Once the electoral legal framework is finalized, planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities need to be instigated. This will include developing operational plans for the implementation of the different phases of the electoral cycle, such as voter information; registration of voters, political parties and candidates, and observers; political party campaigning; polling and counting; and results management. Operational plans will point to activities to be implemented, timelines, geographical scope, human resources and training needed, budget and so on. Weakness or controversy in one electoral phase can compromise the integrity of the subsequent phases or of the whole electoral process.

Existing tensions and conflicts may also spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. It is therefore important that electoral planning is timely, holistic and conflict-sensitive and that it considers both the process and the structural factors of conflict. A baseline risk analysis conducted during the planning phase will be an asset for conflict-sensitive planning. 

A.        Improved electoral management and justice

Electoral planning is a process led by an electoral management body. Key considerations of electoral planning are the timing of electoral events and the resources, financial and human, needed for the implementation of specific activities. Specific considerations include, among others, the costs associated with different activities, the recruitment and training of election staff, the procurement of electoral materials, logistical organization, communication, security and so on. Timely, thorough and holistic planning processes will ensure broad consultations within an EMB, as well as with external actors. In conflict-prone societies, an EMB will benefit from conducting a risk assessment to identify potential process weaknesses and security threats, both internal and external to the electoral processes. An EMB should also establish an analytical capacity to record incidents and observe changing risks throughout the different electoral phases. In this case, the planning processes should, where feasible, include specific details on how these threats can be addressed.

• Conduct an inter-agency exercise to foresee factors and scenarios which may represent security risks for elections in different phases of the electoral cycle and across different geographical regions

Conflict-sensitive planning entails a thorough analysis of the security risks associated with electoral processes. A baseline risk analysis should be implemented as an inter-agency exercise that brings together election officials, security sector agencies, civil society organizations, academia and others. Such an exercise can look into the historical record of election-related violence and current trends at national, provincial and local levels. The aim is to identify internal and external factors that may increase risks and trigger election-related violence throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle. A baseline risk analysis should include gender and minority dimensions and also explore prevention and mitigation strategies. Due to the changing dynamics of electoral processes, a baseline analysis should be followed up by periodical exercises which will explore emerging risks.

A baseline electoral risk assessment is conducted ahead of the 2013 general elections in Kenya. Following the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of Kenya undertook a number of steps to strengthen its capacity to prevent and mitigate electoral violence ahead of and during the general elections in March 2013. The IEBC, supported by International IDEA, organized a workshop that brought together the IEBC staff, the Kenyan police and intelligence agencies, national human rights and reconciliation commissions, and academics. A two-day discussion was focused on mapping electoral risks in different counties ahead of the general elections. The risks associated with the different phases of the electoral cycle were also considered. In parallel, a national public opinion survey was conducted to measure citizens’ perceptions in this regard. These exercises made it possible to generate a baseline risk analysis which pointed to 14 risk factors which needed to be monitored and analysed throughout the different electoral phases.^[1]

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), conducts electoral planning in consultation with the major national agencies. Mexican elections are complex undertakings which, due to presence of organized crime groups, often face enhanced security challenges. During the planning phases, the INE maintains close consultation with the major national agencies and institutes, including the army, navy, police, civil protection organizations, energy and water agencies and others represented in the national Group for Strategic Facilities Coordination. The Group coordinates operational planning and prevention and mitigation of conflicts in different areas, including electoral processes.^[2] Through the inter-agency data exchange, the INE is able to identify areas where electoral processes face increased risks.^[3]

The timely and transparent publication of the election schedule by the Election Commission of Pakistan ahead of the 2013 elections allows it to obtain timely feedback from electoral stakeholders. Historically, elections in Pakistan have been marred by violence. After the President announced the 2013 general election date, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) immediately started preparing an election schedule.^[4] The schedule was soon completed and published on the ECP website.^[5] This allowed political parties to scrutinize the schedule and to present arguments with respect to the suggested changes in it. Following those appeals, the ECP modified the schedule,^[6]including deadlines for nomination procedures, as well as the timelines for submitting nomination appeals.^[7]

