particular problems which have acted as the spur to reform.

(1) Controlling Corruption.

This has been a primary aim of most reform efforts. A common argument for making it compulsory to declare political contributions is that this is likely to deter politicians from entering into shady deals in exchange for contributions, (see also Political Participation)

(2) Promoting Fairness.

The purpose of restricting the amount that politicians are allowed to spend is not only to control the demand for donations (and thereby to limit the scope for corruption), it is also to reduce the disparities of resources between rich and poor political organisations, see Level Playing Field, Fairness

(3) Controlling the rapid rise in the costs of campaigning.

(4) Promoting vigorous political parties.

Proponents of financial subsidies to parties stress that democracy requires strong and competitive parties. If parties are to be able to present themselves to the electors, and if they are to be able to research into alternative policies, they require the finance to employ adequately sized staffs. The best way to ensure that parties have sufficient resources to carry out their democratic functions is to give them subsidies from the public purse. This argument comes typically (though not exclusively) from the political Left.

(5) Encouraging grass roots participation.

An opposing view is put forward, especially from the political Right. According to this view, the essential characteristic of democratic parties is that they are voluntary organisations that rely on the support and efforts of members. They should depend neither on the state nor on large, private contributions. Their finances should be based on a large number of small subscriptions.

In one-party systems, under which membership of the ruling party brings material advantages, people are likely to join for the sake of their jobs and careers. By contrast, participation in political activities in a competitive party system does not bring these benefits. Leaders of democratic parties in multi-party systems need to attract followers who will give their support for idealistic reasons. It is therefore important for democratic parties to receive financial donations, but in addition to receive help in the tasks of electioneering from ordinary members. It follows from this view that a main aim of regulations of political funding should be to encourage wide individual participation through small-scale payments and subscriptions. This objective is of particular importance in a new democracy in which party organisations are weak and need to recruit members, also see Political Participation.

It is sometimes argued that it is unrealistic to expect political parties in areas of the world where incomes are very low to collect significant funds in membership subscriptions. In these conditions, the only available sources of money are grants from public funds or from foreign donors. But there are strong grounds for objection to this view. There is a special danger in such countries that the organic growth of parties may be stifled by 'gold poisoning' in the form of such grants. If party leaders are able to benefit from financial aid, they will frequently lose their local roots. Parties in a considerable number of new democracies have been damaged by well-meaning, over-generous, short-term financial subventions.

Why are Political Financing Regulations Often Evaded ?

It will be useful to outline some of the ways in which the reforms of recent years have been evaded. An examination of these techniques by which laws are ignored will provide warnings, as well as the benefit of experience, for the legislators of today. The leading German scholar, Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, has summarised the difficulties experienced by reformers in Western nations:

Political practice of almost two decades has re-emphasised the general paradox of constitutional reform measures. Implementation of reform legislation breeds the need for more (and more complex) reform legislation. The elaborate restrictions designed to control the flow of money into the political process have encouraged the professional politicians to engage in a creative search for potential loopholes either in the application of the existing law or when drafting necessary amendments.¹⁷

Similarly, Herbert Alexander, has stressed the 'pitfalls' of ill-considered reform proposals. Reform legislation has a tendency to create new and unexpected problems. Evidence for this is the series of unending 'reforms of reforms' in a number of countries such as France, United States, Italy and Germany. See also Loopholes.

Why has it proved so hard to devise satisfactory laws to regulate political finance? There are at least two basic reasons.

(1) Loopholes.

Although contributions to political parties and to election campaigns are two of the most important and most direct channels through which money may be use to influence politics, they are not the only ones. Restrictions on the financing of parties and elections are likely to prove ineffective if other forms of 'politically relevant' financing remain unchecked. The vital issue of loopholes is discussed in another entry, see Loopholes

(2) Inadequate enforcement.

In a field as controversial and complex as the funding of parties and campaigns, laws require effective supervision and implementation. As Khayyam Paltiel put it:

'Enforcement demands a strong authority endowed with sufficient legal powers to supervise, verify, investigate and if necessary institute legal proceedings. Anything less is a formula for failure.' See also Breaches and penalties.

Germany provides a dramatic example of non-enforcement of the law relating to political money. The revelations of the early 1980s surrounding the 'Flick Affair' suggested that there had been some 1,800 cases of infringements of the law involving all the main parties, some of the most senior political figures and many of the country's top business corporations.

Writing in 1994, Alexander and Rei Shiratori reported that in Italy a belated investigation was uncovering abuses of many years.

'The inquiry, called 'Operation Clean Hands,' has claimed the lives of seven high ranking officials, including a former minister who committed suicide after being formally notified that they were under investigation for violating laws on party financing. So far, 1,500 politicians - including two former prime ministers - and businessmen have been imprisoned or interrogated and six Government ministers and four heads of major political parties have resigned their posts'.¹⁸

The issue of enforcement nevertheless poses another dilemma. On the one hand, laws are of little value unless they are enforced. On the other hand, the demands of accountability may prove so onerous that they will themselves add greatly to the costs of campaigning and will deter ordinary citizens from standing for political office. This has been the experience of the United States. Here, regulations about the disclosure of political donations and about maximum permitted payments by each donor have become so complex that candidates have been obliged to employ specialist lawyers and accountants. Election law has been a burgeoning field of activity - and of profit - for the legal profession.

These warnings are not intended as a counsel of despair. However, they are intended to encourage care and caution. It is vital to consider the details as well as the principles of any intended legislation concerning political finance.

In light of the many complexities involved in controlling political financing, laws need to be considered with care. Regulations are valueless unless a well-planned, professional and neutral system of implementation is created. Two of the most promising types of regulations are those providing for free broadcasting time for parties during election campaigns, and for tax incentives (or matching grants) for small donations.

Draft Only

Public Financing

Financial subsidies to political parties or to candidates for public office have been introduced in most Western democracies since the 1950s. In several nations subsidies have become a party's most important source of income. Direct financial subsidies paid to candidates or to political parties from public funds have become the norm.

Moreover, direct subsidies have been supplemented in many countries by indirect financial aid from the state. For example, candidates and parties often receive allocations of free broadcasting time during election campaigns, while candidates sometimes receive free or reduced postal facilities.

Direct financial assistance from public funds has become a staple source of financing for candidates and parties in a large number of countries. The predominant role of public financing becomes apparent when all sources of financial and in-kind assistance from the state are combined.

Administrative Implications

A system of public subsidies has several administrative pre-requisites:

First, if financial payments are given to political parties, a legal definition must be given to the term 'party'. Without such a definition, it would be impossible to decide which organisations should receive aid. Normally, a party is defined as an organisation which has presented a stated minimum number of candidates for election and which has gained at least a minimum proportion of votes. In Germany, the qualifying hurdle to enable an organisation to qualify as a 'party' for the purpose of receiving public subsidies is to gain at least 0.5% of the national vote.

Second, to receive public funds, a party will normally be obliged to set up an acceptable administrative structure to ensure that the grants are properly used and that accounts are kept.

Comments

Public subsidies have proven attractive to reformers for several reasons. In the wake of corruption, it has been advisable for countries to release political party organisations from the need to scramble for private or for corporate donations. Advocates of state aid to parties have argued that a system of public funding is likely to be fairer and purer. It also has the undoubted attraction to politicians and to party bureaucrats of providing a relatively assured source of income.

Public funding nevertheless has been subject to severe criticism. First, the provision of state aid has tended to increase parties' appetite for funds. Therefore it has not ended the search for additional private donations and it has not eliminated corruption. The massive corruption associated with political funding in Germany and in Italy has occurred in countries where parties have received lavish state aid.

Second, it is an illusion to suppose that state aid is likely to produce a 'fair' allocation of money between parties. It is hard enough to devise an acceptable division of free broadcasting time. The problems involved in sharing payments from the public treasury are even more intractable. 'Fairness' is an elastic concept, and it is to be expected that the governing party or the governing coalition of parties will devise a system that will be in its own interest. Moreover, legislators will have an incentive to make financial arrangements that benefit sitting members of Parliament - themselves - and which place challengers in their seats at a disadvantage.

Third, a reliance on public funds risks making parties lose their voluntary and participatory character. If party organisations become state-funded bureaucracies, they are - it is argued - likely to lose the independence which is essential if they are to play their proper democratic roles.

One response to these concerns is to limit the proportion of a party's income that it may receive from public funds. This provision has been introduced in Germany.

Draft Only

Direct

Historical Background

The use of tax-payers' funds to finance candidates and parties is by no means a recent phenomenon. It was a time-honoured practice in some countries for governments to use secret funds to help their political allies. In Britain, Secret Service money worth £10,000 a year was used for partisan purposes by the government of the day until the 1880s. The Conservative government abolished the Secret Service money in a move probably less motivated by morality than by the desire to deny this source of finance to any future Liberal government.¹⁹

The nineteenth century also witnessed Bismarck's active use of a secret Reptile Fund. Its main use was to bribe journalists (known contemptuously as 'reptiles'). But the fund was deployed additionally for a variety of political objectives both within Germany and abroad.

During the Cold War, clandestine flows of governmental funds for elections and party-building reached very large proportions.

Alongside this old system of concealed governmental funds for party politics, the twentieth century saw the development of financial assistance from public funds for members of legislatures. Pay and allowances for parliamentarians and later for party groups in legislatures became normal.

The innovation since the late 1950s has been that public funds have increasingly been provided openly to candidates and parties. An early example of overt public funding was in the American territory of Puerto Rico. Professor Paltiel has outlined the background:

'The pioneering subsidy system introduced in Puerto Rico with the Election Fund Act of 1957 was designed to remove the former dependence of the island's main political parties on the entrenched sugar interests and on the 'macing' of civil servants, many of whom were pressured into donating as much as 2 percent of their salaries to the party in power. The act provided for the creation of an election fund in every four-year cycle from which registered 'principal' political parties - those which had gained 10 percent of the votes cast for governor in the previous general election, presented candidates in every district, and won representation in the legislature - could withdraw up to $75,000 in nonelection years and $150,000 in election years to meet administrative, operational, and election costs.'²⁰

The first direct subsidy system in West Germany was introduced in 1959. Writing in 1989, Herbert E. Alexander²¹ listed the following dates when direct public subsidies were introduced or when legislation for such payments was enacted in a number of countries:

COUNTRY	YEAR
Costa Rica	1954
Argentina	1955
(West) Germany	1959
Austria	1963
France	1965
Sweden	1966
Finland	1967
Israel	1969
Denmark	1969
Norway	1970
Brazil	1971
Canada	1974
Italy	1974
United States	1976
Spain	1977
Mexico	1978
Venezuela	1978
Turkey	1983
Australia	1984

Additional countries with direct financial subsidies to parties and / or candidates include:

Czech Republic
Greece
Hungary
Nicaragua
Poland
Portugal
Romania
South Africa
Taiwan

Countries without direct state funding of extra-parliamentary party organisations or candidates included in 1995:

Britain
India
Ireland
Luxembourg
Malaysia
The Netherlands

In The Netherlands there is, however, public funding of educational institutes linked with the parties.

Varying Uses and Forms of Public Subsidies

It is convenient to distinguish between

(a) payments for election costs and payments for the routine organisation of political parties between elections,

(b) payments to political parties and payments to candidates,

Subsidies - Electoral Costs Versus Routine Organisational Costs of Parties

Examples of countries where public subsidies are for electoral costs include Canada, France, Italy (since 1993), and Poland.

The routine, operational costs of party organisation are funded in Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy (from 1974 to 1993), Japan, Portugal and Sweden.

In some jurisdictions, there are subsidies both for routine organisational costs and for election campaigns. These include Hungary, Israel and Mexico.

Subsidies - to Candidates Versus to Party Organisations

The distinction between payments to political parties and payments to individual candidates is illustrated by the system of election subsidies in Canada. There are two separate categories of election subsidy, one for individual parliamentary candidates, the other for the national party organisations.

Subsidies to National Versus Local Party Organisations

It is usually the central organs of a political party which receive public payments. This serves to increase their clout in internal party politics. There can be little doubt that the overall effect of direct subsidies to parties has been to strengthen the trend towards the centralisation of power within them - a development that has resulted from other causes too.

There are exceptions to the rule. In Sweden, a separate subsidy may be granted by municipalities directly to local party organisations, a system to combine public funding with a degree of decentralisation. Since 1977, all authorities and provinces in Sweden subsidise the parties represented on their councils. ²²

In some federal regimes, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, second-tier authorities - states or provinces - supplement federal subsidies (which concern the costs of federal elections or federal party organisations) with subsidies for activities at the state or provincial level. According to Alexander, there was public funding in most Canadian provinces and (West) German as well as Austrian länder. A minority of state governments in the United States and Australia also had subsidies. There were even schemes in a few American localities - Seattle, Tucson and Sacramento County. (p. 15.)

Draft Only

Funding Formulas

Thresholds

It is standard practice to impose a minimum requirement on parties and candidates wishing to receive public financing. The requirement may be in several different forms.

(a) A condition of financial aid to individual candidates may be that they should obtain a certain percentage of the votes cast in their districts in the election for which the subsidy is being sought. Since it will be unclear before the election whether each candidate will obtain the necessary threshold of support, it will then be necessary to reimburse money after the election to those candidates who qualify. This system has a disadvantage for candidates who are uncertain about whether their level of support is likely to meet the requirement for subsidies. Such candidates will therefore be under pressure to limit their outlays in case they do not receive a post-election reimbursement.

Alternatively, for routine grants to political parties, the threshold may be based on the results of the most recent general election.

(b) For a political party, the requirement for subsidy of campaign costs may be that it puts forward candidates in a certain number of seats.

(c) For subsidies for routine organisational costs or of campaign costs, parties may be required to win a certain number of seats in the legislature.

(d) The test may be a certain percentage of the national vote.

(e) There may be a combination of tests: a minimum percentage of the national vote and a minimum number of seats in the legislature.

Thresholds for public subventions vary between 0.5 percent of the national vote in Germany to 15 percent of the vote for individual candidates in Canada. It should be noted that, in countries where parties are required to achieve a threshold of electoral support to qualify for seats in the legislature, a different threshold might apply to public subsidies. For instance, in Germany, the basic threshold for seats in the Bundestag is 5 percent of the national vote; but for public subsidies, the qualifying hurdle is only 0. 5 percent.

As of 1995, thresholds of electoral support for public funding include the following. Some of the statistics refer to grants to national party organisations, others to candidates for various elective offices:

Taiwan - 75 percent of the votes needed by each candidate to secure election
Canada - 15 percent
Turkey - 7 percent
Italy - For Senate campaigns 5 percent of votes in the region, or 15 percent of all votes for independent candidates
France - For National Assembly election 5 percent
Greece - 3 to 6 percent
Australia - 4 percent
Sweden - 2.5 percent in last 2 elections
Japan - 2 percent or over 5 candidates incumbent Diet members
Mexico - 1.5 percent
Israel - less than 1 percent
Germany - 0.5 percent

The argument for a low threshold is fairness to emerging political parties. The arguments for higher thresholds are, first, that they deter frivolous parties and candidates such as Britain's 'Monster Raving Loony Party' which might otherwise create themselves for the specific purpose of gaining a chunk of public money. In addition, a high threshold may ensure that public funds do not need to be given to extremist parties which are likely to use the money to spread anti-democratic and (in many cases) radicalist doctrines.

However, the support in some countries for extremist parties is sufficiently large to make it impossible to set a threshold that will exclude them from a share of taxpayers' money without also excluding some significant, legitimate parties in the process. The possibility that public funding will promote non-democratic parties is an unfortunate but sometimes inevitable consequence of the introduction of state financial aid.

Formulas

In different countries, the distribution of public funds for parties or candidates is based on several criteria.

(a) The grant may be a proportion of actual expenditure where the receipt of public money is on condition that the party or candidate also raises money from private sources.

(b) The grant may be conditional upon the recipient's agreeing to forego the right to raise campaign money from private sources. (This is the rule for public funding of presidential election campaigns in the United States.)

(d) The grant may be proportional to each party's number of seats in the legislature.

(e) The grant may be proportional to each party's representation in the legislature but with the additional provision that parties supporting the government receive less per seat than opposition parties.

(f) The grant may be based on several criteria.

Examples

Canada

An example of the reimbursement of campaign costs is the Canadian system.

(a) Each candidate receives a reimbursement of 50 percent of campaign costs. Candidates must receive 15 percent of the vote in order to qualify and they must also adhere to a set spending limit.

(b) For campaign expenses of national party organisations, the reimbursement is 22.5 percent of the total. Again, there is a spending ceiling. National parties are not required to obtain a minimum percentage of the vote to qualify; instead, they are required, first, to spend at least 10 percent of the maximum permitted budget and, second, they must field at least 50 candidates.

Germany

An example of a formula for annual, routine subsidies to national party organisations is the German system.

(a) The public subsidy is computed on the basis of the latest election result. For the first 5 million votes, each party receives DM 1.30 per annum and DM 1 thereafter.

(b) In addition, DM 0.5 is granted for every DM 1 received by the party in membership dues.

(c) The direct subsidy must not exceed the amount raised by each party from membership subscriptions and other private sources.

(d) To qualify for matching funds, membership subscriptions must be no more than DM 6,000 per person per annum.

(e) The party must have obtained at least 0.5 percent of the vote in the last election (or 1 percent of the vote in a state election).

(f) According to an amendment of 1993 to the Parties Law, there is an absolute ceiling of DM 230 million a year on the total direct subsidy to all parties combined. ²³

Nicaragua

For the 1990 elections, the Supreme Electoral Council was authorised to allocate a specific amount to political parties.

Fifty percent of this was to be divided between them in equal amounts,
the remainder on the basis of the number of votes received in the 1984 elections.
Parties which did not contest the earlier ballot each received the same as the party with the fewest votes.

Draft Only

Costs and Public Responses

Draft Only

Examples of the costs of direct subsidies to candidates and political parties are as follows. They exclude the additional expense for tax-payers of subsidies-in-kind and other forms of indirect assistance. ²⁴

Australia (1992-93) - AUS $ 14.2 million.

Austria (1989) - About 970 million schillings (including grants to party newspapers).

Canada (1993) - CAN $30.5 million. Approximately $10.5 million of this was for reimbursements to registered political parties and $20 million to candidates.

France (1989) - FF 105.6 million

Germany (1994) - Direct public funding of parties represented in the Bundestag was DM 332.2 million. Including certain indirect items such as party taxes, see Party Taxes and tax concessions, see Tax Concessions, the total amounted to DM 607.2 million. The figure is even higher if state grants to the political foundations are taken into account, see Political Foundations.

Greece (1993) - 10.7 billion drachmae

Italy (1995) - The total budgeted for the reimbursement funds was 91 billion lire.

Japan (1994) - Under the 1994 Law Concerning Financial Assistance to Political Parties, the total amount of public financing was limited to Japanese Yen 30.9 billion.

Mexico (1994) - The General Council of the Federal Electoral Institute decided in January 1994 to set the total public financing at U.S. $ 67 million. Expenditures in 1994 on the public financing of Mexican political parties amounted to U.S. $ 59.6.

Spain (1993) - Public funding was 12.009 billion pesetas, compared with 1.7 billion in 1980.

Sweden (1990-91) - Direct funding to political parties was SKr 132 million.

United States (1988) - U.S.$ 92.2 million on Democratic and Republican presidential election campaigns.

Public Opinion on State Subsidies for Parties

In view of the high costs of public subsidies for political parties and candidates, it is not surprising that the public have been suspicious about the opportunities they have given for politicians to feather their own nests. As Gullan Gidlund reports,

'A common characteristic in the Nordic countries is that opinion polls and other studies have shown that the general public has been less enthusiastic and more negative than its political representatives towards the parties being financed, to a large extent, by public funds'.²⁵ In Italy, a referendum held in April 1993 resulted in a 90.3 percent vote to abolish public financing for parties, both for election campaigns and for routine organisational expenses of the party organisations. The system of subsidies introduced in 1974 was, therefore, abandoned. However, a new law reintroduced another public funding scheme in the form campaign reimbursements for campaigns for the legislature.'

Draft Only

Party Newspapers and Special Party Organisations

Before television became the most powerful medium of political communication in economically developed nations, newspapers were of even greater importance to political parties than they are now. Party leaders took great trouble and often spent large sums of money to ensure that particular newspapers supported their 'party line'. Financial backing for newspaper sometimes took the form of grants to apparently independent journals; at other times, parties set up newspapers of their own.

The importance of a party press is illustrated by the fact that when the Bolshevik authorities smuggled diamonds into Britain shortly after the Russian Revolution to stimulate British working-class politics, one of their prime objectives was to assist the newspaper associated with the British Labour Party, the Daily Herald. The diamonds had been confiscated from leading families, including that of the Tsar, by the new regime.

There are parts of the world where newspapers have small circulations and where television is not widely available. In countries such as Tanzania, radio and political meetings remain the main forms of political communication. Party-affiliated newspapers exist, but have small circulations.

Press Subsidies

Despite the decline of the party press, there are a few countries in which public subsidies are devoted specifically to such newspapers. Karl-Heinz Nassmacher has given the following summary:

In both Sweden and Austria, public subsidies to the press are closely linked to legislative action regarding parties and their funds. The Swedish party subsidy of 1965 was the substitute for a proposed press subsidy; nevertheless a specific press subsidy was enacted a few years later. In Austria, legislation concerning the party subsidy and the press subsidy was passed jointly and even published in two consecutive chapters of the statute book.

[In Sweden] [a]ll papers belonging to the Social Democratic Party or the Trade Unions are eligible for a press subsidy, as well as some papers owned by the (previously agrarian) Centerpartiet.

[In Austria] [b]etween 1975 and 1982, eight daily papers that were closely linked to the political parties - with less than one fifth of the total circulation - received about one third of the federal press subsidy. This amounted to a 40 percent supplement of the party organization subsidy.²⁶

Other Subsidies

In some countries, public subsidies are given to other party-linked organisations. Professor Paltiel, writing in 1981, listed the following examples of countries where there were public subsidies to party-linked women's and youth organisations: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Sweden.²⁷

Further subsidies are given in some countries - especially Germany - to party foundations, see Political Foundations.

Draft Only

Funding of Party Overseas Activities

Many political parties belong to international groups of like-minded parties, see Foreign Contributions. The main groupings are the Socialist International, the Liberal International, the International Democrat Union (an organisation of conservative parties) and the Christian Democrat International. Either through these 'Internationals' or on a more individual basis, political parties sometimes give practical aid to their foreign counterparts. This assistance may take the form of training party organisers and leaders; sometimes it involves direct financial assistance or aid-in-kind (such as the provision of newsprint, printing equipment, or even vehicles to enable party organisers in the recipient country to travel to remote areas).

Sometimes the funds for activities involving international solidarity come from ideologically-motivated party supporters in the donor country; sometimes groups of emigres in the donor country help to fund political parties and candidates in their former homelands, especially when these homelands conduct democratic elections after a period of non-democratic rule.

Nevertheless, the funds for party-to-party assistance have often come not from individuals but from the governments of the donor countries. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the new Bolshevik regime created the Communist International (Comintern) to serve as a channel for delivering money and other forms of assistance to form Communist parties in other countries. Though supposedly coming from ordinary Soviet citizens, the funds transmitted through the Comintern effectively consisted of state aid from the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, the Hitler regime used party-to-party links to export Nazism and to conduct campaigns of subversion, especially in Central Europe.

After the Second World War, party channels were again used to export political influence by both sides in the Cold War. While the Soviet Union continued to back overseas Communist parties and other sympathetic organisations (such as selected trade unions, liberation movements, and newspapers), the United States and its Allies also made frequent and large-scale payments to anti-Communist politicians and parties in countries threatened by Soviet infiltration. The party internationals appear to have served occasionally as one channel for such activities. However, the extent to which they acted as conduits for money from intelligence agencies is still a matter of uncertainty and disagreement.

From the early 1960s, the West German Government started to systematically channel a portion of its foreign assistance budget through a set of German party foundations, see Political Foundations. Each foundation was linked to (though legally independent from) a major West German political party. For example, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung was connected to the Christian Democrats; the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung was connected to the Social Democrats; and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung to the Free Democrats. The Stiftungen (Foundations) were almost entirely dependent on public funds. They acted as conduits for assistance to like-minded foreign political parties, trade unions, and civic groups. Frequently, their grants went to parallel foundations linked to political parties in the recipient countries. From the 1960s, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation was an important channel for assistance to centre-right parties and unions in Latin America; the Friedrich Ebert Foundation concentrated in the same period on aid to emerging Socialist regimes in the newly-independent countries of Africa.

In the early 1980s, the Congress of the United States created a National Endowment for Democracy. One of the main functions of this new body was to provide public funds for overseas activities to the two main United States political parties (albeit on a far smaller scale than those give to the West German political foundations). The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs (NRI) were set up, with headquarters in Washington, to receive and to distribute this new source of funding. The NRI was later renamed the International Republican Institute (IRI). Like their West German counterparts, these institutes were legally independent from their parent parties, but the composition of their governing boards ensured a close connection between each party and its international institute.

In Britain, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, established in 1992, provides funding - mainly from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office - for overseas democracy-building projects. Half of its funds are allocated to the political parties represented in the House of Commons. Other governments which now give public funds to their domestic political parties (or to foundations linked with these parties) for overseas political aid include Austria, Holland, and Sweden.

Draft Only

Indirect

In many countries, the system of public funding of political parties is like an iceberg. The easily visible part of the system consists of direct financial subsidies to the party organisations. But it is also necessary to take into account the various indirect payments and benefits-in-kind received by the parties.

Free Broadcasting Time

One of the most widespread features of modern electioneering is the allocation of time to the main political parties to allow them, free of charge, to deliver their messages on television and radio. Given the overwhelming importance of television as a medium of political communications, this 'free time' is a vital benefit-in-kind, though it is hard to calculate its commercial value.

State Payments in the Legislature

Members of Parliament and party groups within the legislature often receive payments for research, office expenses, etc. Although these payments are usually intended to permit individual parliamentarians and party groups to carry out their legislative duties, some of the money is likely to be used for partisan political purposes and therefore constitutes an extra source of indirect public funding of the political parties.

Parliamentary payments and allowances are diverted to partisan use in a number of ways. For instance, legislators are expected in some countries to donate a portion of their salaries to their party organisation, see Party Taxes. Legislators frequently use staff, who are officially employed to help the legislator carry out research or to serve his constituents, to conduct activities that are to all intents and purposes electioneering. In one way or another, a considerable portion of the public subsidies provided to enable parliamentarians to carry out their official duties ends up by being used for party political, electioneering purposes.

Use of Governmental Facilities and Public Personnel

Governments frequently use public facilities for party purposes. In Germany, the governing party has at its disposal the Federal Press and Information Office. Though its formal purpose is to conduct propaganda on behalf of the government, there is frequently little to distinguish this task from that of conducting propaganda intended to help the re-election of the governing party. For instance, the Federal Press and Information Office commissions opinion polls, thereby saving the party headquarters of the governing party from having to pay for them.

State Grants to Party Foundations

In addition to grants to parties and political candidates, additional money is given in Germany and in several other countries to 'political foundations'. These organisations are closely connected with a political party, though they are - in formal legal terms - independent. By carrying out party-related policy research and by conducting 'political education' courses, and even by commissioning public opinion research, the foundations relieve the parent parties of the need to spend money on these activities, see Political Foundations.

Tax Reliefs, Tax Credits, and Matching Grants

These are another form of indirect public funding of parties, see Tax Concessions and Matching Grants.

For more information see also Non-Financial Assistance.

Draft Only

Access to Media (etc.)

Examples

In Britain, a candidate for parliament is entitled to ask the Post Office to deliver one item of literature free of postal charges to each person named on the electoral roll. Political parties are also entitled to allocations of free time on radio and television. The regulations require the broadcasting networks to give a 'fair' allocation of time to reporting the activities and speeches of each political party in news programmes during general election campaigns.

The provision of free or subsidised access to television is a crucial aspect of regulation of political finance in a large number of countries. The United States is one country where candidates and campaign groups are free to purchase advertising time without restriction and where broadcasting subsidies are not provided. The need to purchase broadcasting time is one explanation (though not the only one) for the escalation of campaign costs in America.

Administrative Implications

There are three sources of difficulty:

First, the broadcasting authorities may be reluctant to give enough time for political broadcasts during election campaigns. Many viewers are bored by political propaganda and are tempted to switch off their sets at the start of a political broadcast. The managers of the television and radio stations, whose motive is to attract the largest possible audience, resent political broadcasts for this reason. If political broadcasts take the form of short advertisements (on the lines of those for commercial products) viewers will have less time to switch off. Though such short advertisements - on the lines of those used during political campaigns in the United States - are less 'boring', they are also far less informative and are likely to take the form of emotional attacks against political opponents.

To ensure sufficient time for the parties to present their messages, the broadcasting authorities are obliged, in a number of countries, to make a considerable amount of time available for campaign broadcasts.

