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Vote Counting Index
Vote CountingThe Vote Counting topic area deals with the actual counting of votes, which requires accuracy, speed and security. A discussion of 8 fundamental principles of vote counting, (transparency, security, professionalism, accuracy, secrecy, timeliness, accountability, and equity), is presented in Guiding Principles. For more general information on this topic area, please select Overview. In addition to the above-mentioned topics, this topic area addresses issues relating to cost and administrative considerations, the effects of a choice of ballot on the count, and vote counting at polling stations versus counting centres. Main topics within Vote Counting: Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count Vote Counting at Polling Stations Vote Counting at Counting Centres In addition, the Country Examples Index provides country examples of how votes are counted. Each country has a different electoral system, highlighting vote-counting considerations for each system. Please use the feedback buttons to forward suggestions, commentary and additional information that will enrich the topic area. Enjoy! OverviewObjectives The objectives of the Vote Counting topic area are to:
The Importance of Vote Counting Vote counting is one of the most crucial stages in the election process. Failure to complete the count and transmit results in a quick, transparent, and accurate manner can jeopardize public confidence in the elections and will directly affect whether candidates and political parties accept the final results. Frequently, the importance of detailed planning, training, and organization is overlooked, or is considered as being of secondary importance. Examples of serious counting problems have arisen in elections in several countries, including South Africa, Bosnia, Haiti, and Mozambique. In other countries, vote counting, while conducted in different ways, has well-established routines: see Sweden (see Counting Ballots in Sweden), Burkina Faso (see Vote Counting in Burkina Faso), and Ghana (see Vote Counting in Ghana) for descriptions. Designing Vote Counting Procedures The type of electoral system used will determine some of the specific measures needed to successfully conclude an election count. (See Electoral Systems and Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count for more on this topic.) However, several general principles apply to all electoral systems. Counting procedures should take account of available resources, such as staff, premises, transport, communications, and equipment. For example, a computerized method of counting votes would not be suitable for locations with unreliable power supplies or a shortage of skilled computer operators. A balance may need to be struck between integrity, accuracy, and speed. The more checks and balances there are, the slower the process. The faster results are announced, the more there may have been a compromise in accuracy. In each case, the systems designer must decide which of these guiding principles is most important. Counting can take place manually, mechanically, or electronically. Counting can be done at the polling station level or at counting centres. More complicated systems may require the conduct of different phases of the count at several locations. Majority system counts can normally be completed at the electoral district level. In a proportional representation system a final centralized count may be necessary to translate votes into seats. Who Should be Responsible for Vote Counting? The count is one of the key areas where fraudulent practices can occur. To minimize the possibility of fraud, vote counting should be the responsibility of an independent or electoral management body. Monitoring mechanisms could be built into the process. There should be checks, balances, and audit trails throughout, as well as clearly defined processes for complaints and appeals. Counting Rules Must be Clearly Understood Counting rules should be clear, known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national/international electoral observers. Despite these rules, some legislatures do have specific instructions to follow (see Examples of laws and regulations - Philippines), while others are more general. See Ghana Examples of laws and regulations - Belgium, Sweden Examples of laws and regulations - Sweden, Ukraine Examples of laws and regulations - Ukraine and Spain Examples of laws and regulations - Spain for examples of various kind of legislatures. Also, it is desirable that information and training programs on the count itself be provided to all participants. Counting Must be Open and Transparent It is of great importance to the legitimacy of the elections that the counting process be open and transparent. Representatives of political parties and candidates, and national/international electoral observers should be allowed to witness the process and be permitted to copy the statement of the count documenting the results of the counting process. Training is Essential Detailed and intensive training of election officials, as well as representatives of political parties/candidates (see Party and Candidate Representatives and Training Party Representatives for more information on these issues), and national/international electoral observers is essential to ensure consistency of approach, and especially to determine what constitutes a valid and a rejected ballot. Poll workers (as well as poll officials) must be non-partisan in their actions, thorough in their procedures, and committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. They must understand, for example, that even after ballots have been counted, they remain legal documents in some jurisdictions. Identification of voters and their votes, especially voters receiving special assistance and small polls, must be kept secret at all times. Publicizing Election Results The political parties and the media should be given the opportunity of publicizing the unofficial results, but the responsibility and authority to announce the official election results should rest with the electoral management body. Guiding Principles
To establish and maintain public confidence in the electoral process, vote counting systems and procedures should incorporate the fundamental principles of vote counting in a democratic election. These fundamental principles are:
Transparency For the counting process to be open and transparent, representatives of political parties and candidates should be allowed to witness and/or participate in the process, and permitted to copy the statement of the results of the counting process. National and international electoral observers should also be allowed to witness the process and permitted to copy the statement of the results of the counting process. In some countries, ordinary citizens are encouraged to watch the counting process. Manual counting is by its nature more transparent than computerized counting. If vote counting is computerized, new mechanisms for ensuring transparency, such as external audits, need to be introduced. Security The security of the ballots and the ballot boxes, from the time voting begins to the completion of the count, is fundamental to the integrity of the counting process. Polling and counting officials, representatives of political parties and candidates, and national and international electoral observers should carefully watch the ballots and the boxes at all times, and accompany them if they are moved from one location to another. Individually numbered, tamper-proof seals or bags should be used to ensure the secure transport of ballots. Professionalism Polling and counting officials must act in a professional manner. They should be thoroughly trained in the counting process, as distinct from the voting process; thorough in their procedures; and committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. Once a person accepts work as a counting official, he or she must be non-partisan throughout the entire process. Some jurisdictions require that all counting officials (as well as poll officials) sign an oath to this effect, creating awareness that they can be legally prosecuted if their work is proved to be partisan. Accuracy Accuracy is directly related to the integrity of the count, and of the elections themselves. Later discovery of errors and correction of mistakes can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud. The accuracy of the count will depend on clear procedures and manuals, adequate staff training, and their commitment to the process. Clear audit trails of ballots and ballot boxes, as well as checking and rechecking mechanisms, will contribute to the accuracy of the results. Whilst mechanical voting or computerization may enhance accuracy, this must be balanced against the resulting apparent loss of transparency. Secrecy Secrecy of the vote is important because it ensures that voters cannot be punished for the way they vote, or intimidated into voting a particular way. To preserve the secrecy of the vote, voters' identification must be protected during the count. If their identity and choice on the ballot is determined as a result of counting procedures, it must be kept confidential and never revealed. If the secrecy of the vote of individuals or a community is a concern, measures such as counting at counting centres, rather than at individual polling stations, or mixing ballots from different polls, can be considered. Numbered ballot papers corresponding to matching stubs with the voter details, while facilitating accountability and clear audit trails, compromise secrecy and are best avoided. Timeliness Delays in completing the count and in the release of unofficial preliminary results can negatively affect the level of integrity and confidence in the voting process. The responsible electoral management body should carefully plan all stages of the counting process to facilitate the early announcement of results, or at least to realistically assess when results can be announced, taking into consideration the communications and transport infrastructure. Accountability Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the counting process are important. At the national level, the electoral management body should be accountable. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election officer or commission official. At polling stations, specified poll workers may be responsible for polling and counting. Clearly defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers. Clear audit trails are essential in ensuring accountability. Equity Equity generally means that the rules are the same for all participants in the electoral process, and that they accept these rules. The proper training and non-partisanship of counting officials and polling officials, and the presence of political party representatives, national and international electoral observers will help to ensure that counting is conducted in a fair and correct manner. Administrative ConsiderationsClear vote counting procedures, careful planning, thorough training, good facilities, and appropriate equipment are essential administrative considerations. As vote counting is the final step in the election process, it is often given a lower priority than it deserves. Considering its importance in ensuring confidence in the result of an election, it is critical to give vote counting high administrative priority to ensure success. What is administratively expedient can vary greatly between countries. Here are some generic truisms regarding the administrative implications of choices in vote counting procedures:
A complicated vote counting formula or system will have administrative implications in terms of increased training needs, need for additional personnel, longer hours, and even additional venues for counting. Use of polling staff for counting is generally positive from an administrative point of view, as it can simplify recruitment, training, and payment. Infrastructure Requirements Planning for vote counting procedures needs to take into account the infrastructure, including facilities for transporting essential items and communicating results. Premises used for vote counting need to be secure and suitable for their purpose. Plans should include the care and treatment of personnel, such as the provision of food and water, as well as suitable lighting and temperature. This is especially important when the count is conducted by polling station officials who have worked hard all day taking votes, or when heavy volume calls for the count in a counting centre to continue for many hours. Personnel and Training Requirements The effectiveness of any vote count process depends upon the counting staff. Sufficient staff should be employed to efficiently complete the count, and every staff member should be appropriately trained. It is extremely important that the counting staff not be too tired when the count begins. If polling staff conduct the count, they will need rest breaks during the day. The counting staff's remuneration and training should be an important part of the election's budget. At the Management Level At the management level, it is desirable to have a permanent electoral management body with sound skills. Professional, knowledgeable, experienced, and neutral staff will contribute to the success of an election, and will provide benefits in all areas of electoral management, including vote counting and publicizing results. Generally, the electoral management body will be responsible for developing training materials and procedures. These should build on the best examples of local and international experience. If possible, it is desirable to test them in small-scale activities (such as partial elections or simulations) before holding a national election or referendum. At the Local Level Usually, local electoral management staff are employed only when an electoral event is called. Some countries have permanent local election officials who have other duties, such as maintaining the register of voters. Where local election officials and support staff are employed for each electoral event, it is desirable to recruit these staff well before the event is called, and provide them with comprehensive training on counting procedures and other aspects of the election or referendum. It may be appropriate to pay these staff for attending training sessions and related costs (such as travel, accommodation and food). It is usual to provide local election officials and other senior management officials with a reference guide explaining all aspects of the administration of the electoral process. This could include procedures for opening and closing a local office; guidelines on hiring local staff, including job descriptions, minimal qualifications and desired skills; and the protocol for dealing with candidates and representatives of political parties. Detailed procedures for vote counting and reporting results should be specified well in advance, so that proper preparations can be made. The importance of the final count, and the necessity of careful record-keeping in order to provide fully accurate official results, should be emphasized. The level of responsibility given to local election officials will vary from place to place. Often, local election officials are responsible for recruiting and training the local staff needed for conducting the election. Ideally, these staff should be identified and recruited well in advance of the election. Other administrative staff may be needed to perform the many tasks associated with running an election, such as dealing with public inquiries, and ordering, storing, and distributing electoral materials. Recruitment and training of all the poll workers needed for election day (and for vote counting after election day, if necessary) should be done as soon as possible after the election is called. As a contingency measure, more poll workers than are necessary can be selected and trained, in order to have personnel available, in the event some workers cannot fulfil their duties on election day. A stand-by fee could be given to such substitute personnel if they are not required to work. Recruitment Criteria Men and women should be recruited on an equal basis, according to their ability to carry out the duties required in an unbiased and professional manner. Some jurisdictions require that poll workers be qualified voters and/or live within the same electoral district where they will be working on election day. These criteria should be publicized and known to all candidates and political parties involved, to preserve the transparency of the process. The electoral laws may restrict who can be recruited as a poll worker. In some jurisdictions, poll workers are nominated by political parties in proportion to the number of votes or seats won at the previous election. The parties draw up lists and refer the names of acceptable personnel to the responsible local election official. Workers who are nominated by a political party, but appointed by the local electoral management body, must agree to carry out all their duties in a neutral and non-partisan manner. Local customs and circumstances will decide the desirability of involving political parties in the appointment of poll officials. Where a population is highly politicized, and most likely candidates for employment can be expected to hold a strong political allegiance, this practice may be desirable to ensure that there are checks and balances built into the process. The poll official recommended by one political party can be watched by the poll clerk recommended by the opposing political party, and vice versa. The poll workers generally understand the importance of being non-partisan, once they are appointed by the local electoral management body, especially if they have been required to take an oath assuring their neutrality. On the other hand, it might be difficult for these poll workers to be completely neutral and non-partisan if they are unable to take sufficient emotional distance from the political issues. Where a population is less politicized, and sufficient employees can be found who do not have a strong political allegiance, it may be desirable to employ poll staff who can be expected to be neutral. In some countries, persons who are seen to be politically active are not permitted to work as poll officials. Regardless of whether or not political parties become actively involved in the recruitment process of the poll workers, they should still appoint representatives of the political party/monitors/observers at the polling station, if provided by law. Accreditation provided in advance by the electoral management body is common practice. People recruited as poll workers should be suitably qualified, able to attend training, and work long hours on election day. They should be literate, numerate, and able to communicate well verbally. In places where several languages are spoken, it is important to recruit staff with appropriate language skills. Senior students, civil servants, teachers, health workers, and retired people are often recruited as poll workers because they satisfy these requirements. Appointment of civil servants as poll workers can raise questions about the non-partisanship of such poll workers, depending on the professional reputation of the public service, and whether positions are filled on merit or on the basis of partisanship. Even if well-qualified civil servants are recruited, they will still need training in counting procedures and other aspects of their duties in the electoral process. Training Requirements The level of training provided to poll workers will vary according to local conditions and the seniority of the polling officials. Local election officials, officers in charge of polling stations and counting centres, and other senior officers usually receive more detailed training than more junior officials. Senior officials should be trained well before polling day. Ideally, junior officials should be trained before polling day, with a briefing session on polling day, before polling starts. Where polling station officials conduct counting, training for the count will take place in conjunction with training for polling. The type of training will depend on the available budget and the ease with which staff can be given face-to-face training. A typical training program for senior officials will include face-to-face training conducted by a qualified instructor, audio-visual training aides (if available), training manuals, and simulation exercises. In some cases, poll workers will receive training manuals to read and sample exercises to complete at home before attending training. More junior officials can be trained in a similar manner, or trained by their supervisors after the supervisors have been appropriately trained. Locations for face-to-face training should be carefully chosen and equipped. Suitable equipment will include chairs and tables, and, as appropriate, equipment such as white boards, black boards, or overhead projectors, and video and television where available. A microphone and speakers might be needed for larger groups. All the materials used on election day (such as ballot papers, ballot boxes, seals, forms, etc.) should be available and their uses demonstrated. The locations should be large enough to accommodate the officers being trained in comfort, and large enough to set up a simulated polling site. Conducting a counting simulation is a very effective learning tool, that helps to visualize the counting process, and pre-empt problems that may arise, by including examples of dubious ballots, and by practising filling in forms. It is desirable to make attendance at training a mandatory condition of employment of poll workers and counting staff. In order to encourage people to attend training, it is usual to pay them an appropriate allowance or fee. In some countries, professional trainers will be used instead of the local election officials to conduct poll and counting worker training sessions. Sometimes a small group of professional trainers will train other trainers, who will then go into the field to conduct the training directly to the poll and counting workers on behalf of the electoral management body. Salary, travel, and accommodation expenses for such trainers will need to be included in the budget.
Special Considerations in the Case of less Developed Countries
Recruitment and Training of Poll Workers Recruitment of all poll workers needed for election or referendum day (and for vote counting after, if necessary) should be done as soon as possible after the election is called. Teachers and senior students are often targeted as potential poll workers. Literacy and the ability to count should be the basic criteria for all vote counting officials. Training provided a few days prior to election day, with perhaps a short reminder on election day, has the advantage of keeping the procedures fresh in the minds of poll workers. Long training on election day is not likely to be effective, due to the pressure from candidates and others. Forms and instructions should be simple, but not omit any important information. The use of illustrations, instead of long, written instructions, may help semi-literate poll workers. Forms, instructions, and training materials should be translated into local languages if the country operates with several languages. Wherever possible, vote counting simulations should be part of the training process, as well as a simulation of filling out the counting forms. Materials should include examples illustrating both acceptable and unacceptable ballots. Equipment Polling and counting stations should be appropriately equipped. Adequate lighting is important for counting at polling stations and at counting centres, and must be planned for according to the local environment. If electricity is not reliable, an alternate lighting system should be provided. In some cases, it may be preferable to centralize counting at a counting centre where electricity is available. A power generator can be made available in case of power failure. If the count at a counting centre will go on for several days, opening and closing hours can be planned to maximize the use of daylight. It is wise to include a flashlight with batteries in each electoral kit. If candles are supplied, matches (preferably waterproof and windproof), and a candle holder should be included with a suitable cover to protect the light from the wind. Camping lights powered by gas or propane are another option, with instructions on how to handle and store the fuel. In certain countries, security seals for use on the ballot boxes must be specially designed to resist heat, humidity, or rough handling. Ballot box stickers should be used and tested prior to the election in an environment similar to the one that will be encountered on election day. Depending on local circumstances, it may be best to supply low-tech equipment that is not dependent on power sources, and can be repaired in the field. Reliance should not be placed on computer equipment, for example, if there is a risk that the equipment will fail and cannot be repaired or replaced. In all cases, well-managed storage of electoral materials prior to election day, as well as well-communicated instructions on how to handle these materials on election day, are important to avoid accidents, mistakes in the counting process, or accidental destruction of the forms or ballots. The training manual should be part of all electoral kits in each polling station in order to provide a reference tool in cases of doubt. The training manual should include several illustrations on how to perform prescribed activities, as well as how to solve frequently encountered problems related to the counting process (with samples of forms and how to complete them). To reduce cost and to facilitate the counting process, the electoral management body can, and should, use locally available materials where appropriate. The communication of results needs to be planned carefully, taking local conditions into careful consideration. If there is no reliable telephone and fax network, then a system of manual transmission of voting results needs to be planned in advance, with transparency and including election officials and national and international electoral observers in the transport of the voting results. Role of International Observers Delegations of national and international electoral observers are sometimes able to provide an alternative communications network to transmit electoral results. This can be a contingency network for use by local authorities if their own systems fail. However, the use of this alternative has to be carefully considered. If national and international electoral observers are seen as being too closely associated with local authorities or certain political parties, then making use of their facilities may affect public confidence in the electoral process, and the credibility of the observers themselves. In this case, it might be appropriate to use national and international electoral observer communications systems only to report to higher authorities that the regular communications system has failed, or to report irregularities and other problems.
Application of Technology
Today, while the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective. Technology has the potential to dramatically improve the vote counting process. It can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting. It can also improve the democratic process by making complex electoral systems easier to use. Using Technology to Assist Manual Vote Counting Computing technology is often used to count the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format. Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election. Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time. Data entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy. As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs. For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level. Data entered into a vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures after data entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, using different operators. Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure. Where a network server is used, it is common to have a mirror server set up that can take over if the main server fails. Technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries. Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems. Worst case scenarios should also be anticipated. It is wise to be able to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. Technology for Voting and Counting Processes Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots entirely. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed the counting process. Over the last thirty years, various voting machines have been developed using the available technology. In the 1950s and 1960s, punch-card machine systems were developed. Voters punched cards (with a supplied punch device) opposite the candidates' names they selected. The cards were placed into a sealed ballot box and, after the polls closed, tabulated by card counters. 1 In the 1970s, optical-scanners or Optical Mark Reading (OMR) systems were developed. Using this system, voters make a mark on a paper ballot to indicate their choice of candidate or issue. A scanning device 'reads' the marked entries and calculates vote totals. These systems can count ballots as they are deposited, or count ballots only after the polls close. 2 More recently, a new type of system, called the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system has been developed. This system records votes by means of a ballot display provided via mechanical or electro-optical devices that can be activated by the voter. Once the voter has made his ballot selections, the device processes the data with a computer program, and records voting data and ballot images into internal memory devices. It can produce a tabulation of the voting data as a hard copy printout, or store it in a removable memory device. Telephone voting is a variation on the DRE system, where the telephone is used by the voter to record his vote. This system removes the need for polling stations. By calling a specific phone number, the voter authenticates his identity by entering a Personal Identification Number (PIN) on the key pad of the telephone. The PIN is used to confirm the voter's eligibility and presence on the voters' list. Prompted by a computer-synthesized voice, the voter enters his choice by pressing a key corresponding to the candidate, party, or option they wish to vote for. Once this step is completed, the computer asks the voter to confirm his choice. The voting results are stored in a computing device (or multiple devices) linked to the telephone network. Results can be instantly counted once voting closes. Technology and Complex Electoral Systems Voting directly, using mechanical or electronic devices, or machine-readable ballots, is relatively straightforward where simple electoral systems are used, such as first past the post or list systems. In these cases, voters are able to indicate their choices in a relatively simple way, for example, by making one mark or pulling one lever. It is more difficult to use these methods in complex electoral systems that permit many multiple choice responses, or require candidates or parties to be ranked in numerical preference. As technology improves, it is likely that effective methods will be available to meet the needs of these systems. However, mechanical or electronic devices that cater for complex systems are not yet in widespread use. A compromise solution currently in use is to continue to use ordinary paper ballots, and to employ data entry operators to input all the valid marks made by voters into a database. A computer program then takes the raw data and performs the necessary calculations to arrive at an election result. This system eliminates the need to manually count or sort ballot papers, and can be faster and more accurate than manual counting. Deciding to Use Technology Before deciding to implement a computerized voting and/or counting system, an electoral management body might consider these questions:
If the answer is yes to most of these questions, it may be worth studying the costs and benefits of a machine based voting system. 3 However, these drawbacks should also be considered:
Technology to Communicate Results Some jurisdictions have experimented with communication systems that use computer-assisted technology, where the poll official enters the poll results on the key pad of a telephone when prompted by a results-counting computer located at a remote centre. A paper-based balloting system and manual counting procedure are still used; automation is limited to the communication and collection of results from polling stations. Using this system, the poll official dials a specific phone number and, prompted by a synthesized voice, enters his PIN provided by the electoral management body on the telephone key pad. Once the computer confirms the validity of the PIN, its synthesized voice asks the poll official to enter the district and polling station code. The computer's voice then lists the candidates' names in the order they appeared on the ballot. At the end of each name, the poll official enters on the key pad the number of ballots cast for the candidate. The synthesized voice repeats the numbers entered and asks the poll official to confirm the numbers by pressing a specific key on the key pad. If the poll official detects an error, the transaction can be cancelled and repeated with corrected figures. This process continues until all the results for the polling station have been transmitted. The advantage of this technology is its speed in delivering the aggregated preliminary results for an entire district (or country) and the reduction in the personnel needed to receive phone calls made by poll officials and count the aggregated results. The main constraint is the requirement to have digital network telephones with key pads (touch-tone technology) in all polling stations. In some areas, this may be a problem as rotary-type analogue telephones are still widely in use and digital networking technology is not yet available. Also, some poll officials may not be familiar or comfortable with this type of technology and will require thorough training in order to build confidence in such a process. Furthermore, significant costs will be incurred and time required to instal the computer system and customize it to the electoral management body's needs. These costs may well exceed the short-term cost of hiring and training the staff required to gather the results given verbally over the phone. Internet and World Wide Web As access to public computer networks increases, polling officials may post future election results directly on the World Wide Web, or other interface on the emerging 'information highway.' Already tested in some jurisdictions with varying degrees of success, election results can be posted instantaneously to a global audience using the Internet. In future, voting itself may also be done via the Internet. However, the issue of verifying the identity of each voter presents a significant security challenge. Some cost-effective and simple methods of personal identification will need to be developed and implemented before voting via the Internet or some similar computing/communications interface becomes commonplace.
Cost Considerations
The cost of elections, or any electoral event, is a concern to governments and election management bodies alike, regardless of the country's level of development. A prohibitively high cost election system that the country cannot afford can jeopardize the entire democratic process. To minimize the cost of an election, the vote counting system and procedures chosen should make use of the existing infrastructure, such as transport and communication networks, as much as practicable, and take into account literacy levels and recruitment pools for officials. What is affordable, expensive or feasible can vary greatly between countries. Here are some generic guidelines regarding costs:
Specific Needs for Vote Counting The local environment and political situation may add to specific needs for vote counting at polling stations. Such local factors might include the need for additional security measures during counting or specific communications technology that is not readily available. Higher than expected turnout may affect the counting duration, and additional staff may be required to cope with the additional ballots to be counted. Expected budgets may be exceeded if such contingencies have not been planned. Worst (or best) case scenarios (for example, expecting 100 percent of registered voters to turn out to vote) are frequently used when election budgets are planned in order to build in sufficient capacity. The selection of a specific counting technology may also increase costs or reduce them, depending on the choices made in terms of manual or machine counting. Also, costs will vary depending on the methods chosen for communicating voting results. Transmitting results by phone is often cost-effective, depending on distance and availability. Transmitting results by fax is also cost-effective and can be more accurate, as it is easier to make a mistake verbally than it is in writing. Where faxes are used, budgets should account for related supplies and services such as toner cartridges, maintenance, and the cost of fax lines. Where conventional fixed telephones or faxes are not available, mobile phones or radios may be used. Results may also be sent by electronic mail where access is available. Where no electronic options are available, results may have to be delivered by courier. Human Resources versus Cost of Technology Use of technology for counting votes may reduce the overall cost of an election and be more effective under certain conditions. However, depending on local factors, the process of manually counting paper ballots may be comparatively less expensive. Whether a technological solution is cost-effective will depend on a range of local circumstances, including the complexity of the voting system, the number of ballots being counted, the relative cost of labour compared to technology, and whether counting is centralized or decentralized. In general, a mechanical or computerized method of counting paper ballots (as opposed to systems where votes are cast electronically or mechanically) may be cost-effective, where large numbers of ballots are being counted centrally, where a voting system is used that lends itself to mechanical counting, and where labour costs are relatively high. Cost considerations aside, election management bodies should be aware that mechanical or computerized counting methods might be faster and more accurate than manual methods. While the use of technology might appear a costly option, if the technology acquisition costs can be amortized over several elections, the investment may be worthwhile. On the other hand, rapid advances in technology tend to cause electoral technology to age quickly and be overtaken between two elections. Availability of technical support during the electoral period is another important aspect that should be considered. A detailed cost-benefit analysis, accompanied by a study of the legal impacts and management risks associated with the adoption of a particular technological solution, may be worthwhile before any final decisions are made to adopt technological vote counting methods.
Cost ComponentsBudget The budget costs associated with vote counting are linked to the larger process of setting up and running the polling and counting stations. The following information relates to the considerations that should be taken into account in planning an election budget. Personnel Planning The salaries and fees paid to staff and poll workers usually constitute the largest part of the election's polling day budget. Personnel costs can include:
Using civil servants or citizens who are either volunteers or on civic duty, are ways in which to save salary costs to polling station and counting centre officials. Using the same officials in subsequent elections will decrease training costs. Materials Many kinds of materials must be developed and mass-produced for use in polling stations and counting centres. These include:
Choosing materials carefully can save costs. Materials that can be re-used for several electoral events, such as metal ballot boxes, may lead to cost savings, but the cost of storing materials must be taken into account. Alternatively, materials which cost less to produce, but which may only be used once, such as cardboard ballot boxes, do not have to be stored and may be cheaper. There will also be a freight component in the cost of most electoral materials. Items made locally may be cheaper than items made elsewhere, when freight is taken into account. Ballot papers are usually expensive. Some ballot papers incorporate a security device to discourage fraudulent voting. Recent advances have reduced the cost of security printing. It is worth exploring the available options to minimize the cost of ballot papers. Some high-tech materials, such as audio-video presentations and computers, may improve processes, but they are also usually expensive. Judgement will need to be made to determine whether the advantages of high-tech equipment are worth the cost. Rental of Premises Renting space for use as polling stations or counting centres can be a significant budget item. In several countries, the electoral laws allow the electoral management body to use schools and other public locations as polling stations at no cost. However, some regions may not have available public facilities, and the budget should plan for additional funds required to rent voting and counting locations. In other countries, the electoral management body may be able to negotiate with the relevant authorities to get free access to schools and other public locations. Otherwise, there will be a need to rent space for polling stations and counting centres. The budget should provide adequately for this. Office Equipment and Communications Fees Necessary office equipment, such as chairs and tables, must be procured. In some cases, this equipment will be supplied by the school or other location. The election budget should cover the cost of hiring this equipment if needed. If required, more advanced equipment such as office desks, fax machines, personal computers, and phone lines for local offices, may also need to be rented and budgeted for accordingly. In addition, telephones, including fixed phones and mobile phones, fax machines, radios, and computer lines may need to be included in the budget. Ideally, each polling station and counting centre should have the means to quickly communicate with the electoral management body to report problems, seek advice if needed, and transmit counting results. Transport Local conditions and common sense will indicate the most appropriate and cost-effective transport for the region concerned. Election management bodies must ensure that electoral material is transported securely, so that it is not tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. For this reason, it may be desirable to avoid public and commercial transit systems, although these can be used if appropriate. Electoral material may be transported by motor vehicles, boats, helicopters, light aircraft, commercial aircraft, or even pack animals, depending on local circumstances. Transport is particularly difficult in remote areas, and can be very expensive. Vehicles may be supplied by a government agency, the military, the police, or an organization such as the United Nations. If vehicles are not supplied, they may need to be rented. If necessary, the budget should include ancillary costs to cover maintenance, fuel, and insurance. The budget may also need to allow for drivers or crew. If no vehicles are available, money for taxis and public or commercial transport should be considered. If electoral materials have to be transported from polling stations to counting centres, or to a central location, these costs must be included in the budget. Voter Education Programmes Voter education programmes can be a very large part of an election budget, depending on the methods chosen and the location. Methods can range from newspapers, radio and television advertising, to posters, pamphlets, direct mail, community seminars, and the Internet. Voter Lists The compilation or maintenance of voter lists must be included in the budget of the relevant management body, although they may not be included in election costs. At election times, costs will be incurred in printing and distributing voter lists for use in polling stations. Some jurisdictions process these lists after polling day to identify examples of multiple voting and, in compulsory voting countries, failure to vote. This can be done manually or electronically. These costs must be included in the budget if appropriate. Postage and Freight The budget must include the cost of mailing out and receiving mailing ballots (postal ballots), if they are allowed under the electoral law. Many jurisdictions provide reply-paid envelopes for ballot material. The budget should also allow for other mail to voters, such as information pamphlets, and for courier fees for sending official materials between various locations. Software and Hardware If specific software is developed to process or count ballots, or to process election results, development, testing, documentation, and training costs must be budgeted. The hardware required to operate the software, its deployment in the field, and the technical support required to maintain and service it will need to be included. Operational support costs, such as staff, office space and facilities, should be included as necessary. Election Funding of Candidates and/or Parties Some jurisdictions provide election funding to candidates and/or parties to cover some of the cost of campaigning. If appropriate, these costs should also be included in the budget. Results Centres or Counting Rooms Many jurisdictions have regional and/or national results centres or counting rooms. These are useful to communicate the election result to the public, the candidates, the parties, and the media, and are an important element in making the election process open and transparent. Counting rooms can be simple, with manual count boards and simple communication links by phone or fax, or they can be very sophisticated, with computer links, displays and analysis. In this electronic age, election results may also be distributed electronically by computer feeds or the Internet, with no need for a physical counting room. In some cases, counting rooms are organized and funded by media organizations. In others, counting rooms are funded by the election management body. The election budget should include the cost of results centres or counting rooms as appropriate. Miscellaneous Costs Petty cash for small purchases or emergencies should be provided to the local offices of the electoral management body. Contingency measures for bigger items such as relocation of offices in case of disaster, re-deployment of electoral management body staff, and backup electrical generators should be budgeted according to local risk factors and the general operating environment. Audit Procedures and Accountability Suitable audit procedures should be in place to ensure that staff responsible for managing funds are fully accountable and are not able to appropriate funds illegally. Records of all valuable assets should be kept to ensure that assets are not disposed of illegally or declared 'lost.' Election officials should be aware that they are accountable for the funds and goods under their control, and they should be aware of the penalties for misusing their position. For more details and complementary information, please refer to Cost Considerations in the Electoral Management topic area and Cost Considerations in Voting Operations. Social and Political ContextThe social and political context is important to consider when choosing an electoral system and vote counting process. For example, local political considerations will determine whether it is desirable to sacrifice some accuracy for speedy transmission of results, or whether security should be strict or relaxed. One of the most important criteria is to ensure that the citizens and candidates understand the process and have faith in it. Security In a country emerging from civil strife, it is important to ensure that every stage in the electoral process, including the crucial vote count, is secure, transparent, and reliable. If security or accuracy considerations permit, it may be desirable to hold the count as close to the citizens as possible, for example with a manual count at the polling station level in full view of voters, national and international electoral observers, and party representatives. If this is not possible, the count should be as transparent as circumstances allow. Security provisions included in legislation and procedures should include security of the vote (and voter) and security of the process. If there is a possibility of repercussions to the voter for voting in a certain way, then the mixing of ballot boxes from different areas before counting should be seriously considered (see Vote Counting at Counting Centres). Security of the polling place may necessitate the guarding of polling stations by the military and the police. Security of the ballot boxes, especially for those counted at counting centres, may warrant the use of armed convoys. Sensitive election materials should never be left solely in the care of the police or military, however, but should be accompanied at all times by an election official and, perhaps, national and international electoral observers. Legislation should be such that elections are not jeopardized, even if individual polling stations come under attack, or need to be closed for any reasons. Provisions should be made for the speedy rerunning of elections in those stations. Literacy Low literacy rates are important to factor into training and counting procedures. Where literacy is a problem, a simple electoral system will facilitate accuracy, but recount and rechecking procedures should be included in the process. Communication of Results In an increasingly fast-paced world, election management bodies are feeling the pressure to deliver rapid (if not immediate) transmission of results. Technical innovations in electronic voting, counting, and transmission are certainly facilitating speedy results. Speed, however, should be carefully balanced against other important considerations such as:
Historical Review
From a simple showing of hands, or standing in front of a chosen candidate, vote counting went to secret paper ballots. Current trends in vote counting are towards secrecy, complexity (for reasons of accuracy and representation), electronic options, and rapid transmission of results. The development in vote counting naturally follows voting procedures and techniques. Before the paper ballot, other means were used. In ancient Greece pieces of ceramic, ostraka, were used. Today, voters in the Gambia use marbles to indicate their choice of candidate. However, the paper ballot is most common these days, although technical means such as voting machines are used in some legislation. During recent decades, technical support for vote counting has made rapid progress. The manual count remains the most common and widespread method of vote counting. However, depending on the general level of development, calculators or computers are used to calculate results, and computers are used for the distribution of seats. For a discussion of machine-assisted vote counting, see Application of Technology.
Additional Resources
Published Resources Cassidy, Michael. 'Les droits démocratiques et la réforme électorale au Canada' in the Collection d' tudes de la Commission Royale sur la r forme lectorale et le financement des partis, 10. Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1991. Dundas, Carl W. Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections, Frameworks Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, Monitoring. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994. Dundas, Carl W. Organizing Free and Fair Elections at Cost-Effective Levels. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993. Edgeworth, Linda et al, Election Official Training in Bangladesh: Project Overview and Recommendations, October-November 1995, Country reports, Washington, DC: IFES, 1995. Elections Canada. Compendium of Canadian Electoral Legislation. Ottawa: 1996 Electoral Commission of India. Procedures of Counting of Votes by Mixing of Ballot Papers - Revised Instruction. New Delhi: 1996. Federal Election Commission. The Electronic Transmission of Electoral Materials. Innovation in Election Administration N 12, Washington, DC: 1995. Raynolds, Andrew, and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997. Trudel, Linda. The Pollworker Training Handbook. Washington, DC: IFES, 1997. Electronic Information Resources
Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count
This section discusses how the electoral formula and chosen ballot type might affect vote-counting procedures. What Vote Counting Means It is necessary to carefully distinguish between counting the votes and determining the winner (See Transforming Votes to Seats). Counting the votes consists of opening the ballot boxes, sorting their contents, determining the validity of ballot papers, and counting ballot papers counted. Except in countries using voting machines, this is a very concrete operation, based on actual objects (ballot papers and, if applicable envelopes), and is often done manually. It is a labour intensive operation. However, in some countries mechanical or electronic devices are used to facilitate the counting. Except for determining on the validity of ballot papers, counting votes does not require exceptional skills, only concentration, literacy, and honesty. Those who count votes are not highly paid and in some countries the literacy requirement excludes many applicants. Vote counting involves the preliminary operation of checking the validity of ballot papers. Electoral legislation normally outlines detailed grounds for rejecting ballot papers. Election officials must be fully familiar with those provisions. This operation requires a higher skill level than simply counting the votes. Decisions on the validity of ballot papers may be made collectively (for example, by a majority decision of all election officials present) or hierarchically (by the presiding officer). The decision may also be 'kicked upstairs' to higher officials. Decisions of that nature must be subject to judicial review to prevent abuses. Vote counting results normally produce the following information for each counting unit: 1. how many electors have voted ('Registered' is a term reserved for encouraging voters to register.); 2. how many ballot papers were rejected; 3. how many ballot papers were valid; 4. how many votes went to each party and/or candidate. Counting the votes can be accomplished by lower officials, usually at the voting station level, but also at the electoral district level, or on a national level. The final stage of vote counting is the aggregation of figures for electoral districts. Electoral districts are the territorial units for which representatives are elected and where votes are added before the electoral formula is to be applied to determine who is elected. If the counting unit is smaller than the electoral district, the figures included in the statements of votes for each counting unit must be aggregated for all the counting units in the electoral district. This operation involves gathering the results from each counting unit, checking whether all statements are in, and aggregating the figures included in each statement. Only once the totals are available for the electoral district is vote counting over. The next step is applying the electoral formula to determine who is elected. Electoral Formula An electoral formula may be defined as the criterion that determines the winner(s) of an election. For legislative elections, the electoral system is the rule whereby members of a legislative house are elected and votes transformed into seats. For presidential elections, the electoral system is the benchmark a candidate must reach to be declared elected: e.g. a plurality or a majority of the popular vote. Electoral formulas are outlined in Transforming Votes to Seats. The electoral formula will affect many other variables of the election process. In particular, it has some effect on the ballot type and on the counting procedure. Influence of Electoral Formula over Ballot Type (see Way of Voting): The variables of ballot type are outlined in greater detail in file Ballot Type Counting Requirements. 1. Ordinal or Categorical Ballots The chief effect of the electoral formula on the ballot type is whether a categorical or an ordinal choice will be required from voters. A categorical ballot is one where the voter makes a straight choice, either for a candidate or for a party list, or for a party and a candidate at the same time. An ordinal ballot is one where the voter indicates his preferences among the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order (1, 2, 3) or by cumulating votes on certain candidates. On an ordinal ballot a voter is able to alter his vote between the first and second round of an election. Most electoral formulas require voters to make a categorical choice, which means that categorical type ballots are the most common occurrence. Ordinal ballots only account for one-quarter of the world total. They can be required for four formulas: the Alternative Vote, the Single Transferable Vote, the Block Vote, and the Two-Round System (see table in Way of Voting). Whether the ballot requires a categorical or an ordinal choice does not mean that an unmarked ballot paper will be substantially different. In two single-member electoral districts using respectively first-past-the-post or the alternative voting, for example, the ballot papers may be the same. Voters may express their choice by a single mark in the first case or by a series of numbers in the second. 2. Ballot Structure: The Australian Ballot, the 'Ballot and Envelope System,' and the French Ballot Another important dimension of the ballot paper is its structure. Two broad options exist: an 'Australian ballot' (named after its country of origin) on which the names of all-competing parties and candidates are grouped on a single sheet of paper, to be marked by the voter. The other option, the 'ballot and envelope' system, requires printing a distinct ballot paper for each of the competing parties or candidates, and inviting voters to insert a single paper into an envelope, which is to be dropped into the ballot box. Between those two types exists an intermediary solution: the French ballot, which lists the candidates to be marked by the voter. This type of ballot is used in some jurisdictions where proportional representation (PR) is combined with the right for voters to express preferences for individual candidates within the party list. Most electoral formulas are fully compatible with either ballot structure option (see 'group 1' in the appendix). However, some electoral formulas (First Past the Post, Two-Round, or PR) in multi-member electoral districts with panachage or preferential voting within a list, are compatible with both. Australian ballots are clearly advisable, especially if the number of members to be elected is high: (see 'group 2' in the appendix.) Finally, some electoral formulas are only compatible with Australian ballots, and cannot be operated with the ballot and envelope system. This is the case for the alternative voting and STV (see 'group 3' in the appendix), because both require an ordinal choice which cannot be expressed with enough clarity under the ballot and envelope system. Influence of Electoral Formula over Vote Counting The most important influence of the electoral formula over vote counting is to determine what must be counted. Some formulas simply require counting the votes for candidates or parties. Other formulas require counting the votes both for parties and for candidates within each party list. If the electoral formula requires voters to express an ordinal choice, then vote counting is performed in a very different way. Another influence of the electoral formula is the determination of which territorial level (the voting station, the electoral district, or the nation as a whole) votes must be counted and aggregated.
Appendix Following is a discussion of the compatibility of various formulas with the Australian ballot paper and the ballot and envelope system. Group 1 - The following formulas are compatible with both the Australian ballot and the ballot and envelope system:
Group 2 - The following formulas are compatible in theory with both the Australian ballot and the ballot and envelope system. However, in practical terms, it is advisable to use Australian ballots, especially if the number of votes to be cast in the district is high.
Group 3 - The following formulas are compatible only with Australian ballots:
Electoral Systems Counting Requirements
Following is a discussion of concrete examples of vote counting and how this is affected by electoral systems. Which electoral formula is in force has an effect on how vote counting is accomplished. What has to be counted, and where the counting is to be done is examined. 1. What has to be counted? Following is a summary of the counting requirements for each electoral formula:
a. Each seat is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat 'A', Seat 'B', etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat. b. No distinct competition for each seat, voter has as many votes as there are members to be elected. In both cases, count the votes for each candidate. If a second ballot is necessary, count the votes again for each candidate standing at the second ballot. PR list when preference votes for individual candidates are allowed.
2. Where are votes to be counted? Determining which level will be the counting unit is an ad hoc decision made by national legislation. The simplest option is to count the vote in individual polling stations. This is the most generally recommended alternative since the officials who perform the operation are already on the spot. There are also reasons of timing: electors and candidates are anxious to know the results, so why not count the votes right after polling is completed? There are also security and public trust reasons: counting the votes at a higher level necessitates transporting the ballot boxes to a different physical location, an operation which involves the risk of tampering or theft, and of course fosters the suspicion that this might happen. Votes can also be counted at a higher level, be it in counting centres including numerous polling stations, at the electoral district level (United Kingdom) or even nationally. This necessitates safety precautions to overcome the security and public trust considerations mentioned above: ballot boxes must be sealed carefully so that their contents cannot be emptied or tampered with during transportation. Reliable officials must do transportation. A worthwhile precaution is to require inspectors from the various parties to sit in the vehicle transporting the boxes. Eventually, armed protection of the vehicles transporting ballot boxes and party inspectors may be deemed necessary. While counting the votes at a higher level is often not the best alternative, there may be sound reasons for selecting this option. For example: 1. Protecting voting secrecy: It may happen that all voters in a given polling station vote for the same candidate or party, in which case their vote is known to all. Counting the votes at a higher level, where the contents of numerous polling stations are mixed together, minimizes the likelihood of such an occurrence. 2. Protecting voters: if the elected Member knows which polling stations supported him or her and which did not, there is a risk of retribution during his or her term of office against those parts of the district that voted 'the wrong way'. 3. Protecting national or social cohesion: If electoral districts include communities sharply differentiated by language, social class or otherwise, making the results available for smaller subdivisions within each district may reveal sharp cleavages within the electorate. In hot political situations, this may lead to the fingering, by losing candidates, of a particular sub-group (for example, an ethnic or linguistic minority) as the one that 'tilted the balance'. Counting the votes at a higher level helps to conceal those cleavages and, presumably, to preserve national and social cohesion.
4. Material considerations: Polling stations may be ill-equipped physically to count the votes. For example, if they are located in open-air spaces due to the unavailability of appropriate buildings, or are too poorly lighted for the operation to be done in an efficient way. In such cases, it may be better to count the votes in larger counting centres located in public buildings (like schools or administrative offices) that are better equipped and better protected against intruders. 5. Size considerations: In very small countries, it may be deemed easier to centralize counting in view of the small distances to be traveled. 6. Ensuring that the rules governing the rejection of ballot papers will be uniformly and fairly applied: While counting the votes for individual candidates or parties is a simple and straightforward operation, which does not require high skills, deciding on the validity of each ballot paper demands higher qualifications. Even trained judges may have difficulty in deciding some specific cases. Further, the rules governing that operation may be understood differently by lower officials. Presumably, making such decisions at a higher level ensures they will be made by trained officials and that the law will be applied the same way in all dubious cases. 7. Electoral systems requirements: While national electoral legislation often differs as to whether counting the votes is to be done locally or at higher levels, electoral formulas impose minimal constraints to legislators in this regard. In other words, whichever of the above-mentioned formulas is chosen, it is possible for vote counting, as distinguished from determining the winner(s), to be done on the spot, in voting stations, or to be done at higher levels if necessary. This evaluation is dictated by empirical observation, which indicates that no electoral formula, even the most complex ones, actually precludes vote counting from being done in polling stations, nationally or somewhere in-between. For example, under the simplest formula, First Past the Post in single-member districts, vote counting is done in polling stations (Canada) or by the returning district for the whole electoral district (UK). Under the Alternative Vote (AV), counting of first preferences was done in polling stations in the three Canadian provinces which had that system, two of them for about 30 years, while in Australia it is done in larger counting centres. Even under Single Transferable Vote (STV), the counting of first preferences was done in polling stations in the two Canadian provinces which had that system, again for about 30 years, while in Malta counting is done nationally. AV and STV impose only one important constraint with regard to vote counting: while counting of first preferences can be done in polling stations, the transfer of second and other subsequent preferences must be done at the electoral district level. The reason is that only on the basis of the aggregate figures for the whole district can the decision actually be made as to whether any transfer will be necessary, and as to which candidates, if necessary, will be eliminated and have their second preferences counted and transferred. The crucial point to be ascertained before deciding to count second or subsequent preferences is whether or not a candidate has obtained a majority of first preferences in the electoral district, a decision that obviously can be made only on the basis of district-wide figures. If it is found that such a majority has been reached, counting stops there and second or subsequent preferences will never be counted. If the opposite is found, then it is up to the officials for the electoral district to eliminate the weakest candidates, to count second preferences on the ballots where first-preference votes have been given to such candidates, and transfer them to the remaining candidates, up until one candidate secures the required majority or quota. This implies that the winner(s) of the election will be known later than election night under both AV and STV. This is one of the drawbacks pointed out by the opponents of these formulas. On election night, one can only speculate, on the basis of the trends of previous elections, to which candidates the second or subsequent preferences of the weakest candidates will go. To overcome that perceived weakness, Australia decided in the early 1990's that vote counting in counting centres (a level, which is between polling stations and the electoral district,) would involve the counting not only of first preferences but also of second or subsequent preferences. This allows election officials to immediately provide the media and the public with a reliable guess as to where the second and subsequent preferences of the weakest candidates will go, and who the likely winner is. However, this is only a preliminary count, to be repeated later at the electoral district level, and only the latter count has any official value.
Ballot Type Counting Requirements
An explanation and description of the types of ballots (single ballot, open and closed lists) takes into consideration the following three variables:
These three dimensions will be reviewed in turn. Ordinal vs. Categorical Ballots A categorical ballot is one where the voter makes a straight choice either for a candidate or for a party list. An ordinal ballot is one where the voter is required to indicate preferences among the various candidates or parties by numbering their respective names, in declining order (1,2,3...) (see Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count and Way of Voting). Counting implications: Preferential ordinal ballots make ballot counting more complex. The chief rule is that only 'first preferences' i.e. the number of ballots where the name of a given candidate are marked with the figure '1', are normally to be counted on election night. Subsequent preferences are to be counted only if no candidate is found to have obtained a majority (more than 50%) of first preferences. In this case, the weakest candidate is eliminated and the second preferences expressed on his or her ballots are counted and transferred to other candidates. However, in order to provide the media and the public with a reliable guess as to where the second or subsequent preferences of the weakest candidates will go, Australia directs that those preferences be also counted on election night, whether they prove necessary or not in the end. The Structure of the Ballot Paper The simplest option is the so-called 'Australian ballot', which groups the names of all candidates for a single office on a single ballot paper, to be marked by the voter. Another option is the French 'ballot paper and envelope system' where there is one ballot paper for each candidate, voters collect each candidate's ballot and insert one in an envelope to be dropped into the ballot box, and dispose of all other unused ballots. Counting implications: Australian ballots are easier to count, as they are simply taken out of the ballot box, unfolded and sorted. A supplementary advantage is that the results of the count are easier to check post facto. Once counting is completed, the ballot papers marked for each party or candidate are placed in distinct sealed envelopes and archived. If the results of the election are later challenged, the envelopes may be reopened before a judge and their contents counted again. Further, rejected ballot papers may be re-examined in determine whether they ought to have been rejected or not. Under the ballot and envelope system, the first step is to count the unopened envelopes to determine how many votes were cast. Then each envelope can be opened, the ballot paper taken out and the name of the candidate or party on the ballot read aloud and recorded by attendants. From this moment, nothing distinguishes a ballot paper which has been duly cast any other, and the only evidence of how many votes were cast for each party or candidate is the tally sheet used by counting officers, and the final statement of the votes cast. Only the latter has any official value and is kept for recording purposes. Normally more than one copy of the statement is made. If conflicting figures are found in the various copies of the statement for any voting station, there is no authoritative evidence as to what the right figures are, because the ballot papers are not kept. Even if the ballot papers are kept and put into sealed envelopes, nothing distinguishes a ballot paper actually cast for a candidate or party from any other ballot paper that was not actually cast. Only ballot papers and envelopes that were rejected are kept and annexed to the statement of votes. This system makes it difficult for judges to recount the ballot papers subsequently, or even to decide whether a ballot paper has been lawfully rejected. For example, if a vote has been rejected because the envelope was found to include no ballot, or because a ballot paper was inserted in the box without being put into an envelope first, or because the envelope included ballot papers for different candidates, the only evidence available, apart from suitable mentions on the minutes of proceedings of the counting station, is an empty envelope or isolated ballot papers. Sometimes legislation provides a mix of both schemes. Voters can be required to insert the list of candidates sponsored by a single party into the envelope, but in addition, allow voters to mark the name of one or more candidates on that list. This kind of hybrid can be found notably in some proportional representation (PR) countries where preferential voting for some candidates is allowed (e.g., Latvia). The Number of Offices to be Filled In most countries, an election involves a single set of elective offices, e.g. Members of Parliament. This requires a single ballot paper. It also happens that numerous offices are to be filled at the same time such as President, Congressman, Senator, State governor, State legislator, etc (e.g., Liberia). This raises numerous issues, both political and technical. a. Straight ticket vs. Split ticket: One option is to oblige voters to give a single vote for a party, which is deemed to count for each of the candidates sponsored by that party for the various offices to be filled. For example, the Venezuelan ticket, whereby a single vote is valid for all the candidates sponsored by a party at the local, state and national level, is an extreme example of this. Another option is to allow voters to have a distinct vote for each office. Counting implications: When voters are required to cast straight tickets, vote counting is simplified because all that needs to be done is to count the ballot papers cast for each party. When voters are granted a distinct vote for each office to be filled, which allows them to 'split their ticket', counting is much more complex. Separate tally sheets must be used for each office to be filled, which makes vote counting a lengthy operation. In such cases, the use of mechanical or electronic voting machines may appear the only solution that ensures a quick determination of the winner(s). b. A single multi-office ballot paper vs. numerous single-office ballot papers. The former option allows for both straight and split tickets. The latter is compatible only with split tickets. Counting implications: Same as above. If numerous ballot papers, one for each office, are used, it is recommended that the ballot papers for each office be printed on paper of a distinctive colour to avoid confusion during the count, especially if all ballot papers, irrespective of the office to which they relate, are put into a single ballot box.
Transforming Votes to SeatsAn Outline of the Main Formulas Determining the winner(s) is usually accomplished at the electoral district level, though it may be done also at the national level. For various reasons, higher officials do it. The rules governing the determination of winner(s) (the electoral formula) can be complex, especially if a scheme of proportional representation is in force. Further, determining the winner is an important political responsibility: any serious error made at this stage might generate a political crisis. Any suspicion of fraud will have the same consequence. There are various electoral formulas in force in the world today. We have aggregated them into three main clusters: plurality-majority, proportional representation (PR), and semi-PR systems. However, each of these clusters includes different formulas. A short outline of the working of each follows: Plurality-Majority Formulas
b. Each seat in the district is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat 'A', Seat 'B', etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat, and each elector has a vote for each seat. In this case, the candidates with the highest number of votes for each seat are elected.
There may be no restriction as to who may stand [at the second ballot], there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker candidates, or only the two strongest candidates may stand [at the second ballot]. In any case, the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected.
a. Each seat is numbered in a distinctive way (Seat 'A', Seat 'B', etc.), with one distinct competition for each seat. Voters cast one vote for each seat. Votes are counted separately for each seat. On the first ballot, the candidate with a majority of the vote is elected. If no candidate obtains a majority, a second ballot is held at a later date (ex., one or two weeks later). There may be no restriction as to who may stand at the second ballot, or there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker candidates, or only the two strongest candidates may stand at the second ballot: in any case, the candidates with the highest number of votes are all elected. b. No distinct competition for each seat, voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled. In this case, candidates who have a majority of the vote are elected. If some seats remain unfilled after the first ballot, a second ballot is to be held later, with voters casting as many votes as there remain seats to be filled. There may be no restriction as to who may stand at the second ballot, or there may be a threshold eliminating the weaker candidates. In either case, voters cast as many votes as there are members to be elected at this second ballot, and the candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.
Semi-Proportional Systems
Proportional Representation (PR) - Multi-Member Districts
At least five different scenarios have been found: 1. Scenario A (Finland): Electors must vote for a single individual candidate only, and this vote is also deemed to be a vote for the party sponsoring that individual. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of the total number of votes cast for all candidates sponsored by that party. Thereafter, within each list, seats go to the candidates obtaining the highest number of individual votes. 2. Scenario B (Netherlands): Electors can only vote for a single individual candidate, and this vote is also deemed to be a vote for the party sponsoring that individual. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of the total number of votes cast for all candidates sponsored by that party. Thereafter, for each party, a 'list quota' is computed. This is the result of the division of the number of votes cast for the party by the number of seats it won. Candidates whose personal preference votes are equal to or higher than the quota are elected. The votes obtained by these candidates surplus to the list quota are then transferred to the other candidates in the order of listing. However, candidates who obtained more than half of the list quota are given priority when votes are transferred, irrespective of their position on the list. The other candidates remain in the order in which they originally appeared on the ballot papers. Candidates are then elected on the basis of the order in which they appear on the amended list. 3. Scenario C (Belgium): Electors may vote either for a party list or for one individual candidate within a party list. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of the total number of votes cast for that party and for each of the candidates sponsored by that party. Thereafter, the total number of votes cast for a party and its candidates is divided by the number of seats won by that party, plus one. The result is an 'eligibility number'. As party votes are deemed to indicate an acceptance by the elector of the rank-ordering of candidates determined by the party, party votes are then transferred to the highest-ranking candidate on the list, and added to his or her personal votes. The surplus of party votes (i.e. the difference between the total number of party votes and the eligibility number) is thereafter transferred to the second candidate on the party list and added to his or her personal votes, and on and on until all party votes have been allocated to individual candidates. Then, the candidates with the highest number of votes, both party and personal, are elected. In Denmark, voters may also vote either for a party or a candidate. However, the rules governing the nomination of candidates vary from party to party. 4. Scenario D (Czech Republic): Electors must vote for a party list and may, in addition, vote for one or many of the candidates within that list. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of party votes. Thereafter, within each list, seats will go to the candidates obtaining the highest number of individual votes, provided that at least 10% of the ballots cast for the party include individual preferences. Otherwise, seats go to the highest-ranked candidates. 5. Scenario E (Latvia): Electors must vote for a party list. In addition, they may vote for one of the candidates within that list or cross out the name of a candidate within that list. Seats are first distributed among parties on the basis of party votes. Each candidate's personal votes are increased by the number of votes cast for his or her party, and decreased by the number of ballots on which his or her name was crossed out. Then, seats go to the candidates who got the highest figures after those computations have been made.