• Secure and allocate sufficient funds for electoral activities in the budget, including conflict and violence prevention efforts

Electoral management bodies (EMBs) need sufficient funds to safeguard the integrity of elections. This entails investment in a well-trained electoral staff, the production of high-quality electoral materials, the building up of internal information technology (IT) and communication capacities, strong public relations and outreach. In addition, an EMB should include specific budget lines for the collection of unbiased information that will help assessing the quality of electoral processes. In conflict-prone societies, it may be important to have resources that can be directed towards the prevention and mitigation of electoral violence. Of course, EMBs should be mindful to adopt strategies that are sustainable and cost effective.

The financial resources allocated to the Election Commission of India by the central and state governments include specific security and violence-prevention budgets. With over 700 million voters,^[8] India is the largest democracy in the world. The Election Commission of India (ECI) is funded by the government of India. A so-called Consolidated Fund pays for staff, technical operations, electronic voting machines and various office expenses. Federal state governments cover expenses relating to staff at the state headquarters and in the districts, the printing and transport of ballot papers, preparing and printing the electoral register, procuring material for the conduct of elections, training, the salaries of election officials and the expenses of central election supervisors. Each state also pays for security forces deployed for elections. During the 2009 parliamentary elections, prevention efforts, which for example included video monitoring of ‘dangerous’ individuals, were funded out of the general election budget.^[9] ‘The broad powers given to the ECI by the constitution have been liberally and boldly interpreted to make the government pay for any necessary expenses. The ECI’s accounts are subject to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General and its report is tabled in the Parliament.’^[10]

• Ensure that boundary delimitation process is conducted in timely fashion and that political stakeholders accept the outcomes

The delimitation of electoral boundaries may be very complicated, especially under some electoral systems.^[11] Electoral districts are often aligned with a country’s administrative divisions, which may have some practical advantages when citizens know them well. However, there are some drawbacks. These boundaries may be artificial and of little significance to citizens. Furthermore, this may divide natural communities, such as racial, ethnic, religious, or spoken language communities.^[12] The decision to establish electoral districts must therefore be sensitive and well informed to avoid division of the traditional communities of interest. Fundamental principles for boundary delimitation include: (a) the impartiality of the boundary authority; (b) equality of voting strength; (c) the representativeness of cohesive communities defined by administrative boundaries, geographic features, and interest; (d) non-discrimination with respect to race, colour, gender, language, religion, or related status; and (e) transparency and accessibility to the public.^[13] The EMB should plan and conduct boundary delimitation in a cooperative manner in order to prevent the emergence of violence.^[14] In this regard, electoral dispute resolution mechanisms should be put in place to deal with complaints. The technical capacity of an EMB to implement boundary delimitation may require the use of the Global Information Systems (GIS) software.^[15]

Boundary delimitation improved through the use of the GIS ahead of the general elections in South Africa in 1999. Preparations ahead of South Africa’s 1999 general elections—the second post-apartheid elections to take place—included adjustments to the electoral district boundaries. The process started in 1997 with the Election Steering Committee working in cooperation with the Department of Land Affairs and Statistics in order to create a geo-spatial database for the entire country. After more than a year, the geographical dataset was delivered to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The Global Information System (GIS) software was used to delimit approximately 14,500 electoral districts. In parallel, local electoral officers from each municipality had been requested to convene party liaison committees consisting of local representatives from all political parties to examine the newly created maps depicting the voting districts. In total, the IEC received only six disputes, all of which were resolved within two weeks of the election. The IEC was honoured with the prestigious 2000 Computerworld Smithsonian Award in the Government and Non-profit Organizations category for ‘innovative applications of information technology that benefit society’. In making this award, special mention was made of the innovative use of GIS systems by the IEC.^[16]

• Ensure that the operational timelines for implementation of election activities are realistic, feasible, and translated into the election calendar

