



ELECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 2009–2011: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses from a comparative perspective the national elections (legislative and presidential) held between 2009 and 2011 in seventeen Latin American countries. There are five key issues that guide this analysis: the institutional conditions of electoral competition, the electoral offer, election results, party systems, and post-electoral executive-legislative relations. The political consequences of these electoral processes—except perhaps in the cases of Honduras and Nicaragua, where some minor negative trends have arisen—reveal a pattern of apparent normality and political alternation, with a change in the presidential elite and winning proposals that were articulated via institutions. The paper concludes by outlining how countries in the region have successfully overcome challenges of a varying nature and importance, that until recently generated a degree of uncertainty in their respective political systems.

This paper is also concerned, from a temporal perspective, with some of the constants of voting behavior and party systems in the different countries of Latin America. Voter turnout, electoral volatility, the numeric format of the party system, and the ideological positioning of the political parties are indicators laid out for the last twenty years. Again, the constants are more persistent than any profound changes in these indicators.

RESUMEN

Este trabajo analiza las elecciones nacionales legislativas y presidenciales celebradas entre 2009 y 2011 en diecisiete países de América Latina bajo una perspectiva comparada. El análisis realizado sigue cinco ejes: las condiciones institucionales de la competencia electoral, la oferta electoral, los resultados de los comicios, el sistema de partidos y las relaciones derivadas de los resultados entre los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo. Las consecuencias políticas de estos procesos electorales—excepto quizás para los casos de Honduras y Nicaragua, donde acontecieron circunstancias menores negativas—revelan pautas de aparente normalidad y de alternancia política, con cambios en la elite política y en propuestas ganadoras articulados por mediación de las instituciones. El trabajo concluye subrayando que hay países en la región que han conseguido superar con éxito retos de naturaleza e importancia variada que habían generado hasta muy recientemente cierto grado de incertidumbre en sus respectivos sistemas políticos.

El trabajo también aborda, desde una perspectiva temporal, algunas de las constantes del comportamiento electoral y de los sistemas de partidos en los diferentes países de América latina. La participación y la volatilidad electoral, el formato numérico de los sistemas de partidos y la ubicación ideológica de los partidos políticos son indicadores que se muestran para los últimos veinte años. Una vez más, se constata que las constantes en dichos indicadores son más persistentes que los cambios profundos.

INTRODUCTION

Between January 2009 and November 2011 a significant number of elections took place throughout Latin America as part of a process that has been uninterrupted in the region for the past twenty years. The consolidation of elections is an important feature of the political life in the region and undoubtedly constitutes an issue of academic interest. As has been the case with those studies on traditional Western democracies that have become a reference point for theoretical approaches in comparative politics,¹ Latin America offers an opportunity to test existing ideas and even produce new ones.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes, from a temporal perspective, some of the constants of voting behavior and party systems in the different countries, according to four indicators: voter turnout, electoral volatility, the numeric format of the party system, and the ideological positioning of the parties. Seen over time, the constants are more persistent than the profound changes in these indicators. In the second part, which is more extensive, I address the elections held between 2009 and 2011 in seventeen Latin American countries from a comparative perspective.²

There are five key issues that guide this analysis: the institutional conditions of electoral competition, the electoral market, the results of the elections, the party system, and the post-electoral executive-legislative relations. The political consequences of these electoral processes—except perhaps in the cases of Honduras and Nicaragua—reveal a pattern of apparent normality and political alternation, with a change in the presidential elite and winning proposals that were articulated via institutions. The paper concludes by outlining the main challenges for elections in Latin American countries over the next few years.

¹ This study does not aim to provide exhaustive evidence of this situation, given that there have been extensive studies by Rokkan (2009 [1970]), Taagapera and Shugart (1989), and Lijphart (1994), among many others.

² However, I have included Paraguay in the appendices although it is not considered in the paper because the elections will take place in 2013.

THIRTY YEARS OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Patterns of Electoral Participation

Appendix I provides data on the average voter turnout in various Latin American countries over the past three decades. I present the percentages of those who are registered to vote as well as the percentages of the population of voting age, for both legislative and presidential elections. The turnout is usually higher in presidential elections than in legislative elections. This is clearly reflected in the mid-term elections held in Argentina and Mexico where the average is three percentage points and over fifteen percentage points less, respectively. In the case of El Salvador, where both elections coincided only once (1994), there was still more participation in the presidential election than in the legislative elections, with a difference of about ten points. Finally, in Colombia, where parliamentary elections are held three months before the presidential elections, the turnout is around six points lower.

Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Uruguay are the only five countries where the margin between the electoral census and population of voting age is almost nonexistent, reflecting the role of the electoral bodies. In the case of Mexico, this margin is in fact getting smaller. In contrast, there is a group of countries where the average difference is over twenty points, as in the cases of Bolivia and Chile (where voting registration is voluntary). For their part, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela have a ten-point difference between the electoral census and population of voting age.

The data on participation in presidential elections shows a fairly stable trend in most countries, with less than 10 percent fluctuation between four and nine elections. There was a large decline in Venezuela between the elections held in 1988 and 1993, a year in which electoral participation fell by twenty points. This reflects the existence of two different moments, with an average participation of 85.7 percent between 1978 and 1988 compared to 63.7 percent between 1993 and 2006. Honduras has also experienced a steady downward turn in voter turnout, which went from 84 percent of the census in 1985 to 50 percent in 2009. A smaller decrease occurred in Costa Rica with values of about 81 percent in 1978 and 1994 with less than 70 percent. Participation in elections in Chile

went from 94.7 percent of the census in 1989 to 87.2 percent in 2009. Nevertheless, this decrease is actually more pronounced when using data with respect to the voting age population, falling from 89.3 percent in 1989 to 63.6 percent in 2005.

Taking the average voter turnout in presidential elections over this period, there is very different behavior within Latin America. In Uruguay, for example, participation is at 90 percent, whereas Colombia is at the other extreme, with 47 percent. Colombia combines voluntary voting and a context of violence that makes the electoral processes in some parts of the territory more difficult. In between these two extremes are six countries with an average participation of above 75 percent: Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and Panama. Six other countries have an average participation of between 65 and 75 percent: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Finally, Guatemala, Mexico, and Honduras have an average participation of between 57 and 62 percent.

Electoral Volatility and the Numerical Composition of the Party System

Appendix II contains data on the volatility registered in both the legislative and presidential elections over the past three decades. In general, the volatility in legislative elections is slightly lower than in presidential elections, which shows a greater stability of citizen preferences for congress than for the presidency.

Volatility in the region has tended to be very high, except for a small number of cases, with rates often exceeding 40 percent. Only Brazil and El Salvador show a downward trend towards single-digit levels. Historically, Honduras has had very high levels of volatility, which in the last period grew by 15 percent. Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay have average volatility values of less than 20 percent, remaining relatively stable over time, albeit with a slight increase in the case of the first three and a slight decrease in Mexico and Uruguay. Panama and the Dominican Republic have rates ranging from 20 to 30 percent.

Consequently, the Andean countries and Guatemala have seen a huge shift in voter preferences, becoming chronic over time. Hence, it is fully justifiable to refer to them as suffering from a severe crisis of representation (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro 2006).

Appendix III presents data on the numerical format of party systems in Latin America—in terms of the distribution of both votes and seats in parliament—something that confirms the lack of proportionality of the electoral systems; an issue that I shall return to later. The effective number of parties provides a clear image of the region's multiparty scenario, a format that has become consolidated with the passage of time.

If we take the data on the effective number of parliamentary parties, most cases tend to increase over time, except in Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico, where the respective levels have remained stable. However, the effective number of parliamentary parties has declined in Bolivia, Colombia—after increasing in 2002 and 2006—Ecuador—after peaking in 2002 and decreasing since then—Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The index values show a two-party scenario in Bolivia after 2005, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. Uruguay has been heading towards a bipartisan format since 2004, while Costa Rica is gradually moving away from this scenario. Venezuela has an artificial two-party situation as a result of the opposition to the ruling party being gathered into a very heterogeneous group (the Democratic Unity Roundtable, *Mesa de la Unidad Democrática* or MUD). The multiparty system is very extreme in Brazil, with an index reaching ten, as is the case in Chile and Colombia with values of over five; Argentina and Guatemala have indices of between four and five; and the remaining countries—Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru—have average values of between three and four.

The Ideological Positioning of Parties

It is possible to place Latin America parties on the left-right scale via interviews with legislators, something that has become a common practice, generating a wealth of studies (Alcántara 2004 and 2008). The left-right axis accurately projects the national interparty differentiation in most countries and, therefore, reflects political competition.

Appendix IV shows the evolution of the ideological positioning on this scale of various Latin American political parties over fifteen years. Considering the nearly seventy parties one by one, most show a remarkable stability in their average positioning

on this left-right scale over time. There are only eight parties that have undergone significant oscillations in their assessment, which amounts to only 12 percent of the data collected. Three parties have turned to the center-left and center-right (the Argentine Peronist Party and the Colombian Liberal Party, which went from 7.38 to 4.79 and 6.09 to 4.50, respectively, whereas the Nicaraguan Liberal Constitutionalist Party has moved from 9.16 to 7.27). On the other hand, five parties have turned to the right: the Peruvian Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA) has increased from 3.86 to 6.93; the Dominican Liberation Party from 4.10 to 7.35; the Liberal Party of Honduras from 4.72 to 6.33; the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica from 5.07 to 8.29; and the Patriotic Society Party of Ecuador from 5.42 to 8.08.

An interesting exercise when analyzing the political “color” of parties in the legislatures is to list the parties that are situated on the left (those between one and four), the center (between four and seven), and the right (between seven and ten). Although the universe analyzed here does not include all the parties in congress, it is indeed a representative sample. Twenty-four percent of parties are located on the left, 31 percent are at the center, and 45 percent on the right. This evidence questions the left turn in the region over the past decade. It is true that the actual weight of each party is not taken into account here, but it offers a picture of the political scene. When looking at the situation in each particular country, we can confirm that the leftist parties in Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic³ are not accounted for.

³ This does not mean they do not exist, but in any case their size is certainly reduced, and they were not interviewed. A contrasting case is Honduras, where there is a small leftist party that was taken into consideration by interviewees.

THE 2009–2011 ELECTIONS

The occurrence of national elections in seventeen countries in the region offers a great opportunity to study this aspect of comparative politics.⁴ In the first year of this short period of time, Latin America has been immersed in the world financial-economic crisis, and although this did not affect all countries to the same degree, in 2009 it still represented a regional downturn, around 2 percent of the gross domestic product. However, a pattern of normality has prevailed throughout the period analyzed here, and therefore no extraordinary conclusions in terms of politics can be drawn.

Of all the elections held, two countries present a significant anomaly, albeit for different reasons. In the case of Honduras, the elections were rejected by a number of key countries within the region and created divisions within Honduran society. Most Hondurans perceived the events of June 2009 as a coup and therefore opposed the exile of President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, although a large majority had opposed Zelaya’s attempt to carry out a popular consultation and his proposal to establish a new constituent assembly (Pérez, Booth, and Seligson 2010). This situation resulted in a decline in voter turnout, at less than 50 percent, the lowest since the restoration of democracy in the early 1980s.

As for Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega’s irregular participation in the elections, despite an explicit constitutional prohibition on reelection, created an undeniable episode of democratic deterioration. Only the Sandinistas’ manipulation of the constitutional court could make this possible. Ortega’s running for election, as a result of his control of the electoral body, was surrounded by numerous reports that cast doubt over the elections, with results rejected by the opposition and widely criticized by the international community.

⁴ Along the same lines see earlier work by Alcántara and García Díez (2008).

The Institutional Framework of Elections

Carrying out any election involves a complex institutional process that is evaluated by the public. In turn, public opinion polls reflect the quality of these processes. In this regard there are two indices of trust in elections and electoral courts that highlight some undefined feelings towards elections on the part of citizens (Table 1), with important differences among countries. The effects of Honduras's political crisis are felt here, as it is the country with the lowest levels of citizen trust in elections and electoral bodies, although political elites do not necessarily feel the same way. At the other extreme, Uruguay and Chile enjoy high levels of institutional trust in electoral mechanisms.⁵ Argentina, Panama, and Costa Rica registered noticeable discrepancies amongst citizens and elites on this point. Parliamentary elites in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador expressed the highest level of distrust of elections and electoral bodies.

