

European Union Election Observation Mission Bolivia 2006





BOLIVIA

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION AND REFERENDUM ON REGIONAL AUTONOMY 2 July 2006

EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

FINAL REPORT

Table of Contents

ACI	CRONYMS OF BOLIVIAN POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS	1
1	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
2	INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION AND	O ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4
3	POLITICAL OVERVIEW	5
	3.1 Road to Constituent Assembly Election and Ref Autonomy	5
	3.2 Key Political Actors	6
4	LEGAL FRAMEWORK	7
	4.1 Electoral Legislation	7
	4.2 Translating Votes into Seats	8
5	ELECTION ADMINISTRATION	9
	5.1 National Electoral Court and Departmental Elec	toral Courts9
	5.2 Polling Station Members	
	5.3 Voter Information	11
6	VOTER REGISTRATION	12
	6.1 Voter Registration System	
	6.2 Issuing of Identity Cards	13
7	CANDIDATE REGISTRATION	13
8	CAMPAIGN AND MEDIA	15
	8.1 Electoral Campaign	
	8.2 Key Media	
	8.3 Legal Framework of the Media	
	8.4 Media Complaints	
9	PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE ELECTORAL PRO	OCESS25
10	PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS GROUPS IN THE ELI	ECTORAL PROCESS27
11	1 ELECTION DAY	27
	11.1 Polling	27
	11.2 Role of Party Agents	28
	11.3 Domestic Observers	
	11.4 Closing and Transmission of results	29

This report was produced by the EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) and presents the EU EOM's findings on the Constituent Assembly Election and the Referendum on Regional Autonomy in Bolivia. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the Commission. The European Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor does it accept responsibility for any use made thereof.

	11.5 Polling Complaints	29
12	FINAL RESULTS	30
	12.1 Constituent Assembly Election	30
	12.2 Referendum on Regional Autonomy	
13	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT	31
	13.1 Independence of the CNE and Enforcement of Its Resolutions	31
	13.2 Transparency of the CNE	
	13.3 Voter Register	
	13.4 Cooperation between State Institutions in Issuing Identity Cards	32
	13.5 Verification of Requirements for Candidates before the ElectionError!	
	13.6 Role of Electoral Coordinators and Electoral Notaries	
	13.7 Access to Polling Centres	33
	13.8 Indigenous Languages	33
	13.9 Party Agents	
	13.10National Observer Groups	
	13.11Out-of-Country Voting	34
	13.12Regulations on Use of Public Areas during Campaign	
	13.13Distribution of Free and Equal Airtime in State-Owned Media	
	13.14Suspend Promotion of Public Institutions during Campaign	
	13.15Campaign Code of Conduct	
14	ANNEX I: MEDIA STATISTICS	36
15	ANNEX II: ELECTORAL RESULTS	41

ACRONYMS OF BOLIVIAN POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

AAI Alianza Andrés Ibáñez

ALBA Alianza de Bases

ADN Acción Democrática Nacionalista

APB Autonomía para Bolivia

AS, Alianza Social

ASI Autonomía Social Integradora

ASP Alianza Social Patriótica

AYRA Movimiento Ayra

CDC Convergencia Democrática Nacionalista

CN Concertación Nacional

FRI Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda

MACA Movimiento Acción Ciudadana

MAR Movimiento Autónomo Regional

MAS Movimiento al Socialismo

MBL Movimiento Bolivia Libre

MCSFA Movimiento Ciudadano San Felipe de Austria

MIBOL Movimiento de Integración Boliviana

MIR-NM Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria- Nueva Mayoría

MNR Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario

MNR-A3 Alianza 3 - Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario

MOP Movimiento Originario Popular

PODEMOS Poder Democrático y Social

TRADEPA Transformación Democrática Patriótica

UCS Unión Cívica Solidaridad

UN Unidad Nacional

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Invited by the Government of Bolivia, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) observed the Constituent Assembly Election and the Referendum on Regional Autonomy that were held on July 2, 2006. The mandate of the EU-EOM, led by Monica Frassoni, was to observe and assess the whole election process in light of the Bolivian legal framework and international principles for election observation.
- The electoral process complied largely with national legislation and international standards, especially in the areas of freedom of expression and transparent election administration. The legal framework provided an adequate basis for conducting credible elections. Election Day proceeded smoothly and peacefully, with a turnout of 84.5%, equalling the highest level of participation in the last 25 years achieved in the December 2005 general elections and thereby confirming the commitment of the Bolivian authorities and voters to democratic and genuine elections.
- The EU-EOM congratulates the electoral authorities, government, political parties and the people of Bolivia for having conducted credible and genuine elections, despite some shortcomings on which recommendations will be offered in the final part of this report.
- The National Electoral Court (Corte Nacional Electoral, CNE) and the Departmental Electoral Courts did not show political bias in their management of the election process, despite repeated accusations and delegitimation attempts, especially from the Government and to a lesser extent from some opposition representatives. The EU-EOM welcomed the fact that the Government's publicly expressed position toward the CNE warmed significantly after Election Day.
- Even if the electoral process was conducted professionally, the EU-EOM found room for improvement, in particular as regards the access to vote of the citizens of Bolivia. Various shortcomings were observed throughout the country, in relation to information on the electoral process (registration and voting procedures, political platforms); in providing all eligible voters the right to vote, notably in rural areas; and in procedures to correct mistakes in the voter register.
- The constitutional obligation to vote was not fully matched by effective facilities, including transport, voter education and information. The authorities failed to provide sufficient information on the electoral process in the indigenous languages of the country. Restriction on circulation of vehicles and inadequate voting premises during Election Day made it difficult for disabled and elderly voters to vote.

- The EU-EOM did not receive any substantial evidence of politically motivated irregularities in the list of voters removed from the register ("depurados"). However, legally established mechanisms to reinstate voters' names wrongly deleted from the lists are still deficient. Publication of the list of depurados just seven days before Election Day and mostly only in the Departmental Electoral Courts gives too little margin to citizens to correct potential mistakes in the list. It was observed for example that citizens discovered only on Election Day that they had been excluded from voter lists. Moreover, the EU-EOM noted that awareness by citizens and electoral officials on the procedures to correct mistakes could be greatly improved. Finally, the fact that only the electoral judges had the power to correct mistakes during Election Day, and that few of them were available, made it very difficult to apply even the existing procedures to correct mistakes.
- The EU-EOM also considers that the mechanism, established in Article 70 of the Electoral Code, automatically to remove voters who do not vote in one election from the voter register has disenfranchising effects and could therefore be reconsidered.
- The Government's programme to provide identity cards ("carnetización" process) provoked controversies during the electoral process, including allegations that foreign citizens might be or were being registered to vote. The deadline for new inscriptions to be included in the voter register was April 3, 2006. By that time, only approximately 14,000 new identity cards had been issued, and it was therefore obvious that the "carnetización" was not to have any significant effect on the outcome of the July 2 elections. Moreover, the EU-EOM was not presented with any evidence of irregularities in the "carnetización" process.
- Issuing new identity cards is a most important and legitimate goal and should be pursued by the Bolivian authorities. The EU-EOM recommends the Government to continue this process to enable previously marginalized Bolivians to participate in future elections. The EU-EOM also considers that the process could be more efficient if steps would be taken to improve coordination between the different public institutions responsible for the citizen and voter registers.
- Most political organisations failed to provide relevant information about their political platforms and objectives for the Constituent Assembly. The CNE did not fully succeed in releasing adequate, easily understandable and multilingual information about the objectives and the specificities of the Constituent Assembly Election and the Referendum on Regional Autonomy.
- To improve women's prospects in elections, Bolivian electoral legislation provides for special quotas. Even with the quotas, traditional mechanisms of gender-based discrimination continued to play a role in the placement of candidates in the lists. In most cases the first candidates in the lists were male. The marginalization of women was also evident in that the overwhelming majority of the candidates advertised in the media were male. Although the quotas helped women to

increase their electoral presence, there is still much work to be done to improve their possibilities to compete in future electoral processes.

• The Bolivian media reported about the elections without undue interference from public authorities. The few reported incidents during the campaign did not disturb the generally calm atmosphere in which the media worked. In general, the distinction between information and opinion was maintained by the media, and the coverage tended to be balanced. Only in the coverage of the Referendum on Regional Autonomy, the media tended to privilege the option of their preference.

2 INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In response to an invitation by the Government of Bolivia dated of 9 March 2006, the European Commission in consultation with the European Union Member States deployed a European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) to observe the Constituent Assembly Election and the Referendum on Regional Autonomy that were held on July 2, 2006. These polls represented an important moment in the process of political, economic and social change in Bolivia. The mandate of the EU-EOM was to observe and assess the whole election process in light of the Bolivian legal framework and international principles.

Following the EU's long-term observation methodology, the EU-EOM arrived in Bolivia on May 24, 2006, over five weeks before Election Day. The preliminary conclusions of the EU-EOM were made public in an interim report that was presented on July 4, two days after the elections. Thereafter the Mission continued to observe the counting and tabulation processes, as well as proclamation of results, and stayed in the country to analyse and report on the post-election period until August 8, two days after the Constituent Assembly was established in Sucre.

The Mission was led by Chief Observer Monica Frassoni, Member of the European Parliament from Italy. The Deputy Chief Observer was Teivo Teivainen, from Finland. The Core Team also included Luis Martínez Betanzos, from Spain, as Legal and Electoral Expert; Lars Tollemark, from Sweden, as Observer Coordinator; Milan Boldi, from the Czech Republic, as Deputy Observer Coordinator; Xabier Meilán, from Spain, as Media Expert; Xavier Noc, from France, as Operations Expert; Martim Freire, from Portugal, as Security Expert; and Silvia de Félix, from Spain, as Press Officer.

The EU-EOM deployed across all nine departments of the country over one hundred European observers from 22 of the 25 Member States of the European Union. Apart from the nine Core Team members, the Mission consisted of 26 Long-Term Observers and 60 Short-Term Observers. Additionally, eleven members of European diplomatic missions based in La Paz were deployed as Short-Term Observers.²

² For more information on the Mission, see www.eueombolivia.org.

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¹ See European Union Election Observation Mission Bolivia 2006, *Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*, La Paz, 4 July 2006, available at http://www.eueombolivia.org/english/xxdefault.asp?id=1&show=59&m=0.

Although independent from any other institutions of the European Union, the Mission received logistical support from the European Commission in Brussels as well as from the Delegation of the European Commission and the EU member state diplomatic representations in Bolivia. The Mission also maintained cordial and cooperative relations with the governmental and electoral authorities of Bolivia, as well as with representatives of Bolivian political parties and civil society groups. The technical implementation of the Mission was efficiently managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Our most sincere thank you to everyone, and in particular to the Bolivian people who always expressed a welcoming hospitality toward our Mission.

