Electoral processes are known for being a cornerstone of democratic regimes. Even more, in recent years elections are recognized as the ending point of a conflict and the initiation of a democratic era. Peace building missions mark as a benchmark the run of transparent and peaceful electoral process. Even if post-conflict countries had experienced peaceful elections this is not a precondition for having future peaceful electoral processes. A clear example of this is Guatemala; the 1990, 1996 and 2000 elections can be described as transparent and peaceful. Unfortunately, the 2007 and 2011 are remembered for the high amount electoral-related violent incidents [1], “While not as bloody as the 2007 elections, during the 2011 election at least 36 candidates, party activists, and their relatives were killed in campaign-related violence” (Freedom House, 2011).
This article aims to explore some causes of electoral-related violence during the Guatemalan electoral process 2011, considering the historical background of the country. In addition, it discusses the role of civil society organizations and the use of Information, Communication and Technology (ICT’s) as preventive mechanisms.
Why has electoral-related violence increased in such an alarming manner?
Guatemalan society has been forced to witness violence for a long time. After 36 years of internal conflict and more than three decades (1954-1986) of authoritarian regimes, Guatemalan society has beheld the massacre of indigenous communities, disappearance of students, and several atrocities committed by the state [2]. Even after the signing of the peace agreements (1996) and the instauration of a democratic regime the levels of violence have not decreased. The murder rate is of 5500 per year in a country of 14 million inhabitants (United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomacy Security, 2014) placing the country in the list of the most dangerous countries in the world. Electoral processes are no exception, and during the last two processes several electoral-related violent incidents occurred. According to the publication “Prevention of Political Violence and Electoral Conflicts” (Acción Ciudadana, 2011) during the 2011 electoral process, 9 of 333 counties were in high risk and 36 counties presented a medium-high risk situation. “Even before the political campaign started 29 people were killed and several political parties’ members denounced threats and intimidation” (Insight Crime, 2011).
The question that arises is what triggers the electoral-related violence in Guatemala? Authors and organizations agree that three main causes are the presence of drug cartels, nonexistence of penalties for breaching the electoral law and existence of corruption networks that control the state.
Insight Crime and International Crisis Group both emphasize that drug cartels presence is a fact that explains the high levels of violence and electoral- related violence. “As drugs cartels battle over transit routes, competition in those areas for the local government posts whose collusion facilitates trafficking may be particularly fierce” (International Crisis Groups, 2011). During the 90’ and early 2000 the majority of drug activities -transit and storing- where controlled by local cartels. There was tacit agreement between the government and cartels; cartels kept low profiles [3]–meaning no violence against civilians, and operating in zones that were previously agreed- and the government giving a blind eye to drug dealing issues. The scenario got complicated for Guatemala when Mexico decided to embark on the “War against Drugs”, Mexican cartels migrated to the north-west zones of Guatemala. As reported by Insight Crime, Mexican criminal gangs, such as the Zetas, have been stepping up their presence in Guatemala, which could explain the higher level of pre-election violence this year (Insight Crime, 2011). The new cartels started a fight to control routes, reduce the influence of local cartels and gain the support of public authorities. In contrast with local drug cartel, Mexican cartels use violence to guarantee the support of communities and politicians.
The inexistence of penalties for breaching the electoral law and codes of conducts opens the door to actors that care little about respecting the law. This situation can be observed clearly in the violation of the electoral campaign spending limit. During the 2011 electoral process it was reported that the main parties – Patriot Party (PP), National Unity of Hope party (UNE) and Leadership Party (LIDER) - considerably exceeded the expending limit, “On August 31st the electoral authority said that the Patriot Party had already exceeded the $6.2m spending limit; its two closest rivals were not far behind” (Huffington Post, 2014) The overspending is mainly worrying because the money spent has no clear sources and it’s not channeled to parties in a transparent manner. Political parties sustain that all those millions come from private donors; nevertheless there is enough evidence to affirm that drug traffickers are financing campaigns to guarantee their security during the next years. “Drug traffickers are said to be financing some campaigns, and to have already had considerable success in placing their supporters in various elected political posts” (The Economist, 2011). In addition, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has no mechanism to prevent the overspending during campaigns, the former president of the institution, Maria Eugenia Villagran, admitted that the penalty -$125- is laughable and useless (The Economist, 2011).
Finally, having a state that has been co-opted by corruption and criminal networks and that is known for its high levels of impunity facilitates electoral-related violence. From the violent incidents that occurred during the 2007 and 2011 electoral processes less than 2% have been solved (Freedom House, 2014). As it was said before, having no penalties for breaking the law and a weak judicial system allows corruption and criminal networks to act freely. The moment the state allows impunity the members of these networks know that they can impose their will and that disputes can be solved with violence. Some of the electoral-related incidents were caused by disagreements between political parties’ members or inside the party, “During 2011 elections candidates decided to kill their opponents, raising the electoral-related violence” (Prensa Libre, 2015. Spanish to English translation).
