It seems that Madagascar is in the process of discussing the format of the ballot papers for the next Presidential elections.
In the discussion, two options are being debated:
What are the advantages and disadvantages of these two solutions?
As with all electoral design options, it is important to begin by establishing the criteria which should be used to judge the appropriateness of the system chosen. When it comes to ballot paper design, voter understanding, easiness of voting, voting integrity, cost and compatibility with election legislation are some criteria which can be used to guide the decision.
Many times the criteria chosen as important will contradict each other and - before choosing - it is up to the designer to prioritise the criteria and look at country's specific contextual factors.
There is no single answer to the question of which form the ballot papers should take; but certain advantages and disadvantages with the different options can be identified:
In addition to the individual advantages and disadvantages, it is also important to remember that any change in ballot paper design from previous elections will carry with it the need for significant voter education efforts in due time before the election.
“Electoral management bodies need to take into account a range of issues when designing the ballot paper. A general principle underpinning any design is that the simpler the ballot paper the more effective. Ballot paper design has an impact on two important aspects of the election process:
Helena Alves: I believe that before discussing the design, the first thing it is to establish criteria to judge the design choice that fits Madagascar voting needs. In fact, the ACE Ballot paper design file sets up the general criteria to follow on the choice of ballot paper.
So, a possible choice of criteria for Madagascar might be:
Jerome Leyraud: Maria-Helena provided you with an exhaustive list of criteria to be looked at when deciding which ballot system to introduce. There is no a single answer to the question and fierce discussions may go for ever between electoral practitioners on what the best system is, if any!
However, in an attempt to contextualize the matter, I would like to bring to your attention shortcomings of the multi-ballot system identified in previous electoral exercises in Madagascar.
Madagascar inherited from the French Administration the use of different ballot papers for each candidate. As far as I can remember, in the 2002 polls, candidates had to supply the Ministry of Interior with ballot papers to be delivered to the Administration (4 prefectures and/or 18 sous-prefectures). The number of ballot papers requested by the Administration far exceeded what was required, hence resulted in an undue extra-cost for candidates.
The late validation of candidates by the Constitutional Court (HCC) obliged the candidates to postpone the printing of their ballot papers until the very last moment, resulting - first - in shortage of local printing facilities once the list of candidates were published (all candidates ordering printing of ballots to a limited number of local printing companies) and - second - in a burdensome logistical dispatch of ballots by candidates countrywide just a few days before the elections.
It’s also worth mentioning that the provision of a multi-ballot system may facilitate some types of polling mishandlings (opportune loss of opposition candidate ballots, for instance) and political control of balloting (through direct intimidation to choose the right ballot before entering the booth, or more “subliminal-type” indications such as different ballot piles, or wasted ballots - although regulations usually require the dustbin should be emptied regularly).
There is indeed a long list of malpractices related to multi ballot systems although single ballot system doesn’t necessary provide a secured alternative to such wrongdoings.
In Africa, a lot of countries having inherited the multi ballot system have resisted the introduction of single balloting practices with ambiguous arguments, including voter customary practices, better understanding of ballot use and voting procedures, budget constraints (when candidates are asked to supply ballots), all relevant arguments (to be assessed) but that also may cover hidden agendas.
I would therefore suggest adding to the overall assessment, as presented by Maria-Helena, the risk factor:
Michael Maley: Thanks for your question - always interesting. I've benefited from reading the responses from Helena and Jerome, and would only add a few points.
First, the question didn't identify exactly how option two would work, and it's a critical issue. In practice, it would be extremely risky just to give voters a handful of ballots, and ask them to put one in the box and return the rest. Under such a scheme, there would be no mechanism for validating the single ballot the voter chose to deposit as one which had been validly issued, and it would be difficult to prevent excess ballot papers from being taken out of the polling station. Taken together, these factors would greatly increase the opportunities for ballot box stuffing.
The scheme of this type which I encountered previously, in Malawi, involved issuing the voter with a ballot envelope, into which the ballot paper for the voter's chosen candidate was placed. As part of a project to facilitate a revision of the electoral process in Malawi, a conference was held in Mangochi in February 1995, with support from IFES, at which a paper was put forward by the Electoral Commission of Malawi which contained a discussion of the multiple and single ballot alternatives, and which argued for a shift to a single ballot.
The relevant text from the paper, and the record of the discussion which flowed from it, are in the attached document. The last intervention in the discussion, from the Army Commander, made a considerable impact at the time, and carried the day: the Conference endorsed the proposed shift to a single ballot paper. At some point between February 1995 and now - I'm not sure when - Malawi made the shift.
The other more recent example which may be of interest arose in the Solomon Islands. Elections up to that of 2001 used a multiple ballot box system, which required the voter to deposit an unmarked ballot paper (in effect a token) into a ballot box corresponding to the candidate of his or her choice; the system gave rise to extensive opportunities for vote buying.
For the April 2006 election, a system using a single marked ballot paper – in effect, your option 1 - was adopted. The change had been recommended by observers following the 2001 election, and was strongly supported by civil society, and by the media. It was preceded by an extensive civic and voter education campaign, worked very well in practice, and was widely seen as a significant enhancement of the electoral process.
Horacio Boneo: I fully agree with Jerome and Michael’s criticisms of the multiple ballot scheme. We use it here in Argentina, with a few variants. The ballots are left on separate piles for each candidate on a table in a closed room where voters pick up the ballot of their choice, place it in the signed envelope provided by the polling station authorities and drop it in the ballot box which is outside the room in front of the polling station authorities.
Parties are required to print their ballots according to certain norms, using part of publicly provided funds, which leaves to them the estimates of how many ballot they would need (smaller parties almost always print a limited number of ballots).
This involves leaving the voters alone with the ballot papers, which is an egregious breach of security logic, and the main activity of the party agents is to ask permission every few voters to get inside the room and check if there are enough ballots for their candidate. Candidates not represented by party agents are therefore at a disadvantage. If a voter cannot find the ballot for his/her candidate, s/he has to tell the polling station authorities that there are not ballots for all candidates – remembering not to mention the party for which ballots are missing – if they do that, their vote can be challenged by the party agents present.
Therefore, and just to be on the safe side, parties provide their loyals with ballots so that they can place it on the ballot even if ballots are missing from the table. All in all, a very messy and inconvenient system.
The main advantage of multiple ballots is that they are (at least in my country) produced in very cheap newsprint paper and can be printed using rotative printing machines. Therefore, ballots are very cheap and can be printed very quickly. As they are so cheap, most parties use them during their campaign, distributing them as flyers to the voters.
The only problem when you change form one system to other, as Michael points out, is that it is essential to make a huge investment in voter education.
Alan Wall: I'd add my agreement to the points made by Jerome, Michael and Horacio on the potential integrity and other shortcomings associated with using a separate ballot paper for each candidate.
Similar problems to the ones they raise have been noted in other countries - such as Burundi.
Stina Larserud: Given the events after the elections in 2001 where both major candidates contested the results and claimed victory it seems election integrity is a salient issue in Madagascar and should be paid special attention to for the 2006 elections.
It may therefore be of vital importance to examine and assess the risks and particularities of fraud (real and perceived alike) in Madagascar and have those assessments guide the ballot paper choice. While it is easy to think of ways in which option 2 can be misused (though none of the available ballot design options guarantees that no fraudulent activities will be carried out as Jerome pointed out), there are ways in which these risks can be limited.
Important measures include:
