The roles and responsibilities of host countries in external voting programmes have ranged widely depending on context, available resources, and the degree of international interest and support. In most cases the duties and responsibilities of countries hosting foreign electoral activity on their soil are minimal, being confined to the role of facilitator rather than that of organizer or implementer. While host countries can assist in the external voting process, their role should not threaten the secrecy of the ballot or the neutrality or transparency of the programme. It is critical that external voting programmes be conducted without political or government influence or interference.
The following are some of the areas where host countries can play a role in external voting programmes:
Providing data. A primary role of host countries in external voting programmes has been to provide a range of data and information to facilitate the process. Demographic data can help with estimating the numbers of eligible electors and identifying where they are resident within the host country, and can contribute to determining where registration and voting will take place. Data on infrastructure within host countries can also assist an external voting programme.
Data protection. It is essential that any data collected as part of an external voting programme be protected. Ensuring data protection can be a critical component of the overall programme, as the lack of adequate data protection can directly influence turnout. Any information on individuals eligible to participate in the vote that may come into the hands of the host country as a result of the external voting programme should be used exclusively for the external voting programme. These obligations should extend permanently beyond the expiry of any memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or agreements signed by the host country.
Identifying locations. In addition to providing data, host countries can help by making public facilities and similar premises available as registration and polling sites, or with identifying suitable premises for election activities or for temporary office space as needed. However, while host countries can help by providing information, it is important that the country conducting the election make the decisions regarding registration and polling sites. (In the Iraq case (January 2005), the United States emphasized that its role was simply that of a facilitator and that it did not have any authority in deciding on registration and voting sites.) The number and location of registration and polling sites can influence turnout and possibly affect election results, particularly where travel costs are high and are borne by voters themselves.
Freedom of movement. Host countries can help by facilitating and supporting the freedom of movement of election staff, monitors and observers, political party officials and potential voters. Such assistance can include the provision of multiple entry visas or travel permits in a timely fashion. Additionally, host countries can ensure any air, land or sea clearances or permissions necessary for the transport of persons or materials related to the external voting programme. Host countries may also subsidize travel costs or otherwise facilitate voters’ travel to register and to vote.
Customs. Host countries can ensure that all necessary customs clearances and permits will be provided for any equipment and materials that may need to be brought into the country in order to conduct the external voting programme. This can include waiving taxes or other fees. However, in the case of the Iraqi external voting programme in Canada, Canada did not recognize the facilitating organization, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as having any special legal status in Canada, and therefore did not consider the IOM to be eligible for any visa waivers, immunity or duty-free treatment. In fact, Canada specifically held that any imported election material would have to go through the normal customs clearance procedures.
Legality of residency and documentation. In some cases there may be eligible electors who are undocumented or residing illegally in the host country. The legality of one’s residency does not affect one’s right to political participation: undocumented or illegal residents in host countries have legal citizenship in their countries of origin and the rights and responsibilities that come with that citizenship, including the right to vote. However, the government of the country conducting the election may wish to negotiate with the host country to ensure that participation does not result in deportation or other potentially harmful ramifications for individuals. Such risks could significantly affect levels of participation, and could affect turnout unequally across sectors of a population, thus threatening the legitimacy of the election in the eyes of some citizens.
Points of contact. Host country responsibilities can include the appointment of points of contact in relevant government offices to assist in the processes of issuing visas or permits, customs clearance, providing security, and other matters.
Staff. Recruiting and training staff to run election-related activities in host countries, including electoral registration and polling, can be logistically and financially challenging. While host countries can provide invaluable help by providing data to assist with identifying and locating potential staff, the recruitment, hiring and training of staff should generally be conducted under the direct supervision of the country of origin or its designees.
In the case of the 2004 Afghanistan elections, when external voting was conducted in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, the IOM, with a mandate from the Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), recruited and trained international and national core staff, community mobilizers, and registration and polling station staff. Overall, thousands of staff were recruited, the majority of them (95 per cent) Afghan nationals, and hiring policies maintained a gender and ethnic balance at all staffing levels. Training was conducted in less than one week. In the case of the 2005 Iraq elections, a number of host countries paid particular attention to staffing issues. Turkey, for example, specified that any locally recruited staff must have clean judicial records. Germany specified that any staff must be subject to local labour laws.
Security. Ensuring security, in terms of both the physical safety and security of participants, staff and materials, and the integrity of the electoral process itself, is of critical importance. External voting poses unique challenges in both these respects. Cooperation between host countries and the country of origin is essential to ensuring that the external voting programme is conducted in an atmosphere that is free of violence, intimidation or coercion.
While there are no clear standards or best practices in this highly sensitive area, it is generally most convenient and cost-effective for the host country to provide security during the electoral event. Other alternatives could be the use of international peacekeepers (in appropriate situations) or the use of private security companies. One of the most important questions when considering security provisions is whether freedom and security can be guaranteed in external voting programmes to the same degree as within the country of origin.
