EISA PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION

REPORT

GUINEA-BISSAU

March 2014

Contents

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE 2014 ELECTIONS

Guinea-Bissau was born as an independent state on 24 September 1973, when the the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the nationalist movement fighting against Portuguese colonial occupation, unilaterally declared independence from Portugal. The new state was immediately recognised by the United Nations and a number of other countries. Portugal only recognised Guinea-Bissau's independence on 10 September 1974, after the coup d'état that brought down the dictatorial government in Portugal on 25 April 1974. Only after Portugal's recognition did the PAIGC become the *de facto* government of Guinea-Bissau.

From 1974 to 1980, Guinea-Bissau was ruled by the PAIGC as a constitutional single-party state. In 1980, then prime-minister João Bernardo (Nino) Vieira, a former guerrilla commander, led a coup d'état against president Luis Cabral, suspended the Constitution, and installed a mixed military-civilian government under a Revolutionary Council that led the country as a single-party state until 1994. The main reasons for the coup were the strong disagreements among factions within the PAIGC coupled with an economic crisis that led to serious food shortages.

In 1989, the Vieira government initiated political reforms towards a multi-party system, and held the first multi-party presidential and legislative elections in 1994 which he and the PAIGC won. In 1998 a military rebellion led by Brigadier Ansumane Mané became a full-fledged civil war, which eventually forced Pres. Vieira to flee the country in 1999.

The UN Security Council approved the establishment of the UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea Bissau, UNOGBIS, on 3 March 1999. The mission was actually deployed on 25 June 1999. On 1 January 2010, the UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS, would replace UNOGBIS.

Malam Bacai Sanhá took over the presidency *ad interim*, and new elections took place in late 1999 and early 2000. Kumba Yalá and his Social Renewal Party (PRS) emerged as the winners. In 2003, a new coup took place and Kumba Yalá was replaced by an interim president, Henrique Rosa. The following year the country held legislative elections. Following the legislative elections, Ansumane Mané, now Chief of the General Staff, attempted a new coup, but it failed and he was killed.

Former president "Nino" Vieira, who had returned from exile, won the 2005 presidential election, but was killed on 2 March 2009 in a revenge attack by the military after being accused of having masterminded the assassination on 1 March of Tagme Na Waie, the Chief of General Staff and Vieira's long-time rival. In the 2008 legislative elections, the PAIGC won a comfortable majority in parliament. Following Vieira's assassination in 2009, an early presidential election was called in June 2009, and was won by PAIGC's Malam Bacai Sanhá, who died in office on 9 January 2012 as a result of illness. His presidency also witnessed an attempted

coup in December 2011, this time against Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior and Chief of General Staff, Gen. António Indjai. President Sanhá's death triggered early elections on 18 March 2012.

The legislative elections were won by the PAIGC, but no candidate managed to get the required absolute majority in the presidential election, forcing a run-off between the two candidates with the highest number of votes, namely the PAIGC's former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr and Kumba Yalá. Carlos Gomes Jr was the favourite to win the run-off. On 12 April 2012, days before the second round, the military intervened and overthrew the government to prevent Carlos Gomes Jr from becoming the country's next President.

Intense international mediation, with ECOWAS in the lead, resulted in an agreement among political parties for the establishment of a transitional inclusive government in May 2013, despite ECOWAS "zero tolerance" policy against unconstitutional changes of government. The main task of the transitional government was to manage the country until elections took place and prepare for elections.

In the meantime, ECOWAS started deploying its Mission in Bissau (ECOMIB), a 629-strong military and police force in May 2012 to monitor the transition. The ECOMIB forces come from Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Senegal. At the same time, the Angolan Mission (MISSANG), comprising 270 military and police that had been in the country since March 2011 was asked to leave Guinea-Bissau which they did in June 2012.

Elections were initially scheduled to take place on 16 March 2014, but were eventually postponed to 13 April 2014.

2. ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.   The constitutional and legal framework:

Guinea-Bissau is a constitutional and republican democracy with a semi-presidential political system. Civic and political rights are recognised and protected by the Constitution.

The President of the Republic is the Head of State, and is elected by absolute majority through universal suffrage every five years. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first round, a re-run should take place within 21 days between the two most voted candidates in the first round.

A sitting President cannot run for a third consecutive term, nor during the five years following the end of the second term.

