At all levels of the results tabulation process, procedures and logistics should be carefully planned for receiving results from several locations at the same time. The tabulation exercise should ensure transparency, accuracy and minimize risks of tampering with results forms, or genuine mistakes by enforcing clear instructions based on an effective staff training program and close supervision of the results-generating exercise.
A form with spaces for pre-printed information needed during vote result collection should be provided to staff answering the phone. In addition, a procedure requiring the recipient of the results to read back the results received to the sender for confirmation would reduce the error rate considerably.
Depending on the level of technology used for results tabulation, various tools could be utilized to enhance transparency. A wall chart, large white board, or computer spreadsheet projected on screen listing each voting station could be completed as the results come in. Once all the information for each election is received, the combined result for the entire electoral district should be updated. Best international practice indicates that both aggregated results and results by voting stations be transmitted to the next level, as this will enable party agents and observer to track individual statements of votes throughout the entire results-generating process, without which the transparency requirement has not been met.
National Level
At the national level, the same type of logistics should be used, but on a larger scale. Data communications are easier at the national level and therefore more commonly used. Since the information needed is often already in electronic format, it can help to speed up the process for data entry, as well as enabling pre-developed software checks and manual verification on received results data. Also, both aggregated results and by voting stations are pro-actively shared with party representatives, observers and media at the national level.
Even when results are received from local levels in electronic format, the EMB cannot accept the results at face value. A first quality control check is done to verify if the results appear to be correct. Data should be checked for mathematical correctness, but the software used often includes triggers requiring closer scrutiny by senior EMB official before cleared for inclusion. Triggers could be set off by unusually high voter turnout or unprecedented results in favor of one party. A more exhaustive quality control checking procedure for each electoral district and its voting stations, will need to be done when the actual statement of votes forms arrive and are compiled prior to release of final results.
If a country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be available when they are needed to compile the national interim results.
For interim results, all types of ballots (if possible) should be included to avoid any major discrepancy between interim results and final results.
Special ballots, write-in ballots, mail ballots, as well as ballots cast on ordinary voting, advance voting, and mobile voting should be part of the count for interim results.
Depending on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few days prior to Election Day, or after the close of voting on Election Day. If the latter is the case, then the counting procedure should be designed carefully, so it will still be possible to include special ballot results in the interim results.
For the special ballots (mail and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed forces, etc. Different coloured envelopes will facilitate the sorting by category.
For mail ballots, three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code and signature of the voter or other administrative information), and a secrecy envelope containing the ballot.
After verification of proper registration and no previous voting having been taken, and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot box with its ballot still inside.
If the special ballots are counted a few days prior to Election Day, the results should be securely kept and only released at the close of the election. In some jurisdictions special ballots are counted after the Election Day, and in others, on Election Day.
If advanced-voting takes place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each day, but the ballot choices are not counted. The number of ballots must match the number of voters of each day. This reconciliation measure is done to create an audit trail of ballot usage.
The advance vote ballot boxes are then kept safely until voting day, and counting should take place at an office of the electoral management body at the closing time of the ordinary voting. The counting of advance voting ballots should be done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for ordinary voting.
Counting for mobile voting stations may take place at the last place visited, or at an office of the electoral management body. To count the votes of incarcerated voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied, but, of course, this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated or imprisoned voters takes place prior to Election Day.
If ballot boxes and results are delivered simultaneously (i.e. where telephones, fax etc. are not available), the local office of the electoral management body should carefully plan the reception of the ballot boxes and the results.
Planning must ensure that provision is made for all the ballot boxes and results arriving at the same time. First, to respect the order of arrival, a receiving official could immediately give a number to the person arriving from a voting station with the ballot box and the results.
Then, in chronological order, the identity of each delivery person should be verified, the voting station identified, and the results should immediately be taken and placed in a specified area ready to be compiled.
The receiving official should then verify the ballot box, and the authenticity of its seals, and prepare a receipt for the person who delivered the materials, as well as one for the electoral management body. If the receiving officer has concerns regarding the ballot box and/or the statement of votes form, the voting station material should be quarantined for further investigation. An especially dedicated team of EMB officials trained for such a task should before this duty. The ballot box should then be removed from the reception area and be placed in a secure storage room where more detailed verification can be done.
Use of Technology
Telephones, SMS and fixed or mobile internet technologies are widely used in the transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting results, such systems should include authentication of the users and similar security protocols. In some systems, only pre-authorized cell phones can be used to transmit results. This is an efficient way to avoid unauthorized people reporting false results.
As a general rule, all data transmitted should be encrypted and communication should use appropriate protocols. The use of encryption and protocols allows us to enhance the integrity of data in three ways:
For all types of transmission, the systems must be tested prior to voting day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they will encounter on election night. A technical specialist should also be available at any time, in case of system failure. A contingency back-up system should also be created, tested, and fully available.
