This question is posted by ACE on behalf of PN member Piang Yow Wong.

 

Original Question:

This question is about boundary delimitation issues in Malaysia. We seek PN members' advice on how to address the following issue:

 

• As a result of large differences in constituency size, the value of votes is not equal across constituencies. For instance, a vote from the smallest constituency, Putrajaya (15,791 electors) is worth nearly 9 times the vote of the largest constituency, Kapar (144,369 electors). 
• We have analysed the maps and discovered that constituency size can be quite easily re-balanced to within +/- 20% of the average. 

 

With this in mind, 

 

1. What steps can we take to persuade the Election Commission to consider our studies and offer  better balanced constituencies?
2. Should the Election Commission refuse to consider our proposals or consider and reject them, is there any remedial action that we can take?

 

The following Google document might answer some questions: https://docs.google.com/a/tindakmalaysia.com/document/d/1Ua6tF7zL6zS8PA0O2YdaQ6kY7tTUQ2zESK6WiJlmvvc/edit?usp=sharing

Those who wish to access it may require approval from me (google's standard procedure). An email request will be sent to me and I will grant access ASAP.

 

Thank you for your kind assistance,

PY Wong

 

Question 

Boundary delimitation resulting in disproportionate representation is an issue common in democratic states that, if extensive enough, can cause a breakdown in the democratic legitimacy of the offending state. In Malaysia, the misbalance in constituency representation is protracted to the point that a vote from the smallest constituency, Putrajaya (15,791 electors) is worth nearly 9 times the vote of the largest constituency, Kapar (144,369 electors). Malaysian political scientists have conducted an analysis on the boundary delimitation maps and discovered that constituency areas could potentially be re-drawn into +/- 20% of the average: a marked improvement from before.

 

Therefore, the question:

 

What steps can Malaysian citizens and political scientists take to persuade the Election Commission to consider the study and offer more balanced constituencies?

 

What actions can Malaysians take if their re-drawing proposal is refused?

 

Summary of Replies

Members of the Practitioners' Network were encouraged to provide guidance on the issue based on their geographic areas of expertise, first on the value of fair boundary delimitation, and subsequently on ways to address grievances to the government of Malaysia.

            Boundary Delimitation Suggestions

• During boundary delimitation, strict attention should be paid to both the geographic variables of land area and the demographic factors of population density and living space, as was done during the delimitation of Côte d'Ivoire.
• Consider a specialized technical group of experts to work with Parliament to facilitate specialized boundary delimitation. In Mexico, the IME (their EMB) uses a mathematical and computerized system based on a Heuristic Model with 10 criteria: for example, legal factors, social factors, administrative factors, etc.
• India recently utilized GIS maps to combat disproportionate representation. Prior to delimitation reform, one parliamentary constituency comprised of 350,000 population while another one had 3,400,000. In the recent delimitation exercise all the seven constituency of Delhi were re-drawn to represent equal population with variation of +/- 10%.
• Focus on delimitation based on set of internationally-accepted standards of political and social factors, as Kenya did during their delimitation reforms prior to the March 2013 general elections.  

            Suggestions for Successful Lobbying

•  Conduct an argumentative advocacy campaign based on international standards to raise awareness. Participate in the public forum.
• Check if the Electoral Commission of Malaysia has complied with the relevant stipulations relating to delimitation of constituencies. If the Commission is not in compliance, the issue is whether any interested entity, individual or political party, has the proper locus standi with respect to this issue before the court to compel the Commission to act.
• Seek an audience with the EMB through memorandums or appointments.