Even if the legal framework defines the timing of elections, rules may allow the EMB to choose the exact date of elections and consequently decide the timing of the different electoral phases. In the timing and sequencing of elections, the EMB needs to allow sufficient time for the implementation of all preparatory activities preceding election day. Unrealistic timelines may cause delays and thus affect the credibility of electoral processes and their outcomes. Planning of election timelines should consider external risks, particularly in areas that are prone to environmental hazards, as well as seasonal weather conditions. In some countries, the planting season may affect the participation of women due to their roles in food production. Poor weather conditions may affect the transport of election materials and citizens’ access to the electoral facilities. Time lost may be difficult or impossible to make up. Furthermore, an EMB when planning needs to consider whether a possible second round of elections is applicable. The second round of presidential elections may be particularly sensitive because of the high electoral stakes and frustration that may accumulate during the period leading up to the run-off. Once formulated, operational timelines should be included in an election calendar that needs to be periodically updated.

• Establish electoral dispute resolution bodies and mechanisms at an early stage in the process

Well-functioning electoral dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent potential to prevent violence. The planning process should pay particular attention to the timeliness of dispute resolution and the capacity of the responsible bodies to deal with a potentially large number of complaints. Since the electoral process cannot be halted when a challenge is introduced, the establishment of adequate dispute resolution mechanisms which are trusted and effective is essential for ensuring the credibility of the electoral process.^[17]

Eleven actions for an improved electoral dispute resolution (EDR) system in Bhutan, 2008. After the 2008 parliamentary election, which witnessed some violence,^[18] the EMB undertook efforts to understand and address weaknesses relating to the election dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms. The improvements included (a) the establishment of a two-level EDR body; (b) the introduction of clearer rules for complaint adjudication; (c) guidelines for the proper presentation of complaints;
(d) the establishment of investigation committees; (e) improved regulations governing the hearings; (f) better guidance for decision-making; (g) the enabling of summary decisions; (h) better provisions for final and binding decisions; (i) time limits for considering cases; (j) mandatory referral; and (k) the making of provision for complaints during non-election periods.^[19]

• Design sample electoral materials at an early stage and test their usability and accuracy

Electoral materials, including voter registration forms, provisional and final electoral registers, ballot papers and tabulation forms, need to be designed carefully to minimize the potential for mistakes, disputes and conflicts. These materials should be clear, concise and understandable for a broader population, including linguistic minorities and people with disabilities, and have security features, such as watermarks, security printing or other secure features as may be appropriate for the context in which these will be applied. Allowing sufficient time for the designing, testing and improvement of electoral materials may be beneficial in avoiding tensions generated by technical problems. Furthermore, there are many countries that do not have sufficient capacity to print or source some of these materials and therefore resort to sourcing same abroad. In these instances, communication with internal stakeholders is vital. The process of sampling electoral materials and the security measures to be taken by suppliers in the printing country become an important consideration for electoral stakeholders. Decisions and activities need to be taken well in advance, to compensate for the longer supply chain applicable in those circumstances.

• Establish data collection and analysis capacities to understand risk levels and make informed and conflict-sensitive decisions

Numerous factors can cause outbreaks of election-related violence. These may be process-specific (electoral) or context-specific (structural) factors. Risk assessment is a useful methodology in assessing relevant risk factors in a given national and electoral context. However, the risks associated with specific factors may change over time. Factors that are not initially categorized as risks may resurface during the later stages of electoral processes. It is therefore important to establish a standing capability within the EMB to analyse risk dynamics throughout the electoral cycle. This can be done through continuous data collection and analysis, with the aim of producing information that allows conflict-sensitive electoral decision-making. Furthermore, such analysis can be used to mobilize external agencies that may have mandates and capacities to address identified risks, such as security sector agencies and other state and non-state actors. At the same time, electoral management bodies will benefit from improved information and analysis generated and shared by external agencies and actors.

