The CNE should conduct an internal evaluation of the administration of the recall referendum process, make recommendations for legislation to ensure a transparent and swift process, respecting the intent of citizen petitioners as well as the rights of the potentially recalled official; protect individual privacy during verification and, as much as possible, signature collection

Perform an external, third-party audit of the Electoral Registry, analyzing alleged voter “migration”

Perform an election day audit of automated voting machines after poll closings; tally sheets should be printed before results transmission and all software/related certifications should be observed by parties and receive independent, third-party certification

Review the active participation of electoral security in the administration of the electoral process with the aim of stemming allegations of military intimidation or impeding the electoral process

The CNE should be more open to national and international observation, which will enhance confidence and help ensure transparency, integrity, and legitimacy of the process

Remove the paradigm break in the user interface for the null vote; the touchpad should include a separate button for “null vote,” which should be displaced and confirmed on the touch screen

Provide voters the option to cancel their votes if the receipt does not accurately reflect their choices

Reconsider the “two times, three minutes” policy for voters; voters should not lose the right to vote because they have difficulty navigating the technical system in use

Clarify physical security procedures and require consistent application; these measures should allow table authorities, poll workers, machine operators, and Plan Republican to more easily ensure physical security of machines and make the use of tamper-evident seals more meaningful

Consider using an independent certificate authority to issue the certifications securing the communications between voting machines and the tally, thus helping protect the central tally system from potential attacks

Negotiate complete audit procedures with political parties in advance

Provide complete, detailed system documentation to accredited auditors in advance so they may adequately prepare

During the hot audit, a comparison of the paper slip count to the machine printed precinct tally result should be mandatory; audited paper slip results should be analyzed by statistical procedures, with clear processes in case of discrepancies between paper and electronic results

Place increased emphasis on voter and poll worker education

Re-engineer the voting process to improve the flow of voters through polling sites; suggestions include adding more vote tabulating machines and reducing the number of voters per machine

Conduct timely, comprehensive simulations, testing all party of the automated process that are open for scrutiny by political parties, candidates, media, and observer groups

Adhere carefully to constitutional provisions for the nomination of National Electoral Council (CNE) directors

Handle appeals in a timely, impartial manner; the CNE should redouble its efforts to resolve pending cases and publish its decisions in the national media

The role of national observation is critical for the credibility of elections. The EU EOM recommends that the participation of national observation organisations in future processes be promoted. Similarly, it proposes that limitations on the number of observers that they can deploy be dropped, as long as they comply with the requirements that guarantee effective and independent work.

The EU EOM recommends that the CNE give greater priority to the sanctioning instruments for electoral crimes and faults as foreseen in the Basic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation and reflected in the regulations that it has adopted. Inasmuch as possible, the goal is to dissuade and punish the perpetration of such actions, before the end of the election campaign. The EU EOM further proposes that the participation of public servants in election campaign activities, be it voluntary or induced, be investigated and sanctioned, in accordance with Venezuelan law and international election practices. The exercise of the sanctioning powers, which the CNE is endowed with by law, would benefit the credibility and legitimacy of the Electoral Power, and of election processes per se.

Furthermore, the EU EOM recommends that at the designated closing time for voting centres on Election Day, only those voters that are queuing to vote at that moment be allowed to vote, and not those that join the queue afterwards. Such a measure would require amending existing legislation, and would put Venezuela in line with common practice in neighbouring countries and internationally; putting an end to the accusations of interested extended voting hours, which have been repeatedly heard in recent election processes, including the 2006 Presidential Elections, although in this case they were more subdued than in the past.

The EU EOM proposes that the CNE extend the period of the public testing campaigns of the voting machines right until a few days before to the elections. In this manner, it would help to familiarise voters with the technology and lead to a better understanding of the electronic voting system. The CNE could organise this voter education campaign together with national civil society organisations.

The EU EOM recommends that if the CNE decides to continue using the fingerprint readers in the future, it clearly defines and delimits their use as part of the voting process. In case of having sufficient fingerprint readers so as to incorporate them to all voting centres, and in accordance with the directive to develop the electronic voting system, as established by Venezuelan law, the readers could substitute the hard copy voter lists, as well as serving for the identification of voters, and the verification of their right to vote, providing that the current mistrust of the electorate and the political forces is overcome. They could also be used as a method to avoid multiple voting, accompanied by a really effective indelible ink. In the EU EOM’s opinion, these measures should be followed by a broad reaching public outreach campaign to eliminate the existing prejudices that exist among voters regarding the fingerprint readers. The Electoral Power, responsible for such a sovereign decision, should assess the economic costs of such a measure, and consider the need to provide far more technical training to Polling Station staff, which should be able to handle a more complex device than that which is in use at present.

The EU EOM observed that many of the problems that had been identified by various civil society organisations in the REP are due to the civil registration and ID Card system. For the CNE to win over the trust of the citizens in the electoral register, the integrity of both these systems must be ensured. To this end, it suggests that joint actions be organised between the offices responsible for the civil register, the electoral register, and the ID Cards to tidy, update, and restore the integrity of the respective databases in a synchronised manner.

Furthermore, the EU EOM recommends that the Venezuelan media adopt selfregulatory measures, to avoid the excessive partisan bias with which the majority cover the election campaign. Impartiality is a specific mandate enshrined in Venezuelan law and of exacting professional journalistic standards, and need not contradict the right of the private media to express openly and honestly the editorial line of their choice.