Mitigating electoral conflict in Kenya’s 2017 General Election
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About This Brief

This policy brief analyses the challenge of ensuring peaceful 2017 general election in Kenya and makes recommendations to mitigate the risks posed by the polls. It does this through an examination of the 2017 electoral landscape through the lenses of political and socio economic context. Further, it examines the institutions that will handle 2017 elections and the extent to which they are suited to delivering a peaceful and credible election.

In addition, it assesses the degree to which previous efforts to address the challenge of electoral violence in Kenya, especially those employed in 2013, have contributed to mitigating and resolving violent conflicts. Finally, the brief offers policy recommendations for the various stakeholders towards a credible and peaceful election in 2017. The views expressed in this policy brief are exclusively those of the author.

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1. Introduction

On 8 August 2017 Kenya is expected to conduct a general election in which new representatives at the county and national levels will be elected. This election is likely to be one of the most competitive at the local level yet. More than one-third of the counties are said to be at risk of violence.¹ Some of the new positions established by the 2010 constitution, particularly the position of County Governor and Member of County Assembly (MCA), have attracted a high number of candidates. In fact, some of the presidential candidates in the 2013 election have now declared that they will run for the position of County Governor.² As Kenya’s electoral history has previously shown, high levels of electoral competition are often accompanied by higher prospects of violence.³

The juxtaposition of heightened political competition, ethnic mobilization of voters and underlying political and socio-economic grievances during elections tends to result in explosive political violence. In fact, since the return to multi-party democracy in 1992, three of the five elections that Kenya has held – 1992, 1997 and 2007 - have been marred by high levels of violence. The 2007 electoral cycle, in which the results of the presidential vote were contested, saw the worst levels of violence in which more than 1,133 people were killed and close to 500,000 displaced.⁴ This election was characterized by heightened competition between the then incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki, and the leader of a united opposition, Raila Odinga, both of whom relied, albeit in different fashions –on the ethnic mobilization of voters. The situation was made delicate by the articulation of long-standing political and socio-economic grievances, which had been carried over since the constitutional referendum of 2005.

The combination of these factors, with claims of a compromised vote to favor the incumbent resulted in explosive political violence. It appears that similar factors are converging in the lead up to the 2017 election. Additionally, there is widespread feeling that the long-standing grievances that fueled violence in 2007–08, and were merely suppressed during the 2013 general elections, have not been resolved. However, in the 2017 election, the situation is likely to be more complex as the national level dynamics are replicated at the county level.

¹ Letoo, S (2016) NCIC identifies 19 counties at risk of violence in 2017 The Star
² See Kajilwa, G (2016), Peter Kenneth drops 2017 presidential ambition, says he will vie for governor, The East African Standard; Ndungu, G & Munene G (2016), Martha Karua to run for Kirinyaga governor, Daily Nation
⁴ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, 2008, ibid
It is important to note that elections do not necessarily cause violence, but the process of competing for political power often exacerbates existing tensions and escalates them into violence. \(^5\) Usually, election-related violence is designed to affect the process and outcome of election processes by disabling and disrupting opposing forces and/or to influence voting behaviour through threats and intimidation. \(^6\) In Kenya, electoral violence has also been used to shape the political geography as some groups are displaced before the elections to stop them from voting. \(^7\)

Election violence can occur in the various phases of the electoral cycle: pre-election phase, Election Day and post-election. Prior to elections, violence can be as a result of exclusion of some groups from the electoral process, disruption of political campaigns by rivals, intimidation of voters and candidates and use of threats and violence to influence voter participation. In some cases, the rivalries are played out in the polling station. After the election, violence is usually driven by disputes over election results, and the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes in a fair, timely, and transparent manner or when some groups recognize that they have no representatives in the government.

Any meaningful efforts towards a peaceful election in 2017 must therefore be driven by a solid understanding of the political and socio-economic context in which the polls will be conducted and learning from the successes and failures of the interventions employed in ones. This means developing a good analysis of the landscape to understand the types and drivers of conflict in the various counties, projecting when the conflict might erupt and establishing effective mitigation and resolution mechanisms.