3 POLITICAL OVERVIEW

3.1 Road to Constituent Assembly Election and Referendum on Regional Autonomy

The Constituent Assembly has been a long-held demand in Bolivia, especially by many of the indigenous movements and other highland social forces. After a period of particularly intense social upheavals, the agreement to hold a Constituent Assembly Election on 2 July 2006 was reached during the interim presidency of Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé on 6 July 2005. At the same time, the government also called for general elections to be held in December 2005.

The victory of the leftist MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) in the December 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections opened a process of social and political changes in Bolivia. Evo Morales won the presidency with an absolute majority of the valid votes (53.7%) and his party MAS simultaneously gained an absolute majority in the House of Representatives as well as 12 out of the 27 seats in the Senate. Various MAS leaders subsequently stated that although they now controlled the government, they still did not have power in real terms. For them, the Constituent Assembly represented one of the most important means to transform the basic structures of the Bolivian state and, potentially, to obtain a more solid control of the country.

The demands for the Referendum on Regional Autonomy have mostly originated in the lowland areas, particularly in Santa Cruz, where much of Bolivia's natural resources and economic elites are located. Approximately 300.000 valid signatures in favour of a referendum were collected by the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee and handed to the National Electoral Court in February 2005. The number exceeded the limit, six per cent of the country's registered voters, established by the Referendum Law of 2004 to start the process of organizing the very first referendum upon popular initiative in the history of Bolivia.

During the first months of the Morales government, there were intense negotiations on how to combine the Constituent Assembly Election with the Referendum on Regional Autonomy. In somewhat simplified but illustrative geographical terms, the negotiations led to a compromise between the demands of the pro-Constituent Assembly highland western departments and the pro-Referendum lowland-Amazonian eastern departments. On 6 March 2006, two special laws calling for two simultaneous polls on July 2 were finally approved by the Parliament. It was established that the result of the Referendum on Regional Autonomy would be binding for the Constituent Assembly in the departments where the majority would vote in favour of the autonomy, though the exact meaning of the autonomy was left for the Constituent Assembly to define.

3.2 Key Political Actors

The most important political change in Bolivia in the recent years has been the spectacular rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), led by Evo Morales. A hybrid between an alliance of social movements and a political party, MAS has reached levels of popular support never experienced by any political group in the contemporary history of Bolivia. Various earlier leftist political groups have either merged into MAS or decided to support it, though some small left-wing groups that have influence mainly in the universities and in the teachers trade union represent the minuscule left opposition to MAS.

The historical political parties that mostly controlled the state institutions in the past decades have entered a period of serious crisis and loss of popular support. These include the traditionally populist Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), in many ways the most important party of the second half of the 20^{th} Century; the social democratic Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR); and the right-wing Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN). Of the three, MNR maintains popular support especially in the lowland department of Beni, whereas the other two have all but disappeared from the electoral map.

As the popularity of the traditional ruling parties has waned some of their cadres and supporters, especially of ADN, have become active in the new right-wing political alliance Poder Democrático y Ciudadano (PODEMOS), formed in November 2005 around the presidential candidacy of Jorge Quiroga. Since its founding, PODEMOS has been the second-most important political group of Bolivia.

The third-most important new political group in Bolivia is Unidad Nacional (UN), led by Samuel Doria Medina. In its discourse, UN represents itself as a centrist alternative to both MAS and PODEMOS. MBL (Movimiento Bolivia Libre), a centre-left party, maintains a level of support in the same range as that of UN, though in the Constituent Assembly Election some of its formal candidates, especially in the rural areas of Cochabamba, were affiliated with MAS. Other political groups include the indigenous-based political party Ayra and the citizen alliance Concertación Nacional (CN), the latter with a strong presence of evangelical Christian groups.

There also exist smaller parties and political alliances, some of which enjoy certain support in particular regions or sectors. For example, the citizen alliance Alianza Social (AS) has a strong presence in Potosí. More generally, the regional divide has become an increasingly important political factor in Bolivia. Especially the pro-autonomy citizen alliance Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz, supported by the economic elites of Santa Cruz, could be considered a significant political actor in opposition to MAS, even if it is not formally a political group that would have own candidates in the elections. Its role was strengthened by the Referendum on Regional Autonomy, though at the same time it must be remembered that in the Constituent Assembly Election MAS became the most voted political party also in Santa Cruz.³

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³ On the results of the different political groups in the Constituent Assembly Election, see Chapter 13 and Annex.

4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

4.1 Electoral Legislation

Since 1991, Bolivian elections have been regulated by a legal framework that in general terms provides a satisfactory basis for conducting credible elections, though the EU-EOM has some recommendations for improvements. The electoral norms are mostly in accordance with the relevant international norms and practices. Among the nine Articles that refer to the electoral system, the current Constitution establishes the autonomy, independence and impartiality of the election authorities. This ensures that other powers of the state have very limited legal possibilities to interfere with the running of elections.

In case the election authorities enter into a conflict of competence with other state institutions – belonging to the executive, the legislature or the judiciary – the issue can be resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal. Apart from that kind of limited constitutional oversight, that has never played a role in strictly electoral matters, the legislation establishes a near-complete autonomy for the electoral authority. In comparison with other countries of the region, the legal autonomy of the Bolivian election authorities comes close to making them a "fourth power" of the state, even if no such separation is explicit in any of the existing laws.

The most elaborate set of electoral norms is the Electoral Code, with 245 Articles. There are various other laws, decrees, and by-laws that regulate different aspects of elections, including specific norms that called for the July 2 Constituent Assembly Election and Referendum on Regional Autonomy. The main norms that constituted the legal basis of the July 2 polls were:

- Constitution of 1967 (amended 1994, 2002, 2004, 2005)
- The Electoral Code of 1999 (amended 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005)
- The Political Party Law of 1999 (amended 2001 and 2005)
- The Citizens' Groups and Indigenous Peoples' Law (2004)
- The Referendum Law (2004)
- The special law that called for the Constituent Assembly Election (*Ley Especial de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente*) (2006)
- The special law that called for the Referendum on Regional Autonomy (Ley de Convocatoria a Referendum Nacional Vinculante a la Asamblea Constituyente para las Autonomías Departamentales) (2006)

Bolivian elections and referendums are legally characterized by universal, secret, individual, equal, direct, free, and compulsory suffrage. Bolivian citizens of 18 years of age and above are guaranteed the right to elect and be elected provided they are included in the electoral register. The formal exceptions to the right to be elected follow standard rules about the need for certain public authorities and civil servants to resign from their duties if they become candidates.

One of the vacuums that the EU-EOM has noted in the electoral laws of Bolivia is the lack of proper regulation of domestic election observer groups. At present the norms seem to assume that since in principle any Bolivian citizen is free to observe the activities of the polling stations during Election Day, there is little need for specific norms.

Another aspect in which the EU-EOM has noted a lack of explicit regulation is in the area of enforcement of the decisions of the Corte Nacional Electoral. While the enforcement of the CNE's decisions in strictly electoral matters has presented no problems, in cases where the law gives the CNE the prerogative of ordering civil servants of other branches of the state to resign for violations of electoral laws, there exists no clearly established procedure for executing these orders.

Early voting for members of the security services, such as members of the police and armed forces, is not properly developed in the current electoral framework. For example, police officers on duty who are deployed to areas different from their polling station during Election Day can be effectively disenfranchised, and the same can happen with medical personnel on duty as well as hospital patients.

Before the forthcoming referendum on the constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly, the electoral authorities face the task of creating voting procedures for Bolivians resident in a foreign country. In a country characterized by high levels of emigration, organizing out-of-country voting, which has already been included in the electoral legislation but not yet regulated by specific by-laws or other procedural norms, will be both important and challenging.

Apart from these vacuums, the EU-EOM considers some other parts of the existing electoral norms problematic, especially when they limit excessively the scope for the possibilities of Bolivian citizens to exercise their constitutional right to vote. These issues will be analyzed in various sections of this report and finally in the concluding chapter that presents the main recommendations of the EU-EOM.

4.2 Translating Votes into Seats

The mechanism for translating votes into seats in the Constituent Assembly was subject to continuous political negotiations during the first months of 2006. The resulting system was a mix between the method used in the elections for Senate (that aims at giving equal weight to all departments, including the sparsely populated ones) and the principle of proportionality.

The "Ley Especial de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente" specified that the Assembly would consist of 255 members. Compared to other recent constituent assemblies in the region, and taking into account the population of Bolivia, this number can be considered high. For electoral purposes, the country is divided into 70 constituencies: three members were elected from each constituency, making a total of 210. The additional 45 members were elected on the level of departments, with each of the nine departments represented by five members.

The boundaries of the constituencies combined with the specific system for allocating seats in the Constituent Assembly resulted in an election system in which the weight of each vote in the least populated department (Pando) was about 13 times higher than each vote in the most populated department (La Paz). Even if the principle that votes should be given equal weight was not followed, most of the key actors did not seem to find this a major problem. The main disagreements in defining the electoral system for the July 2 vote were on how many seats the winning list in each constituency should be able to gain.

The original proposal of the governing MAS for the Constituent Assembly Election was that a political group winning more than 50% of the vote in any of the 70 territorial electoral districts would take all three seats of the constituency. A compromise with the opposition was finally reached, resulting in a system in which the group winning most votes in the constituency takes two seats and the third one goes to the group gaining the second-highest number of votes. This system, which favours the two major lists in each constituency, is somewhat compensated by the more minority-friendly system of

allocating seats at the departmental level (where the majority list gets two seats, and the next three lists get one seat each assuming they obtain more than five percent of the vote).

There have also been demands to establish special constituencies to guarantee a level of representation to Bolivia's numerous indigenous groups. Moreover, it has from time to time been argued that a number of representatives of the indigenous communities should be elected through mechanisms based on traditional customs that differ from the one-person-one-vote principle. These mechanisms have, however, not been incorporated into the system of translating votes into seats in the Bolivian electoral laws.

5 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

5.1 National Electoral Court and Departmental Electoral Courts

Before the electoral reform of 1991, the election authorities of Bolivia were in practice representatives of political parties, whereas thereafter they have been requested by law to be non-partisan. This change was triggered by events in 1989, when the election authorities divided along party-political lines and the subsequent majority of the electoral court annulled votes with a clear political intentionality.

The CNE is the highest authority in electoral matters. Four of its five members are elected by the Parliament through a two-thirds majority, which ensures that they need to enjoy the confidence of a relatively wide spectrum of the groups represented in the Parliament. The fifth member is appointed by the president of Bolivia. All five are elected for four-year terms and at least two of them need to be lawyers.

