Logistics
The
procurement and distribution of election materials and equipment take on added
dimensions when external voting takes place. If external electors are living in
several different countries, the problems of delivering items to coincide with
the delivery of the same items inside the country grow in proportion.
Special
arrangements may have to be made with providers such as printers and
manufacturers to deliver to several locations, both inside and outside the
country. This raises questions of security and timing, which have to be
carefully controlled. Infrastructure problems of transport and communications
must always be considered in planning these deliveries. The transport of ballot
papers can be complicated by the electoral system used. In an election where
proportional representation (PR) is used nationally, the same ballot paper is
used everywhere. However, in an electoral system where each electoral district
or province or region has a unique ballot paper, distribution becomes more
complex. Voters have to be identified by constituency, adding another step to
the process, unless a postal ballot is used. This, of course, has its own
complexities because each voter then needs a list of candidates or parties for
the particular electoral district.
A breakdown
in the delivery of materials can create a tense situation, as was experienced
in the Central African Republic National Assembly election in 1998:
There was
bitterness in neighbouring Gabon
and in France,
where angry migrant voters surrounded their diplomatic missions insisting on
voting. A protestor in Libreville, Gabon, told newsmen that ‘we’ve not been able to
vote here in Libreville
because the consulate did not receive the necessary materials to enable it to
organise the elections. This is why we’re protesting against the flagrant
violation of the constitution by blocking Central Africans in Gabon from
freely exercising their civic duties. We’re contesting with all our energy’
(Tumanjong 1999: 41–42).
Even
countries with excellent infrastructure and communications can experience
difficulties. Some Canadian electors working in Kosovo at the time of the
Canadian election in 2000 were unable to vote when many ballot papers did not
arrive at the Canadian Co-ordination Office in Kosovo on time.
An
important aspect of the logistical plans is the appointment and training of
staff for the external voting. Whether they are hired directly or appointed by
a national or international agency in each country, the election officials will
need specific and detailed training. Although registration and voting manuals
prepared for in-country training will be useful, there will also be specific
matters that need to be addressed for the staff managing the external voting.
These may include the context (e.g. peace agreements, country background), the
particular challenges (e.g. reaching electors in refugee camps and finding out
how to reach those who are scattered), and special instructions for returning
registration materials and ballot papers to the EMB.
Voter
education and communication with prospective voters are also a part of the
logistical preparations. Materials designed for internal voting may need to be
modified for use outside the country (including language). Close cooperation with
international and national organizations will be needed to reach prospective
voters and to conduct education programmes. The use of the mass media needs to
be kept to a minimum in order to keep down costs unless there is a large
population of external electors in a particular country. The host country’s
regulations on the media may also need to be checked. Announcements and
information must be targeted carefully to reach eligible electors in different
locations. The election officials may also be involved in distributing campaign
information if the political parties do not have the means to do this outside
the country. Toll-free telephone lines may be needed to answer queries if large
numbers of external electors are resident in a particular country.
As with the
planning process, the logistical preparations have to be carefully monitored
and worked out to ensure that all contingencies are provided for where the
timelines for registration and voting are concerned.
The security of
election materials
The security
and control of registration and voting materials require special attention for
external voting. Security is as essential externally as it is internally but
there is the added challenge of securing sensitive materials during transport
to and from several countries. Once the ballot papers are returned to the EMB,
they may also need to be transported further to the provincial or municipal
level, depending on the counting and reconciliation arrangements. Each step
requires a security plan to prevent fraud.
Observers and political party representatives often
want to follow the trail of the ballot papers and other election materials from
origin to destination. Secure transport, such as a courier or diplomatic pouch,
is required to reassure observers, candidates and voters that the ballot papers
cannot be tampered with in any way.
Security
will also be an issue during the registration process. In some circumstances,
providing the data necessary to register to vote may be dangerous for the
individual. Refugees may be concerned about losing their refugee status or
being forced to return prematurely to their country of origin. For this reason
they may want assurance that the registration data will remain confidential to
the EMB. This, however, may conflict with the ideal of an open list to which
the political parties have access. Measures can be devised to protect the
information on the elector’s location or status by carefully selecting the
information that will be printed on the electoral registers. This type of problem
requires careful consideration if the needs of the displaced citizen are to be
balanced with the needs of the electoral system.