Second, there is a problem of ensuring that broadcasting time is allocated fairly to the different parties. One approach is to base each party's share on its proportion of votes in the previous election. This puts parties which are newly formed or whose popularity has recently increased at a disadvantage. Another method is to allow the same time to all parties. But this gives undue prominence to insignificant and extreme groups and is likely to tempt some groups to form themselves as 'parties' for the sole purpose of gaining free publicity. A third rule is to give parties broadcasting time only if they are putting forward a minimum number of candidates. However, this too may provide undesirable broadcasting opportunities to extreme, fringe groups with almost no followers.

In Britain, the allocation of broadcasting time is made by an informal committee that includes representatives of the main parties and of the broadcasting authorities. This has usually led to an agreed formula before every general election.

Third, technical problems may arise in countries in which there are a large number of radio and television channels and in which political campaigning is conducted by individual candidates rather than by political parties. If a party seeks to present a nation-wide message, it presents no problem if a particular television channel reaches just one city or one area. If an individual candidate wishes to appeal directly to his electors, he may face the difficulty that his electoral district does not correspond with the delivery area of any television or radio station.

Comment

Despite the administrative complications, provision of free broadcasting time is important. Unlike newspapers, which may exist without limit, there are likely to be few television or radio channels. Broadcasting is a powerful quasi-monopoly.

It is in the public interest that access to television should be allocated fairly between parties and should not be sold to the highest bidder. It is vital that the division of time between parties should be according to an agreed formula or according to an agreed procedure. The use of television should not be under the sole control of the government.

Draft Only

Tax Concessions

Examples

In several countries, including Germany and Canada, small and medium sized donations are encouraged by tax reliefs, tax credits or matching grants, see Matching Grants. The technical details of the different schemes, though important, will not be discussed in detail since these notes will concentrate on the underlying principles.

A common device to encourage private donations to charities is to make them tax free. The public treasury subsidises such gifts by foregoing the tax that it would otherwise receive on that amount of money. The same device has been used to encourage donations to parties. In order to ensure that the system does not favour rich donors, the tax reliefs have been limited to relatively small donations.

In Germany, donations to parties by individuals are tax deductible up to DM 6000 a year per person. In other words, the amount contributed is subtracted from an individual's gross, pre-tax income. This reduces the liability for tax, depending on each individual's marginal tax rate. There is also a tax credit for donations up to DM 3000 per person per year. Corporate donations are permitted but are no longer tax deductible.

In Canada, there is a system of tax credits. Unlike the tax deduction, the tax credit involves a reduction in the actual amount of tax paid. Therefore, it does not rely on each individual's marginal tax rate. In Canada, individuals receive a tax credit of 75 percent for the first CAN$100 contributed each year. The credit falls to 50 percent for additional donations between $100 and $550 and to 33.3 percent for donations between $550 and $1,150. This system means that someone who contributes $100 dollars to a party receives back $75 as a tax credit and, in effect, pays only $25, the rest being added by the public treasury. Since the system was introduced in 1974, political parties have come to rely much more on small scale contributions. The importance of large contributions has diminished.

But what about electors who are on low incomes and who therefore pay no taxes? A system of tax reliefs on political donations does not benefit them. Consequently, political parties that gain much of their support from the poor arguably lose out from scheme of tax relief on political donations. To encourage political donations by persons on low incomes who pay no tax, a matching grant rather than a tax relief may therefore be used. Such matching grants are discussed in entry Matching Grants.

Another use of the tax system to benefit political parties is a relief from some or all forms of taxation for political parties. Though this helps the parties, it does not encourage donations to them. Such countries include Denmark (except for real estate), Germany (with the exception of business activities), Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the non-profitmaking bodies that administer party funds in Belgium. ²⁸

Comments

Tax reliefs on political donations and matching grants have proved relatively successful and provide one of the most promising approaches to the regulation of political finance. In particular, they accord with the democratic aim of encouraging party activity and avoiding undue dependence on a few large contributors.

Draft Only

Matching Grants

Matching grants are a variation on a scheme providing tax relief or tax credits for political donations, see Tax Concessions. Like tax reliefs, matching grants aim to encourage political donations by individuals by providing an extra amount from public funds when individuals make a political contribution. Unlike tax reliefs, matching grants are not dependent upon the tax status of the individual donor. Therefore, matching fund systems are arguably fairer on parties and on candidates whose support comes from members of low income groups who do not pay income tax and who will not benefit from tax reliefs.

In some states within the United States, the regulation systems provide for matching funds. Hawaii and Michigan match donations up to $100, Massachusetts matches donations up to $250, and New Jersey up to $1,500. In most cases the match is 1:1. In Hawaii, the state provides a party with an additional $100 for $100 contributed to the party by an individual donor. In Michigan and New Jersey there is a 2:1 match. For $100 donated to a party in Michigan, the state provides an additional $200.

In addition to matching grants for donations, some systems provide matching grants for campaign expenditures. In Canada, parliamentary candidates are entitled to a reimbursement of a part of their campaign expenses provided they succeed in obtaining 15 percent of the vote.

Administrative Implications

The schemes that have been described are subject to abuse. It would be possible for a party to give $100 to a member, asking the member to return the money as a 'contribution'. The party could then claim the $100 matching grant. Provided that matching grants and tax benefits are restricted to relatively small donations, it is hard to organise such cheating on a large scale without risk of discovery.

Comments

Matching grants and tax reliefs on political donations have proved relatively successful and provide one of the most promising approaches to the regulation of political finance. In particular, they accord with the democratic aim of encouraging party activity and avoiding undue dependence on a few large contributors.

Draft Only

Party Taxes

When a political party is successful in securing the election of its candidates as members of Parliament or as members of the national or local government, it will be in a position to benefit from access to public funds.

(a) In modern times, members of Parliament, particularly those in industrialised countries, are normally entitled to salaries and allowances for travel, office, and research costs.

(b) In some countries and at certain levels of government, the governing party is entitled to what have traditionally been known as the 'spoils' of office. In particular, they are able to provide public employment to political supporters. In countries such the United States, trade unions of public service workers have attempted to secure the rights of workers to security of tenure of their jobs and have, with considerable success, tried to limit the power of incoming mayors and state governors to dismiss workers employed by their predecessors and to replace them with their political cronies. Nevertheless, appointments on the basis of political patronage rather than on the basis of qualifications are still common in many parts of the world.

In view of their powers to award jobs and contracts, it is not surprising that governing parties use this power to demand kick-backs from those to whom they grant these benefits. Members of Parliament, especially those representing Communist or Socialist parties, have in a number of countries (such as Germany) made regular demands on elected office-holders to pay a portion of their public salaries into the party's coffers. The reasoning is that they owe at least part of their salary to the party which has been responsible for their success in the last election and which has the power to engineer their deselection at the next election.

In a number of states in the United States, unskilled workers appointed to jobs in public authorities on the basis of political recommendations were traditionally expected to give a part of their pay to the party machine. One method of 'taxation' was to pressure patronage employees to purchase expensive tickets for fund-raising dinners held on behalf of the party or of its major political candidates.

As far as 'party taxes' extorted from contractors are concerned, it was reportedly a regular practice of Communist-ruled local authorities in France and Italy to demand payments for party funds from those awarded local government contracts for building works or for other purposes. According to some reports, the system of 'party tax' for contractors also had an international dimension in Italy. Here, major companies given contracts for exports to the Soviet Union were sometimes expected to pay a set percentage of the contract total as a donation to the Italian Communists.

Obviously, it is hard to conduct reliable research into the scale of such 'party taxes'. But they are clearly a significant feature of political financing in a number of countries, demonstrated by the large number of different words used to describe these taxes.

Draft Only

Political Foundations

What are Party Foundations?

They are normally organisations closely linked with a particular political party, even though they have a distinct legal status. These foundations, see also Funding of Party Overseas Activities, generally carry out work that benefits the parent party but that is not directly connected with the immediate task of electioneering. Party foundations typically conduct courses to educate party members or sympathisers in political work; they are sometimes responsible for policy research, for maintaining the parent party's archives, and for assistance to sister parties in foreign countries.

The most important examples of party foundations are the German Stiftungen (Foundations). They are:

Friedrich Ebert Foundation (linked with the Social Democrats)
Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Christian Democrats)
Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Free Democrats)
Hanns Seidel Foundation (the Bavaria-based Christian Social Union)
Heinrich Boll Foundation (The Greens)

Examples of other political foundations in Western Europe are:

Dr. Karl Renner Institut, Austria (linked with the Austrian Social Democrats)
Fondation Jean Jaures, France ( French Socialist Party)
Eduardo Frei Foundation for International Solidarity, The Netherlands (Christian Democratic Appeal and Christian Democrat Parties)
Alfred Mozer Stichting, The Netherlands (Dutch Labour Party)
Centerns Internationella Fond, Sweden (Centre Party)
Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, Sweden (Swedish Moderate Party)
Olof Palme International Centre (Swedish Social Democratic Party)
Swedish International Liberal Centre (Liberal Party)

The sizes of different foundations vary greatly. The most impressive and established are the German Stiftungen. According to a report prepared in June 1996 by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the five German Stiftungen had a combined budget in 1996 of no less than US$450 million. The Stiftungen broadly match their parent parties in the size of their staffs and in their budgets.

Arguments in Favour of Party Foundations

Since party foundations generally receive the bulk of their funds from the public purse, opinions about their merits vary according to each commentator's judgement of the merits of state funding of political parties.

To supporters of the principle of state aid, the financing of foundations is justified and valuable. Since parties have a number of crucial roles in a democracy, it stands to reason that they should receive sufficient resources to permit them to carry out these roles. If political participation is important, then parties should have the resources to organise programmes of political education for their members and for would-be members. If parties are to present policy alternatives to those of the government's civil servants, then they must receive funding to enable them to carry out policy research. The 1991 report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing accepted this line of argument when it proposed additional state aid to create a network of party foundations in Canada on the European model.

Arguments Against Party Foundations

Those who criticise state aid to political parties point out that 'party foundations' exist to provide legal loopholes. Since the German Stiftungen are, technically, independent of their parent parties, they are in a position to receive public funds which (for various constitutional reasons) cannot be given by the state to the parties themselves. The foundations' existence serves to disguise from the electors the full extent of the parties' reliance on the public purse.

Draft Only

Private Financing

Arguments for Private Financing

There are solid reasons why money from private sources is viewed by some, especially those on the political right, as more desirable than money from the public treasury. If a political party or a candidate for elective office is obliged to collect money from individual supporters, then the very act of fund-raising will lead to greater participation and to more effective organisation than if the money for campaigning has been provided on a plate by the state.

Private financing is desirable too because it avoids the pitfalls of public funding. Publicly-funded parties tend to become over-bureaucratic; they are governed from the top, since it is the senior officials who receive and administer the state aid; they rely too little on their members. Moreover, the allocation of public subsidies between the parties is usually determined not on the basis of an objectively just distribution but on the bargaining power of the various party leaders in smoke-filled rooms.

Since there are so many interpretations of fairness, see Level Playing Field, Fairness, each party will argue for a definition of 'fairness' that serves its self-interest. In practice, minor parties whose support is needed to form a coalition ministry - such as the German Free Democrats - will be able to obtain an unfairly large allocation of public funds. This is seen in the allocation of public money for the German political foundations linked to each of the main political parties, see Political Foundations.

Arguments Against Private Financing

First, private financing is blatantly unfair. In societies with great disparities of wealth, it is possible for a few millionaires and billionaires to contribute a larger total than a mass of poor donors. Moreover, if the super-rich are able to finance their own election campaigns, they will gain an unfair advantage and the legislature will be manned by an excessive and untypical group of millionaires.

Second, private contributions may lead to political corruption. Businessmen will make political contributions in return for public contracts and other benefits, see Illegal Financing.

Third, many private payments do not come from individuals but from institutions such as business corporations. Individual shareholders rarely have a say in the decision by the board of directors to make or to withhold such donations.

A Compromise View

Private contributions are more desirable than public subsidies provided that they are given in relatively small amounts by individual electors. It is large private donations - especially secret ones - that give rise to problems. Systems of regulation should therefore encourage small private donations by devices such as tax reliefs and matching grants, see Tax Concessions and Matching Grants.

Draft Only

Membership Subscriptions

Variations in the Meaning of Party 'Membership'

In some political parties, the membership card is like a passport held by the citizens of a country. An individual pays a set subscription fee which is valid for a set time period, signs a declaration of support for the principles of the party, receives a membership card, a membership number, and a place on the party's national membership roster. In return, the member receives certain rights as a 'card-carrying member' - a citizen of the party.

In fact, this classic model of membership is far from universal. In the United States, for example, the Democratic and Republican Parties have nothing approaching the above system of 'card-carrying membership'. In Britain, the method adopted in the past by the Conservative Party has been far less formal than that described in the previous paragraph. Since there has been no set membership subscription, it has been impossible to make a clear distinction between money received as membership subscriptions and as donations.

According to Maurice Duverger, the main distinction in membership is between Socialist parties (the German Social Democrats are the classic case) and Centre and Centre-Right 'cadre' parties. It is in the Centre-Left parties, argued Duverger, that membership subscriptions played the most important role in fund-raising. This was because such parties relied mainly on the backing of the working-classes. They had to rely on building their finances through a large number of small subscriptions. By contrast, Centre-Right parties could often obtain support from wealthy local notables. Therefore, a strict system of collecting subscriptions was unnecessary.

Plausible though this hypothesis seems to be, it corresponds only loosely with modern realities. Variations in the nature of party membership are most notable between countries rather than between different parties within a single country. For example, membership is particularly well-organised, well-defined and a source of considerable funds for a range of parties in Germany and Austria.

Membership Subscriptions as a Source of Party Income

In most countries, membership levels have been falling. Income from subscriptions is rarely a major constituent of overall party income. A comparative study of political financing in European countries concluded that membership subscription play 'only a limited role' in present-day party funding. 'According to the financial statistics of parties - which are, however, not fully comparable - parties raise less than a quarter of their total income from members' contributions.'²⁹

State Aid and its Impact on Individual Subscriptions

Opponents of state financial aid to political parties have often argued that such aid will have the effect of removing parties' incentives for collecting membership subscriptions. Supporters of state aid have pointed out that, in some countries where parties receive handsome public subsidies (such as Germany) levels of income from subscriptions have nevertheless remained relatively high.

Changing Methods of Collecting Membership Subscriptions

With the advent of credit cards, computerised address lists, and direct mail, there has been a change (seen, for instance, in Britain) in the way in which the political parties collect membership subscriptions. In the past it was the job of party activists to travel from door to door to collect subscriptions from existing members and to recruit new members. This face-to-face method has given way to automatic techniques. Modern technology has led to computerised address lists and records of payments. Subscriptions are typically renewed through appeals sent by direct mail and members are given the opportunity to pay by credit card.

There is some evidence that the modern, impersonal method of collecting subscriptions has resulted in larger subscriptions and, in some cases, to an increase in the number of members. At the same time, members recruited by direct mail are considerably less likely to participate in party activities than those recruited on their doorsteps in the traditional manner.

Draft Only

Plutocratic Approach

The term 'plutocracy' means government by rich individuals. A common criticism of democracy, made around the turn of the Century by anti-democrats such as Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, was that abuses of the system of financing elections meant that so-called democracies were actually no more than plutocracies. By their ability to bribe politicians and to fund their campaigns, the super-rich retained a grip on power, despite 'one person, one vote'.

Without drawing Pareto's extreme and pessimistic conclusions, it is reasonable to express alarm about the potential influence of rich donors. Even though politics is a costly business, a number of the richest men and women in many countries are able - provided they are permitted to do so - to make political donations so large that they will have a distinct impact on the political process. For example, the central campaign costs of the two main UK parties (Conservative and Labour) in a modern general election are around the £20 million (US$ 33 million) level. There are a considerable number of British residents whose wealth is at least ten times this figure. In the British general election of 1997, one businessman, the late Sir James Goldsmith, gave £20 million of his private fortune to run an anti-European Union campaign.

Why do the Rich Make Political Contributions?

There are five common motives:

First, there is the motive of self-protection. It is rational for the rich to donate money to avoid the return of a government committed to policies of nationalisation, high taxes for the wealthy, or other measures likely to damage their general interests.

Second, donations may be given with the object of gaining some specific reward such as a business contract from new government.

Third, there are - very occasionally - ideological reasons for contributions; a wealthy person may wish to contribute to a cause in which he strongly believes.

Fourth, there are social motives. At times when new fortunes are being made, there sometimes emerges a group of newly rich millionaires who desire to gain social prestige to match their wealth. One traditional method of gaining social access is to contribute handsomely to charities, universities, and symphony orchestras - bodies that will have members of distinguished families on their boards of governors. Another way to achieve social success is to donate money to top politicians, thereby receiving as rewards invitations to exclusive gatherings.

Examples of social payoffs include the titles awarded in the early twentieth century to political contributors in Britain (peerages - carrying the hereditary title of 'Lord' and the right to a seat in the house of Lords; baronetcies - the hereditary title of 'Sir', without the entitlement to a seat in the House of Lords; and knighthoods - the non - hereditary title of 'Sir'). The award of titles in exchange for political contributions was made illegal in 1925. According to some, the system has survived, albeit on a less formal, less easily detected basis. In the United States, the traditional reward for upwardly-mobile millionaires has been an appointment as ambassador.

Fifth, the rich are able in some countries to use money to forward their ambitions to gain elective office for themselves. In the United States, candidates for the Congress are permitted to spend unlimited amounts of their own money on their personal election campaigns.

Trends in Plutocratic Donations

According to a common interpretation, the heyday of plutocratic funding of political parties in countries such as the United States and Britain was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a time when vast fortunes were being made in a number of countries; it was the age of the Robber Barons in the United States. The importance of 'fat cats' (rich individuals) was arguably reduced, first, by the rise of institutional financing of political parties (by corporations and by trade unions) and, second, by the spread of public funding of parties and elections from the 1950s onwards and by the introduction of regulations designed to limit large individual contributions, see Funding by Institutions.

It is too early to proclaim the demise of the political 'fat cat'. Billionaires play active roles in political funding in some of the 'tiger economies' of Asia. In Britain and other Western countries, the pro-business policies of governments in the 1980s and 1990s have led to the creation of a large number of new rich, some of whom have become generous political donors. There is evidence that, in countries such as Britain, political financing has once again entered a 'plutocratic era'.

Loopholes

Where regulations demand that personal donations to candidates or to political parties must be publicly declared if they exceed a fairly low threshold, there are several techniques for evading the rules. Some of these are similar to the techniques used by corporations and, in some countries, by trade unions, see By Business Corporations, Fundraising Activities and In Kind Contributions. Evasion techniques especially suited to personal donations include the following:

Dividing one large (declarable) contribution into a number of smaller (not declarable) ones. This seems to be a practice in Germany. An owner of a business consisting of a number of holding companies is able to give a donation from each. Provided that the amount given by each of the companies is below the threshold for declaration, a large combined total may remain legally undeclared. The same applies to donations given by separate member's of the donors family or by individual employees or directors of his business.

Providing money in the form of loans rather than outright 'contributions'. Loans may be especially valuable when a party is unable to raise money for its activities from a commercial bank. The party stands to benefit from below-market interest rates. Moreover, if the party proves unable to repay the loan it may be possible for the donor to write off the loan at a later stage as a business loss.

Donating to personal funds of politicians. Political donations may be free from rules concerning declaration provided that they do not go into the accounts of a political party. In these cases, there is an incentive for politicians - particularly party leaders - to collect personal political war chests. These special funds may be controlled by a group of trustees to ensure that the money in them is kept distinct from the recipient political leader's personal finances. Moreover, the money may be designated for specific political purposes such as policy research. Nevertheless, the effect is to create a channel for political funding that escapes the disclosure rules that may apply to party donations.

British examples of personal political funds are the Lloyd George Fund, collected from 1916 onwards on behalf of the Liberal Prime Minister, the political fund collected in the 1970s for the Labour Party leader and, from 1974-76, Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and the 'blind trust fund' raised in the early 1990s on behalf of the then Labour opposition leader, Tony Blair, contributions in kind.

Other activities that may be regarded as indirect political contributions include business or employment given to a member of a political leader's family. In a major American city, the son of a powerful political leader was employed as representative of an insurance company. By directing insurance contracts to this company, the politician was effectively receiving a commission.

Draft Only

Funding by Institutions

Private funding does not always came from individuals. It may be derived from interest groups, see Private Financing or from economic institutions. The most important sources of institutional funding are business corporations, which usually support Conservative or other Centre-Right parties and trade unions, which usually support Socialist or other Centre-Left parties. In each country, the significance of institutional sources of political money depends partly on political traditions and partly on legal restrictions, see Bans Against Certain Kinds of Contributions.

Institutional Contributions to Party Politics

The basic justification is that individual businesses, trade unions, and organisations representing groups of corporations or groups of unions are affected by government policies. They therefore have direct and legitimate reasons to try to secure the election of parties and candidates that will forward their interests. For instance, if a trade union wishes to secure legislation that sets a minimum wage or regulations on maximum permitted working hours, it may be necessary to lobby the government of the day to pass these measures. It may be equally or more rational to aid the election of union activists to the legislature who will work from the inside or to secure the return of a new government that is committed to these reforms.

A second justification is that collective action may be more effective than individual action. A contribution by a single individual is unlikely (unless it is exceptionally large) to have an influence on the party or the candidate to whom it is offered. By contrast, a political donation given by a corporation or trade association will be more effective from the contributors' viewpoint. As far as donations by working-class electors are concerned, it may be essential to pool a large number of small payments if any political impact is to be achieved - hence the justification of political donations by trade unions.

Criticisms of Institutional Contributions

It may be argued that any method that links contributions to the demand for a payoff is undesirable. Debates in the legislature for or against a minimum wage should not be based upon the relative amounts of money supplied to political parties by trade unions and by businesses. The very fact that institutional contributions are more likely than individual donations to be tied to expectations of influence over policy is a source of criticism.

When an institutional body makes a contribution, it is uncertain whether members of that body have been consulted and whether they would have agreed had they been consulted. The absence of internal democracy within many trade unions and many corporations means that the decision whether or not to make a donation may depend upon the whim or on the personal ambitions of one of the leaders of the organisation irrespective of the wishes of the members.

In the case of business corporations, it is possible for an individual shareholder that disapproves of the corporation's policy on political donations to sell his shares. But there are many cases where this line of action is not available. For example, a member of an occupational pension fund will not have a say in its investment policies. Membership of a trade union will under many circumstances be compulsory for someone working in a factory or trade.

A system of institutional contributions may result in an arguably unhealthy situation where there exists a semi-permanent connection between trade unions and one particular political party or between corporations and another party. The party-corporation nexus may lead to an inflexible system of politics.

Trends in Institutional Donations

Variations between countries are so distinct that it is dangerous to comment on overall trends. Nevertheless, one cautious suggestion is that the importance of institutional contributions to political parties and to candidates in established democracies has declined, though they remain significant in some countries. There are three reasons for this decline:

The system of corporate versus trade union funding of politics probably reached a peak at the time when political conflict itself was based predominantly on class lines, with a party of business and of the middle classes competing against a party of the workers. Since the 1960s, the economies of Western countries have developed from an industrial to a 'post-industrial' stage. The percentage of the population employed in manufacturing has sharply declined. Worker-versus-employer conflicts in factories have become less relevant since fewer people now work in factories.

Public funding has become much more significant.

Corporate financing of political parties has become discredited in some countries following scandals (Japan and France, for example).

Draft Only

By Business Corporations

Historical Background

When class politics was at its height, in the period between the two World Wars (1918-1939) and in the aftermath of the Second World War (1945 onwards), 'big business' felt itself obliged in a number of industrialised countries to confront what it saw as the dangers of Soviet-inspired Communism and of the disruptions of organised trade unionism. At this time, 'big business' not only made hefty payments to anti-socialist and social-democratic parties and their candidates, it also tended to act in a collective fashion.

In some countries, special organisations were formed to collect money from businesses that could then be conveyed as a lump sum to the parties and candidates that 'big business' sought to sponsor. Khayyam Paltiel sums up the phenomenon of what he calls 'conveyors and sponsors' (i.e. intermediary organisations to collect corporate political payments) as follows:

...the growing concentration of the business sector helped produce the sponsor and conveyor organizations linked to the peak industrial groupings and federations of Europe and Japan. Conveyor associations organised to channel and distribute funds from business associations to anti-social democratic parties appeared well before World War I in Imperial Germany ... [During] the Weimar Republic, sponsor groups were formed by industrialists to back specific parties favourable to their needs. Similar practices were adopted and continued into the post-1945 period in Japan, Norway, France (the Conseil National du Patronat Francais), the United Kingdom, and numerous countries with strong neocorporatist traditions of functional representation.³⁰

An example of the corporatist model of business-versus-trade union financing of politics is shown by the behaviour of English mine-owners in the aftermath of the Mineworkers' strike and the General Strike of 1926:

In 1928, the West Yorkshire Coal-Owners' and South Yorkshire Coal-Owners' Associations were both subscribing officially and liberally to Conservative Party funds; many coal-owners had no doubt supported the Conservative Party before but they had not been sufficiently unanimous in their support to subscribe collectively. ³¹

The consolidation of business support for the Conservative Party was seen in the formation in 1948 of British United Industrialists, an organisation that acted as the collecting point for corporate payments to the party.

From the 1950s onwards, the role of such collective funding bodies has tended to decline. Corporations are now more likely to contribute on an individual basis and without the intervention of intermediary bodies. Advantages that could accrue to the donor business itself seem somewhat more likely to be the motive for political payments in the modern era than general considerations of class struggle.

Current Examples of Corporate Contributions

Direct contributions to parties from business enterprises remain a significant source of financing in some countries, though they are generally less important than in the past.

In Canada, 40 percent of the 500 largest financial enterprises made an annual contribution to a political party in 1983-90. Contributions from corporations to the federal organisation of the Progressive Conservative Party rose in real terms (1989 values) in election years from CAN$9.4 million in 1979 to $13.6 million in 1984 to $15.1 million in 1988. This represented about half of the party's total income. The proportion of income coming from corporations to the Liberal Party was approximately the same, but the New Democratic Party obtained less than 10 percent of its income from business.³²

In Britain, business donations have virtually all been made to the Central Office of the Conservative Party. Constituency associations have been less dependent on such payments. The proportion of Conservative central income derived from corporations declined from about three-fifths in the 1970s to one quarter in the early 1990s. As corporate payments became a less healthy source of money, the party turned increasingly to individual businessmen for the personal donations that are summarised in the entry on the plutocratic approach, see also Plutocratic Approach.

In a country such as Brazil, corporate donations and gifts from individual plutocrats seem to be indistinct, but they are in combination a vital source of funds. According to Roberto Aguiar:

...campaigns are funded mainly by bankers, industrialists, traders, and livestock breeders. Firms providing specialised services to the state have been, on the whole, particularly generous in contributing to political parties and candidates.³³

New Channels for Corporate Political Payments

A common feature of democratic politics in recent decades has been to subject corporate donations to increasingly strict regulations, if not to ban them altogether. In some countries corporate payments have been discredited by scandals. A consequence is that, on the surface, business payments seem to have declined in significance. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that what has occurred in a number of countries has been the establishment of new channels for business payments for political purposes. A common response to regulation has been the search for loopholes.

In (West) Germany, the corporate donations that were a vital source to the Christian Democratic Union in the 1950s appeared to decline in significance as a consequence of legal rulings about their tax status and as a result of generous public funding of party organisations and party foundations. However, the Flick scandal, which came to light in the early 1980s, revealed the existence of a mass of illegal business donations.

According to Erhard Blankenburg, the widespread nature of the abuses relating to corporate political payments was illustrated by the fact that between 1982 and 1988, preliminary proceedings had been opened in more than 1,800 cases, involving all the major political parties except The Greens and a good part of Germany's corporate elite. Few of the cases were taken to court 'as most of them were either dismissed or settled by fines in a plea-bargaining fashion.' ³⁴

In France, the development of clandestine channels of business payments to parties and candidates following the legislation of 1995 which banned them is a theme of Yves-Marie Doublet.³⁵

There are similar processes of evasion in India, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Sweden.³⁶ According to an assessment cited by Professor Randhir B. Jain, the ban of company donations introduced by the government of Indira Gandhi 'played ... hell with the system and also with business ethics and morality.' Since the Right Wing opposition could no longer receive business donations on a legal basis,

...other methods of raising money were discovered ... Licenses and permits were unabashedly hawked. Dubious foundations and organizations were created with a view to raising and soliciting funds. Leading industrial houses, known for their impeccable business morality ... eventually buckled under in the race for survival... Although the ban on company donations was removed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the damage done to political life ... with repeated allegations and counter-allegations of bribery and kickbacks (as in the Bofors affair) has been irreparable.³⁷

Rei Shiratori makes a contrast between regulations and reality in Japan. One method of evading control on corporate political donations has been that

Many politicians try to circumvent the regulations set forth by the Political Fund Control Law. They hold fund-raising parties frequently and ask companies and industrial federations to buy large numbers of tickets since this money is not considered a political donation. Politicians set up as many political support organizations as possible since these organizations function as channels through which political funds can be introduced.³⁸

According to Pilar del Castillo, '[t]he rules of party finance in Spain prescribe a dominant role for public funding ... By imposing a strongly statized system and condemning private financing, continuing private financing operates outside the control of the established mechanisms of the law. This system fosters irregularities and corruption that would be less likely to develop in a framework of complete freedom and disclosure.'³⁹ She describes the role of middlemen who mediate between parties and business interests, negotiating exchanges of clandestine business money for political influence.