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)[20], develops a robust risk data analysis system ahead of elections. One year ahead of the 2009 legislative elections, Mexico was experiencing an increased number of attacks on civil society by organized criminal groups, causing uncertainty and fear. Due to increased security risks, the IFE put in place a general strategy to prevent attacks on citizens and political actors. Two mechanisms were put in place, namely a ‘political-electoral information system’ and a ‘scenario analysis programme’, to allow the IFE to assess risks relating to drug trafficking, murders, robbery, kidnapping, poverty and electoral complexity throughout the country. The ‘state risk index’ included data from a task force composed of local state governments and security sector, communication and infrastructure agencies. The system was designed to minimize the risks related to the electoral process and to protect the electorate going to the polls in 2009. The overall strategy contributed to informed decision-making in terms of preventative action.^[21]

In Burkina Faso, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)provided a training program on conflict prevention and mitigation strategies for communal-level election commissioners. The training program was based on IFES’ EVER methodology and customized to the Burkina Faso context, as well as to the operations of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and its communal administrative divisions. Following training, IFES provided support to the Independent Communal Electoral Commissions (CECI) and Independent District Electoral Commissions (CEIA) to establish an elections conflict monitoring cell, which identified sources of potential conflict, collected data through focal points, analyzed data gathered, implemented conflict prevention activities, and issued. The monitoring cell used information collected through focal points to draft reports on the nature and frequency of conflict incidents, tension levels, and threats. The reports were then delivered to the CENI to enhance its decision-making process ahead of the 2016 municipal elections, and its implementation of conflict prevention measures. The reports and data from the monitoring cell were also delivered to the National Committee for the Security of Elections.

• Ensure that the introduction of information technology-based solutions is timely and manageable

EMBs are increasingly relying on the application of sophisticated IT-based solutions in the implementation and management of delicate and complex electoral processes. Popular IT systems include biometric voter registration, electronic voting and electronic vote transmission. The use of IT may ensure that electoral processes are more expeditious and less prone to human mistakes, and thus contribute to increased trust in, and the credibility of, election results. On the negative side, late procurement and testing and breakdowns of these systems may cause serious problems to election administrators, resulting in loss of public confidence and damaged credibility of election results. To minimize the risks relating to the introduction of new technologies, an EMB should ensure that the testing and procurement of equipment happen during an initial stage of the electoral processes. It should be possible to compensate for delayed delivery and testing, or failure of these systems, through the deployment of alternative resources and procedures. Experience shows that introduction of ITs may work best if the development and implementation are incremental and are owned and trusted by all relevant national stakeholders. It is also important to highlight the complex relationship that exists between the choice and sophistication of the technology used in an election and the level of confidence in the electoral process. In some cases, the introduction of electoral technology might not be the best solution. Thus, the need to ensure that new technologies are considered on a case-by case basis in accordance with national needs and financial capacities, following a comprehensive and consultative feasibility study.

E-voting is introduced gradually by the Brazilian Superior Elections Tribunal. ‘Introduction of e-voting in Brazil was motivated by economic and fraud-prevention factors. A multi-year approach for the gradual introduction of e-voting was adopted and included the following steps: (1) Voter and civic information including usability and feasibility studies starting in 1986; (2) Capacity building within the EMB, and digitalization of the result aggregation; (3) Development of hard- and software, involving local technical expertise; (4) Testing of equipment in the Brazilian environment; (5) EMB’s final decision on the type of machine fitting the Brazilian context best; (6) Quality control and testing in various environments; (7) Authorization of e-voting in 1996 local and municipal elections; (8) Post-election review and subsequent quality overhaul; (9) Full e-voting roll-out in the 2002 general elections. A hacking competition was organized in 2009 to create additional confidence in the technology. Over the years citizens and stakeholders gained enough trust in the system for the paper trail that was initially included to be deemed redundant and scrapped after technical problems associated with the printers. While systems without paper trails are often disputed, the Brazilian case exemplifies what can be achieved with successful trust, capacity and consensus building over many years and several electoral cycles.’^[22]