Voter
registration
Legislation
defines who is eligible to vote and an EMB establishes the procedures for
registering eligible electors and preventing fraud. The electoral registers are
generally a matter of public record, which means that the data to be published
in the lists must be agreed upon and other data collected must remain
confidential.
External
electors may be registered on the electoral register of the electoral district
of their previous place of residence, or on another national list (for example,
if the country concerned has a single consolidated electoral register), or
there may be a special electoral register of external electors. In the latter
case, the list can be by country, by type of residence (permanent or
temporary), by category (refugee, guest worker etc.) or by any combination of
these. There may be a permanent register of electors that has to be updated
regularly, or registration may be regular and automatic, or electors may need
to register in advance of each election.
External
electors who are working or travelling in another country will need to confirm
that their names are on the electoral register. The onus is on the elector to
check this by post or by the Internet. For large displaced populations, it is
usually necessary to hold a new registration because any electoral registers
that exist are generally out of date. This process can be very costly to
organize and manage. In these cases, the onus is on the EMB to ensure the
process occurs. The registration process must be designed so that the register
of external electors will meet the requirements set out in the law as well as
meeting any specific problems in host countries. Registration can be carried
out by trained local officials, by embassy staff or by post. Whatever process
is used, controls are needed to prevent fraud. Registration cards and the data
need to be secure in order to avoid duplication or loss. Controls over the
distribution of cards and other materials and their return must be in place so
that those handling them account for every item.
Prior to
registration, the locations of potential electors have to be targeted as
closely as possible. The communication plan devised to reach the eligible
electors with information about the process will need to be reasonably
specific. The information can be channelled through international
organizations, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community
groups, as well as Internet websites.
External
electors, especially refugees, often do not have official identification
documents. Procedures need to be adopted to allow eligible electors to register
using some other means of identification (e.g. United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) records) or on oath. At the same time, the procedures have
to ensure that non-eligible persons are not registering fraudulently. The
procedures also have to give equal access to all eligible external electors,
regardless of ethnicity or religion. Members of minority groups often find it
more difficult among other things to establish their identification and
citizenship, and may need more attention in the registration process.
Any special
procedures must remain within the spirit of the existing legislation and may
require amendments to the law. If the election officials in each host country
make their own decisions about who is eligible or about what forms of
identification will be accepted, this can have great ramifications for the
acceptance of the results of an election.
The
accurate registration of external electors can become a political issue, as
happened in Guyana
after the franchise was extended to non-resident electors after 1968:
There were persistent allegations that the lists
of overseas voters were often inaccurate and made without the prior knowledge
or participation of the Elections Commission. The lists were said to be heavily
padded with fictitious and ineligible voters, having an inaccuracy rate of
about 75 percent of the entries. Voters were found to be living at nonexistent
addresses, in vacant lots, in open pastures and in abandoned premises. Another
criticism levelled at overseas voting was that up to 95 percent of those votes
went to the ruling party . . . [An amendment in 1985 attempted] to change the
regime of overseas voting, but the basic scheme was left intact and remained
flawed since it was susceptible to serious election manipulation (Dundas 1993:
145–6).
Legal
methods for objecting to the registration of a name or correcting an entry on
the register of external electors also need to be in place if the list is not
integrated into the internal electoral register. Minimum standards must be met,
similar to those that apply for internal registration, to ensure the integrity
of the electoral registers.
External
voting and the secret ballot
All the
measures that are used to protect the secrecy of the vote internally must be
duplicated in the external setting. The training of election workers, including
any diplomats or members of the military who are involved in establishing
polling stations, is an essential step in ensuring the integrity of the vote.
In most cases it will be possible to duplicate the polling station procedures and
voting procedures in the external polls. In other cases it may not be
practical—for instance, if there are only a few electors. When a postal return
system is used, extra steps are needed to ensure secrecy. This can prove
difficult when a voter receives the ballot paper by post and marks it at home.
It may be necessary to require voters to go to an embassy or a public
institution to mark the ballot paper in secrecy. An instruction must be
included with the ballot paper to inform the voter that he or she must mark the
ballot paper in private and that any interference is a breach of the law.