In Sweden, the process has been different. Despite the ending of direct business contributions to the Conservative Party in 1977, company money still plays a role in political life. Corporations do not contribute to parties but, instead, conduct publicity campaigns that have clear, though indirect, political and partisan implications.

Draft Only

By Trade Unions

Trade unions have been the main organisations established to represent the rights of workers and to take their part in disputes with their employers. Since 'big business' has funded middle-class parties, it is hardly surprising that unions have long supported working-class parties. However, the nature of the organisational links between unions and social-democratic and Communist parties has varied greatly both between countries and, within countries, over time.

Examples of strong organisational links between unions and Labour parties or Centre-Left parties have been seen in Britain, Scandinavia and (in a more complex fashion) in the United States.

In Britain, the body that was later to emerge as the Labour Party was originally established in 1900 by a combination of small socialist societies and by some trade unions. Since members of Parliament were at the time unpaid, since the costs of running election campaigns for the House of Commons were high, and since the Liberal Party was usually unwilling to select working-class candidates because they could not contribute substantially to these costs, a new method of funding seemed essential. Political levies from members of trade unions were the most efficient way to collect enough money in small amounts to allow candidates drawn from poor backgrounds to compete in parliamentary elections.

From this beginning, special political levies by trade unions were to provide the largest part of Labour's funds during its entire existence. They still do, even though they have become a little less dominant in the last few years.

Justifications For Trade Union Funding

The main justification for trade union funding in the established democracies is that it has been essential in view of the usually much larger funds available from corporations and from rich individual donors to their political adversaries.

In addition, money raised by unions from their members has usually been more closely regulated than parallel contributions by the rich and by companies.

A third justification is that union funding has expressed an organic unity between different organisations within what may broadly be called the 'Labour Movement' in each country. Therefore, it has not been a matter of unions' trying to gain special privileges in return for their payments (often the case with business contributions to politicians and to parties). Political giving has been a fraternal activity by one set of workers' organisations to their natural political allies.

There is a further argument for union involvement in politics in countries where there is no tradition of competitive elections. In some of these countries, trade unions may be one of the only independent or relatively independent set of organisations and the only force capable of organising a challenge to the existing regime. The roles of some African union organisations (for instance in Zambia) and of the Polish Union, Solidarity, in the 1980s are examples.

Criticisms of Political Funding by Unions

A primary source of concern is about the rights of individual union members not all of who are supporters of the party or parties to which the union leaders decide to contribute. Even if regulations (as in Britain) permit individual members of unions to sign a form 'contracting out' of that part of their union affiliation fee which is to be used for political purposes, the system will arguably still be unfair. Inertia means that members will tend to pay the political levy even if they oppose the purposes for which it is used. In some cases, members may fear that 'contracting out' of the political levy will make them targets of local union leaders.

An additional worry is that decisions about the use of political levy funds will be decided by a narrow group of union leaders who are, in practice, insufficiently accountable to the ordinary members. Moreover, the leaders may be given seats on the ruling board of the party to which donations are given (as in the British Labour Party) or for other reasons have excessive influence over party policy.

Draft Only

Fundraising Activities

In broad terms, it is convenient to divide the fund-raising activities of political parties into three levels of magnitude of contributions being sought. There are top level contributions (usually from the very rich or from institutions such as corporations); there is low level, 'grass roots' fund-raising activities carried out by local party organisations; and there is a middle level of activities. This last category is the subject of this entry.

Apart from fund-raising through business schemes, two of the most common forms of fund-raising carried out by central party organisations in some First World countries and aimed at medium-sized donations are (a) social events such as dinners and (b) direct mail.

Fundraising Dinners and Social Occasions

This is a time honoured form of political fund-raising in the United States but is also being practised more frequently in countries such as Britain. These occasions are less intimate than events for top-level contributors, who will be rewarded by personal access to party leaders.

The number attending a fund-raising dinner or reception will normally range from a few dozen to a few hundred. There will be too many guests to permit each one to engage in a detailed conversation with the party leaders. Nevertheless, the occasion will be sufficiently personal for leading figures to make brief contact with most of that present - a handshake and a few words. Moreover, there will be some tokens of exclusivity, possibly in the form of signed photographs of the leader or membership of a specially designated club limited to contributors of a certain amount. In addition, the successful fund-raising dinner will attempt to give those present the feeling that they are members of a social or business elite and will provide a chance to see and be seen by others sufficiently prominent to be able to afford the costs of a ticket. The cost of a ticket to a fund-raising event is typically between US$250 and US$1000.

Direct Mail

Direct mail fund-raising consists of appeals on behalf of a candidate or a political party sent by mail to a set of selected individuals. The success of such mailshots depends upon the efficiency with which those contacted are selected. Obviously, there are considerable costs in paying for postage stamps and for sending letters to a mass of people, of whom a relatively small proportion are likely to respond. Indeed, the amount collected through a direct mail appeal is not always as great as the cost involved in sending out the letters.

The success of fund-raising by direct mail depends upon a number of factors:

first, the level of postal costs in the country concerned;</li
second, the efficiency of the postal service;
third, the habits of the population and whether a positive response to impersonal appeals is normal among, at least, a significant minority;
and, fourth, the care and skill with which the data base of those to whom letters are sent has been prepared.

The data base for a direct mail appeal may consist of the names and addresses of those likely to contribute because of their past behaviour. Those who are party members or who have given contributions to the party in the past may be selected. However, the strategy of appealing again to those who have given in the past has limitations. Repeated demands for money to the same people risks 'donor fatigue'. Moreover, candidates who have not previously run for public office and newly-formed political parties will not have an established supporter base. In these cases, it will be important to select names and addresses of groups that probably contain a relatively high concentration of those able and willing to give.

In some countries there is a commercial trade in lists of names. For instance, a Left Wing political party may purchase a list of the names of subscribers of a magazine advocating a radical lifestyle; a Right Wing party may prefer to send a mailing to those who subscribe to an economics or business journal. Other methods are to send letters to those living in certain neighbourhoods or to survey lists of shareholders of particular companies.

Draft Only

In Kind Contributions

Supporters may help a party's or a candidate's financial position not only by making a gift of money but also by providing free or low cost services and goods which would otherwise need to be purchased.

During an election campaign, a wealthy supporter may put a private aircraft or car at the disposal of party leaders or officials. Making houses or apartments available to those working in the campaign will reduce hotel bills. Businesses may make banks of telephones available for teams of canvassers, especially during slack periods such as evenings and weekends when the donors do not require them.

Sympathetic suppliers may discover, accidentally-on-purpose, that they have surplus stocks of pens, newsprint, computers and other useful goods, which are then 'sold' to the party at knock-down prices.

Trade unions, corporations, or other employers may give employees paid leave to enable them to give their services free of charge to a party's election campaign. Alternatively, volunteers may use their vacation entitlements to carry out party activities, while those not in employment may also act as volunteers.

A further technique of providing a gift-in-kind is for a corporation or trade union to commission research, supposedly for its own use, but actually for the purpose of saving a party organisation from having to commission the research itself. The information is then provided to the party, normally on a confidential basis. For instance, if a political party needs to commission a private opinion poll concerning public attitudes to a group of issues and policies, it may reach an agreement with a sympathetic enterprise to include the relevant questions in its regular market research.

In Germany, the governing party has benefited from access to the results of internal survey research commissioned for the Chancellor and for government ministries. Insofar as this has reduced the need for the headquarters of the governing party to commission its own commercial research, this access has served as a form of subsidy-in-kind.

Accountability for In-Kind Contributions

In-kind contributions raise both theoretical and practical problems of accountability. These problems are especially important when it comes to enforcing regulations concerning campaign spending limits, disclosure requirements and restrictions on certain categories of contributions (for instance from corporations, trade unions or foreign donors).

First, it is open to argument how far the provision of volunteer services to a party or to a candidate should be regarded as an in-kind contribution. Certainly, if a professional such as an accountant or lawyer, who normally charges clients on an hourly fee-for-service basis, provides his time for nothing and uses that time to provide his usual professional services, it is possible to put a financial figure on the value of the time and the service that have been donated to the party. But it is rarely possible to calculate the value of volunteer time on a commercial basis. Moreover, it is arguable that participating in campaigns is merely a form of citizenship. It would be absurd - even if it were practical to do so - to attempt to put a value on the efforts of a party supporter to persuade friends and colleagues to vote for a particular party during ordinary conversations.

In addition, the attempt to put a value on volunteer help involves immense practical difficulties.

Other forms of aid-in-kind also lead to regulatory problems. For instance, how is it possible to regulate the costs of local telephone calls made on campaign business from one private home to another?

Draft Only

Profits from Party-Owned Business Activities

Several different activities fall under this category. First, there are genuine business activities, including sales of party literature, badges, and other political objects; second, there are schemes that may be seen to involve an element of pressure or extortion; third, 'business activity' may be bogus and a method of escaping regulations relating to foreign political donations or to the disclosure of domestic donations, see Broadcasting Time.

In the past, Left Wing parties that were short of the company donations that benefited their political rivals frequently ran party-owned businesses.

Sales of Literature and Other Business Activities

There are solid political reasons for parties to sell their literature and posters at a loss. After all, campaigning requires that they should be distributed as widely as possible, which requires low sales prices or free distributions. Nevertheless, party organisations may decide to take a tougher line on pricing of campaign literature and materials, aiming to cover their costs and even to make a profit. They may also market political paraphernalia such as badges, ties, tee shirts, ribbons, tea or beer mugs, and even Christmas greetings cards.

Modern business schemes adopted by some political parties include 'affinity' credit cards. By arrangement with a bank, party supporters may use a special version of a major credit card. This will usually carry a special party logo and the bank administering the card will remit a small percentage of all purchases made with the card - typically 0.25 percent - to party funds.

Business activities that may be regarded as 'genuine' also include bookshops run by a party headquarters and even ventures with no apparent political connection, such as the travel agency that was run for some time by the British Labour Party or the retail stores run by the British Co-operative movement, also affiliated to the Labour Party. In Austria, even the breakdown services for motor vehicles are affiliated to the main parties.

Schemes Which Involve Pressure on Major Donors

It has become customary for the main British political parties to organise 'exhibition' stands at their annual party conferences. Corporations are charged a considerable sum for hiring space at these exhibitions. The clear motive provided for enterprises is that they will have the opportunity during the several days of the party conference to obtain access to delegates. These delegates are a carefully screened audience with an unusually weighty political influence. Party organisers typically promise that the party leaders will visit the exhibition during the conference. The exhibition stands thereby provide an excellent opportunity for lobbying and image-building. Delegates, who include members of Parliament, are sometimes tempted to visit the exhibition stands by small gifts or free beverages.

Another form of commercial venture is the system of charging of journalists hefty fees for seats on the campaign aircraft or bus taking the party leader on his travels during an election campaign.

The reason why these schemes may be regarded as involving pressure is that newspapers are, in effect, being charged for access to the party leaders on their tours; corporations are being told that if they wish to obtain privileged access to senior party figures during the annual party conference, they will be required to pay for it. One defence of the system is that the charges that are being levied are a matter of public knowledge and that the sale of access during conferences is relatively innocent compared with other methods of influence peddling. A further defence is that national conferences and conventions are expensive for parties to run and that they need to find means of recouping some of their outlays.

Bogus Business Schemes

Where corporations or individuals are subject to onerous legal restrictions on political donations, or where there is a possible stigma attached to contributions, one way of evading the limits on amounts that may be donating or of evading disclosure rules is to disguise a contribution as a business transaction.

One technique involves the exchange of money for some service provided by the party. A second technique involves the provision of services or goods to a party or to a candidate in return for some payment, but at a below market rate.

The listing of a donation as a 'payment for service' is a time-honoured device. For example, some party organisations for many years produced annual year-books or political directories. These included advertisements from companies. Whether these were genuine advertisements or disguised donations depended upon the rates charged. Clearly, companies frequently paid fees so far above market rates that they could hardly be justified as bona fide advertising costs.

More modern schemes of 'payment for service' include so-called 'consultancy services'. A party organisation may produce a series of private political briefs containing information of such accuracy and political value that they justify a high fee for the banks and other corporations which take out subscriptions. Since it is almost impossible to put a defined market value on advice or information, even high subscription fees may be justified. Common sense suggests that such briefing services are thinly-disguised methods of permitting corporations to subscribe to a party without declaring the fact to their shareholders or to the regulatory authorities.

Wewer has detailed some of the ingenious ways in which German political parties and occasionally the party foundations provided commercial cover for contributions. ⁴¹

Examples of Party Business Enterprises

(a) Israel.In a classic, though dated, account published in 1981, Khayyam Paltiel gave several examples of party business enterprises. He cited Israel as a country with probably the broadest range of party-linked enterprises:

'Most Israeli parties began as settlement movements and were by necessity driven to enter into almost all facets of social and economic life even before the proclamation of the state in 1948. Parties publish daily newspapers, own their own publishing firms, have their own recreation movements and sports teams, own banks, housing projects, wholesale and retail co-operatives, control the largest sick funds including hospitals, and are the largest employers in the field of heavy industry through the trade-union-controlled industries.'⁴²

(b) Western Europe.Paltiel also gave examples from Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia:

'Beside recreational facilities, the Italian Communists run chains of stores, garment-manufacturing firms, travel agencies, and import-export agencies which handle a large part of the country's trade with Eastern Europe. The French Communist party ... owns no fewer than 310 enterprises ... The Bank Gemeinschaft in Germany and the Sparkasse in Austria are closely linked with those countries' Social Democrats. And the Scandinavian socialist and communist parties own travel agencies and quasi-commercial enterprises in the import-export area.'⁴³

(c) India.An example of an allegedly bogus business scheme in which donations seemed to be disguised as 'advertisements' or as purchases of goods was outlined in a study by V.B.Rao:

'Advertisements in party newspapers by big businesses, which are willing to pay an exorbitant price for them, is another mode of collections [sic] ... Sales of party souvenirs by the Indira Gandhi Congress Party yielded a big amount for that party in 1972. It is believed that the Congress collected nearly 100 million rupees (then about U.S. $10 million) through advertisements for a souvenir which never saw the light of day. ⁴⁴

(d) Spain.The details of a allegedly bogus 'consultancy service' are given in the same Library of Congress study:

'Prime Minister Gonzalez called for a general election on June 6, 1993 ... The move ... postponed the internal problems of the PSOE (Socialist Party) that was recently hit by a scandal concerning illegal financing of its 1989 campaign through a consultancy agency (FILESA). News of the FILESA affair broke in autumn 1991 ... The case was under investigation for 15 months but the Audit Tribunal, a body which monitors the accounts of Spain's political parties and whose make-up reflects the balance of power in parliament. The Tribunal exonerated the PSOE, due to the casting vote, cast by the PSOE-nominated chairman ...

'The case would probably have died down had it not been for the actions of a judge, who began a judicial investigation into the matter... On April 4, 1993, an official report, ordered by a judge in the Supreme Court, revealed that two senior Socialist party officials were involved with two companies known as FILESA and TIME EXPORT, which received payments for non-existent consultancy services for 8.5 million [U.S.] dollars. Some of the money, it was alleged, had been used to pay the party's election expenses... Tax inspectors working for the court, compiled a reportedly that itemised a list of payments, totaling 8.4 million dollars, that the FILESA group received from leading domestic banks and companies in return for consultancy reports and also a list of subsequent payments that the group made to the Socialist party to cover its electoral expenses ...

'The report also claims that FILESA directly paid service companies supplying the Socialist campaign headquarters, and that in order to disguise the payments it took receipts for them from a group of companies called 2020, which is controlled by a former national coordinator of the Socialist party's finances.

'The FILESA case was viewed by some as the mere tip of an iceberg of corruption. The 2020 group itself has been linked in press reports to large consultancy payments made by Germany's Siemens group at the time it was negotiating the contract to supply the Madrid-Seville high speed train.' ⁴⁵

(e) France. According to Professor Pierre Avril, some of the true sources of political financing include 'less innocent' sources utilising research organisations similar to those of the consultancy services used in Spanish politics. Party-controlled municipal authorities typically use these services.

'The municipality may pay for research services at rates higher than their true value (the difference being used to finance the expenses of the Party), as happened in 1982 town-planning operations in Paris. The municipality also may force the companies applying for contracts to hire these research organizations, which then levies a 'research fee' of 2 to 2.5 percent of the value of the contract ... The company Urbatechnic, which supports the Socialist party, contends that it supplies a service equal to the commissions it receives. It also reports that three-fourths of its commission is paid back to the national treasury of the Party after its functioning expenses are deducted.'⁴⁶

Draft Only

Grass Roots Approaches

Voluntary Activities

In political parties with a large number of members and a network of local party organisations ('grass roots'), local fund-raising may provide a valuable source of money. Finance collected at the grass roots may prove sufficient not only to maintain the low-level party organisations themselves and to cover the costs of local electioneering, but also to subsidise the party headquarters.

One staple source of local funds is membership subscriptions, see Membership Subscriptions. But this is not the only source and it is not always the most important. Whereas fund-raising by central party organisations typically involving the search for a relatively small number of large contributions, the technique at the local level is the opposite. Here, the total is built from a very large number of voluntary activities involving a mass of members and supporters.

Voluntary fund-raising activities may absorb a great amount of time and energy. According to one view, fund-raising distracts local party activists from more productive political activities such as holding political debates about policy matters, collecting political petitions, and so forth. But the need to collect money may have beneficial side-effects. It provides a powerful incentive to recruit new members. Fund-raising events that are largely or completely social in form sometimes have the effect of knitting together groups of party supporters who, at the time of an election campaign, are then more prepared to carry out political work.

An example of the wide range of grass roots fund-raising activities carried out by local Conservative associations in Britain in the period before their recent decline is provided by the results of a survey of social events organised for fund-raising purposes by ward branches of 18 Conservative constituency associations in 1968-69. These organisations conducted themselves on a similar basis to local churches, women's institutes, dramatic societies, Masonic lodges, and many other neighbourhood clubs and associations. The breakdown of 600 separate social events was: ⁴⁷

Whist (card game) - 184 meetings.
Bridge (card game) - 32 meetings.
Bingo (gambling game) - 9 meetings.
Coffee mornings - 41 meetings.
Wine and cheese - 13 parties.
Cocktail party - 9 parties.
Tea party - 9 parties.
Luncheon - 10 parties.
Supper - 6 parties.
Dance or party - 29 parties.
Talks and films - 26 meetings.
Jumble sales - 21 events.
Barbecue or garden party - 19 events
Fetes or fairs, - 26 events
Outings and visits - 46 events

The significance of small-scale social events designed to raise money is that in 1973 a sample survey carried out by the British Cabinet Office indicated that membership subscriptions and donations accounted in combination for only one quarter of the income of Conservative constituency associations while the proceeds of social functions accounted for a half of the total. The same survey showed the locally organised gambling schemes were the main source of the Labour Party's income at the constituency level.

Patronage-Based Approaches

In a number of countries, local fund-raising is based to a considerable extent on the links between local party organisations and power in municipal or city government.

It is possible under a number of systems for those elected to low-level political offices to have an influence over the selection of prospective employees for jobs controlled by local government authorities - perhaps in the Town Hall, as teachers in the school system, or employees of a local court of justice. 'Jobs for the boys' was the mainstay of the old-fashioned local 'political machines' in the United States.

Municipal authorities may have other forms of patronage at their disposal. In Austria, members of the party which holds power in a locality is expected to give preference to party members and party workers when it comes to the allocation of houses and apartments owned by the municipality and rented at below-market rates. A further form of patronage is the ability to grant contracts for building works or for the supply of goods to local merchants.

In all these cases, those receiving material benefits from the party's office-holders may be expected to show their gratitude and to safeguard their future interests by making donations to the local party organisation, see Party Taxes.

Draft Only

Foreign Contributions

Foreign contributions are frequently of decisive importance, though they are usually unpublicised. This entry will, first, set out some of the ambiguities in the term 'foreign'; second, it will distinguish between different kinds of foreign money; third, it will survey the arguments against and in favour of foreign donations.

Ambiguities of the Term 'Foreign'

In today's world, the terms 'domestic' and 'foreign' are much less clear in practice than in theory.

(1) There are many groups of workers who live temporarily in a foreign country while they remain citizens of their home country. These 'guest workers' are to be distinguished from ethnic diasporas of those who have changed their citizens and have immigrated on a permanent basis into a new country. Those living temporarily abroad frequently retain the right to vote in their home country. Their political contributions - though made from abroad - should arguably not be classified as 'foreign' contributions. Indeed, regulations concerning the funding of election campaigns in the United States permit donations from organisations of citizens living overseas such 'Democrats Abroad' and 'Republicans Abroad', even though donations from foreigners are banned.

However, the distinction between citizens living temporarily abroad and those who have emigrated on a permanent basis is not always clear. For instance, there are millions of 'guest workers' in countries such as Germany who have lived in their new country for many years and, in some cases, have even been born there. Nevertheless they have not been granted citizenship by the new country and are thus in a limbo as far as their civic rights and obligations are concerned.

(2) The introduction of elections for the European Parliament has also broken down the distinction between 'home' and 'abroad'. Citizens of any member country of the European Union are permitted to vote and to put themselves forward as candidates throughout the European Union and not merely in their own countries. It therefore becomes unclear whether, for example, a contribution by a Greek businessman to a British political party is or is not to be considered as 'foreign'.

(3) In the special case of Britain, citizens of Ireland resident in Britain as well as citizens of Commonwealth countries are permitted to vote and to participate in British elections. Again, the question arises as to whether a contribution to a British party from the Commonwealth is 'foreign'.

(4) The existence of multinational corporations, whose accounts and business dealings straddle a large number of nations, makes it hard to identify 'foreign' and 'domestic' money.

Donations from Ethnic Diasporas

The mass migrations of the last two centuries have led to the formation of communities that, though economically integrated into their new countries, retain an interest in the politics of the 'Old Country'. Indeed, migrants are often more passionate and hold more extreme opinions about political conflicts in their former homelands than those who have continued to live there.

For example, the political and paramilitary organisations of Irish nationalists have for generations relied largely on funds collected within Irish communities in the United States. Political parties within Israel maintain close connections and permanent organisations within major Jewish communities in several countries. Diasporas of Poles, Albanians, Slovakians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Croatians, etc., have all been significant at various times.

The role of funding from the diaspora is particularly important when emigrants live in countries where living standards are markedly higher than in the Mother Country. In these conditions, financial support from emigrants can be crucial.

Contributions from Foreign Business Interests

Politicians regularly receive political payments from foreign business interests. Whether the initiative generally comes from the foreign corporations or from local politicians is a matter of argument. Companies seeking oil franchises or other major contracts often argue that they are obliged by greedy politicians to give huge bribes and political donations. The opposite view is that they are only too willing to act as agents of political corruption.

Whoever is to blame, the fact remains that huge bribes from abroad have all too often been given and received. Unusually detailed evidence about international political payments emerged during the 1970s amid revelations and investigations in the United States Congress about the activities of the Lockheed Corporation. Top politicians in Japan were shown to have accepted illegal payments. Further examples of political contributions from foreign corporations came to light involving Italian politicians. More recently, the Bofors scandal has rocked Indian politics. In Britain, the Conservative Government was accused in the early 1990s of collecting political contributions from Greek and Hong Kong billionaires. Revelations about German business donations to Spanish politicians surfaced in the course of the notorious Flick Affair that followed revelations in the early 1980s in Der Spiegel.

Contributions from Foreign Criminal Syndicates

See Illegal Financing.

Contributions from Alike Political Parties

See Funding of Party Overseas Activities.

Ideological 'families' of political parties (and trade unions) have sometimes collected money for the benefit of sister parties in foreign countries. This assistance has sometimes been given through the Party Internationals (such as the Socialist International). The Swedish Social Democrats have been well-known for their activities involving international solidarity, especially with Social Democrat parties in emerging democracies.

However, the amounts of money collected by parties from their members for international solidarity has usually been small.

Secret Money Provided By Foreign Governments

Governments have traditionally used secret service funds to bribe (or, putting it differently, to assist) prominent foreign politicians and their election campaigns. Other political uses of secret service funds have included payments to foreign trade unions and to foreign newspapers.

Such payments have a long history. In modern times, the 'Reptile Fund' used by the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, provided a precedent followed by subsequent German regimes. During the First World War, the German Foreign Ministry encouraged the Bolsheviks by sending them money through devious routes across the Baltic. Hitler used similar techniques. After the Second World War and at least until the 1970s, a secret 'Chancellor Fund' was at the disposal of successive West German Chancellors. Secret payments to Chilean politicians in the 1960s and to Portuguese and Spanish anti-Communists in the 1970s reportedly came from this source.

As revelations following the fall of the Soviet regime have shown, the Soviet Union provided regular funds to foreign Communist parties and to pro-Communists organisations.

Soon after its formation in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States also became active in making payments to anti-Communist politicians, parties, and trade unions in a large number of foreign countries. In the era of the Cold War, political parties in Africa and elsewhere reportedly received financial support from the Soviet Union and from China as well as from the United States. Some oil-rich countries such as Libya are also alleged to have been active in providing money for foreign political causes. This list is doubtless incomplete, see Foreign Contributions.

Foreign Money From Democracy-Building Organisations

Political foundations such as the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy, Britain's Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the German Stiftungen receive money from their home governments for distribution abroad. This modern method of political aid aims to differ from the Cold War techniques of clandestine political funding through intelligence agencies. The three distinctive features of the methods used by these foundations are as follows.

1. The grants they make are (with the partial exception of those given by the German Stiftungen) publicly listed. They make no secret of their activities.

2. They are organised in a way that is intended to ensure that decisions about which organisations to assist are made by independent committees acting at arms-length from the donor government.

3. Some of the democracy-building foundations allocated money to several political parties in the donor country. These parties may, in turn, choose to aid several rival parties in the recipient country. In this way, the donor country does not aim to manipulate election results in the recipient country; instead, its object is to assist a system of competitive politics. For instance, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy gave grants at the same time in the early 1990s to three British parties to enable them to assist three different and opposing parties within Albania.

Trends in Foreign Funding of Parties and Elections

Though foreign political funding is a shady and controversial area of activity about which there has been too little research, enough is known to prove its significance. However, it should not be assumed that the activities that have been most scrutinised - such as those of the CIA - have necessarily been the most important. Nor should it be assumed that patterns of activity that were common during the Cold War are the same as those of today.

One reasonable surmise is that intelligence agencies have become somewhat less active in providing campaign funds to their foreign friends while the roles of corporations and of criminal syndicates have become relatively more important.

Dangers of Foreign Contributions

There are objections of principle as well as of practice against foreign contributions to domestic politics. The objection of principle is that national sovereignty demands that the political process in each state should be autonomous. It is no more legitimate for foreign citizens to pay money to support a political candidate than it is for them to have the right to vote for him. 'Political aid', according to this view, is likely to become a form of neo-colonialism. Revelations about the manipulative activities of the intelligence agencies of the great powers or (often more important) of neighbouring regimes demonstrate how serious these dangers have been in the past.

The practical objections to foreign financial assistance are as follows.

1. It is hard to introduce rules that assure the accountability of overseas donations. Whereas a government can oblige domestic corporations to declare their political payments and to impose penalties if they fail to do so, the task of bringing foreign corporations (or individuals) to account is far harder.

2. The search for foreign donations may distort relations within the party receiving aid from abroad. Politicians with good foreign contacts may win office on the basis of their overseas fund-raising abilities even if they have a small local base. Battles over control of foreign largesse have the tendency to cause quarrels, jealousies, and splits.

3. A ready source of foreign funding may lead the recipient party to live beyond its means and to be lazy about seeking money from local sources.

4. Foreign funding is fickle. The priorities of foreign political aid organisations change from year to year. A period of generous assistance may come to a sudden end and leave a party high and dry.

Arguments in Favour of Foreign Contributions

First, political contributions from foreign sources do not always have a subversive intent. Sometimes, they are also motivated by a desire to help to establish democracy in a country with a poor record of civil rights. Foreign assistance to political parties may be likened to foreign help for indigenous human rights groups. During a time of transition to democracy, there are likely to be no established party organisations. Help from abroad - albeit on a temporary basis - may therefore play a positive role in helping new parties to build themselves from scratch.