 

Countries Studied

• Côte d'ivoire
• Mexico
• India
• Kenya
• Malaysia

 

Contributing Members

• Sinisa Bencun
• Marguerite Yoli-Bi Kone
• Deyanira Galindo
• Carl Dundas
• Noor Mohammad
• Piang Yow Wong
• Jesus Antonio Castellanos Vasquez
• Immaculate Njenge

 

External Sources

• Castellanos, Jesus (2004). The Electoral Administration in Venezuela and new challenges arising from the Constitution of 1999. Specialized Publications CAPEL of www.iidh.ed.cr
• Jaramillo, Juan and Tickner, Arlene (1999). Colombia II, The Long Road to the renewal of the policy. Electoral Systems in the Andean countries. (Mechanisms, effects and alterations). Andean Parliament, Bogotá
• http://www.bridge-project.org/en/curriculum/979-modules/970-boundary-delimitation-synopsis.html

Dear friend,

 

First of all, it is important who is "we", in terms of your legal eligibility to propose amendments on election legislation. However, you  have many arguments on your side to argue with election decision makers (El. Commission, the parliament), and to start advocacy campaign to get more supporters. The first point is the international standards that you can reffer to, saying the acceptable +-% of number of voter discrepancies between the constituencies. Have in mind (even you say it is easy to re-balance) that this is not only relevant - other issues like current administrative units, geographical zones and coherent links inside of consituency are very important as well. Sometimes, due to constitutional provisions or equal ethnical representation in the e.g. parliament, higher dicrepances between vote value are acceptable, but the sample you are saying is really dramatic.

 

In the end, constituency borders are the subject of decision makers, and there is no mehanizm to force them to do it. But you can asses the providions against international standards. Argumented advocacy can give result. Good luck with your future actions!

 

Looking forward to assist you more if possible,

 

Siniša Bencun.

Que dit la électorale de votre pays sur les modifications de ce genre? Si la loi d'être modifiée , il faut faire le plaidoyer auprès des parlementaires si cela ne marche pas avec la commission électorale. Dans tous les cas il faudra bien faire l'analyse et y montrer le bien fondé de cette modification pour tous surtout les politiques. Utiliser des variables précis comme la superficie, la densité de la population et les espaces habités pour faire le découpage avec un pourcentage pour chaque variable. C'est ce que nous faisons en Côte d'ivoire.

Que dit la électorale de votre pays sur les modifications de ce genre? Si la loi d'être modifiée , il faut faire le plaidoyer auprès des parlementaires si cela ne marche pas avec la commission électorale. Dans tous les cas il faudra bien faire l'analyse et y montrer le bien fondé de cette modification pour tous surtout les politiques. Utiliser des variables précis comme la superficie, la densité de la population et les espaces habités pour faire le découpage avec un pourcentage pour chaque variable. C'est ce que nous faisons en Côte d'ivoire.

Que dit la électorale de votre pays sur les modifications de ce genre? Si la loi d'être modifiée , il faut faire le plaidoyer auprès des parlementaires si cela ne marche pas avec la commission électorale. Dans tous les cas il faudra bien faire l'analyse et y montrer le bien fondé de cette modification pour tous surtout les politiques. Utiliser des variables précis comme la superficie, la densité de la population et les espaces habités pour faire le découpage avec un pourcentage pour chaque variable. C'est ce que nous faisons en Côte d'ivoire.

As mentioned above, it is very difficult to give an opinion because it all depends on the country's legislation, and from there what institutions are in charge to modify the current legislation.

A fact is that it is important to consider a specialized and technical group on the boundary delimitation in order to provide the appropriate popular representation. This group should consider to be integrated as well with parliamentarians, and specialized scientists, academics (mathematicians, computer or ICT's expertes) and even orgnizations from the civil society.

In Mexico, INE (our EMB) has the attributions to redraw the electoral boundaries every ten years, however, prior to the period several seminars and working groups are developed among different specialists and the political parties are involved in every step.

