

FINAL REPORT

Evaluation of European Communities Support to Zambia on Democracy and Good Governance

Project 8 ACP ZA 046

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Executive Summary

The European Community (EC) has substantially supported the 2001 Electoral Process in Zambia through a project aimed at improving voter participation, increasing confidence in the electoral process and the Election Commission, and promoting of a levelled playing field for the contesting parties. A total of € 6.9 m were spent through 3 main components: support to the Election Commission of Zambia (ECZ), support to Civil Society Organisations and an Election Observation Mission.

The Evaluation Mission on the EC Support to the 2001 Zambia Electoral Process has been conducted both in Brussels and in Zambia from 3 to 30 March 2003.

The complexity and opacity of the project framework have required the team to first try and clarify it through three dimensions : analytical decomposition of the elements of the project, budgetary structure and chronology of the implementation. Hence the team has evaluated all elements of the project at 3 different levels (elements, components and global project) and along 5 criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). The team has paid a particular attention to the lessons-learning aspect and recommendations aspect.

Despite the fact that the EC support was particularly relevant, the design of the project had serious defects, in particular due to the mixing and confusion of different activities and to the inadequacy of some financial instruments. In particular, the EU Electoral Unit would be granted too many different activities to carry out.

The beginning of the project has been substantially delayed by the formulation and use of elements of conditionality by the Members States. These conditionalities were expected to act as incentives for improvements of the system. In practice, they have been counterproductive and have disturbed the implementation of the whole project by excessively delaying its start.

Support to the ECZ and DNR, although very substantive, has not brought about the expected results. In many instances, either the material delivered was not adequate, or it was delivered too late, or both. This is particularly true of the DNR, which did not receive any of the material required. It also seems that the crucial role of the DNR in the voter registration process might have been underestimated in the project design. In addition, a lack of management capacity and a lack of communication between the stakeholders and among the beneficiaries has been identified as factors having contributed to these failures. Finally, regarding the support to the ECZ, much more has been done in terms of material support than in terms of promotion of transparency, management skills, communication skills and readiness for reform.

The EC project has efficiently contributed to support **Civil Society Organisations**, in particular by sponsoring their civic education activities. It is very likely that the small scale projects conducted by local NGOs through the Civic Education Trust Fund contributed to the surprisingly high voter turnout. However, as regards the objective of increasing voter registration, the EC support had no impact at all, for the civic education small scale projects started after the end of the voter registration period. Additional contributions from Member States have used the channel of the Civic Education Trust Fund to support domestic election observation and party agents monitoring, both essential instruments of transparency.

The EU eventually managed to deploy an **Election Observation Mission** (EOM), despite the fact that the timeframe for the elections was particularly tight and despite the defects of the original design of the operation, in particular with regards to financial and procedural constraints. Some acrobatic administrative solutions had to be worked out in order to overcome these financial and procedural constraints. The solution adopted, even though unorthodox and time-consuming allowed addressing the essential issues of independence of the EOM, quick recruitment of the observers and resource finding. The EOM managed to deploy 16 long term observers and 63 short term observers and, given the circumstances, is to be considered as a success.

Among the three main objectives stated in the Financing Agreement and used as references to apply conditionalities, only the aim of **increasing voter participation** has been partially achieved. On the contrary the issue of **increasing confidence** in the electoral process and in the Electoral Commission of Zambia, as well as the aim of promoting a **levelled playing field** still need to be tackled.

The evaluation team paid special attention to providing recommendations for the design and implementation of this type of project directed both at the Zambian partners and at the services of the European Commission. The recommendations focus on several key issues :

- The design of this type of project should make clearer distinction between all activities undertaken and should better identify their interrelationship.
- Greater attention should be paid to the choice of the appropriate financial instruments in relation to specific activities.
- The implementation of such a project should include better dialogue and partnership at all levels and allow for an efficient coordination of all stakeholders.
- It should be less bureaucratic in its management.
- The implementation should also benefit from a real guidance.
- Finally, long term impact should be sought, in particular through substantive capacity building of both the domestic institutions involved and the Civil Society Organisations.

I. PROJECT BACKGROUND

1. The project to support the 2001 electoral process in Zambia followed a study made in late 1999 and released in March 2000 known as the “Selsey Report”, which was drafted in close liaison with the Electoral Commission of Zambia. The report recommended the EC would substantially contribute to a process aiming at the consolidating multiparty democracy and good governance.
2. The previous election process in 1996 had been supported by the European Commission, in particular through support to domestic election monitoring organisation (FODEP). At that time, a stronger support to the electoral process, in particular via technical assistance, had not been possible due to the reluctance of both the Government of the Republic of Zambia and of Member States (see November 2000 Financing Agreement).
3. In preparation of the 2001 electoral process a Financing Agreement (FA) was signed between the European Commission and the Republic of Zambia in November 2000 that would describe the project, in particular as regards technical and administrative aspects of the implementation, and estimate the cost of the project. The whole EC contribution to the process would amount to 6,000,000 € and was to be carried out with EDF resources.
4. The Financing Agreement set the overall objective as being “the improvement of democracy and good governance” through the support of “elections scheduled for 2001 and other related activities”. The European contribution would involve several activities structured in 3 components including :
 - (1) Technical assistance and supplies to the Election Commission of Zambia (ECZ), supplies to the Department of National Registration (DNR) – low turnout in voter registration had been identified as a priority target ;
 - (2) The establishment of a European Union Electoral Unit (EUEU) in charge of administering election observation activities and managing a Trust Fund for contributions from Members States towards electoral activities undertaken by the Government or by NGOs. The EUEU would also administer the financing of civic education and domestic monitoring activities by local NGOs ;
 - (3) a limited amount of funds were also made available for a possible election observation mission (EOM) because “at a later stage it [might] not [have been] possible to mobilise funding at short notice”. This third component was then extended substantially.

II. OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

5. The ex-post evaluation that has been carried out here was already planned in the FA’s cost estimate. This type of evaluation exercise has become common practice for EDF funded programmes. They are now compulsory and systematically carried out.
6. Pursuant to the Terms of Reference, the evaluation has been undertaken as per the provisions of the Financing Agreement and will serve as a lessons-learning exercise for the application of future projects within the field. The target audience is the European Commission and the Government of Zambia. The evaluation report has been finalised after having taken into consideration the comments from the stakeholders.

7. On the basis of the findings of this evaluation, the experts have evaluated the overall conduct of the EC support and formulated recommendations as regards future projects in this field. The evaluation of the overall conduct of the project focused in particular on the achievements and shortcomings of the project in terms of
 - Increased voter participation
 - Increased confidence in the electoral process and in the Electoral Commission
 - Promotion of a levelled playing field for the contesting parties.
8. It must be emphasised that the first interviews conducted by the team in Brussels indicated that there are high expectations among the European Commission's services with regard to :
 - Possible improvements of electoral support projects design (in particular with reference to the coming electoral process in Malawi, for instance) ;
 - Need for a confirmation of the agreement reached in the Note on the Division of Responsibilities for Election Observation and Assistance Activities – June 2001 ;
 - Progresses and continuity of democracy in the SADC region (with reference to Zimbabwe for instance) ;
 - Possible support to future electoral processes in Zambia (discussed during the recent visit to Zambia of Commissioner Poul Nielson).
9. After presenting the background of the project, the evaluation team provided detailed chronology of the course of events starting from the Selsey report. The evaluation team has analysed the various activities undertaken in implementation of the 12 contracts and Work Programmes along the usual evaluation criteria. An evaluation form has been put together and completed for each of the 12 contracts and Annual Work Programmes/Cost estimates (AWP/CE).
10. This analytical work has been developed into a three fold evaluation of the project along the three components classification designed in the Financing Agreement, i.e. :
 - Support to ECZ and DNR (TA and supplies) ;
 - EU Electoral Unit activities related to civic education and NGOs ;
 - Election Observation Mission.
11. The third stage of the evaluation focussed on the overall project and raised several key issues, either identified by the evaluation team or pursuant to their terms of reference, such as the overall design, organisation, supervision, administration, management and implementation of activities pertaining to election-related field operations carried out under the project.
12. The evaluation team has inspected and constructively assessed the inter-relationship and consistence between the three different components of the programme, and prepared a detailed report setting out relevant findings and concrete policy recommendations, which, in turn, should result in better project design.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. General considerations

13. The team wishes first to stress the fact that its evaluation is external and has been conducted in total independence from any of the various stakeholders of the Zambia 2001 Project.
14. The evaluation team has adopted the Logical Framework (or “logframe”) as the cornerstone of its methodology and will follow the Project Cycle Management (PCM). The Logical

Framework is the most widely accepted planning tool in the European Commission, and provides useful quality assessment possibilities.

15. In the particular case of the Zambia 2001 Project, the original logframe was made at the time the Financing Agreement was concluded (November 2000). As the shape of the project has undergone modifications during the course of its implementation, and pursuant to the terms of reference of the evaluation mission, the evaluators had to reconstruct a logframe corresponding to the activities actually carried out in 2001.
16. The criteria to evaluate the activities are those of the evaluation methodology as it is designed by the European Commission and other International Agencies, and as they are formulated in the Evaluation Mission terms of reference.
17. Relevance of the project in terms of project preparation and design. Was the information on which the project and its components were based appropriately collected and analysed (identification, feasibility study, etc)? Was it consistent with the programme proposed (goal, purpose, results, activities, etc)? Were risks and pre-conditions clearly and comprehensively identified? Was the intervention logic coherent with prevailing conditions in the country? Did the project design adequately consider the timeframe for implementation vis-à-vis internal commission procedures? Of particular importance is the project's relevance vis-à-vis the following objectives : increased voter participation, increased confidence in the electoral process and the Electoral Commission, promotion of a levelled playing field for the contesting parties.
18. Efficiency. Did the activities achieve the desired results? Did the inputs efficiently contribute to the achievement of results? Could similar results have been obtained at lower costs? Were activities timely implemented, and if not, did delays result in the need for additional resources and/or time? Were procurement arrangements adequate (services/supply)? Were organisational arrangements adequate for an optimal cost-efficiency? How did the TAs to EU Electoral Unit and the ECZ and international/domestic observers fit in the electoral process in Zambia in 2001? What were the strengths and weaknesses in management and co-ordination (communication, human resources deployment, information, budgeting and financial management)? Could these weaknesses have been anticipated and avoided? What were the levels and stages of involvement of key stakeholders in the various stages of the electoral process? Have partnerships been built and with whom? How strong is the sense of ownership at various levels? How efficient were approaches/methods (training of trainers, voter education, training of election observers/monitors, training manuals, etc) for the achievement of results? Were the anticipated results reached? How were the needs for flexibility and predictability balanced? Were there appropriate monitoring indicators and baseline data?
19. Effectiveness. To what extent do the results obtained based on representative selection of provinces/districts/constituencies, contribute to the project purpose? Are there additional results, both positive and negative, or additional beneficiaries, which were not initially identified? Were assumptions realised, and if not, what were the consequences for the programme?
20. Impact. What has been the project's impact (contribution to its goal)? What assumptions at this level have materialised and what have been the consequences?
21. Overall Quality and Sustainability. What is the likely sustainability of the project with respect to policy, legal electoral frameworks and constitutional measures, economic and financial

sustainability, social factors (including public involvement, gender, technology), institutional and management capacity in both the ECZ, NGOs and other key players in the electoral process in Zambia?

22. Conclusions and recommendations should include in particular, (a) overall successes and failures, and causes; cost efficiency; adequacy of means and time to achieve purpose (b) sustainability and (c) alternative solutions.
23. Lessons learnt should be highlighted : (a) policy, legal, constitutional, organisational and operational lessons, (b) pre-conditions that would be required in the future for such projects, (c) general development lessons (national and regional instruments and strategies).
24. The evaluation team has also used as much as possible the performance ratings (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, less than satisfactory, highly unsatisfactory), as recommended in the Guide to the Evaluation Procedures and Structures currently operational in the Commission's external Cooperation Programmes.

B. Conduct of the mission

25. Two particular features of the context of the evaluation mission have played a role in shaping the work to be carried out by the team :
 - Many of the actors involved in the Zambia 2001 project, within the services of the Commission, in the Delegation and among other stakeholders in Lusaka are not any more in the same position as they were at the time the project was implemented.
 - The understanding of the overall shape and conduct of the project is made more difficult, for it was implemented through series of ad hoc decisions.
26. Therefore the team used a set of different tools as sources of information :
 - Research into the available documentation in Brussels, in the Delegation in Lusaka, in the NAO offices in Lusaka and in the ECZ.
 - Interviews with most of the stakeholders both in Brussels and in Lusaka.
 - In addition, a questionnaire was sent out to several key actors of the project, after which written answers and comments were sent to the evaluation team by Dr Jochen Krebs (former head of the EC Delegation in Zambia) and by Mrs Gillian McCormack (former Media Consultant within the EUEU). Other stakeholders such as the EOM LTO Coordinator and Logistician, as well as the Project officer within the EC Delegation were given an opportunity to comment during phone interviews with the evaluation team.
27. After submission of the draft report, the main stakeholders were given an opportunity to offer their comments on the evaluation report within a period of two weeks. The team received substantial comments from, among others, the EC Delegation in Zambia, the Office of the National authorising Officer of Zambia, the British Council office in Brussels, Mr Michael Meadowcroft (former head of the EUEU and Chief Observer).

IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE EC SUPPORT TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

28. From the first findings of the evaluation team during their work in the offices of the European Commission in Brussels, several dimensions emerged as crucial to the understanding of the project carried out in Zambia in 2001 and to its evaluation.

29. First of all, the project has a very important time-related dimension, as it has undergone modifications at various stages, and elements of the projects had to be implemented with very short notice or respect deadlines. It seems that some parts of the original project, in particular the election observation component, have had to be adapted during the implementation phase to several types of constraints and deadlines. Adaptation generally took the form of riders both to the FA and to contractual documents signed for the implementation. As regards observation, the project's budgetary architecture was finalised at the last moment. It is therefore crucial to clearly identify the phases of the evolution of the project.
30. In addition, this project involved a large number of stakeholders, including several Zambian Institutions, the Delegation of the European Commission to Zambia, several services of the EC in Brussels (RELEX/B/1, AIDCO/C/3, AIDCO/C/8, AIDCO/F/3, AIDCO/F/6, DEV/C/3), private companies contracted for procurements, and finally the British Council and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa taking a crucial role in the implementation of the project. The evaluation required to identify the division of tasks and responsibilities between these actors in the conduct of the 2001 project.
31. Finally, even though this project was foreseen to be funded with EDF, some additional resources from the budget (line B7-709) had to contribute, in particular to the covering of part of the election observation mission's expenses. In the end, the activities foreseen in the November 2000 Financing Agreement have been funded with resources from :
 - The EDF usual procedures ;
 - EDF funded basket-funds (including Members States contributions) ;
 - The use of the EDF Incentive Amount ;
 - The budget line B7-709.
32. It is very clear both from the Evaluation Mission Terms of Reference and from the general evaluation methodology that the evaluation team is not meant to conduct a financial audit. The issues related to the financial dimension of the project are assessed with regard to their consequences in terms of operational and methodological constraints. A particular focus has been put on the issue of the relevance of the use of one type of financing instrument with regard to a particular activity.

A. Analytical approach

33. One of the challenges of this evaluation is to adopt a proper and workable classification of the different items of the project in order to analyse both achievements and shortcomings. The aim is to be able to give a clear analysis of each element and also to provide a broader picture of the overall project.
34. The Zambia 2001 project had 3 main components and was implemented through the signing of contracts and Work Programmes (AWP/CE) with supplies companies, public bodies and NGOs. Eleven of these contracts and AWP/CE were signed in direct implementation of the FA and were funded by EDF resources. These 11 elements are accounted for in the "Livre des comptes par pays – ACP ZA – Zambie – 8ème FED" (financial follow-up computerised spreadsheet for contracts and Annual Work Programmes / Cost Estimates) under the project 8 ACP ZA 046.
35. The observation component benefited from additional resources at a later stage of the implementation from (1) the use of the ACP incentive amount (50.000 €) and (2) from the

budget line B7-709 through a Grant Contract awarded to the British Council, which is then the 12th element. These 12 contracts and AWP/CE are the following.

- Funded with EDF resources :

	Type of Document	Description	Amount in €
1	Work Programme	Running costs of EUEU	321.200,00
2	Procurement Contract	Supplies to the ECZ - Smith & Ouzman Ltd	782.000,00
3	Procurement Contract	Supplies to the ECZ - GS Procurement Consultancy	44.887,00
4	Procurement Contract	Supplies to the ECZ - Shonga Steel	632.963,18
5	Service Contract	Support to EUEU - British Council	416.000,00
6	Procurement Contract	Supplies to the DNR - Skipco PTY Ltd	347.000 ,00
7	Procurement Contract	Supplies to the DNR - Unit Export Ltd	153.000,00
8	Work Programme	Support to ECZ (Media, Civic Education, etc.)	2.370.210,13
9	Work Programme	EUEU Civic Education Trust Fund	200.000,00
10	Service Contract	Technical Assistance to ECZ (EISA)	270.000,00
11	Memorandum of Understanding	Election Observation	749.205,00
		Additional contribution from the Incentive amount (8 TPS 134) added to the MoU (11)	50.000,00

- Funded with the budget line (B7-709) resources :

	Grant Contract	British Council Election Observation Mission	570.995,00
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36. The evaluation team has chosen to structure its work by using the 12 contracts and AWP/CE in order to obtain a workable and comprehensive classification of the whole spectrum of activities undertaken under the project. Structuring the beginning of the analysis along this breakdown seems relevant as it provides a clearer division of activities and analytical framework than other possible breakdown criteria, such as budget lines or stakeholders' functions, which are somehow unclear in the project design.

37. Based on the terms of references, contracts and work programmes available, as well as on information gathered from interviews and exchanges of correspondence between stakeholders during the implementation, the evaluation team has worked out a first diagram aimed at clarifying the whole spectrum of activities carried out in support to the electoral process 2001 in Zambia.

- Diagram 1 (see below) reads as follows¹ :

38. The first component, on the left is the Support to the ECZ and DNR. It includes several elements :


- A contract with the South Africa based NGO EISA (item 10) to provide 2 technical assistants to the ECZ. These technical assistants were supposed to provide advice to the Election Commission as regards supplies contracts and were also involved in the managing of a Trust Fund aimed at covering activities of civic education, media access and other related items.
- Five supplies contracts (items 2,3,4,6 and 7) to procure material necessary for both voter registration and the conduct of the electoral process.
- A Work Programme (item 8) aimed at supporting the ECZ and managed by the technical assistants.

¹ The numbers referred to in the Chart are those used in the "Livre des comptes par pays – ACP ZA – Zambia – 8ème FED".

39. The second component is the European Union Electoral Unit (EUEU)² support to civil society in relation to their activities of civic education. It includes :
- The setting up of an EU Electoral Unit, which team members are recruited and provided through a service contract signed with the British Council (item 5).
 - A Work Programme (AWP/CE) aimed at covering the running costs of the EUEU (item 1).
 - A Trust Fund (item 11) aimed at financing Civil Society Organisations' micro projects in relation with voter education, training and technical assistance to NGOs, information to political parties and candidates and information to the Police.
40. The third component, on the right, has a more complex structure which reflects the acrobatic "damage control management" that shaped the implementation. It includes :
- The creation of a basket fund (item 9), managed under a MoU (signed 25 October 2001) aimed at covering the costs of the Long Term Observers, parts of the Short Term Observers costs, and some parts of the Core Team costs.
 - A Grant Contract (item 12) signed with the British Council – Brussels and financed by the B7-709 Budget Line, aimed at ensuring the recruitment, contracting and deployment of the STOs and to cover the costs of the Chief Observer.
 - An extension of the first British Council contract (EDF contract) in order to cover the costs of the EOM Core Team.