Second, financial assistance from overseas is often the only way to create a semblance of fairness between government and opposition parties. This is demonstrated by the examples of Poland and Chile in the late 1980s. In Poland, the independent trade union, Solidarity, and the independent press could not match the resources available to the military regime without equipment (such as computers and printers) and supplies of newsprint from foreign supporters.

Draft Only

Interest Groups: Third parties

In this context, the term 'third parties' does not refer to political parties. It is a technical term for other types of organisation that may wish to participate in the electoral process. These are typically pressure groups concerned with a single moral or material issue. Examples of such contributions to political campaigns are those by pro-animal lobby groups to the British Labour Party and by many Political Action Committees in the United States. 'Third parties' is a term that includes but is wider than the business and trade union organisations whose role as political funders is discussed in another entry, see Funding by Institutions.

Such organisations participate in the electoral process in a number of ways:

(a) by making financial contributions to the party or candidate most closely representing their views.

(b) by financing advertisements or other campaign activities intended to benefit a party or candidate, or

The activities of bodies other than political parties are, of course, a legitimate aspect of any pluralist system. Nevertheless, they raise problems for the control of political spending.

First, where donations go directly from pressure groups into the coffers of a political party, there is arguably an increased risk of influence-buying. Whereas individual donors may frequently vote for the party which represents their opinions, an organised pressure group is more likely to try to use its funding power to influence the policies of their political beneficiaries and to obtain commitments in exchange for their payments.

Second, where pressure groups conduct an independent political campaign, other problems arise.

(a) If candidates for office or political parties are subject to a legally-imposed limit on the total they are permitted to spend but there are no limits on 'independent' spending by pressure groups, the effect is to weaken political parties as institutions and to encourage the development of non-party organisations. This may be an undesirable side-effect.

(b) Independent spending by pressure groups may be seen as a loophole that subverts the purpose of limits on spending by parties and candidates.

(c) Where independent spending by advocates of different candidates is uneven, the objectives of regulations that aim to secure a level playing field between those candidates is undermined.

Third Party Contributions: Fairness Versus Free Speech

Where political payments from pressure groups are made into the coffers of political parties or into the campaign accounts of candidates for public office, they are amenable to the regulations that apply to such accounts. It is where pressure groups fund activities that are legally distinct from those of parties and candidates that an insoluble problem arises concerning their regulation. Quite simply, regulators are faced with a choice between the objective of fairness and that of freedom of speech.

Independent political spending by pressure groups provides a loophole that may make meaningless any laws about spending limits and other forms of fairness between candidates and parties. The only way to close this loophole is to subject pressure groups to regulations and restrictions as tight as those for candidates and parties. But the consequences of doing this are far-reaching. The larger the number of organisations and activities that are restricted by law, the greater the limits on freedom of expression. If, for example, candidates are divided on policies relating to laws concerning moral issues (such as laws on abortion), then restriction on campaign activities by pressure groups implies that Churches will be required to abstain from campaign activities for or against a particular candidate or a political party.

Beyond the question of regulation of 'third party' political activities, there arises also the question of the role of the press. If newspapers are heavily partisan - as is often the case - they might easily affect the electoral outcome. Some commentators on the political Left have argued that newspapers are normally a tool of capitalists. They are likely to support capitalist parties. Therefore, fairness requires that the press should be regulated during elections in the same way as television channels. A set amount of space should be assigned to the competing parties according to rules similar to those for TV and radio. The objection to this is that control of the content of newspapers is not compatible with basic democratic freedoms (see Guiding Principles).

Draft Only

Illegal Financing

Though there are many varieties of illegal financing of political parties and candidates, this entry concentrates on two major forms:

1. Kickbacks from licenses and from illegal profits derived from business dealings and

2. Donations derived from the profits of organised crime. Categories of illegal donations are described in more detail in a later entry, see Other Illegal Donations.

Political Contributions from Organised Crime

It is no coincidence that the political influence of organised crime is a problem in so many countries. Whereas the individual criminal tends to act in secret and aims to avoid detection through stealth, the option of secrecy is not open to organised crime syndicates. If their trade is in drugs, illegal gambling, prostitution, and loan-sharking, they must be able to reach a large number of clients - ordinary citizens - each day. Their activities must be an 'open secret'.

Since crime syndicates cannot hide their activities, they must obtain protection from arrest and punishment through other means. These include violence and bribery. Informers and diligent judges will be threatened and they or their families will be maimed and killed as a warning to others. Policemen and other law-enforcement officials will receive bribes for inside information about police activities and to turn a blind eye to illegal activities involving the sale of drugs on the streets and other forms of vice. However, there is also a third technique used by crime syndicates to obtain protection - to make political contributions to parties and to candidates running for elective office.

There are several possible advantages for criminals from political contributions. If they are seen to have friends in high elective office, the police will be tempted to avoid investigating their activities too thoroughly. The traditional response of police chiefs, when faced with drug dealers and vice kings who appear to enjoy political protection, is to concentrate on arresting and convicting the small fry - low-level drug pushers or prostitutes - while leaving the senior crime bosses untouched.

Political protection may have other uses. If the mayor of a town is responsible for appointing and dismissing the chief of police, then organised criminals may, by contributing handsomely to the mayor's election campaign fund, obtain a decisive influence over this crucial appointment. In other cases, criminals may be able to affect the appointment of judges.

Small Safe-Havens

There will often be a large advantage for crime syndicates to corrupt the politicians of a small town or of a small country. The disparity of wealth between a relatively poor, small country and an international syndicate with huge resources will make it relatively easy for criminals to bribe the top politicians and to take effective control of the government.

The advantages for criminals of creating a safe haven in a small country (often an isolated island state) can be immense. An island where the authorities are almost guaranteed to tolerate their activities may be used as a landing point for small aircraft carrying contraband drugs from producer countries to the rich Western markets. Corrupt diplomats of such countries may be employed to import drugs to their destinations using diplomatic bags, which are not subject to search by customs authorities. Haven countries provide opportunities for criminals to bank their profits and to launder them.

There have been frequent reports about the influence of criminal syndicates on politicians in certain island states in the Caribbean and in the Pacific.

New Democracies

The economic turmoil in new democracies such as Russia has reportedly created conditions in which organised crime flourishes and where criminals have a strong hold on some politicians. The reason for this phenomenon is simple. Economic disruption makes it difficult for parties and for candidates to raise money from ordinary citizens, who are too poor to give donations. At the same time, some criminal organisations have become rich.

Draft Only

Narco-traffic

The illegal trade in drugs has become the principal activity of international organised crime syndicates. Trafficking in narcotics requires bribes and political contributions to politicians who need to be paid to turn a blind eye to illegal behaviour on a mass scale.

In the late 1980s, Interpol reported that about one-third of its cases related in some way to drugs-related corruption of public officials.

Drug trafficking has few international boundaries. However, it especially affects some Latin American countries where drugs are produced. The problem is illustrated by a study of Colombia, home of the Medellin and Cali drugs cartels. Eduardo Posada - Carb reports:

'On June 21, 1994, just a few hours after the electoral celebrations ended, ... the [Colombian] public learned of the existence of some tapes, dubbed the narco-cassettes, whose contents suggested that money from drug-trafficking had financed the presidential election campaign. Police raids a week or so later yielded documentary evidence linking the Cali drug cartel with a significant number of politicians.

' ... the scandal has led to penal action against prominent figures on an unprecedented scale in Colombia. Fernando Botero, the director of Ernesto Samper's presidential election campaign and, until August 1995, his minister of defence, is now serving a jail sentence. The treasurer and administrator of the campaign are also behind bars. About 20 members of Congress ... are currently under investigation, some are under arrest. The procurador general (attorney-general) was removed from his post and is now in prison ... '

Colombian elections are financed also by contributions from business enterprises such as the Grupo Santo Domingo. This is justified by Senator Jaime Arias, leader of the Partido Conservador on the ground that '[w]ere it not for the contributions of big companies, there would be more money from the Mafiosi'.

'This fear of campaign financing by the drug cartels is hardly surprising ... the dramatic rise of homicide rates since the late 1970s suggests a close connection between drug-trafficking and violence ... The assassination in 1989 of Luis Carlos Galán, the front-runner for the presidential election stunned the country... The extent to which money from the drug trade has gone into electioneering cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy... A commission set up to look into this issue after the electoral campaign of 1982 acknowledged that: 'Some people without any political background were getting access to parliamentary seats through deals in which drug money was a factor.' ...

'[In the 1994 presidential election] alleged sums entering the campaign from the drug cartels - estimates range from $3 million by the Fiscalia to $6 million by some journalists - were unprecedented. Moreover, it is not known how much drug money goes into the campaigns of congressmen and other elected officials.' ⁴⁸.

Draft Only

Other Illegal Donations

Other illegal donations will be considered under two headings:

1. where the contributions themselves are illegal, and

2. where the contribution is legal in itself but where there is an illegal payoff or deal.

Categories of illegal donations include:

1. donations given secretly in jurisdictions where they are required to be disclosed;

2. donations from prohibited sources - these may include payments from the proceeds of crime or (in some countries) from foreign sources, companies, and trade unions;

3. payments in excess of set contribution limits;

4. political payments disguised as business transactions where such payments would have been illegal had they been given as donations.

Political donations that are illegal because of the payoffs linked with them include:

1. The illegal exchange of money for public appointments. Bribes are not always given for the personal benefit of the bribe-taker. They sometimes go into the coffers of a political party or a campaign chest. 'money for honours'. It was proven that a series of appointments to judgeships had been made in Philadelphia in the 1970s in return for money for the local Democratic Party organisation.

2. The exchange of money for public contracts or for favourable regulatory decisions. A well - publicised set of American examples emerged during the Watergate investigations following the re-election as president in 1972 of Richard Nixon. Herbert Alexander described one example - the 'milk deal' - as follows:

'A classic illustration of how money may talk when special interests deal with the government was provided by the dairy industry in the first Nixon administration. The story embraced the so-called 'milk deal' - the sudden increase in the government subsidy of milk prices in seemingly apparent response to campaign contributions.'

Three dairy co-operatives, based in Texas, Missouri, and Kentucky 'came in the late 1960s to constitute the richest new source of political money in years.' The affair of the milk-deal started on March 12, 1971 when the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture announced that there was insufficient reason to raise the milk subsidy. The decision was reversed soon afterwards, bringing a windfall of between U.S. $300-700 million to the milk producers, but higher milk prices for the public. The policy reversal followed a pledge of U.S. $2 million in campaign contributions, though it was stoutly denied that the administration's reversal of policy was a result of this, see ⁴⁹.

3. Contributions obtained by exerting illegal pressures on the donor. An example of extortion against corporations comes from one of the classic 'city bosses' of political machines in the United States, Bois Penrose of Pennsylvania. In the nineteenth century Boss Penrose would wait until an election was approaching to introduce proposals in the state legislature that would have the effect of reducing the profits of certain corporations. If the corporations then made donations to his campaign coffers, the threatened legislation would be quietly dropped.

A lower-level example of extortion, taken again from the rich experiences of Pennsylvania politics, is the formerly widespread practice of 'macing', see Party Taxes. Workers employed by the state government, without security of tenure and on the basis of their services to the state governor's party organisation, were regularly required to give campaign contributions. These were sometimes in the form of relatively expensive tickets to fund-raising dinners held by their party. They were subjected to threats - ultimately held by the Courts to be illegal - that they would lose their jobs if they omitted to make these contributions.

4. The exchange of donations from criminal syndicates in return for direct or indirect promises of non-enforcement of the law. Again, the literature of 'machine politics' in the United States is a rich source of examples. In the 1970s, a government prosecutor in Western Pennsylvania, Richard Thornburgh, who would later become U.S. Attorney General, discovered what he described as a 'politico-racket' complex in the Pittsburgh area. The scandal would lead to the suicide of the District Attorney for Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) when he faced prosecution.

Thornburgh showed that criminal organisations had been permitted to run illegal gambling schemes with the knowledge that the local police would not prosecute them. Their immunity resulted from arrangements involving campaign contributions to the political allies of the District Attorney. The criminals warned that if their underlings were prosecuted and if the lucrative business in illegal gambling were shut down, the campaign contributions would cease.

This is an example of 'old-fashioned' organisation crime that operated in the days when illegal alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and loan-sharking were the main forms of business and when drug trafficking had not yet become the predominant activity.

5. 'Money for honours'. This is a phenomenon associated principally but not exclusively with Britain. Under British law, it is illegal to link a political payment to the promise of a title such as 'Lord' or 'Sir'. The Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act was passed in 1925 to end what had until then been an active trade in political honours. Middlemen conducted negotiations between the senior members of the governing party (which was entitled to recommend the award of titles) and rich men who craved to be ennobled or titled. Whether the law eliminated the trade or merely made it more subtle is a matter of argument, see Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices.

Draft Only

Regulating Party Financing

If public subsidies to political parties and candidates are the 'carrot' available to reformers, there are also several 'sticks' at their disposal. Regulations of political financing are of several kinds, see Party and Candidate Financing, Regulation/Oversight of Campaign Finance and Processing of Nominations. They consist of the following categories, each of which will be surveyed in a different file (or in several files):

Limits on expenditures.

Contribution limits.

Disclosure regulations.

Bans against certain types of contribution.

Bans against certain types of expenditure.

Expenditure Limits

Expenditure limits are one device intended to control inequalities between parties and between candidates, to prevent rises in the costs of politics, and restrict the scope for undue influence and corruption.

Spending limits apply most often only to certain phases and levels of political activity. They are applied most often to the campaign expenses of candidates in legislative elections.

To specify which activities are subject to expenditure limits, it is, therefore, convenient to distinguish between:

expenditures by local branches of the party and by their candidate (or, in multi-member districts, their candidates) for legislative office and expenditures by national party organisations (including the party headquarters, and party organisations in the national legislature).
It is also necessary to distinguish between expenditures specifically and directly related to the election campaign and spending on the routine organisation and research activities of parties in the long periods of 'electoral peacetime'.

These two distinctions lead to the following four categories:

Local election expenditures.
National election expenditures.
Local 'routine' (non-election) expenditures.
National 'routine' (non-election) expenditures.

Since expenditure limits do not normally apply to routine spending by political parties, they will be discussed more fully in a later section, which deals specifically with the regulation of election campaigns. This entry will discuss some of the problems involved in determining what items are to fall within the scope of regulations about spending limits.

Campaign Versus Non-Campaign Spending

The fact that expenditure limits apply to election expenses but not to routine expenses raises the question of how a distinction can be made between these categories. In practice, this raises seemingly insoluble difficulties. These are discussed in later entries, see Election Campaigns. The definitions of the 'campaign' period used in different countries are also reviewed later, see Regulating Advertising.

Non-Monetary Assistance

A further problem concerns the treatment of non-monetary assistance. This problem raises itself regardless of the distinction between campaign and non-campaign periods or between national and local expenditures.

As far as some types of benefits-in-kind are concerned, they could hardly be omitted from the calculation of expenses without destroying the very purpose of expenditure limits. Campaign money is used to buy goods and services - paper for printing leaflets; rental of campaign offices; other office costs such as telephone, postage, lighting, heating, the purchase or hire of equipment; transport costs; and so forth. Yet, supporters can provide all these as gifts-in-kind. Therefore, it is essential to include the value of such gifts.

However, there are some gifts-in-kind that it is arguably inappropriate and impractical to include. In particular, a difficulty arises about how volunteer labour should be treated under the regulations concerning campaign spending limits. If the commercial price of such help were included, the result would be to prevent citizens from participating in election campaigns. Also, it would be virtually impossible to cost and to police a system that required candidates or their agents to record and assess the commercial value of all voluntary help. Nevertheless the exclusion of the value of voluntary work admittedly provides a significant loophole.

Draft Only

Contribution Limits

Limits on permitted contributions are intended to reduce the possibilities for the exercise of undue influence on a candidate or party by a contributor.

The limits may apply selective to certain categories of donor, for instance, candidates in the United States are exempt from limitations for contributions to their own campaigns. Alternatively, the limits may apply selectively to different categories of recipient (in Italy, donations to candidates rather than the party are subject to a ceiling).

Contribution limits may be calculated by a variety of formulae. They may be in the form of a sum of money; they may be calculated as a percentage of the donor's income or assets; or they may be related to a yardstick such as the statutory minimum wage or to the average wage. Such yardsticks are useful in countries with high rates of inflation.

Examples of countries with contribution limits as of 1995, included the following countries. Some countries imposed limits only for particular categories of donor or categories of recipient, see ⁵⁰:

Brazil
France
India
Israel
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Russia
Spain
Taiwan
Turkey
United States

Examples of countries with no contribution limits as of 1995, included:

Australia
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Sweden
The Netherlands

Examples of countries with limits for certain categories of contributor only:

Brazil - individuals and companies
India - companies
Israel - individuals
Mexico - non-profit organisations

Example of country with limits for contributions to candidates but not to parties

Italy

Administrative Implications

The administrative burden of implementing such regulations can be considerable both for candidates and for the government. The US laws are enforced by a six-member bipartisan Federal Election Commission, backed by a large staff, see Administrative Implications.

Comments

A positive effect of this regulatory device, especially in countries where the limit is strict, is that the low level of permitted contributions has probably obliged candidates to raise money from a larger number of donors than before. They are thus less dependent upon a small number of 'fat cat' millionaires.

But the limits have a number of shortcomings:

They have had the side effect of making candidates start their campaigns at a much earlier stage. The next presidential campaign starts when the last one is barely over.

Despite the restrictions on the amounts that a single donor may contribute, the overall levels of campaign costs have continued to rise.

The limits have been evaded in a number of ways. An important loophole in the United States is that they have applied only to campaigns for election to federal offices. The regulation of campaigns for state and local offices has remained the responsibility of state governments. Another loophole is that the contributions limits apply only for donations to campaigns. It is possible to give unlimited additional sums provided that they are allocated to general 'party building' activities such as voter registration and membership campaigns. In addition, payments to party-related 'think tanks' are also untouched by the contribution limits.

The journalist Elizabeth Drew, wrote a book titled Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption in which she argued that 'The political practitioners who have learned their way around both the Presidential and the congressional campaign-finance laws - and all the skilled ones have - view them with amusement. One Democratic practitioner says, 'They are over-regulating the penguins at the top of the iceberg.' (p.2.)

Draft Only

Levels

The rules for donations to political parties are complex. In part, they are as follows:

Brazil

'For the 1994 General Elections, donations by individuals were limited to a maximum of 10% of the 1993 gross profits [i.e. their personal incomes] ... In the case of companies, the maximum was 2% of the gross income in 1993... [T]hese limitations have ... been extensively criticized since the limit on contributions is based on a percentage of income instead of a fixed maximum amount. This mechanism has favoured those parties more closely related to financial and economic elites...' (p. 43.)

France

by individuals to a single party 50,000 francs
by individuals to candidates 30,000 francs

Germany

Professional associations, trade associations and trade unions are restricted to gifts of no more than 10 percent of their budgets.

India

The contributions by a company in a single fiscal year must not exceed 5 percent of its average profits, determined in accordance with the provisions of the companies law, during the three years immediately proceeding the relevant financial year.

Israel

The amount that may be contributed by individuals - including separate members of one household - to political parties is limited to an amount equal to 27,240 NIS per year (approximately U.S.$ 9,100) or 54,480 NIS (approximately U.S. $18,200) during an election year.

A legal amendment of 1993 forbade a candidate in a party primary election campaign from accepting in excess of 5,000 NIS (approximately U.S. $1,700) from any donor, his family or dependents included. In primaries where a candidate for prime minister or party chairman is running together with other members of the party, the ceiling is four times greater.
In primaries for the office of Prime Minister the limit is 20,000 NIS, approximately U.S.$6,666.

Italy

Donations from any source to a candidate are limited to 20 million lire.

Japan

Annual donations to political parties from institutions, corporations, unions, or other groups are allowed ranging from - 7.5 million (U.S. $ 75,000) to - 100 million ((U.S. $ 1 million) in accordance with the sum of capital issued by the corporation or the number of members of the union or group. Contributions to any single political faction or support organisation are limited to - 1.5 million (U.S. $15,000), but this restriction does not apply to contributions made to any single political party or political fundraising organisation.
To political parties from individuals, annual contributions - except testamentary gifts-made by individual citizens to political parties or political fundraising organisations are to be restricted to - 20 million; to political factions or support organisations to - 10 million; and to any single fund management body - 1.5 million.

Mexico

Non-profit organisations are allowed to donate up to 5 percent of the total amount of public financing granted to the political party in the corresponding year.

Russia

For candidates for deputy of the Duma of the Federal Assembly:

a candidate's own funds may not exceed 1000 minimum salaries,
funds allocated by the electoral association or electoral bloc that has nominated the candidate, up to 1500 minimum salaries.

Candidates for president:

a candidate's own funds may not exceed 1000 minimum salaries,
individual voluntary donations up to 50 minimum salaries each.

Taiwan

From individuals to political parties. not more than NT $200,000, approximately U.S.$7,692.
From individuals to candidates, not more than NT $20,000, approximately U.S. $769 and up to 20 percent of their annual income.
From corporations to a political party, not more than NT $3 million, approximately U.S. $115,000.
From corporations to any single candidate, not more than NT $300,000, approximately U.S. $11,500 and up to 10 percent of their income.

Turkey

Individuals and those private corporations which are permitted to donate to political parties are restricted to U.S. $10,000 per annum, including the value of services.

United States

Individuals may only give up to a maximum of $1,000 to each candidate in each federal election and in each primary election; up to $5,000 a year to a 'political action committee', such as those sponsored by business corporations or labour unions; and $20,000 a year to a national political party committee. Political contributions by one person to all candidates and election committees are limited to a total of $25,000 a year.
Political Action Committees (PACs) that qualify may contribute up to $5,000 to a candidate in each election and each primary.

Sources

France

Yves-Marie Doublet, L'argent et la politique en France. Paris: Economica, 1997, pp. 16 and 72-3.

Germany

Werner Kaltefleiter and Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, 'The New German System of Public Subsidies to Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995, p. 393.

Russia

Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO), Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995.

United States

Milton C. Cummings Jr. and David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure. Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, seventh edition, 1993, p. 298.

Other countries

Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, pp. 107, 119, 130, 140, 166, 189, 195.

Draft Only

Disclosure Regulations

The objectives of disclosure regulations are to promote accountability and to control the potential for corruption. Arguments of principle against disclosure are discussed in other entries, see Ensuring Openness, Transparency and Desirability of Disclosure of Political Donations.

Disclosure regulations vary greatly in what is required to be revealed, by whom, and to whom. This entry therefore starts by listing the different categories of disclosure regulations. In countries where such regulations exist, they usually apply only to some of the types of disclosure listed below.

Categories of disclosure are as follows:

1. Disclosure of expenditures versus disclosures of incomes. For example, in Britain, parliamentary candidates are required to disclose election expenditures but not the level or sources of income.

2. Disclosure of totals and main sub-headings (of income or expenditure) versus disclosure of full details, including details of specific contributions. For example, in Germany, it is only the total and the main sub-headings of income and expenditures that are disclosed to the public and only donations above a relatively high threshold.

3. Disclosure of party finances versus disclosure of candidates' finances. For example, in Britain, it is candidates' finances that must be disclosed; in Germany, it is those of the parties.

4. Disclosure of overall party finances versus disclosure of election/routine finances as separate categories. In Germany the published accounts for many years were of overall income and expenditure without separate information about expenditures devoted specifically to election campaigns. In Sweden, the accounts that have been submitted since 1980 on a voluntary basis to the government concern their total spending and do not single out the amount spent on election campaigns. ⁵¹

5. Disclosure of overall national and local versus national party finances.

6. Disclosure as a responsibility of donors versus disclosure as responsibility of party or candidate receiving donations. For instance, in Britain, responsibility for reporting declarable donations by companies and trade unions rests with the donors, not with the recipient political parties.

7. Disclosure to official auditing body but not to members of the public; disclosure by making materials available for inspection at a government office; disclosure in an official document published by a governmental body; publication in a newspaper.

These distinctions are sometimes important. For example, British legislation requires all donations to political parties or for other political purposes of more than £200 a year to be disclosed. However, the form of disclosure is not wholly effective for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, the responsibility to make a disclosure rests with donor companies and not with parties, candidates or other political bodies receiving the gifts. Second, donors are required to declare these gifts in the annual directors' reports lodged with the authority responsible for the regulation of companies. In practice, it is impossible for researchers to gather information on donations from some half million separate directors' reports. Many donations by companies are thus published in such an obscure way that comprehensive lists of corporate donors cannot be drawn up.

Disclosure Regulations and Other Controls of Financing

In each country, the type of disclosure that is required is determined in large part by the other regulations and subsidies that are in place. For instance, in Britain, the election expenses of individual parliamentary candidates are subject to a legal limit. No similar restrictions apply to national party organisations. Consequently, it is logical that the only form of disclosure that is required is of campaign expenditures by candidates. Candidates do not have to declare sources of income since these are not subject to restrictions. Moreover, national party organisations do not have to make reports on their finances.

Where subsidies are given to political parties on an annual basis, reporting is logically of their routine, annual accounts (as in Spain and Germany). By contrast, where campaign costs are controlled or subsidised, it is these costs that have to be accounted for.

Loopholes

There are various techniques for evasion of disclosure regulations:

1. Illegal cash payments - the traditional 'brown envelopes' or suitcases of bank notes, see Illegal Financing

2. Where donations must be disclosed, payments to parties may be disguised as business transactions or as loans, see Profits from Party-Owned Business Activities.

3. Where donations must be disclosed, payments to parties may be disguised as gifts in kind, see In Kind Contributions.

4. Where donations must be disclosed if they are above a threshold sum, they may be divided into a number of smaller payments, each of which is slightly under the declaration threshold. Separate donations may be made by a husband, wife, children, and so forth.

5. Where this is permitted, donations may be conveyed to a candidate or party through an intermediary. It will then be the intermediary person or organisation which is disclosed, not the ultimate donor.

6. Where donations to political parties or candidates must be disclosed, payments may be given instead to front organisations, personal political funds of politicians, partisan think tanks or foundations, which carry out the political functions of the party but which escape the regulatory regime.

7. Parties and donors may exploit the regulations relating to the timing of disclosures to ensure that such disclosures take place as long as possible after the gift has been made and, if possible, after the election campaign that it has been given to assist.

8. Where expenditures must be disclosed only if they for the purposes of an election campaign, party organisations may display considerable ingenuity in reallocating and disguising these items as routine, non-election expenditures.

Disclosure of Amount

The Effect of Accounting Conventions

Where political parties are expected to publish their annual accounts, there may be great variations in the way this is done, see Campaign Expenditure Disclosures.

First, different accountancy rules will produce very different totals. For instance:

if the total raised in a direct mail fund-raising operation is given net of costs, then the totals shown both on the income and expenditure sides of the party accounts will be significantly smaller than if fund-raising costs are included as expenditures and fund-raising income is include gross rather than net of costs.
The same applies to accounting procedures concerning party publications.
Where a political party owns the buildings it occupies and need pay no rent, should rent at notional commercial rates be included on the expenditure and income sides of the accounts?
The accounts for a given financial year will be effected by the accounting conventions employed concerning payment dates.

Second, the totals will depend on rules about what items must be included in the accounts.

Finally, there may be considerable variations in the amount of detail shown in the accounts that must be submitted in different countries as well as in the sub-headings under which the accounts are shown.

To limit potential misstatements in the presentation of accounts, rules have been introduced in different countries regarding the methods by which the accounts must be drawn up and the form in which they must be published. Such rules have the advantage of real or apparent standardisation between different political parties. Their limitation is that they may demand divisions between income sources or between categories of expenditure that are somewhat artificial. For instance, it is unclear how significant is the distinction in German party accounts between membership 'subscriptions' and 'donations'.

Rules regarding the required procedures for submitting accounts may not be wholly clear from the relevant legislation. Therefore, it may fall to the regulatory body established to administer the regulations to offer advisory opinions about the format and the accounting conventions that the parties must use. It is no coincidence that some of the countries with the most precise reporting requirements for parties have major regulatory bodies, such as Elections Canada, the Australian Electoral Commission, and the U.S. Federal Election Commission.

Example of Regulations about the Format of Accounts

The following are among the rules set out by the Australian Electoral Commission: ⁵³

'Gross figures only must be used (e.g. a fund-raiser which took $1,000 with costs of $750 for a net profit of $250 should have the full $1,000 disclosed under receipts and $750 disclosed under payments).

The return reports transactions on a cash accounting basis ... For example, a payment by cheque is not reported when the cheque is written but, rather, when the cheque has been presented and money has therefore actually changed hands.'