Electoral laws in over half of the countries considered here have been modified during the last four years, legislative activism in this matter being a notable feature of Latin American politics. This has resulted in substantive changes in the constitutional sphere, as is the case in Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic, which adopted considerable constitutional, legislative, or regulatory reforms, and in Mexico, El Salvador, Panama,⁶ Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, which also adopted reforms though of lesser importance than those of the first three countries.

With regard to the presidential election, where voting is direct in all countries except in Panama and Honduras, where the principle of a relative majority in one round prevails, in the remaining twelve countries the President was elected by a qualified majority in the second round.⁷ In El Salvador, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, Peru

⁵ The three countries with the highest levels of citizen trust in elections (Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile) are those with higher levels of democratic quality in 2010, according to IDD-LAT. See www.idd-lat.org.

⁶ Panama is an exceptional case in that according to the constitution there is always a process of electoral reform during the year following the election.

⁷ The limited impact of the presidential election system on the number of candidates that are presented is noteworthy (see Table 1), since the range of cases goes from two to nine nominations. In Costa Rica, despite its traditional bipartisan situation (the presidency has never been won in the last sixty years by a candidate not from the PLN or the PUSC), there were nine candidates, but in this country it is estimated that an incentive for this high number lies in the

and Guatemala, the required qualified majority is 50% . With the exception of El Salvador, where Mauricio Funes reached that threshold in the first round, in the other countries—despite polarization—there was need for a run-off. This was due to the existence of third forces moderating the bipolar tension and something to which we shall return later, namely a very severe party breakdown that meant that elections turned into a mere contest between candidates.

TABLE 1

INDICES OF POPULAR TRUST IN ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS IN 2008 AND PARLIAMENTARY ELITES' TRUST IN ELECTION RESULTS AND ELECTORAL BODIES (2005–2010)

	Citizens' Trust in Elections *	Citizens' Trust in the Electoral Courts **	Elite Trust in the Election Results ***	Elite Trust in Electoral Bodies **** (percent)
	(index)	(index)	(scale)	
Uruguay	73.4	64.5	4.88	97.4
Costa Rica	61.4	62.2	4.20	83.9
Chile	60.6	57.2	4.65	94.0
Dominican Republic	59.9	61.9	3.36	44.6
Venezuela	57.6	51.0	NA	NA
Bolivia	56.7	54.9	4.08	62.5
Mexico	53.1	61.7	3.58	57.2
Colombia	52.8	52.8	3.65	72.4
El Salvador	48.7	44.6	3.71	58.9
Brazil	48.1	45.0	3.74	80.3
Panama	47.8	51.3	4.78	92.2
Ecuador	45.7	38.9	3.27	47.1
Argentina	44.9	38.0	4.17	81.2
Peru	44.4	42.4	3.82	79.1
Honduras	37.9	38.4	3.83	96.7

Note: Respondents evaluated their trust on a scale of 1 to 7 in 2008, where 1 means “no trust” and 7 “high levels of trust.” These responses were recalibrated on a scale of 0 to 100. (Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay are not considered because elections were not held during the studied period.)

*Ratings on a scale of 1 to 100;

** Index on a scale of 1 to 100;

*** Averages on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “low” and 5 is “high” trust;

****Sum of percentages of “bastante confianza” and “mucha confianza.”

Sources: * compiled from Layton (2009); ** from Montalvo (2009) and Brenes (2009); and the rest from PELA (1994–2011).

There are five national cases where the run-off election depends upon a specific percentage of votes won in the first round, which is less than the absolute majority. Costa Rica requires the winning candidate to receive more than 40 percent of the vote, while in

possibility of running both for the presidency and the legislature. In fact the PUSC presidential candidate who lost was elected deputy.

Ecuador and Bolivia the winner has to receive this amount or over ten percentage points more than the candidate in second place. In Argentina the most voted candidate is elected in the first round when he or she wins more than 45 percent of valid votes or reaches 40 percent with a distance of at least ten percentage points with respect to the runner-up. In Nicaragua, in order to be elected, the president must receive at least 40 percent of the vote or 35 percent plus an advantage of at least five percentage points over the runner-up. If these circumstances do not occur, then the top two candidates are short listed for the second round.

In five cases the elections were determined in the first round, although the two leading candidates in Costa Rica and Argentina won only 72 and 71 percent of the vote, respectively, reflecting that the partisan fragmentation in both countries can also be found in the presidential arena. In Costa Rica, Otto Guevara, leader of the Libertarian Movement, came in third place, with 20.9 percent. In Argentina, President Cristina Fernandez obtained a significantly higher number of votes (50 percent) against a highly fragmented opposition.

It should be noted, however, that in all twelve cases where there is a possibility of going to a second round, the candidates who finished ahead in the first round were already winning once they passed to the second round.

The electoral laws governing legislative elections project an extremely complex scenario under the common denominator of proportional representation, which does not tend to work in practice. Appendix V reflects this situation. Taking the four indicators of the size of the assembly, district magnitude, the criterion of representation, and the type of list, there is clear evidence of heterogeneity. Undoubtedly, the variation in the size of the assembly is related to the size of the country, but taking each Latin American country as a unit of analysis this situation is not quite so important. Leaving aside the two Latin American countries that have lower chambers with five hundred or more members (Brazil and Mexico), the remaining countries comprise three groups: those with fewer than one hundred members (Uruguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, and Costa Rica),

those with between 120 and 130 deputies (Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Bolivia),⁸ and those with between 158 and 183 deputies (Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, and Dominican Republic). The size of the assembly is linked to the magnitude of the district, which in turn is connected in most countries to administrative-political units (department, province, state) that ensure a minimum representation. Nevertheless, this is not the case in Panama,⁹ Chile,¹⁰ Mexico,¹¹ and Venezuela.¹²

Except for the larger states in Brazil, the five multimember districts in Mexico (with forty members), and most of the capitals' districts (which are over ten), in most districts of the different countries the magnitude is small (less than seven) creating an effect that destroys the proportionality that is supposedly maintained in most of the electoral systems outlined here. In this regard, in addition to their commitment to a mixed representation formula, countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, and Guatemala reflect a majority logic. Mexico, which also combines majority criteria with proportional representation, maintains a clear proportional component.

In the case of upper houses, there is a national constituency in Colombia and Uruguay, and there are departmental constituencies in Bolivia and Dominican Republic, provincial constituencies in Argentina, and state constituencies in Brazil. In Mexico the senate is composed of senators elected by the states and a national constituency, while in Chile districts are formed ad hoc.

Legislative elections in a large number of countries are carried out with lists of candidates that are closed and blocked to ensure control by political parties. The only examples of complete preferential voting are in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. In Brazil the voter can opt to vote for the party's list of candidates or just for the party. In

⁸ For electoral purposes Argentina could be joined to this group because in their elections it chooses, every two years, half of the chamber composed of 257 deputies. That is to say that in the election it is as if they elect an assembly of 128–129 deputies.

⁹ There are some circuits that coincide with districts, while others do not. In some districts, mainly in the province of Panama, there are districts that have more than one circuit. They do not change frequently, but in 2006 two were eliminated because in 2004 they fixed the number of deputies; previously it used to increase according to the growth in the population.

¹⁰ This is because the country is divided into sixty districts.

¹¹ Where deputies are elected according to proportional representation in five constituencies established for this purpose.

¹² There are 110 nominal deputies (60 percent of the assembly) elected in different single-member districts.

Colombia the party can decide whether or not to open the list, and in Panama voting is open in the list submitted by the party.

A typical component of any electoral system as such is the electoral threshold. However, data on this component are not collected here, since either they do not exist or when they do the effect on the extent of majority bias found in many Latin American electoral systems is null.

A final point in this section includes the quality of elections, in terms of the speed, transparency, and independence of the electoral bodies responsible for organizing the elections. In general the performance of these agencies has been sound, although as already mentioned above in the cases of Honduras and Nicaragua there was a significant questioning of the electoral body, characterized by criticisms of some of their decisions. Probably the two most “painful” scenes occurred in Ecuador and Colombia where the counting of votes and the proclamation of deputies took several months. However, in many countries, these bodies are still partisan, resulting in the political contamination of the decisions (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2009). For example, in Mexico congress was unable to elect the three vacant council members in the context of a growing interest in influencing the election process on the part of TV channels. This effect is possibly less noticeable in Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, and Uruguay.

The Electoral Market

One of the areas in which there has been a major breakthrough has been the imposition of primaries for the selection of candidates by political parties and voters (Alcántara 2002; Freidenberg and Alcántara 2009). The route was opened up after the profound Uruguayan electoral reform of 1996, which offered the open participation of citizens, a single date, and supervision by the electoral organism. Nevertheless, the other Latin American countries did not strictly follow this model.¹³ While primary elections had been carried out long before, countries decided that each party could have them without obliging them

¹³ In Argentina a law was passed in 2002 on mandatory open primary elections, but this was never implemented because congress kept postponing its implementation until it was finally repealed in 2006. In December 2009 a new, similar law was passed, which was applied for the first time in 2011.

to enforce a reform. Over time, the party elites started deciding to open up the primaries to the entire electorate, as in the case of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal, PL) of Colombia, the Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente País Solidario, FREPASO) in Argentina, and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) in El Salvador. The result up until now has been rather poor.

Of the fourteen cases considered here, primaries for presidential elections were held in Panama, Uruguay, Honduras, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Argentina. The 2008 primaries in Panama had disastrous results for the Revolutionary Democratic Party (Partido Revolucionario Democrático, PRD), when its candidate Balbina Herrera suffered from the deterioration of high expectations—according to opinion polls—to the benefit of her opponent, Ricardo Martinelli of Democratic Change (Cambio Democrático) who was supported by the historical Panamanian Party (Partido Panameñista, PP) and who underwent this process without a rival. In Uruguay the primaries for all the parties that were to participate in the presidential elections were held on the same date, June 28, 2009. With voluntary voting, the National Party (Partido Nacional, PN) presented three candidates—although only two of them had any real chance of winning—and attracted more voters (45.9 percent) than the majority party, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio, FA), which won a lower percentage of votes (41.3 percent) for its three candidates, and taking a distant third place, the Colorado Party (Partido Colorado, PC) (12 percent), which presented six candidates. In Honduras the primaries, which took place seven months before the coup, were referred to the justice system due to the inability of the vice president, Mel Zelaya of the Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido Liberal de Honduras, PLH), to run. In Costa Rica only two parties, the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN) and the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC), carried out a competitive process for selecting presidential candidates. While the PLN had an open convention with a wide participation to choose among three candidates, the PAC launched a semi-open convention with three candidates, which drew limited participation. In Colombia there were primaries to elect four of the six presidential candidates of the PL, the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano, PCC), the Green Party (Partido Verde Colombiano, PV), and the Alternative Democratic Pole

(Polo Democrático Alternativo, PDA). In Argentina all the candidates were obliged to win primaries held at the same time, following the Uruguayan model.

Nominations for the two presidential candidates of the two Chilean blocs, the Alliance for Chile and the Coalition, took place in a context of low levels of participation. While Piñera's candidacy was decided by the two parties that supported him—his National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI)—Eduardo Frei, leading the center-left Concertación, competed in open primaries in two regions, with low participation, which gave rise to a consensus in the party elite about his suitability as a candidate.¹⁴

Of the three countries where only legislative elections took place, Venezuela is the only one where there was a primary process to choose candidates. The United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV) held primaries on May 2, 2010, for nominal candidates, with a high level of competitiveness and a turnout of around 40% of its militants, while the candidate list was chosen by the national party itself. The vast majority of the opposition, articulated around the MUD, resorted to a double method of negotiations among the various factions and primaries held on April 25, 2010, to choose twenty-two candidates and reflect the diversity of its members.

In the remaining countries nominations were approved in the governing bodies of the various parties. This was the case in the Dominican Republic, where the imposition of candidates was more by party leaders, despite the fact that competitive elections were held in most circuits for the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, PLD). The fact that there was a possibility of “saving spaces” for the final decision on the basis of possible agreements with the Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano, PRSC) undermined the possibility of holding primaries. In this country a scenario of preelection party switching broke out, with some who were relegated in their organization due to calculations on alliances, factional

¹⁴ However, the closure within the Coalition when beginning to launch a more open selection process to choose the presidential candidate led to the exit of Marco Enriquez Ominami from the Coalition and his candidacy as an independent candidate. This in turn damaged the *Concertacionista* project.

fighting, and quotas on electoral lists, or others who simply did not accept the result of the primaries and changed parties.

