To establish and maintain public confidence in the electoral process, results management systems should incorporate certain fundamental principles governing a democratic election.
These fundamental principles are:
Transparency
Traditionally EMBs almost exclusively associated transparency with the actual counting process by allowing representatives of political parties and candidates to witness and/or participate in the process, as well as granting them permission to receive an official copy the statement of the results of the counting process. National and international electoral observers should also be allowed to witness the process and be issued an official copy of the statement of the results. The concept of transparency has become much broader as EMBs take a holistic approach in the vote counting process and see it as one integral part of the results management system. Subsequently transparency must also be ensured when developing the overall concept of the results management system, as well as its individual components including: counting of votes, tabulation of results solutions, communication systems for transmitting interim results, transportation of sensitive election results material, storage of the legal statement of counts and other election-results related material. Just as access to the counting of votes by non-EMB officials is essential for transparency guaranteeing accessibility for party agents and observers to the tabulation of results is equally important. International best practice now requires that where EMBs present aggregated results they should also disclose the results from individual voting stations and thereby enable accredited observers, party agents and media representatives to track results from a voting station through the entire results process. Utilizing the EMB’s website is a fast and accessible means for distribution of nation wide voting station-based results. Voting station breakdowns of results should also be readily available for the constituency in question where results are tabulated and interim results announced at constituency levels.
Manual counting is by its nature more transparent than computerized counting. If vote counting, transmission of results and aggregation of results are based on ICT-solutions, then new mechanisms for ensuring transparency need to be introduced. However, is important to look at cases were ICT-solutions have reduce the possibility of committing fraudulent activities. In Brazil, when the e-boxes were introduced in the electoral process, there was a decrease in fraudulent activities that were possible before, such as changing ballots to different boxes, or altering partial results in each electoral section[1]. Moreover, the EMB must have an active campaign explaining citizens how the ICT-solutions will be strengthening the system.
[1] Filho Brunazo, Amilcar. "Voto Electrónico - Las nuevas tecnologías en los procesos electorales". 2005: http://www.brunazo.eng.br/voto-e/textos/CIPPEC-Brunazo.htm
Security
The security of a results process encompasses a broad range of considerations and actions. An EMB would often include the following considerations in its security plan for the results system:
Today there exist numerous security features to control access to and movement of sensitive material. The more common features are barcoding voting station kits prior to distribution for proper tracking, plastic security seals with unique numbers to detect unauthorized access to sensitive material while in transit, use of tamper evident bags to transport completed results forms and ballots when not resealed in a ballot box. While materials are in the voting station, sensitive material is always in the custody of the authorized election officials and often, translucent ballot boxes locked with uniquely numbered security seals. In centralized counting facilities or results aggregating centres access control is instrumental for the security of the facility. This is valid for personnel, materials, as well as vehicles. Depending on the threat level, various measurements are taken to ensure safety, such as compulsory ID card checks, metal detectors, mandatory searches of all vehicles and material prior to entry to the compound. Inside the facility, only authorized personnel is in charged of movement of sensitive material. The chain of custody is as follows: check-in, temporary storage, quarantine area, counting or aggregation and permanent storage (see chain of custody for additional details). In other societies the major security concern could be related to the data system and communications systems used to transmit, tabulate, aggregate and release results. As such, extensive security features such as firewalls, preparations for denial-of-service attacks are performed, strict use of passwords enforces, and encrypted data communications are introduced.
Regular offsite backups of data are another method to avoid catastrophic loss of data due to hacking, flooding, fire or malfunctioning hardware.
One of the more difficult security risks facing an EMB is the protection of its staff members. Election Commissioners, the Chief Election Officer and a handful of other key permanent officials of the EMB can often be enveloped by a security umbrella, but an EMB often employs hundreds of permanent staff and tens of thousands of temporary workers during peak season. Election officials, or a close family member, are all susceptible to threats or intimidation. Procedures and actions to be taken in such a case could form an integral part of the mandatory training all election officials receive, irrespective of their position in the organization.