The choice
of polling station locations for personal voting is based on the registration
information. However, contingency plans must be in place for changes in the status
of electors. A large-scale return of refugees prior to polling day can affect
the number and location of polling stations. There may also be numbers of
externally registered electors who choose to return for voting day, wanting to
vote in-country.
The ballot
papers marked by external voters generally require the use of a series of
envelopes to keep the ballot and the voter’s identity secret at each step—at
the poll, during return to the EMB, and finally at the count (see figure
5.1). The voter’s identification
is indicated on an outer envelope so it can be double-checked against the
electoral register for eligibility and to prevent voting more than once. If it
is a postal ballot, this envelope will also be pre-printed with the address of
the EMB (or the organization that is administering the vote). An inner
envelope, marked with the address of the body to which the ballot paper will be
sent for the count, allows the ballot papers to be distributed to the proper
national, provincial or municipal level. Finally, an unmarked inner envelope
containing the actual ballot paper is placed in the appropriate ballot box for
the count. Some combination of two or three envelopes will allow the voter’s
eligibility to be confirmed, the ballot paper to be delivered correctly and the
ballot paper to be counted without it being traced back to the voter. This
process in the vote is important and careful instructions will be needed so
that the voters and the election officials understand the system and are fully
confident in it.
Envelopes used for external voting
Decisions
about how the ballot papers are counted are also an important part of the
secrecy of the vote. If there are only a few external ballot papers, they may
need to be mixed with internal ballot papers to prevent disclosure. For
instance, in Lesotho
in 1998 some provinces had only one external ballot paper, which was mixed with
other ballot papers at a specified poll. If there are very large numbers of
external ballots, the decision is often made to count them centrally either at
the polling stations (as in Croatia
in 1997) or after return to the EMB (as in South Africa in 1994 and Kosovo in
2000). The numbers are then added to the totals. Unfortunately, in
post-conflict situations, the reconciliation process can break down, and
sometimes political party representatives object to all external ballot papers
at the count. This happened in Lesotho
in 1998.
Security at
the external registration and polling stations is often subsumed by the embassy
or consulate where the station is located. Local police, if necessary, can
enhance the security. If there is a specific threat or a perceived security
risk such as during the 2005 Iraqi election, special arrangements are made for
extra security procedures. This needs to be factored into the budget process.
Observers and political party representatives are another integral part of the
secrecy of the vote. These participants ensure that procedures are followed and
that the secrecy of the vote is maintained at each step of the electoral
process. It is often difficult for political parties to send representatives,
so international observers have to be relied upon to carry out the duties of
oversight of external voting.
International
observers have been deployed to observe the external vote in some elections.
However, the costs for international organizations to send observers to several
countries for an external vote has led to other solutions. Diplomatic staff and
other international staff (e.g. NGOs) in each country are often recruited to do
the observation on behalf of an international organization. These observers are
trained and report back to the organization, which prepares an overall report.
The EMB also sends its own staff to each location to ensure procedures are
followed.
Contracting out
external voting
The
electoral management body can run the election itself or contract it out. The
latter option is unusual where an established EMB is in control of the
electoral process, but is used more frequently in transitional elections with
substantial direct input from the international community. The EMB in
conjunction with the subcontractor will also need to interact with various
government departments (e.g. the department for foreign affairs).
Prior to
1996, where it existed, external voting was a part of the overall election
planning process. For instance, the refugee registration and voting operation
in Cambodia
in 1993 was an integral part of the functions of the Electoral Component of the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). However, for the
1996 election in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, because of the scale of
external voting, other approaches were considered. Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina
were living in over 50 countries, but the largest numbers were in the
neighbouring countries. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) established a Steering Group to coordinate this task. The group
worked with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)
and the IOM. Processes were established for registration and voting both by
post (in most countries) and in person (in neighbouring countries).
Subsequently, the IOM was contracted to manage the participation of refugees in
the municipal elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and later for the external voting in Kosovo (in 2000) and several other
countries (see also chapter 7 and the case studies on Afghanistan, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Iraq).
The
contractor coordinates and liaises with the EMB and is responsible for
infrastructure arrangements, information, registration, database preparation
(in some cases), polling, and challenges to the inclusion of names on the
electoral registers. The contractor can also be responsible for archiving and
documentation.