In the field of legislative elections, the use of formulas that contemplate preferential voting—as in the cases of Ecuador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Honduras, and Peru—has clashed with rules on the party selection of candidates, and these types of formulas have often been difficult to put into practice or are very vague. Moreover, the judicialization of the selection process of candidates was the dominant note in the Dominican elections.¹⁵ In addition, there are very different candidate selection processes in each country. In Mexico the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) has a much more centralized candidate selection process than the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD). In Chile the process of forming the lists of candidates for the house of representatives is extremely laborious, to the extent that the two major coalitions negotiate on the candidates for the sixty electoral binominal constituencies. In this sense, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC), which placed a candidate from within the Coalition in each of the districts, ceded this prerogative in the 2009 elections. It was also at the heart of these negotiations that the Communist candidates won three seats, offering the party representation for the first time since 1973.¹⁶ In Peru, due to the decomposition of the party system and the type of candidates that were put forward, there was no process of candidate selection (Meléndez 2011), nor were there primaries at the presidential or legislative level in Guatemala.

The financing of election campaigns for most countries, despite alleged concern on this issue, has reached a sort dead end, with states showing that they are unable to control their private financing. The case of Panama illustrates this situation given that there is a huge influx of money from private sources in the electoral arena, without any

¹⁵ In the Dominican Republic there is a Contentious Electoral Chamber, which has been a specialized agency of the central electoral board since 2003 and which received 256 appeals during the elections in May 2010 to address the partisan controversies generated around the creation of lists.

¹⁶ With the Chilean system of binomial representation, in the 2005 elections there was an untenable situation due to 13.32 percent of voters not being represented in the lower chamber. See Ruíz Rodríguez (2008).

proper controls. In another scenario, as a result of the condemnation of political practices in the past, public financing of politics has disappeared in Bolivia and Venezuela. This creates an alarming situation of inequality in the electoral process. For this reason, in Argentina there has been some progress with the introduction of two reports, one before and the other after the elections, in which parties are required to detail the origin and destination of their funds. Nevertheless, the penalties for political groups that do not present these reports have only occasionally been put into effect. By the end of 2009 a new law was passed, prohibiting the hiring of advertising space in the media by political forces, restricting them to using free space donated by the national government. This law also imposes limits on private financing in election campaigns. In Venezuela, parties must also submit a report after the election but, as is the case in other countries, the sanctions are not very effective.

TABLE 2

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 2009–2011

Country	Number of Presidential Candidates	Percent of Concentration of the Presidential Vote in the Two Most Voted Candidates in the First Round	Percent of Difference of the Presidential Vote between the Two Most Voted Candidates in the First Round	Percent of Difference of the Presidential Vote between the Two Most Voted Candidates in the Runoff	Presidential Alternation
El Salvador	2	94.0	2.6	None	Yes
Panama	3	97.7	22.4	None	Yes
Honduras	5	94.6	18.5	None	Yes
Bolivia	8	90.6	37.2	None	No
Ecuador	9	80.2	23.6	None	No
Brazil	9	79.5	14.3	12.1	No
Uruguay	5	79.2	19.4	9.2	No
Chile	4	73.7	14.4	3.2	Yes
Costa Rica	9	72.0	21.8	None	No
Colombia	6	68.0	27.2	41.5	No
Peru	11	55.2	8.2	2.9	Yes
Argentina	7	70.8	37.0	None	No
Guatemala	10	56.2	12.8	7.5	Yes
Nicaragua	5	93.8	31.5	None	No

Author's own elaboration.

The presidential campaigns have also been characterized by televised debates between the candidates, a phenomenon that is gradually taking hold, albeit with some

resistance. Several episodes are worth highlighting: the half-dozen discussions among the presidential candidates in Colombia and Brazil; the three debates in Peru; the two meetings among the candidates in Costa Rica; and the two meetings that took place among the four candidates in Chile. In Panama there was a single debate among Ricardo Martinelli, Balbina Herrera, and others in the primaries for the PRD and a single debate among the candidates of the PP. In Guatemala there was only one debate in the presidential run-off between the candidates and Manuel Otto Perez Molina and Manuel Baldizón. Debates were noticeably absent in Honduras, Uruguay (where the last preelectoral debate was held in 1994), Ecuador, and Bolivia. In El Salvador there was no debate among presidential candidates, but there were several debates in the case of mayors and deputies. In countries where only legislative elections took place there was no discussion, possibly because of the plurinomial nature of these elections. Nevertheless we should note that there was a debate amongst the candidates of the City of Buenos Aires.

In terms of their content, campaigns have largely reflected existing social concerns about insecurity and political polarization, which will be discussed in detail below. This has simplified the ideological debate, because in most cases it meant choosing between mutually exclusive options. However, the real difference between these options centered on particular leaders, with almost no separation in terms of ideology or clearly opposed proposals, creating a situation of extreme personalization. This was the situation in Panama, which was dominated by the emerging leadership of the anti-PRD front, in the Dominican Republic between supporters of Fernandez and their antagonists, and to a large extent in Costa Rica between the leadership of PLN and the rest. It was also the case in Honduras, between the candidates of the National Party of Honduras (Partido Nacional de Honduras, PNH) and the PLH, in Peru in the final round of the elections between Keiko Fujimori and Ollanta Humala, and in Guatemala between Otto Perez Molina and Manuel Baldizón. A hybrid situation of personalization and strongly antagonistic political projects occurred in Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Nicaragua. And finally, we recorded the most genuinely program-orientated fray in El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay.

The weight of outgoing presidents when supporting specific candidates, who then ended up winning, was evident in Costa Rica: Oscar Arias did not hide his preference for Laura Chinchilla, the candidate whom he fully supported in the primaries of the PLN. In Colombia Uribe steadily supported Juan Manuel Santos, and in Brazil Lula supported Rousseff's candidacy. In these three cases the outgoing presidents had a decisive role in proposing the presidential candidates of their parties and ensuring their election.¹⁷ In Chile Michelle Bachelet had to accept the nomination in the Coalition of the Christian Democrats of former President Eduardo Frei, whom she also supported in the campaign. In Uruguay the preferences of outgoing President Vázquez failed to lead his candidate, Danilo Astori, to victory in the primaries. In any case, presidential activism in the different campaigns where the presidents were not directly involved has been very intense. The popularity and weight of the strong leadership of Leonel Fernandez and Hugo Chávez had an important influence in the legislative elections of their respective countries. The impact of Felipe Calderón in Mexico's 2009 legislative elections was less significant.

The campaigns countenanced the active engagement of businessmen, something that became very evident with the same business background of the candidates in Panama and Chile. Furthermore, as well as the option in favor of the Free Trade Agreement in Costa Rica for the PLN there was also support for formulas that were more sensitive to economic interests, as was the case with the nominations of Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia and the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA) in El Salvador. There was also opposition to the government in Bolivia and Venezuela and to the Ecuadorian government from Guayaquil-based businessmen. The Catholic Church's influence was less widespread and important than that of business, but the Church had a prominent role in the election campaigns in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. In Costa Rica the Catholic Church blocked a proposed reform by civil society and some politicians to delete the reference to God in the constitutional oath and the state's denomination. This meant that the PLN candidate Laura Chinchilla got closer than ever to the church, receiving the title of "favorite daughter of the Virgin

¹⁷ In Guatemala, outgoing President Alvaro Colom declined to support the candidacy of his wife, Sandra Torres, so that the National Unity of Hope–Grand National Alliance (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza–Gran Alianza Nacional, UNE-GANA) coalition failed to have a candidate.

Mary” from the Bishop of Cartago the day after the election. In the Dominican Republic the Cardinal joined in at the end of the campaign, calling for the public to participate in a recital of the ten commandments, with clear political intent given that it was the night before election day.

The Election Results

In six of the fourteen countries where there were presidential elections in 2009–2011, there was a change in the governing party. In Chile and El Salvador elections marked a change after two long decades of ideologically opposed forces, albeit by the narrowest margin of votes of all the cases reported here; the Coalition government ceded to the Alliance for Chile and ARENA gave way to the FMLN. In Panama and Honduras, government alternation followed the established pattern. In Panama the CD in partnership with the PP pushed the PRD out of power, while in Honduras the PNH replaced the PLH, maintaining the pattern of no party staying in government longer than a term. In Peru and Guatemala alternation was inevitable given that neither of the parties in government presented a candidate in the elections. Peru’s APRA (Peruvian “Arist” Party, Partido Aprista Peruana, PAP) did not present a presidential candidate, but the triumph of Ollanta Humala led to the Left gaining power for the first time in the country’s history. Guatemala’s National Union of Hope (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza, UNE) did not compete in the presidential elections given that the wife of president Colom was denied legal capacity to run by the constitutional court, despite their divorce.

Of the eight remaining countries where there was continuity, in four cases the same president was re-elected to office (Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Cristina Fernandez in Argentina, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua). In Uruguay, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Brazil, the same parties remained in government: the FA, the PLN, Uribe’s Social Party of National Unity, the “U,” (Partido Social de la Unidad Nacional, U), and the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), respectively. Consequently, the countries of the region show patterns of political continuity at the presidential level, with just under half of the governmental groups remaining in office. This also means that the drive for reelection that marked the previous election cycle was maintained in this cycle, with the renewal of candidates of the parties that were in power

in four cases—despite reelection not being permitted under the constitution—and with just a few cases of alternation of power between parties.

The average number of candidates was high; in half of the countries it was seven or more. However, there was a clear—albeit differentiated—tendency to concentrate the vote on two candidates in the first round: in five countries the top two candidates attracted more than 90% of the vote; in three countries the top two candidates capture about 80 percent of the vote; in four countries they concentrate between 68 and 73 percent of the vote; and in just two countries, Peru and Guatemala, the two leading candidates receive less than 60 percent of the vote (55 and 59 percent respectively). This leads us to believe in the existence of a heterogeneous scenario, but in which the competition has acquired a bipolar logic. Furthermore, in all cases where there was need for a second round, the candidate who finished first in the first round ended up winning the election.

Of the fourteen presidents considered, three are women (Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, and Cristina Fernandez in Argentina), and another woman has left the presidency (Michelle Bachelet in Chile), which suggests that spaces are slowly opening for female executives. With regard to congress, the presence of women remains low on average, ranging from just under 9% in Panama and 10% in Brazil to close to 40% in Costa Rica and in both chambers in Argentina and even 50% in Bolivia following the introduction of quota laws. Most countries have intermediate values ranging between 15 and 20 percent, in the cases of Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. In Mexico (chamber of deputies) and Ecuador 26 and 32 percent of the members of their assemblies, respectively, are women.

In terms of those countries where only legislative elections were held, in Mexico the government was punished and the PAN became the second player in the legislature behind the PRI. By contrast, the governments of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela have been successful in the legislative field of politics, which have given majorities to the PLD and the PSUV, respectively. The ruling party's victory was more substantive in the first case, given that it retained control of the lower house and the senate overwhelmingly. Venezuela was not quite so successful, given that it did not achieve a

qualified majority of two-thirds; nevertheless, the government has the majority in the only existing chamber. These three elections to a large extent work as a showcase for the next presidential elections. It should be noted, however, that in the case of the Argentine legislative elections of 2009 the victory of the opposition to *kirchnerismo* was not the prelude to their success in the presidential elections two years later.

There are five aspects that are particularly noteworthy when comparing the votes recorded in these elections. They are: 1) the party trajectories of presidential candidates, 2) the revitalization of third forces, 3) the relatively high recorded voter turnout, 3) the problem of disproportionate results, and 4) the territorial aspect of the vote.

As opposed to a scenario dominated by anti-politics or by the presence of populist routes to power (Freidenberg 2007), it appears that most of the elected officials of the fourteen countries have had previous political careers, partisan experience, and other political offices. I have found only two exceptions to this rule: Mauricio Funes and Ollanta Humala. The first was a well-known Salvadoran journalist who, despite having no political experience or past support base, was the FMLN's candidate. Humala had very little political experience other than his presidential candidacy in 2006 and his five-year leadership of the under-performing Nationalist Party. The remaining twelve presidents have had long political careers, although to a lesser extent in the cases of Ricardo Martinelli and Otto Perez Molina, in Panama and Guatemala, both of whom had been presidential candidates in previous elections. Martinelli was a well-known and successful Panamanian businessman who had also been director of the Social Security Fund for the PRD government of Ernesto Perez Balladares and canal minister under Mireya Moscoso of the PP. Perez Molina, of military origin, had been minister for defense with Oscar Berger and deputy with Guatemala's Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota, PP).