When the previous president of the CNE resigned in March 2006, and given that another member had resigned earlier, the CNE had to prepare the July 2 elections while comprising only the minimum quorum of three members. The political forces in Parliament could not reach a political agreement on new members before the elections, which created a potentially problematic situation with the risk that the CNE would be inquorate if any of the remaining three members would resign or otherwise become unable to continue. Even if having to function with the minimum quorum did not have any visible effect on the efficiency of the CNE, the EU-EOM considers that the lack of time limits for the Parliament to elect new members is problematic. This lack of time limits may lead to the CNE having to work extended periods with the minimum or an insufficient quorum.

Of the nine Departmental Electoral Courts, Potosí, Chuquisaca, Oruro, Tarija, Beni and Pando each have five members, Cochabamba has seven, whereas the two biggest ones La Paz and Santa Cruz have each been divided into two geographical units and are thereby constituted by ten members. The nomination process for the members of the Departmental Electoral Courts

is similar to that of the CNE, one member being appointed by the president of Bolivia and the others by the Parliament from a list of candidates provided by the CNE. All Departmental Electoral Courts functioned during the electoral process with the legally established maximum number of members.

Most of the activities of the electoral authorities were announced well in advance in the official Electoral Calendar. It was remarkable how the electoral authorities at different levels were able to comply with the deadlines established by the Electoral Code.

In general terms, most political actors agree that since 1991 the election administration has functioned relatively well. An opinion poll in which Bolivians ranked the credibility of state institutions placed the CNE second, only after the Catholic Church. Published on May 28, the poll conducted by Apoyo found 80% of Bolivians expressing approval of the CNE, whereas the approval rate for the Catholic Church was 81% and for the Parliament 64%.

During the preparations for the July 2 polls the government, and to a lesser extent some opposition parties, repeatedly alleged that certain members of the Corte Nacional Electoral would be politically biased. On June 7, President Morales said international observers were the only guarantee of transparency in the July 2 elections. According to Morales, "there is distrust in some members of the CNE who were members of parties defending the interests of landowners and privatizers, and worked in favour of the neoliberal model". The statement was widely perceived to refer in particular to the CNE president Salvador Romero, who subsequently stated that the CNE does not comment on declarations by state authorities.

After the election, however, the government conceded that the electoral authorities had acted in a professional and transparent way. On July 11, President Morales praised the work of the CNE, stating that this time the electoral process was "very transparent" and that the Constituent Assembly Election and Referendum on Regional Autonomy had been completely different from earlier elections. The EU-EOM had already expressed publicly in its preliminary statement on July 4 that there was no evidence of politically motivated bias in the overall performance of the CNE.

5.2 Polling Station Members

One of the most massive and complex operations of any election administration is to select, train and coordinate the work of the vast number of polling station members. In the Bolivian electoral system polling station members play a particularly important role. In each polling station they have a sovereign position in the sense that their counting of the votes is final, and even if the Departmental and National Electoral Courts may in some cases annul the results of a polling station the individual votes are never recounted.

Each polling station of Bolivia consists of three full members and three substitutes. In the July 2 vote, the Bolivian electorate was divided into 21,382 polling stations, a small increase on the December 2005 total of 21,111. The list of 127,966 polling station members, who were selected by lot in computerized sessions by the Departmental Electoral Courts, was published 30 days before Election Day as stipulated by the Electoral Code. The substitute members were selected and trained together with the three full members. In many cases, there were both full and substitute members present in the polling stations, amounting to more than three

members per polling station. According to the evaluation of the EU-EOM observers, 94% of the polling stations visited functioned well or very well, which suggests that the training had been of good quality.

Although the electoral authorities repeatedly emphasized that all registered voters participate with equal possibilities in the selection of the polling station members, the selection mechanisms are not entirely randomized. First of all, the Electoral Code requires that two of the polling station members need to be able to read, and this requirement has been taken into account in the algorithm used in the selection. Another bias, without any legal basis, is that citizens older than 65 have been almost totally excluded from the possibility of becoming polling station members. While people older than 65 represent 10.2% of registered voters, among the polling station members only 0.022% (28 individuals) were older than 65.

The EU-EOM considers that the exclusion of people older than 65 is age-based discrimination ("ageism"). It is also a problem for the transparency of the electoral administration that this exclusion has not been made explicit by the electoral authorities.

5.3 Voter Information

The public information campaign carried out by the CNE covered all the traditionally used media during such campaigns: TV, radio, newspaper advertisements, written pamphlets and information sessions both in rural and urban areas. The public information offices of the Departmental Electoral Courts had the possibility to adapt the general guidelines issued by the CNE to suit the particular characteristics of their regions. Most of the Departmental Electoral Courts re-designed their materials especially to give a sense of proximity to the different ethnic groups resident in their respective departments. In regions with a significant indigenous population, they sometimes used indigenous languages in their public information campaigns, although written materials were produced only in Spanish (see the chapter on Indigenous Groups).

Even if the electoral authorities demonstrated high professional standards in many of their public education materials, their public awareness campaign did not fully succeed in providing voter information on the electoral process. The EU-EOM also noted the lack of written electoral information in the indigenous languages of the country. Moreover, information on the procedures to correct mistakes in the voter register was insufficient and contributed to the high number of citizens absent from the register, notably in rural areas. The publication of the list of people removed from voter register (a total of 568 735 persons, most of them for failing to fulfill their obligation to vote in the previous election) on June 25, only seven days before Election Day, gave little time for aggrieved citizens to request corrections. Moreover, such requests had to be made and dealt with in the main offices of the Departmental Electoral Courts, which was particularly difficult for the remote rural populations.

Apart from the electoral courts, another institution that had the mandate to produce public information on the Constituent Assembly process was REPAC (Presidential Representation to the Constituent Assembly), established on March 6 to prepare the ground for and provide support to the Assembly. Partially due to its late establishment, only four months before

Election Day, REPAC had low visibility and did not accomplish its task of building a comprehensive public information campaign throughout the country.

6 VOTER REGISTRATION

6.1 Voter Registration System

As in other countries of the region characterized by a large indigenous population, the reliability of the databases about the citizens of Bolivia is relatively low. The custom of officially registering births and especially deaths is not deeply rooted, in particular among the rural population. The high level of emigration, much of it unregistered, provides an additional challenge for the population records.

According to the 2005 figures of the National Statistical Institute, Bolivia has a population of 9,427,219 citizens. Among the total population 56% are eighteen years or older, with a total of 5,202,614 Bolivians having the legal age to be registered as voters. The voter register kept by the CNE, however, only includes 3,713,345 registered voters. The EU-EOM notes with concern the large number of Bolivians of voting age who are absent from the voter register. In order to help the transparency of the electoral process it is important to identify the reasons for this large number of non-registered citizens.

One of the most debated issues of the electoral process was the management of the voter register. During the election campaign, MAS made public allegations of politically motivated irregularities in the removal of voters from the voter lists through the process of *depuración* (purging). According to Article 70 of the Electoral Code, a citizen who did not vote in one election is automatically removed from the voter register for the next election. This legal principle was adequately explained by the CNE to the parties' representatives in several instances, even if the public information campaign on this issue remained insufficient.

The lists of names removed from the register were made public only one week before Election Day, which left little time for concerned individuals or political organisations to verify the accuracy of the *depuración* exercise and identify possible mistakes. Parties could still, however, have compared the publicly available lists of citizens removed from the voter register and the lists of those citizens who were recorded as having voted in the previous elections. No systematic verification process of this kind was brought to the attention of the EU-EOM, and no evidence was presented in support of the concern that the *depuración* may have been conducted in a biased or otherwise inappropriate way.

At the same time, the EU-EOM considers that the procedures for removing names from the voter lists, and for re-registering names erroneously removed, could be significantly improved especially as regards timeframes and public information on complaints and appeals. Such improvements would contribute to reduce the risk of disenfranchizing voters and would increase voter confidence.

The EU-EOM also finds it problematic that the mechanism established in Article 70 of the Electoral Code automatically removes from the voter register people who do not vote in one election. While it does help diminish the number of dead or emigrated persons in the voter register, and thereby also contributes to relatively high offical levels of electoral participation,

it constitutes an excessive sanction. Others sanctions for registered voters who do not vote include a 90-day inhabilitation for any public office or salary, as well as a 90-day prohibition to make bank transations or obtain passport.

Additionally, the prospect that in future electoral processes, especially in the forthcoming referendum on the Constitution, voting for Bolivians living abroad will be facilitated is a factor that needs to be taken into account in the future of the voter register.

6.2 Issuing of Identity Cards

One of the main obstacles to the right of Bolivian citizens to participate in public affairs is the large number of citizens who are not registered as voters, in part because they do not have identity cards needed for the registration process. Indigenous citizens, particularly those living in rural areas, are disproportionately affected by this problem. The issue was already recognised as a serious one well before the election of the current Government of Bolivia in 2005, and the CNE was already undertaking a programme to encourage citizens to obtain identity cards and register to vote.

Following President Morales´ election, a high-profile campaign was launched by the Government to provide identity cards (*carnetización*) and thereby enable citizens to register to vote. This campaign provoked controversy in the run up to the July 2006 elections, including allegations that foreign citizens might be registered to vote. The involvement of Venezuelan experts invited by the Ministerio de Gobierno to share their expertise in this field was viewed with suspicion by PODEMOS and used for election campaign purposes against MAS.

The deadline for new inscriptions in the voter register was 3 April 2006. By that time, approximately 14,000 new identity cards had been issued as a result of the Government's *carnetización* campaign. Assuming that all of the holders of these new identity cards also registered to vote, they would account for less than 0.4% of the total number of registered voters in Bolivia. In view of this very small percentage, the impact of the *carnetización* process on the final outcome of the July 2 elections was minimal. The EU-EOM was not presented with any evidence of irregularities in the *carnetización* process, but even if there had been irregularities, the electoral impact would still have been minimal.

The EU-EOM considers that providing identity cards for marginalized Bolivians is a highly positive process, in order to increase their citizen rights including that of electoral participation. While it is difficult to establish the exact number of Bolivians currently without identity cards or excluded from the voter register, their existence constitutes a serious problem for the democratic process in Bolivia.

7 CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

Before the constitutional reform of 2004, only registered political parties could present candidates in Bolivian elections. The current electoral laws provide a possibility for non-party groups, defined as "citizen groups" and "indigenous peoples", to present their own candidate lists. A specific law, adopted in 2004, regulates the presentation of these lists. In both cases, in order to participate in an election the groups need to gather a number of supporting signatures amounting to 2% of the valid votes in the previous national election in the

corresponding electoral district, in addition to meeting other requirements for their registration.

