It is recommended that the ministry continues to improve the encryption model in order to further tighten the security and secrecy of the vote as well as to reduce complexity in set-up, configuration and testing.

It is recommended that strict separation of duties is defined and documented at all levels, and included in the electoral regulatory framework.

It is recommended to establish clear criteria for determining invalid votes in the electoral framework and that procedures are updated to ensure timely detection thereof.

In order to enhance the integrity of the overall internet voting process, it is recommended that the printing process of polling cards be further tested and improved, allowing enough time for proper testing.

The election authorities could consider producing and publishing command level protocols and appropriate instructions for installing and configuring all hardware and software components.

It is recommended that for internet voting, a body with the power to oversee internet voting is formalized. The authorities could determine the distribution of roles and responsibilities between stakeholders involved in internet voting.

Before starting projects on remote electronic voting, federal evaluation and certification of remote electronic voting products should be intensified prior to public test or even use. Pilot projects should be given the necessary time and financial resources to be tested comprehensively to ensure reliability, security and integrity.

Ensuring public funding of evaluation would enhance the credibility and independence of the certification process.

The trend towards the use of new voting technologies which use either VVPATs or hand- or computer-marked paper ballots is positive. Authorities could consider adopting federal legislation for the mandatory use of a paper trail in elections, including federal standards on mandatory hand-recounts of paper ballots and VVPATs.

DREs and optical scan machines should be arranged in polling stations in a way to ensure the secrecy of the vote.

Consideration should be given to the design of electronic voting equipment so that a
change or error in its software would not cause an undetectable change or error in the
voting results. This, for instance, can be ensured by using a voter-verifiable paper audit
trail or cryptography measures.

A transparent process of testing and certifying voting systems should be required to
ensure integrity of voting systems.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends greater participation of parties and civil society in monitoring of the internet voting system to provide an opportunity to identify potential weaknesses and security concerns. The OSCE/ODIHR further recommends consideration of a more defined division of duties among the staff implementing internet voting such that no one person would be involved with the entire process.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that monitoring and response to potential threats coming from the internet should be more systematic and include a plan to deal with such threats, with well-defined roles for each institution. In addition, the monitoring of the Vote Storage Server should be improved to provide greater assurance that no unauthorized access via the internet has affected the integrity of the data.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that in addition to the audits of the process now
conducted, all components of the system, including the source code, should be audited by an independent body in accordance with publicly available specifications, with all reports made public.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that the NEC review the process of counting internet
votes and announcing the results to ensure that all devices used are subject to adequate
security measures.

Usability of voting machines should be improved, and more extensive voter education efforts should be conducted.

Audits should be conducted at various stages of the process to ensure that adequate security procedures are being followed by local authorities.

To preserve the secrecy of the vote, the user-generated four-digit control code should
be eliminated, and the voter register component of the system should be separated
from the voting component.

The legislation regulating the electronic voting system should provide for meaningful
post-election recounts and audits of results. Legislation should include provisions
requiring voter-verified paper audit trails or an equivalent verification procedure.

Consideration could be given to ensure that a printout of the initial local results is given to political parties.

Consideration should be given to guarantee the presence of at least one assessor during the transfer of the documentation to the counting centre.

Consideration should be given to include a hand-over document for ballot boxes after the closing, in order to facilitate accountability of their transfer to the counting centres (Jites).

The system could be reviewed to include a separate final confirmation screen where the voter could verify his/her choice of political party and selected candidates.

The election administration appears to enjoy the trust of the electorate and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, as a matter of best practice and transparency, it is recommended that detailed results of all polling stations (for e-voting) and counting centres (for paper ballots) are publicly disclosed when counting is completed.