The revitalization of the third forces, however, has been of a different nature. In Uruguay the third force was one of the traditional parties, the Communist Party (Partido Comunista, PC) which obtained 17.5 percent of the votes in the first round, a figure that made it impossible for the Broad Front's candidate to achieve an absolute majority against the White Party's candidate. However, there was a different scenario in the other three countries with a considerable presence of third forces. In these countries, a third

candidate emerged between the ruling class and the opposition, attracting around 20 percent of the vote.¹⁸ However, while in Chile and Brazil these candidates emerged within the party or coalition government with dissident candidates, the third candidate in Colombia rose from different ranks from the opposition to the left of Uribe.¹⁹ In Peru five candidates gained over 10 percent of the vote in the first round, and the concentration of the vote between two candidates was the lowest by far of all elections held (see Table 1). In the same way, in Guatemala the three candidates received more than 15 percent of the vote in the first round, gaining just 75 percent of the vote.

There are four groups of countries in terms of the registered voter turnout in the elections held between 2009 and 2011. The first group would be characterized by very low participation, as was the case in the presidential and legislative elections in both Honduras and Colombia as well as the legislative elections in Mexico. The legislative elections in the Dominican Republic and the legislative and presidential elections in El Salvador would fall in the second group, defined as low participation. Elections in other countries, therefore, could be included in the third group, with average turnout (Ecuador, Panama, Argentina,²⁰ Costa Rica, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) or in the fourth group with high participation in elections (Brazil, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia). The scenario described shows a tendency to middle and high levels of participation. Notably, in two extreme cases—Mexico and Brazil—the number of invalid ballots was over 5 percent. In Mexico there had been a deliberate campaign for the “null vote,” and in the end the invalid ballots option came fourth in the Mexican elections.

Participation must take into account the degree of inclusion of sectors that have been excluded in the past for ethnic, social, economic, or cultural reasons. In this sense,

¹⁸ Despite not having studies based on post-election surveys, there seems to be a hypothesis about the existence of a common national youth vote accompanied by national expressions in each country. In the case of Brazil the evangelical vote has been mobilized, and in Chile there was discontent with the candidate of the coalition as in the case of Colombia with the disappointment generated by the proposals of the PDA.

¹⁹ This refers to Marco Enriquez Ominami, a Chilean socialist activist who left the Coalition and obtained 20.1 percent of the votes, to Marina Silva of Brazil Green Party who before separating from the PT had been minister with Lula and gained 19.3 percent of the vote, and to Antanas Mockus, the Colombian PV figure who emerged as a different option to the PDA, clearly opposed to Uribe, and who got 21.5 percent of the votes in the first round.

²⁰ It should be noted, however, that Argentina had the lowest voter turnout since the transition in 2009.

the most favorable scenario has occurred in Bolivia, where abstention has been reduced by more than twenty percentage points in the last decade as a result of a wider mobilization of the indigenous groups, increasing the country's overall turnout in elections to 94.5 percent.

As noted above, in much of Latin America unequal allocation of seats or the small size of the districts have favored less populous districts with a larger number of seats than their share, creating an “over-representation” effect. The Dominican Republic is one of the most acute cases, taking into account that the PLD gained 41.6 percent of the popular vote and 57.3 percent of the total number of seats (without forgetting that in the senate with the same percentage of votes the party obtained 96.8 percent of the senators, given that it follows the principle of majority representation). Likewise, in Venezuela the last electoral reform, which changed the electoral districts, favored the current president, giving more seats to the sixteen states that support the ruling PSUV, to the detriment of the eight opponents, given that with 48 percent of the popular vote the party won about 60 percent of the national assembly.²¹ In Chile the UDI, which is the party that benefits most from the disproportionate system, obtained 30.8 percent of the seats with 23 percent of the vote. Mexico, due to the governability clause contained in its own constitution, maintains a fairly high potential for disproportionate results,²² although this did not occur in the 2009 elections.

In Latin America, given the federal nature of some countries and the weight of regions in others, the vote ends up having marked differences from one area to another. This situation means that we must pay attention to the territorial dynamic of the vote. This is projected either by the emergence of significant political forces at a local level or by the concentration of the vote of various national parties with varying intensity in different districts. This aspect of Latin American electoral behavior has gained importance in the last decade. However, in the last election, two of the countries with the

²¹ With data from 1999 Snyder and Samuels (2004) point to Argentina as the case of the most disproportionate results amongst the bicameral federal countries in the region and the third considering all countries. For the last legislative elections, however, no official aggregated data exist at the national level, a fact that precludes comparison with the other national cases cited here.

²² Under a clause in Article 54, Section V, of the constitution, the party that gained 42 percent of the votes obtained an absolute majority of the lower chamber.

greatest electoral tensions were Ecuador and Bolivia. In Ecuador the classic division between the coast and the sierra was mitigated, allowing Rafael Correa to nationalize the vote to a greater degree than in previous elections. Similarly, Evo Morales, with electoral support above 60 percent in the center of the country and 75 percent in the west, was able to increase his support to 43 percent in the departments in the east of the country, reducing the gap that existed just five years previously. In Peru the vote also had a distinct geographic component. Humala gained more support in the center and south and Fujimori in the north and on the outskirts of Lima, while the votes of the defeated Toledo, Kuczynski, and Castañeda were concentrated in the capital.

In Venezuela the country was split into two regions since the ruling PSUV won two-thirds of all states (primarily the rural and less populated ones), whereas the opposition party MUD won in eight states (Anzoategui, Carabobo, Capital District, Merida, Miranda, New South Wales, Tachira, and Zulia). In Brazil there was also a regional split, with the opposition Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) controlling the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná, and Goiás which together make up 47 percent of the population and produce almost 54 percent of GDP, while the PT took hold in the north-east.

PARTY SYSTEMS

The changes in party systems that began during the first decade of the century have been confirmed after the 2009–2011 electoral period. In Bolivia and Ecuador, possibly the two countries most affected by the beginning of the demise of the traditional parties in the previous election, this trend has been confirmed with the re-establishment of a new party system that is slowly taking hold. However, towards the end of 2011 a clearly different scenario has been recorded in both countries. In Bolivia there is a situation of bipartisanship, with the Movement toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) as an unstructured, hegemonic party resulting in a number of effective parties that is less than two. In Ecuador a multiparty scenario still prevails but with the smallest number of effective parties in the country's legislative history, since the various forces that support the Country Alliance Movement (Alianza Patria Activa I Soberana, PAIS) of President

Rafael Correa control 47 percent of the seats in the assembly. The movement, rather than partisan, format of the political forces in power expresses the way in which these countries have overcome the great ethnic and regional fragmentation of their societies, which also excluded large sectors from the political scene until just a few years ago.

Costa Rica has continued to move towards a multiparty system, away from its historic bipartisan conformation with the consolidation of the Libertarian Movement (Movimiento Libertario, ML) and, above all, the PAC. This has also happened in Colombia, where the two historical parties, PCC and PL, are still going strong, together with Uribe's U Party, which was founded in 2002, and new formations such as the Green Party (Partido Verde, PV), PDA, the Radical Change Party (Cambio Radical, CR), the Citizens' Convergence Movement, and other minority groups. In Argentina the fragmentation of the party system, a phenomenon that had been occurring in previous years, has reached its highest levels yet.²³ Peru has also joined the trend of extreme fragmentation that results from support for highly personalistic candidates who give the system a multiparty profile but without parties, something that is also the case in Guatemala.

In the opposite direction, the Dominican Republic is moving towards bipartisanship since the virtual breakdown of the PRSC. El Salvador, albeit to a lesser extent, is also reducing its number of effective legislative parties, showing a tendency toward bipartisanship. Uruguay, meanwhile, stopped the decline of the number of parties in 2004, heading towards a three-party system. Possibly the most novel case is Venezuela, where the opposition was incorporated into the assembly after being completely absent in the previous legislature, having not presented itself for election. Unlike the bipartisanship in the Bolivian parliament, Venezuela's political alignment is split between two major blocs²⁴ with a minor hinge party, Fatherland for All (Patria para Todos, PPT), whose seats may be decisive in the adoption of enabling legislation. There

²³ The number of effective legislative parties in the chamber of deputies in Argentina resulting from the last election is almost double that of a decade ago. The number of senators also increased, but to a lesser extent.

²⁴ The opposition MUD integrates a group of parties, the most relevant of which are A New Time (Un Tiempo Nuevo, UTN), the most voted opposition party, Justice First (Primero Justicia, PJ), and the historical Democratic Action Party (Acción Democrática, AD). At the front lies the government of the PSUV as the dominant political force.

is a similar situation in Nicaragua surrounding opposition between Sandinistas and Liberals.

In the other national cases the party systems have remained stable, and there have only been very slight changes after the last elections. Consequently, there is a dominant note of a relative continuity of party systems in Latin America and, in some cases, the confirmation of the trends set over the last two elections. In this context, it should be stressed that the previous elections of 2005–2007 acted as more of a watershed than the elections of 2009–2011, except for the Venezuelan case.

In a number of the Latin American countries considered here the presidential “zero sum” logic has created bipolar situations that did not result in the consolidation of bipartisanship. The presidential polarizing factor is increased when confrontational projects are incorporated into the policy area or when historical social polarization is exacerbated by new types of strongman or *caudillista* politics, as is the case in Nicaragua. We should also take into account exclusively oppositional logics when establishing electoral alliances, for instance in the case of the anti-PRDists in Panama, anti-Peronism in Argentina, the post-Pinochet cleavage in Chile after the transition to democracy, and the polar opposition between the PLD and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, PRD).

As has been explained, legislative bipartisanship is only present in four countries: Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In contrast, Brazil,²⁵ Chile, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Guatemala have higher effective number of legislative parties—over 3.70—which indicates an obvious situation of pluralism. Uruguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Mexico are in the middle, with indices of between 2.65 and 3.04. However, as discussed in the next section, multipartism is diluted in the everyday political arena, generating a bipolar framework, as is the case in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru, and Guatemala.

Therefore, this bipolar situation, which was present in twelve countries towards the end of 2011, has produced a political landscape in Latin America in which there are systems with government parties that mean that most executives have their own

²⁵ In the Brazilian elections of 2010 twenty-seven parties received votes as compared to twenty-eight parties in 2006.

legislative majority or, if not, a negotiated majority. The logic of multiparty systems with their emphasis on consensual mechanisms is found only in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Guatemala, something that has been happening for over a decade in these five countries.

From an ideological point of view and at the presidential level, the leftist trend is being consolidated, particularly in the cases of Ecuador, Uruguay, Brazil, and Nicaragua. Bolivia also belongs to this group, but on a more radical level. This group of five countries can also be joined by El Salvador and Peru. By contrast, on the other side of the ideological spectrum, an opposite trend was consolidated in the recent elections held in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, as well as Panama, Honduras, and Chile as a result of alternations that took place. Table 4 presents partial evidence of this.

Polarization also reflects the ideological distance that separates the parties or blocks in a number of countries considered here (see Appendix IV). However, there have been historical trends towards lower levels of ideological polarization in Panama, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. Costa Rica is progressively going in the same direction, given the rightward turn by the PLN. There are two situations in these countries: either the ideological differences between the relevant parties on the left-right scale are very small, or these parties are all located towards the right.

Another feature of the elections considered here is the fact that Latin American political parties continue to maintain largely clientelistic patterns, *caudillistic* leadership styles, and low levels of institutionalization that make them more similar to voting machines. The first two elements are particularly present in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua. This lack of institutionalization mainly affects systems that have recently undergone a process of re-foundation such as in the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and in Guatemala. In some of these cases the process of consolidation is just beginning.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE: AN ATTEMPT AT AN EXPLANATION

The political landscape created after the latest round of elections has once again produced a well-known scenario, with heterogeneous characteristics. The complex relations

between the executive and the legislative branches are due to a presidential form of government that coexists with mechanisms of proportional representation that—despite the majoritarian aspects outlined above—have a very significant impact on the make-up of parliaments, as well as with certain regional tensions. In addition, *caudillistic* traditions continue to be present in Latin America, as well as the trend toward a multiparty system, described in the previous section, without incorporating patterns of cooperation that could improve competition.