Professionalism
EMBs have come to recognize that one of their most valuable assets is its staff. However, it can also be its weakest link, as even the best laid plan utilizing the simples forms and most user-friendly technologies risk failing of the staff is not properly trained and motivated.
For a long time, EMBs primarily focused its training to voting station and counting officials, as they were expected to conduct their duties and responsibilities in a professional manner. They should be thoroughly trained in the counting process, as distinct from the voting process; thorough in their procedures; and committed to treating electoral materials with care and respect. However, as the requirements for what constitutes a credible election results processes have grown so has the staffing categories expected to display professionalism when executing their respective duties. In addition, as new technologies are introduced into the electoral process, greater emphasis could be put on the computer literacy skills of staff recruited. Traditionally, older, more experienced election workers lack the computer and smart phone literacies, while younger more technology literate recruits lack the electoral experience. In order to meet the increasing demands put on election officials (both permanent and ad hoc workers) training programs need to be more sophisticated and specialized. Subsequently, extensive preparations by the EMB are required to meet the expanding training demands.
Awareness of the electoral process in general and knowledge of the task at hand are two important traits of a professional election official. However, once a person accepts work as a counting official, he or she must be also non-partisan throughout the entire process. Some jurisdictions require that all election officials sign an oath to this effect, creating awareness that they can be legally prosecuted if their work or conduct is proved to be partisan, or if they violate laws, regulations and the EMB’s code of conduct. The oath should also include a confidentiality clause that ensures that sensitive information and the identity of voters is not divulged. Having a signed code of conduct on record, can be particularly important when investigation accusation of malfeasance by an election official (see Integrity subsection below for additional information).
Accuracy
Accuracy of the election result is directly related to the integrity of the count, tabulation and aggregation process. Later discovery of errors and correction of mistakes can lead to accusations of malpractices or even fraud.
The accuracy of the count will depend on clear procedures and manuals, correct software programs and communications system that are properly tested, adequate staff training, appropriate checks and balances, and officials' commitment to the process. Clear audit trails of ballots, ballot boxes, statement of result and tabulation forms, as well as checking and rechecking mechanisms, will contribute to the accuracy of the results. Whilst ICT solutions may enhance accuracy, this must be balanced against the resulting apparent loss of transparency.
Secrecy
Secrecy of the vote is important because it ensures that voters cannot be victimised for the way they vote, or intimidated into voting in a particular way. To preserve the secrecy of the vote, a voters' identity should never be linked to his/her choice. However, in a voting station with a very small number of registered voters, the secrecy of the vote can easily be violated, should they all vote for the same party.
If the secrecy of the vote of individuals or a community is a concern, measures such as counting at counting centres, rather than at individual voting stations, or mixing ballots from different voting stations, can be considered. Sequentially numbered ballot papers corresponding to matching stubs with the voter details compromise secrecy and are best avoided. However for audit purposes, it is sufficient if ballot papers and counterfoils are printed with the numerical range contained in the booklet of ballot papers in question and, thus, avoid violating the secrecy of the vote. Alternatively, if numbers are used, they could also be random on ballot stub and ballot paper – but matched in a database only available to EMB and judicial authorities.
Timeliness
EMBs need to cater to two distinct yet intertwined processes: tabulation and reporting. Each of these must generate timely election results. Delays in completing the count and in the release of unofficial preliminary results, and subsequent final results, can negatively affect the level of integrity and confidence in the voting process.
The responsible Electoral Management Body should carefully plan all stages of the counting process to facilitate the early announcement of results, or at least to realistically assess when results can be announced, taking into consideration the communications and transport infrastructure.
However, it is instrumental that EMBs are not pressured into releasing results prematurely. The EMBs must give themselves sufficient time to properly transmit, tabulate and check results before releasing both interim and final results. In order to manage such expectations, EMBs must clearly and repeatedly reinforce the expected timeline for release of results during the lead up to Election Day, as well as informing voters if the process is going according to schedule, or if the schedule has changed.