Agreements with host countries generally include specific security stipulations, particularly regarding registration and voting sites and the transport of election materials. Agreements can specify support from local and national police and security forces and can establish communications structures between the host state and election administrators. Where additional training may be required for the forces providing security, election officials and administrators can make recommendations regarding training and observe the process.
During the external voting programmes in the 2004 Afghanistan and January 2005 Iraq elections, the host countries provided security for registration and polling sites in most cases. They also assisted with providing security for the movement of election materials. For Iraqis voting in the United States, the responsibility (and costs) fell on local law enforcement agencies. The US Government facilitated the provision of adequate security by informing state and local authorities and encouraging them to work with the IOM, which ran the external voting programme. In Germany, the IOM was ultimately responsible for maintaining order at registration and voting sites, while German security and order agencies were responsible for maintaining security outside the locations where registration and voting took place.
Preventing fraud. One of the most serious obstacles to external voting has been the view that it opens additional avenues to fraud which can undermine the entire electoral process. Some observers have argued that the introduction of external voting in countries with a history of electoral fraud can undermine the public’s confidence in the process and threaten the consolidation of democracy.
While ensuring the integrity of the electoral process itself and preventing fraud are generally the responsibility of the country holding the election, host countries can help by guaranteeing certain safeguards to protect against fraud. The host country may be able to provide invaluable assistance in this regard, particularly in terms of sharing data.
Electoral registration. The conduct of the electoral registration is a critical component of external voting programmes. The role of host countries in the registration process is extremely sensitive and highly political, particularly where host countries may have an interest in the outcome of the election or may have ethnic, religious or other ties to the country conducting the election. While host countries may have a role in the registration process, usually through providing demographic data, it is important that protection is put in place to prevent foreign governments from influencing the outcome of an election by screening the registration process and thus ‘engineering’ turnout.
Even where polling does not take place on foreign soil, timetables may make it necessary to conduct electoral registration or other activities out-of-country, particularly where time does not allow full repatriation of refugee communities before registration takes place. In the case of the 1993 Cambodian elections, Cambodian laws prohibited any electoral activity on foreign soil. As a consequence, refugees were forced to return in order to participate in the election. However, the repatriation of Cambodians from Thailand progressed more slowly than had been expected, thus affecting electoral registration timetables and jeopardizing the integrity of the electoral process. In order to register returnees in time, the United Nations and the Thai Government reached an agreement to allow most of the registration process to be conducted in Thailand. However, because Cambodia’s electoral law did not allow for electors to register on foreign soil, electors did not receive registration cards until they reached Cambodia. (For additional discussion, see Gallagher and Schowengerdt October 1997 and 1998: 205.) In this case a combination of in- and out-of-country electoral activity was devised to ensure enfranchisement.
Information dissemination: campaigning, voter information and civic education. Host government cooperation, support and facilitation of the dissemination of information, including campaign materials as well as voter and civic education, is critical to the success of any external voting programme. In the Eritrean referendum of 1991, for example, Sudan’s cooperation and initiative were essential to the education of voters in refugee camps.
Host governments can help in information campaigns of all types by making available local and national forms of electronic and print media, including television and radio, for the purposes of the electoral process. When external voting is being conducted in refugee camps, voter information and education should be tied to existing communication systems, particularly those linked to refugee priorities such as food and shelter.
External voting also poses questions about whether external electors will have less, equal or greater access to information than their counterparts in the country of origin. For example, Bosnian refugees in 1996 had access to the international press and other sources of information, while electors within Bosnia and Herzegovina had access to more limited media. Administrators of external voting programmes must consider whether differences in access to information might influence the overall integrity of the process or the outcome of the election. These differences become particularly important where one group of electors is limited by its access to government-controlled or otherwise unbalanced media.
The campaign period can be critical to an electoral process, providing potential voters with essential information about the choices before them. Where campaigning is allowed, host governments can help by authorizing candidates to campaign within the guidelines of any codes of conduct that may exist. While most countries do permit voter and civic education activities, it is not uncommon for a country to prohibit foreign nationals from campaigning on its soil. In the January 2005 Iraq elections, neither Turkey nor Canada allowed foreign political parties to conduct election campaigns on their soil.
Campaigning aside, the distribution of general political information is highly sensitive. In the case of the 1997 Liberian elections, not only did host governments resist external voting on their soil, but they also banned the dissemination of election-related information within their borders. For Bosnian electors in Croatia, the 1997 MOU between Croatia and the Refugee Elections Steering Group (RESG), an ad hoc organization tasked with coordinating Bosnia’s out-of-country voting, prevented Bosnian political parties from campaigning on Croatian soil and limited the types of voter and civic educational materials that could be distributed to small brochures in the Croatian and Serbian languages ‘in order not to provoke other nationalities’ (Gallagher and Schowengerdt 1998: 202).