In the lead up to the 2009 parliamentary elections, the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities participated in the Lebanese Election Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA) project aimed to track the risk of election-related conflict in each electoral district in Lebanon. This contributed to the development of effective security planning (with other security agencies and stakeholders) to mitigate risks of election-related conflict during the campaign, polling and results phase of parliamentary elections. LEVRA used a methodology that analyzed data to indicate risk of political, confessional or electoral violence and assessed whether the data indicated a risk of violence in that district. In partnership with a local Geographic Information Systems (GIS) company, a tracking and mapping software was developed to record and data, incorporating GIS technology to map the risk assessments for each electoral district. Subsequently, incident maps were developed, and the information was used to design a security plan for the parliamentary elections. LEVRA also established a secure website that contained the risk assessment information, available for use by the Ministry and other stakeholders.

• Ensure political preconditions for the implementation of technical activities

Elections are often organized in national contexts where the political landscape is very complex. Political divisions within the legislative and executive institutions can increase the complexity of electoral processes and demand increased integrity and operational capacities of the organizations with electoral mandates. While it may be important to ensure that a political consensus is reached among the relevant political actors that give an EMB legitimacy, an EMB should have a good awareness of the politically delicate phases and activities in order to ensure that political consensus is maintained before and during the implementation of specific technical segments of elections. This may require political sensitivity and consensus-building skills among election administrators.

The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), exercises political sensitivity when implementing technical processes. To implement its mandate in the complex political context of Mexico, the INE distinguishes between two aspects of electoral management. The first is the technical dimension. It entails management of resources and operational activities to ensure that election processes are implemented in a timely, credible and peaceful manner. The second dimension is political. The INE acknowledges that election administrators require a good sense of the political situation in order to better understand the possible political connotations of electoral activities. This allows it to make politically sensitive electoral decisions and take action ensuring that electoral processes do not raise political controversy. In fact, Mexican experiences confirm that there is an interplay between the technical and political dimensions of electoral processes. ‘Politics and technique change jointly: technique is the administrative body, and politics is what gives sense and feeds the spirit of the administration’.^[23]

B.         Improved electoral security

Planning of security precautions and responses needs to be undertaken on the basis of risk assessments of the general election environment and specific issues related to the geographic or political landscape. Security sector agencies are generally accustomed to strategic and operational security planning. In an election year, these plans must take into account the dynamics of electoral conflicts, such as increased political tensions and conflicts, and requirements to provide security for a large number of electoral actors, activities and facilities and a great deal of information. To support and reinforce the integrity of electoral processes, the SSAs’ electoral security planning must be timely and well informed about specific electoral needs. Specific consideration should include electoral risks, needs for the provision of physical protection (to actors, events, facilities and materials), financial and human resources, coordination with other actors and so on.

• Conduct a timely exercise to assess security risks relating to electoral processes within different electoral phases and across different geographical regions

Security sector agencies should mobilize organizational expertise to carry out a comprehensive electoral risk assessment early on in the electoral processes. This assessment must look into the historical and current electoral conflict dynamics in different geographical regions. To the greatest extent possible, consultations should involve all relevant stakeholders including EMBs, relevant ministries (for example, interior, defence, police, justice, health and transport), local governments, political parties and civil society organizations.^[24] Understanding of the political actors’ incentives to resort to the use of violence during electoral processes can inform the planning of appropriate security responses.^[25]

The Colombian Ministry of Defence maps risks relating to electoral security during local elections in 2011. In 2008, the government of Colombia estimated that illegal armed groups could, through intimidation and other violent means, potentially disrupt the 2011 local elections in as much as one-third of the country. As a response, the Ministry of Defense mapped out high-risk areas with a focus on electoral security. In total, 53 police regional centres were involved in mapping out risk areas by using the existing statistical data and targeted surveys. The exercise identified 58 municipalities where candidates might experience increased security risks. High-risk areas were provided with security protocols and protection schemes in order to guarantee a functional electoral process. Political actors travelling to areas where protection schemes were put in place were encouraged to inform the police before travelling. This allowed the authorities to ‘dispatch adequate protection measures’.^[26]

• Operationalize the electoral security strategy in respect to protection of electoral actors, events, facilities and materials during the different electoral phases

Operationalization of electoral security plans will help in translating broader electoral security concepts into practical action points. It will point to specific categories that need security protection, such as actors (election officials, political leaders), electoral events (political party rallies, for example), electoral facilities (such as voter registration centres and EMB offices and warehousing facilities where electoral materials are kept), and electoral materials (such as sensitive electoral materials). Furthermore, it will link specific security protection needs with specific phases of the electoral cycle and assign inter-agency responsibilities.