Citizens of Guinean origin, who are children of parents of Guinean origin, over 35 years of age, in full possession of their civil and political rights, are eligible for the office of President of the Republic.

The Parliament, called National People's Assembly, has 102 Members. Members of Parliament are elected through a proportional representation system by closed party list for four-year mandates, on the basis of 31 constituencies, 2 of which representing the diaspora. Members of Parliament cannot be members of Government.

Citizens of Guinean origin, over 21 years of age, in full possession of their civil and political rights, are eligible for the office of Member of Parliament.

The Prime Minister is the Head of Government, and is appointed by the Head of State on the basis of parliamentary election results, and in consultation with the parties represented in the National Assembly. The other members of Government, namely ministers and secretaries of state, are also appointed by the Head of State in consultation with the Prime Minister.

2.2.   **The electoral legislation**

Elections in Guinea Bissau are regulated by the following laws:

- The Constitution;
- The Law on the election of the President and the Members of Parliament;
- The Voter Registration Law;
- The EMB Law;
- The Law on International Observation;
- The Law on Political Parties.

The law on the election of the President of the Republic and National People's Assembly states, *inter alia*, that:

- All citizens who are 18 years old on Election Day and are registered can vote;
- Electoral campaigns may be financed by donations from foreign political parties, voluntary contributions by voters, donations from the candidates, and by campaign fundraising events. Foreign governments and foreign governmental organisations are prohibited form funding electoral campaigns;
- Polling stations have a maximum of 400 voters, and should coincide with the location of the voter registration centres;
- Polling stations are managed by four polling officials;
- Early voting is available for the military and security forces who are on duty on Election Day, and for naval and air transportation staff, who will be out of their constituencies on Election Day for work-related reasons;
- Election results must announced within 10 days of the closing of the polls;
- Second rounds for presidential elections must take place within 21 days of the final announcement of results.

2.3. **Election management:**

Elections in Guinea Bissau are managed by an independent National Electoral Commission (CNE), comprised of a 4-member Executive Secretariat, which include the CNE President, the Executive Secretary and 2 deputy Executive Secretaries, a representative from the President of the Republic, a representative from the Government, a representative from each competing poltical party or coalition, a representative from each competing presidential candidate, and a representative of the National Media Council.

The Executive Secretariat members are chosen by Parliament from a list of candidates submitted by the High Council of Judges for a mandate of 4 years, renewable only once. The current Secretariat, appointed in June 2013, is therefore comprised of four judges, and presided by Mr. Augusto Mendes, a Supreme Court Justice. The CNE manages all phases of the electoral process with the exception of the voter registration process, which is managed by the Office for the Technical Support to the Electoral Process (GTAPE), under CNE supervision.

Under normal circumstances, the Guinea Bissau electoral process should be funded by the Guinean state budget, but given the current financial crisis Guinea-Bissau faces, the 2014 electoral process is funded by donations from international partners, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East Timor, and a basket fund managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with contributions from the European Union (EU), South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan and Turkey.

The Electoral Commission also received technical support from La Francophonie, Brazil, and the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC).

On Election Day, there will be just over 3,000 polling stations, managed by over 12,000 staff. The exact number of polling stations was not known at the time this report was written.

3. KEY FINDINGS ON THE PRE-ELECTION PHASE

3.1. Constituency delimitation

Electoral constituency boundaries in Guinea-Bissau are predetermined by administrative boundaries, so no constituency boundary delimitation process exists. There are 29 constituencies, of which 27 in the territory of Guinea-Bissau and 2 in the diaspora (Africa and Europe).

3.2. Voter registration

Voter registration is conducted by the GTAPE, an institution subordinated to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, under the supervision of the National Electoral Commission. The 2013 voter registration process was aimed at registering all eligible voters, both in Guinea-Bissau and in the diaspora. The registration used a computarised process. In addition to the supervision by Electoral Commission, the voter registration process was monitored at national level by a committee comprised of representatives from political parties, Parliament, the President's Office and civil society.

Delays in the disbursement of international funding for the registration of voters prevented the simultaneous roll-out of the process in the whole country on 1 December 2013. Instead, the process started in phases, with the use of mobile voter registration teams due to the low number of voter registration kits available. Therefore, voter registration teams spent only a small number of days at each voter registration centre, and many voters were not able to register within the initial deadline of 31 January 2014. In order to cover as many citizens as possible, the deadline was extended to 8 February in the Guinea-Bissau territory and 10 February in the diaspora.