It has to be highlighted that the phenomena mentioned above are not the only causes of electoral-related violence. There are many other factors that need to be considered, for example the lack of ideologies among the parties, poor leadership (caudillismo) and clientelism.
What has been done and what can be done?
Acknowledging the risks that electoral processes bring it’s vital that the civil society in Guatemala participates more actively during the processes. In 2011 a consortium of civil society organizations –Mirador Electoral – mapped zones that were prone to suffer electoral-related violence. These maps were shared with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (SET), international community and other members of the civil society. This effort helped to implement preventive mechanisms and to reduce the amount of incidents, for example, citizen electoral observers were deployed in these areas in order to prevent conflicts and communicate to authorities possible risks. In addition, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal provided special training to the personnel that were located in these areas. Moreover, Mirador Electoral introduced the software Ushahidi. This allowed engaging with citizens that were not part of any organization but were interested in participating and supporting the electoral process, many marginalized communities were reached and the participation of women and youth was encouraged. According to the official webpage of the consortium several violations were recorded – the majority from Guatemala City - and presented to the Election Dispute Resolution Body.
For future elections, the scenario continues to be complicated with political parties starting to campaign far in advance, lack of ideologies, inexistence of concrete political programmes, and a SET that has little room to impose sanctions. Civil society organizations need to be more active than ever and invest more efforts in the use of Technology, Information and Communications (TICs), for example Ushahidi can be used to combat electoral malpractices, identify actors that commit malpractice and the areas that are more vulnerable to conflicts. Also, civil society has to support and work in coordination with the SET, double efforts need to be avoided and traditional marginalized groups have to be reached and involved.
[1] The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance defines electoral-related violence as: “Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections — such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll — and to influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions”. (“Elections-Conflict-Prevention.pdf,” 4)
[2] For more information about the internal conflict in Guatemala please go to: http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/alien-tort-claims-act-litigation-u-s/
[3] The majority of local drug lords were support and beloved by communities, the reason is that they provided basic services –education, health, and recreation- jobs, and protection against ordinary violence. (International Crisis Group, 2011).
References
· Acción Ciudadana, 2011. Prevención de Violencia Política y Conflictos Electorales. Mirador Electoral 2011.
· Bevan Claire, 2011. Politics is a death sentence in Guatemala. http://newint.org/blog/2011/07/07/guatemala-election-violence/#sthash.QRiJfdaM.dpuf. Consulted: December 1st, 2014.
· Freedom House, 2011. Guatemala. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/guatemala#.VHyM0DHF-s0. Consulted: December 1st, 2014.
· Huffington Post, 2011.Guatemalan Elections, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/09/guatemala-election-2011-perez_n_955679.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. Consulted November 27th, 2014
· Ibid, 2014. Countries at the Crossroads, Guatemala. https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/guatemala#.VLUebyvF-s0. Consulted January 9th, 2015.
· Insight Crime, 2011. Drug Gangs Cast Shadow over Guatemala Campaign Funding. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drug-gangs-cast-shadow-over-guatemala-campaign-funding. Consulted Dec 3th, 2014.
· Insight Crime, 2011. Electoral Violence Escalates in Guatemala. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/electoral-violence-escalates-in-guatemala. Accessed October 29, 2014
· Insight Crime, 2011. Why Violence Could Boil Over in Guatemala Elections. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-violence-could-boil-over-in-guatemala-elections. Consulted November 27th, 2014.
· International Crisis Group, 2011. Guatemala’s Elections: Clean Polls, Dirty Politics - International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/guatemala/B024-guatemalas-elections-clean-polls-dirty-politics.aspx. Consulted Dec 2nd, 2014
· International Crisis Group, 2011. Guatemala: Drug trafficking and Violence. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/guatemala/139-guatemala-drug-trafficking-and-violence.aspx. Consulted Dec. 5th, 2014.
· Prensa Libre, 2015. Se vislumbra campana negra y pocas propuestas. http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Se-vislumbra-campana-negra-pocas-propuestas_0_1283271677.html. Consulted January 13th, 2015.
· Schneider, Mark, and Javier Ciurlizza. 2011. “Guatemala Elections and Drug Cartels – Also a Risk for America.” Christian Science Monitor, August 11. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0811/Guatemala-elections-and-drug-cartels-also-a-risk-for-America.
· The Economist, 2011. The return of the iron fist. http://www.economist.com/node/21528620.
· United States Department of State, Bureau Of Diplomacy Security, 2014. Guatemala 2014 Crime and Safety Report. Consulted January 8th, 2015 https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15656
· Vox, 2014. How the War on Drugs Perpetuates Violence in Latin America. http://www.vox.com/2014/11/14/7189219/drug-war-mexico-colombia. Consulted November 27th, 2014.