In Mexico is used the Heuristic Model and 10 criteria are used to develop a mathematical and computerized system to run the best model with a +/- 15% of difference. The criteria are: Legal factors: The Constitution establishes 300 uninominal districts and 200 plurinominal (five regions: 40 seats per region); The Constitution mandates that even the smallest states (Mexico is a Federal Republic divided into 32 entities) must have at least two seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Lower Chamber) and 4 Senators per state. Social factor: the boundaries delimitation must consider the Census (every ten years) and the distribution of the population; the indigenous communities must be drew concentrated in order to be represented at Congress (at least 10% of Mexico's population is indigenous); Political and administrative factors: in order to avoid gerrymandering or to favor a political party, the electoral boundaries must be as polygonal shaped possible; the administrative and municipal/states boundaries must be respected; the geographical characteristics (mountains, rivers) and the infrastructure must be considered, all these in order to have continuity.

The electoral district boundaries delimitation are very important because they are the concrete mechanism for social and political representation, and to the EMB is very useful in order to plan and organize the logistics for the electoral process: where to set the polling stations, main communication infrastructure for the material distribution; how much material and type of material is required for each polling station, and very importantly to update and validate the electoral roll.

It is important to mention that in Canada have similar mechanisms to draw electoral boundaries, like it is based in the census and cartography, they also have a polygonal shaped boundary drawing system and the have a range of +/-25% of difference due to the territory's extension.

Finally, I want to extend an invitation to participate in the International Center for Electoral Training and Research (CICIE) by its acronym in Spanish) which promotes the exchange of knowledge and practices among electoral authorities and strategic stakeholders of the electoral democratic system. I will attache a file on CICIE's international cooperation program.

The electoral legislative scheme, including the constitutional provisions relating to elections, if any, is the key to check if the Electoral Commission of Malaysia has complied with the relevant stipulations relating to delimitation of constituencies. If the Commission is not in compliance, the issue is whether any interested entity, individual or political party, has the proper locus standi with respect to this  issue before the court to compel the Commission to act. Perhaps the issue may be non-justiceable so far as the courts are concerned and the remedy may be political action.

The tolerance range above the average (total population or total electorate divided by the number of constituencies) should be between 5% and 10% to meet best electoral practices, although there are some notable exceptions , including Canada and Jamaica, where the tolerance level above and below exceed best practices levels significantly.   

Such a situation arose in daily state in India recently. One parliamentary constituency namely Chandni Chowk comprised of 350,000 population while another one had 3400,000. In the recent delimitation exercise all the seven constituency of Delhi were re-drown to represent equal population with variation of +/- 10%.

 In addition, GIS maps were used to ensure that no Gerrymandering could be possible. 

Thank you for all the responses. I am attaching the document that appears in google doc for your convenience.

Our Delimitation is governed by the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, which you can see in pages 11 to 13 of the attachment.

Part I covers the principles of Delimitation and

Part II covers the process for Delimitation Hearings.

The key principles are in Section 2(c): the number of electors within each constituency in a State ought to be approximately equal except that, having regard to the greater difficulty of reaching electors in the country districts and the other disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such constituencies;

i. Approximately equal,

ii. Weightage for area to be given for rural constituencies because of greater difficulty of reaching elector and other disadvantages facing rural constituencies.

 

We have a few problems here:

1. There is no description of what are the disadvantages facing rural constituencies.

2, This document was drawn up around 1962 when mobile phones have not been invented. With the ubiquitous availability of hand-phones today (We have more handphones that people in Malaysia), the issue of greater difficulty of reaching the elector should no longer be valid.

From the above, the EMB came up with a table on page 13 classifying the seats into 3 categories - urban (more than 60,000 electors), semi-urban (30,000 - 59,000) and rural (<30,000). For the ongoing Delimitation exercise in Sarawak (our largest State on the Borneo Island), this is what was recommended by the EMB:

Smallest Parliament seat, P207 Igan - 18,082 electors and largest Parliamentary seat P195 Bandar Kuching - 18,394 electors. This ratio is 434%.

 

We are unable to understand the justification for such a large variation in the seat sizes.