The same rules also grapple with the almost impossible problem of defining 'volunteer labour':

'Volunteer labour does not need to be disclosed. The donation of one's time by a member of the party is volunteer labour. The donation of time by a person who is not a party member is only considered volunteer labour where it does not constitute a service for which that person normally charges.

'For example, the donation of legal advice by a solicitor who is a party member is volunteer labour, which need not be disclosed or included in the party accounts, but the donation of legal advice by a solicitor who is not a party member is a gift-in-kind, which must be disclosed at the 'appropriate value' - normally the commercial or sale price of the service. If, however, a solicitor who is not a party members hands out 'how to vote cards' that does constitute volunteer labour because it is not a service for which that person normally charges.' (p. 28.)

Reporting Burden on Local Party Organisation

If party accounts are to be comprehensive, they will need to include not only the finances of national party organs but also of regional and local associations as well. The finances of the headquarters organisations of national political parties will clearly need to be approved by professional accountants.

By contrast, small units of an organisation run by local volunteers - ward branches in cities or party organisations at village level - may find it nearly impossible to adhere to the same formalities. The funds of local party branches will frequently be so small that an accountant's fee will eat up a large proportion of their meagre income. Moreover, if the national headquarters is required to make a comprehensive financial return, including information from low-level party organisations, the disclosure rules will lead to a possibly undesirable centralisation and bureaucratisation of parties.

Possible remedies for this problem are, first, to require lower accounting standards from local party organisations. For instance, less onerous accounting standards may be required from party organisations with an income below a threshold. The Lortie Commission recommended that simplified requirement should apply to party organisations with an annual income and expenditure less than CAN $5,000.⁵⁴

A second remedy is to remove from the national party organisation the responsibility for gathering statistics from local party organisations. The disadvantage here is that the burden of collecting statistics from a multitude of local and frequently amateur local committees will fall on the regulatory body.

Draft Only

Disclosure of Source

'Sunlight is the best disinfectant,' declared the celebrated Justice of the United States Supreme Court Louis D. Brandeis. According to this policy, forcing knowledge of who is giving how much into the system can best control the possible infection of corruption through political donations. The most common regulatory device for political contributions is to regulate that gifts above a certain threshold must be declared.

Administrative Implications

If the regulations are to be effective, it is necessary to require detailed information that identifies each donor clearly. In countries where many people have the same surname, such as Smith in Britain or the United States, the disclosure that 'J. Smith' has donated $100 will show little without an address. Yet, donor lists that provide such information have the negative side effect of intruding on the privacy of citizens, especially those wishing to support an unpopular party.

Comments

The Effects of Disclosure Regulations are Unclear

In the United States, the regulations provide a great deal of detailed information that is processed in a way that makes it easy for interested members of the public and journalists to use the donors' lists. This is because addresses must be appended to names and because the information is computerised. The shortcoming of the regulations is that they cover only one category of donations - to federal election campaigns. The lists are thus incomplete and potentially misleading.
In Germany, the opportunities to evade the disclosure rules are even greater. A wealthy donor who wishes to give undisclosed political donations, may divide his gifts into a series of payments each slightly under DM 20,000 - from himself, his wife, each family member, and each separate business corporation he owns. Another method of evasion is to pay excessive rates for 'services' provided by the party, which count legally as business transactions rather than donations. For instance, business supporters frequently pay high rates for advertising in relatively obscure party publications.
In Canada,as in the United States, the low disclosure threshold means that a great amount of information is available. However, the following complaint was raised during the public consultations held by the Lortie Commission:

'The intention [of the disclosure laws] is laudable, but for all practical purposes the Canada Elections Act does not allow the identity of party backers to be revealed. In fact, the Act does not require backers' addresses to be disclosed. ...it's meagre information and difficult to use'.⁵⁵
In some countries, such as Italy, disclosure rules are regarded by some officials as even more defective than those of Canada.

Draft Only

Disclosure Thresholds

As of 1995, the level at which regulations relating to the disclosure of political donations - to parties and to candidates - was as follows: (Dollar equivalents are at 1995 rates.)

Australia

Donations to candidates: AUS $200
Donations to parties: AUS $1 500

Canada

CAN $100

Germany

DM20 000

Great Britain

Donations from individuals - no disclosure required
Donations for all political objects from domestic companies - £200
Trade union political levy funds - all accounts

Greece

200 000 drachmae (US$1 225)

India

All corporate donations

Italy

5 million lire

United States

US$100

Draft Only

Access to Disclosed Information

By Authorities

In some jurisdictions, information must be given to a regulatory authority to ensure compliance with the various regulations relating to political financing. However, this information is not made public or is made public only in summary.

For example, in Germany, 'the parties must submit annual statements of accounts to the Speaker of the Bundestag, who publishes them as a legislative document. A certified accountant must have certified these financial statements. A more detailed explanation of the party finances is not made public. The accuracy of the report is only guaranteed through the certifying accountant who has access to all the relevant information and documentation. In comparison to American standards, the German disclosure requirements and reporting procedures are minimal'.⁵⁶

By Public

Even where information is available to the public in the form of official returns or reports, there are wide variations in the ease of access that is offered. There are three main levels of access.

1. Where information is available at a government office but where each member of the public must visit the office in person to see the information. This may be especially onerous if information is held in a large number of different offices.

2. Where information is published in an official report.

3. Where special measures are taken to make information readily available, particularly on the internet, and where records of donations above the disclosure threshold are computerised and are thus easy to locate through electronic search (by name, address, amount, date of donation, etc.). The United States Federal Election Commission is an example of a regulatory organisation that has gone to great lengths to make large amounts of information available to members of the public. The effectiveness of the disclosure operation is limited, however, by the fact that the disclosure rules are riddled with holes. Thus a great deal is known about only a portion of political payments.

By Media

Unless there is a hint of scandal, newspapers are unlikely to publish details of official reports by candidates of their election expenses. If, therefore, the regulatory authorities wish to ensure that these reports are widely circulated, they may stipulate that they have to be published in some newspapers.

In Greece, every candidate is obliged to publish a summary of his campaign expenditures in two newspapers in his electoral district. However, in the elections that were held in 1989 and 1993, many candidates failed to comply with this requirement. Out of 300 deputies elected, only 200 complied upon expiration of the reporting deadline and only after repeated requests by the Speaker of the Parliament. ⁵⁷

In Egypt, donations to parties equivalent to at least US $150 must be reported in newspapers. This provision has been criticised as a device to limit contributions to opposition parties. The argument for this view is, first, that it imposes additional costs on parties receiving political contributions and, second, it inhibits would-be donors, who are likely to be reluctant to see their active support for anti-government parties advertised in this way.

Draft Only

Bans Against Certain Kinds of Contributions

Examples

1. Contributions from business enterprises:

In a number of countries, including Sweden and the United States, business corporations are not permitted to make donations to political parties or election campaigns.

2. Contributions from trade unions:

In Britain, political donations by trade unions are regulated - but not banned.

3. Foreign contributions.

4. Contributions from government contractors or from others with a direct financial interest in the government.

5. Anonymous contributions.

Objectives of Bans and Limitations

The rationale for restrictions on political giving by companies, trade unions, and foreigners is that democracy requires the action of individual citizens of the country in which the election is being held. The power of corporations and trade unions may be so great as to drown the influence of individuals. Moreover, the internal decision-making procedures within many corporate bodies are defective. In practice, union leaders may not faithfully represent their members, and the interests and political opinions of company directors may not be identical to those of their shareholders or of their employees. An additional argument for banning political contributions by corporations and by labour unions is that they give an unfair advantage to the political parties that benefit from this funding.

Similarly, the argument that political funding should be provided by citizens is sometimes used to justify a prohibition of contributions from foreign donors or from overseas corporations.
Bans on donations from government contractors or from others with financial interests in the government are based on the need to avoid conflicts of interest.

Practical Considerations

There are arguments of democratic theory both for and against these categories of donation. These will not be discussed. The following comments deal only with the practicalities.

Measures designed to control particular types of contribution are especially liable to evasion. A ban against corporate contributions to parties and to campaigns, however justified in theory, may lead to new practices that are even less desirable than those which the laws have been intended to control. This is illustrated by several examples:

U.S. corporations and unions are not permitted to make direct political contributions. The ban has encouraged the development of special organisations attached to particular corporations or unions; they do not collect money from the corporation or from the union directly, but from its members. They are called 'political action committees' (PACs). These committees, which developed as a response to laws introduced in the 1970s, have been criticised for activities at least as serious and potentially damaging as those that existed before they were created.

In Britain, the limitation on permitted campaign expenses of parliamentary candidates has made it unnecessary for them to look to corporations for contributions to election expenses. But politicians try to enhance their incomes. Corporations pay politicians in other ways. Many members of the House of Commons accept direct personal payments - distinct from payments to their party organisations - from corporations. Such payments, which are given in exchange for advice and consultancy, are potentially even more corrupting than contributions to party funds. In 1994, the prime minister established the Nolan Committee, chaired by a leading judge, to investigate the problem.

The United States has gone several steps further in regulating the personal finances of legislators. They are required to disclose their personal assets and are subject to restrictions about earnings apart from their official salaries. Even these severe rules have proved inadequate. One of the few forms of outside earning permitted to a Congressman has been royalties from the authorship of books. A Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives was forced to resign following revelations that he had received a large payment in the form of a book royalty but which was considered to constitute a disguised contribution.

Bans against foreign contributions to elections are easily evaded. In some cases, parties wishing to receive foreign contributions have established 'independent' 'non party' foundations to receive the money. In other cases, payments have been made through domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies.

Political payments have been disguised as business transactions. Payments at rates above those valid commercially for advertising in party publications is a device that has already been mentioned. A further device - used in Germany - is the creation of a party enterprise that offers 'economic consultancy' services to corporations. One of the most blatant schemes was reportedly used by the Soviet authorities to channel money to Communist parties in Western Europe. When some Italian corporations received contracts to export goods to the Soviet Union, part of the deal was that they should pay an agreed proportion of the profit to the local Italian Communist party. In this way, the party received aid from abroad but no money crossed the frontier.

Draft Only

By Companies

As of 1995, countries banning corporate donations included:

France
India - ban applied only to government companies and corporations in existence for less than 3 years.
Israel
Japan - ban applied only to corporations receiving subsidies or party to contracts with the government.
Mexico - ban does not apply to non - profit organisations.
Turkey - ban applied to banks only.
United States - ban applied to federal elections only. There were additional bans relating to lower level elections in 21 of the 50 states and limits in 21 more.

Note that in the United of Political Action Committees. These are political fund-raising organisations whose running costs may be met by corporations but which must raise the actual contributions from their members. In the case of corporations, the members are normally individual company employees.

Countries permitting corporate donations include:

Australia
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Italy
Malaysia
The Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan

In Germany, there are measures to discourage, though not to ban, contributions from companies and - in particular from trade associations. Unlike contributions from individuals, company donations do not offer tax relief. Moreover, professional organisations and trade associations - whose past reputation as conveyor belts from corporate donations has raised considerable fears - are subjected to special disincentives. They may not donate more than 10 percent of their budgets and they are subject to a specific tax of 50 percent on their political donations, see ⁵⁸.

Draft Only

By Unions

As of 1995, countries banning political donations by trade unions included the following:⁵⁹

Brazil
France
Turkey
United States

In the United States the ban on political donations by labour unions has been widely evaded by the Political Action Committees (PACs). These are political fund-raising organisations whose running costs may be met by the unions but which must raise the actual contributions from their members. In the case of union PACs, the members are normally individual union members.

As of 1995, countries permitting political donations by trade unions included:

Australia
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
India
Israel
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
The Netherlands
Poland
Russia
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan

In Germany donations from trade unions, like those from professional organisations and trade associations are permitted but are subjected to special disincentives. Unions may not donate more than 10 percent of their budgets and they are subject to a specific tax of 50 percent on their political donations.

Draft Only

Foreign Donations

As of 1995, countries banning foreign donations included the following:⁶⁰

Brazil
Canada (partial ban)
France
Germany (partial ban)
India
Israel (partial ban)
Japan
Malaysia
Poland
Russia
Spain
Taiwan
Turkey
United States
Ukraine

Additional countries listed by Yves-Marie Doublet as banning foreign donations as of 1997 were:

Albania
Algeria
Egypt
Jordan
Moldova
Romania
Yemen

Countries permitting foreign donations included:

Australia
Czech Republic
Great Britain
Greece
Italy
Mexico
The Netherlands
South Africa
Sweden

Draft Only

By Government Contractors, etc

Examples of special bans are as follows:⁶¹

France

Public corporations under public or private law with the majority of capital owned by one or more public entities cannot contribute. Casinos, gambling establishments and similar facilities cannot contribute directly or indirectly.

Greece

The Law expressly prohibits financial assistance to political parties by the public sector as well as by any legal persons of public law such as public utilities and educational institutions.

India

Government companies

Japan

Corporations receiving subsidies or party to contracts with the government

Turkey

Government and municipal bodies, corporations of which all or some of their capital is invested by the government or municipalities. Professional associations, humanitarian organizations and religious foundations are also banned from making political donations.

Draft Only

Bans Against Certain Types of Expenditures

A technique to reduce the cost of campaigning is to prohibit certain costly kinds of expenditure. In the 'arms race' between political parties and between candidates, this is the equivalent of an agreement between nations to ban certain costly types of weapons.

Bribery and 'Treating'

In the nineteenth century, when the number of those qualified to vote in countries such as Britain was still small, election campaigns consisted largely of bribes and entertainment for electors. This proved very costly, particularly when the right to vote was extended and the number of thirsty voters' throats and greedy palms grew too rapidly for the comfort of the politicians and their patrons who had to pay the bills.

In 1832, 850 out of 1,000 voters in the English parliamentary constituency of Stamford were bribed. A candidate was expected to employ an agent - often a local lawyer - to pay innkeepers for refreshments for voters on polling day. Candidates were also expected to find employment for electors by using them as cab drivers, messengers, poll watchers, and clerks. ⁶²

British legislation of 1883 banned some of these activities such as the provision of refreshments or payments to transport voters to the polls. These measures, combined with stricter enforcement of laws against bribing voters helped to reduce campaign costs.

It is significant that certain countries with high campaign costs are those where vote bribery and entertainment for candidates is still reputed to be common - such as Taiwan and Malaysia. Concerning the latter country,

'An article in a Bangkok newspaper, citing what the author calls 'a radical [Malaysian] monthly news magazine,' quotes the magazine as claiming that the then upcoming 1990 elections in Malaysia might be the most expensive one in the country's 33-year history. The news magazine is also quoted as saying that in the villages of Malaysia, a vote would cost from M$20 to M$25. Fence-sitters (undecided voters) could, it said, be wooed with cash, and the UNMO had campaigned on a family-to-family basis, paying out about M$2,000 to M$3,000 per household, or so the article claimed.' ⁶³

Political Advertising

In many countries, the heaviest campaign cost is now advertising. This is especially the case where candidates and political parties are permitted to purchase advertising time on television. A ban on such purchases may thus keep campaign costs in check. In some countries, there is a similar ban on the purchase of space on commercial billboards, see Regulating Advertising.

Draft Only

Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Corruption linked with political funding is no different from other forms of corruption when it comes to the sharp variations in public opinion to which it creates. Long periods of indifference alternate with sudden, high profile crises, with the demand to 'chuck out the rascals' heading the government or the ruling party, and with calls for reform. It is, in fact, difficult to isolate those reforms which have started as anti-corruption initiatives since so much legislation concerning the financing of elections and political parties has been introduced as a reaction to scandals. Certainly, corruption and suspected corruption relating to political financing has been the main source of discontent with the working of democracy in recent years in most of the advanced industrialised nations of the Group of Seven, i.e. Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States. The possible exception in this list is Canada.

An understandable and common reaction to scandal has been to establish some form of enquiry, followed by new legislation.

In Italy, the corruption crisis of the early 1990s led to a referendum on the public financing of political parties and to demands for a change in what was seen by the public as a deeply flawed system. It is open to speculation that what the Italians wanted most was change - any change. Had there been little public funding of political parties, the reform pressure might well have taken the form of a demand for the introduction of such public subsidies.

In the United States, the demands for reform came in the decade of the Watergate Affair. The new public subsidies for presidential campaigns and the controls on donations failed to solve the problems of rising costs and apparent sleaze. The fund-raising methods employed in the 1996 presidential election campaign by President Clinton and vice-president Gore have led to further legal investigations and to demands for new laws. The main difference between the 1970s and the 1990s is that disillusion with the reforms of the 1970s has led those who are dissatisfied with the rules to be more cautious about suggesting legislation as a panacea for corruption.

In Britain, public worries about possible payoffs for contributors who have made large, unpublicised payments first to the Conservatives and then to the Labour Party led to an investigation in 1993 into the funding of political parties. This was conducted by the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons. In 1997, a prestigious extra-parliamentary committee on Standards in Public Life (the Neill Committee) launched an enquiry into the same subject. This is expected to lead to recommendations for significant new legislation.

In France, the interplay of scandal and new legislation has been recorded in the works of Yves-Marie Doublet.

As a generalisation, scandals have led to public enquiries. These enquiries have led to reforms, especially to demands for greater disclosure of political contributions and for the public financing of elections and parties. However, a further generalisation is that the reforms have sometimes proved a disappointment and have failed to prevent later scandals connected with politicians' search for funds. There are a number of possible reasons for this. One of the most important is that infringements of the law have all too often been poorly investigated or not investigated at all. Moreover, the determination of the authorities to bring prosecutions against wrong-doers has left much to be desired in some countries.

The most effective anti-corruption initiative relating to political financing is, therefore, one of the most difficult - namely systematic and fearless enforcement.

The problem of enforcement arises from a combination of two things. First, as seen in a number of entries, politicians and important donors are often able to find ways to evade the law in ways that are not obvious. It is rare to discover party bagmen in the act of receiving bundles of forbidden cash. It is difficult to establish that favourable decisions by a government are a payoff for a contribution. The Republican administration in Washington in the 1970s claimed that the decision about milk susbsidies was not linked with promises of contributions; the West German courts in the 1980s felt that the prosecuting lawyers in the Flick Affair were unable to prove that massive, discretionary tax relief to the Flick Concern had been connected with its huge political donations; in Britain, the Blair government's decision to press for an exemption for Formula One motor racing from a proposed ban on sponsorship by the tobacco industry was claimed to have been made independently of a donation of £1 million received from the leading member of Formula One.

Second, the political pressures against mounting prosecutions tend to be very large indeed. After all, political financing involves some of the most powerful figures in any society and few prosecutors will venture to make them a target unless there is strong public pressure to do so.

Draft Only

Election Campaigns

The entries in this section will examine some of the technical questions involved in regulating the activities of political parties and candidates for public office during election campaigns. Narrow technical considerations, though vital, are not sufficient to ensure that an election is carried out according to standards of fairness, freedom of speech, and the other guiding principles set out earlier (see Guiding Principles). For example, even if public broadcasting time is allocated fairly between political parties and candidates, this may constitute a small island of fairness amid a rough sea of injustice. This is because such broadcasts are only a small part of the output of public broadcasting.

This file therefore starts by examining the overall context - the 'sea' - within which elections take place. It will examine, in particular, the unfair advantages which governments can gain, even if they stick to the letter of the rules relating to the election campaign itself.

This entry will also examine the meaning of the term 'election campaign.' Political parties often maintain permanent organizations at national, regional, and local levels. Is it possible to distinguish, either for legal purposes, or for more theoretical, academic purposes between 'routine' and 'campaign' activities and costs?

Election Campaigns: Possible Abuses by Governments

Governments consist of human beings, normally ambitious human beings anxious to retain power. Government leaders are likely to make every attempt to manipulate public opinion. If they face restrictions in the election period itself, they will try to gain every possible advantage in the weeks and months that precede that campaign. Unless checked by a vigilant press, by effective protests from opposition parties, pressure groups, or by other social and religious leaders, they will use their governmental prerogatives to carry out what amounts to a disguised (or sometimes barely disguised) appeal for public favour.

First, there are many possible abuses of public broadcasting, if the executives who run the television and radio stations are in the pockets of the government. The time allocated to parties for election broadcasts will usually be relatively insignificant when compared with total broadcasting output. How news reports are compiled and presented is even more important. Public opinion may also be affected by discussion programmes, plays, and even soap operas. These 'non-news' programmes may be designed with propaganda in mind. Even soap operas may be used as political tools, portraying a prosperous, go-ahead populace concerned with personal problems and romantic dilemmas in settings that suggest an economically secure lifestyle.

Second, the government may abuse its authority by using government information services to present partisan propaganda under the guise of objective public information. Or, it may use its powers of job patronage to fund election campaigning from the public purse. Public employees may be released from their duties provided they spend their time in helping the election campaign. There are many other ways in which governments may use their power to gain unfair electoral advantages.

Third, where there is a threat of violence and intimidation, the existence of fair campaign laws and efficient electoral administration will be undermined.

Examples of Government Manipulation of the Airwaves

The underlying problem raised by the examples applies to many countries:

Malaysia, 1982.

[T]he news programmes [on television] were filled with ministers opening schools, temples, bridges, roads, and virtually anything else that could be opened during the weeks before the election.⁶⁴

Mexico, 1994.

The National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) accused the networks of biased coverage in favour of the PRI. They especially criticized Televisa, a network watched by 80 percent of the Mexican television viewers. In July 1994, Televisa ignored one of the biggest PRD rallies of the campaign, while it spent twenty-two minutes of air time on now-President Ernesto Zedillo. PRD has called Televisa 'one of the pillars that sustains the authoritarian regime.'

A study done by the Mexican Academy of Human Rights on news coverage by the air programme's 24 Horas ... of the Televisa network and Hechos ... of the Azteca Television Network, from January to April 1994 found that the PRI had a 3.1 advantage in total air time compared with PAN and PRD, which were the two strongest opposition parties.⁶⁵

The conclusion that emerges from these and many other examples is that a fair political system requires attention to broader questions of the professionalism of broadcasters, and of the need to guard the independence of the media from the government of the day. It is not enough for political leaders and foreign election observers to focus their attention on the allocation of time for free broadcasts by the rival parties during the limited period before the poll.

As in Mexico, a system of monitoring the output of the broadcast media by academic or human rights groups may be helpful in drawing attention to any bias.

A checklist of items relevant to fair political coverage should include, beside the allocation of time for party election broadcasts:

allocation of broadcasting time to political parties between elections

measures to assure fairness in news coverage and in current affairs programmes

arrangements for televised debates between rival party leaders during election campaigns

arrangements for the appointment and dismissal of senior broadcasting executives who help to ensure against government control or manipulation

Misuse of Government Power for Campaigning Purposes

It is sometimes hard to distinguish between ways in which governments are legitimately entitled to advertise their achievements, and the abuse of official propaganda for partisan purposes. It is also difficult to draw the line between reasonable rewards given by governments to supporters in the form of patronage jobs, unjustly awarded public contracts, and corrupt, sleazy actions. Though the boundary line may be unclear in particular cases, this in no way invalidates the distinction. It is of little value to pass laws against vote buying or other forms of electoral corruption by political parties and by candidates if the government of the day is able to carry out activities which are, in practice, little different from vote buying.

Tackling Abuses of Power and Potential for Violence

While there are no simple solutions, there are several ways in which the atmosphere within which an election takes place may be improved. These include codes of conduct for political parties and candidates, (see Codes of Conduct for Political Parties) political education programmes run by the parties themselves, (see Political Parties and Voter Education) observation by human rights groups within the country, various forms of international assistance or observer missions (these are more likely to be successful if they start well before the poll), (see Foreign Contributions) and a free press.

Permanent, Routine versus 'Election Campaign' Activities

Even as far as individual candidates are concerned, it is hard to distinguish between a routine, and a campaign activity. Consequently, it is equally difficult to make a demarcation between an 'election' and a 'non-election' expense.

When legislators write letters to their constituents, or assign staff to deal with their personal problems, are they just carrying out their normal duties as representatives, or are they already conducting a campaign for re-election? Studies of the U.S. House of Representatives have detailed how incumbent members conduct what amounts to a permanent campaign, and use the financial and staff assistance they receive from public funds - supposedly to carry out public duties - to ingratiate themselves with their future voters. Mass questionnaires in the guise of requests for the opinions of voters are intended to advertise the name of the Congressman. Another technique is a letter to each young person who reaches voting age saying 'I am here to help you' - again with the same intention.

In countries where local party organizations exist on a permanent basis, it is even harder to tell when the 'campaign' proper begins. Until recently, the constituency associations of the British Conservative Party usually had a permanent local office staffed by a full-time agent and secretary. Together with the association's officers, the agent has the job of building a membership roll, and making preparations during electoral 'peacetime' for the weeks immediately preceding the next general election. This is likely to include the purchase of word-processing equipment and other electioneering paraphernalia. Yet, it is only the costs incurred in the short period of the official campaign that are included in the costs that must be contained within the parliamentary candidate's legal limit.

At the national headquarters, too, the distinction between campaign and non-campaign may be artificial. If a political party headquarters commissions private opinion polls on a regular basis, at what stage does the cost of these polls become a campaign expense?

Since there can be no watertight, objective division between routine and campaign items, party organizations make whatever division is most advantageous. For instance, at the constituency level, there is a strong incentive for party organizations in Britain to put expenditures wherever conceivably possible into the non-campaign category. They will thus escape the regulation and restrictions that apply solely to 'campaign' costs. In contrast, when the Constitutional Court in West Germany ruled in the 1960s that public subventions could go only to the campaign activities of the political parties, the incentive was to load up the 'campaign' category on the grounds that, directly or indirectly, the entire objective of a party organization is to win elections, and that the category of 'routine' is a misnomer.

A realistic generalization is that wherever special restrictions are imposed on activities and expenditures, defined as 'campaign' activities, parties and candidates will try to re-define as many items as possible as 'non-campaign'.

The already difficult task of drawing a boundary line between campaign and non-campaign is sometimes made even harder. First, in countries where there is no fixed election date (as in Britain), the parties must put themselves in readiness for an election that might be called by the Government at short notice. In the later stages of the term of a Parliament, when the prospect of a sudden election campaign becomes greater, the political parties and their candidates must step up their electioneering activities, just in case the election is called. There may be a number of false alarms. The result of the uncertainty is a variable, and sometimes prolonged, run-up period to the campaign: a period of semi-campaigning.

Second, the problem of dividing between routine and campaign is not only a matter of the time at which expenses are incurred. It is arguable that some expenses incurred before the start of the election period should be classed as campaign items, while other items of spending incurred during the time of the election should be classed as routine. For instance, if a political party spends money on preparing films to be used in their election broadcasts, these costs should - according to one view - be included as 'campaign' costs no matter when they were incurred. Conversely, the rental of a permanently-occupied party headquarters building during the election can reasonably be called a non-election item, since the party would have paid it had there been no campaign.

At this stage, any effort to sustain the election/non-election divide becomes very messy. Yet, laws that apply to election campaigns make the task of distinguishing unavoidable. The problems are well illustrated by a study, considered in the next section, commissioned by the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing.

Canada: Election versus Non-Election Spending

Canadian electoral law imposes ceilings, not only on the permitted election expenses of parliamentary candidates, but also on those of the national party organizations. The division between election and non-election items is therefore of importance.

At the national level, there is an incentive for the large parties to stretch the definition of 'non-election' expenses. This is because they otherwise risk exceeding the permitted spending ceiling. In contrast, smaller parties have the opposite incentive. Their expenses are well below the ceiling. Therefore, they stand to gain by moving items into the 'election' category. This is because election expenses (but not routine costs) are partly reimbursed by the government.

The problems of definition provide a feast for lawyers and regulators since the interpretation of single words in the relevant legislation can have far-reaching consequences. For example, Professor Stanbury has reported that

[t]he definition of 'election expenses' in the Canada Elections Act requires that an expense be 'for the purpose of promoting or opposing, directly and during an election, a particular registered party.'

The ambiguity now passes to the word 'directly'. What of activities that benefit a party's electoral prospects indirectly? According to guidelines issued in 1988 by the Chief Electoral Officer

The cost of collecting and analyzing survey information is not an election expense, as the activity does not result in the direct promotion of a party ...

Other categories are excluded on the same grounds.⁶⁶

At the constituency level, an ambiguity about one obscure point relating to the definition of 'election expenses' in Canadian law led to the so-called 'Masse affair.' Marcel Masse resigned his Cabinet post when it was announced that he was under investigation with respect to his 'election expenses' following the 1984 election. The chief electoral officer felt obliged to point out in his 1985 Statutory Report that

the present definition of election expenses is so vague and imprecise that its application to various sections of the Act has become extremely difficult.⁶⁷

To complicate matters further, definitions of 'election expenses' vary across different jurisdictions within Canada itself. According to the Final Report of the Lortie Commission:

In Canada, approaches differ at the federal and provincial levels for defining election expenses. Under one approach, sometimes referred to as 'inclusive', an initial broad definition of election expenses is followed by a few specific exclusions and, in some cases, inclusions. Of the seven provinces that have statutory spending limits, five have adopted this inclusive approach (Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island). In contrast, the federal definition of election expenses entails an initial statement followed by a list of several items considered to be election expenses; the list, although not intended to be exhaustive, helps to give meaning to the definition ...⁶⁸

It would be wrong to judge the Canadian legislation too harshly. Admittedly, it is the task of lawmakers to draft clear measures. But the job of finding wording that draws a boundary between 'election' and 'non-election' activities and expenses is as hard as making a legally watertight distinct between terms like 'tall' and 'short'.