This Policy Brief seeks to identify strategic approaches and best practices that electoral stakeholders should employ to anticipate and prevent electoral violence in the 2017 elections. In substance, it makes two key points. First, that the likelihood of violence is high due to heightened political competition at the national and county levels, credibility gaps in the institutions handling the elections and a polarizing socio-economic context that predisposes citizens to engage in violence. Secondly, that the involvement of county governments in the design of interventions geared towards a peaceful election in 2017 is critical since success depend on locally grounded and nuanced understanding of the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The policy brief discusses the 2017 election landscape including the specific issues raised by devolution, evaluates some of the interventions employed in the 2013 electoral cycle and makes policy recommendations for the various stakeholders.

2. The 2017 Election Landscape

This policy brief argues that the likelihood of violence in the 2017 election is high due to heightened political competition at the national and county levels, credibility gaps in the institutions handling the elections and a polarizing socio-economic context that predisposes citizens to engage in violence.

The 2017 election will be highly competitive at both local and national levels due to the high number of candidates and incumbents who will be seeking re-election. The dynamics of election-related violence are complicated by Kenya’s multi-layered struggle for power, with candidates competing on the national level and for various posts in the 47 new counties created under the 2010 constitution. \(^8\) At the national level, the President is seeking re-election and the opposition candidates, who have continuously challenged the legitimacy of the current government, appear keen to build a broad coalition aimed at unseating him. If this were to unfold this way, the election would be similar to the 2007 election whose contested results precipitated the worst political crisis in Kenya yet. At the County level, the positions of County Governor and Member of County Assembly (MCA), which were new in the last election following the enactment of a new constitution in 2010, have drawn the interest of many aspirants increasing competition for power to unprecedented levels. This competition is largely driven by the desire to gain control of the county’s substantial budget and resources. Without resolute preventive action, it is likely that politicians may resort to divisive tactics, exclusivist politics and intimidation during campaigns. \(^9\)

Planners and perpetrators of ethnic violence in Kenya continue to enjoy relative impunity for their actions. From the early 1990s when ethnic violence became a serious concern in Kenya, there have been few arrests and even fewer successful prosecutions of perpetrators of violence. \(^10\) In particular, efforts to form a local tribunal to bring perpetrators of the 2007/2008 violence to account were politically frustrated. ICC cases against the six persons presumed to bear the highest responsibility for the PEV violence also collapsed.

Over the years, powerful leaders who have been implicated in violence use their influence over justice institutions to block or frustrate prosecution for their actions. Feeding into preexisting feelings of discontent, politicians tell their supporters that they needed to be in power to sort out historical injustices as a way to legitimize their actions. \(^11\) Some cases however, indicate an unwillingness of police to take action against perpetrators of violence, for instance the public brawl between two

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\(^{9}\) CHRIPS (2016). Conflict Assessment Report,

\(^{10}\) Inquiries into violence in Kenya’s elections going back to 1992 have identified individuals responsible for violence, but successive governments have consistently failed to ensure that these people are held to account. See Human Rights Watch (2011), Turning Pebbles: Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya.

\(^{11}\) Republic of Kenya (2008), Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, ibid
politicians in Kisumu and violence during the Jamhuri day celebrations in Meru, has not lead to any prosecution.

As a result, this impunity has led many politicians forming gangs and militias, which they deploy regularly to drive certain political outcomes. Such groups have been used to disrupt political processes especially party elections. Lack of prosecution for both members of these groups and their sponsors signals a continued unwillingness of the state to bring perpetrators of violence to account for their actions. Since the 2013 election, the credibility of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) has been significantly challenged by the main opposition parties. Since 2013, the IEBC has faced constant attacks from the opposition, denying it critical broad based support which it needs to be seen as fair arbiter. Some of the attacks have been related to the handling of the 2013 election particularly the failure of election technology used to identify voters and transmit results and corruption allegations surrounding the tendering process of printing ballot papers (popularly known as the ‘chicken gate’ scandal).

Collapse of the ‘Okoa Kenya’ popular referendum initiative provided the CORD coalition with additional ammunition with which to challenge the commission, notwithstanding the failure to raise the required number of signatures. Subsequently, the opposition carried out a sustained campaign that led to the resignation of all the IEBC Commissioners less than one year to the election. Late 2016, after the resignation of the commissioners, the IEBC Secretariat came under attack for continuing with preparation efforts for the 2017 elections before the commissioners had been replaced.