There are three models that define these relationships, dividing the set of countries studied here into different groups. First is the group of six countries where the government has a parliamentary minority (El Salvador,²⁶ Guatemala,²⁷ Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico,²⁸ and Chile²⁹). Secondly, there are eight countries where the government has a parliamentary majority (Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Nicaragua). Finally, in three countries the government has majority support, thanks to a broad coalition (Panama, Colombia, and Brazil) and given that their political life, especially that of the first two, is characterized by patterns of remarkable stability and certainty. In this last group of countries the option of a coalition is presented in an almost closed manner before the election, and this results in the conformation of ministerial positions for its members. Large coalitions around the candidacies of Martinelli in Panama³⁰ and Santos in Colombia³¹ ensure a calm executive-

²⁶ Shortly after the start of the term the situation was complicated in El Salvador when a group of deputies left ARENA to form a new political party, the Grand Alliance for National Unity or “WIN” (Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional, GANA).

²⁷ The high level of party switching in Guatemala currently makes it very difficult to predict the position of executive-legislative relations once the legislature starts operating.

²⁸ While in Mexico new coalitions are developing that are more pragmatic than ideological in many states, this momentum has not reached the national level.

²⁹ Sebastian Piñera has fifty-seven members from the UDI and RN in congress but, while he also has the support of the four “independent” pro-Alliance and (on occasions) two Regionalist Party of Independents (Partido Regionalista de los Independientes, PRI) deputies, they act as a “wild card,” which makes it difficult to attain the required majority of sixty-one deputies. The senate has only fifteen UDI and RN senators, making it even more difficult to achieve the majority of nineteen although, again, the two independents are pro-Alliance. Piñera has also received support from PDC Senator Hosain Sabag Castillo.

³⁰ Ricardo Martinelli, in a national assembly composed of seventy-one deputies, has the support of thirteen deputies of his party, CD, to which twenty-two members of the PP, four of the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica, UP), and two of the National Republican Liberal Movement (Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista, MOLIRENA) can be added.

legislative relationship from the government's perspective. In Brazil alone the geometry of the coalition government has greater variability patterns due to the much greater fragmentation of the party system, so it often happens that the coalition supporting the executive comprises up to seven parties.³²

TABLE 3	
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN 2011	
Type of situation	Country
Minority government	El Salvador
	Mexico
	Costa Rica
	Chile
	Peru
	Guatemala
Coalitional majority government	Panama
	Colombia
	Brazil
Government majority	Argentina
	Ecuador
	Uruguay
	Honduras
	Bolivia
	Dominican Republic
	Nicaragua
	Venezuela
Author's own elaboration.	

The type of strategies adopted by the executive to take forward its political agenda depends on the situation of the presidential party in the legislature: that is, whether it can or cannot count on a large legislative contingent, as well as the type of legislative powers that the constitution or laws offer leaders (García Montero 2009). The political weakness of the president becomes a determining factor in the strategy that compels governments to negotiate with other parties in seeking legislative support. For this reason, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru, which have not formed stable closed coalitions, are seeking legislative support—even if just temporarily—for the

³¹ At the beginning of his term Juan Manuel Santos had stable support from the PCC, the U, and the Party for National Integration (Partido de Integración Nacional, PIN), which gave him sixty-seven of the hundred and two senate seats and eighty-six of the hundred and sixty-four lower house. Gradually he has been gaining the support of other liberal groups to increase his margin for maneuvering.

³² In this regard, see the evolution of Brazilian presidential coalitions in recent years in Alcántara and Melo (2008).

approval of certain legislative packages that are part of the government's agenda. Brazil, as has been said, offers an intermediate scenario.

On the other hand, the majority tradition of some countries has led to completely new situations. For example, Rafael Correa of Ecuador is the first president who has won in the first round with a comfortable majority in congress. Ricardo Martinelli is also the president who has obtained the most votes in the Panamanian presidential elections. In the same way Porfirio Lobo achieved the highest electoral percentage by a president in the recent history of Honduras. The Bolivian MAS gained a qualified majority of two-thirds in the legislature and it is also first time that the ruling party has gained control of the senate, a position of dominance that the PSUV in Venezuela could not attain.

TABLE 4

IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING OF THE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGISLATURES AND THEIR DIFFERENCES

President-Country *	Ideological Positioning of the Presidents A	Average Ideological Positioning of the Legislature B	Difference between A and B
Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua	1.96	4.69	- 2.73
Evo Morales, Bolivia	2.21	4.35	- 2.14
Mauricio Funes, El Salvador	3.11	5.30	- 2.19
José Mujica, Uruguay	3.26	4.76	- 1.50
Rafael Correa, Ecuador	3.43	4.00	- 0.57
Ollanta Humala, Peru	4.14	4.81	- 0.67
Cristina Fernández, Argentina	5.79	4.62	1.17
Porfirio Lobo, Honduras	5.87	5.84	0.03
Leonel Fernández, Dominican R.	5.87	6.56	0.69
Laura Chinchilla, Costa Rica	7.07	6.18	0.89
Sebastián Piñera, Chile	7.29	5.51	1.78
Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia	7.68	6.39	1.29
Felipe Calderón, Mexico	8.18	6.14	2.04
Ricardo Martinelli, Panama	8.64	6.73	1.91

Mean values as assessed by legislators on a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right.

* No data available for Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), and Otto Pérez Molina (Guatemala).

Source: PELA (1994–2011).

However, there are significant differences in the ideological position of the presidents. This can be measured by the perceptions of members of the legislature and the average position of the congress, again according to the perceptions of the legislators (Table 4). This allows for different governance scenarios, integrating these differences

with the types of situations arising strictly from executive-legislative relations, in terms having a majority or not, as presented above (Table 2).

According to these data, there are three governance scenarios (Table 5). One is a situation of complex governance that combines greater ideological distance between president and congress (over 2) where both are in minority. In contrast there is also a more simple type of governance scenario where there is a small ideological distance and a government with parliamentary majority. In between these two scenarios there is a more neutral scene.

TABLE 5

GOVERNANCE SCENARIOS 2011: STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT PLUS IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE

Type of Scenario	Country
Complex governance	El Salvador
	Mexico
Neutral governance	Nicaragua
	Peru
	Panama
	Costa Rica
	Chile
	Bolivia
	Uruguay
Simple governance	Argentina
	Colombia
	Ecuador
	Honduras
	Dominican Republic

Author's own elaboration.

CONCLUSION

The elections that have taken place over a period of three years have been another step in the democratic electoral path that began in Latin America in the late 1970s. The democratic development index data for 2011 continue to show striking disparities in the region.³³ Furthermore, they show that only three of the seventeen countries studied in this

³³ Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica stand out from other countries given their high democratic development. Peru, Panama, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil form a second group of countries that complete the set of eight that exceed the regional average. The rest of the countries present low

paper have improved their positions since 2009.³⁴ Likewise, only three countries have made progress in one of the dimensions that makes up the proposed index, the political rights and civil liberties dimension,³⁵ reflecting a situation of political impasse.

This paper has tried to emphasize the extent to which certain sets of indicators offer a richer picture of Latin American diversity and at the same time confirm that stability has been the dominant note following the elections held between 2009 and 2011. This situation is accompanied by the consolidation of trends already established in the previous elections or, more broadly, over the past two decades. The profound shift in Bolivian politics, which is probably the most important development since 2005, has only reaffirmed the constitutional development that will configure a new state, as well as a new matrix in the relations between society and politics, undoubtedly becoming the main theme that will guide the political class in the coming years. Similarly, the anomalous elections of Honduras and Nicaragua are nothing more than the repetition of historically precarious situations, where clientelism in both cases and oligarchic politics in the first case find fertile ground and where the lack of accountability and *caudillistic* trends abound with no restrictions whatsoever in the second case.

Analyzing the elections together has revealed considerable shortcomings when registering a qualitative leap in procedural issues related to campaign financing, the slow pace of public debates among candidates, and the insistence of parties on the monopoly of representation which leads them to such extremes as to block the practice of enhancing internal elections to select candidates. The elections have also shown that, despite the profusion of electoral reforms, fundamental questions remain regarding the proportionality of the systems or the implementation of reliable mechanisms of

democratic development, situating themselves in the last four places: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Guatemala. See <http://www.idd-lat.org/>.

³⁴ The period covered by the IDD-Lat ranges from 2002 to 2011, 2009 being the year with maximum regional values, while 2010 and 2011 have shown two consecutive years of falling. Between 2009 and 2011 only Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru have increased their score, while Chile maintained its values. See <http://www.idd-lat.org/>.

³⁵ I refer to Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. This dimension is composed of the following indicators: vote of political commitment, index of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House), gender in government, and conditioning of freedoms and rights by insecurity. See <http://www.idd-lat.org/>.

recounting agile votes, something that is evident in Brazil due to the consolidation of electronic voting.

Regarding the organizational aspect of electoral processes, including candidate selection, the threshold of fair electoral campaigns that is mainly related to funding and the electoral process itself, given that in some regions vote buying practices still exist, are issues that are worth emphasizing when considering higher standards of democracy.

On the other hand, there are countries in the region that have successfully overcome challenges of a varying nature and importance that until recently generated a degree of uncertainty in their respective political systems. In Brazil the challenge was finding a PT leader able to succeed Lula and to continue the PT's project of social inclusion, progress and regional leadership. In Colombia the issue was the constitutional court blocking a new attempt to amend the constitution to make way for Uribe's reelection aspirations. In Bolivia a ruling party without political structures, and whose deputies suffer from dual loyalties to the party and the social groups they represent, has nonetheless succeeded in effectively managing power. In El Salvador the Left reached power for the first time in its history, leaving behind the demons of the traumatic war only two decades ago. Chile saw the first alternation in power after the restoration of democracy, led by a right-wing government that has no ties with the military. In Venezuela there has been a shift from a monochromatic parliament to the integration of the opposition into parliamentary life, although their room for maneuver is very limited. Finally, in Peru the Left has reached power through a formula that is not strictly *caudillistic*, in a framework that confirms the decomposition of the historical party system and the difficulties of building a new one, given that it is a system based more on candidates than parties. Furthermore, most of the countries discussed here are now resolving their everyday challenges in a context of widespread institutional normality.

At the same time, the fact that many of the elections analyzed here took place in 2009, a year in which Latin American economies not only interrupted their high growth rate of previous years but plunged on average by 1.9 percent (ECLAC 2011) has interesting explanatory implications from the perspective of economic voting. The continuity of many parties in power and the alternations in El Salvador, Panama, Honduras, Chile, Peru, and Guatemala are more linked to the end of the political cycle

than to punishment by the electorate due to the adverse economic situation. Furthermore, the removal of any climate of uncertainty³⁶ has resulted in the very quick recovery of growth rates prior to the crisis.³⁷ However, a detailed study of these national cases, focusing on the causes that explain voting behavior and paying particular attention to the characteristics of their institutional contexts, would offer more definitive conclusions.³⁸

Finally, the consolidation of elections throughout the region over nearly three decades opens the possibility, for the first time, of carrying out longitudinal comparative studies. We could consider, for example, the impact on the party platforms and the validation—or not—of programs and leadership, as well as voting behavior at the individual and/or aggregate level. In this way, we shall be able to draw conclusions about long-term trends emerging in Latin America's democratic political systems.

³⁶ Frot and Santiso (2010, 36) confirm that elections have an effect on portfolio flows only when they produce some kind of political uncertainty.

³⁷ The estimated growth for Latin America as a whole in 2011 is 4.3 percent less than the percentage in 2010. See ECLAC (2011).