Draft Only

Codes of Conduct for Political Parties

Codes of conduct are general guidelines setting out standards of behaviour, normally agreed on a voluntary basis. The fact that codes of conduct are not normally incorporated in law means that they can proclaim standards that are difficult to embody in a statute. For instance, codes of conduct for political parties have included obligations on them to act with 'self-restraint.' It would be hard to incorporate a definition of self-restraint into the law in such a way that breaches could be defined, proved, and made subject to penalties. See also Establishing a Code of Conduct and Codes of Conduct.

Despite their general, didactic nature, codes have nevertheless been incorporated occasionally into electoral law, sometimes in a special schedule. In a number of African countries, they are embodied in electoral legislation.

The definition of 'codes of conduct for political parties' adopted by the International IDEA is:

a set of rules of behaviour for political parties and their supporters relating to their participation in an election process, to which parties ideally will voluntarily agree; and which may, subsequent to that agreement, be incorporated in law.'pce01#1'

Examples of Codes of Conduct for Parties

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, and Election Workers. Provisional Election Commission, 1996

Cambodia: United Nations Electoral Law for Cambodia, 1992 Annex - Code of Conduct, August 1992

Ghana: Code of Conduct for Political Parties in Ghana for Public Elections, 1992

India: Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties and Candidates. Election Commission of India, 1991

International IDEA: Draft Code of Conduct for Political Parties Contesting Democratic Elections, 1997

Namibia: Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Activities by Political Parties in Respect of Elections, Government Gazette, 1992

South Africa: Electoral Act, 1993 - Schedule 2 - Electoral Code of Conduct, 1993

Grounds for Criticism of Codes of Conduct

It is easy to be cynical about codes of conduct. First, they are open to criticism on the ground that they sometimes do no more than embody platitudes. For example:

Bangladesh, 1996: 'An election shall not be influenced by money, arms, muscle power or local influence.'

Malawi, 1994: 'Parties must use acceptable language.'

Malawi, 1994: 'Political parties and independent candidates shall not induce people to do things against their will.'

On the other hand, they are equally open to criticism on the ground that they sometimes include provisions that are so precise that there is no reason why they should not be part of a conventional electoral law. For example:

India, 1991: 'Excepting the voters, no one without a valid pass from the Election Commission shall enter the polling booths.'

Guinea, 1992, Seychelles, 1992: 'Defence Force personnel shall not go to vote in their uniforms.'

Malawi, 1994: 'Parties and their supporters shall not hold campaign meetings within the premises of military units and police stations at any time ...'

Second, codes will tend to be least respected where they are most needed. In countries where elections are being held amid deep mistrust and in the immediate aftermath of bloody conflict, is it not utopian to expect the rival parties and candidates to be seriously influenced and restrained by exhortations about 'good behaviour'? What impact are voluntary codes likely to have in the former killing fields of Cambodia? Can they really eliminate, or even reduce, tensions between ethnically-based parties in war-torn Bosnia?

Third, if codes of conduct are given the force of law, this may lead to problems for opposition parties. In general, the language of codes is so broad that it will be easy for an oppressive regime to accuse its opponents of breaches, while leaving its own supporters free from prosecution.

Fourth, the value of codes of conduct is lessened if they are introduced - as frequently happens - as a result of pressure from international bodies. There is a temptation for the different parties to sign up to codes in the expectation that they will then be free to ignore them.

Justifications of Codes of Conduct

First, codes of conduct need not, and do not always express vacuous generalities. They may set out standards that are by no means obvious. For example:

Bangladesh, 1991, Ghana, 1992, Guinea, 1995, Seychelles, 1992: 'No party will take any initiative for the release of any armed person arrested by police during the election campaign or in (or in the vicinity of) a polling station during voting.'

Sierra Leone, 1996, South Africa, 1993: 'Parties shall ensure the full and equal participation of women in the electoral or political process.'

Cambodia, 1992;s Namibia, 1989: 'Parties will meet on a fortnightly basis to discuss all matters of concern relating to the election campaign. A standing committee of party leaders at headquarters will meet on a fortnightly basis ...' (In Namibia, meetings are weekly once the election date has been announced.)

Second, declarations of what may seem to be pious hopes may nevertheless have a considerable educational value. They send out a clear moral message, and leave parties open to public opprobrium if they blatantly disregard standards that they have undertaken to respect.

Third, the process of discussion of rules and standards between opposing party officials and leaders may be valuable in lessening fears and creating moral bridges, especially at a time when a country is emerging uneasily from civil war or from non-democratic rule. The very process of creating a code of conduct is arguably a significant instrument of conflict resolution. According to International IDEA's Draft Code of Conduct for Political Parties Contesting Democratic Elections, such codes:

...have been a feature in a number of elections in which the democratic process was facing significant challenges, and have been implemented with the intention of minimizing conflict, eradicating intimidation, and encouraging a climate of open, free and fair competition during the election period.

Draft Only

Regulating Advertising

It is useful to distinguish three kinds of regulations:

those which provide a free or subsidized benefit in kind for candidates or political parties

those which control or ban advertising activities

definitions of the campaign period to which the rules apply

Publicly Subsidized Campaign Advertising

The most common and, probably, the most important form of publicly subsidized advertising is the free broadcasting time made available in many countries to political parties. This is discussed separately in two special entries, Public Broadcasting Allocations and Formulas for Allocating Time.

Some countries provide facilities for free or subsidized postal facilities or for subsidized printing of campaign materials. For example:

Belgium: special postage rates for campaign material marked with the words document lectoral

France: [I]ndirect public funding includes subsidies for ... the cost of publishing, printing, mailing and posting campaign materials.

Great Britain: each parliamentary candidate is entitled to send free of any postal charge to each elector one postal communication weighing not more than two ounces and containing matter related to the election

Japan: each candidate for membership in the lower house (single-member districts) is allowed to mail up to 35,000 postcards free of charge. For the election of members of the upper house (local districts only), this number may be increased, depending on the size of the electoral district. Also, within certain limits, the making of handbills and posters is allowed and the candidate will be reimbursed for the cost.

Luxembourg: free postal services are provided for each candidate

Mexico: there is a sales tax exemption on the printed and audio-visual materials sold by the political parties. Mailing and posting and telegraphic communications are exempted from taxes.

Spain: there is a reduced fee for public postal services during the campaign

Taiwan: the Central Election Commission compiles an election gazette to be distributed to each household and publicly posted. The views, photograph, and personal details of each candidate are included.

In Japan, the government pays for newspaper advertisements for candidates. Each candidate for election to the lower house (single-member districts) and the upper house (local districts) is entitled to five free advertisements in any newspaper of their choosing during the campaign period.⁷⁰

Free poster sites are occasionally provided. This happens in Germany, where municipalities make billboards available. In Spain, municipalities have to reserve some free space in public places for political propaganda. In the Czech Republic, a city authority may make space available for political posters. The space must be divided equally been the parties participating in the elections. (pp. 59, 76, 177) Free poster space is also provided by municipal councils in Belgium.⁷¹

Regulations and Restrictions

First, crucial rules concern paid political advertising on television and radio, as well as regulations about the coverage of the election on news programmes. These are discussed in special files, see Public Broadcasting Allocations and Formulas for Allocating Time.

Second, regulations regarding the display of posters on commercial billboards. In Britain, this has now become the most costly item of spending by the national headquarters of the Conservative and Labour Party organizations before and during general election campaigns. As described above, there are a few countries, like Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic where parties may be given free use of billboard sites. Such rules are sometimes accompanied by a ban on the purchase of commercial hoardings by the party organizations. For instance, this is the case in Spain and the Czech Republic.

Third, there may be a restriction on paid press advertisements during an election by candidates or parties. This is the case in Japan. In Italy there is a central authority vested by law, the Garante per l'editoria e la radiodiffusione, which is responsible for guaranteeing equal access to press advertising for all candidates, their groupings, and political parties in the thirty days preceding an election. Other political advertising in the newspapers and periodicals is forbidden.

As new communication technologies develop, including faxes, telephone banks, electronic mail, cable television, and so forth, new problems of regulation will undoubtedly arise.

Different Definitions of the 'Campaign' Period

The underlying problems of distinguishing between routine and election activities and expenditures have already been discussed, see Election Campaigns. It will be useful, however, to list some of the definitions used in different countries. In Australia, the 'election' period lasts from the time the election writ is issued to the time until the close of polling. In Canada, too, the start of the official campaign period is the same.

In Britain, the campaign starts, for the purposes of spending limits incurred by parliamentary candidates, at whatever time they start campaigning. For this reason, a would-be candidate will normally arrange to postpone his nomination until the Prime Minister announces the election date. It is from the time that he has been formally nominated (usually by his local party organization) that the expense clock starts to run. Before nomination, candidates can in practice start to 'nurse' the constituency, provided that they are careful to refer to themselves as 'prospective parliamentary candidates' but never as the 'parliamentary candidates'.

The length of the formal campaign period in Japan is only twelve days for the Lower House (seventeen days for the Upper House) and in Taiwan as little as ten days. In Turkey, regulations relating to the fair use of news broadcasts starts fifteen days before the poll, and free party political broadcasts are squeezed into the final seven days before voting day.

Draft Only

Public Broadcasting Allocations

Broadcasting in Political Communication

Public broadcasting has played a dominant role in political communications in many countries. This is because technology has permitted only one, or a limited number of television and radio channels. Whereas it has been possible - given the political freedom and the will - to create numerous publishing outlets of all sizes, broadcasting has been a natural, or near monopoly. Furthermore, television and radio have emerged in recent decades as by far the most popular and influential forms of communication. Thus, control of TV and radio bestows great political influence. See also Regulation of Media.

However, new technologies are changing this situation. In some countries, cable television has meant that there are now numerous alternative channels. It has been possible for many years to listen to the output of foreign radio stations. Improved reception means that TV in some countries also receives programmes from neighbouring countries and further afield. The development of worldwide TV news services, such as the U.S.-owned Cable News Network (CNN), is another innovation, as is the greater availability of video recorders. The Internet and electronic mail promise further revolutions in communications.

Despite these innovations, public broadcasting, and especially radio, remains for the time being the essential medium of political communication in many developing countries. Measures to control TV and radio to ensure that it promotes fairness between opposing political groups are essential. The task of ensuring this fairness is made harder by the fact that public television is so often under the effective control of the government of the day.

As far as elections are concerned, regulations involve both subsidies, usually in the form of allocations of free time on television and radio and controls - a carrot and a stick for the political parties.

Questions about Free Time for Political Broadcasts

A central question revolves around the distribution of time between competing political parties. This is the subject of the next entry, Formulas for Allocating Time. However, there are other issues. These may be at least as important.

First, any system of free television time may create particular problems in political systems like that of the United States, where elections consist of many thousands of essentially distinct battles between candidates, and where the role of political parties is relatively small. Thus, a particular candidate - say, for the office of U.S. Senator for California, for Congressman for a district in the State of New York, for Governor of Illinois, and so forth - will be little affected by the performance of his party's presidential candidate in a televised national debate, or by the general standing of his political party. It is his own propaganda that matters, and the personal image he manages to convey to his voters. Once it is a matter of allocating time between individual candidates rather than between national political parties, the task becomes far more complex; the many different elective offices in the United States contributes to the complexity.

Added to this is the fact that there exists in America a multitude of local TV and radio stations whose catchment areas often rarely coincide with those of electoral boundaries of Congressional districts. It is, therefore, open to argument that practical reasons exclude any possibility of introducing 'free time' for political broadcasts in American campaigns.

Without minimizing the difficulties, the Japanese system for free newspaper advertisements for candidates may provide a suitable model. As outlined in another entry, (see Regulating Advertising), candidates are permitted up to five free advertisements in a newspaper of their choice. Similarly, it would be possible to permit U.S. candidates for national elections, and for senior offices in state governments and legislatures, to choose the TV and radio stations on which they wished their free time slots to appear.

Second, tensions often arise between the broadcasting networks and the political parties about the amount of time they must make available for political broadcasting. Commercial stations stand to lose money from their advertisers if too many advertising slots are used up for political broadcasts. Moreover, the fact that TV sets can often be operated by remote control means that viewers will be tempted to turn to another station as soon as a political broadcast comes on the air.

A further issue is the length of the time slots allocated for political broadcasts. If a political party is given a total number of minutes of free broadcasting time during an entire campaign, it will want the maximum flexibility about how long each broadcast should be. If political broadcasts are to be 'serious' and to provide the opportunity for each side to present its policies and its leaders in detail, then each transmission needs to be relatively long. However, the advertising experts advising parties normally feel that a large number of short 'spots' are more effective than a small number of long programmes. In Britain, where the two main parties are each entitled to five TV broadcasts lasting ten minutes, they have tended in recent campaigns to schedule broadcasts of only five minutes, even though they have therefore had to 'waste' the other five minutes allotted to them. They have not been allowed to trade five slots of ten minutes each for ten slots of five minutes. The civic argument against short advertising spots is that they encourage increasingly shorter 'sound bites', a 'dumbing down' of political discourse, and negative campaigning.

The fact that political broadcasts are unpopular among executives of the broadcasting authorities leads to a number of control devices. First, the same political broadcast is, in some countries, shown at the same time on all the main channels. The remote control thus provides no escape for the politically apathetic viewer. (Electricity authorities and water authorities have occasionally remarked on the increase in the number of cups of tea or of visits to the nation's bathrooms during such 'no escape' periods.) A second method is to oblige the broadcasting authorities to transmit party election broadcasts as condition of their licenses. A third method (as in Mexico) is for the government to purchase broadcasting time for these political transmissions.

As far as the length of time slots for free broadcasts is concerned, international practice varies. In Turkey, parties must use their portion of time in slots of at least two minutes. In Germany, slots are 150 seconds. In Britain, the main parties must take their slots in portions of ten minutes.

Third, there is the issue of the production costs of party election broadcasts. A wealthy party will be able to spend money on preparing elaborate and costly film clips and will be able to employ some of the most experienced and costly advertising advisers and film-makers. By contrast, poor parties may be able to do little more than use their time slots for face-to-camera recordings of party leaders. Arguably, the contrast between the production costs of rival parties may undermine the fairness principle on which the idea of free election broadcasts is based. If this is seen as a problem, possible solutions are:

provide money or facilities to each party to assist in the production of their broadcasts, or

ban the use of filmed materials and insist that all the parties use their slots for simple, face-to-camera broadcasts.

Turkey has adopted the latter solution. On free TV broadcasts, male and female speakers must wear suits, and males must also wear ties. Only the Turkish flag and party emblem can be seen in the background.

Fourth, further questions arise about the rules for the broadcasting of debates, such as the famous, and probably decisive, TV duels in the 1960 presidential election in the United States between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon.

Rules on Paid Advertising during Election Campaigns

In several countries, commercial broadcasting networks are prevented from profiting at the expense of political parties by rules laying down that advertising time must be made available to the parties at rates no higher than those for commercial advertisers.

If only a limited time is available for paid TV advertisements by the political parties, there may need to be a mechanism for ensuring that it is fairly divided. Canada illustrates this situation.

In Canada, parties receive an insignificant amount of free broadcasting time. However, they are permitted to purchase air time, and receive partial reimbursement of their costs. The Canada Elections Act requires every broadcasting station to make a total of six and a half hours available for political broadcasts during a period beginning on the 29th day before the poll and ending on the second day before the poll. These hours are divided up by agreement between the rival political parties. If an agreement cannot be reached between them, the matter is referred to the government-appointed broadcasting arbitrator.⁷²

Third, there is the very important question of how to assure that news broadcasts during election campaigns are fair. In Britain, the laws relating to broadcasting incorporate political neutrality. If political parties feel that they have been unjustly treated, they are entitled to appeal to the law courts. One way to try to assure fair coverage of election news is a rule in Britain that the proportion of time given on news and current affairs programmes to the coverage of the campaigns of the different political parties is in the same ratio as the parties' entitlements to free broadcasting time.

In Turkey, during the period that begins fifteen days before the election and ends at 6 p.m. on the eve of the elections, radio and television news bulletins must contain messages that are submitted by the political parties participating in the elections. The High Election Board limits the number of words in each party's text.⁷³

Draft Only

Formulas for Allocating Time

As of 1995, there were several formulas for allocating free broadcasting time, which will be discussed here.

Equality between Parties

Czech Republic: In the electoral campaign, all political parties contesting the elections are allotted a total of twenty-one hours of broadcast and television time which is divided among them equally. The actual hour of presentation for each party is determined by lot.⁷⁴

India: Party political broadcasts were first arranged on radio and television during the 1977 state elections, with the order of speaking arranged by drawing lots. This followed agreement by all parties that they would have equal time. ⁷⁵

Mexico: The 1993 amendments to the electoral code charged the Federal Electoral Institute with buying and allocating fifteen minutes per month on television and radio for each party. ⁷⁶

Allocation of Time to Party Candidates in the Current Election

Japan: Candidates of any party that puts forward at least twelve candidates are given the same amount of broadcasting time. Candidates receive less time if parties run fewer than twelve candidates. In the Upper House, every candidate (regardless of party endorsement) is given five and a half minutes of free broadcasting time. Candidates are not permitted to buy broadcasting time. Parties are permitted to buy advertising time, provided that their advertisements call for support for the party, not for specific candidates. (Information supplied by Gerald Curtis.)

Allocation Based Wholly or Largely on Results of Previous Election

Belgium: Free access to the state-owned television network is in proportion to the strength of each party group at the level of the European Union.

Greece: The allocation of time among political parties is based on the size of the party in the previously dissolved Parliament. The three largest parties in the previous Parliament are entitled to at least thirty-eight minutes weekly on televised programmes. Smaller parties with members in the previous Parliament are entitled to eight minutes weekly. Parties with no representation in the Parliament, but with a list of candidates in seventy-five percent of the electoral districts, are entitled to five minutes weekly. In addition, each large party is entitled to one forty-five minute broadcast.

Spain: The formula is:

ten minutes for parties, federations, or coalitions which did not participate, or did not have representation in the previous election

fifteen minutes for those with up to five percent of the vote at the previous election

thirty minutes for those with between five and twenty percent; forty-five minutes for those with at least twenty percent

Allocations Based on a Mixture of Principles

Israel: The allocation of broadcasting time is based on a compromise between the status quo and the new situation.

[e]ach party, including those which were not represented in the previous parliament, has been given ten minutes and each party already represented in the outgoing parliament receives three additional minutes for each member in the parliament.⁷⁷

The Netherlands: The allocation is based on a compromise between the principle of equality, and that of preference for large parties, as defined by the number of seats contested in the current election. In the period preceding an election the Media Commissariat (established under the Media Law) may allocate extra time to political parties and groups which have submitted a list of candidates in all nineteen electoral districts. ⁷⁸

Turkey: All parties participating in the election are entitled to ten minutes. Parties with parliamentary groups may receive ten more minutes. In addition, the governing party is entitled to another twenty minutes, and the main opposition party to another ten minutes.⁷⁹

Allocations Agreed by a Committee of Broadcasters

Australia: The Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), the public broadcasting authority, is not obliged by law to provide free broadcasting time to participating parties in an election. It is up to the discretion of the ABC's Election Coverage Committee to determine how the public is to be informed on 'issues of current debate.' In the past it has been its policy to allocate free time.

Great Britain: A committee is formed from representatives of the broadcasting authorities and the political parties. The committee tries to agree on a fair allocation. In the past, this has consisted of a number of elements. First, the two main parties have received equal shares. The share of the third party - the Liberal Democrats - has been based partly on the result of the previous election, and partly on its subsequent performance in partial elections, local government elections, and in the polls. Moreover, the formula has usually given the third party a share which is, on the one hand, smaller than that of the main parties, and on the other hand, larger than its pro rata share, as measured either by its previous or current political showing.

#EndNotes

#1. Sources: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

#2. ibid.: 103-4.

#3. ibid.: 159

#4. ibid.: 5

#5. ibid.: 171

#6. ibid.: 194

Draft Only

Campaign Expenditure Disclosures

Disclosure requirements often come in the wake of regulations setting limits on campaign spending or contribution levels. Where disclosure is required for its own sake, and not in order to permit the policing of legal limits, then the rules are likely to be more lax and arbitrary. An example is the rules governing disclosures of campaign expenditures by national party organizations in Australia. The definitions of what constitutes campaign expenditure are over-simplified because they do not need to be exact. See also Regulation/Oversight of Campaign Finance.

However, where candidates must keep their expenses within limits, with severe penalties for failure to do so, separating campaign and non-campaign items will be taken very seriously. It will be subject to detailed rule-making, either through legal decisions (as in Britain), or through advisory opinions of regulatory agencies in those countries where such agencies are strong and active.

The most common form of campaign disclosure concerns election expenditures rather than income, since it is the level of spending that is normally subject to restriction.

The Australian Example

This is an illustration of a loose disclosure system operating without a campaign spending limit.

The electoral return that each party's appointed agent must complete after a House of Representatives or Senate election needs only disclose expenditures in six categories:

broadcasting advertisements (including production costs)
publishing advertisements (including production costs)
display advertisements at a place of entertainment (including production costs)
costs of campaign material where the name and address of the author is required (e.g. how-to-vote cards, pamphlets, posters)
direct mailing, and
opinion polling or other research related to the election.⁸⁰

The return covers campaign expenses involving goods and services provided from the issue of the election writ until the close of polling. It need not include items of campaign spending apart from those listed. For example, travel and postage costs are not included.

Draft Only

By Candidates

Britain and Canada are examples of countries where parliamentary candidates disclose campaign expenses. In Britain, the return must show that expenses have been contained with the permitted limit. In Canada, the expenses return is both for this purpose, and for the purpose of determining the amount of money to reimburse the candidate.

Britain

The candidate's election agent must draw up the return of expenses according to a set format. The candidate must sign and swear by it, and submit it within thirty-five days of the declaration of the election result. Failure to submit the return on time means that a successful candidate cannot in the meantime sit or vote in the House of Commons. If he does so while his return is overdue, he is liable to daily fines. If a candidate exceeds the limit, he may seek relief from the courts, if an accidental miscalculation has been made in good faith, or if there has been a minor, inadvertent breach. But if a candidate is convicted of illegal or corrupt practice (in other words, a serious offence, which may result from overspending), he stands to lose his seat in the House of Commons.

The heavy penalties underscore the fact that returns of election expenses must be taken seriously. However, in keeping with the British approach to the regulation of election campaigns, the rules about what does or does not constitute a declarable election expense are unclear, unless they have already been the subject of a past court case.

For example, the time when the election campaign starts is not determined, as in some other countries, such as Canada and Australia, by some well-defined event, such as the dissolution of Parliament, or the issue of the election writ. For the purposes of calculating expenses, the campaign starts whenever candidates start to promote themselves. On the other hand, they may promote their party's policies even though they thereby make themselves known to the local voters in the process. This subtle distinction emerged from a decision in a case dating back to 1910 (the East Dorset case). The verdict in this case means that a candidate may address political meetings provided:

he does so under the banner of his local party association
he calls himself the 'Prospective Parliamentary Candidate' rather than the 'Parliamentary Candidate' and
he does not distribute his photograph as part on any political literature

As far as expenses incurred on polling day and on the preceding days are concerned, legal uncertainties stretch to the question of whether an election agent is obliged to enter as expenses the notional commercial cost of rooms in the homes of volunteers used as committee rooms. This, too, has been the subject of several court cases.

Such niceties result from the 'adversarial' approach, which is basic to electoral administration in Britain. (see Approaches to Regulating Parties and Candidates) It is left to one of the losing candidates or his party organization to challenge possible contraventions of the law in the courts. The regulatory authorities will not take the initiative. Nor will they normally offer advisory opinions as to what is or is not within the law.

Canada

The system for candidates' expense returns is not entirely different in Canada, and its British origins are clear. However, there are some significant contrasts between the Canadian and British rules. These result from the fact that Canada, like Australia, relies to a large extent on a bureaucratic system of electoral administration. There are well-staffed and highly developed offices, both at the federal and provincial levels, devoted specifically to this task. Where there is room for doubt, candidates can usually (though not always) rely on advisory opinions by the Chief Electoral Officer of the federal office, known as Elections Canada, or his provincial counterparts.

In contrast to Britain, the Canadian regulations set out the precise time period to which the expense return must relate: candidates' expenses are from the time the writ is issued.

Apart from information about expenses, the returns must include details of all contributions of more than CAN$ 100.

There are guidelines from the Chief Electoral Officer about which items count or do not count as election expenses. (However, these guidelines have not avoided all problems concerning the definition of 'election expenses,' as described in another entry, Election Campaigns).

Draft Only

By Parties

Disclosure by parties of campaign expenditures (as distinct from combined routine and campaign costs) becomes necessary where, as in Canada, the national party organizations are subject to campaign spending limits. The difficulties at the local level in distinguishing between routine and campaign items are compounded when it comes to the central party organizations, see Election Campaigns and Spending Limits .

For example, the Canadian guidelines about election expenses include the following exclusions:

The party must not report those specific costs to produce an advertisement [e.g., raw film footage] which was not used during the election ... The cost of collecting and analyzing survey information is not an election expense as the activity does not result in the direct promotion of a party, its leader, candidates, members, programs or policies and therefore does not directly support the primary objectives of the party ...

Notwithstanding the importance of this process, the cost of policy research and formulation is not an election expense ...

Although [expenditures for party worker self-improvement and education] may put the party in a better position to promote itself ... such costs are not election expenses... Activities such as social functions generally ... are not considered to be election expenses.⁸¹

If a party's return of campaign expenses must include the expenses of organizations at the local as well as national levels, then the practical problems of drawing up the returns are increased. A further problem concerning expense returns by parties, as opposed to those by candidates, is that the most effective penalty available to punish individual candidates (the threat of losing his seat in the legislature) is not available when it comes to punishing whole parties. An alternative penalty is deregistration.

Draft Only

By Interest Groups

Some countries require pressure groups and other bodies to report their political spending.

Australia

Apart from parties and candidates, 'third parties' ('that is, persons or organizations other than registered political parties, candidates and Senate groups who participate in election campaigns') are also required to file disclosure reports with the Australian Electoral Commission. These obligations include broadcasters and publishers.

Broadcasters are required within eight weeks of the poll to submit returns to the Commission, giving details of electoral advertisements broadcast during the campaign. Broadcast time for which there has been a charge at less than the commercial rate is regarded as a gift, and must be reported as such.

Publishers are required to file returns with details of electoral advertisements costing in total more than AUS $1,000.⁸²

Britain

Trade unions and companies must disclose their political donations, whether for election campaigns, or other purposes.

Trade unions are not permitted to make any political donations unless they have first held a ballot of members to decide whether to establish a special 'political fund'. If such a fund is formed, its income and expenditure must be reported each year to the Certification Office for Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. The statistics are then published in summary in the Annual Report of the Certification Officer. The detailed returns are available for inspection by members of the public at the Certification Office in London.

If a company makes payments exceeding £200 a year for any of a variety of political objectives (including donations to parties and to candidates), these must be declared in the directors' annual report. These reports are available for inspection by members of the public, but information about political donations is not collected or published on a comprehensive basis.

Draft Only

Spending Limits

Examples

In Britain, limitations on permitted spending by individual candidates for election to the House of Commons. (There are no similar limits on the expenditures of national party organizations, provided that they do not mention the names of individual candidates.)

In the United States, limitations on the spending total of presidential candidates who accept public subsidies. (Candidates may spend without limit provided that they forego any entitlement to public funding.)

In Canada, limitations on permitted campaign spending by national party organizations.

Administrative Implications

In order to ensure that expenditures fall within the permitted total, it is necessary to create a strict administrative structure whereby all expenditures must be authorized in advance by the candidate, or by a specially appointed official (known, in Britain, as the candidate's 'agent'). It is also necessary to create rules concerning the submission of campaign accounts - including the time within which accounts must be submitted, and the form of the accounts.

Other administrative issues are:

the penalties imposed for exceeding the limits and
the means by which the rules are enforced

(1) Penalties. In Britain, parliamentary candidates who break the rules regarding permitted expenditures are (if they have been elected) subject to forfeiting their parliamentary seats.