Even after the new commissioners took office, the commission continues to be challenged on various fronts. Notably, the IEBC Secretariat came under attack for continuing with preparation efforts for the 2017 elections before the commissioners had been replaced. It appears that improving the responsiveness – and preparedness - of the police has been interpreted as increasing their technical capacity rather than better management of security. As such, police reform has translated into a capacity-building exercise to strengthen the operational capability of the state police manifested in, inter alia, the procurement of more advanced - military-grade – equipment and recruitment of more officers without due regard to more accountability.

Trust and credibility in the judiciary, which is responsible for the resolution of electoral disputes, has also waned significantly. The high levels of trust that the ‘new’ judiciary enjoyed after the 2013 election in adjudicating electoral disputes helped to prevent violence. This was in sharp contrast to 2007 where disputing parties, who didn’t trust the courts, chose to go to the streets. However, since the 2013 Presidential petition, the judiciary has been facing criticism of the way it handled the process. This has impacted on its credibility. For instance, evaluations of the judiciary’s handling of electoral petitions after the 2013 election found that the heavy focus on speed may have compromised the quality of the rulings.

Nonetheless, it was the concurrent ‘board room’ wrangles in the Supreme Court relating to the retirement of judges and accusations of bribery against Justice Philip Tunoi, a Supreme Court judge, that dealt the heaviest blow to the credibility of the judiciary. The accusations and counter-accusations of partisanship between the judges exposed bitter rivalry among them. These instances, coupled with reports of corruption in the courts and wrangles in the Judicial Service Commission, have significantly reduced the chances that disputing parties will accept the ruling of the courts, even if they were to seek resolution of electoral conflicts there.

Police reform efforts promoted as the way to improve responsiveness and increase accountability of the Kenya police have not achieved much. Despite indictment of the police by the Waki Commission and subsequent legal and institutional reform efforts emanating from the Ransley Taskforce, the traditional repressive nature of the police has remained. It appears that improving the responsiveness – and preparedness - of the police has been interpreted as increasing their technical capacity rather than better management of security. As such, police reform has translated into a capacity-building exercise to strengthen the operational capability of the state police manifested in, inter alia, the procurement of more advanced - military-grade – equipment and recruitment of more officers without due regard to more accountability.

Just like in the past, police have employed excessive force to disperse political gatherings such as frequent protests calling for the removal of IECB commissioners. Additionally, human rights abuses by the police, especially enforced disappearances, extra-judicial and summary executions continue unabated, as the recent killings of human rights lawyer, Willie Kimani, his client and taxi driver illustrates. Further, the capacity of the police to carry out investigations and sustain prosecutions in court remains low. Notably, many of the cases presented to court relating to hate speech, political violence and even crime have failed due to lack of evidence. Little wonder that leaders and their gangs continue to perpetuate acts of violence with impunity.

This raises questions on the ability of the police to contain political violence if it were to emerge or even to carry out investigations and obtain convictions in court. Political statements linking security agencies, particularly the National Intelligence Service (NIS), with plots to rig the election pose another major threat to trust in the institutions.

National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and the district peace committees continue to face capacity challenges. A key role of the NCIC is to monitor hate speech, which has been identified as trigger for violent conflict. Unfortunately, the commission has come to be seen as a toothless dog due to its limited success since inception in 2009. Some of the cases against leaders accused of engaging in hate speech end up with the demand for an apology, a slap on the wrist, rather than substantive action.

The District Peace Committees (now County Peace Committees) are the other pillar of the national peace infrastructure. However, most of these committees have not been effective mainly due to lack of resources. In some places, the committees also suffer from lack of legitimacy as members are appointed without consultation of the local community. Without the local buy-in, some of these committees come to be seen as extensions of the government rather than locally grounded mechanisms of peace. Absence or weakness of these institutions which are vital to prevent and mitigate violence, does not auger well as the country gears for elections.

The propensity for violence is further aggravated by divisive political discourses underlined by a socio-economic context characterized by hopelessness and perceptions of marginalization. A mixture of high levels of poverty, youth unemployment, long-running perceptions of historical marginalization and entrenched ethnic mobilization create a potential explosive environment. It has been widely noted that most violent conflicts in Kenya can be attributed to access to resources, economic and political marginalization and youth unemployment.

These long-running, underlying issues become sources of violence easily appropriated during elections. For instance, politicians have been known to claim that they will repossess the lost land for their groups if elected. The recent invasion of private ranches by herders in Samburu and Laikipia Counties is a case in point. In other cases, politicians have sponsored unemployed youth to form gangs, which they use to cause violence.