Since the national requirement of supporting signatures is the same for citizen groups and indigenous peoples as for political parties, the difference between the three categories has limited relevance for groups that aim to compete nationally. The key difference is that citizen groups and indigenous peoples have the possibility to register in only some electoral districts by complying with the 2% requirement in those districts.

By the April 3 registration deadline five political groups presented valid candidate lists in all nine departments. Additionally, twenty groups presented candidates in one or more departments. As shown in the following chart, no lists were registered in the category "indigenous peoples". This suggests that the 2% threshold of signatures may have been high for indigenous groups with potential interest in participating in the electoral process, especially in the context of relatively short time frames in organizing the elections. At the same time, it must be remembered that even if no groups formally registered as "indigenous" participated in the elections, the ethnic plurality of the candidates as well as of the elected members of the Constituent Assembly was probably higher than in any previous national elections in Bolivia.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION 2006 PARTICIPATION OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS BY DEPARTMENT

No.	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION	CHUQUISACA	LA PAZ	СОСНАВАМВА	ORURO	POTOSI	TARIJA	SANTA CRUZ	BENI	PANDO
1	(*) MAS	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
2	(**) PODEMOS	Х	X	х	Х	х	Х	Х	х	х
3	(*) UN	х	Х	х	Х	х	х	х	х	х
4	(*) MIR-NM	X	X	Х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х
5	(*) AYRA	X	X	Х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	Х
6	(***) CN	X	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	
7	(***) TRADEPA	X	X	Х	Х	Х		Х	Х	Х
8	(*) MNR	X	X	Х	Х	Х			Х	Х
9	(*) ADN	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х			
10	(*) MBL	X	X	Х		Х	Х	Х		
11	(*) UCS	X	X		Х					
12	(***) ASP		Х							
13	(***) CDC			Х						
14	(***) ALBA				Х					
15	(***) MAR				X					
16	(***) MCSFA				Х					
17	(***) MIBOL				Х					
18	(***) AS					х				
19	(***) MOP					Х				
20	(**) A3-MNR							Х		
21	(**) AAI							Х		
22	(***) APB							х		
23	(***) ASI							X		

No.	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION	CHUQUISACA	LA PAZ	СОСНАВАМВА	ORURO	POTOSI	TARIJA	SANTA CRUZ	BENI	PANDO
24	(***) MACA							X		
25	(**) MNR-FRI						Х			
	TOTAL PARTICIPATION	11	12	11	14	12	9	13	8	7
	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS		TOTAL							
1	(*) Political Party		8							
2	(**) Political Alliance		4							
3	(***) Citizen Group		13							

June 17 was the last day prior to Election Day to present legal petitions about Constituent Assembly candidates. There were 2,124 candidates and 19 petitions were presented to the CNE. The CNE had four days to reach a decision after the petitions were accepted and concerned candidates notified and given a possibility to respond.

Of the 19 petitions, the CNE resolved one in favour of the petitioners. The case concerned a candidate from Santa Cruz, belonging to the citizen group ASI (Autonomía Social Integradora), who was removed from the candidate list by the CNE for not having resigned from her position as a civil servant. This decision was based on Article 105 of the Electoral Code in which being a civil servant constitutes one of the reasons to be disqualified as a candidate.

In the Constituent Assembly Election, most of the requirements of the candidates established in Article 182 of the Electoral Code were verified by the CNE only after Election Day. This practice created a situation in which one elected candidate was not able to receive her official credentials by August 6, the date the Constituent Assembly was inaugurated. Although in this election the effect of the practice of verification ex-post was limited to one person, in future elections such practice could create more complicated situations.

8 CAMPAIGN AND MEDIA

8.1 Electoral Campaign

Especially at the beginning of the electoral campaign period, which started as stipulated by the Election Code 60 days before Election Day i.e. on May 1, the campaigns were relatively low profile. The campaigning did, however, gradually become more visible during the last two weeks before Election Day.

One reason for the low-profile campaigns was the shortage of financial resources. First of all, parties had spent much of their energy and finances in the December 2005 general elections. Moreover, there was initially much uncertainty about the availability and exact amounts of public funding which would be offered for the campaigns of the July 2006 elections.

The Constituent Assembly Election special law initially specified that the amount of public campaign funding would be equivalent to 1.25% of the consolidated national budget. It was, however, obvious to most concerned parties almost immediately that there had been a numerical mistake in the drafting of the law, and that the intention of the legislator had been

to set the funding at 0.125%. Negotiations to correct this error were complicated when the governing MAS repeatedly proposed the complete removal of any financial support from the state to political entities. An agreement was finally reached on May 19 when the law was amended by the Parliament and the financial support was set at 0.07% of the national consolidated budget.

According to the law, the parties were allocated different amounts of money to buy advertising space, based on the percentage of votes received in the December 2005 legislative elections. Accordingly, only four political groups benefited from state funding: MAS, UN, MNR and PODEMOS.

Apart from the low-profile campaigning, one of the reasons for the limited public enthusiasm was that most of the candidates were relatively unknown. Many of the country's well-known politicians were already holding public office and by law could not therefore become members of the Constituent Assembly.

The economic incentives associated with gaining a seat in the Constituent Assembly were relatively meagre in comparison with those associated with gaining a seat in the Parliament, which also discouraged some potential candidates. Moreover, there was a sense that voters were tired of electoral processes after the December elections. Other important issues, such as the reforms of the policy on natural resources and land ownership, also detracted attention from the July elections.

8.2 Key Media

The Bolivian media landscape is densely populated. A recent study estimates that the country has 455 TV stations, 805 radios, and 51 periodical publications. According to a 2004 national poll commissioned by the CNE, 74.5% of Bolivians consider themselves heavy mass media users. The typical media consumer lives in an urban setting, belongs to the middle class and has an educational degree. In order to be informed about politics, most of the people (56.3%) interviewed for the CNE's poll said they preferred TV, as opposed to 22.1% who preferred the radio; 9.3%, their friends; and 4.5%, the newspapers.

The state owns three media outlets: the TV channel Canal 7 (also known as TVB), Radio Illimani and the news agency ABI. The state-owned TV and radio reach most of the country, but their audience is considered very low.

Most of the media are privately owned. The ones with the largest national audiences belong to press or business conglomerates, such as the Spanish Grupo Prisa, which owns the national TV station ATB as well as four newspapers (among them, the influential, La Paz based *La Razón*), and Grupo Líder, a chain of eight newspapers whose flagship is *El Deber*, a national daily published in Santa Cruz. Generally, the privately owned media, especially the largest print and TV outlets, maintain a critical distance from the current Government's policies. In recent times, the Santa Cruz TV station *Unitel* has been considered the most openly critical of the executive power. Government representatives, including president Morales, have publicly contested its critical attitude.

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⁴ CONTRERAS BASPIÑEIRO, Adalid, *De enteros y medios de comunicación. Tendencias en la oferta y el consumo mediático en Bolivia.* La Paz, CEDLA, 2005.

An important actor in the media realm is the Catholic Church, linked to two of the largest national radio stations, Erbol and Fides. The first is close to progressive peasant and indigenous movements, whereas the latter has a more conservative stance. There is also a wealth of local, independent media, many of them linked to religious and community groups, educational institutions and unions. Some of them broadcast for Aymara, Quechua and, to a lesser extent, Guaraní communities in their own languages.

8.3 Legal Framework of the Media

Media activities in Bolivia are scarcely regulated. Article 7b of the Constitution refers only briefly to the citizens' right to express ideas and opinions through any media.

The reference media law is the 1925 Ley de Imprenta (Press Law), which covers all media, electronic as well as print. The law defines media offences, establishes financial penalties for offenders and declares the inviolability of professional secrecy. A series of juries hears and tries alleged offences. These juries, chosen by the municipal councils, are composed of 40 individuals in the departmental capitals and 20 in the provincial capitals.

Another media-related law is the 1995 Ley de Telecomunicaciones (Telecommunications Law), which regulates broadcasting activities through public and private networks. The law has an essentially technical nature. Basically, it sets the administrative conditions for broadcasting in Bolivia, and refers to content only when it foresees penalties for violating public morality or copyrights, ranging from financial penalties to a 125-day-long suspension for the most serious breaches of the provision.

Attempts by past governments to increase control over the media have met strong opposition from the sector's associations and have not been successful. Media associations and unions have always advocated self-regulation. The Journalist Association of La Paz was the first institution to draw up a code of ethics for its associates, which was followed by similar initiatives by other local trade organizations. On May 12, 2006 a National Council of Ethics was established to issue public recommendations about media practices. The Council is composed by two journalists and three prominent members of civil society (currently, two former vice presidents of the country and a historian). The Council cannot impose sanctions, but relies on its public recognition for the implementation of its recommendations. So far, it has once expelled a journalist from the Journalist Association for a violation of its code of ethics. The Council, however, has not been recognized by the National Press Association and the Journalist Union of La Paz, which contested its creation as "unilateral and imposed in an undemocratic manner".

8.4 Media Complaints

During its stay in Bolivia, the EU-EOM recorded three complaints issued by media companies against different public authorities. One took place when Moisés Miranda, secretary general of the Oruro Prefecture, called on June 1 the local media "liars" after having been criticized by the press for his management. On June 5, a group of journalists was allegedly attacked by escorts of president Evo Morales in Caracollo, in the department of Oruro. Finally, on July 14, the National Press Association condemned the insults uttered by

Percy Fernández Áñez, mayor of Santa Cruz, against the newspaper *El Deber* and two of its reporters.

The EU-EOM considers that those incidents did not disturb the generally calm atmosphere in which the media reported about the elections. Furthermore, the EU-EOM did not receive any report of alleged violations against the Press Law or any of the journalistic codes of ethics during the campaign

During the electoral campaign period the CNE received eight requests to suspend electoral advertisements, seven of them filed by PODEMOS and one by UN. As a result of the complaints, the CNE ordered the removal of four electoral spots.

The first suspension orders followed a PODEMOS complaint against two advertisements produced by MAS and UN, respectively. The one by MAS accused PODEMOS' leader, Jorge Quiroga, of spending the largest secret funds in the history of Bolivia (297 million *bolivianos*, approximately €30.8 million) in a two-year period. The advertisement alleged that Quiroga and his brother had used the money for their own benefit. As for the UN advertisement, it featured a fist-fight in Parliament between PODEMOS and MAS congressmen. The CNE initially rejected the complaints by PODEMOS, because they invoked Article 121 of the Electoral Code, which forbids offences against the honour and dignity of candidates, and neither Quiroga nor the congressmen were candidates to the Constituent Assembly Election. Following a new complaint by PODEMOS, this time based on Article 120 of the Electoral Code, which protects dignity of persons, the CNE ordered on June 23 that the two advertisements be taken off the air. The EU-EOM media monitoring unit noted, however, that the two advertisements were suppressed from all the electronic media only four days later.