As a result of the mobility of the voter registration process, many voters had to register in registration centres different from the ones where they registered in previous electoral processes, often far away from their areas of residence. Particularly in the Bissau area, many voters did not receive their voter's card on the registration day, because the printing machines had run out of toner. GTAPE had to track those voters at a later stage to hand them their cards. It was unclear at the time of writing this report how many voters did not receive their cards and what percentage of those who had not received them had been reached by GTAPE. Less than a week before election day, many regional electoral commissions were still distributing voters' cards.

After the end of the registration period, voters were given 15 days to verify their data and submit requests for corrections if necessary. Upon completion of the voter

registration process, GTAPE handed the full voter registry to the National Electoral Commission. Copies of the voter registry are also available to political parties and candidates upon request, although according to GTAPE they rarely request them.

A total of 775,508 people (95.6% of the total expected number), including 402,966 women (52%), were registered in Guinea-Bissau. Of those, 22,312 were registered in the diaspora.

Civil society stakeholders raised concerns about the number of voters who may have not received their cards, and voters who have registered in registration centres different from the ones they usually use and on election day may go back to their usual polling stations, instead of the place where they registered. Both issues may prevent many voters from voting.

3.3. Political party registration and candidate nomination

Political parties running for Parliament and presidential candidates (both nominated by parties and independent candidates) submit their candidatures to the Supreme Court, which decides on their eligibility.

Candidature submissions by independent presidential candidates must be supported by 5,000 registered voters, with at least 50 voters in at least 5 of the country's 9 regions. Candidates supported by registered political parties are not required to submit voters' signatures. Parliamentary candidatures are submitted through closed party lists by legally registered political parties or coalitions of parties.

The candidatures submission process ended on 5 March 2014, with 21 presidential candidates and 22 parties wanting to participate in the parliamentary election. After verifying all the candidatures in a period of 8 days, the Supreme Court published the list of approved candidates for both elections, having rejected 8 presidential candidates and 7 parties. Rejected candidates had 48 hours to appeal, and on 18 March the Court published the final lists.

The following candidatures were approved (presented in the same order as they will appear on the ballot):

Presidential election:

1. Arregado Mantenque Té, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)
2. Abel Incada, Partido da Renovação Social (PRS)
3. Paulo Gomes, independent candidate
4. José Mário Vaz, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)
5. Ibraima Sori Djaló, Partido da Reconciliação Nacional (PRN)
6. Jorge Malu, independent candidate

7. Afonso Te, Partido Republicano da Independência para o Desenvolvimento (PRID)
8. Nuno Gomes Nabiam, independent candidate
9. Hélder Lopes Vaz, Resistência Guiné-Bissau (RGB)
10. Mamadu Iaiá Djaló, Partido da Nova Democracia (PND)
11. Domingos Quadé, independent candidate
12. Cirilo de Oliveira, Partido Socialista (PS)
13. Luis Nancassá, independent candidate

Of the 13 presidential contestants, 5 are independent candidates, and there are no women as presidential candidates.

Legislative election:

1. PSGB (Partido Socialista da Guiné-Bissau)
2. FDS (Frente Democrático Social)
3. PUSD (Partido Unido Social Democráta)
4. UPG (União Patriótica Guineense)
5. PRN (Partido da Reconciliação Nacional)
6. UM (União para Mudança)
7. PRS (Partido da Renovação Social)
8. PCD (Partido da Convergência Democrática)
9. RGB (Resistência da Guiné-Bissau)
10. PSD (Partido Social Democrata)
11. PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
12. PND (Partido da Nova Democracia)
13. MP (Manifesto do Povo)
14. PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores)
15. PRID (Partido Republicano da Independência e Desenvolvimento).

The candidate nominations process within several political parties was quite contentious and therefore there are several independent presidential candidates, who come out of parties which have submitted official candidates. Some of these parties have acknowldged that this will represent a challenge in the presidential election as it may split their electorate.

3.4. The media

There is one main public radio station (RNGB) and one public TV channel (RTGB). In addition to those media, there are a number of private radio stations and some private newspapers.

The law requires all media to report objectively on the electoral process, and allocates free broadcast slots on the public broadcasters for electoral campaign by parties and candidates. Every party or coalition running for parliament and every presidential candidate are entitled to 10 minutes of radio time and 5 minutes of television time daily.