² The Unit bears different names (Electoral Unit, Electoral Support Unit, Electoral Implementation Unit) in the Financing Agreement. The Evaluation team chose to always refer to it as the European Union Electoral Unit (EUEU).

**European Communities Support to Zambia on Democracy and Good Governance
Projects: 8 ACP ZA 046, 8 TPS 134 and B7-709N/2001/3176**



B. Budgetary approach

In order to evaluate the proportionality between the assumed objectives and the allocation of resources, the evaluation team has worked out the following diagram. Please note that some Member States contributed to the Civic Education Trust Fund in addition to the 200.000 € foreseen in the FA and appearing on this diagram.



C. Chronological approach

41. Time factors played an important role in the implementation of the Project for all components:
- The late lifting of the embargo on several items of the project, in particular the supplies contracts for the ECZ, resulted in emergency management and several failures to deliver the right material on time. As regards the materials to be delivered to the DNR, the length and complexity of procedures may partly explain the failure of that part of the project.
 - The late commencement of the civic education activities by local Civil Society Organisations (CSO) did not allow them to have a real effect on voter registration. Yet they might have had an effect on the turnout.
 - The tight timeframe, late announcement of the date of the elections has put heavy constraints on the setting up of the Election Observation Mission.
42. The Evaluation team has attempted to reconstruct a chronology of the main events of the project.

• Chronology

June/July 1999 and January/February 2000	A "Study to identify support to the electoral process in Zambia for the year 2001 Elections" is carried out by Nicholas M. V. Selsey, EU consultant to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ).
March 2000	An agreement is reached between the Head of Delegation and the Heads of Missions of the Member States present in Zambia, on a Financing Proposal.
10 May 2000	Financing Proposal is formulated.
12 May 2000	Position Paper of the Heads of Missions providing "indicators for assessing progress on issues related to the political environment".
November 2000	The Financing Agreement 8 ACP ZA 046 is signed between the Government of Zambia and the European Commission.
February 2001	The Tenders for the 5 supply lots are launched.
March 2001	Terms of Reference are released and tender procedure commenced for a Service Contract aimed at setting an EU Electoral Unit.
26 April 2001	Signature of the first AWP/CE prepared for a period of 2 months (20 April – 20 June 2001) and aimed at covering the running costs of the EU Electoral Unit. As the deadline for signing the first legal commitment (start-up event) was approaching, and as it seemed clear that the tenders launched in the previous months could not reach the contract stage before that date, the AWP/CE was signed in emergency 4 days before the deadline, in order to be the first legal commitment and thereby "save" the project. It never came into force, for no one could be identified as imprest account holder when it was signed (the EUEU team would arrive 2 months later).
1 st May 2001	Deadline before which the first legal commitment has to be made in execution of the financing agreement. The commitment of the fund is subject to the existence of a start-up event (legal commitment) before that date.
May 2001	Bids for Tender for the supplies to the ECZ and DNR are opened and evaluated.
17 May 2001	An inter-service meeting within the European Commission identifies potential difficulties and issues to be resolved including : - A clearer distinction between the technical assistance and the observation mission should be established ; - New sources of funds should be found ;

	- An exploratory mission should be field. The creation of a basket fund, funded with EDF resource and managed under a MoU is suggested.
5 June 2001	Notification to the successful bidder of the EUEU Technical assistance – British Council.
15 June 2001	The suspensive clause (embargo related to elements of conditionality) is lifted, therefore allowing starting the contracting process for the 3 supplies contracts in support to the ECZ. Both contracts in support of the DNR were free of conditionality.
19 June 2001	After Tender Evaluation Team (Lusaka) evaluates the bids for tender, lots 1, 2 and 3 of procurements for the ECZ are awarded to 3 suppliers. The lifting of the suspensive clause allows for contracting procedures to proceed.
25 June 2001	Beginning of voter registration campaign. Service contract is signed with EISA for the provision of TAs to the ECZ.
End of June 2001	Arrival of the EU Electoral Unit Team (Michael Meadowcroft, James Piriou, Hannah Fearnley).
4 – 15 July 2001	AIDCO/C/3 Task Officer for Zambia is in mission to Lusaka to discuss coordination and budget for observers. - Only 200.000 € was originally foreseen - Assessment by AIDCO/C/3 = 1.050.000 € needed - Propose to raise the ceiling in the FA up to 0.6m€. In addition, contribution of B7 up to 0.6 m€ and/or use “incentive fund”.
July 2001	The EUEU conducts an assessment on the deployment of an EOM. Supply contracts are signed by the NAO and endorsed by the Delegation.
26 July 2001	Signature of the AWP/CE EU Electoral Unit Running Costs.
31 July 2001	End of voter registration campaign.
Beg. of August 2001	Annual Work Programme/Cost Estimate for support to the ECZ.
August 2001	Several inter-service meetings and discussions as regards a workable way to cover the costs of an EOM are held in Brussels. The issues at stake are : - the availability of 500.000 € on the B7-709 budget line, - the sharing of the expenses between EDF and B7-709, - the handling of the EOM by the EUEU, which would imply an extension of the British Council EDF contract to include statistical analysis of the results, media monitoring, logistics, etc. FA ceiling increase appears to be a workable solution, but it could not cover the travel of observers to and from Zambia for NAO would not accept Zambia NIP EDF funds to be used for that purpose.
23 August 2001	Signature by NAO of the AWP/CE – Civic Education Trust Fund (Item 9).
End of August 2001	The EUEU advertises invitations to Civil Society Organisations to submit proposals of small scale voter education projects.
31 August 2001	The Government of Zambia formally invites the EU to observe the elections.
Beginning of September 2001	Inter-service meetings in Brussels discuss the arrangement as follows : - Core team costs will be covered by EDF, as well as Long Term Observers expenses in Zambia. - LTO transport could be covered by the Member States. - STOs travel would be covered by B7-709 or by a contribution from the Member States.
16 September 2001	The additional Core team members are selected under the BC EDF contract.

End of September 2001	Inter-service meetings are held in the Commission in Brussels to discuss and decide on the following issues : - The date of the elections and the possibility to set up an EOM if the date is too close, - The capacity of AIDCO/F/3 to launch a project to fund STOs rapidly, - The compatibility of B7 funded EOM component with other EDF actions, - The contribution of the Member States either to the MoU or by covering the LTOs travel expenses, - The need for a MoU is recognised, as the normal EDF procedures would make the Government of Zambia the contracting authority for the LTOs and STOs. The possibility of making a “political MoU” with Member State(s) contributing without being formally engaged is considered, - The possibility of using the service of the British Council Brussels for the contracting, payment and travel of the STOs is considered.
28 September 2001	Decision of the Africa Working Group to send an EUEOM.
29 September 2001	Rider to the FA, adding 550.000 € to the “Contribution to the observers costs”.
2 October 2001	First contact between the EC and the British Council Brussels to see whether BC would be ready to undertake the Observation mission.
6 – 12 October 2001	Voter register is made available for public inspection.
8 October 2001	Agreement on the addendum to the EDF British Council Contract : - extension of current EUEU members mandate, - addition of 3 members for Core team.
8 October 2001	Rider n°2 to the Financing Agreement adding 50.000 € to the “Contribution to observers costs” requested by NAO.
15 October 2001	Request from the NAO that the EOM component of the FA should be carried out through a MoU creating an imprest account.
17 October 2001	MoU is signed to allow for Member states to contribute to the EUEU Civic Education Trust Fund. The British Council – Brussels sends warnings to the Commission as regards the possibility to fulfil the task within the considered budget.
2 nd half October 2001	COREU is sent to the Member States to ask for names for 24 LTO.
23 October 2001	The ECZ certifies the voter register, hence allowing the President to announce the elections’ date.
24 October 2001	The Rider n°2 to the Financing Agreement adding 50.000 € to the “Contribution to observers costs” is accepted by AIDCO/C. The amount available on the Trust Fund (MoU) is now 800.000 €.
22 November 2001	Announcement of the elections’ date as set for 27 December.
28-29 November 2001	Arrival and briefing of the Long Term Observers.
30 November 2001	British Council Brussels warns EC on concerns as regards availability of seats for STOs and requests change in the budget to cover the hiring of a plane.
4 December 2001	British Council Brussels sends a revised budget to AIDCO/F/3 which amount is 742.357 € instead of 570.995 €.
10 December 2001	British Council Brussels raises concerns about the uncertainty of chartering a plane and express their need of a written confirmation of a revised budget.
11 – 12 December 2001	The solution adopted for the British Council Brussels contract is that the budget will remain 570.995 € and instead of an increase, some items will be withdrawn from the B7-709 and put on the EDF Trust Fund.

13 December 2001	The EUEU Team Leader becomes the EOM Chief Observer following his appointment by Commissioner Chris Patten.
14 December 2001	The Grant Contract is signed with the British Council Brussels.
22-23 December	Arrival and briefing of the Short Term Observers.
27 December 2001	Election Day.
31 December 2001	The EU Chief Observer holds a Press conference.
1 st January 2002	Departure of the observers.
Jan. – Feb. 2002	Extension of Michael Meadowcroft's contract until 8 February 2002.
18 October 2002	Rider n°3 to the Financing Agreement to extend the duration of the project until 30 April 2003.

V. EVALUATION OF EACH CONTRACTS AND WORK PROGRAMMES

43. As stated in the inception note, dated 14 March 2001, the evaluation team first analysed the performances of the activities undertaken through the 12 different contracts and Work Programmes.