³⁸ On the relationship between economic voting and the political context in Latin America see Benton (2005) and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2008).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX IA

VOTER TURNOUT IN LATIN AMERICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ELECTORAL ROLL IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

ARGENTINA														
	1983	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009
Electoral Roll	85.61	83.77	84.0	85.29	79.93	80.33	82.08	79.62	82.22	72.92	71.77	73.31	76.21	72.39
BOLIVIA														
	1980		1985	1989		1993		1997		2002		2005		2009
Electoral Roll	74.32		81.97	73.66		72.16		71.36		72.06		84.51		94.55
BRAZIL														
	1982	1986		1990		1994		1998		2002		2006		2010
Electoral Roll	82.31	94.98		85.83		81.94		78.49		66.96		83.27		81.76
CHILE														
	1989		1993		1997		2001			2005		2009		
Electoral Roll	94.72		91.34		87.32		87.11			87.67		86.66		
COLOMBIA														
	1978	1982	1986		1990	1991	1994	1998		2002		2006	2010	
Electoral Roll	33.23	40.66	44.26		53.60	38.54	32.52	45.41		43.37		39.94	43.56	
COSTA RICA														
	1978	1982		1986	1990	1994	1998		2002		2006		2010	
Electoral Roll	81.24	78.62		81.81	81.79	81.09	69.92		68.84		65.20		71.63	
DOMINICANREPUBLIC														
	1978	1982		1986		1990	1994	1998		2002		2006		2010
Electoral Roll	72.91	73.12		69.49		58.44	82.35	51.91		51.61		59.16		56.43
ECUADOR														
Provincial	1979	1984		1986		1988		1990	1994	1996	1998	2002	2006	
Electoral Roll	80.4	71.2		74.0		77.3		67.7	65.5	67.8	86.2	-	75.9	
National	1979	1984		1988		1994	1996	1998						
Electoral Roll	80.20	70.6		77.10		65.50	67.9	64.2						
EL SALVADOR														
	1985	1988		1991		1994	1997	2000		2003	2006		2009	
Electoral Roll	42.00	67.74		52.89		51.52	39.18	38.48		41.03	54.22		53.58	
GUATEMALA														
	1985		1990		1994		1995		1999	2003			2007	
Electoral Roll	69.28		56.43		21.02		46.80		53.36	57.89			60.47	
HONDURAS														

MEXICO										
	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009
Electoral Roll	72.53	51.82	49.43	65.93	76.02	57.66	63.59	41.29	57.87	44.69
NICARAGUA										
	1984	1990		1996		2001	2006		2011	
Electoral Roll	75.41	86.30		75.62		-	61.04		-	
PANAMA										
	1994		1999			2004		2009		
Electoral Roll	72.81		74.78			76.26		72.53		
PARAGUAY										
	1989		1993			1998	2003		2008	
Electoral Roll	52.01		68.16			80.54	64.12		65.43	
PERU										
	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2006	2011		
Electoral Roll	70.67	79.30	68.09	66.48	81.98	80.42	77.99	83.72		
URUGUAY										
	1984	1989		1994		1999		2004	2009	
Electoral Roll	87.87	88.67		91.42		91.78		89.61	89.86	
VENEZUELA										
	1978		1983	1988	1993	1998	2000	2005	2010	
Electoral Roll	87.56		87.75	81.65	60.16	52.44	56.55	25.26	62.44	

APPENDIX IB

**VOTER TURNOUT IN LATIN AMERICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTING-AGE POPULATION
IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS**

ARGENTINA

1983	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009
80.71	79.70	81.42	82.01	77.27	77.88	79.76	78.51	81.77	72.58	70.95	71.56	-	-

BOLIVIA

1980	1985	1989	1993	1997	2002	2005	2009
54.30	55.44	45.57	45.25	54.76	62.15	59.23	-

BRAZIL

1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
64.77	78.65	78.48	76.54	74.15	62.07	-	-

CHILE

1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009
89.30	84.50	73.95	67.72	63.64	-

COLOMBIA

1978	1982	1986	1990	1991	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
30.11	35.87	39.59	39.00	27.25	25.41	38.50	37.74	-	-

COSTA RICA

1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
72.60	73.37	78.85	78.64	75.97	62.43	60.01	-	-

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
62.18	63.21	62.44	50.36	69.36	44.64	43.94	-	-

ECUADOR Provincial

1979	1984	1986	1988	1990	1994	1996	1998	2002	2006
42.81	57.96	64.55	69.52	64.42	64.58	67.75	85.90	-	-
1979	1984	1988	1994	1996	1998				

ECUADOR National

42.71	57.52	69.36	64.58	67.83	63.97				
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	--	--	--	--

EL SALVADOR

1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009
44.72	40.84	40.33	47.19	35.48	35.16	37.70	-	-

GUATEMALA											
1985		1990		1994	1995	1999	2003		2007		
51.11		42.25		15.31	35.38	43.43	48.05		-		
HONDURAS											
1981		1985	1989		1993	1997	2001	2005	2009		
70.71		80.81	79.02		67.77	69.26	65.62	-	-		
MEXICO											
1982	1985	1988	1991		1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	
65.78	48.04	45.17	53.01		69.61	55.06	62.44	40.77	-	-	
NICARAGUA											
1984		1990		1996		2001		2006	2011		
-		75.29		75.05		74.94		-	-		
PANAMA											
1994			1999			2004		2009			
70.77			73.18			73.82		-			
PARAGUAY											
1989		1993			1998	2003		2008			
55.29		48.66			59.10	47.05		-			
PERU											
1980	1985	1990		1995		2000		2001	2006	2011	
51.52	64.79	58.17		59.10		77.16		75.32	-	-	
URUGUAY											
1984		1989		1994		1999	2004		2009		
93.51		95.67		95.23		94.69	92.01		-		
VENEZUELA											
1978	1983		1988		1993		1998		2000	2005	2010
76.67	81.50		76.01		50.14		42.08		44.95	21.87	-

Source: OIR (2011), compiled by Cecilia Rodriguez.

Notes:

-Voter turnout is calculated based on total votes cast (valid votes + blank + appealed + nullified).

-Voter turnout data corresponds to the election of legislators in the house; for countries with bicameral systems, does not include data for senators.

-Data on Voting-Age Population (VAP) are calculated from CELADE of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Population Division, Demographic Bulletin 71, "Latin America: Population by Calendar Years (1995–2005)."

Ecuador: Until 1998 members of congress were elected by a system of proportional representation in a national constituency and in provincial constituencies, hence the distinction between national and provincial legislative elections. Since the 2009 elections the deputies passed to be called assembly members.

No data on the number of votes in the 2002 legislative elections.

Honduras: The electoral participation calculation for the 2005 legislative elections was not performed owing to inability to obtain the total number of voters: voters can deposit as many votes as the magnitude of their respective district department permits, thus the sum of votes exceeds the number of voters.

Nicaragua: No data available on the number of registered voters in the 2001 election, for that reason only calculated turnout as the VAP.

The calculation of voter turnout for the elections of 2006 has been made on the basis of the total valid votes only, because of lack of data on blank and nullified votes.

No data on the number of registered voters in the 2011 elections, so the calculation is based on turnout.

Dominican Republic: Voter turnouts for elections in the years 1978, 1986, and 1994 were calculated based on the valid votes since the central electoral board has not provided information on null and blank votes.

APPENDIX IC

VOTER TURNOUT IN LATIN AMERICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ELECTORAL ROLL IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

ARGENTINA								
	1983	1989	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Electoral Roll	85.61	85.29	82.08	82.29	78.21	76.18	79.38	
BOLIVIA								
	1980	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009
Electoral Roll	74.32	81.97	73.66	72.16	71.36	72.06	84.51	94.55
BRAZIL								
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010		
Electoral Roll	88.08	82.24	78.51	74.45	83.25	81.88		
CHILE								
	1989	1993	1999	2005	2009			
Electoral Roll	94.70	91.31	89.94%	87.67	87.16			
COLOMBIA								
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
Electoral Roll	40.34	49.81	43.31	42.48	33.95	51.22	46.47	45.05
COSTA RICA								
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
Electoral Roll	81.27	78.63	81.82	81.81	81.11	69.99	68.84	65.21
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC								
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1996	2000	2004
Electoral Roll	72.91	73.12	69.49	59.79	83.81	77.63	76.14	72.83
ECUADOR								
	1978	1984	1988	1992	1996	1998	2002	2006
Electoral Roll	72.08	70.09	77.7	71.1	68.00	64.02	65.00	72.20
EL SALVADOR								
	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009		
Electoral Roll	56.31	54.70	50.73	38.57	68.50	62.92		
GUATEMALA								
	1985	1990	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Electoral Roll	69.28	56.43	46.80	53.76	57.89	60.36	69.38	

HONDURAS								
	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009
Electoral Roll	76.48	84.04	75.97	64.96	71.09	66.26	55.08	49.87
MEXICO								
	1982	1988		1994		2000	2006	
Electoral Roll	74.83	50.18		76.70		63.56	58.13	
NICARAGUA								
	1984	1990		1996	2001	2006		2011
Electoral Roll	75.42	86.23		76.39	-	66.84		-
PANAMA								
	1994		1999		2004		2009	
Electoral Roll	62.62		76.17		76.93		74.00	
PARAGUAY								
	1989	1993		1998		2003	2008	
Electoral Roll	53.44	69.46		80.54		64.29	60.34	
PERU								
	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2006	2011
Electoral Roll	79.97	90.54	78.27	73.21	82.83	82.28	88.71	83.71
URUGUAY								
	1984	1989		1994	1999	2004	2009	
Electoral Roll	87.87	88.67		91.42	91.78	89.61	89.86	
VENEZUELA								
	1978	1983		1988	1993	1998	2000	2006
Electoral Roll	87.55	87.75		81.92	60.16	63.45	56.63	74.69

APPENDIX ID

**VOTER TURNOUT IN LATIN AMERICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTING-AGE
POPULATION IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

ARGENTINA								
	1983	1989	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
VAP	80.71	82.01	79.76	81.83	77.32	-	-	
BOLIVIA								
	1980	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009
VAP	54.30	55.44	45.57	45.25	54.76	62.15	59.23	-
BRAZIL								
	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010		
VAP	80.88	76.82	74.16	69.01	-	-		
CHILE								
	1989	1993	1999	2005		2009		
VAP	89.31	84.41	73.09	63.64		-		
COLOMBIA								
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
VAP	36.56	43.94	41.42	30.90	26.53	43.43	40.79	-
COSTA RICA								
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
VAP	72.63	73.37	78.87	78.66	75.99	62.49	60.02	-
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC								
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1996	2000	2004
VAP	62.18	63.21	62.44	51.52	70.58	64.11	63.59	63.92
ECUADOR								
	1978	1984	1988	1992	1996	1998	2002	2006
VAP	40.02	57.74	69.95	69.01	67.90	63.96	65.92	-
EL SALVADOR								
	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009		
VAP	59.07	36.88	46.47	35.09	58.74	-		
GUATEMALA								
	1985	1990	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
VAP	51.11	42.25	35.38	43.76	48.05	-	-	

HONDURAS								
VAP	70.71	80.81	79.02	67.77	69.26	65.78	55.06	-
MEXICO								
VAP	67.87	45.85	70.23	62.41	2006 -			
NICARAGUA								
VAP	-	75.23	75.81	75.38	2006 -		2011 -	
PANAMA								
VAP	60.86	74.54	74.46	2009 -				
PARAGUAY								
VAP	58.80	49.58	59.10	47.17	2008 -			
PERU								
VAP	58.30	73.97	66.86	65.08	77.95	77.06	-	-
URUGUAY								
VAP	93.51	95.67	95.23	94.69	92.01	2009 -		
VENEZUELA								
VAP	76.66	81.50	76.26	50.14	51.02	45.38	2006 -	

Source: OIR (2011), compiled by Cecilia Rodriguez.

Notes:

- Voter turnout is calculated based on total votes cast (valid votes + blank + appealed + nullified).
- The participation data are for the presidential election in the first round.
- Data on Voting-Age Population (VAP) are calculated from CELADE of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Population Division, Demographic Bulletin 71, "Latin America: Population by Calendar Years (1995–2005)."

Nicaragua: No data available on the number of registered voters in the 2001 election, so only calculated turnout as the VAP.

The calculation of voter turnout for the elections of 2006 has been made on the basis of the total valid votes only, because of lack of data on blank and nullified votes.

No data on the number of registered voters in the 2011 elections, so the calculation is based on turnout.

Paraguay: The 2000 elections were to choose the position of vice president.

Dominican Republic: Voter turnout for the elections of 1996 was calculated based on the valid votes, since the central electoral board has not provided information on null and blank votes.

APPENDIX IIA

ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

ARGENTINA

1983–1985	1985–1987	1987–1989	1989–1991	1991–1993	1993–1995	1995–1997	1997–1999	1999–2001	2001–2003
23.03	23.77	17.97	19.25	10.17	23.98	36.24	11.75	30.97	27.95

BOLIVIA

1985–1989	1989–1993	1993–1997	1997–2002	2002–2005	2005–2009
31.45	39.33	25.88	56.18	66.29	40.68

BRAZIL

1986–1990	1990–1994	1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
35.62	18.01	15.26	15.30	17.35	11.1.