(2) Enforcement mechanisms. In Britain, it is the responsibility of political opponents to draw up a legal case, which is then contested in the law courts. In some other countries (such as the United States, Canada and Australia), the task of enforcing laws relating to political funding, and to other aspects of electoral administration, is the responsibility of a special administrative body. In the United States, this organization is called the Federal Election Commission. Where such an organization is created, it is of course important to ensure that it is politically neutral and professionally competent. It is necessary to ensure that it has sufficient funds to guarantee that its staff can operate without feeling under threat.

Two common complaints about the British system of enforcement are:

the expense of bringing legal charges, and
the temptation for the main parties to collude with each other in avoiding charges of breaking the law.

Comments

The long-established limits in Britain on individual candidates' spending on local parliamentary campaigns appear to have worked better than the newer regulations in the United States and Canada which have imposed ceilings on spending at the national level.

The limits on parliamentary candidates' spending were introduced in Britain as far back as 1883. The restrictions apply only to expenditures during the three or four week election period. Spending by local party organizations in the period of four or five years between successive general elections is unrestricted. This makes it possible for candidates to evade the intent of the law to some extent. For example, local printers sometimes agree to produce election literature at a low cost, in return for the prospect of more profitable work for the local party organization between elections. Nevertheless, the limits on local spending do have the real effect of severely restricting the ability of candidates to purchase advertisements in newspapers or to give payments to a considerable number of campaign workers (as was the nineteenth century practice). The regulations have succeeded in encouraging local parties to create committees of party members who give their services as volunteers. Thus the restriction on local campaign spending has promoted the growth of local political parties by encouraging participation. The relative success of the legislation stems from the particular conditions of British politics, and from the fact that local and national campaigns are, in practice, largely separate. The main task of the party at the local campaign level is to impress the name of the individual candidate for Member of Parliament on the minds of the voters. It is at the national campaign level that the policies and images of each party are promoted.

Where there is legislation to restrict national level campaign spending, the record has been less successful. The first major problem is that national organizations have succeeded in stretching the limits by placing expenditures in categories exempt from the regulations. Since the limits apply only to a campaign period of a specified length of time, expenditures are attributed wherever possible to the non-campaign period. This is parallel to similar evasions at the local level, though the implications at the national level are more serious.

In addition, campaign activities are sub-contracted to organizations that are legally independent of the party. The techniques involved in this exercise are detailed in Alexander's volumes on the funding of each recent presidential campaign in the United States. In 1988, the campaigns of George Bush and Michael Dukakis each cost twice as much as the permitted limit.⁸³ This was because American law permits anyone to conduct a supposedly 'independent' campaign for or against a candidate

as long as these independent expenditures are made without consultation or collaboration with the candidates or their campaigns.

Alexander and Bauer draw the following conclusion:

expenditure limits are illusory in a pluralistic system with numerous openings for disbursements ... when freedom of speech and association are guaranteed, restricting money at any given point in the campaign process results in new channels being carved through which monied individuals and groups can bring their influence to bear on campaigns and officeholders.⁸⁴

The attempt to restrict campaign expenditures of national party organizations creates a second and related problem. If the spending ceiling applies solely to parties, it will still be possible for non-party organizations to campaign without limit. This creates the paradox that a religious group or a 'single-issue' lobby may spend unlimited sums of money in attacking a party that, for instance, favours abortion. Yet the party will be restricted in the money it may spend in countering the attack. If the rules on campaigning are to be fair, it will be necessary to extend their reach to all types of organization. It was this problem, stemming from the system of limitation of national party campaign spending, that obliged Canada to establish a Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing in 1990 see Interest Groups: Third parties.

Countries with Spending Limits for Candidates/Parties

Examples as of 1995:

Brazil
Canada
Israel
Italy

Countries with Limits for Candidates but not Parties

Examples as of 1995:

France
Great Britain
India
Ireland
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Taiwan
United States
Ukraine

Countries with Limits for Parties but not Candidates

Example as of 1995:

Spain

Countries with no Spending Limits

Examples as of 1995:

Australia
Czech Republic
Germany
Greece
The Netherlands
Sweden
Turkey

Draft Only

Calculation/Communication of Limits

Examples of permitted expenditure ceilings, as of 1995, follow.

France

In 1993, candidates for election as deputy to the National Assembly were limited to 250,000 francs plus 1 franc for each inhabitant in the electoral district.

Presidential elections. In 1995, the ceiling for each presidential candidate was 120 million francs, plus a total of 140 million francs for the two candidates at the second ballot.

Great Britain

Candidates for the House of Commons and for other elective offices are subject to campaign spending limits. In 1994, the limits were: for county (rural) constituencies, £4,642, plus 5.2 pence for every entry in the electoral register to be used at the election; for borough (urban) constituencies: £4,642, plus 3.9 pence per entry.

India

The limit is 150,000 rupees per candidate.

Italy

Each candidate is limited to a total resulting from adding to a fixed amount of 80 million lire, the sum of 100 lire multiplied by the number of citizens residing in the single-member districts. For those candidates who run for seats assigned by proportional representation the corresponding amount is ten lire for every citizen residing in the electoral district.

Election expenses for each party and other groupings must not exceed a total resulting from the sum of 200 lire multiplied by the number of inhabitants of the districts of the Senate and of the chamber in which they are represented by lists of candidates, or by individual candidates.

Japan

Spending limits for candidates apply only to the formal campaign period of twelve days. There are no limits for candidates for election to the upper house through the national constituency. The applicable limits are:

For lower-house elections (single-member districts): 19,100,000, plus a sum derived from multiplying 15 by the number of registered voters, and dividing by the number of seats in the electoral district.

For upper house elections: 13,600,000, plus a sum derived from multiplying 8 (or 12) by the number of registered voters, and dividing by the number of seats in the electoral district.

Malaysia

Each candidate standing for election to the House of Representatives is limited to MAL $50,000, and each candidate for election to a state legislative assembly to MAL $30,000.

Mexico

Limits were introduced in 1993.

For federal senators and deputies, the formula includes three elements: an amount per registered voter, geographic area, and population density.

The range of limits for senate campaigns range from a high of about U.S.$9 million for the State of Mexico, to a low of U.S.$426,000 in the State of Baja California Sur. The limits for federal deputies ranged between U.S.$653,000 and U.S.$45,000.

For the 1994 presidential election, the limit was U.S.$42 million per candidate.

Poland

The expenses of nominating lists of candidates and waging the electoral campaign for any registered district list of candidates may not exceed sixty times the average monthly wage.

Russia

Candidates for deputy of the Duma of the Federal Assembly:

a candidate's own funds, which may not exceed 1,000 minimum salaries
funds allocated to the candidates by the electoral association or electoral bloc that has nominated them, up to 1,500 minimum salaries
own funds of an electoral association, or electoral bloc, may not exceed 100,000 minimum salaries

Spain

Each political party is entitled to a sum that is the product of forty pesetas times the number of voters in each electoral district where a party's candidate is standing for election.

United States

Partly as a consequence of the Supreme Court's ban on spending limits, federal campaigns other than for the presidency are not subject to limits.

A presidential candidate is also theoretically free from expenditure limits, but only provided he refuses to accept public subsidies for his campaign. Candidates have invariably accepted such subsidies as, therefore, have at the same time agreed to limit their campaigns to the amounts provided from public funds. In the 1996 race for the presidency, the subsidy and related spending limit for the Democratic and Republican candidates was U.S.$62 million each.

Ukraine

Candidates for president: up to 10,000 minimal salaries.

Candidates for deputy: up to 100 minimal salaries.

Draft Only

Personal Expenses Issue

This issue arises where candidates for the legislature are subject to a ceiling on the amount that may be spent on their election campaign, as in Britain or Canada. In these cases, the candidate's personal expenses are not included as an election expense.

There is a valid reason for excluding personal expenses from the items that must be included within the permitted campaign budget. If candidates do not live in, or near the electoral district where they are standing for election, then they may incur considerable costs of board and lodging, as well as travel to the district, from their place of residence. The personal costs of the rival candidates will differ, especially if some are able to live at home while the campaign takes place, and others have to pay for accommodation and other personal needs. Where the limits on permitted campaign expenses are tight, it is reasonable - if only for reasons of fairness - that the allowance should be available for political outlays, and that it should not be consumed by personal items.

Nevertheless, the exclusion of personal expenses creates a possible loophole that some candidates may exploit. One British example illustrates this well. A wealthy candidate lived in a stately home near the constituency where he was a candidate for the House of Commons. During the campaign he invited a large number of friends to stay as guests in his home, and made food and drink available on a generous scale. While they were his houseguests, the friends acted as volunteer helpers for the campaign. The amounts spent on entertaining them were personal expenses of the candidate. He often entertained his friends. The fact that on this occasion they took advantage of being present in his home to carry out voluntary electioneering duties was coincidental.

Draft Only

Breaches and penalties

Why Electoral Laws Are Often Not Enforced

It is of little value to have laws on the statute book, unless those who contravene the law are subject to penalties. But it is, in addition, of little value to include a schedule of penalties on the same statute book unless the offender anticipates that breaches of the law are likely to be investigated, and unless he fears that illegal practices will be enforced. Punishments that are not applied will not deter wrongdoers.

Yet, laws relating to the conduct of elections - especially those regarding political financing - are often disregarded. There are several reasons why this is commonly the case. First, there may exist a culture of disregard for the law among the rival political parties and candidates. If most or all of them turn a blind eye to the regulations, none of them will wish to initiate a legal challenge against political opponents for fear of retaliatory actions against themselves. Informal 'non-aggression pacts' between professional campaign organizers of various parties are a common feature of political life.

Second, the institutions responsible for electoral administration may not possess an enforcement arm and, therefore, may be in no position to initiate inquiries or checks into possible wrongdoing. Breaches of the rules (for instance, concerning limits on permitted campaign spending) may be subtle and hard to detect. Without a qualified and properly staffed 'detective force' the authorities will frequently take no action unless presented with a complaint. They will merely respond, but they will not initiate inquiries.

Third, when legal challenges are left to aggrieved individuals or parties (for instance, candidates who feel that they have been unfairly defeated), the costs of initiating such an action may prove prohibitive. All too often, cost considerations have deterred defeated candidates from bringing election petitions in the law courts in Britain.

Examples of Rarely Enforced Laws

It is not hard to find examples of poor enforcement.

Germany According to the U.S. Library of Congress, '[s]anctions are not a major feature of the German provisions on party financing.'

Italy 'Law No. 515 [of 1993] ... has quietly achieved a complete depenalization of all violations of private financing [of election campaigns] by imposing exclusively administrative fines that range in amount from a few thousand [U.S.] dollars to a few hundred thousand dollars. These are modest sums when compared to the astronomical cost to taxpayers for the kickbacks and bribes involved in the political scandals over just the last decade.'

Turkey In Turkey, the 'Constitutional Court usually fails to audit the accounts of the parties in the year submitted. It generally takes a few years before the Court examines them.' ⁸⁵

Britain Parliamentary candidates face severe penalties for exceeding the legally permitted limit on campaign spending. Yet the last election petition that led to an elected candidate being forced to forfeit his seat in the House of Commons was brought three-quarters of a century ago.

United States In the United States, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 proved almost entirely a dead letter:

in the history of the 1925 act, no one was prosecuted for failing to comply with the law. Only two people--Republicans William S. Vare of Pennsylvania and Frank L. Smith of Virginia--were excluded from office for violating spending limits. And they were excluded in 1927 as a result of violations incurred in the first election in which the law was in place. Over the next forty-five years, no other candidates were punished under this act. ⁸⁶

Policy Implications of Fact of Rarely Enforced Laws

Two very different reactions are possible to the fact that penalties of breaches of electoral laws are rarely imposed. One approach is to advocate relatively light penalties, such as small or medium-sized fines. The rationale is that if penalties are moderate, there will be an added incentive for the electoral authorities to seek to enforce them. If the penalty for a breach of the law is very heavy - such as forfeiture of a seat in the legislature - those accused of contraventions will fight extra hard to avoid being found guilty. Enforcement will become especially costly, and, because of this, it will become rare.

The opposite approach is that, since enforcement is likely to be irregular, it is all the more important that penalties for proven and significant breaches should be severe.

Policy about the severity of penalties is influenced also by another factor, namely the possibility of legal breaches that arise out of genuine errors, rather than from an intention and a plan to break the law. The problem about over-severe penalties is that they may unduly damage new and relatively inexperienced parties and candidates. They may thus deter such new actors from entering the electoral arena while leaving unaffected the established parties, which are likely to know the law better as well as the most effective ways around the law. Because of this problem, electoral law in Britain permits candidates found guilty of breaching the law (for instance, concerning campaign spending limits) to appeal to the Court for 'relief' from the heaviest penalties on the ground that the breach has been minor or unintentional.

The Impact of Electoral Laws on the Types of Offences

Breaches vary greatly between country to country on the basis of the laws against which offences or alleged offences have been made. For example, regulations concerning campaign financing in Britain relate mainly to individual candidates and their agents. At worst, successful candidates stand to forfeit their parliamentary seats if serious breaches are proved. However, this penalty of the loss of particular seats in the legislature will be inappropriate and difficult to conceive for list systems of proportional representation. Under these systems, it is the party, rather than the individual candidate that presents itself to the electors.

To give another example, where political parties receive public funding, it will become possible to use a withdrawal of such funding as a penalty. Needless to say, such a penalty will not be available in countries where parties receive no public funding in the first place.

In general, it becomes harder to impose a harsh penalty on a candidate for a presidential election than for a parliamentary election. Equally, it is more difficult to impose a harsh penalty on an entire national party than on a single candidate. If an individual candidate for parliament loses their seat, this will not invalidate the entire national election and it is unlikely to change the entire balance of power between political parties in the legislature.

By contrast, if a successful presidential candidate, or a major party, are found guilty of breaching laws relating to maximum permitted expenditure, the uncomfortable choice for those concerned with electoral law is between a penalty that is too small and one that is probably too large. A financial penalty - even a large one - will hardly be a just and adequate punishment if the winning candidate has achieved success by a significant degree of cheating, and is permitted to enjoy the fruits of this cheating. On the other hand, if the punishment for a breach of regulations relating to expenses carries the penalty of forfeiture of the election, then the stakes involved in investigations regarding alleged offences will be little less than revolutionary. A law court will have in its hands the ability to overthrow a president, or to void the seats of an entire party.

Types of Penalty

The most common penalties are:

forfeiture of contributions obtained in contravention to laws or regulations,

forfeiture by a political party to part or all of its entitlement to public funding,

fines,

imprisonment,

temporary loss of right to sit and vote in the legislature by successful candidates who have failed to submit a return of expenses on time,

forfeiture of seat in the legislature by a successful candidate later found guilty of a serious offence,

loss of civil rights by those found guilty of offences. This may include a loss of the right to vote for a certain period of time, the loss of the right to stand as a candidate for office in the electoral district in which the offence has taken place, the loss of the right to stand as a candidate in any electoral district.

Responsibility for Breaches

Who should be held accountable if a campaign worker disobeys the law in the interests of his party or his candidate? Is it just to penalize candidates for actions taken on their behalf, but without their authorization?

There is no simple answer. If those at the top of the campaign hierarchy are held responsible for every low-level breach, they will risk being penalized for actions over which, in practice, they have had no control. On the other hand, if the candidate is free from liability, there will be a great temptation for campaign organizations to disregard the law in the knowledge that, even if they are found out, the candidate and the party will not suffer. In some countries, a junior official is expected to be the person who will carry the can and will, if necessary, go to prison on behalf of the cause. He will then receive his reward later from the party hierarchy for saving the principal actors from incarceration or other serious penalties.

A device was introduced in Britain in the nineteenth century to deal with this problem, and this has been adopted in other countries that have copied the 'Westminster Model'. Since candidates cannot be expected to deal with the details of campaign organization and spending, while at the same time spending their time making speeches and meeting electors, candidates may delegate the task of managing the campaign, as well as the expenditure of money, to an agent. Since candidates have been able to appoint an agent of their choosing, candidates are therefore liable for breaches committed by the agent. At the same time, the agent must assure that no campaign expenditure is incurred without his authorization.

Enforcement: Electoral Authorities versus Law Courts

Where there is a special electoral authority, it may have certain enforcement responsibilities. For example, the United States' Federal Election Commission is permitted to reach agreements with those accused of breaches of campaign finance laws. If those accused of offences are willing to come to such an agreement, they will not normally face prosecution before the Courts.

A conciliation agreement between the Federal Election Commission and the person against whom a legal complaint has been filed consists of three elements:

a description of the facts.
an admission by the accused of a violation of the law,
a financial penalty.

In 1991, the Canadian Royal Commission for Electoral Reform and Party Financing made the case for administrative, rather than criminal, enforcement:

the designation 'criminal offences' should be reserved for violations of society's most fundamental values. An individual should be convicted of a crime and subjected to the corresponding stigma and punishment only where it can be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prohibited conduct was carried out intentionally, knowingly or purposively. Most election violations do not fall under this rubric. Rather, they are primarily administrative or regulatory in nature. ...

We propose that all violations under the Canada Elections Act be defined as either infractions or offences. Infractions would be either procedural, administrative or regulatory and would involve less severe penalties. They would be adjudicated exclusively by the Canada Elections Commission, with the possibility of judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada. The second category of violations would be the more serious, involving some element of wilful misconduct. These violations could result in severe penalties, including higher fines, imprisonment or the loss of certain rights under the Canada Elections Act.⁸⁷

In some countries, apart from electoral commissions and courts of law, enforcement of electoral laws is a responsibility of the president or speaker of the legislature (as in Germany and Greece).

Penalties: Non-Compliance with Electoral Law and Agreements

This distinction is relevant where, as described above, an electoral authority has reached a conciliation agreement with a person accused of a legal violation. Where this agreement includes a fine, and where the violator fails to pay the fine, there will need to be provision for a distinct, additional penalty for non-compliance with this agreement.

For more information on this and related subjects, see also Legislative Framework.

Draft Only

Types of offences

Offences

Offences committed by candidates, political parties, members of the public, or by organizations include:

breaches of laws relating to financing of parties and campaigns,

personation,

physical intimidation or 'undue influence',

bribery of voters,

bribery of candidates,

breaches of regulations concerning political broadcasting,

Offences Committed by Electoral Officials and Public Officials

Though most offences relate to misconduct by candidates, political parties, or members of the public, the behaviour of public officials responsible for administering elections is also open to question. Indeed, those entrusted with administering elections have special opportunities to subvert the electoral process and, for this reason, should arguably be liable to especially severe penalties. This reasoning is embodied in some election laws in Britain. For instance, higher penalties apply to officials convicted on indictment of these offences than to other persons.⁸⁸ Mexico is another country where public officials are liable to special penalties.

Mexico A 1994 amendment to the Federal Criminal Code contains a classification of electoral offences. They include:

Offences perpetrated by electoral officials: altering documents belonging to the Federal Registry of Electors, modifying results, stealing ballot or electoral documents, and allowing the insertion of invalid ballots in the ballot box.

Offences perpetrated by public officials: forcing subordinates to vote for a specific candidate or political party, using public funds, goods or services to favour a given party or candidate.

It is also an offence under Mexican law for ministers of religion to try to influence a voter's decision or to encourage abstention.⁸⁹

Draft Only

Severity of offences

In different countries, there are various ways in which severe breaches are distinguished from lesser ones. One distinction is between offences specifically against election laws and offences under general laws of the country. A second distinction is between offences punishable under civil law and contraventions of criminal law. A third distinction is between 'illegal' and 'corrupt' practices.

Britain The Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 and subsequent amendments divided offences into a less serious category ('illegal practices'), and a more serious one ('corrupt practices'). This distinction was adopted in a number of other 'Westminster Model' countries.

Illegal practices and payments include:

Illegal practices by candidates and election agents

knowingly incurring any election expense in excess of the maximum amount allowed,

knowingly publishing a false statement of the withdrawal of a candidate for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of another candidate.

Illegal practices by election agents

paying without a judgement or order of a competent court any claim for an election expense after the time limited for paying such expenses.

Illegal practices irrespective of person committing them

any payment on account of the conveyance of electors to or from the poll,

the payment to any person, other than the candidate or his election agent, of any money provided for election expenses by any person other than the candidate.

It is illegal employment to engage, or employ for payment, or promise of payment, any person as a canvasser (that is, someone who goes from door to door to encourage electors to vote for a particular candidate).

using, with intent to influence voters in contravention of the law, any television or other wireless station from abroad for the transmission of matter having reference to an election.

Corrupt practices include:

personation

false declaration as to election expenses

bribery of any voter

gifts by candidates

a promise or procurement of any office or employment to induce a voter to vote or to refrain from voting

This 'Westminster model' is found in other countries, such as Japan.

Draft Only

Fines and imprisonment

Some categories of fines and prison sentences are as follows:

simple forefeiture of undocumented receipts (in Turkey)
a fine of a fixed sum, plus twice the amount of the unauthorized receipts (in the United States for some offences)
forfeiture by a party of fifteen percent of state finance for operation purposes (in Israel)
suspension of state funding for one year for political parties guilty of improper preparation of balance sheets (in Greece)
a fine or imprisonment or both (for corrupt electoral practices in Britain)
a prison term of up to five years for accepting campaign contributions from abroad (in Taiwan)

A more detailed example is provided by the list of penalties in Australia:

failure to furnish return when due: Agent of party: AUS $5,000; Agent of candidate, or others required to furnish a return: AUS $1,000
continued failure following conviction for failure to furnish return: AUS $100 a day
furnishing an incomplete return: AUS $1,000
failure to maintain records of parties and groups: AUS $1,000
knowingly furnishing false or misleading information to a person making claim required to furnish a return: AUS $1,000

Failure to produce documents, or give evidence, or giving false or misleading evidence: AUS $1,000 and/or six months in prison.⁹⁰

Draft Only

Forfeiting parliamentary seats

Declaring an Election Void

There are two main reasons why the election of a candidate may be declared void.

the administration of an election may have been so defective as to cast real doubt on the validity of the results
a candidate may be unseated for cheating (for example, by exceeding the maximum permitted expenditure)

One of the most recent British examples of seriously defective electoral administration dates back to 1874. In the Hackney Election Petition Case, defective administrative arrangements meant that two polling stations never opened, and other stations were closed during various times of the day, so that a high proportion of the potential voters were disenfranchised.⁹¹

The Law 'On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine' includes a provision in article 47 for a similar eventuality:

The Central Election Commission may declare elections ... as void if during the course of their conduct or tabulation of votes there were violations of this Law, which have substantially influenced the results of the voting ... Decisions of the Central Election Commission can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, whose decision is final.⁹²

The central example regarding forfeiture of a parliamentary seat by a successful candidate subsequently found guilty of a campaign offence, is the British law relating to permitted spending by candidates and their agents. The fact that this law has never since the 1920s led to the forfeiture of a seat in the House of Commons may be interpreted in different ways - either as a sign of the deterrent effect of the law, or as an indication of poor enforcement. There is probably some validity in both these interpretations.

Forfeiting Civic Rights

Someone who has committed a serious breach of electoral law arguably cannot be trusted to carry out his civic duties in the future, and is unworthy of the opportunity to present himself to the electors as a candidate for public office. On grounds such as these, electoral law in Britain imposes special civic penalties:

Any person reported by an election court as personally guilty of a corrupt practice is subject to the following incapacities:- (1) Incapacity for five years of being registered as an elector or voting at any parliamentary or local government election in the United Kingdom. (2) Incapacity for five years of being elected to or sitting in the House of Commons or (3) of holding public or judicial office.

A candidate reported by an election court as personally guilty of a corrupt practice is in addition (4) banned from being elected for ten years to the constituency for which the election was held. However, (5) if the offence was committed by the candidate's agent the same ban on the candidate lasts only for seven years.

Justices of the peace, members of certain professions (such as lawyers, clergymen, and doctors) and persons holding liquor licences are subject to other actions, if convicted of corrupt practices regarding elections.

Smaller civic penalties apply to convictions for the lesser category of offences described as 'illegal' practices. ⁹³

Prior to 1996, Japanese candidates appointed an agent to run the campaign to take the hit, and even go to jail for campaign law violations. The 1996 version of the law makes the candidate responsible. There is a loophole or a shortcoming in the law, in that it prohibits a convicted candidate from running for five years in the district in which he was elected. It does not prohibit him from running in another district, or in a different election, e.g. for prefecture governor rather than Diet (parliament) member.

Draft Only

Breaches of regulations regarding party name

Difficulties may arise not only with regard to party name, but also with regard to party symbols. If there is a split within an established party, and two or more factions emerge, the ownership of the traditional name and - even more important - the symbol, is likely to have considerable political importance. Different factions may each wish to maximize their electoral prospects by using this name and symbol. There may also be competition between the opposing groups to claim the traditional party colour.

If different groups within a party cannot come to an agreement, there may need to be a legal determination as to which group is entitled to hold power in the party and to represent it at the next election. But the group which is, in legal terms, the breakaway, rebel group may still choose to use every means to persuade the electors that it is the true heir to the party tradition. It may continue to campaign under the party name, and to use the party symbol (or a new symbol that is almost indistinguishable).

Under most jurisdictions, it will be relatively simple for electoral officials to cope with would-be imitators of existing party names and symbols when it comes to nominations. If a new party, or a breakaway faction of an old one, proposes to misrepresent itself and its candidates, those responsible for administering the elections may simply refuse to accept their nominations, and may omit to include on the ballot papers any party names and symbols that are grossly misleading.

However, it is harder to control candidates and their supporters who persist in presenting themselves under another party's flag during their campaigns or their fundraising drives.

In Britain, a political party is able to register its symbol as a trademark, and bring an action against someone who uses the symbol without authorization in the same way as a company may initiate a prosecution against a business rival who pirates its logo. In addition, it is possible to bring a charge against a mimic candidate under a section of the electoral law that makes it an illegal practice to issue a false statement for the purpose of affecting the electoral result.

In the United States, it is an offence to solicit political contributions fraudulently by misrepresenting the party for which the gift is being sought.

Draft Only

Breaches of rules for nominating candidates

Breaches include the failure to register nomination on time, failure to give required deposit, and forgery of signatures on the candidate's nomination form.

Normally, there is no need for any penalty for breaches such as the failure to register a nomination on time, or a failure to submit the required financial deposit. The simple consequence of failure to complete the necessary formalities within the time required is that a candidate's nomination is not accepted, and that is the end of the matter.

Where signatures are required to support a candidate's nomination, breaches present a greater problem since it may not immediately be apparent that any breach has occurred. The official responsible for administering an election may accept a nomination form without checking with each signatory. In order to provide a safeguard against the forgery of names on a candidate's nomination paper, the timetable for elections in Britain to the House of Commons provides a short period after the closing time for the submission of nominations during which challenges may be presented to the nomination.

If an opposing party suspects that some of the names of a nomination form have been forged (or if it believes that the supposed signatories are dead), it has a few hours in which to search for, and present evidence to the returning officer (the official responsible for accepting nominations). For instance, it may be possible to obtain information from the registrar of births, marriages, and deaths. Alternatively, it may be possible to contact electors whose names have been forged, and to persuade them to say so to the returning officer. If presented with evidence of this kind, the returning officer may decide not to accept the flawed nomination.

If a returning officer accepts a nomination, and if it later is shown that one or more of the signatures of those supporting the nomination have been forged, the election will not, under British law, be declared void automatically. Legal representatives of the candidate whose nomination was flawed are entitled to argue that the forgery did not materially affect the result of the election. If such a candidate has in the meantime won the election by a substantial margin, the law courts are unlikely to overturn the result.

Draft Only

Breaches of political finance regulations

Variations in what is Subject to Regulation

As with other categories of violation, breaches of political finance regulations vary from country to country, according to the regulations themselves. The tighter and more extensive the system of regulation, the more types of violation become possible.

For example, according to the existing system in Britain, neither parties nor candidates are required to list the names of contributors. There is thus no possibility of violations from a failure to follow disclosure laws relating to such contributions. In contrast, a core enforcement task of the Federal Election Commission in the United States is to police detailed rules about the names and addresses of contributors to political campaigns, and regulations about the time within which such information must be submitted.

To give another example, political parties in Germany are required to submit accounts according to set categories and accountancy rules. However, they are not required to distinguish between routine spending of the party organization and spending specifically for election campaigns. However, in Canada, the existence of a limit on permitted campaign spending by national party organizations carries with it a need for returns of such campaign spending, as well as penalties for violations of the rules.

Countries vary also according to whether there are penalties for specific types of violation, or whether there is a common schedule of penalties for whole groups of violations. For example, in Britain, there is a special penalty for failure by a candidate to produce a return of expenses on time, but the penalty for producing a false return is part of the broader system of penalties for corrupt practices.