 

Currently, the EMB only produce hard copies of the electoral maps, which unfortunately are of very poor qualify. We know that the EMB has digital maps. We have requested for their release for public scrutiny. Unfortunately, the response has not been positive. To produce our own digital copies, we had to manually digitize all the polling districts, one by one. After three years of hard work, we are now able to produce digital copies of the EC maps. A sample based on jpg format is shown http://www.tindakmalaysia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Persempadanan-Rakyat-Delimitation-Proposals-.pdf

We are in the process of producing maps for all the Parliamentary and State constituencies in digital format which we expect to be ready when the EMB launches the Delimitation exercise for the rest of Malaysia.

 

 

 

Sr. Yow Wong

   La delimitación de circunscripciones electorales es un tema técnico pero también político. No queda duda de lo vasto de la literatura sobre los efectos del tamaño de los distritos en la proporcionalidad, la construcción sesgada de las circunscripciones (Gerrymandering), incluso de la desproporción de número de electores en las distintas circunscripciones, sean están uninominales o plurinominales, variable denominada Malapportionment, también  llamada Clave de Representación (Jaramillo y Tickner 1999; 57).

  La existencia de malapportionment o inequilibrio en el número de electores por circunscripción pone en riesgo uno de los principios fundamentales de toda elección democrática, a saber:  "one man, one vote, one value", o lo que es lo mismo, las elecciones iguales, que significa que todos los ciudadanos con derecho al voto, sin distingo, tienen el mismo peso electoral.

  La determinación de los criterios de construcción de circunscripciones electorales puede ser producto de voluntad de política ya sea del ente legislador, el administrador de elecciones o de ambos. También lo es la ejecución como tal. La recomendación en este caso es alertar a los entes responsables y al país en general sobre el riesgo de vicios y de no transparencia y eficiencia de una la elección si esta posee fallas significativas en la elaboración de los distritos electorales.

   Dicho esto me permito citar un breve análisis de mi autoría sobre las circunscripciones electorales, en el marco de la experiencia venezolana (Castellanos 2004;7) . A título introductorio diré que desde el año 1992 se estableció en Venezuela un sistema combinado dependiente, denominado de representación proporcional personalizada, similar al alemán, el cual contemplaba para Diputados al  Congreso Nacional y a las Asambleas Legislativas de los Estados (legislativos subnacionales) la existencia de dos votos, uno para circunscripciones uninominales mayoritario y otro por una lista cerrada y bloqueada a nivel del Estado. (Para la elección de los Concejos Municipales, el sistema electoral fue una variante del sistema de representación proporcional personalizada).

    .            .."Circunscripciones Electorales. Hasta 1988 las circunscripciones electorales eran conforme a la división político territorial; es a partir de 1992 cuando efectivamente se elaboran por primera vez los circuitos electorales (circunscripciones artificiales uninominales) para la elección de Concejales municipales, como consecuencia de la aplicación del sistema electoral de representación proporcional personalizada, y considerado similar al sistema electoral alemán; tal construcción debió ajustarse no solo a los diferentes tipos y ámbitos geográficos de elección (de Concejales, en 1992 y 1995; de Diputados al Congreso, en 1993 y; de Diputados a las Asambleas Legislativas, en 1993 y 1995) sino a la estipulación de variantes criterios, desde los iniciales en las Elecciones Regionales de 1992 (continuidad, contigüidad y balance poblacional -con un margen de variación del 15%), pasando por unos más complejos en las Elecciones Nacionales de 1993 (además de la continuidad y contigüidad, se exigía un balance poblacional y electoral de tan solo un 5% de variabilidad), hasta llegar a unos más flexibles, en las Elecciones Regionales de 1995 (como consecuencia de las dificultades estructurales y a efectos de tratar de satisfacer una opinión pública abiertamente en contra, se mantuvieron las constantes, y se accedió en casos excepcionales a aumentar el margen de variabilidad poblacional y electoral en un 20%, con el voto favorable de las 2/3 de los integrantes del CSE, además de permitir la creación de centros de votación multicircuitales. Vale la pena destacar que en todos los casos estaba autorizada, a los fines eminentemente electorales y de acuerdo con el marco legal vigente, la trasgresión de la división territorial existente dependiendo de los tipos de elección; es decir para la elección de Diputados al Congreso y Asambleas Legislativas se facultaba la “ruptura” de municipios y parroquias, mientras que para el caso de Concejales, solo se limitaba al ámbito parroquial. Pese a los intentos de la institución electoral por demostrar la racionalidad y la no motivación partidista (gerrymandering) en la definición de las circunscripciones electorales, causas como la novedad de este tipo de construcciones, la heterogénea e inequitativa distribución poblacional y electoral, lo accidentado y no organizado desde el punto urbanístico de la geografía venezolana, además de la falta de credibilidad en la institución comicial, marcó el cuestionamiento constante y la desconfianza ante esta variable electoral"....  (El subrayado es mío)