Vote Counting at Polling Stations
Advantages The main advantages of vote counting at polling stations are speed and cost effectiveness. As the vote counting can start as soon as the polling station closes, interim results can be released faster than at a counting centre. For a poll of four hundred voters, counting of categorical ballots could take less than two hours. Furthermore, since the same staff receive, count, and transport the ballots from and to the local office, fewer personnel are involved in the overall process. This reduces the pressure of logistics, eliminating the need to identify counting centres, train additional personnel, develop or procure specific materials. Physical requirements are mostly identical to those used for the voting procedures: table, chairs, forms, pencils, calculator, fasteners, seals, etc. (see Voting Arrangements for the explanation of the voting arrangements and Ensuring Readiness.) Since the ballot boxes are kept at the same place where the vote took place, the same poll workers, national and international electoral observers (see Observation of Voting and Counts for further information on election observation), party representatives and candidates stay during the counting process. This makes supervision easier for the person in charge of the polling station. Counting at polling stations indirectly promotes participation of the population since the process is not only closer to their home, but they can actually watch it, making the results more tangible. The process then tends to be regarded as open, accessible, and legitimate. Not only does it demonstrate transparency, but it can also enhance public confidence, especially if poll workers are carrying out their duties in the same area in which they live. Opportunities for fraud will always exist, but safeguards can be developed to make them difficult when votes are counted at a polling station and transmitted in duplicate to local offices. Since the ballot boxes do not move from the polling station for counting, there is less risk than when the ballot boxes are transported to a counting centre first. Disadvantages One disadvantage of counting at polling stations is the long hours required of the personnel involved in the process. It is quite common to see polls opening at 6:00 a.m. and close at 8:00 p.m., followed by a two hour or longer counting process. This adds up to a very long working day for poll workers. Since they are not allowed to leave the polling station during the day, this may increase the possibility of mistakes when the time comes to count the ballots and fill out the forms. To avoid this, food, water, and sanitary facilities should be provided. In terms of security, it is harder to protect many polling stations than one or several counting centres. This can be an important issue in highly contested elections taking place in a violent area or politically charged environment. However, this factor may not be important if security is already provided during the taking of the vote. The presence at the polling station of well-known personalities from the community can be a source of intimidation for some workers in the polling station during the count. In some circumstances, counting at a polling station may also affect the secrecy of the vote, once the results are known. Post-election intimidation and threats to voters from an entire polling station area can be made by political parties, if it is known that nearly all voters voted in a particular manner. This factor is minimized, but not entirely eliminated, in the case of counting centres based on electoral districts. There is a risk that the counting criteria for rejecting ballots and reporting results will be inconsistent from polling station to polling station. The risk of these problems arising decreases with the extent of detailed training and instruction provided. An important consideration is that a reliable communication system is required for transmission of polling station statements of the votes. Depending on the number of polling stations, the local office may need the capacity in their communication system to handle several polling station results coming in at the same time. If a system failure occurs, then all the results are delayed. This affects the speed of releasing the results, which may generate uncertainty in the political environment. In some countries where telecommunications networks are not well developed, this can be a major problem leading to mistrust of the system and accusations of manipulation or fraud. Vote Counting Procedures at Polling Stations In general, the major process components of vote counting at a polling station are:
Following the closing of the polls, ballot boxes are kept at the polling station for vote counting. The following procedures are executed:
The statement of the vote is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers can copy the results. There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the polling station is released and sent to the local office of the electoral management body. Once the counting process is completed, electoral materials are taken to a local office for secure storage. Interim results are also sent to the national level and publicized. Special measures and procedures need to be followed during the entire counting process in case results are challenged. As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at polling stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with its respective processes. At the closing of the polling station, authorized persons and poll workers stay in the polling station and start the counting process. In most cases, it takes less than two hours to complete for a poll of approximately four hundred voters. For efficiency reasons, all poll workers assigned to the polling station should assist the poll official responsible for a ballot box in the counting process. A first reconciliation of ballots may be done before opening the ballot box. Spoiled ballots are counted and put aside. Once the ballot box is emptied of its contents, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles. The votes are then counted into valid ballots (by candidate/political party/option) and rejected ballots (a ballot found in the ballot box is rejected because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required). Clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the poll officials in advance, to facilitate the decision-making process regarding rejections. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the poll official, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote. The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. The results recorded on the statement of the vote will be communicated by the poll official to the local/national office of the electoral management body by telephone or other means. Representatives of political parties/candidates/ options as well as national and international electoral observers, if present, can make a copy of the statement. The count at the polling station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important. The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all polling stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance polls, mobile polling stations, etc. Interim results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancy between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party/candidate/option and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available. Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body. In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply. Training Appropriate training is essential to be able to implement such vote counting procedures at polling stations. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations, need to be included in the budget for the election or referendum. Non-partisanship An important aspect of free and fair elections is the non-partisanship of poll workers. Once a person agrees to work as a poll worker on election day, he also agrees to be non-partisan throughout the entire process. Numerous jurisdictions require that all poll workers sign an oath in order to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved (see Oath of a Poll Clerk - St Vincent and the Grenadines). The importance of non-partisanship remains critical during the counting process. Poll workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear or use any partisan materials. Since the poll official will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal will representatives of political parties/candidates/ options. This person will also have to take the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process. In many jurisdictions, poll officials can be legally prosecuted if their work is proved to be partisan. Political parties and candidates should always be represented in polling stations and the rules must be the same for all political parties and candidates. Usually, political parties' candidates designate a representative to be present in each polling station to witness the voting and counting processes. However, it remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every polling station or not. Many jurisdictions consider their presence to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process. Indeed, when the time comes to make an important decision during the voting and counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed, and agree with the decision. Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent. Finally, the electoral management body needs to record the 'history' of each ballot box and seal numbers where applicable, from initial distribution to final collection and storage. The electoral management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box, from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots. A proper audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control, and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited, and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each polling station, and using the same number for the corresponding ballot box, is one simple method of implementing such a control system. Additionally, the same number should appear on each form used at the polling station. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box (recording ballots book number, serial number of the seals, ballot box number, etc.) becomes clear in cases of judicial recount. Opening/Closing Ballot Boxes
Opening the Ballot Boxes Several tasks need to be carried out at the opening of the polls to facilitate the vote counting at the closing of the polls. The first is to count the total number of ballots originally received (provided by the electoral management body). In countries using one ballot per political party and where envelopes are used, it is important to verify if all parties' ballots are available to voters. This represents an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting takes place. All ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils or ballot book numbers (where applicable) should be verified as well, via inspections of the ballot booklets to ensure completeness. The officer who delivered them, especially if ballots are delivered by hand, should witness the counting of the ballot quantities. He can then sign a receipt, with a copy then attached to the voting record book. In all cases, the information should be written on the ballot accounting form. Depending on the country, and the type of information needed by the electoral management body, in order to reduce duplication of effort, the same information may not need to be recorded in more than one place unless required. Once the ballots are counted, and proper observations or indications on the appropriate forms are made (if needed), then the poll workers should show everyone present at the polling station that the ballot box is empty, before placing security seals on the ballot box. The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and in any other appropriate form. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail. Many mistakes can be prevented by following these procedures. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced to the beginning of ballot marking. At no time should any voter remove ballots from the polling station. Closing the Ballot Boxes At closing time, the person in charge of the polling station should announce the official closing of the poll. The supervisor should ensure that only authorized persons allowed to process or witness the count remain inside the polling station. Poll workers, national and international electoral observers, representatives of political parties, and candidate agents, should be permitted to stay for the counting process. If no one except the poll workers are present, the last voters may be asked to stay and witness the counting. All other persons should wait outside the polling station for the interim results. However, some countries have different procedures. To facilitate the counting process, the polling station may need to be physically reorganized. Tables are generally placed together for a larger working surface, and chairs, pencils, and a board to post results are put in place. Summary of Process At the closing of the polls, authorized persons and poll workers stay in the polling station and start the counting process. An average of two hours is needed to complete the count of approximately four hundred to five hundred ballots, if no serious objections are encountered. The time taken to count ballots will depend on the number of staff and the complexity of the voting system. While the ballot box is still sealed, a reconciliation is done by checking the number of counterfoils (if applicable) indicating ballots given to voters, unused ballots, and spoiled ballots against the total number of ballots issued. The number of voters who voted on election day is also counted in order to verify against the number of ballots used (used counterfoils). All discrepancies must be resolved or reported to the electoral management body. The figures are written on a ballot paper account. Once the first steps are complete, the person in charge of counting can open the ballot box and empty its contents in the centre of the table. It is important that the table be large enough so that no ballots will fall on the floor when the ballot box is emptied of its contents. Seals are verified before ballot boxes are opened in the presence of poll workers, representatives of political parties, candidates, national and international electoral observers. If no persons are present other than the poll workers, then the last voters may be asked to stay in order to act as witnesses. Another reconciliation is done once the ballot box is emptied, and again after all ballots are counted by candidate/party/option. In all cases, the number of ballots in the box is compared with the number of voters who have voted. No ballots should be missing, nor should the number of ballots in the box exceed the number of voters. All discrepancies should be reported and proper modifications or changes made to the forms. As far as possible, everybody involved in the counting process should sign the forms, in order to confirm that the accounting for the ballots was satisfactory, or that they are aware of the source of discrepancy, and that they agree with the decision taken by the person in charge. The usual forms required for the count are a count sheet, a voting record book, a statement of the vote, and the ballot account form. Envelopes, or bags for ballots, and seals to close the ballot box, or to put on the envelopes are also required. For more details on opening procedures as well as closing procedures, please refer to Voting Procedures and Close of Voting. Reconciling Ballot AccountsCounting Ballots At the opening of the polls, ballots (and envelopes where applicable) received from the electoral management body are counted, and corresponding figures written in the ballot paper account form (see Ballot paper account England - reconciliation form, or see the voting record book Voting record book - Canada). At the closing of the polls, the first thing to do before sorting and counting the ballots is to count the numbers of used counterfoils (as applicable) and unused envelopes (as applicable), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots. At this stage, the ballot box remains closed. This total should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening. Verification with the number of voters who voted on election day should also be done using the marked-up voter's list, and the entries in the voting record book. It is important that accurate records are kept of the number of ballots used by each polling station. This will enable the electoral management body to demonstrate that all ballots used at each polling station are genuine and that ballots have nor been fraudulently deposited in ballot boxes or removed from the polling station. Discrepancies In case of discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots, and recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils (if applicable). If discrepancies remain, then verification with higher authority (with the district electoral officer and the electoral management body) of the number of ballots (and envelopes) sent to the polling station should be done in order to verify with their figures and in order to inform them of the situation. Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election or any electoral event. If no solution is found, modifications or changes to the voting record book, ballot account forms, count sheets, and statement of the vote forms should be completed in order to reflect the appropriate numbers of ballots. To validate these new figures, and to make sure that everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it, poll workers, political parties' representatives, and candidates' agents present at the polling station for the vote count should sign the forms and the voting record book. Once this first reconciliation is done, then the person in charge of counting will verify if the seal is still unbroken and if the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the polling station. If locks are used, then the person in charge should ask the person with a set of keys to assist in the opening of the ballot box. This information should be written in the voting record book. The ballot box is then opened and the contents emptied onto a table. These ballots (or envelopes) are counted as well, and compared to figures obtained earlier. The number of ballots (or envelopes) in the ballot box should match with the number of voters who voted, a number that can be obtained by counting the number of counterfoils as applicable (number of ballots used), unused ballots less the number of spoiled ballots. There should be another reconciliation after the count of the ballots for each candidate/party/option in order to verify that all figures total correctly before making the statement of the vote for the polling station. In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated ones or twice until the missing ballot or ballots - or an explanation for the discrepancy - are found. If after verification the missing ballots are still not found, then the electoral management body should be informed of the problem, and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the polling station). Once again, if no solution is found, appropriate changes should be made on the forms signed by poll workers, representatives of political parties and candidates' agents. This new figure should then become the official one for the polling station. In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots which cannot be reconciled, or which are not within a certain tolerance (i.e. difference is not more than two, three or five ballots), legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken. In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the electoral management body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Poll officials and others involved should be aware of these provisions through their training. In the case of multiple elections held on the same day, such as a presidential election, municipal election, and legislative assembly election, finding ballots in the wrong box is a frequent occurrence. In such cases, the poll official should transfer the ballot to the appropriate box, reconcile all the ballots, and make a report for each case. This should be followed by a reconciliation count of the ballots and, if no discrepancy is found, then the poll official can start the count as usual. Sorting
Initial Sorting In the case of multiple ballot elections (presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day for example), there should be an order of priority for counting these ballots, so as to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process. This should be part of the rules given to the poll workers during the training session and in the documentation of operational procedures for counting. Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used when ballots are found in the wrong box. Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots; this is usually the poll official who provided the ballot to each voter on election day. This is particularly important if initials are added on the back of the ballot. In some countries' legislation political parties' representatives handle the ballot sorting. Spoiled ballots should already have been separated and counted as part of preparing the ballot paper account. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly, or is somehow unusable, and hands back to poll officials in exchange for a new ballot. Spoiled ballots should never be placed in the ballot box. In some countries, spoiled ballots are put in a separate envelope. This is to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, as the voter may have indicated how they wanted to vote on the spoiled ballot. Sorting Procedures One way of sorting is as follows. Once the ballot box is opened, the poll official verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. As they proceed with the task, he needs to be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit (by the watermark or other identifying mark on valid ballot papers). Any identified counterfeit ballots should be set aside, counted, and reported to the electoral management body as an attempt at fraud. The poll official will divide up all ballots by candidate/political party/option as they are counted. At the same time, he can determine all potentially rejected ballots and set them aside. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the poll official must go one-by-one through the pile of potential rejected ballots, and decide on the validity of each one. Potential rejected ballots that are determined to actually be valid are separated by candidate/party/option. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The poll official will then add the additional valid ballots decided to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option, and make a total count for each candidate/political party/option. Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the poll official, and be known in advance, to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots are to be destroyed. The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count, and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots. Rejected ballots must be closely examined, and the poll official should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot. Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the poll official, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. There must be clear rules for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates. Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The poll official can call out in a loud voice the choice of each voter, and show the ballot, so the political party or candidate representatives, and other persons allowed in the polling station for the counting, are able to see the ballot and make their own count. The various representatives and national and international electoral observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each counted ballot. For greatest efficiency, other poll workers should assist the poll official during the counting process. However, it must be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot. Checking Validity of the Ballot
When ballots are sorted, the poll official needs to distinguish a valid ballot from a counterfeit as he goes along. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified. In some jurisdictions, security paper is used for ballots. This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that separate a valid ballot from counterfeits. The poll official should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he does not recognize the ballot, or the ballot was not issued at the polling place, then it should not be included in the count and should be put aside. Authenticating Ballots To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the poll official add their initials in a space provided at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter. Other jurisdictions provide a validating stamp at the polling station for every ballot to be stamped before handing it to the voter. During counting, a ballot without a stamp is rejected. If the initials at the back of the ballot are not from the poll official, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, but the poll official recognizes that he issued the ballot, he can then initial it, and the ballot can be counted as valid. This measure of adding the poll official's initials at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit, but the poll official's initials should always be identical in order to protect the voter's secrecy of the vote. The poll official should always use the same colour of pen or pencil when adding his initials. This problem will not exist when a validating stamp is used as described above. In all cases, all ballots are kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed (at this stage of the process, see Challenging Results for more details on how long ballots should be kept), as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled in such a way that the count can be fully reconstructed. If there is any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the poll official should be able to verify the basis of his decision with the electoral management body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be taken without any doubt. Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots
Separating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important as the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail. Spoiled Ballots Spoiled ballots should never find their way into the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently 'spoiled' by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to poll officials in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box. A spoiled ballot may also be one that is improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy. Rejected Ballots A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box, but has been rejected because it was improperly marked, or is not marked at all when a mark is required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are:
In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes), in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept, and none should be destroyed. Ballot Envelopes In countries using envelopes, since marks are not made on the ballot itself, the way to identify a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope with two ballots, an empty envelope, or a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised, etc. In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot (see Examples of laws and regulations - Philippines). For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of poll workers and documented in their manual (see Manual - Quebec) or in the operational guidelines in order to help the poll official in making his decision. A card summarizing the marks that are to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks, is a very useful tool that can be inserted in the poll workers' kit (see Quick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh). Separating Valid Ballots
All ballots are unfolded (if envelopes are used, then all ballots need to be taken out of the envelopes), one by one, and the poll official makes sure that the ballot is valid. (Please refer to Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots for a discussion of spoiled and rejected ballots.) The poll official may call out loud the name of the candidate/political party/option for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are separating and counting the ballots, and identifying those that are potentially to be rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may, in fact, be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside those potentially to be rejected, and then establish which ballots are actually to be rejected. After the rejections are finalized, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate/party/option can be counted quickly. In all cases, only poll workers should handle ballots, and it must be very clear that the poll official is the person entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot. (See Challenging Results for a more comprehensive discussion on challenging decisions.) The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot is that it allows the representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered, which tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient and slow. Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table: one pile per candidate, per political party, or per option (in the case of a referendum). Ballot should be examined in such a way as to permit national and international electoral observers, representatives of political parties or candidates, and other persons allowed in the polling station during the counting process, to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contents of sorted ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the poll official, they can make official objections. While transparency of the process is important, there should be proper controls on the movement of ballots to ensure that the integrity of the count is not compromised. Tallying
Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) are bundled by groups of ten, for example, in order to facilitate keeping a record of the votes counted. Depending on the number of political parties or candidates, and depending on the number of poll workers, each poll worker can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political parties, candidates, or options. Later, the poll workers can exchange all ballots cast for 'their' political party/candidate/option and verify each other's totals. Poll workers count all ballots, including spoiled and rejected ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount. To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the poll official should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot, and all reasons that should lead to the rejection of a ballot. Minimizing the interpretation needed by the poll official makes it easier to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. If the validity of a ballot is challenged or objected to (see Challenging Results for more information on the subject), then the poll official should be the only person entitled to make a decision, even if the other poll workers are involved in the counting process. In order to be more consistent in his decisions, the poll official can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones, and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate/political party/option. Alternatively, the ballots can be separated first, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted. For each disputed ballot, the ballot should be numbered at the back. The same number should be written in the poll book along with the decision made by the poll official. To count the ballots, the poll official and/or the poll worker uses a count sheet (see Tally sheet Togo - Guinea and Tally sheet - Canada); sometimes the poll clerk performs this task. The representatives of political parties, candidates, and everybody observing the count may have count sheets as well. The official one is the one used by the poll official in charge of the count. The count sheet is used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate/party/option, a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each candidate are added together. If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other poll workers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement. A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually the last one before transmission of the interim results to the regional or local district. It is also important in order to make sure that no votes were changed in favour or against one candidate/party/option. It could include a comparison to the reconciliation done previously, before opening the ballot box. The total number of ballots cast for each candidate, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total of ballots received at the opening of the polling station. Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. The statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, outside the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transported to a secure local storage room. All these documents are needed in case of a recount. This is why elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box contents are important. For greater security, the poll officials and/or poll workers, as well as a representative of the political party/candidate/option could even sign the seal. The poll official should keep one official copy in case of loss. Count of Spoiled/Rejected Ballots
Why They Should Be Counted Spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots need to be counted to create a complete audit trail. These ballots remain official documents, even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount. Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots To eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the poll official should be provided with clear rules of interpretation, and illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for rejection of a ballot. Minimizing the interpretation needed by the poll official makes it easier to make the necessary decisions, and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favour of one candidate, a recount is likely to be requested, and rejected ballots will be carefully analyzed. Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections In several jurisdictions, the poll official is the only person qualified to make the final decision regarding the validity of a ballot, even if all poll workers are involved in the counting process. He is also the person handling disputes regarding objections (for more information see Challenging Results). If a representative of a candidate or a political party disagrees with the poll official on the validity of a ballot, he may challenge the decision. In most cases, the poll official must immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. In order to make more consistent decisions, the poll official may put all contested and questionable ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots. He can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. The rest of the valid ballots can then be added to the count for each political party/ candidate/option. Alternatively, all potential 'reject' ballots can be identified and decided on first, and then the valid ballots can be counted. One way of accounting for rejected ballots is to number them on the back. The same number will be written in the voting record book or the statement of the vote (or a separate form can also be used), along with the decision made by the poll official. All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes as well as on the ballot account form.
Count of Valid Ballots
The poll official and/or the poll workers often use a count sheet to count the ballots. Sometimes the poll clerk performs this task. The representatives of political parties, candidates, and everybody observing the count may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the poll official in charge of the count. The proper information regarding the polling station number and the electoral district should be written at the top or bottom of the form. Each column should show the names of the candidates (or party or option) as they appear on the ballot. There are two common types of count sheets: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate/party/option, and the other where you draw a square with a diagonal mark denoting five votes (see Tally sheet Togo - Guinea and Tally sheet - Canada). In the first case, each square may be marked with a tick for each vote for a candidate/party/ option. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. In the second case, four vertical marks and a diagonal one are made. Each square represents five votes for a candidate/party/option. To correct mistakes, if several count sheets are used at once then there is only a need to correct errors when the results of the count are no longer synchronized. Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate at certain set times (every one hundred ballots for example). Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count all over again. Verification of Count
Once the ballots are counted, a verification of the count is recommended. This verification is usually the last one before the interim results are transmitted to the local office of the electoral management body. This final verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour of or against one candidate/party/option. This last verification should include a comparison to the reconciliation done previously, before opening the ballot box. The total number of ballots for each candidate, plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the polling station. Where envelopes are used, they should be recounted as well in order to match with the number of voters who cast their ballots. If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other poll workers. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate/party/option should be re-examined and recounted. Sealing the Ballots
To secure their contents, the ballot boxes should be re-sealed, with all the ballots considered during the count inside, before returning the box to a local secure storage room. This measure is very important in case of a recount. In certain jurisdictions (see Vote Counting in Burkina Faso, Vote Counting in Ghana and Counting Ballots in Sweden for a tangible country case), forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voters' list are also sealed in the ballot box along with the ballots. The statement of the vote should not be sealed with the other documents, but should be put in a separate envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box. However, this envelope should itself be sealed in order to make sure that no unauthorized person has access to the results and that any changes that are attempted can be detected by higher authorities. A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the electoral management body separately from the ballot box before the ballot box is moved for secure storage. Many systems require delivery of all materials to the responsible authority. The question of whether or not the voting record book should be sealed in the ballot box, or placed with the statement of the vote, is an important one. If the voting record book is used to record transactions that fall outside ordinary voting, then it can be useful to have it available for inspection upon the demand of the electoral management body without having to go before a judge (which is the case in some jurisdictions). Also, the voting record book can be useful to the electoral management body when the time comes to do the official count. Access to it will help to understand any mistakes that have been made regarding the preparation of the statement of the vote, or other procedures related to vote counting. Also, since representatives of political parties and candidates are allowed to witness the official count, they could consult it as well. In any case, the voting record book is an important document, and should be safely kept, sealed in the box, or placed on the outside of the ballot box in the envelope with the statement of the vote. Ballots (and envelopes where applicable) should be placed in bundles, by category (candidates, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box. Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transported to the local storage room. The seal number, if applicable, should be written on the statement of the vote or on the acknowledgement of receipt of the ballot box when delivered to the local storage place. Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to re-seal the ballot box before it is moved. Once again, in the event of a recount, all these documents are needed which explains why elaborate precautions for sealing the ballot box are important. If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the ballot box seal be signed by the poll officials and/or poll workers as well as representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Transmitting Polling Station Results
Once the vote counting process is over, the poll clerk and/or poll official prepares the statement of the vote for a polling station, see Statements of the vote (interim results) - Canada. This form indicates the election results and should include standard information, such as the name of the electoral district, the name and/or number of the polling station, and election date. Specific information on the count should include:
The poll official, as well as the representatives of political parties/ candidates/options sign the form. They should provide their printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers, if any, along with their signatures. If there is a problem, it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them. Some jurisdictions require all poll workers present at the polling station to sign the statement of votes. Once the form is completed, the results should be given orally, or transmitted electronically, to the local office of the electoral management body to allow them to gather interim results as soon as possible. The poll official is responsible for communicating the interim results. The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, modem, or fax, using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results. However, the communications infrastructure of parts of some countries does not permit oral or electronic reporting of interim voting results. In such locations, the use of a messenger carrying the statement of the vote may be the only available alternative. After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the statement of the votes should be transmitted to the same office of the electoral management body by hand in a sealed envelope. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and provide evidence of any tampering with results. Representatives of a political party/candidate/option should be allowed to copy the results. The poll official should keep a copy and another is posted at the polling station. The original is placed in a sealed envelope and attached to the ballot box for use by the electoral management body. Also, any national and international electoral observers should have the right to transcribe the results from the official statement of the vote for the polling station. As print or electronic media are considered a key element in a free democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results, either at the polling stations or at the offices of the electoral management body where results are being reported, unless there are valid security considerations related to the release of partial and unofficial results. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question. The electoral management body is responsible for proper accreditation of personnel allowed at the polling station or results collection office during the counting phase. The media representatives on site should wear identification proving this accreditation. Issue of Transparency The issue of transparency is very significant at the time of the release and transmission of interim results. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options should sign and have a copy of the statement of the vote and should be allowed to witness the transmission of the corresponding results to the electoral management body. Indeed, such transparency of actions is essential in the acceptance of the general outcome of the election. This seemingly small step can directly impact the confidence all participants have in the results gathering process. Importance of Contingency Plans Communications technology plays an increasingly important role in the transmission of voting results. If the supporting systems used by the electoral management body fail, postponement of interim results can ensue, creating numerous administrative, technical, and logistical problems. In addition, such failures tend to be politically embarrassing to the electoral management body. To avoid such failures, a contingency plan should be implemented, and fully tested prior to election day. Identification of a second telephone close to each polling station can be done prior to election day, and can represent an economical alternative in case of technology failure. Computerized call answering machines can be linked and duplicated in the event that one fails. Radio can also be used. Finally, a manual alternative to electronic transmission of results, such as the use of couriers or hand delivery, can become the contingency. Obviously, the selection of a contingency plan is driven by local context and circumstances in the jurisdiction. In some circumstances, prior agreement with security forces to use their communications equipment can be negotiated, or partnership or collaboration with private companies to use their facilities can be made as a backup plan.
Polling Station Statement of Votes
The polling station statement of the votes, see Statements of the vote (interim results) - Canada is the interim results form. The poll official and/or poll clerk normally completes this form. One statement of the votes form should be filled out per polling station, even in the case of voting locations housing multiple polling stations. Each polling station has its own ballot box or boxes. The statement of the votes form could include the following general information:
They should include their printed names, addresses and telephone numbers, if any, along with their signatures. In case of any problem, it will then be easier for the electoral management body to locate and contact them. Specific information on the count should include:
(It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on polling day, and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms. Please refer to Election Day Registration Additions and Revisions and Election Day Registration Additions and Revisions for more details on election day registration.) Additional detailed information, such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box, or of the ballot box itself, is required in some jurisdictions. In several jurisdictions, this form is an important document since it provides the information used by the electoral management body to release both interim and final results. The poll clerk and the poll official responsible for the counting should complete this form with utmost care. Issuance of Statement of Votes
The statement of the votes for a polling station should be prepared with care since it represents the interim and final (unless subjected to a recount) results of the election for a polling station. This form is usually prepared and signed by the poll clerk and/or the same person who handled the counting of the ballots (usually the poll official). The form should then be signed by representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Their signatures are very important in order to reflect and demonstrate that they agree and acknowledge the results. They should include their printed names, addresses and telephone numbers, if any, on the form along with their signatures. In case of any problem, the electoral management body will then be able to contact these individuals more easily. Following the principle of transparency, it is strongly recommended that national/international electoral observers, as well as representatives of political parties/candidates/options, are permitted to make a copy of the statement of the votes. Communicating Results
Once the statement of the votes of the polling station is completed, the poll official should communicate the interim results to the local offices of the electoral management body (and in certain cases, to the electoral management body directly). In the case of voting locations housing multiple polling stations, the person responsible (known in some jurisdictions as the central poll supervisor) should obtain the results from each poll official and transmit them. In many countries the electoral management body maintains local or regional offices during the electoral period. The interim results are generally communicated to the local office, which, in turn, communicates a cumulative statement of the votes for the electoral district to the national headquarters office. Communicating Interim Results The interim results for each polling station, using the statement of the votes (see Statements of the vote (interim results) - Canada), should be transmitted to the office of the local electoral management body by phone (cellular or fixed line), or other means such as radio, if such exists. It is recommended that a unique password or code be provided to the person who will transmit the results. For security reasons, this is best done by the electoral management body during the day of the election itself. This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, and screen out unauthorized persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the local office of the electoral management body. If a fax machine is available on the counting premises, it can be used to send a copy of the statement of votes to the electoral management body. Specific measures should be taken to control access to the fax machine and number, to reduce the risk of any transmissions of unofficial statements of the votes. In all cases, the statement of the votes sent by fax should be signed by the poll clerk and/or the poll official, and/or all poll workers, and by representatives of political parties/candidates/options present at the count. For greater security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original form should be sent separately to the local electoral management body in a sealed envelope. This envelope should be sent along with the electoral materials by hand or by courier. By sending the original, the local electoral management body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically, and ensure they are the same. If the availability of phone (cellular or fixed) at a polling station is a problem, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use. However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any black-out regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages. Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to poll workers before deployment. If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election official of the results to the local electoral management body. If this is not possible, the last alternative is to designate a messenger. This messenger should be a credible person and the choice of such person should be accepted by counting workers, as well as representatives of the political parties/candidates/options. When using this method, the messenger could also bring the ballot box and its contents, eliminating the need for additional transport arrangements. A tamper-evident bag is recommended for this kind of transport, in order to ensure that results are not changed in transit. This is often a thick plastic bag, signed by the persons at the original location that, once sealed, cannot be opened without damaging the bag. Consequently, the receivers can be confident that the bag is the same upon its arrival at headquarters. For this kind of manual transportation of results, a trail of signatures of those handing over the materials, and those receiving them, is essential, and constant accompaniment of the materials by election staff, as well as by national/international electoral observers is recommended. Role of Media News agencies and media organizations will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the closing of the polls. They will dispatch their representatives as close as possible to the scene of the electoral action. The offices of the electoral management body are the most likely media targets, mainly for efficiency reasons. At a centre for collecting results for polling stations, one representative can cover a wide area, and can report for a reasonable number of polling stations. However, for various reasons, the media also may want to access the polling stations during the counting process. As the print or electronic media are considered a key element in a free democratic society, it is recommended that they be given controlled access to counting and polling stations, especially if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question. To keep control on who is allowed at the polling station during the counting phase, proper accreditation should be given in advance by the electoral management body, and corresponding identification should be worn by the media representatives. Also, to minimize the disruption of counting activities, there should be agreements that media personnel will not intervene, or seek interviews while the counting process is taking place, nor take photographs unless given specific permission for each photo. If the media decide to concentrate their representatives at regional or local electoral management body offices, specific physical areas should be set aside to accommodate them. If they require specific installations, such as telephones or fax lines, they should make their needs known well before polling day, and appropriate cost sharing arrangements could be made in advance. If the media concentrate their operation at the regional or local electoral management body offices, periodic reports should be made available to them. Such reports can be given to them at regular intervals: for example after each five or ten polling stations reporting. The report given to the media should include the turnout in a polling station, the results by party/candidate/option, and the figures for spoiled and rejected ballots. Usually, media should be allowed to have access to the same interim results provided by the electoral management body to representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Route of 'Official' Statement of Votes Copies of the voting results should be provided to the electoral management body by the poll official, and the right to copy the results should be given to representatives of political parties/candidates/options, and to national/ international electoral observers. Such copies can be the result of a multi-part carbon copy form, or through the use of photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand transcription. The original statement of the votes should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. This is particularly important to processing a recount of the ballots, if required. Once the statement of the votes for a polling station is fully prepared and transmitted to the local electoral management body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the polling station. This way, the same information and results are made available for everybody, and at the same time. Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinize the counting process, results are public. The statement of the votes becomes a public document; this is made especially evident once it is posted. However, it is important to mention that these results are not official yet, but are only interim results: official final results will always take legal precedence. Consolidating Voting Results
Local Level At the national level, as well as at the local level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several locations at the same time. When possible, efficiency is improved if one phone number or fax number is given to people transmitting the interim results to the local office of the electoral management body. Most telephone systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically switch to the next available phone unit on that line. A form with pre-printed information blocks needed during vote result collection should be provided to staff answering the phone. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit them to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results for the electoral district. A wall chart, chalkboard chart, or spreadsheet listing each polling station should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each poll is received, the combined result for the entire electoral district should be updated. This summary will be sent to the national level. National Level At the national level, the same type of logistics should be used, but on a larger scale. Fax communications are easier at the national level. Since the information needed is already written, it can help to speed up the process for data entry or manual tabulation. Also, a similar spreadsheet should be used at the national level listing all electoral districts. A first quick quality control check should be done to verify if the results make sense or not. A more exhaustive quality control checking procedure, for each electoral district and its polling stations, will need to be done when the final, official results are compiled. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the polls). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national interim results. For interim results, all types of ballots (if possible) should be included so as to avoid any major discrepancy between interim results and final results. Special ballots, write-in ballots, mail-in ballots, as well as ballots cast on ordinary polls, advance polls, and mobile polls should be part of the count for interim results. For more details on these ballots, please refer to Voting Procedures. Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to election day, or after the closing of the polls on election day. If the latter is the case, then the counting procedure should be designed carefully, so it will still be possible to include special ballot results in the interim results. For the special ballots (mail-in and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. Different coloured envelopes will facilitate the sorting by category. For mail-in ballots, three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter or other administrative information), and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot. After verification of proper registration and no previous vote having been taken, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still inside. If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, the results should be kept highly secure, and only released at the closing of the polls on election day. In some systems special ballots are counted after the polling day, and in others, on polling day. If advance polls take place over several days, a reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is done to create an audit trail of ballot usage. The advance poll ballot boxes are then kept safely until polling day, and counting should take place at an office of the electoral management body at the closing time of the ordinary polls. The counting of advance poll ballots should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties/candidates/options, as well as national/international electoral observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary polls. Counting for mobile voting stations may take place at the last place visited, or at an office of the electoral management body. To count the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance polls may be applied, but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated voters takes place prior to election day. If ballot boxes and results are delivered simultaneously (i.e. where telephones, fax etc. are not available), the local office of the electoral management body should carefully plan the reception of the ballot boxes and the results. Some measures should be carefully planned to avoid confusion, if all the ballot boxes and results are arriving at the same time. First, to respect the order of arrival, a receiving official could immediately give a number to the person arriving from a polling station with the ballot box and the results. Then, in chronological order, the identity of each delivery person should be verified, the polling station identified, and the results should immediately be taken and placed in a specified area ready to be compiled. The receiving official should then verify the ballot box, and the authenticity of its seals, and prepare a receipt for the person who delivered the materials, as well as one for the electoral management body. The ballot box should then be removed from the reception area and be placed in a secure storage room where more detailed verification can be done. Use of Technology Phones and faxes are widely used in the transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone, an identification number or code should be given to them. A password may also be considered for fax transmissions. This is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorized people calling in and giving false results. Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be done. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built in to restrict the transmission of results to authorized persons who are permitted access to the system. For all types of transmission, the systems must be tested prior to polling day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A technical specialist should also be available at any time, in case of system failure. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested, and fully available. Receiving Result Counts
Local Level In most cases, the local electoral management body will be receiving the results directly from the polling station on election day. They will then compile the results for the electoral district and send it to the national electoral management body by fax (or other means). The poll officials will call the local level directly to communicate the results of each poll. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to poll officials calling the local electoral management body. It is important, however, that the phone system be installed in such a way that the calls 'bounce' to the next available device on that line. Adequate phones or fax machines (as well as other electronic links) to cope with peak demands should be installed. For more efficiency, the staff answering the phone at the local level should have a pre-printed form for recording results with the names of candidates/ parties/options in the same order as they appear on the ballot paper. This will prevent confusion and mistakes in the data entry. A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various polling stations should be provided to the staff as well. Once again, only the poll officials should communicate to the regional/district electoral management body office to transmit the results of the polling stations. One team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the electoral district. A spreadsheet or a board listing each polling station should be prepared and completed as the results are received. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options, as well as media should have access to this spreadsheet or board, so that they can observe the results as they come in. Special measures should be taken so as to make sure that the same results are not given twice. Numbering the polling stations and corresponding ballot boxes is a simple way to avoid such confusion. However, if such a measure is taken, it should be done at the beginning of the election process, and this number should be used consistently on all forms used for the election, as well as on the ballot box. The use of such a number will also facilitate the creation of an audit trail. The local electoral management body should send its compiled results to the national electoral management body in several stages to accelerate the process of releasing interim results. Then, the national electoral management body will compile, for each electoral district, a summary of interim results for the country. Since interim results are not official results, in some countries it is not necessary for the electoral management body to compile preliminary indications of the voting figures. The media and the non-governmental organizations compile and publicize the interim results while the electoral management body concentrates on compiling the official results and communicating them formally. National Level At the national level, the same type of logistics for receiving the results should be used, but on a larger scale. Also, when all the results are coming in at the same time, the staff responsible for the incoming results should first make a quick quality control check in order to verify if the results make sense or not, for example, whether or not the totals are correct. A comparison with the number of voters registered on the electoral list to the number of voters who cast their vote is a simple and effective way to identify major mistakes. A more exhaustive quality control, for each electoral district and polling station, will be done when the final official results are compiled. Some electoral districts might need more attention than others, especially those that are the subject of intense political campaign activities, or those with a higher degree of administrative difficulties, such as a very high concentration of registered voters (the core of a large city, for example). On election day, these electoral districts might need to be monitored more closely by the national electoral management body. For the national level, receiving results from regional/district offices by fax is easier and more efficient than by phone. However, whatever form is used for transmission of the results should be standard in order to facilitate the collection of summary interim results. The need for data entry source documents is critical if a computerized system is used to tabulate results. A global spreadsheet, either manual or electronic, with all the electoral districts listed can be completed as the results come in. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the polls), and the required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed. In case of emergency, the head office of the electoral management body should always be able to reach their local offices, especially when results are coming in. Whenever possible, a direct phone line should be set up within each local electoral management body, so that the national electoral management body will be able to reach the person (generally the district electoral officer) in charge at any time. The phone number should not be the same one used by the poll officials calling in their interim results. Special Counts Special ballots are usually returned to the head office of the electoral management body. In some legislation, absentee voting takes place in embassies (please refer to Voting in a Foreign Country for voting in foreign countries). If this is the case, then ballots are counted locally, following the same procedures as ballots counted in the country, and results are then communicated directly to the head office of the electoral management body. Depending on the rules of the system used, the legal framework and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be accepted only five days prior to polling day, or right up until polling day itself. If special ballots are accepted right until election day, counting procedures should be designed so as not to let the count delay the publication of interim results. Please refer to Absentee Voting for more details. Envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. If different types of ballots are used, different colours of return envelopes for each category of voters using the special ballots are recommended. This helps to speed up the sorting of the envelopes at reception. Once at the head office, a first verification for creating the audit trail is done: receipt of ballots, comparison of the identity of the voter, signature and bar codes (if used), etc. The voter should have been provided with three envelopes: a pre-addressed return envelope, an outer envelope on which the signature of the voter appears, and finally, the secrecy envelope or inner envelope containing the ballot. This secrecy envelope has no marks on it, in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. First, the returned envelope is opened on receipt, and the outer envelope (containing a secret envelope) is removed. If the identification of the voter is positive, the external envelope is opened, and the secrecy envelope (but not the ballot) is then removed from and inserted into a ballot box. Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before election day, or at the beginning of election day, or at the closing of the polls on election day. However, counting these ballots may take a very long time, depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used. Counting special ballots before election day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are only released when the results of ordinary polls are known. For the advance polls, and sometimes, for incarcerated voters, counting procedures are quite different. If the advance polls take place over several days, a reconciliation may be done at the end of each day. Some jurisdictions require that the ballot box be opened at the end of each advance poll day, and unused ballots, used ballots (which are not counted) and spoiled ballots be sealed in separate envelopes, as well as the electoral list and the poll book. This measure is mainly for control and creation of a full audit trail of ballot usage. For incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance polls may also be applied, but only if the vote took place prior to election day. The ballot boxes for advance polls are kept safely until the closing of ordinary polls on election day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary polls. If possible, the same poll workers who took the votes for the advance polls should be there for the counting. Counting of these ballots should take place at the regional/district office of the electoral management body in the presence of representatives of political parties/candidates/options. The counting procedures are virtually identical to the ones used for counting at ordinary polls. The counting of votes from mobile polling stations may take place at the last station visited by the poll workers, or at a local office of the electoral management body. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of the polls on election day. The location of the count of mobile polling stations should be known by representatives of political parties/candidates/options, and they should be present for the counting. For the purposes of creating separate audit trails, and for properly reporting the results of advance polls, mobile polling stations, and special ballots, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary polls (depending on legislation). This difference should be made very clear with distinctive statement of the votes forms used for these types of ballots. Cumulative Audit Trail
Once the count is finished in each polling station, all the electoral materials (the ballot box with all the used, unused, rejected, spoiled ballots, the electoral list, unused seals, and other unused materials), as well as relevant forms needed (especially the statement of the vote, the count sheet, the voting record book) for the count audit trail will be transported to a secure local storage room which may be at the local office of the electoral management body. At this point in the process, a first verification of the electoral materials received, using a check list and an acknowledgement of receipt form, should be done by officials of the electoral management body to make sure that each ballot box and everything associated with the audit trail is delivered, and that forms are properly completed and signed. The sealed envelopes (if applicable) containing the statement of the votes of each polling station are opened, in the presence of representatives of political parties/candidates/options, and the contents verified. In the event of a mistake, the poll workers are still available, so if a form is not signed or properly completed (wrong number of polling station for example), proper modification can be done immediately in the presence of representatives of political parties/candidates/options. A more exhaustive quality control can take place in the following days, but it should be done as soon as possible, so that an audit trail of final results is carefully verified and completed. A table, with the number of each ballot box (if any) is frequently created by the electoral management body, and used to verify that every ballot box that was issued to polling sites has been returned. Numbering the ballot boxes is a simple and effective way to keep track of them. If this method of ensuring the return of ballot boxes is used, it is preferable that the same persons remain responsible for receipt of the ballot boxes until all the ballot boxes are received. Clear problem-solving procedures must be established to track down any ballot boxes that are late in arriving, or are not delivered within a reasonable amount of time. For each electoral district, a cumulative statement of the votes (see Adding polling stations results - Guinea) is produced by the local office of the electoral management body. This cumulative count usually includes information such as:
A poll-by-poll detailed report needs to be prepared for the official results of each electoral district, and this cumulative statement of votes is the basis for that report. Using the interim results that are collected (especially if they are captured in computer readable form), and cross-checking the statement of the votes for each ballot box for complete accuracy, results in increased efficiency. Checking Count Results Received Ability to subsequently check the interim count results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and prevent any fraudulent manipulation of electoral results. A copy of the original statement of the votes of each polling station (see Statements of the vote (interim results) - Canada) should be sent separately to the local office of the electoral management body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done, once the original is received. If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the statement of the votes of each polling station. (This paper was used in Togo in 1994.) This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately indicates that the initial inscription is modified. The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper. If modification marks appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific polling station, and the results count, as well as the voting record book should be checked carefully. If the poll clerk simply made a mistake in completing the form at the polling station, then he should add his initials, or signature, as well as those of all poll workers and representatives of political parties/candidates/options to denote agreement with the correction. Results per Party/Candidate
For greater transparency, and to allow people to have access to interim results from all polling stations, results on polling night can be posted on a wall/chalkboard/spreadsheet at each local office of the electoral management body (EMB). This also allows journalists and media to see the interim results as they come in, if no periodic report is available to be provided to them. On polling night, interim results should be counted for each candidate/party/option for each polling station. The local office of the EMB will compile these results and create a summary report per candidate/political party/option to send to the national EMB. They will then count the total electoral district results per political party/candidate/option and indicate these to be the final interim result when forwarding the summary to the national office of the EMB. After the final count, the national office will receive the official poll-by-poll final results and compile them into a national publication. In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerized, before the results are publicly posted. After each five to ten polling stations, a comparison should be made between the two persons responsible for the counts. If results no longer match, the previous few additional figures can easily be verified and corrected. If a computerized system is used, two people should enter the same data at separate computer workstations. The computer systems can be programmed to immediately point out when and where entries do not match exactly for a specific polling station. This makes the process of verification much simpler. Consolidating Results: List Systems
Consolidating results in list systems can be very simple and straightforward or highly complicated, depending on the system and the legal framework. In some cases, it is sufficient to count the votes once, either in the polling station or in a counting centre, but in other cases a recount can be necessary. In such cases, the first count is normally in the polling station and the recount in a counting centre. In close list systems, with no possibility for preferential votes, cumulating etc. and just one list per party, one count is normally sufficient. The numbers per list are added up per electoral district, and the seats are allocated to candidates according to list order. In more complex systems, when a party has more than one list per electoral district, or when the voter may cross out, add candidates, or make preferential marks, cumulate etc., the counting and consolidating of the results are more complicated. The exact number of votes for each list and candidate, including cross-outs, additions etc. must be determined before implementing the electoral formula for allocating seats to parties and candidates. A common procedure in such systems is a preliminary count per party in the polling stations at the close of the polls, and a recount later in counting centres at the electoral district or regional level. In some systems a final compilation of the results must be carried out at national level, for example, to allocate national 'equalizing' seats. The more complex a system, and the more complicated the electoral formulas to be implemented, the more crucial are the transparency aspects of the count. Count sheets, reports from the count, and compilations must be clear, comprehensive, complete, and designed in such a way that the entire process can be followed and controlled by the political parties and the electorate. All relevant information must be published without delay. However, it is essential to make realistic plans for the last phase of the electoral process, and not create exaggerated expectations when it comes to the time of announcement of the final results. When the final results are published by the election authorities, instructions on how to protest must be included in the announcement. See List PR for complementary information on this topic. Consolidating Results: List SystemsConsolidating results in list systems can be very simple and straight forward or highly complicated depending on the system and the legal framework. In some cases it is sufficient to count the votes once either in the polling station or in a counting centre, but in other cases a recount can be necessary. In such cases the first count is normally in the polling station and the recount in a counting centre. In close list systems, with no possibility for preferential votes, cumulating etc. and just one list per party, one count is normally sufficient. The numbers per list are added up per constituency and the seats are allocated to candidate according to list order. In more complex systems when a party have more than one list per constituency or when the voter may cross out, add candidates or make preferential marks, cumulate etc., the counting and consolidating of the results is more complicated. The exact number of votes for each list and candidate, including cross-outs, additions etc. must be determined before implementing the electoral formula for allocating seats to parties and candidates. A common procedure in such systems is a preliminary count per party in the polling stations at the close of the polls and a recount later in counting centre at constituency or regional level. In some systems a final compilation of the results must be carried out at national level for example to allocate national 'equalising' seats. The more complex system and the more complicated electoral formulas to be implemented, the more crucial is the transparency aspects of the count. Tally sheets, reports from the count and compilation must be clear, comprehensive and complete and designed in such a way that the entire process can be followed and controlled by the parties and the electorate. All relevant information must be published without delay. However it is essential to make realistic plans for the last phase of the electoral process and not create exaggerated expectations when it comes to the time of announcement of the final results. When the final results are published by the election authorities, instructions for how to complain must be included in the announcement. Publicizing Election Results
Publicizing election results is a process that must be handled with great care. As the first results available are usually interim results that may need amending or adding up later in the process, careful consideration needs to be given to how and when results are published. Votes are counted in many different ways. In most cases, votes are counted for the first time at the polling stations on election day, after the polls close. In other cases, votes are taken to counting centres before they are counted. In some jurisdictions, these first counts are the only counts made, and the ballot papers are looked at again only if the election result is challenged. or a recount is requested by a candidate, a party, or a court. In other jurisdictions, votes counted once at the polling station level are taken to a counting centre after election day, and rechecked and recounted, recognizing that mistakes are common in the initial count. Votes may be recounted again and again at several stages in the process, depending on the complexity of the electoral system, the need for accuracy, and whether the result is challenged. Election results can be released at various stages in this process. In some cases, results are announced progressively on election night, as each counting unit reports its count. For example, in Australia, as each polling station completes its count, the votes cast for each candidate are reported to a central counting room, where results are cumulated for each candidate in each electoral district, and publicly displayed on a counting board and on computer, and are widely broadcast in the media. Under this system, close results can teeter from one likely outcome to another, as results come in from different areas. While this makes for an exciting event, this level of uncertainty might not be desirable in a more volatile country. In other countries, results for each electoral district are not announced until all of the polling stations have reported their results to the district electoral officer, so that the first published interim results will be close to the final outcome. While some jurisdictions permit voting at polling stations only on a fixed day, others permit voting by several different methods, to cater for voters who are unable to be at a polling station on election day. These can include absentee, mail-in ballots, or advance poll ballots, or mobile voting stations, where voters are visited by polling officials in remote locations, hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, or even their own homes. It is not always possible to count these types of votes on or before election night, so that the tallies of these votes have to be added to any interim results announced on election night. With more complex electoral systems, particularly those that involve distribution of preferences, counting may take days, weeks, or in extreme cases, months. In these cases, results are usually released progressively at each stage of the process. Publishing Interim Election Results
When a decision is taken to publish interim results, it is desirable to do so as quickly as possible. A few hours to a day after polls close is considered a reasonable amount of time to release the first interim results, depending on the local political, logistical circumstances and the electoral system. Where counting takes place over several days, updates are often published at the end of each day's counting. Where votes are counted progressively, or are recounted several times, and interim results are published before the final result is determined, interim results could be misleading. For example, interim results could indicate that a candidate or party was winning a seat, or a particular number of seats, but the final result might be different. Consequently, special precautions are needed to ensure that confusion or civil strife does not occur. The release of interim results should include cautionary language. The authority responsible for releasing results should explain that they are not official final results, and that changes and corrections may be necessary in the process of determining the official final counts. The electoral management body does not necessarily have to release the interim results. In some jurisdictions it is seen as more appropriate for the media or non-governmental organizations to release and announce preliminary indications of the vote. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency, it is desirable that the electoral management body take responsibility for publishing interim results. Depending on the local situation, it may be desirable to include all types of ballots (such as absentee, mail-in, advance vote, and mobile voting station) used in the election when interim results are released, to avoid discrepancies between interim and final results. Whatever decision is taken on the ways of releasing interim results, the conditions must be clearly explained. For example, are all votes included? Are the votes subject to recounts, etc.? In other cases, it may not be possible to wait for these figures to be available without unduly delaying publication of interim figures. In this case it is important to qualify the interim results by pointing out that the results do not yet include these other types of ballots. In some cases it may be possible to count absentee, mail-in ballots, advance vote, or mobile voting station before election day, to enable these results to be included in interim results published on election day. If these special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, these results should be kept very secure, and access to them should be prohibited until the polls close on election day. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. While it allows more complete interim figures to be published, it may also seriously compromise the integrity, turnout, or outcome of the vote if any results are publicly released before the polls close. As it is usual for candidate and party representatives to be present when any votes are counted, this is a real risk. Publication of interim results in countries with multiple time zones before the polls close in some areas may have an undesirable impact on voting behaviour. For countries with multiple time zones, staggered voting hours or a black-out on releasing results may be considered, to allow all voters to vote before knowing the election outcome or trends in other parts of the country. In some circumstances, these measures may not be seen as appropriate or necessary. Staggered opening and closing times might be seen as discriminatory in some countries. Canada, for example, uses staggered hours. Discrepancies between Official and Interim Results Discrepancies between interim results and final official results are generally small, if procedures are well designed and carefully followed. While discrepancies may affect particularly close races in individual electoral districts, they rarely affect the outcome of a general election. Where discrepancies do occur, the electoral management body should issue statements explaining the reasons for the discrepancies, to ensure that public confidence in the system is maintained. Deciding not to Publish Interim Results If a political situation is unusually unstable, the electoral management body could consider not announcing interim results, but only final results, in order to avoid any confusion. This option has its risks, as any delay in publishing final results may itself cause instability. This option is not very practicable where party or candidate representatives are present at the counts, as what happens at these counts is effectively in the public domain. Attempting to suppress information from the counts until the announcement of final results in this case is generally not a realistic option. If political or security concerns are acute, consideration could be given to conducting the count in secret, with only polling officials present, or by swearing candidate and party representatives to secrecy until the counting is final. In general, it is preferable to announce interim results, wherever possible, to enhance the transparency of the election process. Security Considerations The electoral management body needs to take special security measures in order to avoid fraud during the process of compiling interim and final election results. Only authorized persons should have access to the processes used to compile election results. Publicizing Official Final Results