Regulations and Penalties outside Electoral Laws

In most countries, there is a core electoral statute where political financing laws are mainly found. However, it is a mistake to assume that the electoral law contains all the relevant provisions. In the United States, beside the Federal Election Campaign Acts, relevant materials are included in the Internal Revenue Code (title 26), as well as other parts of the United States Code dealing with Crimes and Criminal Procedure (title 18), and telecommunications (title 47).⁹⁴

In Britain, not only are the successive Representation of the People Acts relevant to political financing, but also certain companies acts, trade union acts, and broadcasting acts.⁹⁵

Examples

The following are examples of penalties for violations relating to political financing rules:

Australia See Fines and imprisonment Britain Failure by parliamentary candidates to make a return of expenses on time. The agent of every candidate is required to deliver to the official responsible for administering the election (the returning officer) a return of election expenses within thirty-five days of the declaration of the result of an election. The return of expenses must include a number of specific categories of information. If the return is not delivered by the deadline, the candidate may not sit or vote in the House of Commons until it is delivered or an authorized excuse allowed. A candidate is liable to forfeit £100 for every day on which he sits and votes.⁹⁶

Canada The Canada Elections Act creates dozens of possible violations relating to campaign financing. With a few exceptions, those tried in summary proceedings are carry a maximum penalty of one year in prison, and a fine of up to CAN $1,000; for offences tried on indictment, the penalties are up to five years in prison and up to CAN $5,000.

Germany If funds are unlawfully received, improperly used, or unreported by political parties, the penalty is twice the amount involved in the breach. This is deducted from the party's direct public subsidy. If a party fails to submit accounts, its public subsidy is held back until it does so.⁹⁷

United States There is a profusion of possible violations. They include:

violation of limits on individual contributions
political contributions by banks, corporations or labour unions
foreign contributions
contributions of over U.S.$100 given in currency
violations of laws about record-keeping
violations of reporting requirements
overcharging by newspapers, television, or magazines for space for political advertisements
violations of expenditure limits for presidential nominating campaigns
violations of confidentiality provisions concerning pending investigations of breaches by the Federal Election Commission
failure by political fundraisers to disclose to donors that contributions are nondeductible for income tax purposes

Most penalties fall into a number of general categories depending, first, on whether or not the breach has been 'knowing and willful'; second on the sum involved in the alleged offence; third on the method of prosecution.

For offences which are the subject of a conciliation agreement with the Federal Election Commission, or which are the subject of a civil court action initiated by the Commission, the maximum penalties are the greater of (a) U.S.$5,500 or (b) the amount involved in the violation. Where the offence is determined to have been 'knowing and willful', each of these penalties be doubled.

For serious offences which are referred by the Commission to the Attorney General, and which are then subject to criminal prosecution, the maximum penalties are one year in prison and a fine up to a maximum of the greater of (a) U.S.$25,000 or (b) three times the amount of any contribution or expenditure involved in the violation.

Apart from these penalties, particular offences are subject to special penalties. For example, penalties for false accounting, kickbacks, and illegal payments are up to U.S.$10,000 and five years in prison. There is the same penalty for offences relating to limits on spending in presidential nominating campaigns.

Draft Only

Personation

Personation refers to a form of cheating which involves someone pretending to be someone else, and voting in that other person's name. Personation may occur in a number of circumstances. If the death of an elector has been concealed from the electoral authorities, and the name of the dead person has been retained on the electoral register, someone else may vote in the name of the deceased. The false voter will then know with certainty that the real voter will not turn up to vote (unless someone else has personated him already!). Personation may also occur when an voter is known to be away, or if the true voter is prevented by force from visiting the polling place.

A method of deterring personation is to require every voter to present some official form of identification (such as a passport, driving licence, or another official document). In some jurisdictions, a document is accepted for identification purposes only if it includes a photograph of the bearer. A further device intended to control personation is to issue each voter with a voter card that includes a photograph. Voters who show up at the poll without their cards are then not allowed to cast their votes. This method deters personation, but may introduce a new method of electoral bribery. For example, according to reports in Mauritius about the conduct of elections in nearby Reunion, party organizations in Reunion paid voters to surrender their voter cards for the period of the poll. These payments were normally made in geographical areas where an opposing party was known to be popular. This prevented voters who were likely to vote for the opposing from casting their ballots.

In the next few years, new technologies will probably make personation much harder. It is becoming possible to include electronic information on electoral registers that will reliably identify voters, even those without identity papers. For instance, signatures, fingerprints, and photographs may be scanned onto the registers to be used by officials at each polling place.

Existing penalties for personation include:

Britain This is categorized as a corrupt practice. (see Severity of offences) A person convicted on indictment for personation, or aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the offence of personation, is liable to imprisonment for up to two years, a fine, or both.⁹⁸

Mauritius The maximum penalty is imprisonment for up to two years. In addition, the convicted person is banned for seven years from registering to vote, from voting, from being a candidate, or, if elected before his conviction, of retaining his seat.⁹⁹

Mexico A fine of 10 to 100 days of the minimum wage plus imprisonment of 6 months to 3 years.¹⁰⁰

Draft Only

Intimidation of electors

Examples of penalties for intimidation of electors include:

Britain British law distinguishes between:

acts of general intimidation, which are so extensive 'that they may be reasonably supposed to have affected the result' and
isolated acts of intimidation.

The former may lead an election to be declared void regardless of whether or not the acts were carried out by the candidate or the candidate's acts. Where intimidation has been isolated, it is categorized as a corrupt practice, and carries the normal punishment for such actions, though in this case, the result of the election may be set aside only if the candidate or his agents have been involved. seeSeverity of offences

Isolated acts of intimidation fall under the category of 'undue influence.' A person found guilty of intimidation is liable on conviction on indictment to up to one year in prison, a fine, or both.¹⁰¹ Mauritius As under British law, intimidation is listed as a form of 'undue influence.' A maximum penalty is a fine not exceeding 2,000 rupees (about U.S.$100) and imprisonment for up to a year. In addition, the convicted person is banned for seven years from registering to vote, voting, being a candidate, or, if elected before his conviction, retaining his seat.¹⁰²

Mexico A fine of 10 to 100 days of the minimum wage, plus imprisonment of 6 months to 3 years.¹⁰³

Draft Only

Bribery

There is a distinction between:

bribery which consists of buying votes,
bribery of another candidate to withdraw from an electoral contest, and
other forms of bribery, for instance of members of Parliament. For example, in Germany, the giving of a bribe to a Member of Parliament for the purpose of influencing his vote within the legislature now carries a penalty of at least 6 months in prison and the loss of civic rights.

Penalties for vote buying include:¹⁰⁴

Britain

Bribery and the lesser offence of 'treating' are punishable as corrupt practices. See Severity of offences A person found guilty of a corrupt practice is liable on conviction on indictment to up to one year in prison, a fine, or both.

Japan

The Public Office Election Law (1996 revision) invalidates election results if campaign managers, campaign accountants, secretaries of the candidate, or the prospective candidate were convicted of vote buying and punished with a fine or heavier penalty. In addition, the candidate will be banned from becoming a candidate or holding public office in the same electoral district for five years. So far, two Diet members elected in 1996 lower house elections have lost their seats. One resigned before the court ordered a judgement (and is subject to the five year ban), and the other was found guilty. Campaigners who are caught and convicted of bribery in the campaign can be, and often are, given prison sentences. The new law has reduced corruption, but it also appears to have made candidates fearful of engaging even in some legal activities.

Mauritius

A fine not exceeding 2,000 rupees (about U.S.$100) and imprisonment for up to a year. In addition, the convicted person is banned for 7 years from registering to vote, from voting, from being a candidate, or, if elected before his conviction, of retaining his seat.

Mexico

A fine of 10 to 100 days of the minimum wage, plus imprisonment of 6 months to 3 years.

Draft Only

Sample Materials Index

Requirements checklist for candidates - Chile 1997

Requirements checklist for parties - Chile 1997

Candidate registration form - Guinea Bissau

Party registration form - Sweden

Party registration support form - Sweden

Forms: nomination withdrawal - Namibia

Law on participants - Guinea Bissau 1991

Regulations for registration of parties - Namibia

Code of conduct for political parties - Namibia

Party / candidate registration guide - Bosnia

Information for candidates - Quebec

Candidature - Philippines

Party registration guide - Sweden

Proclamation regarding candidates - Namibia

Nomination of candidates local authority elections - Namibia

Nomination of candidate regional council elections - Namibia

Requirements checklist for candidates - Chile 1997

(PDF)

Requirements checklist for parties - Chile 1997

(PDF)

Candidate registration form - Guinea Bissau

(PDF)

Party registration form - Sweden

(PDF)

Party registration support form - Sweden

(PDF)

Forms: nomination withdrawal - Namibia

(PDF)

Law on participants - Guinea Bissau 1991

(PDF)

Regulations for registration of parties - Namibia

(PDF)

Code of conduct for political parties - Namibia

(PDF)

Party / candidate registration guide - Bosnia

(PDF)

Information for candidates - Quebec

(PDF)

Candidature - Philippines

(PDF)

Party registration guide - Sweden

(PDF)

Proclamation regarding candidates - Namibia

(PDF)

Nomination of candidates local authority elections - Namibia

(PDF)

Nomination of candidate regional council elections - Namibia

(PDF)

Country case studies

Draft Only

End Notes

Overview

1. Refer to 1997 memorandum, Frequently Asked Questions by the Information Resources Staff at the Washington, D.C. headquarters of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) for further examples.

Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices

2. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1976, p. 55.

Different Types of Regulation

3. See pp. 7, 23, and 29 in European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Research and Documentation Papers, The Funding of Political Parties in European Community Member States. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Second Edition, 1991, p. 17.

4. Refer to Chapter 9, 'Regulating Political Finance: British Style,' of Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Allocation of Time/Resources Issues

5. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, p.5.

Loopholes

6. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'Memorandum'. House of Commons: Home Affairs Committee, Funding of Political Parties. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Session 1992-92, no 726, 20 July 1993.

Political Parties as Election Monitors

7. NDI Handbook: How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections, An A to Z Guide published by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1995.

Registering Candidates for Presidential Elections

8. Austin Ranney, 'Candidate Selection' In David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, editors, Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 97.

9. Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO), Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995, pp. 304-5.

Registering Parties/Candidates for Elections

10. Source: Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, 8.08.

11. Source: all citations are from Australian Electoral Commission. Federal Registration of Political Parties. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996.

Regulating Nominations in Majoritarian Systems

12. Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, Volume 1, p. 256.

Regulating Nominations in PR Systems

13. Austin Ranney, 'Candidate Selection.' In David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, editors, Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 84.

Signatures

14. Sources: Richard S. Katz. Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, table 14.2 and, for Poland and Russia, Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO), Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995, pp. 229 and 280.

Deposits

15. Richard S. Katz. Democracy and Elections, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 255-61, Table 14.2 and, for Namibia, information from Gerhard Ttemeyer.

Restrictions on Candidacy

16. Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, Volume 1, p. 271.

Party and Candidate Financing

17. In Arthur B. Gunlicks, editor, Campaign and Party Finance in North America and Western Europe. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992, p.260

18. 'Introduction' to Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994 p.3.

Direct

19. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 33.)

20. Khayyam Z. Paltiel, 'Political Financing Abroad: Contrasts and Effects.' In Michael J. Malbin, editor, Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980 , p. 358.

21. Herbert E. Alexander, 'Money and politics: rethinking a conceptual framework.' In Herbert E. Alexander, editor, Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 14.)

22. Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, 'Structure and impact of public subsidies to political parties in Europe.' In Herbert E. Alexander, editor, Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 247.

Funding Formulas

23. Sources: for Germany: Werner Kaltefleiter and Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, 'The New German System of Public Subsidies to Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995; for Nicaragua: Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1994, p. 58; for Canada and Germany: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, pp. 49-50, 74-75.)

Costs and Public Responses

24. Sources: for Austria: Hubert Sickinger and Rainer Nick, Politisches Geld: Parteifinanzierung in sterreich. Taur, Tirol: Kulturverlag, 1990, p.130; France: Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, p. 93; Germany: Hans Herbert von Arnim, Die Partei, der Abgeordnete und das Geld: Parteienfinazierung in Deutschland. Munich: Knauer, 1996 p. 129; Mexico: Fernando Molinar Horcacitas, 'Financing political parties in Mexico.' In Carlos Malamud and Eduardo Posada-Carb , editors, Financing Party Politics in Europe and Latin America. London: Macmillan and Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998 Table 2; United States: Milton C. Cummings Jr. and David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure. Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, seventh edition, 1993 , p. 300; other countries: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, pp. 49, 92 ,129, 137, 165 183

Public Opinion on State Subsidies for Parties

25. Gullan Gidlund, 'Conclusions.' In Matti Wiberg, editor, The Public Purse and Political Parties: Public Financing of Political Parties in Nordic Countries. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1991, p. 179.

Party Newspapers and Special Party Organisations

26. 'Structure and impact of public subsidies of political parties in Europe.' In Herbert E. Alexander, editor, Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 241.

27. Source: Khayyam Z. Paltiel, 'Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms.' In Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Edited by David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 164 ff.

Tax Concessions

28. Dian Schefold, 'Background and Basic Principles of Financing of Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995 , p. 350.

Membership Subscriptions

29. Dian Schefold, 'Background and Basic Principles of Financing of Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995, pp. 343-44. This chapter uses the findings of Dimitris T. Tsatsos, et.al., editors, Parteienrecht im europaeischen vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990.

By Business Corporations

30. Khayyam Z. Paltiel, 'Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms.' In Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Edited by David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 144.

31. Cited in Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 113.

32. W.T. Stanbury, Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada. Volume 1 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993, pp. 293 and 551-2.

33. In Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, p. 79.

34. Erhard Blankenburg, Rainer Standhammer and Heinz Steinert. 'Political Scandals and Corruption Issues in West Germany'. In Political Corruption: A Handbook. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1989, pp.920-1.

35. Yves-Marie Doublet, L'argent et la politique en France'Paris: Economica, 1997, p. 14.

36. Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies'Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, pp. 162-3 and 196 ff

37. In Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, pp. 162-3, p. 198

38. ibid., p. 103

39. . ibid., p. 100

40. . Gullan M. Gidlund, p. 110.

Profits from Party-Owned Business Activities

41. 'Structure and Function of Party-Owned Enterprises.' Paper presented to the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington D.C, 1988.

42. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, pp. 175-76, cited from 'Spanish Socialist's Tarnished Image. Agence France Presse, 2 June 1993 and Survey of Spain. The Financial Times, 2 April 1993.

43. ibid., p. 148.

44. Cited in Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, p. 105.

45. Khayyam Z. Paltiel, 'Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms.' In Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Edited by David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 147.

46. Pierre Avril, 'Regulation of Political Finance in France.' In Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, p. 88.

Grass Roots Approaches

47. Source: as for Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Die Konservative Partei Grossbritanniens 1945-1980'. In Christliche-demokratische und konservative Parteien in Westeuropa. Edited by HJ Veen. Paderborn: UTB Schoningh, 1983, p. 38.

Narco-traffic

48. Eduardo Posada-Carbó, 'Money and Elections in Colombia In The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Forecast, 4th Quarter 1996: Latin America: Regional Overview. London: The Economist intelligence Unit Limited, 1996, p. 4 ff.

Other Illegal Donations

49. Herbert E. Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976, pp. 489-93.

Contribution Limits

50. Sources: For Russia, Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO), Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995. For United States: Milton C. Cummings Jr. and David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure. Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, seventh edition, 1993 , p. 298. For other countries, Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, Table 5.

Disclosure Regulations

51. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354 , p. 183.

52. Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, Elections, & Political Reform. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, Fourth Edition, 1992, pp. 161 and 164.

Disclosure of Amount

53. Funding and Disclosure Handbook: Political Parties, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996, p. 7

54. Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, volume 3, paragraph 401.

Disclosure of Source

55. Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, volume 4, p. 67.

Access to Disclosed Information

56. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, pp. 93-94, p.80.

57. Georgias Papadopoulos, cited in Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, pp. 93-94.

By Companies

58. Sources: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, Table 5, Werner Kaltefleiter and Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, 'The New German System of Public Subsidies to Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995, p. 393, and Ruth S. Jones, 'U.S. State-Level Campaign Finance Reform'. In Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, p.61.

By Unions

59. Sources: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, Table 5, Werner Kaltefleiter and Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, 'The New German System of Public Subsidies to Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995, p. 393, and Ruth S. Jones, 'U.S. State-Level Campaign Finance Reform'. In Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors, Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1994, p.61.

Foreign Donations

60. Sources: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, Table 5 and Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO), Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995. For Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Moldova, Romania, South Africa and Yemen: Yves-Marie Doublet, Le financement de la vie politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Second Edition, 1997, p. 24.

By Government Contractors, etc

61. Source: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, Table 5 and pp. 66, 96,195

Bans Against Certain Types of Expenditures

62. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981 , pp. 15-16.

63. Cited in Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington D.C.: July 1995, LL95-4,95-1354, p. 151.

Election Campaigns

64. H. Crouch, Malaysia's 1982 General Election. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982, p. 38. Cited in Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 150.

65. Cited in Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 160.

66. W.T. Stanbury, Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada. Volume 1, Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993: 384-5

67. ibid., p. 394.

68. Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, 2: 152. 'pce01'

69. Draft Code of Conduct for Political Parties Contesting Democratic Elections, 28.04.97, Stockholm: International IDEA

Regulating Advertising

70. Sources: for Great Britain: Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, p. 263. For Belgium and Luxembourg, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Research and Documentation Papers, The Funding of Political Parties in European Community Member States. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Second Edition,1991, pp. 8 and 31. For other countries: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 65, 138, 164, 188.

71. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Research and Documentation Papers, The Funding of Political Parties in European Community Member States. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Second Edition, 1991: 8.

Public Broadcasting Allocations

72. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 52-3

73. ibid., p. 194

Formulas for Allocating Time

74. Sources: Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 58.

75. ibid., pp. 103-4.

76. ibid., p. 159

77. ibid., p.5

78. ibid., p. 171

79. ibid., p. 194

Campaign Expenditure Disclosures

80. Australian Electoral Commission. Funding and Disclosure Handbook: Political Parties. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996: 15.

By Parties

81. Chief Electoral Officer, Guidelines Respecting Election Expenses of Registered Political Parties.. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer, 1988, pp. 3-4. Cited in W.T. Stanbury, Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada. Volume 1 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993, p. 385

By Interest Groups

82. Australian Electoral Commission. Funding and Disclosure Handbook: Broadcasters and Publishers. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996.

Spending Limits

83. Herbert E. Alexander and Monica Bauer. Financing the 1988 Election. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991, p. 41.

84. ibid, p.42.

Breaches and penalties

85. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 80, 132 and 196.

86. Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, Trevor Potter and Frank J. Sorauf, editors, Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997: 29-30.

87. Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, volume 2: 217-8.

Types of offences

88. R.J. Clayton, Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, Croydon: Charles Knight Publishing, 1990, Supplement no. 5, section 20.15, p. 394.

89. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 168-9.

Fines and imprisonment

90. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354: 35-6

Forfeiting parliamentary seats

91. H. F. Rawlings, Law and the Electoral Process, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1988, p. 228.

92. Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO), Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995, p. 358.

93. R.J. Clayton, Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, Croydon: Charles Knight Publishing, 1990, supplement no. 5, Chapter 20.

Breaches of political finance regulations

94. Federal Election Commission's compilation of Federal Election Campaign Laws, Washington, DC: November 1997.

95. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, Chapter 9.

96. R.J. Clayton, Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, Croydon: Charles Knight Publishing, 1990, supplement no. 5, Chapter 15.

97. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354, pp. 56 and 80.

Personation

98. R.J. Clayton, Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, Croydon: Charles Knight Publishing, 1990, supplement no. 5, 20.03.

99. . Mauritius Laws 1996, volume 4, pp. 606.

100. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354, pp. 168.

Intimidation of electors

101. R.J. Clayton, Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections, Croydon: Charles Knight Publishing, 1990, supplement no. 5, 18.34 - 18.36.

102. Mauritius Laws 1996, volume 4, pp. 605-6.

103. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354, pp. 168.

Bribery

104. Library of Congress, Law Library, Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington, DC: July 1995, LL95-4, 95-1354, pp. 80, 89,144 and 168. Mauritius Laws 1996, volume 4, p. 606.

ACE Website Version 1.0
> <a href='..../english/pi/piz.htm'>Copyright 1998-2003
> IFES, UN-DESA, IIDEA<br> Wed Dec 10 09:47:46 2003 UTC

Bibliography

The following is a list of books, pamphlets and reports relating to parties and candidates. For a list of information available in the Internet, on the same subject, please visit Additional Resources.

General

Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO). Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe. Kiev: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 1995.

Stefano Bartolini, Daniele Caramani and Simon Hug. Parties and Party Systems in Western Europe since 1945: A Bibliographical Guide to the Literature. Draft. Florence: European University Institute, 1996.

David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, editors. Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report. Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991, 4 volumes.

Guy S. Goodwin-Gill. Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1998.

International IDEA, Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Campaigning in Democratic Elections. International IDEA, Stockholm, 1999.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. The Role of Political Parties. Paper presented to the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium, Budapest, August 1991. Published by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Washington, DC, 1992.

Rei Shiratori, editor. 'Electoral Administration in a Comparative Perspective.' Special issue of Journal of Behavioral and Social Sciences. Tokyo: Research Institute of Social Sciences, Tokai University, (37) 1992.

Financing of Parties and Campaigns

European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Research and Documentation Papers, The Funding of Political Parties in European Community Member States. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Second Edition, 1991.

Herbert E. Alexander. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976.

Herbert E. Alexander, editor. Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Herbert E. Alexander and Monica Bauer. Financing the 1988 Election. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

Herbert E. Alexander. Financing Politics: Money, Elections, & Political Reform. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, Fourth Edition, 1992.

Herbert E. Alexander and Anthony Corrado. Financing the 1992 Election. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharp, 1995.

Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, editors. Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.

Hans Herbert von Arnim. Die Partei, der Abgeordnete und das Geld: Parteienfinanzierung in Deutschland. Munich: Knauer, 1996.

Australian Electoral Commission. Funding and Disclosure Handbook: Broadcasters and Publishers. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996.

Australian Electoral Commission, Funding and Disclosure Handbook: Political Parties. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996.

Erhard Blankenburg, Rainer Standhammer and Heinz Steinert. 'Political Scandals and Corruption Issues in West Germany.' In Political Corruption: Handbook. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1989.

Fernando Cepeda Ulloa. 'Financing Party Politics in Colombia.' In Carlos Malamud and Eduardo Posada-Carb 97, editors, Financing Party Politics in Europe and Latin America. London: Macmillan and Institute of Latin American Studies.

Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, Trevor Potter and Frank J. Sorauf, editors. Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997.

Yves-Marie Doublet. Le financement de la vie politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Second Edition, 1997.

Yves-Marie Doublet. L'argent et la politique en France. Paris: Economica, 1997.

Yves-Marie Doublet and Veronique Marmorat. 'Le contentieux du financement des elections legislatives.' Revue Francaise de Droit Constitutionnel 18, 1994.

Keith Ewing. The Funding of Political Parties in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Arthur B. Gunlicks, editor. Campaign and Party Finance in North America and Western Europe. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992.

Neil Harvey and Monica Serrano, editors. Party Politics in 'an Uncommon Democracy': Political Parties and Elections in Mexico, 1994.

Juan Molinar Horcasitas. 'Financing political parties in Mexico' in Carlos Malamud and Eduardo Posada-Carb 97, editors. Financing Party Politics in Europe and Latin America, London : Macmillan and Institute of Latin American Studies.

International IDEA, Handbook on Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, International IDEA, Stockholm, 2003.

Werner Kaltefleiter and Karl-Heinz Nassmacher. 'The New German System of Public Subsidies to Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors, Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995.

Kofi Kumado, editor. Funding Political Parties in West Africa. Boulder, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1996.

Christine Landfried. Parteifinanzen und politische macht: Eine vergleichende studie zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland, zu Italien und den USA. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994.

Library of Congress, Law Library. Report for Congress: Campaign Financing of National Elections in Selected Foreign Countries. Washington DC: July 1995.

Martin Linton. Money and Votes. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1994.

Carlos Malamud and Eduardo Posada-Carbo, editors. Financing Party Politics in Europe and Latin America. London: Macmillan and Institute of Latin American Studies.

Michael J. Malbin, editor. Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, et. al. Buerger finanzieren wahlkaempfe: Anregungen aus Nordamerika fur die parteifinanzierung in Deutschland. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992.

Khayyam Z. Paltiel. 'Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms.' In Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Edited by David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Khayyam Z. Paltiel. 'Political Finance.' In The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions. Edited by Vernon Bogdanor. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'Die konservative partei Grossbritanniens 1945-1980.' In Christliche-demokratische und konservative parteien in Westeuropa. Edited by HJ Veen. Paderborn, 1983.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. British Political Finance 1830-1980. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'Memorandum.' House of Commons: Home Affairs Committee, Funding of Political Parties. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Session 1992-92, no 726, 20 July 1993.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'Fair Elections and Party Finance in Britain: Is there a Case for Reform?' Reprinted from paper presented to the Hansard Society Commission on Election Campaigns. House of Commons: Home Affairs Committee, i>Funding of Political Parties. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Session 1992-92, no 726, 20 July 1993.

Eduardo Posada-Carbo. 'Money and Elections in Colombia.' In The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Forecast, 4th Quarter 1996: Latin America: Regional Overview. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1996. 20

Pouvoirs, no 70. Paris: Seuil, 1994. Special Number on 'L'Argent des Élections'.

Dian Schefold. 'Background and Basic Principles of Financing of Political Parties.' In Josef Thesing and Wilhelm Hofmeister, editors. Political Parties in Democracy. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1995.

F. Leslie Seidle, editor. Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance. Volume 4 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991.

Hubert Sickinger. Politisches Geld: Parteifinanzierung in Oesterreich--ein Handbuch. Taur, Tirol: Druck- und Verlaghaus, 1997.

W.T. Stanbury. Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada. Volume 1 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993.

Matti Wiberg, editor. The Public Purse and Political Parties: Public Financing of Political Parties in Nordic Countries. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1991.

Political Party Foundations

Jacques Oudin. Les fondations democratiques a vocation politique en France: Rapport au Premier ministre. Paris: La documentation francaise, 1997.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'Foreign Political Aid: the German Political Foundations and their U.S. Counterparts.' International Affairs, (67) no. 1,1991.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'The Party Foundations and Political Finance in Germany.' In Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance. Edited by F. Leslie Seidle. Volume 4 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'The Rise of 'Political Aid'.' In Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges. Edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. 'International Political Finance: The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Latin America.' In The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Edited by Laurence Whitehead. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Political Party Laws, Regulations, and Practices

Australian Electoral Commission. Federal Registration of Political Parties. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1996.

Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, editors. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics. London: Sage, 1988.

Richard S. Katz. Democracy and Elections. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Austin Ranney. 'Candidate Selection.' In David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, editors. Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Dimitris T. Tsatsos, et. al., editors. Parteienrecht im europaeischen Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990.

Political Parties as Election Monitors

NDI Handbook: How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections, An A to Z Guide published by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1995.

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network

Herramientas Personales

Parties and Candidates Index

Parties and Candidates

Overview

Guiding Principles

Level Playing Field, Fairness

Freedom of Speech

Controlling Fraud, Corruption and Unfair Practices

Political Participation

Encouraging Internal Party Democracy

Ensuring Openness, Transparency

Accountability

Checks and Balances

Administrative Implications

Cost Implications

Social and Political Context

Historical Review

Additional resources

Regulating Parties and Candidates

Different Types of Regulation

Approaches to Regulating Parties and Candidates

Common Problems in Regulating Parties and Candidates

Broadcasting Time

Allocation of Time/Resources Issues

Fairness vs.Freedom of Expression

Desirability of Disclosure of Political Donations

Loopholes

Regulating Campaigns by Interest Groups

Political Parties and the Electoral Process

Parties in Election Policy Bodies (Commissions)

Parties and Electoral Administration

Political Parties and Voter Education

Training Party Representatives

Political Parties as Election Monitors

Party and Candidate Registration

Registering Candidates for Presidential Elections

Registering Parties/Candidates for Elections

Independent Candidates

Regulating Nominations in Majoritarian Systems

Regulating Nominations in PR Systems

Signatures and Deposits

Signatures

Deposits

Special Initiatives

Restrictions on Candidacy

Party and Candidate Financing

Public Financing

Direct

Funding Formulas

Costs and Public Responses

Public Opinion on State Subsidies for Parties

Party Newspapers and Special Party Organisations

Funding of Party Overseas Activities

Indirect

Access to Media (etc.)

Tax Concessions

Matching Grants

Party Taxes

Political Foundations

Private Financing

Membership Subscriptions

Plutocratic Approach

Funding by Institutions

By Business Corporations

By Trade Unions

Fundraising Activities

In Kind Contributions

Profits from Party-Owned Business Activities

Grass Roots Approaches

Foreign Contributions

Interest Groups: Third parties

Illegal Financing

Narco-traffic

Other Illegal Donations

Regulating Party Financing

Expenditure Limits

Contribution Limits

Levels

Disclosure Regulations