On June 26, PODEMOS filed another complaint against an advertisement by the "Agrupación Ciudadana Fuerza y Esperanza", which charged Jorge Quiroga and two former ministers of his government (2001-2002) with corruption. The CNE reacted on the same day ordering the suspension of the spot. Finally, on June 29, the CNE ruled in favour of a new PODEMOS complaint against an advertisement denouncing the alleged opposition of PODEMOS to the Anticorruption Law. The spot, whose source was not identified by the CNE, disappeared from the electronic media one day after the order was issued, just as the electoral campaign ended.

Another controversial issue during the campaign was the allocation of free airtime on the state-owned television and radio. Article 115 of the Electoral Code states that the state-owned media must begin broadcasting free electoral propaganda for all the contending parties, starting 60 days before the elections. An MBL candidate from La Paz, María Galindo, applied to run an electoral spot and her request was refused on the grounds that the Electoral Code did not apply to the Constituent Assembly Election. Subsequently, Galindo obtained a letter from the CNE stating that the Electoral Code did apply to the election, but in spite of this the state-owned media persisted in rejecting her spot.

On June 21, Galindo accepted a state-owned radio offer to be interviewed along with a group of candidates as part of her share of "free electoral propaganda". Nevertheless, since her request for the TV spot was not met, she filed a complaint before the Ombudsman and the CNE. After several warnings, on June 28 the CNE ordered the firing of the state TV general manager, Jean Claude Eiffel, as foreseen in Article 115 of the Electoral Code. The removal, however, happened only on July 11, well after the end of the electoral campaign, and

therefore did not comply fully with the law, which provides for the "immediate" removal of the officer.

Finally, Article 120 of the Electoral Code forbids pre-recorded or requested publicity of public works. Nevertheless, different institutions at the state, departmental and local level (see below, media monitoring results and Annex I) advertised the government's achievements in office to an extent which came close to infringing the prohibition.

8.5 Media Monitoring Findings⁵

From June 1 to 30, the EU-EOM monitored a sample of Bolivian media. The aim of the monitoring was to assess whether the media abided by the regulations for the electoral campaign and whether they covered it in a fair and balanced manner.

The sample comprised of six TV stations (the state-owned Canal 7, ATB, PAT, Unitel, Red Uno, and RTP), four radio stations (the state radio Illimani, Erbol, Panamericana and San Gabriel), and four newspapers (La Razón, El Deber, La Prensa and Los Tiempos). The sample was chosen among the national media with the largest audiences to include publicly and privately owned media outlets, both in electronic and print format, based not exclusively in La Paz, and broadcasting in at least one indigenous language.

Eight media monitors were trained to measure the space and time given to political actors (not only political parties and candidates, but also the executive and legislative powers, local authorities, CNE and election observers) and to the Referendum on Regional Autonomy. For each of the media items, the monitors were instructed to code its tone (positive, neutral or negative). The electronic media were monitored only at prime-time hours.⁶

8.5.1 Advertisement

According to Article 52 of the Law of Political Parties, only the parties and civic associations which obtained at least 3% of the vote at the national level in the previous elections are entitled to receive state funds for the electoral campaign. As a result, for the July 2 polls only MAS, PODEMOS, UN and MNR obtained financial support for advertisement from the CNE. The amount distributed proportionally to their vote among those parties was 21.3 million bolivianos (approximately, €2.2 million).

To avoid fraud, the CNE devised a new system to deliver the funds for the July 2 elections. The media wishing to run electoral advertisements had to register with the electoral authorities and communicate to them their advertisement rates. The parties entitled to funds then had to choose from the list of registered media outlets those in which they wanted to place their spots. Instead of delivering the funds to the parties, the CNE was directly billed by the media companies for the parties' advertisement expenditures and paid them with

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⁵ For more detailed media statistics, see Annex.

⁶ The monitoring schedule for TV was 7.30 AM to 9.00 AM, 8.00 PM to 9.00 PM, and 10.00 PM to 11.00 PM from Monday to Friday, and 7.00 PM to 11.00 PM on Sunday. As for the radio, the schedule was 7.00 AM to 8.00 AM, 9.00 AM to 10.30 AM, 12.00 PM to 1.30 PM, and 3.00 PM to 4.00 PM, from Monday to Friday, and 8.00 AM to 12.00 PM on Sunday. No media were monitored on Saturday.

promissory notes, which they can use to pay their taxes or sell to other companies. Only small, local media (10% of the registered outlets) got paid in cash.


Parties and civic associations could also buy advertisements from their own budget within the limits set by the CNE in the regulation for the Constituent Assembly Election. The limits depend on the nature and geographical reach of the media outlets:


- Radio and TV broadcasting nationwide cannot run advertisements for more than 10 minutes of their national programming and 5 minutes of local or departmental programming per day for each party or civic association.
- Radio and TV broadcasting at the departmental level cannot run more than 15 minutes of electoral advertisements per day for each party or civic association. If they also broadcast at the local level, then the limit is 10 minutes for the departmental programming and 5 minutes for the local one.
- Local radio and TV cannot run more than 15 minutes of advertisements of parties and civic associations.
- Print media, irrespectively of their geographical distribution, cannot run more than 4 pages per week for each party or civic association.

The EU-EOM's media monitoring found that voter education and the government obtained a share of advertisements larger than parties and civic associations in all the media analyzed with the exception of the newspapers. In any case, electoral advertisements were always presented as such.

On the state TV, the executive power accounted for almost half (49%) of the advertisements, whereas voter education got a share of 31%. The parties came in third place with 16% of the spots. On the private TV channels, voter education represented 42% of the advertisement, followed by parties (34%), and the executive power (14%).


Graph 1: Distribution of advertisements among political actors in TV






On the radio, voter education was the main topic of the advertisement airtime. On Radio Illimani, the state-owned radio, three out of every four spots were devoted to voter education, and the remaining one corresponded to the executive power. Parties and local authorities did not advertise at all in Radio Illimani during the monitoring period and schedule. On the private radios, voter education was 43% of the advertisement airtime, as opposed to the executive power and the parties, with 24% of the spots each one, and to local authorities, with 9%.


Graph 2: Distribution of advertisements among political actors in radio





Finally, the newspapers analyzed were the media running a largest share of advertisements from parties and civic associations, almost two of every three spots (61%). Voter education came in second place (28%), followed by the executive power (10%) and local authorities (10%).

Graph 3: Distribution of advertisements among political actors in print media



The breakdown of advertisements by party shows that the four parties which received state funds for the campaign (i.e., PODEMOS, UN, MAS and MNR) accounted for at least 75% of the party spots in any media channel.

Table 1: Distribution of advertisements by party

(Table only shows parties advertised in the media, dates and schedules monitored by the EU-EOM)

	TV	Radio	Newspapers
PODEMOS	51.3%	23.6%	37.4%
UN	19.4%	38.1%	12.3%
MAS-MSM	17.0%	5.9%	26.9%
MNR	4.2%	6.9%	3.6%
ADN	2.8%	10.0%	15.3%
MBL	2.6%	11.5%	0.0%
AAI	1.8%	0.2%	1.7%
TRADEPA	0.9%	2.1%	0.6%
MIR-NM	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
APB	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%
ASI	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
ASP	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%
CN	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
MACA	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%
UCS	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%

Generally, as far as the parties are concerned, the electoral campaign in the media was very low-key. The cause most often cited to explain this fact was the scarcity of resources. Besides, many candidates had to defray the cost of their campaigns out of their own pockets for a short-term seat in the Constituent Assembly, which was a financial disincentive for spending.

Furthermore, at least one of the parties obtaining state funds for the campaign, the governing MAS, did not even spend the whole amount received: on July 11, during an official visit to CNE's president Salvador Romero, president Morales returned to the electoral authorities 65% of the funds allocated to his party (11 394 000 bolivianos, approximately €1 185 000, out of a total 17 429 053, i.e., €1 813 000).

Finally, as will be illustrated below in the Chapter on gender issues, there was a gender imbalance in the candidates' advertising. Male candidates were the overwhelming majority in the spots analyzed by the EU-EOM monitoring unit, occupying 91.1% of the TV advertisements, 78.9% of the radio advertisements and 85.1% of the advertisements in the printed media.

8.5.2 Editorial Content

The EU-EOM noted an effort by the media to provide information about the electoral process. All the media outlets analyzed and most of those visited by the media expert throughout the country devoted extra airtime or print space to cover the campaign.

In general, the distinction between information and opinion was maintained, and the coverage tended to be balanced. The clearest exception to this broad evaluation was the coverage of the

Referendum on Regional Autonomy, which drew a clear line between the state-owned and the privately owned media taken as a whole: the former gave more airtime to comment and inform about the "yes" vote, whereas the latter privileged the "no" option (for statistics on the Referendum by media outlet, see Annex I, tables 4, 8, and 12).

Table 2: Coverage of referendum by type of media


	Yes	Neutral	No
State TV	35.7%	14.7%	49.6%
Private TV	70.8%	11.8%	17.4%
State Radio	18%	11%	71%
Private Radio	43%	26%	30%
Newspapers	46%	37%	17%


Most of the media representatives interviewed complained about the poor quality of the information provided by the political parties. They often attributed this to the atypical nature of the July 2 elections, the lack of solid party platforms specifically tailored for the Constituent Assembly, and the poor preparation of the candidates themselves.

The executive power was the political actor most covered in all the media groups analyzed. Ongoing Government policies, such as the land or educational reform and the management of natural resources, received indeed more coverage than any other political actor.

Both on state and on privately owned TV, the government was the political actor which attracted most attention (69% and 52.5% of the coverage, respectively). The parties came in second place with 13.2% of the coverage on the state-owned TV and 22.9% on the privately owned channels.


Graph 4: Editorial coverage of political actors on TV






On the radio, the distribution of airtime was not very different: the executive power received more than half of the coverage reserved for all the political actors. Parties, local authorities and the legislative power are the other institutions which received most attention, and none of them achieved more than a 20% share of the coverage whether in the state-owned or in the privately owned radio companies.


Graph 5: Editorial coverage of political actors on radio





Finally, the newspapers divided almost 90% of their editorial coverage between the Government and the parties (61% and 26%, respectively), leaving very small shares for other actors.