Accountability
Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the election results process are important. The legal electoral framework and the EMB’s own Code of Conduct outline the general responsibilities that all election officials must adhere to. The Terms of Reference for each position clarifies in more detail what is expected of individual officers, as do procedures and regulations governing the various stages of the results system. All election officials have a duty of care responsibility.
At the national level, the EMB should be accountable for ensuring that all necessary preparations are completed and the results system put in place is suitable for the tasks at hand. At the electoral district level, it may be a senior election officer or commission official who is accountable for ensuring that the results process is operationalized within their respective area of responsibility.
At voting stations and centralized counting/tabulation facilities, specified officers may be responsible for voting, counting and tabulation. The very same is the case for transportation, of sensitive results related material, communication of interim and final results. Clearly defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may include political party liaison committees, conflict management and resolution bodies and legal structures.
Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon and known in advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international electoral observers. If a results form is incorrectly completed by a voting station and the deficiency spotted during tabulation, unambiguous and well-known procedures as who and how corrections can be made must be in place in order to avoid accusations of tampering with the results tabulation by the EMB (for additional information regarding this very topic, see the 2008 Kriegler report on the 2007 Kenyan elections). Thus, clear audit trails are essential to ensure accountability.
Uniformity
Uniformity means that all rules and regulations treat all voters equally and are applied equally to all voters and stakeholders. Ensuring uniformity across the entire country would require that all officials making up the results management system are well trained and non-partisan, as well as the EMB has an effective command and control capability in place to supervise compliance. The presence of political party representatives and candidate representatives, and observers will help to ensure that various steps of the results system are conducted in a fair and correct manner.
Integrity
The credibility of the results management system is directly related to the integrity of the entire results generating process, and not just the count itself. Subsequently EMBs must make every effort to safeguard the integrity of the results management system by pro-actively combat electoral fraud risks, as well as systemic manipulation and electoral malpractices (See Chad Vickery and Erica Schein (2012) for additional information). By conducting a comprehensive fraud risk assessment of the results management system the EMB will be better positioned to identify potential vulnerabilities. Based on the identified fraud risks, the EMB will be able to rank the risks based on the plausibility of the vulnerability occurring and potential impact if it takes place. This ranking will be an important instrument and effectively guide the EMB as it develops a fraud risk control plan enabling it to deter, detect and overcome fraud risks (For additional information see Darnolf 2011).
However, all EMB officials and officers also have an individual duty to protect the integrity of the results process and could be held responsible for unintentional breaches of their duty of care. If they have been negligent and violated the code of conduct, or the rules and regulations of which they have been trained they may have committed malpractice. EMBs are therefore often recommended to introduce a Code of Conduct and integrate the duty of care concept in the induction training of all its officers, irrespective if they are Commissioners or ad hoc poll workers.
Chain of Custody
A chain of custody is instrumental when adjudicating a challenge to the election results. The EMB must therefore handle its sensitive election material in such a way that the chain of custody is not compromised while moving or storing physical evidence from the time it is obtained until the time it is presented in court.
Election authorities often utilize a special form logging the movement of election material from the central warehouse to the voting station in question. Based on such a form, authorities will know who was in possession of the material during any stage of the process. EMBs use the same system for retrieval of the material from a voting station to its storage facility, as well as to the counting/tabulation facility where applicable. One of the main challenges to the chain of custody is often experienced at central counting and tabulation facilities.
Inside the facility, movement of sensitive material from check-in, temporary storage, potential quarantine area, counting or aggregation, and permanent storage is to be performed only by authorized personnel and properly documented. In some cases where sensitive materials and ID cards are barcoded, a log is established by using hand-held scanners. Alternatively, procedures identifying who is authorized to obtain, and how to move, materials from the various areas of the facility is to be established. A log sheet should clearly identify the person who signed for the material in question. A similar procedure is used for the return of material.