Publication of Official Final Results The appropriate authority should make the official final election results available as soon as possible after the counting process has been concluded (see Statement of vote for officials final results - Canada and Voting abroad registration forms - Spain). Generally, the local or national office of the electoral management body will be responsible for announcing and releasing the official results, unless the courts have a role in certifying the results. Some electoral laws stipulate a fixed day for announcing the official results. Depending on the country and the electoral system being used, an average of one to two weeks is generally needed before detailed preparations are complete for making an official announcement. In many cases the official count can only be concluded once all the ballot papers have been returned to the local electoral management body and all counting steps have been completed, including resolution of any disputes about vote counting (which may result in recounts). Depending on the geography of the country, the communication networks in place, and the electoral system, this process can take from a few hours to several days, weeks, or months to complete. Great care must be taken to ensure that the figures are accurate. Procedures must be in place to ensure that all appropriate checks and balances have been taken into account before the final results are announced. Formal documents showing the results of the count are normally prepared, certified, and signed by the responsible electoral district officer, or other appropriate official. These documents are usually officially published, such as in a Government Gazette, tabled in Parliament, or presented to an appropriate official. Also, copies of these documents are usually provided to candidates and party representatives. Often, formal election results are declared at a public ceremony. Candidates, political party representatives, the media, national/international electoral observers, other interested persons, and the general public are often invited to attend these ceremonies. In some cases, candidates, particularly successful candidates, are given the opportunity to make speeches. It is desirable to produce detailed publications of election results showing the results of the counting at all levels of voting, from polling stations to regions or electoral districts, and the national level. However, in some cases it is desirable to merge some results. Merging Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote It may be desirable to merge or amalgamate results from several polling stations to protect the secrecy of the vote. This is generally done if the publication of results at a detailed level might identify the names and votes of particular individuals. This can happen if the number of votes at a polling station is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party. This can also be done in cases where there is a real risk that publishing the voting results at a particular polling station could result in retribution being visited on the persons who voted there. This problem can be mitigated by mixing the ballots from two or more polling stations from different areas. Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use only, a special notation can be made in order to keep the audit trail clear. Role of Judicial Courts In some countries, judicial courts are only involved in the electoral process after the election, when offenders against the electoral law are brought to trial, or when an electoral result is challenged. In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the outcome and official results of the election, where the results are official only when the court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible, in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from a former government to the one elected. The courts may also be directly involved in the official count, along with the electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from the courts. Challenging ResultsMechanisms for Challenging Results A mechanism for challenging results is desirable at every stage of the vote counting process. This helps to ensure that the election process is transparent, that election authorities are accountable, and that the election outcome is acceptable to all parties. Effective mechanisms for challenging results add to the credibility of an election outcome. If a party to an election is not satisfied that an election has been properly conducted, the ability to effectively challenge the election result will ensure that any genuine errors are corrected, and that any fraudulent activities are identified and dealt with. Conversely, if concerns are baseless, the process of challenging an election outcome should serve to put any concerns to rest, and enhance the credibility of the outcome. If an election cannot be challenged to the satisfaction of all parties, then it is possible that the election outcome will not be accepted, leading to civil or political strife. It is also important that election challenges do not unreasonably delay the election process. Delays in the formation of parliaments and governments can lead to civil or political unrest in extreme cases. Election results can be challenged in several ways, and at several points in the process. Opportunities for challenging results will depend on whether paper ballots, mechanical, or computerized ballots are used. Challenging Results During the Vote Count At the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, when ballot boxes are opened, and ballot papers counted for the first time, observers are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine, whether a ballot paper is formal or informal, or whether it has been correctly sorted to a candidate or party. The polling official in charge of the counting may be given the power to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior polling official can rule on them at a later time. Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, observers may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage, it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper that was made at an earlier count. Where mechanical or computerized voting methods are used, election observers should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities. The methods of disputing the count at this stage will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal, written process. Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be bundled separately, and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. Also, these bundles of disputed ballot papers may be kept separate, so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary. The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process. In some cases, local or international observers may also be given this right. Recounts by Electoral Bodies Where paper ballots are used it is usual to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount, once counting is completed and a result has been obtained. This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved. Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents. Written Requests for Recounts As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible polling official may be given the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount. Generally, recounts are only conducted if an election result is close, and there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count. In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In other cases, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin. If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie. Otherwise, the definition of a 'close' election result will depend on local circumstances, and the estimated margin of error in the first count. The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties are satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount should be conducted. A recount can either be a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count. A recount may be undertaken simply as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. Or a recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it were the original count. Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage. There should be a time limit on applying for a recount. In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a twenty-four hour or forty-eight hour limit. In some cases, recounts may be requested only before the official declaration of the election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal. If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount. Communicating Election Results Before an election result can be challenged, the individuals entitled to make a challenge must be equipped with the necessary information. At each stage of the counting process, it is important to communicate the progressive election results to national/international electoral observers, such as party and candidate representatives. It may also be appropriate to communicate progressive results to the media and the general public. When the election count is concluded, and the election result is officially declared, it is customary to publish an official set of election results. Because challenges may lead to changes in final official results, the election management body should stress that the first published results are preliminary and may change at a later time. This process of communicating the progressive and final election results facilitates the transparency of the electoral process and allows representatives of political parties, for example, the opportunity to challenge the results, if they wish, on the basis of all available information. Challenging Election Results before a Court or Tribunal After any administrative recounts are resolved and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal. A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition. Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, persons eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those mounting a challenge usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result. There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying to an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In Australia, for example, there is a forty-day limit on challenging an election result before a court. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time. At this stage, any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:
Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power to examine ballot papers and other election documents, or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held. Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers and other crucial parts of the electoral process. In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes. How Long should Election Materials be Kept? As a minimum, relevant electoral materials should be securely stored until the last opportunity for challenging an election result has passed. In some cases, this may mean storing electoral materials for the entire life of a parliament. In other cases, electoral materials may be destroyed, once the time for challenging a result before a court or tribunal has passed, or if a challenge has been lodged, after the challenge has been finally dealt with. Only materials relevant to an election outcome need be kept. This will usually include ballot papers, voters' lists, any declarations completed by voters, election results, and any records related to disputed results. If in doubt, it is better to store materials rather than destroy them. Any stored materials must be kept secure from tampering. Ballot papers that may be recounted at a later time cannot be relied upon if the responsible body cannot be sure that they have not been tampered with. Once the decision to destroy electoral materials is taken, the responsible electoral management body should ensure that the materials are destroyed appropriately. Any electoral materials that might identify how an individual voted should be destroyed in such a way as to keep that individual's vote secret. If possible, paper materials should be recycled. Election Challenges and the Political Process Election challenges can be quite disruptive to the electoral and political processes. They can delay the finalization of election results, which in turn can delay the first meeting of the new parliament and the formation of a government. This situation can destabilize a sensitive political environment, and lead to civil unrest. For these reasons, it is important that election challenges are dealt with quickly, efficiently, and with maximum transparency and accountability. The election process is aimed at electing representatives to parliaments that reflect the wishes of the people who voted for them. The processes for challenging election results should be aimed at ensuring that the wishes of the people are accurately reflected in the outcome. Please refer to Vote Counting by Electoral Bodies and Challenges to Validity of Ballots for other details concerning challenging results. Recount at Polling Station
Paper Ballots When ballot boxes are opened and ballot papers counted for the first time at the first stage of the counting process for paper ballots, authorized witnesses are often given the right to challenge whether a ballot paper is genuine, formal or informal, or whether it has been correctly sorted to a candidate or party. Usually, the polling official in charge of the vote counting has the power to rule on disputed ballot papers, or ballot papers can be set aside so that a more senior polling official can rule on them at a later time. Similarly, if ballot papers are recounted at a regional or central counting centre, someone may again challenge decisions taken during the count. At this stage it is usually possible to reverse a decision on a disputed ballot paper made at an earlier count. Mechanical and Computerized Ballots Where mechanical or computerized voting methods are used, representatives of a political party/candidate/option or a candidate should have the right to inspect audit trails and any source documents used, and have the opportunity to challenge any alleged irregularities. The methods of disputing ballot papers at this stage of the count will vary from place to place. In many cases challenges may be made verbally. In some circumstances, it may be desirable to have a more formal written process. Where ballot papers are set aside for the decision of a more senior officer at a later time, these ballot papers should be separately bundled and clearly labelled, so that they can be identified later. These bundles of disputed ballot papers may also be kept separate so that a court or tribunal can rule on them if necessary. The categories of individuals able to challenge a counting decision will also vary. Representatives of candidates and/or parties are often given the right to challenge the counting process. Recount at District/National Level
Some systems have a recount as a normal part of the counting system. This is particularly true for more complex systems such as preferential or parallel systems. Other systems have recount as a way to solve disputes and challenges. Once counting is completed and a result has been obtained, it is usual where paper ballots are used to allow candidates and/or political parties the right to apply for a recount. This means recounting some or all of the ballot papers to satisfy all parties that the correct outcome has been achieved. Depending on the technology used, it may also be feasible to recount an electronic ballot by, for example, reprocessing the original input documents. Requests for recounts are usually made in writing. As recounts can be time-consuming and expensive, the responsible polling official usually has the discretion to decide whether or not to grant a recount. Generally, recounts are conducted only if an election result is close, and there is some doubt as to the accuracy of the count. In some jurisdictions, recounts are automatic if the result is within a certain margin. In other cases, recounts may be mandatory whenever a result is challenged, regardless of the margin. If the initial result is a tie, it is wise, as a general rule, to automatically conduct a recount to determine whether any mistakes were made that, if corrected, could break the tie. Otherwise, the definition of a 'close' election result will depend on local circumstances and the estimated margin of error in the first count. The most important consideration is to ensure that all parties will be satisfied with the outcome. If failure to conduct a recount will lead to one or more parties not accepting the election result, a recount should be conducted. A recount can be either a full recount or a partial recount. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to select some categories to recount, rather than conduct a complete recount. For example, a representative random sample might be chosen to give an indication of the accuracy of the initial count. A recount may be undertaken simply as a check that all ballot papers have been correctly sorted. Or a recount may involve retracing one or more steps and conducting the recount as if it was the original count. Thorough records of any recounts conducted should be kept. These will be necessary to satisfy all parties that proper procedure has been followed, and may be needed if the election result is challenged at a later stage. There should be a time limit on applying for a recount. In most cases recounts will only be permitted within a short time after the completion of counting. For example, there may be a twenty-four hour or forty-eight hour limit. In some cases, recounts may only be requested before the official declaration of the election result. After that time, recourse may only be permitted to a court or tribunal. If the responsible officer decides not to do a recount, a candidate or party may have the right to appeal that decision to a higher authority. That authority, such as a more senior electoral official, may in turn decide whether or not to do a recount. Judicial Recounts
After any administrative recounts are resolved, and the electoral authority has officially declared the election result, there may be further opportunity to challenge the election result by appeal to a court or a special election appeal tribunal. A challenge to a court or tribunal is generally made in a formal legal petition. Challenges may be made by candidates, parties, individuals eligible to vote in the election, or by the electoral administration. Those mounting a challenge usually have to argue a case for challenging an election result. There will generally be a time limit on challenging election results before a court or tribunal. This limit is usually longer than that applying to an administrative recount, as the legal nature of court or tribunal proceedings require greater preparation. In Australia, for example, there is a forty-day limit on challenging an election result before a court. In addition, the court or tribunal may be required to hand down its decision within a specified time. At this stage any aspect of the election may be questioned, including:
Courts or tribunals considering disputed elections may have the power to examine ballot papers and other election documents or order recounts of ballot papers. They are usually given the power to decide to confirm the original election result, or to overturn the election result and declare a different result. They may also have the power to order that another election must be held. Courts and tribunals may be bound by precedents set by previous election challenge rulings. To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, it is important to consistently interpret electoral laws. In particular, each electoral system will have a set of rules defining acceptable marks that may be used on ballot papers. In some cases it may be possible to appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal to a higher authority. In other cases, statutes specify that there cannot be appeals against the decision of an election court or tribunal. This helps to prevent election results and the formulation of parliaments and governments being unduly delayed by legal processes. Vote Counting at Counting Centres
In several elections, for reasons outlined in Vote Counting at Polling Stations, votes are initially counted at voting stations; in some cases they are subsequently recounted at counting centres. There are cases, however, where no counting is done at voting stations, but ballots are transported directly to centralised counting centres after the close of the polls. Rationale for Counting Centres Some combination of the following scenarios warrants consideration of a counting centre approach:
In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more polls are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by polling station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation. This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge). Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots. This includes absentee ballots, mail-in ballots from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail). Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable polls, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee ballots. There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre. The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system of the Commonwealth type, the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level. In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on (see Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count). Transportation to the Counting Centre At the closing of the polls, poll workers seal the ballot boxes and prepare them to be transported to a counting centre along with related documents such as the ballot account form. Each ballot box is then sorted and tallied. The content of the ballot box can be counted separately or mixed with two or more boxes together, after reconciliation, to protect the identity of a poll and/or voters. The statement of the vote for each counting centre is sent to a regional or national counting centre and the representatives of political parties, National/international electoral observers are allowed to copy the results. Releasing interim results is generally much slower when ballots are counted at counting centres. There are several reasons for this:
The logistical complexities of moving ballot boxes and related materials to the counting centre can be an obstacle if transportation is difficult or not readily available. Systems are required to receive and store the ballot boxes efficiently while the need to transport the ballot boxes may make it difficult to maintain transparency and retain confidence in the voting system, the counting system, and the election body concerned. Resulting delays in the announcement of the results can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud during the delivery of boxes or the consolidation of the results of the count. To ensure the success of the counting process, there are administrative considerations and training requirements related to vote counting at counting centres which need to be addressed early in the electoral process and once decided, they must be respected. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with their respective processes. Procedures At the closing of the voting station authorised persons and poll workers stay in the voting station and prepare the ballot box for transportation from the voting station to the counting centre. The slot of the ballot box is closed and sealed and the first reconciliation of ballots is done before completing the ballot account form. The seals on the ballot box are then verified along with all forms in sealed envelopes attached to the ballot box. The waybill or transport form is completed according to the type of transportation used. Important security measures need to be taken to ensure that the ballot boxes will arrive safely at the counting centre. Once at the counting centre, unloading of ballot boxes should be carefully planned and supervised and movement of all ballot boxes should be tightly controlled. All forms related to transportation and movement of the ballot boxes will be completed and verified so that any ballot boxes that are missing can be traced. The ballot box is checked and then sent to a planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes ready-to-be-counted (see Count Checklist for an example of a counting center set-up). From there individual ballot boxes are delivered to the appropriate counting table. The ballot box is opened and once the contents of the ballot box are emptied, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles before being tallied: valid ballots (by candidate/political party/option), and rejected ballots. To facilitate the decision making process, clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and known in advance. (See Quick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh for an example of a quick reference guide used in Bangladesh; Closing instructions for the deputy Returning Officer - Canada used in Canada; and training manuals from South Africa Manual - South Africa and Bosnia Manual - counting at counting centres - Bosnia). Representatives of political parties/candidates/options should be able to examine the rejected ballots and, if they do not agree with the decision of the counting official, be allowed to make formal objections which can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Using a count sheet, all valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and rejected ballots are counted - none should be destroyed at this stage of the process. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote for each ballot box. The ballot box can then be re-sealed and appropriate counting documentation can be completed and either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope. The ballot box is then transferred to a pre-planned location in the counting centre where counted ballot boxes are securely stored. Once there, the person in charge will verify, count, and label each ballot box creating the cumulative audit trail for the counting centre. All the ballot boxes are safely kept at the counting centre until further notice from the Electoral Management Body.
The results recorded on the statement of the vote for each ballot box will be communicated to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre. While preparing the cumulative statement of the vote for the entire counting centre, progress reports will also be prepared and sent to the central office of the Electoral Management Body as results for electoral districts are available. Results will be transmitted directly to the national Electoral Management Body so they can be released as they come in. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options as well as National/international electoral observers, if present, should be allowed to make copies of the progress reports, the statement of the vote for each ballot box, and the cumulative statement of the votes. The national office of the Electoral Management Body adds the results transmitted as well as results of special ballots, advance polls, mobile voting station, etc. All results should be tallied per political party/candidate/option and publicised as soon as possible. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply. To be able to implement such procedures regarding vote counting at counting centres, it is essential that appropriate training be conducted. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations (see Administrative Considerations) will need to be forecast in the budget for the election or referendum. During training and managing a counting centre it is important to emphasise non-partisanship in the conduct of the work. Numerous jurisdictions require that all counting workers sign an oath (see Oath of a Poll Clerk - St Vincent and the Grenadines) to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved. Counting workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear any badge or clothing with political slogans or logos. Since the counting official at each table will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal with representatives of political parties/candidates/options. This person (if applicable according to the legislation) will also have to make the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process. In many jurisdictions, counting officials can be legally prosecuted if their work is proven to be partisan during the counting process. To ensure that the level playing field concept is adhered to, it is recommended that all political parties designate a representative to be present in each counting centre and assign these representatives to scrutinise the counting process. However, it remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every counting table or not. Many jurisdictions consider the presence of political party representatives to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process. Indeed, when the time comes to make an important decision during the counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed and agree with the decision. Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent. Record the 'History' of Each Ballot Box At the counting centre, just as at the voting station, the election management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box from the moment it leaves the local office of the Electoral Management Body until it returns with the counted ballots (especially important when the ballot papers of two ballot boxes or more are mixed together). An adequate audit trail will allow the Electoral Management Body to maintain full control and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each ballot box is a simple method of implementing such a control system. The same number should appear, as well, on each form used at the voting station and at the counting centre. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box is evident in cases of judicial recount. In general, the major process components of vote counting at counting centres are the following:
Preparation for Ballot Box Transport
The preparatory process related to transportation of any ballot box is very important, especially if counting takes place at a counting centre. When ballot boxes are transported from the voting station to the counting centre, important security control must be provided prior to transportation such as verification of the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box and on the slot. In addition, ballot boxes must be accompanied from the departure from the voting station to the arrival at the counting centre. The ballot boxes should never be left without supervision at any time. Fear of manipulation of the ballot box contents during transportation must be procedurally addressed, and measures to ensure that the contents of the ballot boxes remain intact must be respected, communicated, and enforced. Ideally, poll workers as well as two or more party representatives in the same vehicle should accompany ballot boxes and supplies. These measures are designed to prevent fraud and ensure that any tampering that occurs will be easily detected. The control measures should be publicised and known in advance by all participants in the process, including the public, as an indication of transparency. Controls on the movement of 'live' ballot boxes are essential to maintain the integrity of a democratic electoral process. The selection of the carrier, whether it be private sector or public, (belonging to the Armed Forces or the Police), should be decided before the election is called and should take into consideration several factors: reliability, speed, coverage of the territory, availability of contingency measures, etc. The choice of transportation methods as well as the organization assigned to perform transport will be a key determinant in the success of the operation. The confidence in the entire election can be affected if the transportation is not entirely secure and properly carried out. At the closing of the polls, the slot of the ballot box should be sealed so that no additional ballots can be put into the ballot box during transportation. The serial numbers of the official seals used should be written in the respective poll books and/or on the transportation forms (see Movement of ballot box - Bosnia). Then, the poll official counts the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots, and spoiled ballots. This total should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. If any discrepancies are found, the poll official should recount until the missing ballots are found or make the appropriate amendments to the forms (ballot account form, transportation forms, and the poll book) noting the discrepancy. All the forms are put into sealed envelopes and attached to the ballot box. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options can append their signatures on the seals used by the poll official or can use their own seals. The ballot box is then ready to be transported to the counting centre. The transportation form should be completed in multiple copies and given to authorised persons. The voting official, representatives of political parties/candidates/options, the person in charge of reception of the ballot boxes at the counting centre, the Electoral Management Body and the person responsible for the ballot boxes during transportation should each have a copy of the transportation form. For more details on the close of the poll, please refer to Close of Voting. Creation of Ballot Account
Reconciling Ballots Counting the number of ballots received (from the electoral management body) is one of several tasks to be accomplished at the opening of the polls. In countries where each party has its own ballot and where envelopes are used, it is important to count ballots and envelopes and to verify that all party's ballots are available to the voters. This is an important aspect of the audit trail, as this figure will be needed to reconcile the number of ballots used/unused after the voting has taken place. To ensure completeness, all ballots received should be counted, and serial numbers on the counterfoils (as applicable) should be verified through inspections of the ballot booklets. It is appropriate, especially if ballots are delivered by hand, that the ballot quantities be counted in the presence of the officer who delivered them. A receipt can be signed with a copy then attached to the voting record book. More important, however, is that the count be done at the polling station, in the presence of all representatives of political parties/candidates/options. In all cases, the information should be written in the ballot accounting form. Once the ballots are counted and proper observations are made on the appropriate forms, then all persons present at the polling station should be shown that the ballot box is empty before placing security seals on the ballot box. The serial number(s) of the seal(s) should be written in the voting record book and on any other appropriate form. These procedures are very important, as they constitute the start of an important audit trail. Many mistakes can be prevented if these procedures are followed. If discrepancies occur, steps can be retraced back to the beginning of ballot marking. Once these preliminary procedures are completed, the person in charge may announce that the polling station is officially open to the first voter. At closing time, the person in charge of the polling station should announce officially the closing of the poll. The poll official should ensure then that only pre-authorised persons are allowed to process or witness the procedures for preparing the ballot box for transportation to the counting centre. Poll workers, National/international electoral observers, representatives of political parties, and candidate agents, should be permitted to stay. If no one except the poll workers are present, the last voters may be asked to stay to witness the preparation.
The presence of the representatives of the political parties/candidates/options and National/international electoral observers is an important element of the transparency that must be demonstrated in a democratic election. Reconciliation and Procedures in Case of Discrepancies During the closing of the poll and before starting the reconciliation, the poll official should seal the slot of the ballot box, using an official seal with serial numbers. Then the poll official must count the numbers of used ballots by counting the used counterfoils (the ballot box remains sealed), unused ballots and spoiled ballots. The total of these three categories should balance with the number of ballots received at the opening of the polling station. Verification of the number of voters who voted on election day should also be done using the marked-up voters' list and the voting record book entries. It may be necessary to look at the voting record book as some jurisdictions authorize registration of voters on polling day and these may be added using the voting record book. Other jurisdictions use separate forms. Please refer to Election Day Registration Additions and Revisions and Election Day Registration Additions and Revisions for more details on election day registration. This information can be written on a ballot account form (see Tally sheet - Canada), signed by the poll official and/or the poll clerk, poll workers, as well as party representatives. In case of discrepancies in the reconciliation process, the count should be repeated by verifying the observations made in the voting record book for the spoiled ballots. This can also be accomplished by recounting the unused ballots and the used counterfoils. If discrepancies remain, then verification with a higher authority (the district electoral officer and/or the Electoral Management Body) of the number of ballots sent to the polling station should be done to verify figures and to inform these authorities of the situation. Keeping higher authorities informed of any problems is an important part of the transparency required in an election. If no satisfactory answer for the discrepancy is found, corrections and amendments to the voting record book, reconciliation form, or any other relevant form should be made to reflect the appropriate number of ballots. To validate these new figures, and to ensure that everybody who should know is informed of the situation and agrees with it - poll workers, political parties' representatives, and candidates' agents present at the polling station for the vote count. These parties should complete a report and sign the forms and/or the voting record book. This new figure should then become the official one for the polling station. All the documents and forms prepared should be put into a sealed envelope or plastic bag and attached to the ballot box. To facilitate the transportation, a bag large enough to contain the ballot box and all the sealed envelopes attached to it can be used and sealed prior to transportation. If the ballot box is too big or heavy, the envelopes should be securely taped onto the ballot box while ensuring that the seals of the ballot boxes are still legible and intact. For more details on opening procedures and closing procedures, please refer to Voting Procedures and Close of Voting. Providing Security Controls
When ballot boxes are transported from the polling station to the counting centre, important security controls should be provided prior to transportation. These measures can prevent fraud and ensure that if tampering occurs it will be detected. In addition, these controls are essential to the transparency and integrity demonstrated in the democratic electoral process. Poll officials must ensure adherence to the security procedures, and representatives of political parties/candidates/options should be encouraged to witness them. The poll official should verify that the seal on the ballot box closure is still unbroken and that the serial number is the same as the one recorded at the opening of the polling station. The serial number of the seal put on the slot of the ballot box after the close of voting should be verified as well. No ballot box should be transported without being sealed. Maintaining records of the serial numbers of the seals, and allowing representatives of political parties/candidates/options to also maintain such records, is important and useful. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options may wish to put their own seals on the ballot box or simply sign, or attach their initials on, the ones used by the Electoral Management Body. If political parties (candidates/option/supporters) put their own seals on the ballot box, there has to be early consultation to ensure that the seals they use will fit on the ballot boxes and that the ballot boxes will be able to accommodate all the seals. The format and design of the seals should be specified to prevent them from using their seals as advertising stickers. The required strength of the seals should be specified and enforced: if this is not done, the seals may break or fall off while in transit, causing unnecessary complaints, see 4. Controls on the process of manufacturing the official seals used by the Electoral Management Body must provide adequate guarantees that seal substitution will not be possible. In addition, the seals must be strong enough to ensure that they will not break in transit due to the stress of movement of the boxes. It is highly recommended that proper testing be done prior to the ordering and production of large quantities. The seals should be serially numbered. The control measures should be publicised and be known in advance by all participants to the process as well as by the public to provide indications of transparency and security. However, an element of secrecy should be maintained regarding the exact design of materials to avoid illegal reproduction or copying. For example, when publicising the use of the seals, the exact design of the logo (if any) or other specific details about the seals should not be revealed. If reproduction copies are found, it should be easy to distinguish the official seals from counterfeit ones. If the seals arrive broken, a report should be made and signed by officials and the representatives of political parties/candidates/options.
Creation of Transport Logs
Whenever ballot boxes are transported from polling station to counting center, records should be kept to ensure that security is tight and that an audit trail is in place. That way, risk can be minimised, but if anything is missing or tampering is suspected, the problem can be properly investigated. A movement or transportation form (see Movement of ballot box - Bosnia) should be used for the specific purpose of controlling the movement of ballot boxes. Information such as the list below could be included:
Moreover, space could be provided on the form to include basic information on the driver, type of vehicle used, and license plate number. If other means of transportation are used, such as plane or boat, detailed information on the schedule, departure time, and flight number could be written on the form. If needed, details on the itinerary can also be written on the form (such as overnight stops, for example, or if any other type of halt is needed). Finally, the telephone number of a dispatcher at the Electoral Management Body or the phone number of a contact at the destination could be indicated on the form should the driver need assistance to locate the counting centre destination. Multiple copies of these forms could be produced for the following:
Representatives of political parties/candidates/options as well as national/international electoral observers should be allowed to make their own copies. Arrangement for TransportDomestic Arrangements Arrangements for transport should be negotiated and planned before the election is called (see Transportation Infrastructure). The Electoral Management Body will need to be assured that the chosen carrier has the capacity and capability to make the ballot box deliveries within required time frames while using appropriate security controls. The selection of the transport company (public or private) or organization (international organization, Police or Army) will be dictated by the political, social and economical context of each country and depend on various risk factors. It is recommended that factors of reputation, dependability, financial strength, coverage of the territory, shipment-tracing capability, speed of delivery, and availability of contingency measures be used as evaluation criteria for selecting the carrier. When the election is called, a contract should be in place and fully negotiated as to the details of obligation and procedure. If it is not possible to select a single carrier, or if the political situation requires the presence of security forces or reliable and trusted persons, considerations should be given to allow political party representatives to accompany the ballot boxes. However, the right to accompany ballot boxes must be equally open to a cross-section of the parties concerned. To limit the number of people participating in the transportation process, prior agreements between all parties involved are encouraged to assign two persons representing different political sides in the same vehicle along with the election official. National/international electoral observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes as well, but for practical reasons, they might have to follow in a separate vehicle. Security forces may be required in certain political environments. Agreements with security forces should be made prior to the election by the Electoral Management Body to determine the extent and level of security required. If this is not planned properly, the requirements can impose a burden on the security forces. The security arrangements should also be made known to the political parties/candidates/option groups. This is particularly important if there exists a mistrust or lack of confidence in the security forces by the population or the political parties. International Arrangements Transportation of ballots across national boundaries and throughout the world will require a different approach from domestic arrangements and involve very careful planning. Time zones, customs, carrier's schedules, and other types of delays in transport may impact the starting date and hour of the counting process. If the vote abroad takes place in embassies and consulates only, diplomatic bags may be used, avoiding delays at customs. However, such deliveries may not be made as frequently or rapidly as is required. If the international vote is highly decentralised and takes place in major cities where expatriates are found, then a world-renowned courier firm with extensive worldwide coverage could be found for the transport of ballots. Carriers that have divisions specialising in transporting securities should be approached as they are able to provide well designed tracing mechanisms including logs to control and secure packages throughout the route to their final destination. They also tend to possess a broad knowledge of diverse customs regulations and practices, which may alleviate many of the potential delays related to them. Once the Electoral Management Body agrees with a carrier on security measures during transportation, an intimate knowledge of the pick-up and delivery schedules is recommended since this is essential in planning the activities for receiving ballots at the counting centre. The counting centre location should be close to the airport/hub where the selected carrier intends to deliver the ballot boxes to minimise transportation delays once the ballots arrive in the country of destination. If appropriate, political party representatives and Electoral Management Body officials should be at the airport/hub to deal with unexpected delivery problems and expedite processing. Publicity around the transit facilities should be limited to those who require this knowledge. Throughout the process, the Electoral Management Body should designate a specific individual or unit to deal with the carrier and to resolve contracting, logistical and security problems as they arise. For ballots that are sent by mail, arrangements should be made with the National Postal service to conduct a special 'sweep' of their sorting facilities before the ballot return deadline. In addition, special deliveries should be planned to the designated counting centre to maximise the number of ballots received before the deadline date and hour. A specific code on the return address may facilitate such activity and should be planned with the National Postal service authorities, according to their practices, well before printing the address on the mail-in ballot return envelopes.