This right has been compromised during most of the campaign period, due to a strike in the public radio and a decision by television staff not to air campaign broadcasts because of a 4.month delay in the payment of their salaries.

Several stakeholders expressed concerns about the impartiality of the media. Due to lack of resources, journalists often depend on means provided by the parties and candidates to cover campaign events, and that may compromise their objectivity.

3.5. **Civil society**

The electoral legislation in Guinea-Bissau does not foresee citizen observation, but does not prohibit it either. However, civil society groups have always interpreted it as if citizen observation was not allowed. Therefore, civil society organisations have focused on civic and voter education work, monitoring of the media, advocacy for transparent, free and peaceful elections, promotion of candidate debates, as well as participating in the voter registration monitoring committee established by GTAPE.

Youth and women groups as well as trade unions have been very vocal in demanding the complete removal of the military from political life and from any role in the electoral process, especially in the provision of security to polling stations and ballot papers after the voting and counting as the military are not seen by civil society as an impartial player.

3.6. **Gender and minority rights**

There are currently 11 women in the Guinea-Bissau Parliament which represents 11% of MPs. In the legislature elected in 2008 the percentage was 10%. This means that political parties nominate very few women as parliamentary candidates, or place them in un-electable positions within the party lists.

At the time of writing, we had had no access to the party lists for the 2014 legislative elections in order to conduct gender analysis. For the presidential election, there are no women candidates among the 13 contenders.

There are no statistics of turnout by gender or age, but according to the latest voter registration figures women represent 52% of all registered voters.

Women groups have expressed concern that the current political climate of uncertainty about the post-election period, especially regarding the role of the military, may dissuade many women from voting.

3.7. **Civic and voter education**

Civic and voter education is conducted both by the National Electoral Commission and civil society groups. Civil society has established a hotline to connect voters with Regional Election Commissions.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have expressed concerns about the adequacy of public information regarding the places where people have to vote given that many people had to register in places that are different from where they usually vote. CSOs fear that lack of information may lead to disenfranchisement of many voters.

3.8. **Security**

Three types of security concerns were raised by stakeholders: (i) the role and behaviour of the military in the run up to the election, especially during the campaign; (ii) the role of the military in the provision of security for polling day and the election materials during the tabulation process; and (iii) the behaviour of the military after the results are announced.

The first concern stems from several incidents of repression of peaceful demonstrations and freedom of expression by the military since the 2012 coup d'état, and civil society groups feared a repetition of the same behaviour during the heated environment of the campaigns.

The second concern arose from statements made by the military leadership that they would ensure security on Election Day and until the results are announced. The military are seen by many stakeholders as partial and having a direct stake in the outcome of the elections since they have expressed publicly their preference and support for one of the presidential candidates.

The third concern is closely related to the second, and is the most expressed concern by the majority of stakeholders: how will the military leadership react if the candidate they support loses the election? Will they allow the Electoral Commission to announce such a result? Will they accept the results and stay in the barracks, or will they try to intervene to ensure the outcome seen as most favourable to them? The uncertainty about the answers to these questions has created a sombre backdrop to the entire electoral process.

Some stakeholders, especially in some sectors of the international community, strongly advocate for a pre-election agreement between the military leadership and the political actors to define the post-election rules of the game regardless of the electoral outcome. Other voices, however, question the acceptability and legitimacy of such an agreement, arguing that the military cannot be trusted to honour "gentlemen's agreements" and that they should not expect total leniency and immunity regarding their past acts of violence and against the constitutional order.

3.9. Campaigns

By law, the electoral campaign begins 21 days before Election Day and ends at midnight two days before Election Day. Thus the 2014 campaign began on 22 March and will end on 11 April at midnight.

The use of state assets is not allowed by law. Since many of the competing parties are part of the transition government, where they occupy ministerial positions, many stakeholders expect them to use resources of their ministries for campaigning, especially vehicles.

Some stakeholders also expressed concern about the use of funds from illicit activities being used to finance electoral campaigns, as well as informal, non-declared funding from state actors in the ECOWAS region which is a violation of Guinea-Bissau law.

Some parties and candidates have signed a Code of Conduct facilitated by civil society, but it is based on voluntary self-enforcement.