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°1.	
Title: EU Electoral Unit Running Costs.	
Type of arrangement and document of reference: Annual Work programme and Cost Estimate, 26 July 2001.	
Beneficiary: EU Electoral Unit.	Budget : 292.000 € / 321,200 €
Description of activities to be implemented: - The AWP/CE provides resources to the EUEU for its functioning and the fulfilment of its tasks, which are (1) provision of technical assistance; (2) provision of information and assistance in assessments made by heads of missions and donors; (3) administration of activities related to international observers sent from the European Union and Member States; (4) provision of support to civil society in relation to the elections; (5) production of a final report on the elections. The activities covered by the AWP/CE also included Media Monitoring. In addition, the EUEU also conducted the "identification" on the suitability of an EOM.	
Available sources of information: - AWP/CE - EUEU Running Costs, reports, correspondence.	
Relevance. This Work Programme properly addresses the issue of the financing of the EUEU activities and day to day functioning. However, it must be emphasised that the overall design of the AWP/CE bears the same defects as the British Council EDF contract (see Form n°5) which is the inappropriate mixing of incompatible activities such as support to Civil Society Organisations, and identification and setting up of an Election Observation Mission. - The existence of a EUEU that is in charge of preparing a possible EOM is potentially contradicting the principle of preconditions set out for observation. - It is not consistent with the standard currently in force (Commission Communication of April 2000) to leave it up to a consultant to evaluate the suitability of EU observation mission and the preconditions for observation, and to establish the rights and obligations of international observers (Ref. Note on the Division of Responsibilities for Election Observation and Assistance Activities between RELEX, DEV and AIDCO); in particular if the same consultant would eventually lead the EOM. - Media monitoring activities are normally undertaken as an element of an EOM. A methodology has emerged over the years, which was already well in place in 2001. The reliance on a local Civil Society Organisation (CSO) to undertake this activity should have been avoided. The CSO capacity-building dimension of this initiative is overshadowed by the fact that media monitoring is part of an observation exercise, which should not primarily rely on local sources of information. However, it must be mentioned that the budget available for media monitoring was not sufficient to conduct this activity differently.	
Efficiency. The AWP/CE efficiently provided for the financing of the multiple activities of the EUEU. Substantial financial means were available. Its implementation was done in an efficient and flexible manner. However, its design contributed to the confusion between activities and lack of clarity between the elements. The evaluation team did not manage to obtain a clear picture of the expenses (292.000€ as planned in the WP or 321.200 € as stated in the "Livre de compte par pays – ACP ZA Zambie – 8eme FED").	
Effectiveness. The EUEU managed to fulfil the activities required in a timely and efficient manner. However, the over concentration of responsibility on the Electoral Unit allowed critics to single out its Team Leader. Put in the context of the Zambian elections 2001, this made the Team Leader an easy target of criticism and added an element of personalisation in the EC – ECZ dialogue.	
Impact. In a context where the UN refrained from ensuring donors' and observers' coordination, the EUEU played a valuable role in filling this vacuum and in taking a lead. This has notably contributed to creating a broad consensus on the judgement of the election.	
Sustainability. Inapplicable.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. Clearer distinction between activities should be better reflected in budget set up. The design of such a comprehensive project should avoid concentrating all activities in the hands of a consultant. The political assessment on the opportunity to observe an election and the negotiation of a protocol with local authorities on the rights and obligations of international observers are two sensitive issues that should not be left in the hands of a technical assistant. Media Monitoring should not primarily rely on domestic sources.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°2.	
Title: Supplies to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (Ballot papers and indelible ink – Lot n°3).	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : Supply contract MF/ZAM/016/01 Smith & Ouzman Ltd.	
Beneficiary : ECZ	Budget : 782,000 €
Description of activities to be implemented : Supply of 850 reels of security paper (ballot papers) and 5,500 bottles of indelible ink.	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : - Supply Contract - Addendum 1 to supply contract - Interviews - Correspondence	
Relevance. Performance rating: satisfactory. The Law establishes the use of indelible ink. The quantity of indelible ink seems a bit tight (5500 bottles for 5509 polling stations), but this has not been reported as an issue. The choice of funding the purchase of security paper is sound as it increases the guarantees against fraudulent printing and use of ballot papers. Efficiency. Performance rating: satisfactory. A minor calculation and procedural mistake occurred with the Commitment Request, but without any consequence. Delivery was on time and quality according to specifications. Effectiveness. Performance rating: satisfactory. 99.5% of the observation forms show that the indelible ink was used. Even though the security paper delivery was done on time, ballot papers went missing in some places. This is mostly due to the short period of time left to the ECZ to print ballot papers between the announcement of the date of the elections and Election Day. The question of delays and of the capacity of the ECZ to print ballot papers should have been taken into consideration in the assumptions. Impact. Performance rating : satisfactory. Sustainability. Not applicable (consumables).	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. As a rule, support to domestic institutions, in particular through material supplies should pay greater attention to their inner capacities.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°3.	
Title: Supplies to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (lot 1).	
Type of arrangement and document of reference: Procurement contract n°MF/ZAM/017/01 signed with GS Procurement Consultancy Limited (agent in Zambia for Smith & Ouzman Limited) and endorsed by the Head of Delegation on 19 July 2001.	
Beneficiary: Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ).	Budget : 44,887 €
Description of activities to be implemented: supplies of equipment and consumables (mapping material and 60 fax machines). This is by far the smallest contract in terms of budget.	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report): contract, interviews and correspondence.	
Relevance. Less than satisfactory. According to the tender document, this part of the project was identified to support the Electoral Commission of Zambia in one particular duty : the revision of constituency and ward boundaries, the drafting, printing and issue of new constituency / ward boundary maps. Some technical adjustments of constituencies' boundaries were made in March 2001 in order to fit with new district limits. Eventually, the ECZ decided that, as the results of the 2000 census were not available in 2001 when it discussed the matter, it would postpone a review of constituency boundaries until the 2006 elections. This is still the official position as stated by the ECZ Chairman during our stay in the country. On the other hand, in a note following a meeting held with the ECZ on 27 August 1999 already, the Delegation pointed out that the Geological Survey Department had been fully equipped with GIS mapping equipment (the same equipment that is requested by the ECZ) by the EC and that their staff are also fully trained cartographers. At that time, the delegation recommended to promote some co-operation in this area between the two institutions. No appropriate update of the needs expressed at an initial stage in the identification process (delimitation of constituencies, wards and polling districts was defined as a priority area for donors assistance in August 1999, but not any more at the beginning of 2001). Efficiency. Less than satisfactory. A suspensive clause was included in the notice of invitation to tender stating that "the Commission in consultation with Member States reserves the right to suspend the endorsement of the contract in case it finds the conditions of a conducive environment for free and fair elections unsatisfactory". The effect of this clause was lifted on 15 June 2001. There was apparently a mistake in the technical specifications of the paper for maps (thickness). Delay in the delivery of goods (delivery late November 2001). Effectiveness. Very limited. Presumption that the fax machines have been used at the district level during the election time for some purpose. No use of the mapping material so far. Impact. Very limited. Sustainability. As the ECZ is a permanent body, the fax machines could be used in the future to increase the flow of communication between the headquarters and the districts. Some of the mapping material could be used for constituencies redrawing in 2006.	
Conclusion (overall quality assessment). Less than satisfactory.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. The length and the complexity of the tender and procurement procedures have been underestimated. The ECZ should develop more co-operation links with other public institutions instead of trying to carry out all the tasks alone. The needs initially expresses during the identification phase should be updated at a later stage. Need assessment should be continuous.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°4.	
Title : Supplies to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (lot 2).	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : procurement contract n°MF/ZAM/018/01 signed with Shonga Steel Limited (Zambia) and endorsed by the Head of Delegation on 19 July 2001.	
Beneficiary : Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ).	Budget : 632,963 €
Description of activities to be implemented : supplies of equipment (7,000 metal ballot boxes, 7,000 padlocks and 10,000 steel ballot booths).	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : contract, interviews and correspondence.	
Relevance. Satisfactory. For the first time in the history of Zambia, three elections had to take place on the same day. Within the present constitutional framework, this particular situation occurs only every fifteen years, since the presidential and parliamentary elections have to take place every five years while we should have a local government election every three years only. Therefore, it was a necessity to provide more ballot boxes. An other option, probably more costly, and involving other political considerations, would have been to organise the local government election separately at a later stage. The polling booth can contribute to ensure the secrecy of the vote, even though other alternative solutions could have been examined (local manufacture of polling booths on site by the polling officers, as it is the case in many other African countries).	
Efficiency. Satisfactory. A suspensive clause was included in the notice of invitation to tender stating that "the Commission in consultation with Member States reserves the right to suspend the endorsement of the contract in case it finds the conditions of a conducive environment for free and fair elections unsatisfactory". The effect of this clause was lifted on 15 June 2001. Reasonably good performance regarding quality of goods and time for delivery (12 October 2001 for polling booths and ballot boxes ; 6 November 2001 for padlocks).	
Effectiveness. Satisfactory.	
Impact. Satisfactory.	
Sustainability. Satisfactory. Those 7,000 ballot boxes could be used again in fifteen years ! It could be used earlier in case of increase in the number of polling stations. We took note that at the same time some of our interlocutors expressed the wish to be equipped with transparent ballot boxes. We hope that the 10,000 polling booth have been properly stored and could be used for any further election (local government election in 2004 and presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006).	
Conclusion (overall quality assessment). Satisfactory.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. The fact that those items were manufactured locally is probably a positive aspect of this contract (better adequacy to the needs, quicker delivery, and positive impact on the local economy). The secrecy of the vote could and should also be increased by a reform of the voting procedures. (In particular, the fact that serial numbers appear on both ballot papers and their counterfoils, added to the fact that polling officers write the voter's number on the ballot paper counterfoil creates a possibility to trace back the voter's choice.)	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°5.	
Title : Democracy and Good Governance: EU Electoral Unit.	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : Contract No TA/ZAM/011/01 with British Council.	
Beneficiary : EUEU	Budget : 416.000 € (original: 280.000 €). Additional AWP/CE Running costs of the EUEU = 321.200 € (see Form n°1).
Description of activities to be implemented : - Provide technical assistance to the EU Electoral Unit : three consultants (Team Leader, Civil Society Advisor, Logistics and Statistical Officer). - After Addendum in October 2001: extension of the mandate of 2 team members, recruitment of additional core team members (Deputy Team Leader, LTO coordinator and Media Analyst). Tasks and responsibilities: - Management of the EUEU, NGO capacity building, preparation and administration of the process of observing the elections, provision to HoMs and Donors groups of information relating to the suitability of an EOM, administration of the Civil Society – Civic Education Trust Fund. - After addendum : Co-ordination of LTO activities and media monitoring.	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : - Service Contract TA/ZAM/011/01, Addendum n°1 (17 October 2001), Interviews, Correspondence.	
Relevance. The Financing Agreement identified quite clearly the Civic Education / Support to Civil Society Organisation component. According to the Terms of Reference, the EUEU would eventually conduct the EOM but it was clear that a new Chief Observer would have to be found. The recruitment of the three experts, even though relevant with regards to their competences, should have been more balanced from the point of view of their nationality. The mixing of responsibilities in the design between activities of support to civil society and the setting up of an observation mission should have been avoided, for both activities have different logic, methodology and objectives. In a country like Zambia where many of the CSOs are involved in domestic political issues, the fact that the EUEU would adjudicate on projects proposals submitted by local NGOs seems incompatible with the necessary distancing from local political debates that Election Observation requires. This defect in the design of the project has been amplified by several elements of the implementation : the fact that the EUEU would play an informal role of donors coordination, that the EUEU Team Leader would eventually become the Chief Observer, the choice of commissioning a domestic civil society structure to monitor the media, the use of observation data collected by domestic observers.	