Graph 6: Editorial coverage of political actors in newspapers



The MAS was the party most covered by all the media channels, especially in the state-owned electronic media. PODEMOS and UN came in second and third place, respectively, except on the state TV, where UN's share was larger than the one for PODEMOS. These three parties plus three other traditional ones as ADN, MBL and MNR, which obtained a much more modest share of print space and airtime, accounted for between 80% and 90% of the coverage devoted to parties (for more detailed statistics on the media, see Annex I).

Table 3: Distribution of coverage among main parties

	Print	State TV	Private TV	State radio	Private radio
ADN	4%	9%	6%	13%	3%
MAS-MSM	27%	53%	22%	48%	35%
MBL	3%	0%	7%	6%	9%
MNR	6%	6%	11%	3%	5%
PODEMOS	24%	9%	22%	17%	22%
UN	14%	23%	19%	6%	19%
Others	22%	0%	13%	8%	8%

9 PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The electoral participation of women is conditioned by many factors, including women's relatively high levels of poverty and low literacy rates and also cultural patterns. In Bolivia, as in most other countries, women have traditionally been in a socially and economically disadvantaged position as compared to men, and this has been reflected in their lesser possibilities of electoral participation. Literate women were given the right to vote in municipal elections in Bolivia in 1938, while full electoral rights for women were achieved in law only with the social revolution of 1952

The mechanisms of internal party recruitment of candidates and their inclusion in party lists is one of the factors that has prevented women from participating as candidates even after having conquered equal legal rights in this matter. To improve women's prospects in elections, Bolivian electoral legislation has in recent years provided for special quotas. A paragraph on gender balance was included in the law that called for the Constituent Assembly Election. It stipulated that one of the top two candidates on the list in each of the seventy territorial electoral districts must be a woman. As regards the larger departmental districts, the law established that every second candidate should be a woman, resulting in a minimum of two female candidates out of the total five in every departmental list.


Despite the adoption of this quota system, traditional mechanisms of gender-based discrimination have continued to play a role in the placement of candidates in the lists. In the overwhelming majority cases the first candidates on the lists were male. For example, of the winning lists in the 70 territorial districts, only 14% had women as the first candidate, and in the second-placed lists the proportion was 9%. The quotas, however, guaranteed that at least 79 seats (31%) of the seats in the Constituent Assembly would be won by women. The EU-EOM welcomes the use of the quota mechanism. Although it could be further improved in future, at the same time the quota mechanism marks a positive achievement bearing in mind that several European countries are still far from securing this degree of female representation.

Analyzing the gender composition of the new Constituent Assembly members, we can first observe that women won 87 seats which amounts to 34% of the total. This represents the highest percentage of women in the history of national elections for representative bodies in Bolivia. As could be expected on the basis of the different quota rules in territorial and departmental districts, female candidates were more successful in the territorial districts, in

which they gained 36% of the seats, as compared to the departmental districts, in which they gained 24% of the seats.

As regards the different political groups, there was significant variation in the percentage of women among their elected candidates. The percentages are, however, not directly comparable because it may be considered more likely that the electorally more successful groups have a higher percentage of women among their elected candidates (in the territorial electoral districts the winning list always gets one male and one female candidate elected). Comparing the two most voted groups, we can note that among the elected candidates of PODEMOS 25% were women, while the figure for MAS was 47%. Of the other groups that had a minimum of 5 elected candidates, the percentage of women among the elected was: Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) 25%, Unidad Nacional (UN) 12.5%, Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) 12%, Ayra 0%, and Concertación Nacional (CN) 0%.

Apart from formal quotas in the candidate lists, the marginalization of women was evident in the ways candidates were advertised in the media. According to the analysis of the EU-EOM media monitoring unit, the overwhelming majority of the candidates advertised in the media were male, as shown in the following graph.



Graph 7: Distribution of candidate advertisements by gender and media type.

These figures indicate that although the quotas did help women to increase their electoral presence, there is still much work to be done to improve their possibilities to compete in future electoral processes. Political groups and media organizations should reflect on ways to improve the striking gender imbalance in electoral advertising.

An additional factor to be taken into account is that while women comprised 49.99% of the registered voters, they represented 47.24% of the actual polling station members. This slight difference can be explained by the requirement that two of the three polling station members need to be able to read, and in the context of lower literacy rates of women, as compared to men, they were therefore less likely to be selected as polling station members.

10 PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS GROUPS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

While Bolivia has one of the highest proportions in Latin America of indigenous people in the population, it is difficult to provide exact or undisputed figures. Racial and ethnic classification has a long and difficult history in the country, and the categories used are subject to dispute. In particular, the difference between an *indígena* (indigenous, sometimes used synonymously with *originaria*) and a *mestizo* (a person of mixed race or cultural heritage) is the subject of heated debate. It would be beyond the mandate of the EU-EOM to take a position on these debates, but it remains clear that indigenous people constitute a substantial part of the Bolivian population and that they have historically faced various forms of discrimination in most areas of Bolivian social relations, including electoral participation.

While the electoral participation of indigenous people had increased already in previous elections, the ethnic composition of the Bolivian parliament and government changed significantly after the December 2005 elections. One of the most important bases of the governing MAS consists of social movements with a significant indigenous presence. The possibilities of electoral participation of the indigenous groups in the July 2006 polls were thus better than ever before, and the resulting Constituent Assembly has the greatest ethnic variety in the history of Bolivian representative institutions. The EU-EOM has, however, observed some areas of concern as regards the electoral participation of indigenous groups.

As stated above, the public education materials of the electoral authorities, and also of the other branches of the state as well as the political groups, were predominantly only in Spanish. This was most evident in the written material. One argument that the EU-EOM heard from the electoral authorities was that providing written material in the indigenous languages of the country would not be helpful because most of the people who cannot speak Spanish are unable to read in any language. While this argument may have a sociologically established basis (monolingual non-Spanish speakers being in large part illiterate), the EU-EOM finds it an insufficient justification for discriminating linguistically against the large number of Bolivians who have indigenous languages as their mother tongue.

First of all, in such a fundamental process as elections the citizens have a right to receive information provided in correctly produced language, in the formulation of which the best linguistic authorities have participated. Secondly, the EU-EOM considers that, apart from the technical communicational considerations, the right to receive electoral information in one's language, especially in contexts where significant parts of the population speak that language, should be considered a fundamental right by the public authorities.

11 ELECTION DAY

11.1 Polling

Polling took place in an orderly and peaceful manner with the participation of 3,133,602 citizens, representing 84.5% of the voter register. This was the largest number of voters in the history of Bolivia. The overall conclusion of the EU-EOM was that Election Day procedures were good in 94% of the visited polling stations. This, as well as the other percentages

presented in the current chapter, is based on the observation undertaken by 103 European observers who covered 715 polling stations in 32 provinces across 9 departments.

Polling staff were well trained and mostly followed the procedures established in the CNE regulations and training material. The vast majority (89%) of polling stations visited opened on time with all the necessary materials. Key safeguards of the process, such as verification of identity cards and application of indelible ink to the fingers of the voters, were followed in 96% of the polling stations visited. The secrecy of the vote was respected in 97% of the polling stations visited. The fact that there were two different ballot papers, one for Constituent Assembly Election and the other for Referendum on Regional Autonomy, did not cause visible confusion during polling.

The main procedural inconsistency during polling was in relation to the verification of whether voters had ink on their fingers before issuing the ballot papers. Even if the process was not compromised because other safeguards were followed, in 68% of the polling station visited fingers were not adequately checked by the polling staff.

Another aspect that was repeatedly brought to the attention of the observer teams was the difficult physical access for elderly or disabled people. In almost 30% of the polling stations observed, access was not guaranteed for these voters many of whom have special needs. Apart from physical barriers in many polling centres, the regulation that restricts circulation of vehicles during Election Day limited the access of many elderly and disabled people to voting. At the same time, the EU-EOM recognizes and pays tribute to the effort by the CNE to facilitate voting by blind people. In all polling centres, the CNE had distributed special voting material in braille.

One of the most controversial issues in the previous December 2005 elections had been the long queues of people who had been purged from the voter lists ("depurados") and could therefore not vote. During the July 2 polls this issue was much less significant, and the transparent handling of the voter lists was recognized afterwards even by groups, including the government, that had expressed concerns about it during the electoral campaign.

During Election Day some large polling centres appeared disorganized due to the large number of voters, polling station staff, party agents and observers. Considering the size of some of the big polling centres with 50 or more polling stations, there is a need for specific staff to organize the flow and control of voters. Electoral coordinators could fulfil this role in future elections, together with other ad hoc electoral staff, provided their role is clearly defined and known.

11.2 Role of Party Agents

According to the EU-EOM observer reports, party agents - delegates of political organizations - were present in 95% of the polling stations observed. Their large numbers contributed to the transparency of the process and can be considered positive for the electoral process. According to electoral norms, their role should be limited to observation of the process, with a possibility to present official complaints. The party agents, however, in some cases overstepped their duties in the observed polling stations and interfered excessively in the

functioning of the polling stations. This reflects a lack of adequate training by their respective organizations or, alternatively, a lack of presence and/or training by polling officials.

One of the ambiguities related to the role of party agents was the use of party symbols. While the law generically prohibits the use of party symbols inside and around the polling stations, the possibility that party agents wear symbols of their political organizations has not been sufficiently regulated. Party symbols were visible in 14% of the polling stations visited by the EU-EOM, and in most cases this was due to the presence of party agents. While it is not necessarily illegitimate that party agents wear symbols of their political organizations, lack of explicit rules causes confusion about this issue.

11.3 Domestic Observers

Compared to many neighbouring countries, domestic election observation has been historically almost non-existent in Bolivia. Following their first appearance in the December 2005 elections, the domestic election observation network Red Participación y Justicia deployed 3000 observers around the country in the July 2 polls. Their presence was noted by the EU-EOM observer teams in 28% of the polling stations.

The EU-EOM considers that further strengthening of domestic observation efforts will contribute positively to the transparency of future electoral processes in Bolivia. The current electoral norms do not properly regulate the role of domestic observers.

11.4 Closing and Transmission of results

The closing of polling stations visited by the EU-EOM was considered to have proceeded correctly in 96% of the stations. The presence of party agents and domestic observers contributed to the transparency and accuracy of the counting in the polling stations and the tabulation in the Departmental Electoral Courts. The provision of copies of the result forms of the polling stations to the party agents helped the political organizations to monitor the process. The fact that the electoral authorities placed scanned copies of the result forms of all polling stations in the Internet further increased the credibility of the counting process.

The fact that in none of the polling stations of the country the results were declared invalid by the electoral authorities further confirms the general conclusion that the counting procedures were properly implemented. The results for the two election processes were announced by the CNE on July 12. This was the fastest counting process in the history of Bolivian elections.