A parliamentary candidate from the PRS party was beaten and detained by military for a couple of days in the beginning of the campaign. The military alleged that he was still a military officer, and therefore ineligible to be a candidate and therefore were trying to punish him.

3.10. Preparedness of the EMB

The National Electoral Commission has stated that it is well-prepared to manage the electoral. So far, preparations seem to be on track. The CNE is in possession of the voters' registry, has a full map of polling stations, the placement of candidates on the ballots has been decided, 800 thousand ballot papers have been ordered from South Africa, and other key election materials have also been procured or are in the process of being procured.

There are no budgetary concerns as different donors have fully funded the process. The Special Representative of Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. José Ramos-Horta, was quoted in the media as having said that the Electoral Commission has enough funding to run "Gucci elections".

However, less than seven days before election day, it was not clear how many polling stations there would be. By law, there should be as many polling stations as voter registration centres, each polling station should have a maximum of 400 voters, and voters should vote where they were registered. However, many registration centres registered more than 400 voters, therefore extra polling stations had to be created, increasing its number from the initial 2,839 to more than 3,000.

If an adequate and aggressive public information campaign is not carried out to inform voters about these new polling stations, so that voters find beforehand where they are supposed to go on election day, there is a risk of many voters not being able to vote. This can potentially affect as many as 75,000 voters, i.e. 10% of the electorate.

APPENDICES

Historical Timeline

1974: Independence
1974-1980: One-party State led by the PAIGC (President Luis Cabral)
1980: Military coup d'état
1980-1984: Military regime and one-party State led by the PAIGC (President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira)
1984: Single-party elections
1984-1991: One-party State led by the PAIGC (President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira)
1991-1994: Multiparty transition led by the PAIGC (President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira)
1994: First multiparty elections (presidential and legislative)
1994-1999: Constitutional democratic Government (President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira)
1999: Military rebellion and coup d'état
1999: Transitional Government (interim President Malam Bacai Sanhá)
1999: Second multiparty elections (presidential and legislative)
1999-2003: Constitutional democratic Government (President Kumba Ialá)
2003: Military coup d'état
2003-2005: Transitional Government (interim President Henrique Rosa)
2004: Third multiparty elections (legislative)
2005: Fourth multiparty elections (presidential)
2005-2012: Constitutional democratic Government (President Malam Bacai Sanhá)
2012: Death of President Sanhá
2012: Fifth multiparty elections (presidential)
2012: Military coup d'état
2012: Military regime
2012: Transitional Government (interim President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo)

2014: Sixth multiparty elections (presidential and legislative)

History of Multiparty Election Results in GB

1994 Presidential Election

First Round (3 July 1994)
Second Round (7 August 1994)

Candidate	Party	First round (%)	Second round (%)
João Bernardo Nino Vieira	PAIGC	46.2	52
Kumba Ialá	PRS	21.88	48
Domingos Fernandes	RGB-MB	17.44	
Carlos Gomes	Independent	5.04	
François Mendy	FLING	2.8	
Bubacar Djaló	LIPE	2.76	
Victor Saúde Maria	PUSD	2.07	
Antonieta Rosa Gomes	FCG-SD	1.79	

1994 National People's Assembly Election

(3 July 1994)

Party	%	Seats
PAIGC	46.39	62
RGB-MB	19.78	19
UM	12.65	6
PRS	10.3	12
PCD	5.3	1
FLING	2.57	1

1999 National People's Assembly Election

(28 November 1999)

Party	%	Seats
PRS	28.5	38
RGB-MB	21.7	29
PAIGC	18	24
AD	2.3	3
UM	2.3	3
PSD	2.3	3
FDS	1.8	1
UNDP	1.8	1

1999/2000 Presidential Election

First Round (28 November 1999)
Second Round (16 January 2000)

Candidate	Party	First round (%)	Second round (%)
Kumba Ialá	PRS	38.81	72
Malam Bacai Sanhá	PAIGC	23.37	28
Faustino Imbali	Independent	8.22	
Fernando Gomes	Independent	7.02	
João Tátis Sá	Independent	6.5	
Abubacar Baldé	UNDP	5.44	
Bubacar Rachid Djaló	LIPE	3.2	
Joaquim Baldé	PSD	2.32	
Salvador Tchongó	RGB-MB	1.87	
José Mendes	FLING	1.43	
Mamadú Uri Baldé	PRP	0.96	
Antonieta Rosa Gomes	FCG-SD	0.8	

2004 National People's Assembly Election

(28 March 2004)

Party/Coalition	%	Seats
PAIGC	33.88	45
PRS	26.50	35
PUSD	17.60	17
UE	4.28	2
APU	1.36	1

2005 Presidential Election

First Round (19 June 2005)
Second Round (24 July 2005)

Candidate (Party)	Party	First Round (%)	Second Round (%)
João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira	Independent	28.87%	52.35%
Malam Bacai Sanhá	PAIGC	35.45%	47.65%
Kumba Ialá	PRS	25.00%	
Francisco Fadul	PUSD	2.85%	
Aregado Mantenque Té	PT	2.02%	
Mamadú Iaia Djaló	Independent	1.59%	
Mário Lopes da Rosa	Independent	1.09%	
Idrissa Djaló	PUN	0.81%	
Adelino Mano Queta	Independent	0.63%	
Faustino Fudut Imbali	PMP	0.52%	
Paulino Empossa Ié	Independent	0.50%	

Antonieta Rosa Gomes	FCG-SD	0.37%	
João Tátis Sá	PPG	0.31%	

2008 National People's Assembly Election

(16 November 2008)

Party/Coalition	%	Seats
PAIGC	49.52	67
PRS	25.21	28
PRID	7.48	3
PND	2.34	1
AD	1.38	1

2009 Presidential Election

First Round (28 June 2009)
Second Round (29 July 2009)

Candidate	Party	First Round (%)	Second Round (%)
Malam Bacai Sanhá	PAIGC	39.59	63.31%
Kumba Ialá	PRS	29.42	36.69%
Henrique Pereira Rosa	Independent	24.19	
Mamadú Iaia Djaló	PND	3.11	
João Gomes Cardoso	Independent	1.22	
Serifo Baldé	PDSSG-PJ	0.53	
Aregado Mantenque Té	PT	0.51	
Ibraima Djaló	Independent	0.44	
Francisca Vaz Turpin	UPG	0.36	
Luís Nancassa	Independent	0.35	
Paulo Mendonça	Independent	0.28	

2012 Presidential Election

First Round (18 March 2012)

Candidate	Party	First Round (%)
Carlos Gomes Júnior	PAIGC	48.97
Kumba Ialá	PRS	23.36
Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo	Independent	15.74
Henrique Pereira Rosa	Independent	5.4
Baciro Djá	Independent	3.26
Vicente Fernandes	AD	1.39
Aregado Mantenque Té	PT	1.04
Serifo Baldé	PDSSG-PJ	0.46
Luís Nancassa	Independent	0.37

Evolution of Registered Voters in GB

Year	Number of Registered Voters
1994	400, 417
1999	503,007
2004	603,639
2005	538,472
2008	593,739
2009	593,765
2012	593,765
2014	775,508

Evolution of Turnout in GB Elections

Year	Type of Election	Turnout (%)
1994	Presidential (first round)	89.3
	Presidential (second round)	81.6
	Legislative	88.9
1999	Presidential (first round)	73.81
	Presidential (second round)	71.9
	Legislative	Not available
2004	Legislative	76.2
2005	Presidential (first round)	87.6
	Presidential (second round)	78.6
2008	Legislative	82
2009	Presidential (first round)	60
	Presidential (second round)	61.1
2012	Presidential	55%

List of stakeholders consulted

1. Mr. Augusto Mendes, Chairperson of the National Electoral Commission
2. Mr. Cristiano Betan, Director-General of the Technical Office for Support to the Electoral Process
3. Mr. Estevão Gomes, Secretary-General of the National Union of Workers
4. Leaders of the National Union of Workers
5. Mr. Jorge Gomes, Chairperson of the Civil Society Movement coalition
6. Members of the CSM coalition
7. Mr. Simon-Pierre Nanitelamio, UNDP Elections Chief Technical Advisor
8. Mr. Prosper Sica, Senior Political Counsellor, AU Office in Bissau
9. Mr. Ahmed Adams, Ambassador of Nigeria
10. Mr. Martinho Chachiua, Chief Political Affairs Officer, UNIOGBIS
11. Mr. Serifo Jalo, First Vice-President, Social Renewal Party (PRS)
12. Group of Prominent Women