Efficiency. According to several interlocutors of the evaluation team, it seems that the team leader went beyond his terms of reference, although he might have been driven to do so by the context. The EUEU managed to identify, evaluate and support the implementation of civic education activities throughout the country. 99% of the Trust Fund was spent on a large variety of actions (see Form n°09). Thanks to a late and acrobatic financial solution (see Forms 11 and 12), and time consuming bureaucratic arrangements, the EUEU also managed to set up and deploy an EOM consisting of 16 LTOs and 63 STOs.	
Effectiveness. Voter turnout was higher than ever since the first multiparty elections. It is very likely that the civic education projects implemented by NGOs contributed to this result (see Form 09). One side effect of the concentration of responsibility on the EUEU was certainly the fact that it soon became a very visible target for criticisms, to the point that the neutrality of the EOM was challenged. The limit between both EUEU and EOM is impossible to draw; the whole design lacks clarity, potentially creating misunderstandings.	
Impact. Satisfactory.	
Sustainability. Inapplicable.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. Support to civil society and EOM are activities that must not be conducted by the same team for they have different logic, methodology and objectives.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°6.	
Title : Supplies to the Department of National Registration (lot 1).	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : procurement contract n°MF/ZA/015/01 signed with Skipco Proprietary Limited (South Africa) and endorsed by the Head of Delegation on 19 July 2001.	
Beneficiary : Department of National Registration (DNR), Ministry of Home Affairs.	Budget : 347,000 €
Description of activities to be implemented : supplies of consumables and equipment (100 Polaroid cameras, 10,000 Polaroid films, 100 laminating machines, 1,500,000 security pouches).	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : contract, interviews and correspondence.	
Relevance. Less than satisfactory. The design of the project is not fully consistent with the objective stated. No previous analysis and assessment of the registration system was conducted (efficiency of the system, planning of activities, management skills, training of staff, public awareness). Regarding the project identification and the feasibility study, we suspect that at one stage the communication must have gone wrong between the EC Delegation, the Department of National Registration and the consultant. The needs of the DNR have not been assessed adequately. The necessary partnership and collaboration between the DNR and the ECZ has not been sufficiently taken into account. The supply of Polaroid films was not an urgent need, since the Department of National Registration at that time had Polaroid film supplies, which would accommodate the registration process up until the end of the year. There is no precise description of activities to be conducted with the material, no precise description of objective to be achieved. Efficiency. Highly unsatisfactory. The tender process started late. The list of requirement submitted by the DNR in January 2000 has not been adequately updated before tendering in February 2001. A misunderstanding occurred in the preparation of the tender documents. Tender launched in February 2001 concealed a mistake and was therefore unsuccessful (incorrect number of film requested, 25,000 instead of 10,000). The Zambia National Tender Board acknowledged that it made an error in the wording of invitation for bids in the tender. The total price for the two lots considerably exceeded the budget of the financing agreement. Tender had to be annulled. Direct agreement was concluded with Skipco. The working relationship with DNR seemed to be difficult. At one stage, ECZ probably acted as a filter for the funding of DNR. DNR did not really act as the actual supervising authority. After the contract had been awarded, DNR requested a different model of camera, alleging that their field staff was already trained in the use of this camera and familiar with minor repairs. Inappropriate specifications (model of cameras, quality and life expectancy of films, thickness of the security pouches). Discussion to regularise specifications of security pouches still going on in January 2002. Only one item (laminating machines) raised no discussion. Eventually, the implementation of the contract was confined to a succession of mistakes, disputes and misunderstanding. The activities did not achieve the desired result since no material was actually delivered before the election day. Effectiveness. Highly unsatisfactory. No impact on voter participation. There is no good justification for the delay in the implementation, since this element of the project was not subject to HoMs conditionalities regarding the creation of an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Impact. Highly unsatisfactory. No impact at all. Sustainability. Highly unsatisfactory. The Department of National Registration still seems to be under equipped and to suffer from a lack of methodology and management capacity. Conclusion (overall quality assessment). The problem of issuance of national registration cards has been identified ten years ago. Again in 2000, the issuance of national registration cards had been seen as a crucial aspect of the electoral process. It is still not solved in a satisfactory way. This contract did not contribute to increase voter participation. Consequently, it had most probably a negative impact on the effectiveness of other activities of this project (voters registration and civic education). Lessons learnt and recommendations. Lack of communication, lack of dialogue, lack of explanatory work between the different parties involved in the project design, identification and implementation. The length and the complexity of the tender and procurement procedures have been underestimated.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°7.	
Title : Title : Supplies to the Department of National Registration (lot 2).	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : procurement contract n°MF/ZA/013/01 signed with Unit Export Limited (United Kingdom) and endorsed by the Head of Delegation on 31 July 2001.	
Beneficiary : Department of National Registration, (DNR) Ministry of Home Affairs.	Budget : 153,000 €
Description of activities to be implemented : supplies of equipment (20 portable generators, 100 standard manual typewriters suitable for use in rural areas, 10 boats for use in the river areas locally known as "banana boats", 10 outboard engines suitable for the boats).	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : contract, interviews and correspondence.	
Relevance. Less than satisfactory. No previous analysis and assessment of the registration system was conducted (efficiency of the system, planning of activities, management skills, training of staff, public awareness). Even in terms of procurement of material, the real needs were not really assessed in an appropriate way. The slowness and the complexity of the procurement procedures has not been properly anticipated, as regards with the specific nature and requirements of the project including unchangeable deadlines. The need for boats has never been properly justified and supported by a programme of activities to be conducted. Efficiency. Unsatisfactory. The tender process started late. The working relationship with DNR seemed to be difficult. At one stage, ECZ probably acted as a filter for the funding of DNR. DNR did not really act as the actual supervising authority. The activities did not achieve the desired result since no material was actually delivered before the starting date of the registration process. Effectiveness. Highly unsatisfactory. No impact on voter participation. There is no good justification for the delay in the implementation, since this element of the project was not subject to HoMs conditionalities regarding the creation of an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Impact. Unsatisfactory. No impact at all. Sustainability. Unsatisfactory. We assume that this material could be used in the future for other registration operations. The Department of National Registration still seems to be under equipped and to suffer from a lack of methodology and management capacity. At this stage, they are the happy owners of ten brand new and unused banana boats but they don't have a single computer to help them in the management of the issuance of NRC.	
Conclusion (overall quality assessment). A total amount of 500,000 € divided into two lots (347,000 € + 153,000 €) has been given without any impact on the conduct of the 2001 electoral process. None of this equipment arrived at time. This amount dedicated to the delivery of National Registration Cards (pre-requirement to be registered as a voter) represent approximately only 7 % of the total budget.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. Partnership between the DNR and the EU was inefficient. The communication and the quality of the dialogue have to be improved. Some kind of technical assistance provided to this office should be proposed and discussed. A better co-operation between ECZ and DNR has to be promoted. The fight against voter apathy is still a challenge and has to be tackled simultaneously. The length and the complexity of the tender and procurement procedures have been underestimated.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°8.	
Title : Support to the Electoral Commission of Zambia.	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : annual work programme and cost estimate / CE n°1 for the period 31 July 2001 - 31 March 2002 (+ five annexes which are riders to the work programme).	
Beneficiary : Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ)	Budget : 2,370,210 €
Description of the project to be implemented. The work programme was administered by the technical assistance within the ECZ. This was by far the most important element of the EC assistance provided to the electoral process. The objective of the project is to address the following problems : decline of voter participation in the electoral process, unequal access to polling stations, decreased efficiency resulting from reduced allocation of resources, insufficient dissemination of relevant legislation, unequal access to media. The expected results are the following : (1) the capacity for the office of the chairman of the ECZ is enhanced ; (2) the electorate is better educated on how to register and vote ; (3) the efficiency of the electoral process is improved through the training of electoral officers and through the design, printing and dissemination of training manuals ; (4) the electorate, political parties, candidates and the police are better informed as to their rights and responsibilities ; (5) the access to the media is more equitable for participating political parties and candidates so that they can inform the electorate of their programmes ; (6) the increased financial and administrative management capacity of the ECZ ; (7) the improved logistical support to the electoral process through the hire of transport. The activities planned are the following : provision of technical assistance ; provision of transport for the voter registration exercise ; production of voter and civic education materials ; production of materials for the political parties and police information programme ; production of training materials for the electoral officers ; creation of a fund to secure the equal access to the media ; conduct of training programmes for the polling officers ; control of the procured equipment ; liaising with other stakeholders ; purchase of office equipment.	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : work programme and annexes, correspondence, interviews, activity reports, final report of Mr Jerome Rukambe, final report of Mr Noel Lee.	
Relevance. Generally satisfactory. Lack of dialogue with the institutional partner prevented from identifying and expressing the real needs of the Electoral Commission of Zambia. Lack of dialogue and lack of communication was obvious when assessing the need of the ECZ for two technical assistants. The real acceptance of this kind of assistance by the ECZ staff is doubtful. There was a lack of design and lack of regulations regarding two activities : access to the media and civic education.	
Efficiency. This element of the project was subject to HoMs conditionalities regarding the creation of an environment conducive to free and fair elections. This could have delayed the start of the project and affected its implementation. Late arrival of the two technical assistants (July 2001). Mr Joram Rukambe, Technical Assistant and Advisor to the Chairman of the ECZ replaced the expert firstly selected but refused by the ECZ. His terms of reference were subsequently redrafted and his position in the ECZ was changed. Mr Noel Lee Financial Officer and Technical Assistant to the ECZ arrived to late to set up efficient system to monitor procurement and accountancy. Efficiency and cost effectiveness are questionable. The same result could probably have been achieved at a lower cost. The actual co-ordination with other sources of funding (EUEU trust fund and donors working group) was not dealt with in an appropriate manner. The interim audit draft report came to the conclusion that no evidence of a major breach of the terms and conditions of either the Government of Zambia or the European Development Fund Regulations came to their attention during the course of their work. The delay in the announcement of election date made it difficult to plan and implement some of the programmes with time-effectiveness. The work program started with five items of expenditures and was further detailed in the annexes. This gives some flexibility to the implementation.	
Effectiveness. • Training of polling officers (465,000 €). Staff capacity building in crucial. Satisfactory. Main achievement. • Voter awareness and civic education (470,000 €). The selection of NGOs is a sensitive task. Difficulties met in the relationship between ECZ and the national voters education committee (NVEC was formed in May 2001 on the initiative of the ECZ). Lack of good will or capacity to co-ordinate from the ECZ. Eventually, many of the largest NGOs decided to implement their own initiatives. NGO co-ordination and guidance by ECZ to design a national voter education programme is a failure. Electoral conflict management programme seems to have been well designed and implemented in a professional way (apparently funded by the Electoral Commissions' Forum). • Equal access to the media (175,000 €). Limited result. ECZ bought airtime and space in the electronic and print media. The unequal access to the media was still identified and assessed by the observation mission as a flaw contributing to the creation of an unlevelled playing field.	

Impact. Lack of consistency between different activities. Huge contribution has been done to conduct civic education programmes and to hire vehicles to facilitate the voter registration while no actual support was made available to facilitate previous issuance of national registration cards (which is a pre-requirement to register as a voter). The impact is quite substantial compared with the situation prevailing in 1996 (previous election). It is not really satisfactory in terms of cost effectiveness. The amount invested is out of proportion with the achievements.

Sustainability. Management capacity of ECZ probably slightly improved. Independence of ECZ still questionable. As the ECZ is a permanent body, some cars could have been bought instead of hiring all of them (100) for a total amount of nearly 1,200,000 €.

Conclusion (overall quality assessment). The project is generally relevant. The implementation was impeded by a range of difficulties. The cost effectiveness seems unsatisfactory.

Lessons learnt and recommendations.

- We have to tackle seriously the question of issuance of National Registration cards (identity cards). Propose an adequate and final solution to the problem in providing a full support (including technical assistance) to the Department of National Registration.
- The law should provide for free access to the public media for the contesting political parties and candidates.
- A reasonable timing is needed to announce the election date in order to allow a better planning of the activities.
- Two activities should clearly be dealt with separately : direct public awareness on election and support to NGOs to conduct civic education activities. The ECZ should not be involved in the second one.
- ECZ should not try to take everything under his control. It should rather look for more co-operation, both with civil society and with other institutions (DNR, Broadcasting Corporation, geological institute for mapping). We could possibly keep the conflict management within the scope of the ECZ activities, as the electoral staff could clearly be involved in this activity. But we should remove the civic education activities out of the ECZ responsibilities.
- A clearer initial agreement should be reached on the choice and the terms of reference of the technical assistants, in order to avoid subsequent conflicting situations.
- The NGOs should co-ordinate themselves in order to design a consistent national voter education programme.
- Too much was done in terms of logistical and financial support. Very little was done in terms of legal and administrative reform and in terms of development of management skills (ex. registration procedures, access to the media, transparency).

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°09.	
Title : EU Electoral Unit Civic Education Trust Fund.	
Type of arrangement and document of reference: AWP/CE Trust Fund.	
Beneficiary: Civil Society Organisations.	Budget: 200,000 € (+ other donors contribution).
Description of activities to be implemented: - Support to NGOs and financing civic education activities, - Design terms of reference and application forms for applicant NGOs, - Invite Civil Society Organisation to submit proposals for projects aimed at increasing voter education, - Receipt and evaluate projects proposals, - Monitor and evaluate the projects being implemented.	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : - Financing Agreement, - EUEU Civic Trust Fund interim report on implementation and final report, - Interviews, - Correspondence.	
Relevance. Performance rating : satisfactory. The project was consistent with the overall objective of tackling voter apathy, which is a striking issue in Zambia. The overall implementation format (advertisement of the Trust Fund, evaluation of the proposals, invitation of the successful applicants to attend a workshop) is particularly relevant, in particular as it includes an important capacity-building dimension. The choice of using a Trust Fund allowed for other donors to contribute to the project and increased its capacity. Eventually it allowed for a quick response to the short noticed imposition of observation fees by the ECZ. However, as regards voter registration the project started too late to really have an impact on the outcome. In addition, the capacity of DNR to issue enough registration cards and of the ECZ to deliver enough voter cards should have been assessed as a pre-condition for the success of that aspect of the project.	
Efficiency. Performance rating : satisfactory. With the initial 200.000 € budget, 27 projects were undertaken out of 184 proposals evaluated. These 27 projects covered all provinces of the country. The project was well managed and attracted substantial contributions from other donors hence enabling the project to strengthen its support to CSOs. A report of auditors to the office of the NAO carried out in march 2002 shows no financial mismanagement was to be reported. In addition, the implementation of the project seems to have given the EU a very positive visibility.	
Effectiveness. Performance rating : satisfactory. Voter turnout was higher than ever since the first multiparty elections. It is likely that the civic education projects implemented by NGOs contributed to this result. However, the outcome of the projects calling people to register to vote has been limited by the technical incapacity of DNR to register voters in satisfactory number. Better consideration should have been paid to that aspect in the assumptions of the project.	
Impact. See above.	
Sustainability. The capacity building dimension of the project was ensured by the training / workshop provided to the successful applicant CSOs. It still has to be developed. Some equipment purchased by these CSOs in order to fulfil their activities sponsored by the trust fund was left at their disposal.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. The overall design (EDF resources – Trust Fund – AWP/CE) seems to be a workable framework to implement this type of project.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°10.	
Title : Support to the Electoral Commission of Zambia.	
Type of arrangement and document of reference: contract n°TA/ZAM/012/01 signed with the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) on 25 June 2001.	
Beneficiary: Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ).	Budget: 270,000 €
Description of activities to be implemented: provision of 16 man months of technical assistance (one adviser to the chairman of the ECZ and one financial adviser).	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report): correspondence, interviews, activity reports, final report of Mr Jerome Rukambe, final report of Mr Noel Lee.	
Relevance. Lack of dialogue and lack of communication with the institutional partner prevented from identifying and expressing the real needs of the Electoral Commission of Zambia. Misunderstanding when assessing the real need of the ECZ for two technical assistants. The real acceptance of this kind of assistance by the ECZ staff is doubtful. Efficiency. This element of the project was subject to HoMs conditionalities regarding the creation of an environment conducive to free and fair elections. This could have delayed the start of the project and affected its implementation. Late arrival of the two technical assistants. Mr Jerome Rukambe, Technical Assistant and Advisor to the Chairman of the ECZ replaced the expert firstly selected but refused by the ECZ. His terms of reference were subsequently redrafted and his position in the ECZ was changed. Mr Noel Lee, Financial Officer and Technical Assistant to the ECZ, arrived a bit too late to set up efficient system to monitor procurement and accountancy. Effectiveness. The two advisers seemed to be confined to a role of pure administrative officers instead of being the vehicle to introduce some substantial changes in the management and to promote administrative reforms. The financial technical assistant administered the EDF funds according to the rules. Attempt was made to bring the accounting system of the commission to an acceptable standard. Management capacity building was not really taken into account. Impact. The impact of the technical assistance in terms of efficiency of the procurement services was rather limited. It was reduced to the reception, acceptance and inventory, storage, distribution of the material. Sustainability. Still weak.	
Conclusion (overall quality assessment). Some unexpected reluctance from the ECZ regarding the presence of foreign technical adviser. Attempt to neutralise their capacity to induct some changes. Attempt to isolate them. The impact of the project was therefore limited.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. From what we heard during our meetings with many stakeholders, the ECZ is more inclined to show its independence towards the external technical advisors than towards the national political authorities. Transparency and communication skills within the ECZ are still underdeveloped. The issues of the composition, independence and management of the ECZ have still to be addressed.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°11.	
Title : Election Observation Mission (MoU).	
Types of arrangements and documents of reference : Memorandum of Understanding (25 October 2001).	
Beneficiary : Election Observation Mission.	Budget : 750,000 € (8 ACP ZA 046) + 50,000 € (8 TPS 134)
Description of activities to be implemented : Covering the costs of the Long Term Observers (travel to and from Zambia, per diems, all LTOs local expenses). Covering some costs of the core team: per diems for the security advisor, car rental, local staff, etc. Covering some expenses related to the short term observers (visa, per diems, domestic flights, visibility, training, insurance, administrative costs, etc).	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : - Memorandum of Understanding (incl. 2 addenda), - Interviews, EOM reports, - Intra European Commission correspondence.	
Relevance. The MoU was designed as an answer to the difficulties identified as early as May 2001 as regards the financing and the administrative management of a possible EOM. It must therefore be evaluated with regard to the constraints the design of the project had created. The creation of this basket fund (pursuant to art. 251 of Lomé Convention on co-financing) and its management under a MoU properly addressed the issues identified as potentially problematic (finding enough resources, avoiding the EDF recruitment procedures, avoiding local authorities' involvement in the functioning). However, the use of art. 251 procedure on co-financing would imply other conditions, such as the contribution of other donors, which eventually were not met.	
Efficiency. The basket fund and the MoU efficiently contributed to the aim of deploying an election observation mission that would function independently. Minutes of meetings between the services of the European Commission and communications between key stakeholders show that many of them demonstrated responsiveness and adaptability skills in finding an appropriate solution. However, the solution adopted relies on an unorthodox use of the procedures and should be considered as evidence that EDF resources are not to be used for Election Observation Missions.	
Effectiveness. Performance rating : satisfactory. The MoU allowed the EOM to deploy a substantial number of LTOs and STOs, which, given the timeframe and the originally limited resources, is an achievement in itself.	
Impact. The impact of the MoU has to be considered within the Election Observation Mission component as a whole.	
Sustainability. Inapplicable.	
Lessons learnt and recommendations. Proper Identification Mission should be systematically carried out before committing resources to a possible EOM. Using EDF resources to fund an Election Observation Mission creates unnecessary constraints and challenges the independence of the mission. Therefore it should be avoided. As a rule, Election Observation Missions should be funded on a single financial resource, as has been established in the Commission's Communication of April 2000.	

Project 8 ACP ZA 46. Democracy and good governance in Zambia. Identification & Evaluation Form n°12.	
Title : Election Observation Mission (Grant Contract).	
Type of arrangement and document of reference : Grant Contract External Aid with British Council (B7-709/2001/3176)	
Beneficiary : EOM	Budget : 570.995 €
Description of activities to be implemented : - Providing a support office in Brussels to sign contracts with the Chief observer and the STOs, organise observers' flights to and from Zambia, deal with STOs and Chief Observers payments and administrative issues. - Covering parts of the STOs expenses (travel to and from Zambia, insurance, communications, etc.) - Covering most Chief Observer expenses (per diem, fees, travel, local expenses, etc.)	
Available sources of information (interviews, activity report, audit report, previous evaluation report) : - Grant Contract B7-709N/2001/3176, - EOM reports, interviews, - Correspondence (between the services of the European Commission, the EC Delegation in Lusaka and the British Council).	
Relevance. <u>The use of the Budget line:</u> The characteristics of the B7-709 budget line make it the most relevant to fund an EOM. It operates independently from the authorities of the beneficiary country and it allows for a fast and flexible recruitment of observers. However, the amount available on B7-709 was limited to 570.995 €, which was not enough to cover the whole cost of the mission. <u>The content of the Grant Contract:</u> As it was decided that the Head of the EUEU would become the Chief observer, he would be paid from the Grant Contract instead of from the EDF contract for he was the co-imprest holder for the payments on the EDF contract. The inclusion of the Chief Observer on the Grant Contract also ensured the NAO could not interfere in the conduct of his mission. However, the Grant Contract operated within the overall project's confusion between support activities and EOM activities. Even though RELEX/B/1 identified this as a potential problem and requested as early as the end of may 2001 some amendment to the ToR of the three EUEU experts, this issue was not addressed. In addition, the fact that the EUEU Team Leader would become the EOM Chief Observer is questionable for (1) it added to the confusion between EUEU and EOM and (2) he became chief observer at a time when the relations between the EUEU and the local authorities (particularly the ECZ) were apparently already full of mistrust and bitterness. The Grant Contract allowed following the procedures for STOs recruitment and transport.	
Efficiency. Performance rating : satisfactory. It must be emphasised that given the timeframe and the constraints, the successful recruitment, transport and deployment of 63 STOs is a real achievement. Indeed, the correspondence between stakeholders indicates that the flow of information and coordination functioned well. The original budget for STOs transport to and from Zambia was exceeded. Better considerations should have been given in the contract for the potential lack of available seats of commercial flights at that time of the year. The response of the Commission's services to this unexpected difficulty (transferring some expenses foreseen on the Grant Contract to be added to the MoU) was probably the most workable solution available at that time and demonstrates flexibility.	
Effectiveness. Performance rating : satisfactory. The presence of 63 EU STOs (+ 16 LTOs) and their covering of 10% of the country's polling stations most certainly contributed to reduce the possibility of fraud and manipulation, and increase the transparency of the electoral process.	
Impact. To be evaluated within the whole observation component.	
Sustainability. Inapplicable.	
Lessons learnt and recommendation. As a rule, a high attention should be paid to contingencies and EOM should be funded under a single budget line in order to operate self sufficiently. Activities carried out in support of some actors in the process – namely Civil Society Organisations – are incompatible with the preparation and conduct of Election Observation.	

VI. EVALUATION OF THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE PROJECT

A. Support to ECZ and DNR

44. **Relevance.** This area has been adequately identified as a priority for the EC assistance in terms of budget allocation. The two institutions received 66 % of the total amount budgeted. A total of 4,100,060 € (i.e. 59%) was directed to provide supplies and technical assistance to the ECZ and a much more limited amount was earmarked for supplies to the DNR 500,000 € (i.e. 7 %). As voter registration and voter participation were identified as priorities, the distribution of the assistance provided to the two institutions seems unbalanced, both in financial terms and with regard to the technical assistance.
45. A lack of communication and dialogue did not allow a proper identification of the real needs (real acceptance of technical assistance, selection and specification of the supplies to the DNR). Even though the DNR was clearly identified as a key player and a weak point of the registration process, it seems that it was not perceived as a full partner in the project and was overshadowed by the ECZ. The DNR was indeed co-opted by the ECZ into the project. The need assessment should have better identified the weaknesses of the ECZ and the DNR in their role in the registration process and should have tried to promote a more open dialogue and a more tightened co-operation between the two institutions.
46. Regarding the procurement and tender procedures, the length, the slowness and the complexity of the procedures have been underestimated. The supplies to both ECZ and DNR should have been linked more clearly with a timetable and a planning of activities.
47. Some activities should not have been included in the work programme of the ECZ and were eventually transferred to other components. ECZ has backed out from the activities in support of parties' access to the media and handed it over to the NGO PANOS. The idea of providing logistical support to political parties' agents observing in polling stations during the polling day was also abandoned by the ECZ and handed over to FODEP through the EUEU trust fund. These two activities have been considered as being too sensitive politically.
48. A weak coordination within the donors community resulted in an overlapping between the financial technical assistance of EISA and a NORAD/DANIDA funded support to reinforce the accounting unit of the ECZ.
49. **Efficiency.** It seems that the communication between the ECZ, the DNR and the NAO did not function properly. At some stage, the ECZ might have acted as a filter between the NAO and DNR, hence allowing for confusion to occur, in particular, with regard to which body was in charge of expressing needs and specifications. Some confusion as regards the jurisdiction of the "supervising authority" and of the "contracting authority" may have occurred. There would be a need of pre-procurement and post-procurement training for both ECZ and DNR. The late arrival of the two EISA technical assistants did not help in improving the procurement management. According to the ECZ, the late disbursement of EC funds resulted in debts after the end of the process.
50. The conditionalities included in the Financing Agreement and in the tender document have contributed to disturb the timely implementation of the project. A suspensive clause was included in the notice of invitation to tender stating that "the Commission in consultation with Member States reserves the right to suspend the endorsement of the contract in case it finds

the conditions of a conducive environment for free and fair elections unsatisfactory". The effect of this clause was lifted on 15 June 2001.

51. **Effectiveness.** Too much was done exclusively in terms of logistical and financial support. Not enough was done in terms of legal and administrative reform and in terms of development of management skills (ex. simplification of registration procedures, free access to the media, increased transparency).
52. The issue of voter registration in Zambia has been striking since the first multi-party elections more than a decade ago. It was clearly identified as a priority in both the Selsey study and the Financial Agreement. In addition, some improvement on this matter was explicitly requested in the conditionalities. Yet the outcome of this aspect of the project is in total contrast with the expectations. The material supplied did not correspond to the specifications and was delivered to the DNR after the elections.
53. The obvious reluctance from the ECZ to accept any external technical assistance (refusal of the first candidate selected as adviser to the chairman; redrafting of the terms of reference; resistance to change in the management) is unfortunate and has reduced the impact of this element of the project. Technical advice should not be perceived as interference. Some elements of confidence building should be taken into consideration when negotiating the shape of the technical assistance. A clearer initial agreement should be reached on the choice and the terms of reference of the technical assistants, in order to avoid subsequent conflicting situations.
54. **Impact.** The issues of the composition, independence and management capacity of the ECZ are still a clear concern for many interlocutors and have to be addressed. Transparency and communication skills within the ECZ are still underdeveloped. There seems to be some slight improvement in the management capacity of the ECZ as regards the financial management (accountancy).
55. Regarding the support eventually given to the DNR, delays in the tendering procedures, problems of communication and specifications did not permit to deliver the requested material before the Election Day. Even today, the poverty and the inadequacy of the equipment of the DNR are striking in comparison to the expectations of the EC support regarding voter registration, and in comparison to the equipment of the ECZ. The Department of National Registration still seems to be under-equipped and to suffer from a lack of methodology and management capacity. Some kind of technical assistance to be provided to this office should be proposed and discussed. The department would need this assistance to identify its real needs, to plan its activities, to decide about the specifications of the items to be supplied, to participate in the procurement process and in the drafting of the tender documents.
56. A better co-operation between ECZ and DNR has still to be promoted.
57. **Sustainability.** The fact that the ECZ is a permanent body and has important manpower resources is a very positive point. It gives a good basis for a continuous and consistent support and offers in principle the possibility of substantial improvements in the management capacity. The intention has been expressed to bring some improvements to the collaboration between ECZ and DNR regarding the planning and the implementation of their operations.