CHILE

1989–1993	1993–1997	1997–2001	2001–2005	2005–2010
25.18	9.72	18.38	10.77	18.15

COLOMBIA

1982–1986	1986–1990	1990–1991	1991–1994	1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
14.11	14.17	25.51	22.6	29.65	39.59	51.57	51.04

COSTA RICA

1978–1982	1982–1986	1986–1990	1990–1994	1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
23.49	18.54	10.41	12.04	15.89%	31.44	27.11	19.37

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1978–1982	1982–1986	1986–1990	1990–1994	1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
10.88	13.24	23.72	26.31	22.76	10.56	24.9	25.64

ECUADOR									
1979–1984	1984–1986	1986–1988	1988–1990	1990–1992	1992–1994	1994–1996	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2009
41.51	17.55	28.40	26.30	24.87	15.56	27.70	41.0	42.20	–
EL SALVADOR									
1985–1988		1988–1991	1991–1994	1994–1997	1997–2000	2000–2003	2003–2006	2006–2009	
24.30		18.56	27.14	24.52	14.76	10.94	11.98	4.31	
GUATEMALA									
1985–1990		1990–1994	1994–1995	1995–1999		1999–2003		2003–2007	
55.62		54.21	46.78	42.54		51.14		46.64	
HONDURAS									
1981–1985	1985–1989	1989–1993	1993–1997		1997–2001	2001–2005		2005–2009	
4.21	7.22	9.59	5.07		7.5	6.11		15.14	
MEXICO									
1991–1994		1994–1997	1997–2000	2000–2003		2003–2006		2006–2009	
19.48		13.57	15.32	12.15		20.16		23.7	
NICARAGUA									
1984–1990		1990–1996		1996–2001		2001–2006			
56.43		17.07		15.31		35.94			
PANAMA									
1994–1999			1999–2004			2004–2009			
31.08			18.73			23.56			
PARAGUAY									
1989–1993		1993–1998		1998–2003		2003–2008			
33.91		19.74		38.47		16.32			

PERU						
1980–1985	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
52.65	50.25	68.99	41.28	46.40	44.66	44.49
URUGUAY						
1984–1989	1989–1994	1994–1999		1999–2004		2004–2009
13.42	16.97	10.07		26.75		7.79
VENEZUELA						
1978–1983	1983–1988	1988–1993	1993–1998	1998–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010
15.75	19.66	35.18	42.03	39.62	48.23	51

APPENDIX IIB**ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS****ARGENTINA**

1983–1989	1989–1995	1995–1999	1999–2003	2003–2007
24.795	34.46	43.12	72.28	49.92

BOLIVIA

1985–1989	1989–1993	1993–1997	1997–2002	2002–2005	2005–2009
33.26	39.33	27.79	56.20	69.75	40.60

BRAZIL

1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
17.65	44.82	30.32	19.53

CHILE

1989–1993	1993–1999	1999–2005	2005–2009
20.42	23.48	30.31	44.98

COLOMBIA

1982–1986	1986–1990	1990–1994	1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
17.66	38.78	37.09	29.75	25.94	26.03	37.08

COSTA RICA

1978–1982	1982–1986	1986–1990	1990–1994	1994–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2010
19.41	13.37	6.11	4.84	6.15	28.05	39.55	21.00

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1978–1982	1982–1986	1986–1990	1990–1994	1994–1996	1996–2000	2000–2004	2004–2008
10.88	13.24	17.54	27.415	28.105	15.71	33.77	7.54

ECUADOR								
1979–1984	1984–1988	1988–1992	1992–1996	1996–1998	1998–2002	2002–2006	2006–2009	
EL SALVADOR								
1994–1999			1999–2004			2004–2009		
16.39			12.39			15.64		
GUATEMALA								
1985–1990		1990–1995		1995–1999		1999–2003	2003–2007	
54.99		81.62		40.46		69.41	42.60	
HONDURAS								
1981–1985	1985–1989	1989–1993	1993–1997	1997–2001	2001–2005	2005–2009		
4.22	7.22	9.60	5.07	7.42	6.44	11.84		
MEXICO								
1994–2000				2000–2004				
18.49				23.02				
NICARAGUA								
1984–1990		1990–1996		1996–2001		2001–2006		
55.915		7.89		9.77		34.885		
PANAMA								
1994–1999		1999–2004			2004–2009			
28.35		46.06			38.77			
PARAGUAY								
1989–1993		1993–1998		1998–2000		2000–2003		2003–2008
37.12		24.13		6.53		35.84		26.45

PERU						
1980–1985	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
50.25	54.60	61.00	46.40	58.50	50.75	61.52

URUGUAY				
1984–1989	1989–1994	1994–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009
13.42	11.80	10.07	26.75	8.15

VENEZUELA					
1978–1983	1983–1988	1988–1993	1993–1998	1998–2000	2000–2006
17.05	9.42	48.89	76.71	35.53	51.86

Source: OIR, compiled by Cecilia Rodriguez.

Argentina: In the 1999 elections the Alliance is considered to be a continuation of the UCR (not FREPASO or the sum of the two in the previous election).

In the 2003 election the Front for Victory is considered a continuation of the PJ.

The complexity of the fronts, parties, and organizations with different names competing in each of the Argentine provinces is such that data is aggregated at the district rather than national level. Therefore data are only presented up to 2005, and it has not been possible to perform calculations for the next election.

Bolivia: In the 2005 elections PODEMOS was considered a new party. Since the 1997 election results with the estimated volatility are those corresponding to the multimember election for deputies.

Colombia: From the 2002 election onwards “Colombia First” (later Uribe’s party) is considered a continuation of the CCP.

Chile: The volatility has been calculated at the presidential level on the number of candidates.

Ecuador: For 1998, 2002, and 2006 the electoral system was changed and the votes do not register by party but by candidate.

There are no data for elections from 1998 that allow the calculation of volatility.

Guatemala: The data used for calculating the volatility in legislative elections are gathered by national lists.

Mexico: To calculate the volatility of the legislative elections of 2000 the following are considered: PAN = Alliance for Change and PRD = Alliance for Mexico, in the 2003 election; PRI = PRI + Alliance for all, in the 2006 elections; PRI = Alliance for Mexico and PRD = Coalition for the Good of All.

Nicaragua: To calculate the volatility, ONE, AL, and PLC are considered the same party in analytical terms. The votes are for the elections for national lists.

Panama: Volatility is calculated on the data for parties (not alliances).

Paraguay: For the 1998 elections PLRA and PEN attended in partnership. To calculate the volatility for the year, data were computed as votes for the PLRA.

Dominican Republic: For the 1994 elections and beyond the data for calculating electoral volatility are added by partnerships.

Uruguay: To measure the volatility in the legislative elections of 1984–1989 the FA was considered a continuation of the PDC.

For the calculation of the volatility in presidential elections the party data are considered.

Venezuela: The calculation of the volatility in the presidential election was conducted with the data from parties (not alliances).

APPENDIX III

EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES (NEPe) AND EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF
PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES (NEPP)

ARGENTINA												
	1983	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	2005
NEPe	2.63	3.15	3.14	3.25	3.51	3.32	3.56	3.55	3.85	4.14	5.87	6.16
NEPP	2.19	2.4	2.75	2.79	3.15	2.86	2.86	3.25	3.45	3.43	3.48	4.19
BOLIVIA												
	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009					
NEPe	4.58	5	4.66	5.93	5.77	2.62	2.07					
NEPP	4.31	3.92	3.71	5.36	4.96	2.36	1.84					
BRAZIL												
	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010					
NEPe	3.56	9.78	8.53	8.14	9.28	10.62	11.19					
NEPP	2.83	8.69	8.16	7.13	8.47	9.52	10.37					
CHILE												
	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009						
NEPe	7.11	6.66	7.20	6.56	6.57	7.30						
NEPP	5.07	4.95	5.33	5.94	5.59	5.63						
COLOMBIA												
	1982	1986	1990	1991	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010			
NEPe	2.08	2.66	2.20	2.53	2.67	3.87	8.22	9.10	5.96			
NEPP	1.98	2.45	2.17	2.99%	2.75	2.85	6.88	7.59	4.95			
COSTA RICA												
	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010			
NEPe	2.88	2.49	2.48	2.48	2.73	3.30	4.52	4.63	4.69			
NEPP	2.31	2.27	2.21	2.21	2.30	2.56	3.68	3.32	3.9			
	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010						
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC												
NEPe	3.22	2.74	2.73	3.30	3.08	3.07						
NEPP	3.05	2.43	2.32	2.52	2.71	2.01						
ECUADOR												
	1978	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2002	2006	2009
NEPe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NEPP	4.03	6.10	7.58	4.41	6.68	6.40	5.85	5.06%	4.92	7.54	5.84	3.76

ELSALVADOR									
	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009
NEPe	2.69	2.75	3.34	3.48	3.95	3.68	4	3.06	2.91
NEPP	2.56	2.41	3.01	3.06	4.13	3.49	3.55	3.04	2.94
GUATAMALA									
	1985	1990	1994	1995	1999	2003	2007		
NEPe	4.34	5.27	5.10	4.80	3.73	6.56	7.74		
NEPP	2.98	4.43	3.47	2.73	2.35	4.57	4.84		
HONDURAS									
	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009	
NEPe	2.15	2.14	2.13	2.14	2:30	2.58	2.70	2.58	
NEPP	2.17	2.12	2.00	2.037	2.20	2.41	2.41	2:30	
MEXICO									
	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009		
NEPe	2.39	2.87	3.42	3.00	3.54	3.40	3.75		
NEPP	2.21	2.29	2.85	2.54	3.02	3.58	3.03		
NICARAGUA									
	1984	1990	1996	2001	2006				
NEPe	2.09	2.19	2.84	2.16	3.44				
NEPP	2.28	2.05	2.73	2.08	3.14				
PANAMA									
	1994	1999	2004	2009					
NEPe	8.64	5.67	4.46	4.18					
NEPP	4.33	3.26%	2.92	3.65					
PARAGUAY									
	1989	1993	1998	2003	2008				
NEPe	1.69	2.81	2.00	4.10	4.22				
NEPP	1.89	2.45	1.97	3.18	3.89				
PERU									
	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2006	2011	
NEPe	4.18	3.02	5.03	3.42	4.00	6.64	6.95	5.69	
NEPP	2.47	2.31	4.02	2.91	3.81%	4.37	3.78	3.97	
URUGUAY									
	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009			
NEPe	2.95	3.38	3.35	3.12	2.49	2.74			
NEPP	2.92	3.33	3.30	3.07	2.39	2.65			

VENEZUELA	1978	1983	1988	1993	1998	2000	2005	2010
NEPe	3.10	2.96	3.34	5.52	6.96	4.15	1.33	2.19
NEPP	2.65	2.42%	2.83	4.74	5.66	2.79	1.07%	2.04

Source: OIR. Compiled by Cecilia Rodriguez.

Argentina: The complexity of the fronts, parties, and organizations with different names competing in each of the Argentine provinces is such that official electoral data is aggregated at the district rather than national level. Therefore data are only presented up to 2005, and it has not been possible to perform calculations for the next election.

Bolivia: From the 1997 election results with NEPP calculated as the corresponding multimember election for deputies.

Ecuador: No data for calculation of NEPP.

Guatemala: The NEPe calculated corresponds to the election by national lists.

Mexico: The data calculated as the NEPe are from the election by proportional representation.

Nicaragua: The data calculated as NEP correspond to the election by national lists.

Panama: In elections in which the parties were in an Alliance the NEP data are calculated for each party individually.

Dominican Republic: For the 1994 elections and beyond data for the calculation of NEPe are added by alliances.