Transport of Ballot Boxes
The ballot boxes should be transported to the counting centre in a vehicle with a closed compartment and a lock that can be sealed. All the proper information on the vehicle, the driver, the numbers of the seals used on the closed compartment, etc. should be written on a waybill and given to the driver. This same information should be communicated to the counting centre so that it can be checked upon receipt. Such measures promote efficiency of transport and prevent fraud. In the process of transfer from one kind of transport method to another (when using more than one type of transportation such as from a truck to a boat and then back to a truck), the driver should verify the following: that all ballot boxes were transferred; that a new seal was placed on the lock of the compartment of the new transport vehicle; and note the number of the new seal on the waybill. The driver should sign the waybill indicating that the transfer was properly done. Persons who accompany the ballot boxes (representatives of political parties/candidates/options and poll workers) should sign as well. In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Armed forces, police, or an international organization may be used to provide the needed security. An election official and representatives of political parties should accompany the ballot boxes and national/international electoral observers can follow in another vehicle if necessary. The ballot boxes should not be left unattended at any time unless they are locked in secure storage. To demonstrate transparency during transportation, representatives of political parties/candidates/options should be encouraged to accompany the ballot boxes from the voting station to the counting centre. Prior arrangements must be made regarding who is delegated as a representative of political party/candidate/option during transportation, since it will not be possible to have representatives of many political parties accompanying the ballot box transport. Once at the counting centre, the official responsible for the reception of the ballot boxes should collect the waybill from the driver and verify all information: numbers on the seals, driver identification, etc. The same information should be verified against information previously transmitted. The official then breaks the seal and the ballot boxes are counted and removed from the vehicle to the planned location in the counting centre. All forms attached to the ballot box and the seals are verified before putting a sticker or colored tape on the ballot box indicating that the ballot box is ready to be counted. The waybill is completed and signed by the official responsible for the reception of the ballot box, the driver, and representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Copies should be given to the driver, representatives of political parties/candidates/options and the original should be kept by the reception official at the counting centre. Securing of Ballot Boxes During Transportation
If one or more ballot boxes from the same location are to be transported directly to a counting centre, it is advisable to use just one vehicle. If possible, at least two representatives of political parties/candidates/options, representing different political sides could be in the same vehicle along with the election official. National/international electoral observers should be allowed to accompany the ballot boxes. Since some ballot boxes are bulky and heavy, and its more practical to have one vehicle carry the ballot boxes of multiple polling stations to a distant counting centre, it may be necessary to use a rented vehicle with a closed compartment at the back with a lock that can be sealed. Once the lock is sealed, the serial number of the seal along with a brief description of the content (number of ballot boxes and their respective poll station numbers) and the name of driver and passengers can then be transmitted to the final destination by fax or phone and verified on arrival. This information should also be recorded on the waybill. A new seal should be used, and the numbers of the previous seal recorded, each time more boxes are added to a shipment. Usually, these measures will be sufficient to deter any tampering of the ballot boxes. In areas where potential violence may compromise the safe delivery of the ballot boxes, a vehicle escorting the carrying vehicle may be appropriate. Depending of the safety of the area, military or police forces may provide the escorting vehicle(s). Their presence may be an advantage as their vehicles generally have communication capabilities, which could be used in case of emergencies. Again, transmission of transport details to the counting centre or Electoral Management Body prior to the departure of vehicles is recommended and representatives of political parties or national/international electoral observers should be allowed to travel, according to previously settled arrangements, with the escorting vehicles. The transportation of ballot boxes in the most dangerous and violent areas can be done with the assistance of military/police vehicles. Armed vehicles equipped with radios or phones may be necessary to provide the security required. However, agreements with all political parties should be obtained prior to election day, especially in areas where the role of the military in the political process has been questioned. To address any potential criticism, poll workers, political party representatives, and national/international electoral observers should be assigned to travel in the same armed vehicles according to arrangements negotiated in advance by the Electoral Management Body. If, at the destination, it is found that any ballot boxes have been tampered with or are missing, the matter should be reported directly to the Electoral Management Body. The electoral authorities must be ready to begin an investigation, as soon as possible, and conduct interviews with the driver to recollect the sequence of events and, if necessary, confirm this with the passengers. To facilitate the recollection of events, a log book should be provided to the driver to note all departure/arrival times and other events occurring during the transportation (fuel stops, breaks, overnight stays, etc.). At no time should a ballot box transport vehicle be left unattended. During unavoidable stops the driver and assistant/passengers should take turns to guard the ballot boxes. Unloading of Ballot Boxes
Once the vehicles transporting the ballot boxes arrive at the counting centre, designated officials should unload in the order of arrival. If a queue of voters is forming, an attendant could distribute tickets indicating the time of arrival. This will maintain a sequential order of priority in processing the vehicles/teams, and also allow an accurate recording of the time of arrival in the receipt log. The waybill and/or the transportation form should be collected from the driver (see Completion of Transport Logs) and verified: the driver's identification, numbers of the seals, etc. The documentation should also be verified against information previously transmitted to the counting centre from the voting station. The seal on the vehicle should only be broken once proper verification is completed and an exact count of the number of ballot boxes to be received is known. The ballot boxes are then unloaded, one-by-one, from the vehicle and moved to the planned destination in the counting centre. This operation should be under constant supervision from officials of the counting centre. The official responsible for reception of the ballot boxes should verify that the seals are unbroken, and that sealed envelopes are attached to the ballot boxes. If all safeguards are in order, a sticker, coloured tape, or other type of symbolic identification could be placed on the ballot boxes as they are removed from the vehicle. This will indicate that these ballot boxes are verified and ready to be counted. This measure can also help to prevent the counting a ballot box twice, or missing a ballot box in the count. The ready-to-count ballot boxes should be in a location where they will not be mixed with ballot boxes already counted. Once all the ballot boxes are unloaded from the truck, a last verification count of the number received against the number expected via the transport logs should be done. A receipt form can be issued to the driver to verify delivery completion, and the designated officials in charge of receiving the ballot boxes should keep a copy. If the seals on ballot boxes are broken or there is any sign of possible fraud, these ballot boxes should be set aside, in a separate area, and not mixed with others. A report for each of them should be written and signed by officials, drivers, representatives of political parties, etc. These ballot boxes should be clearly identified as not to be opened, with a label or other form of sticker, to ensure they will not be confused with ready-to-be-counted ballot boxes. Any matter of possible fraud should immediately be addressed to the electoral management body so they can start an investigation. Until further notice from the electoral management body, these ballot boxes should be left untouched. Completion of Transport Logs
A document or other type of communication informing the counting centre of the departure of the vehicle from a voting station should be made. This communication, whether it be through phone or fax, should provide the counting centre with the following information: name of driver, passengers, number of ballot boxes and respective poll numbers, ballot box seal numbers, compartment seal numbers, departure time, type of vehicle, etc. This document/information will be checked against actual information provided at the time of unloading the vehicle. Quantities of ballot boxes and their poll numbers should be carefully checked. If discrepancies are found, they should be noted on the log and the electoral management body (EMB) should be informed immediately. If ballot boxes are missing, verification should be made with the departure point to ensure that the information provided at the time of departure did not change. It is possible that a ballot box may have been routed through another vehicle. If the vehicle transporting the ballot boxes has a separate sealed compartment, the serial numbers of the seals should be verified against the information provided prior to departure. The driver should not break the seal unless an election official of the counting centre is present and has verified the number. All other steps mentioned above apply. Once all the information is checked and verified, the official responsible for the receipt of the ballot box should sign the waybill and indicate the arrival and completion times and date. The driver and representatives of political parties/candidates/options who accompanied the ballot boxes should also sign this waybill. Each of them should be allowed to keep a copy. If the driver cannot produce the waybill or the transportation form for the election official, special measures should be taken. Identification of the driver and passenger(s) should be verified against the information transmitted by phone/fax or other means. The license plate and the number of the seal on the vehicle compartment should be verified as well. If all this information is confirmed, the officials may proceed to the next steps. However, an entry regarding the absence of the waybill/transportation form should be made in a log book kept by the official responsible for receipt of the ballot boxes at the counting centre. In all cases, discrepancies should be promptly reported to the EMB. Opening and Closing of Ballot Boxes
Before the ballot boxes are opened, a check could be made that there are only authorised persons present in the counting centre. In some instances the list of authorised persons might include members of the armed forces. Once the ballot boxes are at the counting centre and ready to be counted, the counting official will verify the seals on the ballot box and open it. The contents are emptied on a table in the presence of counting workers, representatives of political parties, candidates, national/international electoral observers, etc. Sealed envelopes attached to the ballot boxes are opened and verification of the reconciliation done at the voting station is made. The ballots on the table are counted to establish quantity. The number of ballots in the ballot box should match the number of voters who voted. This figure should be compared to the one written on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. A last reconciliation is done once all ballots are sorted and tallied by candidate/party/option to verify that all totals are correct before making the official entries and completing the statement of the vote for the ballot box. Everybody (national/international electoral observers and security personnel may be excluded) involved in the counting process should sign the forms to confirm that the accounting of ballots was satisfactory, or to state that they are aware of the source of the discrepancy (if any) and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting official. Once the forms are completed and the ballots bundled, the ballot box will be closed and re-sealed with all the ballots inside, see Sealing of Ballot. In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated until the missing ballots are found, even if only one ballot is missing. If, after verification, the missing ballots are still unfound, then the Electoral Management Body should be informed of the problem and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election. If no solution is found, appropriate amendments should be made on the ballot account forms (and on any form on which this information is required) and on the statement of the vote signed by the counting official and representatives of political parties/candidates/options. This new figure should then become the official one for the ballot box. In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots that cannot be reconciled or that are not within a certain tolerance (i.e. difference is not more than 2, 3 or 5 ballots) legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken. In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the Electoral Management Body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Poll officials and others involved should be aware of these provisions through their training. Merging Results to Protect Secrecy In some situations, Electoral Management Bodies will combine, merge, or amalgamate results of several ballot boxes. This is generally done if the voting procedure makes it possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box; or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party. In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be combined (mixed or amalgamated) with another ballot box. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured. There is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution being visited on the persons who voted at that polling station. Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results form can mitigate these problems. The counting centre approach is appropriate for making this type of modification effective in counting procedures. For internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers per box can be made to keep the audit trail clear. Combining (merging) results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other category of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the Electoral Management Body or in a specific counting centre, results can easily be combined (merged) with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote. Once again, for internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers by category can be made to keep the audit trail clear. Sorting of BallotsGeneral Overview In the case of multiple ballot elections (for example, presidential, national legislature, and municipal elections on the same day) an order of priority for counting these ballots should be given to avoid mistakes and confusion in the counting process. This should be part of the rules given to the counting officials during the training session and in the documentation of operational procedures for counting, see Manual - counting at counting centres - Bosnia Instructions should also be given for procedures to be used in cases where ballots are found in the wrong box. Only one person should handle the initial sorting of ballots from a ballot box, usually the counting official in charge of that ballot box. Spoiled ballots should already have been separated and sealed in an envelope attached to the ballot box. A spoiled ballot is simply one that a voter marks incorrectly and hands back to poll officials in exchange for a new ballot. Spoiled ballots should never be found in the ballot box. Once the ballot box is open, the counting official or representative of political parties/candidates/option verifies the validity of each ballot in the process of counting. The official must be able to distinguish between a valid ballot and a counterfeit one by the watermark or any other mark made to identify valid ballot papers. Any counterfeit ballots identified should be set aside, counted and reported to the Electoral Management Body as an attempt at fraud. The counting official, as he goes along, will divide all ballots by candidates/political party/option as they are counted. At the same time, he can determine all potentially rejected ballots and sets them aside. After the count of valid ballots is complete, the counting official must go one-by-one through the pile of potential rejected ballots and decide on the validity of each. Potential rejected ballots, which are determined to actually be valid, are separated by candidate/party/option. All invalid ballots, as well as any counterfeit ballots, are counted and set aside. The counting official will then add to the initial number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option the additional valid ballots, and make a total count for each candidate/political party/option. Rules of interpretation, guidelines, and illustrations regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and be known in advance to facilitate the decision making process. In all cases, rejected ballots should be put aside and kept. No ballots are to be destroyed at this stage.
The separation of rejected ballots is important to create an audit trail of the count and is an essential component if there is to be a recount of the ballots. see Challenging Results Rejected ballots must be closely examined and the counting official should announce the reason for rejection of each such ballot. Political party or candidate representatives should be able to examine the rejected ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting official, they should be able to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. Clear rules must exist for recording objections made by representatives of political parties or candidates. Once the spoiled, counterfeit (if any), and rejected ballots have been separated, the valid ballots can be counted. The representatives of political parties/candidates/ options, and other persons allowed in the counting centre for the counting, should be able to make their own count. The various representatives and national/international electoral observers witnessing the count must also be able to see each ballot that is counted. For more efficiency, other counting workers during the counting process could assist the counting official. It must, however, be very clear who is entitled to make a decision on the validity of any ballot in question. Checking Validity of the Ballot
When ballots are sorted the counting official must distinguish valid ballots from counterfeits. Each ballot in the ballot box needs to be verified. In some jurisdictions, security paper is often used for ballots. This paper contains a watermark or other form of unique identification (special colour, lines, symbols, or logos) making the ballot virtually impossible to counterfeit. The texture, thickness, colours, size, and format of the ballot are also indicators that will differentiate a valid ballot from a counterfeit. The counting official should know where to look on the ballot to be sure of its authenticity. If he doesn't recognise the ballot or the ballot was not issued at the polling place, it should not be included in the count and should be put aside. To speed up the process of authenticating the ballots, certain jurisdictions require that the poll official append their initials in a provided space at the back of the ballot before handing it to the voter. If the initials at the back of the ballot are not from the poll official, then it should be set aside and not counted as a valid ballot. These initials should appear on the ballot account form, transportation form, the seals, or voting record book. If no initials are on the back of the ballot, the ballot should not be counted as valid. This measure of appending a poll official's initial at the back of the ballot can help to identify valid ballots from counterfeit ones, but the official's initial should always be identical to protect the voter's secrecy of the vote. The poll official should always use the same colour of pen or pencil to append his initials. In all cases, all ballots are kept, even if they are not valid. No ballots should be destroyed (at this stage of the process, see Challenging Results for more details on how long ballots should be kept) as an audit trail of all ballots considered must be assembled so that the count can be fully reconstructed. In case of any doubt, and before taking the decision to reject a ballot as counterfeit, the counting official should be able to verify the basis of his decision with the supervisor of the counting centre and/or with the Electoral Management Body. Rejecting a ballot on the basis that it is counterfeit is an important decision and should be done without any doubt. Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots
Separating rejected ballots from spoiled ballots is important since the significance of these ballots is very different. Mixing them may seriously impact the audit trail. Spoiled ballots should never end up in the ballot box and should be secured in a sealed envelope attached to the ballot box (this is a suggested way). A spoiled ballot is generally one that a voter has inadvertently 'spoiled' by marking it incorrectly; it is handed back to poll officials in exchange for a new blank ballot that is then marked by the voter and placed in the ballot box. A spoiled ballot may also be one that is improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote secrecy. A rejected ballot is one that has made its way into the ballot box but has been rejected because it was improperly marked, or was not marked at all when a mark was required. The most common criteria to reject a ballot are: ballot with no mark; ballot with mark for more than one candidate/political party/option when only one was supposed to be chosen; ballot marked with a type of pen or pencil other than the one provided at the polling station; unofficial mark according to the law; unusual marks; ballot marked so the voter could be identified; or ballot marked in a location prohibited by legislation (outside the circle, etc.). In some jurisdictions, blank ballots (ballots with no marks) are counted separately (and may be considered as protest votes); in others, they are considered to be rejected ballots. In all cases, all ballots are to be kept and none should be destroyed at this stage of the electoral process. In countries using envelopes, since no marks are made on the ballot itself, the identification of a rejected ballot from a valid ballot is different. For example, a rejected ballot will be an envelope in which there will be two ballots; an empty envelope; a ballot in an envelope marked in a way that the secrecy of the voter is compromised; etc. In many jurisdictions, if the intention of the voter is clear, all types of marks can be accepted. In others, the legislation is very clear on which specific types of marks are to be accepted, even on a write-in ballot (see Examples of laws and regulations - Philippines). For these specific cases, those marks should be clearly demonstrated during the training of counting officials and documented in their manual (see Manual - South Africa) or in the operational guideline to help the counting official in making his decision.
A card summarising the marks to be accepted or rejected, with pictures of sample ballots showing those marks, is a very useful tool that can be inserted in the counting officials' training kit (see Quick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh). Separating Valid Ballots
One way to separate valid ballots is as follows. All ballots are unfolded, one by one, and the counting official makes sure that the ballot is valid (please refer to Separating Spoiled/Rejected Ballots for a discussion about spoiled and rejected ballots). The counting official may call out loud the name of the candidate/political party/option for whom the ballot has been marked and hold up the ballot for all to see. If several persons are involved with separating and counting the ballots and identifying those that are potentially to be rejected, the practice of calling out names may not be useful. It may be more efficient to separate the ballots according to choice (without counting them), setting aside those potentially to be rejected, and then establish which ballots are actually to be rejected. After the rejections are finalised, the piles of valid ballots for each candidate/party/option can be quickly counted. In all cases, only counting workers should handle ballots and it must be made very clear that the counting official is the only person entitled to make a decision on the validity of a ballot (see Challenging Results for a more comprehensive discussion). The advantage of showing the ballot and calling out the result of each ballot considered is that it allows the representatives of political party/candidates/options and national/international electoral observers to make their own count. The disadvantage is that the process is interrupted each time a rejected ballot is discovered; this tends to make the count of valid ballots very inefficient. It can also create a very noisy ambience and it could confuse counting officials working at another table. Whichever method is used, the valid ballot papers are put in separate piles on the table; one pile per candidate, political parties, or option (in the latter case for a referendum). The examination of the ballot should allow national/international electoral observers, representatives of political parties or candidates or options, and other persons to see the ballot and ensure that it is appropriately separated according to choice. They should have controlled access to contest the validity of sorted ballots. If political party or candidate representatives do not agree with the decision of the counting official, official objections can be made.
While transparency of the process is important, controls on movement of ballots should always be the first concern of the counting official. Tallying
Summary of the Process Ballots can be bundled by groups of ten, for example, to facilitate keeping a count of the votes counted. It is desirable for every bundle of ballots to be counted at least twice, with one official checking the work of the other official. For example, depending on the number of political parties or candidates and also on the number of counting workers, each counting worker can be responsible for receiving and counting all ballots cast for one or more political parties or candidates or options. Later the counting workers can exchange all ballots cast for 'their' political party/candidate/option and verify each other's totals. All ballots are counted, including spoiled, rejected, and unused ballots. Even if not counted as valid, these ballots are important for the audit trail and will be needed in case of a recount. To eliminate possible objections over the validity of ballots, the counting official should be provided with clear rules of interpretation of accepted marks on the ballot and all reasons that should lead to rejection of a ballot, see Manual - South Africa and Quick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh. Minimising the interpretation that is needed by the counting official makes it easier for him to make the necessary decisions and reduces disputes over the validity of ballots. If the validity of a ballot is objected to or challenged, the counting official should be the only person able to make a decision, even if other counting workers are involved in the counting process. To be more consistent in his decisions, the counting official can put all questionable ballots in one separate pile, decide on all rejected ballots following the count of valid ones and then add any additional valid votes to the appropriate candidate/political party/option. Alternatively, the ballots can be first separated, the questionable ones decided, and then each pile can be counted. Each disputed ballot should be numbered on the back. The same number should be written on the statement of the vote (or other form, as prescribed) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting official. To count the ballots, a count sheet (see Tally sheet Togo - Guinea and Tally sheet - Canada) is often used by the counting official and/or the counting worker. The representatives of political parties, candidates or options and everybody observing the count may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting official in charge of the count for a particular ballot box.
The count sheet is a tool used to facilitate the count. For each vote for each candidate/party/option, a mark is made on the count sheet. Periodically, the marks for each candidate are added together. If a mistake is made during the process, comparison with the count sheets of other counting workers can be made. If the mistake is still not found, the count should be restarted from the last point of agreement. A verification of the count should be done once the ballots are counted. This verification is usually the last one made. It is important to make sure that no votes were changed during the count in favour or against one candidate/party/option. It should include a comparison to the previous reconciliation (the one done at the voting station and the one done once the ballot box was opened). The total number of ballots cast for each candidate plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the voting station. This information should be duly noted on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. If it doesn't, any discrepancies should be investigated. Discrepancies may be a reflection of mistakes made at an earlier stage. Once the counting process is over, the ballots are bundled and put back into the ballot box along with all relevant forms. A copy of the statement of the vote should be in a separate envelope, on the outside of the ballot box. Both the envelope and the ballot box should be sealed before being transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for the counted ballot boxes. In the event of a recount, all these documents are needed. This explains why elaborate precautions about sealing the ballot box contents are important. For more safety, the seal could even be signed by the counting official as well as a representative of political party/candidate/option. The counting official should keep one official copy in case of loss. Count of Spoiled/Rejected Ballots
Why Should They Be Counted? Spoiled ballots, rejected, and unused ballots must be counted to create a complete audit trail. Spoiled and unused ballots were supposed to be counted at the polling station, before the ballot box was transported to the counting centre. These ballots remain official documents even if not counted as valid. Additionally, rejected ballots are essential in case of a recount. Rules of Interpretation for Rejected Ballots This is actually one of the hardest parts of vote counting. To eliminate possible objections to the validity of a ballot, the counting official should be provided with clear rules of interpretation and given illustrations of acceptable and unacceptable marks on the ballot, including the rationale for any rejection of a ballot, see Manual - South Africa and Quick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh Minimizing the interpretation that is needed by the counting official makes it easier for him to take the necessary decisions and will reduce disputes over the validity of ballots. In the event of a close margin in favor of one candidate or party, a recount is likely to be asked for and rejected ballots will be carefully analyzed. Handling Disputes Regarding Rejections In several jurisdictions, the counting official is the only person qualified to make the final decision on the validity of a ballot. He is also the person handling disputes regarding objections. If a representative of a candidate/political party/option doesn't agree with the counting official on the validity of a ballot, he may object to the decision. In most cases, the counting official has to immediately make a decision on whether or not the ballot is valid. To be more consistent in his decisions, the counting official may put all questionable and contested ballots in a separate pile while counting valid ballots. He can then decide which of the potential rejected ballots will actually be rejected, and count the total number of rejections. Remaining valid ballots then be added to the count for each political party/candidate/option. Alternatively, all potential rejected ballots can be pre-identified, decided on, and counted first, and then valid ballots can be counted subsequently.
For each objected ballot, the ballot will be numbered on the back. The same number will be written on the statement of the vote (the voting record book or a separate form can also be used) for each ballot box along with the decision made by the counting official. All rejected and spoiled ballots are counted and recorded in the statement of the votes for each ballot box as well as on the ballot account form. Count of Valid Ballots
To count the ballots, the counting official can use a count sheet. The representatives of political parties, candidates, options and everybody observing the count may have a count sheet as well. The official one is the one used by the counting official. The proper information regarding the ballot box number and the constituency should be written in at the top or bottom of the form. In each column, the names of each candidate (or party or option) as they appear on the ballot should be written. There are two usual types of count sheet: one where each square represents a vote for a candidate/party/option and one where square is drawn with a diagonal mark denoting five votes (see Tally sheet Togo - Guinea and Tally sheet - Canada). For the first one, each square may be marked for each vote for a candidate/party/option. At the end, the total for each will be easy to count. For the second, four vertical marks and one diagonal one are made. Each completed square equals five votes for a candidate/party/option. With regard to recovery from errors, where several count sheets are used at once, there is a need to recover when the results of the count no longer agree. Establishing correlation between count sheets requires a pause for consensus as to how many votes are recorded per candidate at certain set times (every 100 ballots for example). Restarting the count at the last point of correlation is much more efficient than beginning the entire count. Verification of Count
Reconciling to Ballot Account Totals It is recommended that a verification of the count should be done once the ballots of one ballot box are counted. This verification is usually the last one made before preparing the statement of the vote for the ballot box and transmitting the information to the person in charge of making the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. This last verification is important to make sure that no ballots have been introduced or removed that would modify the results in favour or against one candidate/party/option. This last verification includes comparison of the reconciliation done previously, both before opening the ballot box and when the ballot box was opened. The total of ballots for each candidate plus the rejected ballots, the unused ballots, and the spoiled ballots should match with the total number of ballots received at the opening of the polling station. This information was provided on the ballot account form completed at the voting station. If errors are detected, the count sheet should be verified against count sheets of other counting officials working at the same table on the same ballot box. If the error is still not found, then all the ballots counted per candidate/party/option should be reexamined and recounted. Sealing of Ballot
To provide safety of its contents, the ballot boxes should be resealed, with all the ballots inside, before returning the boxes to the planned location for ballot boxes already counted. This measure is very important in case of a recount. In certain jurisdictions, all forms such as count sheets, the voting record book, and the voters' list are also put into the ballot box along with the ballots before sealing. The ballot box's statement of the vote is not to be added to the other documents, but put in a separate envelope and attached to the outside of the ballot box. However, this envelope should itself be sealed to make sure that no unauthorised person has access to the results and any attempted changes can be detected by higher authorities. A copy of the statement of the vote should already have been transmitted to the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre. Ballots are placed in bundles, by category (candidates, rejected ballots, spoiled ballots, unused ballots, etc.) in the ballot box. Once all the ballots and relevant forms are in the box, the box may be sealed and transferred to the planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes already counted. The seal number should be written on the statement of the vote and attached, in a sealed envelope, to the ballot box. Even if all the envelopes or plastic bags are sealed, it is still important to reseal the ballot box. Once again, in the event of a recount, all these documents are needed; this explains why elaborate precautions about sealing the ballot box contents are important. If a paper seal is used, for additional security, some jurisdictions require that the counting officials as well as representatives of political parties/candidates/options sign the ballot box seal.
Transmitting Counting Centre Results
Summary of Process Once the counting process is over, the counting official prepares the statement of the vote for each ballot box. Progress reports for each counting centre will also be sent to the national office of the Electoral Management Body allowing the release results as they come in. A cumulative statement of the vote will also be prepared for the counting centre. Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box This form indicates the results of election day and should include standard information such as the name of the electoral district, the number of the ballot box and date. Specific information on the count should include:
This information should correspond to the ballot account form completed at the voting station. Then, the number of valid ballots for each candidate, political party or option, number of rejected ballots and total number of valid ballots should be recorded. The counting official signs the form, as well as the representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Along with their signatures, the following information could be found: printed names, addresses, and telephone numbers. In case of any problem, it will then be easier for the Electoral Management Body to locate and contact them. Some jurisdictions require all counting workers present at the counting table to sign the statement of the vote. A transcribed copy, carbon copy, or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for the ballot box is given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Representatives of each political party/candidate/option are allowed to make their own copies of the statements of the vote by transcribing the contents. Any national/international electoral observers should also have access to make a copy of the results or transcribe them. The original is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope.
Progress Reports Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, these results should sent directly to the central office of the Electoral Management Body. The purpose of these reports is to allow the Electoral Management Body to release results as they are ready. The same information is needed for the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is used. Cumulative Statement of the Vote for Counting Centre Once the vote statement form for a ballot box has been completed, a copy should be transmitted to the person in charge of combining results and creating a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. The same information is needed from each ballot box that is added into the cumulative statement. The person in charge of combining results will transmit the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre to the national office of the Electoral Management Body as soon as it is completed to allow the national office to gather the national results as soon as possible. The transmission can be done by telephone, cellular phone, modem or fax, using a unique security code to ensure the proper identification of the person transmitting the results. It is recognised that in parts of some countries the communications infrastructure does not permit oral or electronic reporting of voting results. In such locations, an election official hand carries the cumulative statement of the vote to the national office. This may be the only available alternative. After the results have been reported orally or electronically, the original of the cumulative statement of the votes for the counting centre should be transmitted to the national office of the Electoral Management Body by hand or by courier in a sealed envelope. This measure is essential to prevent fraud and to provide evidence of any tampering with results. A carbon copy or a photocopy of the statement of the vote for each ballot box; the cumulative statement for the counting centre; as well as periodic progress reports; are given to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre. Another copy is posted at the counting centre. Any national/international electoral observers and representatives of political party/candidate/option, are allowed to make their own copy of the results by transcribing the information. As print or electronic media are considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given access to the results at either the counting centre or at the national offices of the Electoral Management Body where results are being reported. This is especially important if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question. To keep control of who is allowed at the counting centre or at the Electoral Management Body, proper accreditation must be given by the Electoral Management Body. The media representatives on site should wear identification proving this accreditation. Progress Reports; Cumulative Statement of VotesStatement of the Vote for a Ballot Box The statement of the vote is a form on which results are written. The counting official completes this form for each ballot box counted at the counting centre. On the statement of the vote for each ballot box the following general information could be found:
Representatives of political parties/candidates/options present at the counting table should, as well, append their signatures on the form. Along with their signatures, the following information should be found: printed names, addresses and telephone numbers. In case of any problem, it will then be easier for the Electoral Management Body to locate and contact them. Specific information on the count should include
The following information should be added:
Additional detailed information - such as the serial numbers of the seals on the ballot box or numbers of the ballot box itself - is required to appear on the statement in some jurisdictions. In several jurisdictions, this form is an important document since it provides the information used by the Electoral Management Body to release the results. The counting official responsible for the processing of the ballot box and contents should complete this form with utmost care. Progress Report Once all the ballot boxes for an electoral district are counted, the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre should prepare a progress report ready to be sent to the Electoral Management Body. The progress report should contain the same information as the statement of the vote for each ballot box, or consist of a summary for the entire electoral district. Cumulative Statement of the Vote for a Counting Centre Once the statement of the vote for a ballot box is completed, a copy is given to the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. Each statement of the vote for each ballot box counted in the counting centre is included on this cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. The same general information is needed:
The figure for each ballot box is reproduced on the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre. Specific information could include the number of the ballot box and the total number of valid ballots for each candidate/political party/option; total number of rejected ballots; total number of spoiled ballots; total number of valid ballots for each ballot box. The total for each column is added, creating the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre. Issuance of Statement of Votes
The statement of the vote for each ballot box, the progress reports and cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be prepared with care since it represents the final results of the election for a counting centre, unless subjected to a recount. Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box The statement of the vote for each ballot box is usually prepared and signed by the counting official. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options present at the counting table could then sign the form. Their signature is very important as it reflects and demonstrates that they agree and acknowledge the results. The printed name, address, and telephone number, if any, could also be found on the form along with the signature of poll workers and representatives of political parties/candidates/options. In case of any problem, the Electoral Management Body will then more easily be able to contact these persons. Concerning principle of transparency, it is strongly recommended that national/international electoral observers as well as political party/candidate/option representatives each be able to transcribe the contents or obtain a copy of the statement of the votes. Statement of the Vote for the Counting Centre The progress report and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre should be completed by the person responsible for combining the results for the counting centre. Just like the statement of the vote for each ballot box, the one for the counting centre should also be signed by representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Information contained on this form should also be made available to them, and to any national/international electoral observers present, to transcribe, or a copy of the actual form should be provided.
Communicating Results to National Level
Once the statement of the votes for each ballot box is completed, the counting official should give a copy of the results to the person responsible for combining the results at the counting centre. For greater transparency, periodic progress reports should be sent to the central office of the Electoral Management Body. These progress reports should be sent by electoral district that will enable the electoral management body to release results as they come in. Once all ballot boxes in a counting centre have been counted, a cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre needs to be transmitted to the national office of the Electoral Management Body. Communication of the Results The progress report and cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre should be transmitted to the office of the national Electoral Management Body by phone (cellular or fixed line), by fax, or other electronic means. It is recommended that a unique password or code be provided to the person who will transmit the results. For security reasons, the Electoral Management Body best does this during the day of the election itself. This code will reduce the possibility of impersonation, which will screen out unauthorised persons from transmitting incorrect or biased election results to the national office of the Electoral Management Body. If a fax machine is available at the counting centre, it should be used to send progress reports and the cumulative statement of votes to the Electoral Management Body. Specific measures should be taken to control access to the fax machine and number to reduce the risk of any transmissions of unofficial results. In all cases, progress reports and the cumulative statement of the vote for each counting centre sent by fax should be signed by the person in charge of combining the results for the counting centre and by representatives of political parties/candidates/options present. For more security, and to detect any attempts at fraud, the original cumulative statement of the vote form should be sent separately to the central office of the Electoral Management Body in a sealed envelope. This envelope should be sent by hand or by courier. By sending the original, the Electoral Management Body can verify the results against the one previously sent by telephone or electronically and ensure they are the same. Alternative Methods for Communicating to the Electoral Management Body Should the availability of phones (cellular or fixed) at a counting centre be a problem, alternative methods should be considered. Walkie-talkie or radio emitting devices do not require the installation of a phone line and are flexible and simple in their use. However, their deployment should take into consideration the topography of the area to identify in advance any blackout regions where it is impossible to receive or transmit messages. Again, appropriate training and identification codes should be provided to counting centre workers before deployment. If it is not possible to use any means of wireless communication, the last resort is hand-to-hand delivery by election officials of the results to the Electoral Management Body. If this is not possible the last alternative is to designate a messenger. This messenger should be a credible person and the choice of such person should be accepted by counting workers as well as representatives of the political parties/candidates/options. Role of Print/Electronic Media News agencies and media organizations will likely compete to provide their forecast of the election results as quickly as possible after the counting process begins. They will dispatch their representatives as close as possible to where the electoral action is. The counting centres are most likely to be targeted by the media. At a counting centre, one representative can cover a wide area and can report for a significant number of ballot boxes. Since the print or electronic media is considered a key element in a free and democratic society, it is recommended that they be given controlled access to counting centres, especially if the freedom and fairness of the election process is in question. To keep control of who is allowed at the counting centre, proper accreditation should be given in advance by the Electoral Management Body and media representatives should wear corresponding identification. To minimise the disruption of counting activities, there should be agreement that media personnel will not intervene or seek interviews while the counting process is taking place nor take photographs unless given specific permission for each photo. Should the media decide to station their representatives at the national office of the Electoral Management Body offices or at the counting centres, specific physical areas should be set aside to accommodate them. If they require specific installations such as telephones or fax lines, they should make their needs known well before election day and appropriate cost sharing arrangements and payments should be made in advance. Usually, media should be allowed to have access to the same results provided by the Electoral Management Body to representatives of political parties/candidates/options. Route of Statement of the Vote for Each Ballot Box Copies of the statement of the vote for each ballot box should be provided to the counting official, to the person in charge of combining results for the counting centre, and one should be in a sealed envelope attached to the ballot box. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options present at the counting table, and national/international electoral observers should be allowed to make copies.