11.5 Polling Complaints

The Electoral Code regulates procedures for complaints that can be made to the Departmental and National Electoral Courts. During Election Day complaints about the Constituent Assembly Election could be presented by delegates of political organizations to the electoral judges and appeals could be presented to the respective Departmental Electoral Courts. In the Referendum on Regional Autonomy, persons included in the voter register were entitled to make complaints. In both cases, the complaints needed to be ratified within 48 hours in the Departmental Electoral Courts.

Once the Departmental Electoral Court had made its decision on a complaint, the political organizations had the possibility to appeal to the CNE. The CNE needed to resolve any appeal within 24 hours and issue a resolution. In case the CNE decided to invalidate the results of a polling station, new elections were to be held two weeks after Election Day.

The July 2 polls were characterized by an exceptionally low number of complaints related to Election Day. Whereas in the December 2005 elections the results from 14 polling stations were annulled, this time the results of 100% of the polling stations were ratified without the need to annul any of them.

The EU-EOM noted with concern, however, the lack of consolidated public information on the complaints presented in the polling stations and the Departmental Electoral Courts. Even if the lack of such complaints that would have been taken to the CNE indicates exceptionally well-conducted Election Day procedures, the lack of publicly available consolidated information on the complaints in different polling stations and departments is a problem for transparency of the process.

12 FINAL RESULTS

The low number of official complaints, together with the general efficiency of the electoral authorities, made possible an exceptionally fast processing of the results. While the legally established deadline for finalizing the counting of the votes was July 27, the CNE was able to give the official proclamation of the results already on July 12, more rapidly than ever before in the electoral history of Bolivia. For example, in the general elections of December 2005 it took 19 days to count the votes, as compared to the 10 days in July 2006.

12.1 Constituent Assembly Election

In the Constituent Assembly Election, MAS reinforced its position as the strongest political group in the country, gaining 137 seats (53.73% of the seats) with 50.7% of the total vote through its own lists. The total of seats controlled by MAS can be considered to be 142 (55.68%) once the five MAS representatives who were elected from the MBL lists are taken into account.

The fact that the system of translating votes into seats was particularly favourable to the second-strongest party was evidenced by the electoral results of PODEMOS, which maintained its position as the strongest opposition group. With 15.33% of the total vote, PODEMOS obtained 60 seats, amounting to 23.53% of the total seats.

The three separate lists of MNR (MNR, A3-MNR and MNR-FRI) received 7.54% of the vote, amounting to 18 seats (7.06%). With 7.20% of the vote, UN gained 8 seats (3.14%). Although it secured only 1.06% of the national vote, MBL also gained 8 seats in the Constituent Assembly. In analyzing the results of MBL, however, one must remember that five of its elected candidates were in practice representatives of MAS.

The citizen group AS secured only 0.8% of the national vote, but by coming second in the electoral results of the only department in which it competed (with 13.34% of the

departmental vote in Potosí), it was able to secure 6 seats (2.35%) in the Constituent Assembly. With 3.58% of the vote, CN gained 5 seats (1.96%). As can be seen in the annexed table of results, seven other groups gained seats in the Constituent Assembly.

While the governing MAS secured an absolute majority of the seats, it fell short of its declared aim of controlling two thirds of the Constituent Assembly, the legally established number needed to decide on the new constitution. By the time the EU-EOM left the country, a debate had started on how the two-thirds requirement should be interpreted in the decision-making procedures of the Constituent Assembly.

12.2 Referendum on Regional Autonomy

The political divide between the highland and lowland departments of the country was reflected in the results of the Referendum on Regional Autonomy. While the majority in four predominantly lowland departments voted in favour of autonomy, the five predominantly highland departments chose to say "no" to autonomy.

Of the four lowland departments, the victory of the autonomous option was clearest in Beni (73.83% voting "yes") and Santa Cruz (71.11%), though also beyond doubt in Tarija (60.80%) and Pando (57.60%).

In the highlands, the opposition to autonomy was most pronounced in Oruro (75.48% voting "no"), La Paz (73.44%) and Potosí (73.12%), with Cochabamba (63.03%) and Chuquisaca (62.23%) also taking a clear stand against autonomy.

Nationally, the opposition to autonomy gained 57.59% of the vote. The situation in which four departments voted in favour of autonomy and the overall national vote was opposed to it opened a heated post-electoral debate on the implications of the results.

In terms of the special law that called for the Referendum, it is evident that the national victory of the "no" vote does not invalidate the victory of the "yes" vote in the four lowland departments. By the time the EU-EOM left the country, it seemed likely that political considerations on the relevance of the national victory of the "no" vote would, however, be taken into account by the Constituent Assembly when defining the exact meaning of autonomy for the four departments.

13 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The following recommendations to improve future electoral process are offered for consideration to the Bolivian authorities. The EU-EOM is aware that some of the suggested improvements require resources that may not be easily available, and that decisions on all these issues belong to the Bolivian sovereign powers.

13.1 Independence of the CNE and Enforcement of Its Resolutions

The EU-EOM considers that it is important for Bolivia to retain an independent election administration body. While the overall electoral legislation already guarantees the

independence of the electoral authorities, this aspect could be strengthened by establishing timelines for filling vacant positions of the electoral bodies.

Currently there exists a legal vacuum where the CNE issues an instruction to other powers of the state. It would be advisable to define in law the procedures for the CNE to secure the application of the penalties for electoral offences, especially when committed by other branches of the state.

13.2 Transparency of the CNE

The EU-EOM recommends that the electoral authorities should establish formal structures for regular, open and informative meetings with electoral stakeholders including party delegates, national observers and international observers.

The transparency of the electoral process could be improved further by publishing the details on complaints and appeals received by the Departmental Electoral Courts. The EU-EOM recommends that the CNE establishes a national public register of complaints and appeals.

The EU-EOM also considers that the lack of public information about the exclusion of citizens older than 65 from the possibility to become polling station members is a problem for the transparency of the election administration. This exclusion, that has no legal basis, amounts to age-based discrimination and should be publicly discussed.

13.3 Voter Register

The EU-EOM considers that the procedure established in Article 70 of the Electoral Code, to remove automatically voters who do not vote in one election from the voter register for the following one, has disenfranchising effects and could therefore be revised. The obligation to vote should be better matched by facilities which assist voters in performing their duty.

The current norms stipulate that voter registration closes 90 days before Election Day. Often, voters become aware of the need to regularize their position only shortly before the electoral period. The EU-EOM therefore recommends that the closing deadline for citizens to register in the voter register be moved closer to Election Day.

On the other hand, legally established mechanisms to reinstate citizens wrongly removed from the voter lists are deficient, both in terms of procedure and of its implementation. The EU-EOM therefore recommends earlier the publication of the list of *depurados*. More precise and prompt information about the possibility of correction should also be provided both to citizens and to electoral officials. Consideration could be given to mandating the electoral notaries to reinstate wrongly excluded voters.

13.4 Cooperation between State Institutions in Issuing Identity Cards

The EU-EOM considers that the provision of identity cards to marginalized Bolivians, to increase their citizen rights including that of electoral participation, is a highly positive process.

The EU-EOM recommends that the different organs of the Bolivian state that are currently responsible for maintaining the different citizen and voter registers should establish improved mechanisms of collaboration in this matter, especially between the National Electoral Court and Ministerio de Gobierno. It is also important that the process be conducted in ways that diminish the doubts that different political groups may have about its transparency. The databases that are collected should be adequately managed.

13.5 Role of Electoral Coordinators and Electoral Notaries

The pyramidal structure of election administration requires improved facilitation and communication between electoral notaries and Departmental Electoral Courts. First of all, as electoral notaries play a pivotal role in the logistics of the electoral process, standardized procedures are needed in order to avoid irregularities in their selection. Moreover, the figure of electoral coordinator exists in all Departmental Electoral Courts, but their role is not clearly defined in the Electoral Code. In particular, confusion between the roles of the coordinators, electoral notaries and domestic observers should be avoided. The EU-EOM considers that the role of the coordinators is in particular need of further clarification.

13.6 Access to Polling Centres

The EU-EOM recommends improving the access of the disabled, elderly and other special needs voters to polling centres. This is another important element if all Bolivian citizens are to be able to exercise their duty to vote. For example, the Law on Disabilities, that requires wheelchair access to all public buildings, is often not followed in the polling centres. Apart from physical barriers that exist inside many polling centres, the restriction on the circulation of vehicles during Election Day creates obstacles for access. The EU-EOM recommends that the Bolivian authorities establish improved mechanisms to organize transport facilities and/or alternative arrangements notably for special needs groups and for isolated communities on Election Day.

13.7 Indigenous Languages

The EU-EOM recommends that the electoral authorities produce more electoral material, including written material, in the main indigenous languages of the country. Proper procedures, involving linguistic and cultural experts, should be established to codify standardized electoral terminology in different languages. The EU-EOM considers this not only a practical question but it is also a sign of recognition of the multilingual and multicultural reality of Bolivia.

13.8 Party Agents

Clear guidelines to and better training of polling station staff and representatives of political organizations should be provided in order to avoid party agents to overstep their remit and unduly influence voters in and around polling stations.

13.9 National Observer Groups

Considering the vacuum in the electoral laws of Bolivia as regards domestic election observer groups, the EU-EOM recommends better regulating and recognizing the value of these groups which for the moment remain an excessively informal entity.

13.10 Out-of-Country Voting

Political and operational plans relative to the out-of-country voting need to be decided. Due to their administrative and logistical complexity, out-of-country operations need longer timeframes than in-country elections. The EU-EOM therefore recommends that the Bolivian authorities give enough time to preparing the operation, including the identification of the countries in which elections will be conducted, making memorandums of understanding with host countries and securing the necessary financial resources.

13.11 Regulations on Use of Public Areas during Campaign

The use of public spaces for campaign purposes needs a clear mechanism that will allow equal access to them by all political forces. The EU-EOM recommends eliminating any potential for discrimination by local authorities when granting permits to hold campaign events in public spaces.

13.12 Distribution of Free and Equal Airtime in State-Owned Media

The EU-EOM wishes to encourage proactive compliance with Article 115 of the Electoral Code, which establishes the free and equal distribution of airtime for electoral propaganda among the contending parties in the state-owned media. The state-owned media should draw lots to lay down the schedule of the spots in advance of the 60-day period established by the law to start the broadcasting, and communicate it to the political parties and civic associations, so that they can plan their advertisements in good time.

13.13 Suspend Promotion of Public Institutions during Campaign

The EU-EOM recommends that all kinds of institutional promotion, by national, departmental and local governments, be suspended during the electoral campaign. Such a measure is internationally considered a good practice. Furthermore, it would avoid potential breaches of Article 120 of the Electoral Code, which prohibits the publicizing of public works during the electoral period.