De esto me permito rescatar lo siguiente:

1.- Los criterios más comunes para construir circunscripciones de forma técnica son la continuidad (cercanía) y contigüidad (no existencia de barreras naturales o artificiales dentro de la circunscripción). Pero no son suficientes

2.- Es fundamental definir un balance poblacional (número de habitantes) entre circunscripciones, con la salvedad que  si existen distribuciones significativamente distintas entre el número de habitantes y el número de electores, es necesario plantearse también un balance electoral. (Mientras más reducido es el margen de variabilidad más equitativo es, pero eso depende de múltiples factores, legales, institucionales, procedimientos, geográficos, de bases de datos existentes, etc.)

3.- Si no existen una distribución homogénea de habitantes (y de electores) en los diferentes ámbitos de la elección,  la construcción de circunscripciones será más compleja para el ente responsable de su elaboración. Constituye también un factor de complejidad la falta de información y la desorganización urbanística.

4.- Si bien la posibilidad de trasgredir algunos límites geográficos puede constituir una facilidad para la elaboración de las circunscripciones, no es menos cierto que también a mi juicio incrementan las posibilidades del gerrymandering

5.- Es importante también para el éxito de la construcción de las circunscripciones la credibilidad del ente electoral y el conocimiento público sobre el sistema electoral (incluido las circunscripciones).

 

       Castellanos, Jesús (2004). La Administración Electoral en Venezuela y los nuevos retos derivados de la Constitución de 1999. En Publicaciones Especializadas de CAPEL de www.iidh.ed.cr.

     Jaramillo, Juan y Tickner, Arlene (1999). II Colombia, El largo camino hacia la renovación de la política. En Sistemas Electorales en los países andinos. (Mecanismos, efectos y reformas). Parlamento Andino, Bogotá

 

 

 

 

 

 

Delimitation of Electoral Boundaries Kenyan's Experience;

Delimitation of boundaries in any country can be an extremely emotive issue that require serious thought and ownership by stakeholders. In the last 6 years, Kenya has undertaken a comprehensive boundaries delimitation that resulted in the delimitation of electorla boundaries divided into 290 Constituencies, 47 Counties, 1450 County Assemblies. This does not mean that all issues related to boundaries have been resolved. The electoral boundaries formed a basis for March 2013, general elections.
The Boundaries delimitation of constituencies and wards  boundaries was informed by the Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act 2008, Section 41c was a mandate of the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) which was specifically responsible for boundary delimitation. For boundaries review to be successful, its important for the EMB to adopt internationally accepted standards. These standard may differ from country to country. Some of the most accepted standards include political, economic and social factors. 
In the case of Kenya, the standard are dictated by the Constitution under Article 89 (5) which takes into account the population quota as the fundamental issue in boundaries delimitation.

 What steps can you take to persuade the Electoral Commission;

• Lobbying to ensure that the criteria on equal reprobation is included in the legislative or administrative framework on boundaries delimitation.

• Seek audience with the electoral commission either through a memorandum or an appointment.