Such copies can be made from a multi-part carbon copy form, or through the use of photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand. The original copy of the statement of the vote for a ballot box should be attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. This is particularly important for the processing of a recount of the ballots, should it be required. Route of Statement of Votes for Counting Centre Copies of the voting results should be provided to the Electoral Management Body (often the original sent in a sealed envelope), to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre, and one posted outside the counting centre. Such copies can be the result of a multi-part carbon copy form, or through the use of photocopy machine. Alternatively, multiple copies can be prepared by hand. The representatives of political parties/candidates/options present, and national/international electoral observers, should be permitted to make their own copies by transcribing the information. Once the cumulative statement of the vote for a counting centre is fully prepared and transmitted to the national office of the Electoral Management Body, a copy can be posted at the outside of the counting centre. This way, the same information and results are made available for everybody, and at the same time. Because witnesses are permitted to observe and scrutinise the counting process, results are public. The statement of the vote becomes a public document that is made evident once it is posted. For other complementary information on these issues, please refer to Results Reporting. Consolidating Voting ResultsSummary of Process At the national level, logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several counting centres at the same time. Following are some suggestions to improve the efficiency of the process. Although, these suggestions might need to be modified depending on the country's infrastructure, or other factors that might affect the implementation of these suggestions. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be given to people transmitting the results to the national office of the Electoral Management Body. Most telephone and fax systems now allow for calls to a single number to automatically switch to the next available phone/fax unit on that line. For example, one team should take care of the incoming results, and should transmit the information to the data entry person or person in charge of gathering the results. A wall chart, chalkboard chart or spreadsheet listing for each electoral district should be prepared and then completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each counting centre is received, the combined results for the country should be finalised. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the polls). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national results. Special ballots, write-in ballots, mail-in ballots as well as ballots cast in ordinary polls, advance polls, and mobile polling stations should be part of the count and should be released as soon as possible. Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to election day or after the closing of the polls on election day. If the later is the case, then the counting procedures should be designed carefully so it will not delay releasing the final results. For more details on these ballots, please refer to Voting Procedures.
For the special ballots (mail-in and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head office of the Electoral Management Body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. If different colours of envelopes are used, it will facilitate the sorting by category. For mail-in ballots (see Forms for mail-in and write-in ballots - Canada), three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter) and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot. After verification of proper registration and no previous vote having been taken, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still contained. If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, the results should be kept highly secure and only released at the closing of the polls on election day. These special ballots can be used for absentee voting if no mechanism is in place for voting abroad, in embassies for example (please refer to Voting in a Foreign Country for voting in foreign countries). For the counting process, the same rules for vote counting in the country should be followed. Please refer to Absentee Voting for more information on absentee voting. If advance polls take place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. This reconciliation measure is for creating an audit trail of ballot usage. The advance poll ballot boxes are then kept safely until election day and counting should take place at the closing time of the ordinary polls. The counting of advance poll ballots should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties/candidates/options as well as national/international electoral observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary polls. For counting the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance polls may be applied but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated voters takes place prior to election day. Use of Technology The use of phones and faxes are common for transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results via phone or fax, an identification number or code should be given to them. This method is a simple and efficient way to avoid unauthorised people calling in and providing false results. Transmission of results by modem and computer can also be used. Once again, safeguards and passwords must be built into restricting the transmission of results to authorised persons who are permitted access to the system.
For all types of transmission, systems must be tested prior to election day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A specialist should also be available at any time in case of failure of the systems. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested and fully available. Receiving Results from Counting Centres
Receiving Results from Several Counting Centres The national office of the Electoral Management Body receives the results directly from the counting centres. The person responsible for combining results from the counting centres will directly transmit the progress reports for each electoral district and the cumulative statement of the vote for the counting centre directly to the national office of the Electoral Management Body. For greatest efficiency, one general phone number or fax number should be used. It is important, however, that the phone and fax system be installed in such a way that the calls bounce to the next available device on that line. Adequate numbers of phones or fax machines to cope with peak demands should be installed. A list of the identification codes or passwords associated with the various counting centres could be provided to the staff receiving the results. One team could take care of the incoming results and transmit information to the data entry person or the person in charge of combining all the results for the country. A spreadsheet or a board listing each electoral district should be prepared and completed as the results are received. Representatives of political parties/candidates/options as well as media should have access to this spreadsheet or board so they can observe the results as they come in. Special measures should be taken to ensure that the same results are not given more than once. Numbering or creating unique codes for the electoral districts is a simple way to avoid such confusion. However, if such a measure is taken, it should be done at the beginning of the election process and this number should be used consistently on all forms used for the counting process. The use of such a number or code will also create an audit trail. If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day to the national level (depending on the closing hour of the counting centres). The staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when needed. In case of emergency, the head office of the Electoral Management Body should always be able to reach their counting centres, especially when results are coming in. If needed, a direct phone line can be set up within each counting centre so that the national Electoral Management Body will be able to reach the person in charge of combining the results at anytime.
'Special' Ballot Counts, Mobile and Advance Poll Counts Special ballots are usually returned to the head office of the Electoral Management Body where a special counting centre is established. These results will then be reported to the central collection point separately, as in all other counting centres. Depending on the rules of the system used and the logistics in place, the ballots returned by mail might be accepted only five days prior to election day or right up until election day itself. If special ballots are accepted right until election day, counting procedures should be designed so the publication of results will not be delayed. Depending on the deadline given to return the special ballots, the counting may start before election day, at the beginning of election day, or at the closing of the polls on election day. However, counting these ballots may take a long time depending on the volume of ballots to process and the procedures used. Counting special ballots before election day is common and generally recommended, but special security is necessary to ensure the results are released along with the results of ordinary polls. The ballot boxes for advance polls are safely kept at the counting centre until the closing of ordinary polls on election day. The counting process for these ballots starts at the same time as for the ordinary polls and are virtually identical to the ones used for counting the votes of ordinary polls. The counting of votes from mobile polling stations may take place at the counting centre and ballots are counted as any other ballots. These ballots should not be counted until the regular closing time of the polls on election day. For all cases - advance polls, special ballots, mobile polling stations, etc. - if the count takes place a few days prior to election day, representatives of political parties/candidates/options should be present for the counting. For the purposes of creating separate audit trails and for properly reporting the results of advance polls, mobile polling stations, and special ballots, these unique voting procedures should not be confused with ordinary polls. The difference should be made very clear with a distinctive statement of the vote forms used for these types of ballots. Please refer to Absentee Voting and Voting Procedures for more information on these ballots. Creating a Audit Trail
Once the count for each ballot box is over and the ballot box is sealed, all the ballot boxes will be transferred to the planned storage location for ballot-boxes-already-counted. This storage space should be secure. Ballot boxes will be kept at this place until final results are known and accepted by all participants. In case of recount, the Electoral Management Body will send instructions to the counting centre as to what to do with the ballot boxes involved. Until then, all ballot boxes stay in the counting centre. A spreadsheet, with all the ballot box numbers, should be used to control the storage of all ballot boxes. The supervisor responsible for the ballot boxes (once they are counted) should verify that the seals are properly put on and that the statement of the vote is attached to the ballot box in a sealed envelope. A sticker or other form of identification should then be put on the ballot box to indicate that the control check was done and the ballot box is ready for storage. The supervisor should append his initials or signature to both the spreadsheet and identification sticker indicating that the control measure has been taken. Ability to Subsequently Check Results Received Ability to subsequently check the results received against separate documentation is essential to avoid mistakes, and to prevent fraudulent manipulation of electoral results. A copy of the cumulative statement of the vote of each counting centre should be sent separately to the national office of the Electoral Management Body, in a sealed envelope, and a comparison with first results received should be done once the original is received. If serious fears of fraud exist, a special paper can be used for the cumulative statement of the votes for each counting centre (this paper was used in each voting station in Togo in 1994). This dark coloured paper (dark blue for example) immediately shows if the initial inscription is modified. The colour around the modified area will fade. A pencil should be used for this type of paper. If alterations appear on the paper, then special attention can be given to that specific counting centre and the results should be checked carefully. If the person simply made a mistake in completing the form at the counting centre, then he should append his initials or signature, as well as all representatives of political parties/candidates/options to denote agreement with the correction. Tallying Results Per Party/Candidate/Option
Results should be counted according to candidate/party/option for each ballot box and each electoral district. The national Electoral Management Body will then count the total national results per political party/candidate/option and indicate this to be the final result. In all cases, a double counting procedure should be used, even if it is computerised, before the results are publicly posted. After each 5 to 10 ballot boxes for example, a comparison should be done between the two persons responsible for the counts. If results do not match, the previous few addition figures can easily be verified and corrected. If a computerised system is used, it is recommended that two persons should enter the same data on separate computer workstations. The computer systems can be programmed to immediately point out when and where entries do not exactly match for a specific electoral district. This makes the process of verification much simpler. See Distribution of seats - Sweden for a tangible example of how votes are translated into seats. Publicising Results
Special security measures should be taken by the Electoral Management Body to avoid fraud during the process of releasing results (please refer to Security in Voting Stations for a broader discussion on security). Only authorised persons should have access to the combined results (prior to public release) and modifications to these results should only be done with proper authorisation. These measures should be in place both at the counting centres and at the national office of the Electoral Management Body. Access to the area where the results are being prepared should be limited. The computerised systems used, if any, for combining the results should have safeguards such as passwords, etc. No one other than authorised persons should be able to access the computerised systems and change results. These persons should be carefully selected and identified in advance. Police, Armed Forces personnel, or private security officers should be available on request. An Electoral Management Body security contact person should be identified prior to voting day and should have in hand all specific information needed if the assistance of security forces is required. However, such precautions should not affect the transparency of the counting process. All counting participants, at the national level or at the counting centre, should wear proper identification to avoid any confusion. Identifying badges or cards should be given to the staff of the Electoral Management Body, the representatives of political parties/candidates/options, national/international electoral observers, media reporters, etc. If needed, Armed Forces personnel may be present in the counting centre and should, as well, be required to wear proper identification. Providing the Official Results The Electoral Management Body should include all type of ballots; mail-in ballots (absentee votes and other special ballots); advance polls; mobile voting stations; etc., before providing official results. If such ballots are received and counted a few days prior to election day, then the figures can easily be included in the results. However, if such ballots are accepted by the Electoral Management Body up until closing of the polls on election day, then the counting procedures for these ballots should be carefully designed so they will not hold up the process of releasing results within a few days after election day. If special ballots are counted a few days prior to election day, these results should be kept secure and access to them should be prohibited until closing of the polls on election day. Often these ballots will represent a good statistical indicator of the final outcome of the election. If, by mistake, such results are released before the appropriate time, it could seriously influence either the election outcome or the turnout.
The official results should be released as soon as possible (please refer to Results Reporting for a more elaborate discussion on result reporting). One to five days is considered a reasonable amount of time to release these results, but emphasis should be placed on preparing the results as quickly as possible. The national Electoral Management Body can make the periodic progress report on the results available as they come in. In many jurisdictions it is considered to be more appropriate that the preliminary indications of the vote be released and announced by the media or non-governmental organizations. However, in the interests of demonstrating transparency, the Electoral Management Body should make the results publicly available as they come in. The Electoral Management Body should consider the impact of multiple time zones on releasing results. If results are released in one part of the country while polls are still open in other parts of the country in different time zones, it could create confusion or apathy among voters. 'Staggered' voting hours are used in Canada to prevent this kind of situation. However, given the time required to transport ballot boxes to counting centres, this is not generally a problem. The counting can also be delayed if the hours of voting cannot be changed.
Once all results are received from each counting centre, they should be compiled for publication in the national official results for an election or referendum. Such results can also be compiled by region, by province, by political party, or as global national results. A summary of the final results should be announced as soon as possible by the Electoral Management Body and published in a report. The Electoral Management Body should be the only organization announcing and releasing the final, official results unless the Courts have a role in certifying the results. In most cases it is made very clear that the only official source for any results is the Electoral Management Body. The Role of the Courts In some countries, the judiciary is only involved in the electoral process after the election when it comes time to take to court offenders of the electoral law or when a judicial recount is needed. In other jurisdictions, the Court may have a significant role to play in confirming the results of the election; the results only become official once the Court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from a former government to the one elected. The Court may also be directly involved in the count along with the Electoral Management Body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from the Court. Publishing the Detailed Results After the final results are released many jurisdictions require that detailed voting results be published in the official gazette of the government or another official publication. Legally, they should be presented to the legislature, agency, department, or the administrative entity that the Electoral Management Body reports to. A courtesy copy of the published report can be sent to the different political leaders who ran for the election and to all elected candidates. Publishing this detailed report of the election may take several months of preparation and production. Due to financial constrains, in some countries candidates and all other persons, parties, or organization will buy their own copies of the results from the publisher. Once the final results are known and publicised, the new government should be sworn in as soon as possible to limit the possible political instability and delays in the transition of one government to another. This can often take a week or more, depending on the type of political system used in the country. Combining Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote The Electoral Management Body can merge or amalgamate results of several voting stations. This is generally done if the voting procedure was such that it became theoretically possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box, or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that almost all the votes will be for one candidate or party. In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be amalgamated with other voting stations. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured, but there is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution to the persons who voted at that voting station. Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results of this having been done can mitigate this problem. Such procedures must take place in the counting centre prior to the ballots being counted. Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the Electoral Management Body, results can easily be merged with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use only, a special notation can be made to keep the audit trail clear. Challenging Results
Please refer to Challenging Results for more details on challenging results. Sample materials index
Closing Instructions for The Deputy Returning Officer - Canada
Quick Reference - Counting Centres - Bangladesh
Ballot Paper Account England - Reconciliation Form
Statements of the Vote (Interim Results) - Canada
Statement of Vote for Officials Final Results - Canada
Adding Polling Stations Results - Guinea
Forms for Mail-in and Write-in Ballots - Canada
Movement of Ballot Box - Bosnia
Formatos para el Registro Como Elector en el Extranjero - España
Samples of Invalid and Valid Ballots - OSCE
Examples of Laws and Regulations - Philippines
Examples of Laws and Regulations - Belgium
Examples of Laws and Regulations - Sweden
Examples of Laws and Regulations - Ukraine
Muestra de Leyes y Regulaciones - España
Manual - Counting at Counting Centres - Bosnia
Distribution of Seats - Sweden
The Tasmanian Hare-Clark Scrutiny Process Closing instructions for the deputy Returning Officer - CanadaClosing instructions for the deputy Returning Officer - Canada (PDF)Count ChecklistCount Checklist (PDF)Quick reference - counting centres - BangladeshQuick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh (PDF)Tally sheet Togo - GuineaTally sheet Togo - Guinea (PDF)Tally sheet - CanadaTally sheet - Canada (PDF)Ballot paper account England - reconciliation formBallot paper account England - reconciliation form (PDF)Statements of the vote (interim results) - CanadaStatements of the vote (interim results) - Canada (PDF)Statement of vote for officials final results - CanadaStatement of vote for officials final results - Canada (PDF)Voting record book - CanadaVoting record book - Canada (PDF)Adding polling stations results - GuineaAdding polling stations results - Guinea (PDF)Forms for mail-in and write-in ballots - CanadaForms for mail-in and write-in ballots - Canada (PDF)Movement of ballot box - BosniaMovement of ballot box - Bosnia (PDF)Request for recountRequest for recount (PDF)Final results sheet - IndiaFinal results sheet - India (PDF)Voting abroad registration forms - SpainVoting abroad registration forms - Spain (PDF)Special ballot - CanadaSpecial ballot - Canada (PDF)Samples of invalid and valid ballots - OSCESamples of invalid and valid ballots - OSCE (PDF)Examples of laws and regulations - PhilippinesExamples of laws and regulations - Philippines (PDF)Examples of laws and regulations - BelgiumExamples of laws and regulations - Belgium (PDF)Examples of laws and regulations - SwedenExamples of laws and regulations - Sweden (PDF)Examples of laws and regulations - UkraineExamples of laws and regulations - Ukraine (PDF)Examples of laws and regulations - SpainExamples of laws and regulations - Spain (PDF)Manual - South AfricaManual - South Africa (PDF)Manual - counting at counting centres - BosniaManual - counting at counting centres - Bosnia (PDF)Manual - QuebecManual - Quebec (PDF)Manual - SwedenManual - Sweden (PDF)Distribution of seats - SwedenDistribution of seats - Sweden (PDF)Ballot markings - CanadaBallot markings - Canada (PDF)The Tasmanian Hare-Clark Scrutiny ProcessThe Tasmanian Hare-Clark Scrutiny Process (PDF)Country Examples IndexThe Indonesian Elections 1999 - Case Study on Vote Counting Counting Ballots in Mozambique: A Case Study of the 1999 Elections. Local Elections in Russia : A Case Study
Vote Counting in Burkina Faso
The Republic of Burkina Faso, a francophone West African country, practises a closed-party list Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system. The political parties contesting elections present their district lists of potential legislators (candidates) to the Commission Nationale d'Organisation des Elections (CNOE) before election day. Legislative seats are allocated to the forty-five electoral districts on the basis of one seat per 100,000 people. The number of seats per district ranges from the largest of eleven for the Ougadougou district, to a minimum of one. The party lists of candidates are equal to the number of seats available to the particular district, and are drawn up from most preferred candidate to the least preferred one. At the end of vote counting, seats are awarded to the parties using the Hare quota system. That is, the allocation of seats is determined by dividing the total vote of the district by the number of contested seats. In presidential elections or referendum a two-round majority runoff formula is used. Appointment and Training of Officials The CNOE is itself appointed a few months before the planned date of an impending election. On appointment, it is the responsibility of the CNOE to make all arrangements for the elections, including the appointment and training of all election (and counting) officials. The election officials double as counting officials. All officials are appointed for a particular election or registration, even though most of them are always reappointed. Most of the officials are teachers. By appointing officials, the Commission ensures that they are not active supporters of any political party, candidate, or option for a referendum. All election officials are trained over a period of a day or two within one month of the impending election. CNOE senior staff and qualified district electoral officers carry out by the training. After the training the officials are issued with the officials' manual and other important election documents for ease of reference. Vote Counting The ballot paper design consists of the name, or acronym, of the party and its symbol, and a space at the end for the voter to make his mark. The voter has to insert the ballot paper into an envelope before putting the envelope into the ballot box. Votes are counted at the polling station soon after voting has ended. At the end of voting the election officials, now counting officials, ensure that members of the public leave the room. The following are admitted to the room before the counting process begins:
The leader of the team of officials in charge of the station and any other person present inspect the ballot box to ensure that the seal is still securely in place. He then breaks the seal and pours the ballot envelopes on a large table. Officials carry out a ballot envelope reconciliation, by comparing the number of voters' names checked on the roll with the number of envelopes issued. When they are satisfied with this process, the envelopes are opened, and the ballot papers removed. Any spoiled envelopes are counted and set aside. A ballot account is now carried out, and the ballots sorted into piles according to party, candidate, or option. Officials count each pile of ballots manually. The leader will pick a ballot, hold it visibly for everybody to see, and count it. Each official, representative, or observer can keep track of the votes as the counting proceeds. When the count is completed, he fills in the results form and then signs it, as well as the representatives. Four official copies of the results are made and distributed as follows:
As part of a ballot account, a record is made of spoiled envelopes and rejected ballots. A ballot is rejected for any one of the following reasons:
The results of the polling stations are collated at the electoral area level. The electoral district officer then forwards the collated results to the officer-in-charge of the district, in the case of a more than one constituency district. Representatives of political parties, candidates and options, as well as local and international observers, are witnesses to the collation. Security personnel maintain order at all stages of the process. From the district level, the collated results are sent to the national level for the national collation to be done at CNOE headquarters. However, for legislative elections, the seats won by the contesting political parties are determined at the district level, and the names of the winning candidates sent to the national office. CNOE officials personally transmit all results, in the company of security personnel and party representatives. The CNOE is responsible for publishing the interim results. All challenges/disputes over electoral results released by the commission must be filed at the Supreme Court within five days after the publication of the interim results. The Supreme Court then adjudicates and declares the final results. It may order a recount of the votes. If the Supreme Court finds no merit in the challenges brought before it, it then declares the results as authentic and final. sdgfsdfsdfsdf Vote Counting in Ghana
Ghana practises both the majoritarian and First-Past-the-Post electoral systems. In presidential elections, the winner is the candidate who earns a majority percentage of the valid votes cast. A second round election is conducted for the candidates who obtained the two highest numbers of votes, if no candidate earns a majority in the first round. In Parliamentary elections however, this majoritarian clause does not apply, and a candidate is declared the winner if he earns more votes than any other candidate. An issue for determination by referendum is taken to be determined if at least thirty-five percent of the persons entitled to vote at the referendum voted and, of the valid votes cast, at least seventy percent voted in favour of the issue. The constitution of Ghana specifies when and where the counting of votes cast at an election should be carried out. It says: 'Immediately after the close of the poll, the presiding officer shall, in the presence of such of the candidates or their representatives and their polling agents as are present, proceed to count, at that polling station, the ballot papers of that station and record the votes cast in favour of each candidate or question.' Counting is done manually. Appointment and Training of Election Officials The electoral commission of Ghana employs permanent officers to manage its offices at the national, regional, and district levels. In addition, it appoints temporary staff whenever it embarks on an exercise involving registration of voters, demarcation of electoral boundaries, or elections (including referenda). The highest temporary electoral appointment is the electoral district officer who, assisted by two deputies, is in charge of a district. There is a presiding officer and usually two polling assistants at each polling station. For a national election, therefore, the commission employs as many as 60,320 temporary officials to man the 120 districts and 20,000 polling stations. Most of the temporary staff are very senior public servants, especially teachers, and senior students. Wherever possible, people with past experience at an election are considered for appointment. One important consideration for appointment is that a person has not shown any active affiliation with, or support for, a particular political party, candidate, or an issue to be determined at a referendum. As much as practicable, the officials are also appointed from the area they are to operate in. Public approval for their neutrality and ability to hold the office is sought by publishing the names of the electoral district officers in the national newspapers, and those of the junior officers in the areas where they will work. The political parties are, in addition, given the names and addresses of all temporary staff. Both the political parties and the general public are allowed to make reasonable objections to a temporary staff appointment. The officials must attend the training exercise, regardless of whether or not they have had election experience. The training of temporary staff is always carried out close to the election. The trainers are usually permanent senior staff of the commission and proven qualified electoral district officers. The trainers themselves undergo a training of trainers (TOT) exercise organized by the Public Education and Training (PET) division at the national level. The trainers for the TOT are professional (university) trainers and some members of the electoral commission (the Board of the Commission). The training session is planned to allow the trainees or trainers to be able to go through the election operations manual, and role play the election. No training is carried out at the polling stations, but presiding officers are encouraged to hold briefing meetings with their staff at the polling station before the poll starts. (Copies of training and operations manuals are supplied.) Candidates' agents are allowed to attend the training sessions. In Ghana the term 'election official' is used to mean the officer in charge of the poll taking and counting exercises. The officer therefore doubles for both on election day. The training also involves both aspects of the election. It is normal to train a few more than the number of officials required, and some will serve on a standby basis. The polling station structure is such that the voter population per station is not so big as to require long periods of counting. Most polling stations have less than one thousand voters, and some actually have less than five hundred voters on their lists. Vote Counting Immediately after the polls close, the presiding officer, in the presence of those candidates or their agents, and any other persons permitted to attend the count:
During the count the presiding officer takes a ballot paper, announces for whom or which issue it was cast, and allows any representatives and observers present to check the proof of his announcement. If there is no disagreement, he adds it to the pile of the particular candidate or issue. If there is any disagreement over the ballot, the presiding officer will pass it around for close examination by the agents, to reach a consensus decision, but the presiding officer has the final word. All rejected and spoiled ballot papers are put together in a separate pile. Any of the following reasons cause rejection of a ballot paper:
When the vote counting is completed, a candidate or his agent may require the presiding officer to have the votes recounted, and the officer must comply. However, a second request for a recount may be carried out only at the electoral district centre by the electoral district officer or his deputy. At the end of the count, the presiding officer and the candidates or their representatives (agents) sign a declaration, stating:
The presiding officer then announces the results of the voting at that polling station and gives copies of the results declaration form to each candidate (or agent), and posts another copy at the station. As soon as possible after the announcement of the voting results at the polling station, the presiding officer in the presence of the candidates or their agents puts the ballots of each candidate or issue into separate packets and seals them with his own seal and the seals of the candidates or their agents if they so desire. The packets are then put into the ballot box, along with the following other documents:
The presiding officer then puts his seal (and those of the candidates or their agents) on the ballot box and delivers the box to the electoral district officer. Collation of Votes at Electoral District Centre The electoral district officer makes arrangements for collating the votes in his electoral district in the presence of the candidates and or their agents as soon as possible after the close of the poll. The electoral district officer is required to give the candidates or their agents sufficient notice of the time and place of the collation of votes. During the collation, the electoral district officer shall take the sealed ballot boxes from the various polling stations under his jurisdiction, and open them one at a time, after the candidates (or their agents) have inspected each to make sure the seals are intact. He takes the recorded results of each polling station and reads it aloud in the hearing of everyone present. He then takes them to find the totals for each candidate or issue. He will also carry out a recount of any ballot box, if there was a request for a second recount at the polling station. At the end of the collation, the electoral district officer:
In a Parliamentary election, on receipt of a writ as prescribed by law, the commission publishes in the Gazette a notice stating the name of the person elected and the total number of votes cast for each candidate, and informs the Clerk of Parliament soon thereafter of the name(s) of the candidate(s) elected. In the case of a presidential election or a national referendum, the results declared by the various electoral district officers throughout the country are collated to determine the national result. The commission then causes a Gazette notice to be published, stating the name of the candidate elected. No court certification is required. Petition against Election Results Within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of an election result, a candidate, or a person who lawfully voted, or had a right to vote, or other qualified persons may present a petition to a High Court to declare the said result to be void, or grant any other relief sought by the petitioner. For more information on the legislation in Ghana, please refer to Examples of laws and regulations - Belgium. The Indonesian Elections 1999 - Case Study on Vote CountingThe significance in both the international and domestic public eye of the elections, following as they did 32 years of elections with a high degree of coersion, and low degrees of freedom and transparancy make a case study of the count especially relevant. Mechanisms were chosen to highlight the transparancy and correctness of these elections that could serve as a model for other transitional elections. On the other hand, the notorious problems of the consolidation of the results, will be brought up as a cautionary reminder of the importance of planning and training as carefully for the count and results process, as for the polling process. The 1999 Indonesian transitional elections do not reflect procedurally the conduct of earlier elections, nor do they reflect necessarily the conduct of subsequent elections. The main differences with previous elections were the increase in political participation (48 parties compared with 3 the 32 previous years), and the transparency built into the procedures. Accredited national and international observers were permitted, in unlimited numbers, to watch both the voting and the count. In addition, party agents (maximum one per party), were not only free to observe, but also to challenge elements of the polling or count. The 7 June 1999 elections were for 3 levels - district, provincial, and regional legislatures. For the national elections, a total of 462 seats were at stake (with 38 reserved for the military and police, making a total of 500). These 462 seats were apportioned to the provinces on the basis of population, but with some favouring of the more sparsely populated outer islands over the densely populated Java. Polling was conducted from 8 am to 2 pm in approximately 300,000 polling stations across the country - no mean logistical feat in a country of 17,000 islands, some mountainous, some densely forested. Following the closing of the polls, votes were counted at the polling station, by the polling station officials. As 80% of Indonesia´s polling stations were outdoors, there was ample opportunity for not only the observers and party agents, but also the general public to watch (which they did! - the count across the country was characterised by a carnival like enthusiasm on the part of the onlookers). The Polling Station Count For the sake of this case study, a random 'sample' polling station count is used to exemplify certain stages of the counting process, in this a village polling station in Sorkom Sub-District, North Sumatra. Before opening the ballot boxes, the polling station officials prefilled the Official Reconciliation Forms to the extent possible (see example model C1 form). These forms were in the form of rather unwieldy, large books, a necessity considering that there were not only 48 parties times three elections, but also that all the polling station officials, as well as all the party agents present were to sign, endorsing the correctness of the documents. The C1 book/forms were to be filled out in 3 copies for the station, as well, each party agent had a copy. The first entry on the form 'Ballots Recieved' should have been filled out already at the opening of the polls. The ballot papers for the polling station were sealed in inside the ballot boxes upon reciept, and were to be opened, counted, and recorded as part of polling station opening procedures, in full view of all present, including the first voters the day. The ballots received total should equal the amount of registered voters at the polling station, plus a 3% contingency (for spoilt ballots, or for persons added to the register with valid registration cards, or for persons registered elsewhere with a special authorisation form). The first ballot box, for national elections, was then opened, and ballots counted. The Indonesian 1999 ballots was small-poster size, and folded in a special way to ensure secrecy of the ballot. An 'official' ballot was one signed by the polling station chairman, the vice-chairman, and a third polling station member as well as affixed with an official hologram sticker. The three levels of ballots had three different colours for differentiation; the ballot boxes were in corresponding colours. When the first ballot box was opened, a number of wrong colour ballots had crept in - a common problem for the count when several elections are held at the same time. With the approval of all the party agents present, the misplaced ballots were placed in the correct boxes. The expectation would be of course that any 'missing' ballots for this count would be found in the boxes to be opened subsequently. For this reason, the official reconciliation form results at each polling station were not to be filled in until the end of the count of all three boxes. Back to the opening of the ballot box - the first task upon opening was to sort out the most obvious invalid ballots, that is the 'inofficial' ones, that were missing the three signatures or the official hologram, fake ballots, photocopies ballots, ballots larger or smaller than the official ballots, or ballots in a different colour, which were to be removed and not counted, should any exist. The official ballots were then counted, the total noted, hopefully matching the amount recieved, minus unused and minus spoilt, and minus 'inofficial/invalid'. If the numbers didn´t reconcile, chances are that this was because ballots for 'this' election were still in the, as yet uncounted, other boxes. One by one, in front of all party agents, observers, and the general public, the ballots were unfolded, held up in full view, and the party called out by the chairman, and tallied on a large visible boards. The party agents, and observers if they so wished, had forms to do a parallel tally at the same time. Interestingly for the Indonesian elections, ballots were 'punched' with a hole rather than marked. Because of this, the back of the ballots were shown to all present, so that the hole would be clearly visible. As the ballot papers were thin, translucent, and the party symbols bright and easily visible from the back of the paper, this was fine except, had there been worse lighting, (mostly the count was done in the daytime, between 2-6 pm, but in some places delayed materials resulted in delayed counts, meaning the count was conducted in poor lighting) this could have been a problem. When voters had not properly punched the cards, but rather just made a dent in the paper, these were considered valid if so approved by all present. Ballots marked with a pen, punched more than once, unclearly punched (ie on the line between two parties), or not punched were considered 'invalid', along with the inofficial ballots already removed. The chairman made special effort with the invalid ballots to make sure that the invalidity was approved by all. This greatly added to the sense of transparancy, good will, and participation. Valid votes were both tallied during the count, and the ballots divided into piles, subsequently counted and checked against the large tally board. The parallel count by the party agents and observers present served as a triple check for accuracy. Following the tally, and the determination of votes per party, the ballots were rubberbanded together on a party basis, and placed into an official envelope that was then sealed. Invalid ballots, were placed into another envelope, recorded and sealed. These two envelopes, plus the envelope with the spoiled ballots were placed in a plastic bag. This procedure was repeated for the provincial and district level ballots. After the ballots were tallied for each election, the polling station chair asked the vice chair to count the number of votes for each party, for each election, on each tally sheet. The chair announced the total number of votes for each party so that party agents and observers could hear. The vice chair and another polling station member then record the number of votes for each party on the official reconciliation form (3 copies). Another polling station member recorded the numbers at the same time on a large, visible form on the board. The three copies were signed by all polling station officials, and all party agents present. One form was to be kept sealed, with the other election material, another to be posted publicly at the polling station, and the third to be given to the village level election committee for the consolidation of the results. The sealed envelopes were locked inside one of the ballot boxes, other materials placed in a second, and all the materials accompanied by the polling officials, party agents, observers, and general public, to the location designated by the village level election committee for safekeeping overnight. The consolidation of the results The village election committees, known as the PPS, were each responsible for between 2 and 9 polling stations, depending on the population of the area. The Indonesian elections were organised based on a hierarchy of 6 (!) levels: the national election committee and commission (KPU/PPI), Provincial (PPD1), Regency/Municipality (PPD2), District (PPK), Subdistrict/Village (PPS) and polling station levels. Official reconciliation forms were consolidated at each level - that is, the PPS (Village) consolidated its polling station results, which were sent to the Sub-district (PPK) level. The District level consolidated and sent official forms to the next level up (Municipality), but also sent the results directly to an electronic parallel counting centre in Jakarta, run largely by internationals (Australia). The official manual results, following consolidation at the provincial and national levels. was a process scheduled to take approximately 2 weeks, followed by a 'legalisation' process and official announcement. The computerised count, though inofficial, provided considerably quicker results. Certain observer groups also conducted parallel tallies. Under the current electoral law, candidates are allocated seats on a constituency basis (the constituency, but within a proportional representation system. List of candidates for each party/constitutency are posted in advance. If a party is allocated 3 seats in The use of reconciliation of numbers was an important feature of the election forms, and yet one area that many election officials seemed to have difficulty with. Using the sample polling station as an example, the results were spread over 11 parties, with 2 parties neck in neck, resulting in a marginal victory for Golkar, the party that only a few yearts before had garnered over 90% of the vote. This gives an indication of the changes that a new electoral law, free campaigning, and clear and transparent procedures can bring to a small village. Counting Ballots in Mozambique: A Case Study of the 1999 Elections.After the country's first elections in 1994 had been applauded by the international community, the local election four years later - marked by bitterness between the two major parties and boycotted by most of the opposition with a resulting voter turnout of only 15 percent - seriously questioned the consolidation of the young democracy. This gave the second general elections in December 1999 - the first under the sole responsibility of Mozambican authorities - even more significance as the concluding test for the sustainability of the new democratic system. Realising the growing importance of the upcoming elections, the major parties struggled through to a substantial programme designed to enhance overall confidence in the electoral process. The electoral law was changed to once again incorporate all parties represented in the national assembly in the electoral organs at national, provincial and district level. The parties also agreed to conduct a completely new voter registration exercise in order to eliminate doubts about the trustworthiness of the existing registry. The registration process, monitored by national and international observers, was considered a huge success with 86% of the estimated eligible voters registered. Election Days Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for December 3 and 4 1999, but extended for a third day after heavy rainfall delayed the delivery of materials to several dozen of the more than 8,000 polling stations in the country. A few stations in the rural areas of the most afflicted regions in Zambezia province never opened and thus a total of approximately 8,000 registered citizens were not given a chance to cast their vote. In general, there was a polling station for every voters list with a maximum of a thousand registered voters. In some cases, voters lists were split in two and separate polling stations established to shorten the way for voters in rural areas. The rule that citizens should vote at the same location where they had registered could therefore not be observed in all cases. The stations were staffed with five polling officers. Additional staff members (called auxiliaries) organised the queues and answered basic questions outside of the polling stations. The personnel was due to arrive at the station at 5:00 to set up the voting material before the station opened to the public at 7:00. Accredited party representatives, national and international observers as well as the media were allowed to be present during the entire day (7:00 - 18:00) as well as during the opening and closing procedures. Upon arrival, voters presented their voting card to a polling official who verified that their names were on the voters list. The presiding officer handed out ballot papers for both presidential and parliamentary elections and demonstrated how to fold the papers to avoid unintended ink marks. The ballot papers were different in size, but had an otherwise similar design. The parliamentary ballot paper listed the candidate´s party name, abbreviation and symbol with a separate line for each party or candidate. The presidential ballot paper listed the candidate's name, party symbol, abbreviation and a photograph. The last column on both papers was left blank allowing for voters to mark their choice either with a cross or a thumbprint. Two mobile voting booths that were a part of the material kit for polling stations, provided for the secrecy of the vote. After marking and folding the ballots, voters returned to put them in the respective ballot boxes in front of the presiding officer. Finally, voters were made to dip their index finger in indelible ink to establish that they had already voted. Their names were checked off and initialled in the appropriate column of the voters list before the presiding officer returned their voter cards. The Count at the Polling Station The counting process at the polling station level began immediately after the stations were closed on the last day of voting in the presence of party representatives and observers. As a first step, the total number of voters checked off in the voters list was counted after all empty fields representing non-voters had been crossed out. Unused and spoiled ballots were counted, the result noted in the polling station report and the ballots packed in tamper evident plastic bags. The ballot box for the presidential elections was then opened to count the total number of ballots. The ballots were not unfolded, but repacked in the box afterwards. The process was repeated with the ballots for the parliamentary elections, although in this case, the ballots were not repacked, because the officials subsequently carried out the actual counting. The total number of voters as well as the number of ballots in each of the two boxes was noted in the polling station report and on an additional document that was immediately posted outside the polling station for public information. The counts for presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted separately, but the procedures were similar. The presiding officer took one ballot at a time, unfolded it and indicated aloud the classification given to the vote (party or candidate name, invalid or blank). The deputy officer repeated the classification and showed the ballot to the party representatives and observers present. Ballot papers were arranged in separate stacks representing each party or candidate, invalid and blank votes. A third polling official kept a running tally of the classified votes on a notepad or blackboard. When all ballot papers had been counted, each stack was counted separately and the results compared with the tally. The party representatives were then allowed to examine the stacks and contest the decision of the presiding officer. If a decision was challenged, the complaint was noted on the back of the respective ballot and signed by both the presiding officer and the contestant. The challenge had no immediate impact on the counting results, but the ballot paper was later sent to the National Electoral Commission for a final decision. A separate document (or edict) was filled out for each election, showing the number of registered voters, the number of ballots in the box, the number of ballots per candidate or party and the number of blank and invalid votes. The edicts were signed by the polling officials and posted outside of the polling station for public information. The same information along with the number of contested votes, and all other irregularities or problems was noted in the polling station record. Valid and blank votes were sealed in the same tamper evident plastic bag, while invalid and contested ballots were sealed in another. The polling station record, the voters list and carbon copies of the edicts for both elections were packed and sealed in separate bags. All plastic bags were then stowed with the other material in the metal electoral kit boxes and sent to the district office of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE). While valid and blank ballots were kept at the district level, all other materials and documents were forwarded to the provincial STAE headquarters. STAE personnel or police escorts accompanied the transports. In most cases, party representatives also travelled with the materials. Tabulation at the Provincial Level Upon arrival at the provincial STAE headquarters, the materials were separated. General supplies were stored in warehouses. The voters list, a copy of the polling station documents (report and edicts) and the plastic bag with invalid and contested votes were sent to the National Electoral Commission (CNE) in Maputo, the capital, while a second copy of the polling station documents was kept as a basis for the tabulation of the provincial results. These results, which were scheduled to be published within seven days after the elections, were only preliminary, as the final adjustments made necessary by the re-evaluation of invalid and contested ballots were made at the national level. A special software program based on Microsoft Access had been designed for the elections. All information from the ballot account forms was entered into this database in the respective provincial capital. The data was entered independently by two teams to detect errors in arithmetic and data entry or attempts of fraud. The computer program then compared the two data sets and reported any discrepancy to the administrator whose responsibility it was to examine and resolve the problem. In the case of a simple typing mistake, the edict was again entered by both teams. If the edict itself was faulty (e.g. the sum of all votes did not match the number of ballots in the box), it was given to the Provincial Electoral Commission (CPE) for follow-up. There were no explicit rules or regulations as to how and when the CPE should reconcile the discrepancies, so that in some provinces the commissions waited until all other work was done before they met, thus delaying the re-entry of the faulty edicts and with it the whole tabulation process. Party representatives and national and international observers were given access to the results database, allowing them to see the data that had already been entered and compare it with the figures they had gathered during the election. In case of doubt, observers could ask for the original edict to verify that the numbers on the document matched those in the database. Unfortunately, there was no way to see how many polling stations had yet to be entered. Due to technical problems with the software, access to the observer computer was restricted to short periods of 15 to 30 minutes between the shifts of the data entry personnel. In most provinces, CPE and STAE personnel seemed to be rather reluctant to co-operate with the observers, often interpreting the regulations rigidly or, in a few cases, even denying access to either the observation terminal or the original edicts. In most cases, these problems originated from insufficient training regarding the role and rights of observers and were resolved after a visit of a deputy director of National STAE, who was able to convince the personnel of the validity of the observer regulations. As a consequence of its late completion (only days before the elections were held), the personnel had very little experience with the new software, and observers had not been trained at all on how to use it. This was especially problematic for many of the national or party observers who lacked any computer experience whatsoever. Thus, most observers had difficulties accessing the available data and no clear idea of what they should do with it, consequently relying on the advice of other (often international) observers on how to compare their own information with the computer data. A lack of understanding of the procedures led to confusion on part of the observers, who interpreted technical problems as attempts of fraud. In some cases, observers did not ask for clarification of their doubts, but simply reported their sometimes faulty allegations to their party headquarters, adding to an already tense political situation. Despite all the problems, the observation system successfully detected two attempts of fraud, where data entry personnel had exchanged the number of votes for the two presidential candidates whenever the incumbent had won the majority at a polling station, thus favouring the opposition candidate. With the help of computer audit logs the culprits were found and the results were corrected before serious harm was done. In almost all provinces, technical problems, lack of training with the computer software and a high number of edicts with wrong or insufficient data delayed the publication of the preliminary results. A considerable number of edicts showed mistakes so grave that they could not be processed at all or the CPEs felt unable to reconcile them, in the latter case passing on the responsibility to the CNE. As a result, hundreds of edicts representing several hundred thousand votes were not reflected in the preliminary results, adding doubts about accuracy and transparency of the counting process to the delay. (Re-)Evaluation of Invalid Ballots at the National Level While the tabulation process was ongoing in the provinces, edicts and ballots started to arrive in Maputo. STAE and CNE members began with the reclassification of invalid and contested votes. After the arrival of the materials had been registered, the sealed transport bags were organised by province. The bags were then opened and every ballot was reviewed by two CNE members appointed by different parties. The regulations allowed a liberal interpretation of valid ballots only asking for the voter's will to be clearly marked. In other words, a cross or thumbprint (or both) could be anywhere in the line with the party or candidate information. Even though polling and counting officials had been provided with a comprehensive set of examples for invalid and blank votes, the CNE was overwhelmed by the large number of ballots they had to examine. A document was filled out for each polling station, specifying the number of invalid votes that had been reclassified as valid and to which party or candidate they had been assigned. The results were later summarised for the whole province on a separate form. Another team of CNE members worked on the problematic edicts that had been forwarded by the CPEs. Whenever the problems were sorted out, the data was entered into the database with the provincial results that by then had arrived in the capital. Finally, the summarised results of the reclassification of invalid and contested votes were added to the databases with the provincial results, forming the base for the distribution of parliamentary seats. To determine the outcome of the presidential race, the figures were summed up for nation-wide results. The official results were publicly announced by the CNE with a delay of two days that stemmed partly from the delays caused during the tabulation process in the provinces, partly from the unexpectedly high number of invalid or contested votes and partly due to problematic edicts which had to be reviewed by the CNE. Lessons Learned Although some of the problems that occurred during the 1999 Mozambican elections were country specific, their analysis allows drawing some conclusions worth generalising:
Local Elections in Russia : A Case StudyThe following is a step-by-step account of votecounting procedures in Russia. Repeated by-election of a Duma deputy in Monchegorsk District - December 3rd 2000. Polling station no 163 in Apatity. This polling station was shared and used as two polling stations in the same big room. The room was divided in the middle. Most polling stations were schools, culture houses or daycares. Voter turnout in this particular polling station was approximately 25% compared to the regional average on 37%. It was common throughout the vote counting process that more than one activity took place at the same time. For example the unused ballotpapers were counted at the same time as the number of signatures on the voter register. The vote counting procedures at this election went generally very well and smooth. We did not witness any major violations worth mentioning. This case study represents a typical vote counting procedure from a local election in Russia. The same electoral law is used all over the country with very minor changes. The vote counting procedures at federal elections as well as local are very similar. As far as the domestic observer could tell as well as ourselves, we know could not witness any unusual circumstances during this procedures. The only thing we reacted to was the fact that at some other polling stations at other elections in Russia it had been allowed to come in and go for visitors during the process, however this was not the case at this polling stations. The polling officials were very experienced and seemd to know the full process by heart. Present at the polling station are:
Counting Ballots in Sweden
Summary In Sweden there are three elections (parliamentary, county council, and municipal) on the same day. The votes are counted, by party only, in the polling stations immediately after the closing of the poll. Interim results are reported by telephone from the polling station to the local election committees who report to the regional office of the Regional Tax Board. From the Regional Tax Board, a computer transmits the parliamentary results to the National Tax Board, where a preliminary distribution of seats in parliament is carried out, and the interim results are published. The ballots and reports are delivered to the Regional State Administration where a recount is carried out. Based on the recount, the final distribution of seats for the municipal and county levels is made, and the final results published by the State County Administration. The distribution of seats for parliament is made by the National Tax Board and the final results officially published, based on reports from the State County Administration. Electoral System Sweden has a proportional list system, with a possibility for preferential vote for one candidate on the list. There is a separate list for each alternative (the party can have more than one list in each electoral district). The voter inserts the ballot, with or without preferential mark, in an envelope, using a separate ballot for each election. The ballots have different colours for each election, and separate ballot boxes are used. There are around six thousand polling stations in Sweden, with a separate voters' register for each polling station. Normally, voters choose to vote at the polling station where they are registered. However, absentee voting is permitted at post offices up to eighteen days before election day, and during a more limited period at Swedish missions abroad. About thirty-five percent of the electorate vote using the absentee ballot. The voter can vote either in person or by proxy. Limited mail-in voting is allowed in special cases. Most of the absentee votes are sent to the polling station where the voters are registered and counted there. However, a small proportion of 'late' absentee votes and mail-in votes are counted by the local election committees. Vote Counting in Polling Stations Immediately after the closing of the polls, the votes are counted in the polling stations in this order:
First, the absentee votes are put in the ballot boxes. The number of voters who have cast their votes according to the voter register is determined. The envelopes in the ballot box are counted and compared with the numbers according to the voters' register. If there is a discrepancy, a recount is carried out. If there still is a discrepancy, this is written in the polling station report and the count continues. The envelopes are opened, and the ballots are sorted according to party. Spoiled ballots are set aside and counted. A ballot is spoiled if:
The ballots are then counted per party and the numbers are written in the polling station report. The ballots are put in special plastic envelopes. A separate envelope is used for each party, and for spoiled ballots, and the envelopes are sealed. The ballots, voters' register, and reports are delivered to the local election committee, and from there, to the state county administration for the recount. Reporting of Interim Results As soon as the parliamentary election is counted in the polling station, the results are reported by telephone to the Regional Tax Authority. The parliamentary results are forwarded to the National Tax Board where a preliminary distribution of seats is carried out and published. The results from the municipal and county council elections are reported in the same way, but the procedures end at the Regional Tax Authority, where preliminary distributions of seats are carried out and published. Predictions of the parliamentary results are made by the media based on sample results delivered by the National Tax Board. The media bear the responsibility for these predictions. However, the accuracy of the predictions has improved, and normally the predictions are very close to the actual result. Counting of Absentee Votes and Mail-in Votes The local election committees are responsible for 'late' absentee votes (that have not been sent to the polling stations), and mail-in votes. This count takes place three days after election day, and by and large, the same rules apply as in counting at the polling stations. The election materials are delivered to the State County Administration for a recount immediately after the count is finished. Final Count at the State County Administration At the final count, all ballots are examined and decided on once again. The ballots are counted, not only by party, but each list within the party, and preferential votes for candidates. The numbers are entered into computers, the results are calculated, and seats distributed among parties and candidates. These operations start the day after the election. The final parliamentary results are published after a little more than a week later. The final county council and municipal council results are published approximately three weeks after the election. All ballots, reports, and voters' registers are kept in case of complaints. For more information on vote counting in Sweden, please refer to the legislation Examples of laws and regulations - Sweden, the training manual Manual - Sweden, and the vote counting rules Ballot markings - Canada. Vote Counting in ZimbabweThe following case study is a step-by-step description of the vote counting process in the legislative elections where voting took place over 2 days, the 24th and 25th of June 2000. In addition to describe the vote counting process, it aims to highlight critical areas and suggest recommendations. All the counting officials involved in the legislative elections worked approximately 72 hours without almost any breaks. Considering the length of work, the need for an organised food delivery system, as well as sleeping arrangement, is crucial. Appointment and Training of Counting Officials The Electoral Act establishes the Registrar-General of Elections as the central election authority responsible for the administration of the elections in Zimbabwe. Functions which fall under his office include the appointment of the counting officials as well as the counting of ballots. The Registrar General works together with civil servants at the national, provincial, constituency and local levels in managing and administering the electoral process. For each constituency there is a Constituency Registrar, a Deputy Constituency Registrar, and one or more Assistant Constituency Registrars, all temporary seconded to the elections from the Civil Service. The Constituency Registrar establishes as many fixed, as well as mobile, polling stations as he/she considers necessary to make convenient access possible. In addition, the Constituency Registrar is responsible for managing the counting center for the constituency. The Constituency Registrar serves as the Chief Election Officer for that constituency and appoints a Presiding Officer to manage each polling station in the constituency. For this national election, there were approximately 36 000 temporary polling officials to cover the 120 constituencies and about 4500 polling stations. Since votes were counted at the constituency level, there were a total of 120 counting centers, where the Presiding Officers doubled their role to include counting duties as well. The Constituency Registrar trained all the Presiding Officers in one constituency. The training focused mainly on the polling since the counting procedure was to be held under the direct supervision of the Constituency Registrar in the counting center. Therefore, he/she concentrated the training on the polling where the Presiding Officers would be without guidance. The Constituency Registrars themselves were trained by the Registrar General´s Office. The Presiding Officers/counting officials, (as well as the polling officials, polling agents and local monitors), were towork on both election days and stay overnight with the ballot box in the polling station one or two nights in order to ensure its security. Depending on location and distance from the counting centre, the transportation of the ballot box took place either on the evening of the second polling day or in the morning the following day. At some counting centres the counting officials were offered to buy catered food, whereas in others they were provided with food by relatives and/or friends. Vote Counting The counting of ballots took place on the day immediately following the two days of voting. At the close of poll, the Presiding Officer sealed the openings in the ballot boxes, and allowed Candidates and Polling Agents (party representatives) to affix their seals. Thereafter, the following material were placed together in separate packets:
The ballots and the packets were transported by the Presiding Officer to the Constituency-Registrar together with the Presiding Officer´s statement specifying the total number of ballot papers entrusted to his/her polling station and the sub-totals of used, unused and spoiled papers. Efforts were made to enable election monitors (domestic observers), and polling agents to travel with the ballot box to the counting centre. Due to different conditions for transport of the ballot boxes, the time fixed for the start of the count varied from constituency to constituency. The counting was divided into two phases; the verification phase and the counting phase. During the first phase all Presiding Officers, Polling Officials, Polling Agents, and accreditated local and international observers were allowed inside the counting centre. The Verification of the ballots at the Counting Center The counting took place in a training center. The size of the room was equivalent to the size of two regular classrooms. During the verification of the ballots the room was crowded which made the system of control difficult to handle. The 38 ballot boxes were put on tables and were guarded by polling officials from respective polling station. The Electoral Act allows voters not present in their constituency on election days to cast their votes through postal ballots. Such ballots must be applied for in advance. All postal ballots must be accompanied by a signed and witnessed legal statement insuring that the person casting the ballot is the correct individual. In this election the main part of the postal ballots came from the 11,000 military troops stationed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Before the verification of the regular ballots took place, the Constituency Registrar opened the postal ballot box, counted the envelopes and opened all of them. The number on each postal ballot was verified against the number on the envelope. Then followed an examination of the declaration of identity which needed to be duly signed and witnessed. Therafter the postal ballots were put into an empty ballot box, to be counted at a later stage with the regualr ballots/ After the verification of the regular ballots, they were co-mingled with the postal ballots to ensure secrecy. After the verification of the postal ballots, the verification phase of the regular ballots started. Each ballot box was opened individually. The Presiding Officer from the first polling station provided the information on the number of ballots cast in the polling station as well as the serial numbers of these. All the polling officials as well as the Polling Agents verified this information. After having ensured that the seal on the ballot box was securely intact, the Constituency Registrar opened the first ballot box. Five Presiding Officers were randomly chosen to count the ballots and put them in order according to their serial numbers. Thereafter, the number of ballots in the ballot box was verified against the number of ballot papers issued to the polling station. If the number of ballots did not reconcile, they were recounted until the result was balanced. If ballots were still missing, an agreement was signed by all Polling Agents to continue the verification. Following the verification, ballot papers from all the polling stations, as well as the postal ballots, were co-mingled for the counting of the votes. The unused ballots were put into one box placed in clear view at a table. The Constituency Registrar completed a report of the verification for the Registrar General. Before the counting took place everyone present in the counting centre had to leave the room except five Polling Agents (one for each candidate) and at least five policemen. During a 15 minutes break, the furniture was re-arranged in order to assure sufficient light during the whole count. The Sorting and Counting of the ballots During the sorting and counting process, the following persons were permitted to attend:
One Counting Official (the Presiding Officer or one of the polling officials) from each polling station acted as Counting Officials. Everyone attending the sorting process and the count was required to stay inside the counting centre during the whole count in order to avoid leaks of the result before the actual count was finished. The sorting process began when the Constituency Registrar opened the ballot box/boxes with the mixed ballots and put them on a table. Then Counting Officials divided the ballots according to candidate. Ballots where the indication of the voter was not clear were put aside and dealt with after all other ballots had been sorted. All the polling agents checked the uncertain ballots and agreed by consencus whether or not to accept the ballot. Any of the following reasons caused rejection of a ballot paper:
If the voter had indicated his/her preferred candidate clearly, by means other than a cross, the ballot could be accepted. If candidates or polling agents objected to the rejection of a ballot, this would be noted on papers which were placed in an envelope kept within the packet containing the rejected ballot papers. The rejected ballots were counted and thereafter put into an envelope together with the blank votes. The Count Following the sorting of the ballots, the counting started for one candidate at the time. The ballots were put into piles of 100 votes each. After having been counted once, the same pile was recounted by the counting official sitting next to the one counting the pile the first time. At the end of the count, the constituency registrar declared the candidate who had received the greatest number of votes to be elected as a member of Parliament. If there was an equality of votes between two or more of the candidates, the winning candidate was determined by the drawing of lots arranged by the Registrar General in the presence of a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court. Post-Counting After the counting was completed the constituency registrar sent by telegram, to the Registrar General, the results of the constituency election, including the name of the elected candidate, the number of votes received by the different candidates, and the number of rejected ballot papers. As soon as the names of the persons declared elected were received by the Registrar General and transmitted to the Minister of Home Affairs, the names were published in the Gazette together with the constituencies which they represented. After the announcement of the results of the counting, the Constituency Registrar, in the presence of the candidates or their agents, put the ballots of each candidate into separate boxes and sealed them with his/her seal. The ballots were then delivered to the Register General together with:
The Registrar General must retain all these documents for six months and then, unless otherwise directed by the High Court, destroys them. Election Disputes Following the announcement of the election results, a petition may be presented to the High Court by:
Petitions must be filed within 30 days of the announcement of the result. If the High Court determines that a candidate was not duly elected and that no other person was or is entitled to the seat the seat shall become vacant until a by-election has been held. In recent elections, court petitions have become a more used method when suspicion of electoral irregularities exist. One notable case is that of Margaret Dongo in the 1995 parliamentary elections who filed a petition in Harare South, and won in the by-election. In the most recent elections, approximateley 20 petitions have been filed to the High Court which have not yet been determined. Lesson Learned
testtest Vote Counting End Notes
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