13.14 Campaign Code of Conduct

The EU-EOM recommends that a campaign code of conduct be drawn up and signed for future elections, to commit the political parties and civic associations to substituting verbal aggressions and insults with an informative debate about their platforms.

ANNEX I: MEDIA STATISTICS

TELEVISION

Table 1. Distribution of airtime among political actors by TV channel, June 1-30

	TVB	ATB	Unitel	PAT	Red Uno	RTP
Government	69%	40%	48%	67%	58%	50%
Parliament	10%	7%	9%	6%	11%	4%
Local authorities	4%	13%	12%	8%	17%	12%
Parties	13%	36%	29%	16%	11%	26%
CNE / voter education	4%	3%	2%	2%	3%	8%
Observers	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%

Table 2. Tone of airtime of political actors by TV channel, June 1-30

	TVB			ATB			Unitel			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Government	2%	85%	14%	31%	48%	22%	33%	57%	10%	
Parliament	0%	97%	3%	53%	38%	8%	13%	65%	21%	
Local authorities	9%	85%	6%	35%	39%	26%	14%	56%	30%	
Parties	2%	95%	2%	9%	90%	1%	11%	17%	72%	
CNE / voter education	0%	94%	6%	10%	74%	16%	16%	84%	0%	
Observers	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	22%	46%	32%	

	PAT			Red Uno			RTP			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	
Government	33%	41%	26%	31%	48%	21%	4%	78%	19%	
Parliament	34%	50%	16%	32%	55%	13%	0%	89%	11%	
Local authorities	19%	30%	51%	23%	56%	21%	17%	75%	8%	
Parties	37%	18%	45%	19%	73%	7%	0%	98%	1%	
CNE / voter education	37%	63%	0%	22%	59%	19%	0%	95%	5%	
Observers	0%	100%	0%	7%	10%	83%	0%	0%	100%	

Table 3: Tone of coverage of MAS, PODEMOS and UN by TV channel, June 1-30

	TVB			ATB		Unitel			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive
MAS	4%	91%	5%	9%	91%	0%	30%	11%	59%
PODEMOS	0%	100%	0%	11%	88%	2%	10%	27%	64%
UN	0%	100%	0%	3%	92%	5%	0%	34%	66%

	PAT			Red Uno		RTP			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive
MAS	67%	9%	24%	39%	44%	17%	0%	98%	2%
PODEMOS	40%	26%	34%	13%	84%	4%	9%	91%	0%
UN	9%	18%	73%	20%	64%	16%	0%	100%	0%

Table 4: Coverage of options in Referendum on Regional Autonomy by TV channel, June 1-30

	Yes	Neutral	No
TVB	36%	15%	50%
ATB	55%	24%	22%
Unitel	76%	1%	23%

	Yes	Neutral	No
PAT	83%	5%	12%
Red Uno	63%	19%	18%
RTP	42%	17%	42%

RADIO

Table 5. Distribution of airtime among political actors by radio station, June 1-30

	R. Illimani	Erbol	Panamericana	San Gabriel
Government	59%	65%	56%	22%
Parliament	8%	8%	11%	10%
Local authorities	11%	12%	16%	23%
Parties	13%	13%	14%	32%
CNE / voter education	8%	1%	3%	13%
Observers	1%	1%	1%	0%

Table 6. Tone of airtime of political actors by radio station, June 1-30

	Illimani			Erbol	Erbol			na		San Gabriel		
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government	7%	27%	66%	26%	45%	29%	59%	21%	20%	7%	82%	11%
Parliament	17%	44%	39%	27%	54%	19%	32%	62%	6%	0%	95%	5%
Local authorities	36%	24%	40%	38%	35%	28%	35%	49%	16%	9%	87%	4%
Parties	15%	9%	76%	21%	71%	8%	35%	60%	5%	12%	82%	6%
CNE / voter education	4%	90%	7%	0%	76%	24%	6%	94%	0%	4%	96%	0%
Observers	0%	68%	32%	0%	77%	23%	47%	38%	15%	0%	100%	0%

Table 7: Tone of coverage of MAS, PODEMOS and UN by radio station, June 1-30

	Illimani			Erbol				Panamericana				San Gabriel			
	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive	
MAS	3%	9%	88%	28%	49%	23%		35%	65%	0%		7%	93%	0%	
PODEMOS	59%	10%	32%	53%	44%	3%		43%	57%	0%		22%	78%	0%	
UN	15%	25%	60%	10%	90%	0%		0%	100%	0%		19%	77%	4%	

Table 8: Coverage of options in Referendum on Regional Autonomy by radio station, June 1-30

	Yes	Neutral	No
Illimani	17.8%	10.8%	71.3%
Erbol	28.9%	14.0%	57.0%
Panamericana	36.6%	24.8%	38.6%
San Gabriel	1.6%	0.0%	98.4%

NEWSPAPERS

Table 9: Distribution of print space among political actors by newspaper, June 1-30

	La Razón	La Prensa	El Deber	Los Tiempos
Government	60%	55%	70%	60%
Parliament	1%	1%	1%	0%
Local authorities	5%	5%	5%	7%
Parties	30%	30%	16%	24%
CNE / voter education	4%	8%	8%	7%
Observers	0%	0%	0%	1%

Table 10: Tone of coverage of political actors by newspaper, June 1-30

	La Razón	Razón			La Prensa			El Deber				Los Tiemp	oos	
	Negative	Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Government	28%	55%	17%		35%	45%	20%		38%	39%	23%	39%	40%	21%
Parliament	26%	74%	0%		49%	51%	0%		31%	69%	0%	0%	4%	96%
Local authorities	19%	53%	28%		16%	62%	22%		17%	66%	17%	41%	49%	10%
Parties	14%	84%	2%		22%	77%	2%		16%	82%	2%	10%	87%	3%
CNE / voter education	17%	80%	3%		3%	95%	2%		2%	96%	3%	2%	98%	0%
Observers	0%	100%	0%		0%	100%	0%		30%	52%	17%	0%	100%	0%

Table 11: Tone of coverage of MAS, PODEMOS and UN by newspaper, June 1-30

	La Razón			La Prensa				El Deber				Los Tiempos		
	Negative	Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive		Negative	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Positive
MAS	23%	76%	1%		42%	56%	2%		44%	55%	1%	27%	63%	10%
PODEMOS	19%	79%	2%		48%	50%	2%		32%	67%	1%	7%	93%	0%
UN	5%	91%	4%		8%	89%	2%		0%	95%	5%	2%	98%	0%

Table 12: Coverage of options in Referendum on Regional Autonomy by newspaper, June 1-30

	Yes	Neutral	No
La Razón	29.4%	55.2%	15.4%
La Prensa	31.9%	41.4%	26.6%
El Deber	68.2%	24.9%	6.9%
Los Tiempos	43.1%	27.8%	29.1%

ANNEX II: ELECTORAL RESULTS

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

(Percentage of political organizations calculated over valid vote; percentage of blank and invalid votes, over total vote)

1ST Place 2ND Place 3RD Place

	Chuquisaca	La Paz	Cochabamba	Oruro	Potosí	Tarija	Santa Cruz	Beni	Pando	Country
MAS	54,40%	63,89%	60,37%	60,85%	54,83%	40,80%	26,42%	21,36%	37,22%	50,72%
PODEMOS	15,05%	7,52%	16,08%	8,28%	9,73%	13,68%	24,77%	40,58%	48,38%	15,33%
UN	5,23%	12,49%	8,56%	3,67%	4,27%	4,09%	1,60%	3,56%	5,93%	7,20%
A3-MNR							16,89%			3,90%
CN	6,02%	3,01%	4,83%	9,29%			3,81%			3,58%
MNR	3,41%	1,55%	1,26%	3,18%	2,76%	31,36%			5,56%	2,67%
ASP		7,24%								2,44%
APB							9,61%			2,22%
ASI							9,44%			2,18%
MIR - NM	4,90%	0,51%	0,77%	3,07%	2,18%	6,08%	0,97%	4,89%	2,01%	1,53%
TRADEPA		0,92%	4,32%	1,20%	1,53%		0,57%	1,66%	0,91%	1,45%
MBL	7,54%	0,50%	1,58%		1,33%	1,00%	0,36%			1,06%
MNR-FRI								27,95%		0,97%
AAI							3,87%			0,90%
AS					13,34%					0,80%
ADN	1,97%	0,88%	0,77%	1,07%	1,37%	1,04%				0,72%
UCS	1,50%	1,06%		1,03%						0,49%
AYRA		0,44%	0,55%	1,04%	0,83%	1,96%	0,21%			0,49%
MOP					7,83%					0,47%
MACA							1,48%			0,34%

CDC			0,90%							0,16%
MCSFA				2,93%						0,15%
MAR				1,83%						0,10%
MIBOL				1,37%						0,07%
ALBA				1,21%						0,06%
Valid	78,51%	85,18%	83,50%	77,86%	71,29%	76,32%	87,42%	85,65%	86,96%	83,22%
Blank	17,15%	11,85%	12,27%	17,65%	23,73%	20,30%	9,67%	12,54%	10,86%	13,32%
Invalid	4,34%	2,98%	4,23%	4,49%	4,98%	3,38%	2,90%	1,81%	2,18%	3,46%

NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BY PARTY

Balifical Output			
Political Organization	Departmental	Territorial	Total
MAS	18	119	137
PODEMOS	11	49	60
MBL	1	7	8
MNR	3	5	8
MNR-FRI	1	7	8
UN	3	5	8
AS	1	5	6
CN	2	3	5
APB	1	2	3
MOP	1	2	3
ASP	1	1	2
AYRA	0	2	2
MNR-A3	1	1	2
AAI	0	1	1
MCSFA	0	1	1
MIR - NM	1	0	1
Total	45	210	255

REFERENDUM OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY

Percentage of "yes" and "no" calculated over valid vote; percentage of blank and invalid votes, over total vote

	Yes	No	Blank	Invalid
Chuquisaca	37,77%	62,23%	5,65%	4,77%
La Paz	26,56%	73,44%	3,22%	3,11%
Cochabamba	36,97%	63,03%	3,51%	3,84%
Oruro	24,52%	75,48%	4,46%	3,44%
Potosí	26,88%	73,12%	7,11%	5,44%
Tarija	60,80%	39,20%	4,71%	3,42%
Santa Cruz	71,11%	28,89%	2,88%	2,28%
Beni	73,83%	26,17%	3,18%	1,99%
Pando	57,69%	42,31%	2,14%	1,73%
Country	42,41%	57,59%	3,74%	3,30%