Operationalization of an electoral security strategy during the 2009 elections in India. The Election Commission of India (ECI) was in charge of putting in place an electoral security strategy for the protection of electoral actors, facilities and materials ahead of the 2009 parliamentary elections. The challenges included the provision of security arrangements for 828,000 polling stations. To compensate for a shortage of security personnel, since demand for them would be so great, the ECI requested that chief electoral officers in each state make a preliminary assessment of where to deploy extra security and where to take specific action to deter individuals who might perpetrate fraud or violence. “Vulnerability mapping” helped the chief electoral officers identify which polling places in their state would be most vulnerable. The chief electoral officers then had the power to call upon the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), a paramilitary police service operated by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, to supplement state police during elections., The CRPF operated under the command of the Director General of the police, who took orders from the Chief Electoral Officer during the electoral period. This led to a decline in the number of election-related incidents and the ECI declared that the 2009 election was one of the most peaceful in the country’s history.^[27]

• Ensure that joint security planning, that involves multiple security sector agencies and an EMB, is a collaborative exercise that takes place at the national and sub-national level

Electoral security is most effective when adapted to the local security context.^[28] Implementation of the electoral security strategy may require the establishment of joint coordination bodies such as task forces or joint election operation centres.^[29] Such security forums will maintain and enhance coordination between agencies throughout the electoral cycle. Security planning may also take into account a wider range of actors including political parties, other ministries and civil society groups.^[30]

Coordination between the Interim Independent Electoral Commission and the Kenyan police strengthens security planning ahead of the 2010 referendum. Post-electoral violence in 2007–2008 claimed the lives of over 1,500 Kenyans and caused the internal displacement of more than 300,000 people.^[31] In the context of preparations for the 2010 constitutional referendum, the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and the Kenyan police collaborated on the development of a comprehensive electoral security plan. This methodology included identification of the security personnel required to provide electoral security. Needs assessments were conducted nationwide by the respective officer commanding police divisions (OCPDs). This information was consolidated at the national level and collated through a comprehensive report that was shared with the Commission. The IIEC worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police on security operations ahead of the elections and consulted with the Office of the President, the Department of Registration of Persons and Immigration and, the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs in order to ‘effectively operationalize election activities’. To strengthen the capacity of the Kenyan police force to provide electoral security, uniformed personnel from the Kenyan Wildlife Services and the Prison Department were seconded, trained and then appointed as police officers immediately before and after election day.^[32]

• Develop a curriculum for training of security sector agencies on the specifics of security engagement during the electoral processes

Security sector agencies need training to understand the specific challenges relating to their engagement during electoral processes. Such training should include human rights and gender awareness.^[33] When developing the training, the SSAs should collaborate with the EMB. The training needs to take into account the levels of literacy and linguistic diversity of security sector officers and the length of the training. If the training is cascaded, the capacity of trainers to convey the training, while maintaining its standard, must be ensured.

UN agencies develop a training curriculum for the Sudanese police ahead of the 2010 general elections. The 2010 general election was regarded as an important milestone of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the armed conflict in Sudan.^[34] With assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Elections Assistance Basket Fund, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the United Nations Mission in Darfur developed a training curriculum on electoral security in order to train over 34,000 Sudanese police officers at different levels ahead of the 2010 general election. The curriculum provided a summary of the electoral law, the polling process, the role of the police, likely offences, and mock polling scenarios. The UNPOL also produced 27,000 pocket-sized copies of a as a quick reference guide outlining basic procedures and recommended police conduct during polling days. This training curriculum covered the development of a polling day deployment strategy to mitigate election ‘flashpoints’.^[35]

C.         Improved infrastructure for peace

In addition to EMBs and SSAs, which have clear mandates and responsibilities to ensure that elections are peaceful, a number of other state and non-state actors may have a specific interest in contributing to peaceful elections. These may include civil society organizations and other groups and individuals which represent the building blocks of a national infrastructure for peace. During the election planning phase, these actors should be proactive in identifying and reaching out to other organizations and individuals with a similar agenda and recognized potential to mediate and resolve disputes, such as traditional leaders. This may require the establishment of a joint collaborative forum which can ensure that efforts are coordinated and results are maximized. Specific actions may include the mapping of all existing organizations and actors that may contribute to peaceful elections, the promotion of collaborative platforms and forums, resource mobilization, operational planning, and the establishment of collaboration with EMBs and SSAs.

• Map organizations and individuals with an agenda or capacity to promote peace and conflict resolution during elections at a national and sub-national level

Effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and mitigation may take different forms in different societies. In consolidated democracies, judicial institutions usually enjoy the citizens’ trust and are able to mediate or resolve conflicts effectively. In some societies, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and authorities, such as religious or tribal leaders, complement the judiciary and constitute an essential conflict prevention and mitigation mechanism. In conflict-prone societies, additional efforts are often required to develop and enhance conflict-prevention and peace-building capacities through the establishment of peace and liaison councils and forums that involve civil society organizations, political parties, government agencies, reputable citizens, and organizations and individuals that work to promote gender equality and women’s participation. Understanding the full peace-building and conflict-prevention potential may require mapping of the existing infrastructure for peace.

• Join or initiate discussion forums for participatory dialogues between EMBs, security sector agencies and non-state actors in the planning phase of electoral processes

Participatory and democratic dialogue through multi-stakeholder forums and consultations between state and non-state actors should be established during the planning phase. If electoral management bodies and security sector agencies do not take the initiative to organize dialogue forums, or do not include non-state organizations, these may take proactive steps to convene such forums themselves. Existing forums, established to coordinate broader peace-building and conflict-prevention efforts outside the electoral context, may serve as platforms for discussion and coordination around actions the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence during the election period.

Non-state actors conduct nationwide consultations to support peaceful elections in Somaliland in 2012. Although recognized as credible, the 2010 elections in Somaliland witnessed some election-related violence in the form of intimidation and murder.^[36] Ahead of the November 2012 local government election, the Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SNSAF) conducted a nationwide consultation process which created a platform for dialogue, bringing together all electoral stakeholders such as National Election Commission (NEC), the Committee for the Registration and Approval of Political Associations (RAC), political parties and associations, government officials, parliamentarians and civil society organizations which included traditional and religious leaders, women’s organizations and legal experts. The objective of the pre-election dialogue was to identify the main issues that might have a negative impact on the elections, and to generate appropriate strategies to ensure that elections were free, fair and peaceful. Some of the concerns identified during the dialogue included shortcomings in the electoral legal framework relating to ballot paper design, polling station arrangements, the demarcation of electoral districts and boundaries, inadequate voter education, the NEC’s general lack of capacity and finances, inappropriate election timing (no election date was decided at the time of the consultations) and security concerns.^[37]

• Formalize coordination between state and non-state actors during elections, and mobilize sufficient financial and human resources for joint action

Strengthening a society’s resilience to conflict and violence during elections may require enhanced coordination between, and joint action by, the major state and non-state actors that have a mandate to work for peaceful elections and an interest in doing so. These organizations should work together to develop operational plans for engagement throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle at the national and sub-national level. In conflict-prone societies, such plans should foresee the establishment of standing bodies for data collection and analysis, the creation of early warning alerts, and coordination of prevention and mitigation activities. Preventive and mitigation actions requires funds, however. In the long run, such mechanisms are inexpensive and cost-effective.^[38]