APPENDIX IV

**EVOLUTION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL LOCATION OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, 1994–2011,
ON A SCALE OF LEFT (1) TO RIGHT (10)**

ARGENTINA

Political party	1996	1998	2004	2008	2010
PJ	7.40 (N = 32)	7.78 (N = 69)	6.56 (N = 46)	4.79 (N = 54)	6.37 (N = 41)
UCR	5.63 (N = 47)	5.57 (N = 92)	5.79 (N = 81)	6.06 (N = 100)	6.35 (N = 56)
CC				4.15 (N = 102)	6.02 (N = 61)
PRO				7.25 (N = 106)	8.59 (N = 65)
Socialist Party				4.14 (N = 106)	3.71 (N = 67)

BOLIVIA

Political party	1996	1998	2003	2006	2010
MNR	8.53 (N = 42)	8.25 (N = 76)	8.56 (N = 58)	8.28 (N = 92)	
MIR	6.49 (N = 60)	6.56 (N = 78)	7.13 (N = 63)	7.27 (N = 88)	7.86 (N = 87)
MAS			2.47 (N = 60)	2.76 (N = 43)	4.17 (N = 29)
UN				7.31 (N = 90)	8.28 (N = 95)

BRAZIL

Political party	2005	2011
PT	4.44 (N = 107)	4.73 (N = 107)
PMDB	6.42 (N = 113)	6.55 (N = 104)
PP	8.62 (N = 117)	7.90 (N = 118)
PTB	7.75 (N = 117)	7.25 (N = 120)
PSDB	6.89 (N = 119)	7.13 (N = 113)

CHILE

Political party	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
PDC	4.85 (N = 64)	4.62 (N = 58)	4.62 (N = 70)	4.95 (N = 73)	4.62 (N = 73)
RN	7.83 (N = 67)	7.85 (N = 71)	7.24 (N = 72)	7.70 (N = 73)	7.78 (N = 73)
UDI	9.13 (N = 79)	9.58 (N = 72)	9.60 (N = 62)	9.53 (N = 64)	9.40 (N = 60)
PPD	4.19 (N = 79)	3.71 (N = 75)	3.66 (N = 73)	3.82 (N = 73)	3.73 (N = 73)
PS	2.53 (N = 81)	2.47 (N = 79)	2.30 (N = 79)	2.51 (N = 78)	2.60 (N = 77)
PRSD			3.72 (N = 83)	3.86 (N = 83)	3.98 (N = 82)

COLOMBIA

Political party	1998	2002	2006	2011
PCC	8.28 (N = 64)	8.20 (N = 68)	7.58 (N = 88)	8.18 (N = 68)
PLC	6.09 (N = 43)		4.50 (N = 82)	5.73 (N = 66)
DEMOCRATIC POLE		2.74 (N = 90)	2.14 (N = 101)	2.97 (N = 84)
CR			7.08 (N = 93)	6.40 (N = 78)

COSTA RICA

Political party	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
PUSC	8.15 (N = 27)	8.19 (N = 27)	7.38 (N = 34)	7.27 (N = 51)	6.63 (N = 49)
PLN	5.46 (N = 26)	5.07 (N = 29)	5.57 (N = 37)	8.29 (N = 31)	8.18 (N = 33)
PAC			4.61 (N = 33)	4.00 (N = 37)	3.57 (N = 44)
ML			8.85 (N = 46)	9.82 (N = 50)	8.80 (N = 46)
FA				1.98 (N = 54)	1.68 (N = 53)

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Political party	1995	2000	2003	2006	2010
PRD	5.57 (N = 38)	6.42 (N = 51)	7.06 (N = 61)	6.84 (N = 56)	6.29 (N = 48)
PLD	4.10 (N = 57)	6.10 (N = 65)	5.28 (N = 85)	5.78 (N = 38)	7.35 (N = 34)
PRSC	8.50 (N = 39)	9.16 (N = 90)	8.49 (N = 90)	8.69 (N = 79)	8.43 (N = 73)

ECUADOR

Political party	1996	1998	2002	2009
PRE	6.50 (N = 43)	6.53 (N = 58)	7.17 (N = 72)	6.28 (N = 83)
PSC	9.35 (N = 48)	8.79 (N = 85)	9.32 (N = 73)	9.34 (N = 86)
MUPP		3.63 (N = 95)	3.70 (N = 81)	3.58 (N = 89)
PRIAN			8.95 (N = 83)	9.14 (N = 88)
PSP			5.42 (N = 72)	8.08 (N = 78)

EL SALVADOR

Political party	1994	1998	2000	2003	2006	2009
ARENA	8.28 (N = 24)	9.76 (N = 39)	9.55 (N = 39)	9.31 (N = 54)	9.66 (N = 43)	9.67 (N = 42)
FMLN	1.53 (N = 33)	1.46 (N = 39)	1.59 (N = 42)	1.22 (N = 51)	1.51 (N = 45)	1.41 (N = 39)
PCN	7.17 (N = 44)	8.04 (N = 49)	7.99 (N = 53)	7.31 (N = 62)	8.11 (N = 63)	8.31 (N = 59)
PDC	4.55 (N = 36)	6.63 (N = 49)	5.76 (N = 60)	6.01 (N = 75)	6.97 (N = 67)	7.11 (N = 64)
CD				4.59 (N = 74)	3.69 (N = 69)	3.52 (N = 65)

GUATEMALA

Political party	1998	2002	2004	2008
FRG	9.33 (N = 46)	8.94 (N = 35)	7.83 (N = 94)	7.66 (N = 87)
UNE			5.01 (N = 92)	4.76 (N = 61)
GANAN			8.72 (N = 76)	8.03 (N = 78)
PU			8.17 (N = 113)	8.41 (N = 92)

HONDURAS

Political party	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
PLH	4.72 (N = 30)	5.76 (N = 34)	5.87 (N = 57)	5.40 (N = 48)	6.33 (N = 55)
PNH	8.48 (N = 38)	8.37 (N = 41)	8.65 (N = 53)	8.81 (N = 52)	7.56 (N = 41)
PINU	5.40 (N = 63)	5.17 (N = 69)	5.75 (N = 97)	5.35 (N = 89)	5.67 (N = 88)
PDC	4.36 (N = 66)	4.22 (N = 69)	5.91 (N = 95)	5.48 (N = 85)	5.67 (N = 83)
PUD			2.80 (N = 94)	1.99 (N = 86)	1.95 (N = 87)

MEXICO

Political party	1995	1998	2001	2004	2006	2009
PRI	6.82 (N = 45)	6.94 (N = 64)	6.09 (N = 65)	6.31 (N = 66)	6.23 (N = 98)	6.37 (N = 48)
PAN	8.94 (N = 93)	8.94 (N = 95)	9.27 (N = 73)	9.17 (N = 86)	9.55 (N = 75)	9.41 (N = 67)
PRD	2.71 (N = 101)	2.68 (N = 94)	2.56 (N = 109)	2.78 (N = 97)	2.30 (N = 94)	3.20 (N = 84)
PVEM		5.95 (N = 97)	7.10 (N = 106)	6.92 (N = 100)	6.43 (N = 117)	6.56 (N = 89)
PT	3.68 (N = 109)	3.86 (N = 114)	2.93 (N = 112)	3.55 (N = 117)	2.71 (N = 123)	1.83 (N = 95)

NICARAGUA

Political party	1998	2002	2007
PLC	9.16 (N = 38)	9.01 (N = 27)	7.27 (N = 48)
FSLN	2.39 (N = 41)	1.86 (N = 35)	2.34 (N = 38)
CCN	6.91 (N = 58)	7.63 (N = 53)	6.84 (N = 62)
PCN	8.32 (N = 63)	8.34 (N = 53)	8.61 (N = 64)

PANAMA

Political party	2002	2004	2009
PRD	4.64 (N = 33)	5.39 (N = 31)	4.61 (N = 41)
PA	7.10 (N = 42)	7.04 (N = 50)	7.36 (N = 44)
MOLIRENA	8.15 (N = 60)	7.68 (N = 60)	8.16 (N = 63)

PARAGUAY

Political party	1996	1998	2003	2008
ANR	7.36 (N = 23)	7.85 (N = 28)	6.80 (N = 29)	6.33 (N = 45)
PLRA	5.86 (N = 26)	6.06 (N = 43)	5.55 (N = 37)	6.78 (N = 46)
UNACE			6.77 (N = 33)	8.16 (N = 57)
PPS			3.74 (N = 49)	6.56 (N = 57)

PERU

Political party	1995	2001	2006	2010	2011
PAP:	3.86 (N = 75)	4.34 (N = 64)	6.36 (N = 66)	7.62 (N = 55)	6.93 (N = 86)
PERU POSSIBLE		6.12 (N = 49)	7.03 (N = 86)	6.73 (N = 71)	6.36 (N = 80)

URUGUAY

Political party	1996	2001	2005	2010
PC	7.08 (N = 48)	8.14 (N = 43)	7.91 (N = 74)	8.05 (N = 65)
PN	7.37 (N = 48)	8.00 (N = 52)	7.05 (N = 54)	7.66 (N = 55)
FA	2.67 (N = 47)	3.03 (N = 37)	3.22 (N = 39)	3.71 (N = 38)

Source: PELA (1994–2011).

APPENDIX V

VARIABLES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS FOR LEGISLATURES IN LATIN AMERICA

Country (Size of the Assembly)	Representation Criteria	Number of districts and magnitude	Type of List
Brazil * (513)	Proportional	27 state multimember districts, with a magnitude of between 8 and 71 based on state population	The voter has two options: the roll call vote or vote for the party's acronym.
Mexico * (500)	Mixed proportional representation (d'Hondt system); the majority is represented by a simple majority.	300 single-member districts and 5 multimember districts with a magnitude of 40	Closed and blocked lists
Argentina * (257)	D'Hondt proportional system	23 provincial districts and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, in an amount proportional to the population of each of these districts, from a minimum of 5 members	Closed and blocked lists
Dominican Republic* (183)	D'Hondt proportional system	16 provincial multimember districts elect a minimum of two deputies on the basis of population and one to 5 national deputies.	Preferential voting
Colombia * (166)	Proportional	33 multimember districts and the provincial capital district who elect 161 deputies. The remaining 5 consist of: 2 for the black communities, 1 for the Indigenous, 1 on behalf of Colombians abroad, and 1 more for political minorities.	Closed or open lists, according to party decision
Venezuela (165)	Mixed proportional representation (d'Hondt system); the majority is represented by a simple majority.	110 single-member districts and 24 multimember districts with magnitude ranging between 2 and 3, plus a special district (Indigenous) with magnitude of 3	Closed and blocked lists
Guatemala (158)	D'Hondt proportional system	A national multimember district magnitude, 31 and 23 multimember districts that elect 127 deputies in departments with very different magnitudes: 15 small (1 to 5 members), 6 medium (6 to 10), and 3 large (more than 10).	Closed and blocked lists
Bolivia * (130)	Mixed proportional representation (d'Hondt system); the majority is represented by a simple majority.	70 single-member districts, 9 multimember constituencies elect 53 deputies departmental (1 of 13, 1 of 11, 1 of 8, 1 of 6, 1 of 5, 3 of 3, and 1 of 1), and special districts that choose 7 deputies.	Closed and blocked lists
Peru (130)	Proportional	26 multimember districts (24 departments, plus two split results in two Lima: Lima and Peruvians living abroad, and Lima-provinces). The magnitude is 1 of 36, 2 of 7, 2 of 6, 5 of 5, 5 of 4, 2 of 3, 8 of 2, and 1 of 1.	Closed lists and preferential vote
Honduras (128)	Proportional representation (Hare system)	2 single-member districts (due to its low population density) and 14 multimember constituencies with different magnitude (1 of 2, 2 of 3, 2 of 4, 1 of 5, 1 of 6, 2 of 7, 1 of 8, 2 of 9, 1 of 20, and 1 of 23)	Closed and blocked lists
Ecuador (124)	Personalized proportional	24 multimember districts, plus a national and a district with candidates representing Ecuadorians abroad	Full preferential

Chile * (120)	Proportional	60 two-member districts	Closed and blocked lists
Uruguay* (99)	Proportional	Multimember districts 19 departmental	Closed and blocked lists
Nicaragua (91)	Proportional	1 national and 17 district departments and autonomous regions	Closed and blocked lists
El Salvador (84)	Proportional electoral quotient largest remainder	14 departmental multimember districts (size: 1 of 25, 1 of 8, 1 of 7, 2 of 6, 1 of 5, 3 of 4, and 5 of 3)	Closed and blocked lists
Panama (71)	Mixed proportional representation (Hare system); the majority is represented by a simple majority.	26 single-member and 13 multimember districts (4 of 2, 4 of 3, 2 of 4, 2 of 5 and 1 of 7)	Party preference
Costa Rica (57)	D'Hondt proportional system	7 multimember provincial districts	Closed and blocked lists

(*) Chamber of Deputies

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