Even though the new constitution sought to cure the issues of historical marginalization, especially through devolution, perceptions of uneven distribution of resources are high at both the national and county levels. In a highly charged political environment, this gives salience to rumour and incendiary speech which is now easily propelled through social media platforms. If not managed properly, elections can influence longstanding grievances and sectarian tension, serving as flash points for violence. It is likely that some local leaders will deliberately encourage ethnic animosity exacerbating insecurities, uncertainties and anxieties among communities for political mileage.

Gangs, militias and vigilantes remain salient as instruments of political violence despite numerous efforts by the state to eliminate them. These groups are argued to result from the high levels of youth unemployment, impunity related to non-accountability of previous bouts of post-election violence and political patronage. These groups are prevalent across the country with a recent study by the National Crime Research Centre identifying at least 46 organized criminal gangs. Amongst these are the American Marines and China Squad in Kisumu, Mungiki in Nyeri, remnants of MRC and al Shabaab in Kwale, Wakali Kwanza and Wakali Wao in Mombasa and tribal militia in Isiolo. Politicians have traditionally used violent gangs as a means to access power either by harassing, attacking and intimidating their opponents. This trend appears set to continue as politicians are reportedly paying them to offer ‘security’ services. The China Squad and American Marines in Kisumu, for instance, are said to be affiliated to the two major political sides. Efforts to control these gangs in the past, that have included extra-judicial executions, appear to be unsuccessful. Failing determined state actions, it seems likely that politicians will continue to employ these groupings to gain political advantage in the 2017 election.

19 See for example, Kenya National Human Rights Commission (2008), The Cry of Blood: Report on extra-judicial killings and disappearances; Human Rights Watch (2008), All the men have gone: War crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon conflict; Alston, P (2008), All the men have gone: War crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon conflict; Alston, P (2008), All the men have gone: War crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon conflict.

20 Amongst the achievements of the commission is a curriculum for use in peace building , support for the National Elders Council.

21 For instance, Moses Kuria has been apologised several times after making hateful remarks against individuals and communities. See: Ayaga, W (January 12,2015), Giatunud South MP Moses Kuria apologises over social media hate speech, The East African Standard; Nairobi News Reporter (January 12,2015), Update: Moses Kuria off the hook over Hate Speech, Nairobi News; Shiundu, A (July 8,2015), I apologise, but I have no regrets – Moses Kuria, The East African Standard: Renwii, C (January 16,2015), Moses Kuria updates court on hate speech case developments, The East African Standard.


26 Even those this invasion can be attributed to the drought it is clear that there is political interventions in the process. See Wesangula, Daniel (December 18, 2016), Laikipia, Samburu ranchers cry foul as land sharks invade their farms, The Standard on Sunday, Matara, Eric and Stephen Ngunga (February 7, 2017) Land disputes, drought compel herders to invade ranches, Daily Nation.


30 CnRIPS (2016), Conflict Assessment Report,
3. Securing Elections in a Devolved context

Counties have become the main unit around which the governance of the country is organised. The most significant change in Kenya’s political architecture since independence has been the introduction of devolution. The centrality of counties in the governance of public affairs has created opportunities for synergies and conflicts with National government and also introduced a new layer to state-society relations in Kenya which has an impact in the delivery of a peaceful election in 2017.

Even though security is designated as a national function, in practice it has evolved as a concurrent function between both levels of government. The involvement of counties in efforts towards a peaceful election is critical for two reasons. First, counties have a better understating of their local security challenges and can provide tailored solutions to them. Secondly, in some cases, counties themselves can be drivers and sources of conflict. Despite these emerging realities, the approach to security governance in Kenya has remained centralised around the Ministry of Interior and the National Police Service and hence the capacity for the counties to address conflict has not been fully realised. If properly managed though, county governments could very well put an end to the perennial conflicts that plague their counties.

One of the areas where county government can become key is in ending the cycle of conflicts that have plagued many of the areas in Kenya as they are now responsible for managing most of the underlying causes of conflicts in most of the conflict zones such as land, pasture, and water. Some of the county government have already made notable interventions to improve security in their areas including provision of police vehicles in Machakos, erection of flood lights in all the major towns in Nyeri County, demolition of Oile Market which had become a perennial battleground for gangs in Kisumu and scholarship and business support funds to curb the recruitment of youth to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) in Kwale.