State and non-state actors establish a collaborative early warning and conflict prevention platform ahead of the 2010 referendum in Kenya. During the outbreak of election-related violence in Kenya in 2008, far fewer incidents were recorded in the Kenyan districts where a District Peace Committee (DPC) existed than in districts without such a committee. The results were so convincing that, after the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was passed, the government decided to establish DPCs in all of Kenya’s districts. Prior to the 2010 constitutional referendum, the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management (NSC), the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), PeaceNet Kenya (an umbrella body for peace-building CSOs in Kenya), and UNDP Kenya established the Uwiano Platform for Peace. This Platform also involves other key government agencies such as the Provincial Administration, Kenya Police, Administration Police, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) in ‘a unique multi-stakeholder conflict prevention, de-escalation and response strategy that emphasized preventive action, diplomacy and community dialogue’.^[39] The contribution of Uwianoto the peaceful referendum has been well documented. The key success factors included the strong national profile of the principal partners and their linkage to credible grass-roots networks, including the Provincial Administration, security agencies and district peace committees. Positive media input supportive donors and development partners and the UNDP’s invaluable role in mobilizing resources. The establishment and operationalization of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF), also referred to as the Rapid Response Fund, was one of the most notable achievements of Uwiano.

• Consult with traditional and religious leaders in order to understand their interest and potential to assist in mediating electoral conflict

Acknowledgement of the role of traditional and religious leaders in the peace infrastructure is an important measure for preventing electoral violence, particularly in remote areas. It is important to be aware that the authority of elected leaders has been often in competition with traditional leaders´ power.^[40] Engagement should be based on a constructive approach and respect for traditions.^[41] However, some traditions are not always inclusive and participatory, especially with regard to women’s participation. Traditional and religious leaders should not be perceived as biased if they are to have the legitimacy to resolve disputes.^[42] It is important to be aware of gender roles and context-specific practices and beliefs when working with religious leadership in any particular context.

Chiefs affirm support to democratic processes ahead of Sierra Leone’s 2007 elections. Following a decade-long conflict, Sierra Leone organized its first peacetime general elections in 2002. These elections did witness some incidents of election-related violence. In this respect, the potential of the paramount chiefs to contribute to the prevention and mitigation of election-relation violence ahead of and during the 2007 elections was explored. Ahead of the campaigning phase, the Fatima Institute and the UNDP organized several leadership consultation workshops around the country in an effort to clarify the role of the paramount chiefs in the electoral process, resulting in the Makeni Protocol whereby chiefs affirmed their commitment to promote the democratic and electoral process.^[43] In general, the 2007 election was regarded as free and fair; however, incidents of intimidation were still recorded during the campaign period and on election day.^[44]

• Create a platform to enable information exchange on the electoral process and monitor the activities of electoral stakeholders throughout

Election Watch initiatives are a means to increase the transparency of the electoral process. Through observation of the voting operations, information of the public about the activities in the different stages of the electoral cycle (such as voter registration, nomination of parties and candidates, or campaigning).[45] Moreover, election watch projects monitor the work of other electoral stakeholders, such as political parties, or review the reporting in the media.

The Namibian Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) launches an Election Watch ahead of general elections in November 2014 and regional and local elections in 2015.[46] The project uses different channels to publish election-related material: it operates a website that features background documents and explanations on elections, news from the Electoral Commission, political analysis, party lists, manifestos and speeches.[47] Further, it produces a regular Election Watch Bulletin[48] with information on electoral activities in an online and print version and also makes use of social media. This way, information is made accessible for civil society activists, journalists, students and the public in general. The objective of the project is to act as a platform for the exchange of the views of the citizens and civil society activists on the electoral process and a vehicle for voter education[49]. Another asset is that it can make a contribution to the peacefulness of the electoral process: Through such a comprehensive monitoring effort, potential problems that might threaten the effective organization of the vote and trigger conflicts can be detected. After all, the initiative also strives to promote Namibian, African and international electoral and democratic standards.