• Participating the public forum that the commission will hold on the c=boundaries and sharing your thoughts as documented.

 

 

In my response of Mar 12, 2015, I entered some figures wrongly in paragraph 12. The correction is below. Apologies for the inconvenience.

 

Smallest Parliament seat, P207 Igan - 18,082 electors and largest Parliamentary seat P195 Bandar Kuching - 18,394 (correct figure: 78,394) electors. This ratio is 434%.

The EC completed their 2nd Proposal on Delimitation for the State of Sarawak. The dateline for Objections ended on 29th Apr 2015. It is found that they are still maintaining the gross malapportionment as in the past. Basically, they have designed it such that 33% of the rural voters can decide the Ruling Party.

 

Stampin Voters Object Again to SPR Electoral Re-delineation

Once again, 116 voters from P196 Stampin being dissatisfied with the SPR's work of delineating the electoral boundaries of the state of Sarawak, submitted their objections at the close of the period designated for objections to SPR's revised recommendations in the '2nd display' on the 30th March 2015.

Among the objections of the 116 registered voters were:

1. Although the proposed size of the Parliament of Stampin has decreased to 58,111 electors from 84732 during GE13, it is still 162.42% larger than the state's average of 35,779 voters (known as the electoral quotient - EQ) This decrease was at the expense of the neighbouring constituency of P195 Bandar Kuching whose total electorate has now grown from the already large 78,394 ( in SPR's first recommendation) to a whopping 81,992 (ie. 229% bigger than the EQ or 2.3 times the size of the ideal average constituency). This was due almost entirely to the proposed shifting of almost all of the polling districts under the state constituency of N11 Batu Lintang to Bandar Kuching. Hence the value of urban votes in Bandar Kuching as well as Stampin has been eroded by such a proposal. Bandar Kuching is now 4.53 times the size of the smallest parliamentary seat of P.207 Igan! Other large urban constituencies like Lanang, Sibu and Miri and Petra Jaya also did not get 'redrawn' in accordance to the criteria for delimitation of boundaries stated in the 13th Schedule of the Federal Constitution. As for state seats, N54 Pelawan is 4.67 times the size of the smallest state seat of N26. Gedong (new seat). Through these revised proposals, the SPR has further violated the universal democratic principle of ONE MAN ONE VOTE ONE VALUE.


2. Instead of alleviating the current levels of malapportionment the SPR's revised proposals has drastically aggravated it. An analysis of the state and parliamentary constituencies and its voter population as proposed by SPR arranged by size resulted in the following conclusion. One-third (1/3rd) of the voter population of Sarawak will be able to vote in 50% of ADUNs in the next state elections! Likewise, a mere 34% of the voters in Sarawak can vote in or elect 52% of the wakil rakyat and hence determine the outcome of the elections in the state. The bar charts below illustrates these points. According to SPR's recommendations 35 state seats (out of 82) whose voter population has an EQ deviation of -25% or more; illustrated by the short bars on the left side of the chart. Suffice to say that the rural votes are the kingmakers in the past elections and the ones to come if SPR continues to conduct the delimitation of boundaries according to its own standards and not following the rules set down in our constitution. See attached bar-graphs


3. The letter of objection also includes an alternative proposal for delineating Sarawak based on equalisation principles, for consideration by SPR. As it is not possible to implement "equalisation" principles in isolated constituencies like Stampin, this alternative proposal is intended to be an alternative proposal for all Parliamentary and State constituencies in the entire State of Sarawak. All seats are kept within a +/-25% band about the Electoral Quotient (EQ) for Parliament (PAR) and for State (DUN) Constituency. (Note: 100% = EQ. Electoral Quotient (EQ) refers to the value arrived at when the total number of voters in a state is divided by the number of constituencies for the state). It also takes into consideration administrative boundaries as well as physical and geographical features. The new parliamentary seat for Stampin would only have 43,688 voters.

More - http://sarawakrose.org/