Since security is highly localised in scale, the involvement of county government in security governance is critical to the attainment of security and peace outcomes. Counties face specific security challenges that require their own kind of interventions to resolve. Therefore, a fine-grained understanding of local realities would lead to design of better interventions based on local circumstances and needs. Some of the notable drivers of localised insecurity include terrorism (Garissa, Lamu counties), organised crime (Nyeri, Murang’a), secessionist movements (Mombasa, Kwale counties) and gang-related crime (Nairobi, Kisumu counties). In other counties such as West Pokot, Baringo, Isiolo and Turkana, conflict is largely driven by competition over resources underscored by inter-clan or inter-ethnic conflicts. As the 2017 general election nears, it is likely that politicians will politicize resource-based conflicts. Due to their detailed awareness of local realities and custody of critical developmental roles, county governments can contribute to the generation of security outcomes by providing localised solutions tailored to the specific challenges they face. Continuing with a uniform national approach to dealing with crime and insecurity presumes a homogeneous environment which obviously differs significantly from the reality is unlikely to yield much success.

However, by introducing a new arena of competition at the local level, counties have become a new driver of conflict. The competition for power at the county level has provided an opportunity for divisive political mobilization with potential consequences such as political oppression and intolerance. In the lead up to the 2013 General Election, ethnic alliances and counter-alliances were created to capture power at the county level. As a result, some groups were left completely marginalized leading to conflict. In Marsabit for example, the hitherto marginalized groups (Rendile, Gabra and Burji), formed an alliance to wrestle power from the Borana, who had dominated politics in the region before. The Borana found themselves excluded from positions of power when none of their candidates won the election. Disagreements over the elections outcome in the county and subsequent appointments exacerbated an existing conflict cycle and led to violence that resulted in several fatalities.

It is therefore critical for the county governments to be involved in the design of interventions geared towards a peaceful election in 2017 since they are key stakeholders in security governance. The design of effective interventions requires a locally grounded and nuanced understanding of the root causes of conflict and insecurity. County governments would be a critical partner for the national government in addressing the challenges of youth unemployment and radicalization since they are closest to these challenges.

4. Recommendation for ensuring a peaceful 2017 election

The implementation of the following recommendations would reduce the likelihood and scale of violence around the 2017 elections.

1. The IEBC should increase transparency of its processes and decisions through coordinated stakeholder’s engagement, involvement of observers and effective communications in order to enhance the trust and credibility of Kenyans in the elections.
2. The IEBC should promote healthy, inclusive and non-violent political competition by enforcing the already existing electoral code of conduct to ensure accountability among political parties and candidates.

3. The National Government should ensure accountability for individuals and groups that engage in political violence at all stages of the electoral cycle, including party primaries, through arrests and prosecution.

4. The institutions comprising the national peace infrastructure, including NCIC and County Peace Committees, should be proactive and work with other stakeholders county governments, civil society and faith-based organisations to execute their mandate of promoting peace, before, during and after the election.

5. All institution involved in the electoral processes should establish stakeholder engagement mechanisms to promote transparency and assure the various players of impartiality.

6. The Judiciary should conduct strategic engagement with electoral stakeholders to guarantee them fairness in adjudication of electoral disputes and involve them in addressing the concerns raised on the handling of previous electoral disputes.

7. The National Police Service should develop an election preparedness plan detailing procedures for dealing with electoral violence including strategic and systematic deployment of officers in hotspot areas to forestall violence and to ensure rapid response to distress calls.

8. The National Police Service should also establish a mechanism for consultations with key political parties to reassure them on the police preparedness and to address concerns over the police impartiality.

9. The Media should encourage nuanced and conflict-sensitive reporting of electoral activities and events both on traditional and new media.


This policy brief discusses some of the drivers of violent extremism in Kenya and the available policy opportunities that Kenyan and regional policy makers should consider to effectively address the problem.


This policy brief sets out the evolution of community policing in Kenya to date, and provides analysis on the key challenges hindering the realization of effective community policing in the country.

Policy Brief: Emerging security in the Kenyan Counties (CHRIPS, May 2017)

This policy brief analyses the emerging security architecture within the counties whilst addressing the emerging capacities of the county government and the opportunities to address security challenges. It does this by analysing the existing innovative ideas and practises on security and delves into the contributions by the county government in security management especially in the run to the electioneering period.

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This study argues that the effectiveness of security solutions to the pertinent security challenges in Africa. Through its work, CHRIPS seeks to advance rights and social justice.