B. Support to Civil Society Organisations

58. **Relevance.** Voter turnout figures of previous elections show that voter participation is a striking issue in Zambia. It is estimated that only 55.5 % of the eligible voters are actually registered³. This feature is aggravated by the fact that voter turnout on Election Day has been particularly low since the first multiparty elections in 1991. There seems to be a common understanding among the different stakeholders that these very disappointing features are the result of administrative constraints (in particular the complex, ineffective and time consuming registration process) and of a form of “voter apathy”.
59. The ECZ did engage in this issue, in particular through a National Voter Education Committee (NVEC) set up in May 2001 in order to perform voter education activities and involving CSOs under the umbrella of the ECZ. Mistrust and lack of understanding seem to have been the main features of the relationship between the Electoral Commission and the major CSOs, notably the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Coalition 2001 and the OASIS Alliance⁴. Problems of different approaches and conflicting agenda between the civil society and the government made the functioning of this body difficult. This created tensions and misunderstandings, in particular since the NVEC involved the distribution of resources by the ECZ to the CSOs for their civic education activities. Eventually, the relationship was broken when the ECZ imposed accreditation fees with very short notice and the NVEC failed to deliver what it was intended for.
60. In such a context, the choice made by the EC to support Civil Society Organisations to perform anti voter apathy projects appeared to be very relevant. Not only did it address a striking issue, but it also compensated for the failed NVEC.
61. However, more general considerations can be made on the support to civil society. The impartiality of some NGO has been put into question by some of the evaluation team’s interlocutors. The guarantees for a non partisan ethos do not really exist among NGOs in Zambia. In particular, the choice of a civil society organisation to monitor the media is highly questionable. Media monitoring activities are normally undertaken as an element of an EOM. A methodology for media monitoring has emerged over the years, which was already well in place in 2001. The reliance on a local Civil Society Organisation (CSO) to undertake this activity should have been avoided. The CSO capacity-building dimension of this initiative is overshadowed by the fact that media monitoring is part of an observation exercise, which should not primarily rely on local sources of information. However, it appears that the budget allocated to media monitoring did not allow this activity to be conducted differently.
62. **Efficiency:** The choice of using a Trust Fund revealed to be particularly relevant for it allowed for other donors to contribute to the project and increased its capacity.
63. The decision of the EUEU Team Leader to go ahead with the trust fund before other donors made any commitment worked as an incentive for other contributions to come. Eventually, Sweden and Denmark could cover the costs of local observers fees (imposed with very short notice by the ECZ) and the purchase of voter registers for FODEP and Coalition 2001, hence enabling them to conduct a substantial domestic observation. Additional projects were

³ 2.604.761 voters registered out of 4.687.000 eligible according to the November 2001 figures of the Central Statistical Office.

⁴ FODEP is probably the main CSO for the conduct of domestic observation. Coalition 2001 which main component is Afronet was, among other things, commissioned by the EUEU to carry out media monitoring. The Oasis Alliance groups the major church bodies, the Law association of Zambia and the NGO Coordinating Committee (NGOCC).

implemented thanks to contributions from DANIDA and Irish Aid (Extension of Operation Young Vote, Campaigning Manuals, Police Training, TV programme).

64. **Effectiveness.** The Work Programme was set up on 23 August 2001 and the EUEU published an invitation to CSOs to submit proposals on 29, 30 and 31 August 2001 in the newspapers. After evaluating the proposals in mid September, the selection of projects was finalised on 28 September. The project would start on 1st October, a mid-way workshop was held on 2nd November and a final workshop on 3rd December. 27 small scale projects were performed by CSOs throughout the country thanks to the budget foreseen in the FA (200.000 €).
65. Finally, the evaluation team wonders about the cost effectiveness of the EUEU. Had there been no Election Observation Mission, the setting up and running of the EUEU would have cost 572.000 € (British Council contract before addenda € 280.000 + Work Programme € 292.000) and would have only managed a € 200.000 trust fund, which seems to be out of proportion. This probably derives from the confusion of activities within the projects design.
66. **Impact.** Unfortunately the project started too late to have an impact on the outcome of voter registration. Voter registration was closed on 31 July 2001 and the civic education projects were performed in October and November. The incapacity of DNR to issue enough registration cards and of the ECZ to deliver enough voter cards would have limited the impact of voter registration campaigns anyway.
67. **Sustainability.** There is still a need for more professionalism, management skills and impartiality among the local CSOs.

C. Election Observation Mission

68. **Relevance.** The Financing Agreement (FA) mentioned the possibility of conducting an Election Observation and a provision of 200,000 € had been made accordingly. The rationale of this inclusion in the FA is not very clear. According to the provisions of the FA, this inclusion of 200.000 € was made “because at a later stage it may not be possible to mobilize funds at short notice”. However, the final cost would be more than € 1.4 m. The inclusion of the EOM in the FA might have acted as a commitment of the host country to invite the EU to observe the elections. However, it also meant that if an EOM was to be organised, it would imply the respect of EDF procedural constraints. In particular, EDF normal procedures would threaten the independence of the EOM from the local authorities and impose particular procedures for the recruitment of the observers.
69. The FA committed 200.000 € for observation before any proper Identification Mission was conducted as regards the deployment of an EOM Mission (EOM) and did not address the issues of feasibility, usefulness, relevance of -and possible obstacles to- an EOM. These issues had to be addressed later in the process, the EC and the Member States relying on the information provided by the EUEU to make their decision. Short after their arrival in Zambia, the EUEU team would be requested to fill the gap of the missing identification. As a result, RELEX/B/1 was little involved in the design of the EOM, whereas this project would have needed their methodological input.
70. The issue of the possible recruitment of a Chief Observer and the status of the EUEU / EOM core team is confusing. Neither the FA nor the EUEU terms of reference made a clear distinction between the EUEU and the EOM core team. The issue of the Chief Observer was not clear either. On the one hand, the FA merged both functions by stating that “an EUEU

(...) will administer, train and oversee the activities of short and medium term observers” (FA p.3) and refers to a “an EUEU with one Chief Executive/Chief Observer” (FA p.5). On the other hand, the terms of reference of the EUEU clearly distinguish both positions and indicate that a Chief Observer should be recruited in addition to the EUEU team leader if an EOM was to be conducted. The relation between Team leader and Chief Observer as described in the Terms of reference would be similar to those between a Chief Observer and a Deputy Chief Observer in the format currently applied: “the [EUEU] Team Leader will ensure that the EU Chief Observer has available, in a timely manner, all information...”. As a result of these contradictions it is hard to say what the architecture should have been.

71. Another defective aspect was that the design mixed EUEU activities in support to civil society organisations (CSO) and the EOM under the umbrella of the EUEU, while both activities have different objectives, logic and methodology.
72. Finally, post Election Day observation should have been foreseen earlier in the design of the project so as to allow for long term observers to follow up.
73. **Efficiency:** The possible use of the EIDHR B7-709 budget line was considered since the project started in May 2001, when an inter-service meeting at the European Commission started to identify potential difficulties for the implementation of the observation component of the project (meeting RELEX/AIDCO/DEV – 17 May 2001). At that stage, no proper exploratory mission had been conducted, the GRZ had not formally invited the EU to observe the electoral process and the date of the elections was still unknown. AIDCO/C/3 Task Officer for Zambia went to Lusaka in July 2001 to assess the situation and recommend a workable solution. The issues at stake were that (1) additional resources should be found; (2) the normal EDF procedures would excessively constraint the selection of observers (obligation to tender) and (3) would impede the independence of the EOM by associating the National Authorising Officer (NAO) to its functioning.
74. As a consequence, and after an assessment was made by the EUEU on the possible undertaking of an EOM, it was decided (1) to increase the ceiling amount in the FA up to 750.000 ; (2) to use the co-financing procedure (Art. 251 of Lomé Convention) and create a basket fund so that EDF procedures would not apply to the recruitment of observers and (3) to manage the basket fund under a MoU which would allow the EOM to function independently from the NAO. An additional 50.000 € was taken from the EDF incentive amount (8 TPS 134) to cover the costs of the LTOs travel to and from Zambia (the NAO was reluctant to use Zambia NIP funds for these air tickets). Eventually, B7-709 budget line would contribute and cover the costs of the Chief Observer and parts of the costs of the STOs.
75. Even though it was clear in the EUEU Terms of Reference that a Chief Observer would have to be recruited, the assessment carried out by the EUEU in July 2001 recommended that the EUEU would simply become the EOM core team, which implied that the EUEU team leader would become the Chief Observer. Small changes to the EDF contract (British Council service contract) would allow for an extension of the mission of some of the members and the recruitment of an LTO Co-ordinator.
76. As the British Council had been selected as the implementing agency for the part of the project funded with EDF (see form n°5), it appeared reasonable to take advantage of their headquarters support by contracting them to act as the implementing agency for the two elements of the EOM which expenses were not covered by the MoU : the Chief Observer and the Short Term Observers.

77. The EU was formally invited by the government on 31st August 2001. The Africa Working Group decided to send an EOM on 28th September 2001. Eventually, the elections' date was only announced on 22 November 2001.
78. The additional contract with British Council was signed on 14 December in the form of a Grant Contract. The activities included the provision of a support office in Brussels to sign contracts with the Chief Observer and the STOs, organise observers' flights to and from Zambia, deal with STOs and Chief Observers' payments and administrative issues. The Head of the EUEU formally became Chief Observer on 13 December and therefore had to switch from the British Council EDF service contract (Form n°5) to the British Council B7 Grant Contract.
79. At that time, the LTOs had been deployed since 27 November 2001 (under the MoU) and the core team since 18 October (Media Analyst), 1st November (LTO Coordinator) and 12 December (Logistics Officer), the three latter under the British Council EDF contract (form n°5) extension.
80. Due to the late announcement of the elections' date by the Zambian authorities, it was impossible to find air tickets to Zambia for the foreseen number of STOs (100). The implementing agency therefore had to hire a plane to send the STOs to Zambia and for their return. This resulted in additional costs and the British Council requested the EC to agree on a rider to the contract increasing the budget accordingly (30th November). As this appeared impossible, several items were withdrawn from the Grant Contract's budget amount, which would remain the same, and added to the MoU (see form n°11).
81. Eventually the EOM managed to deploy 63 STOs at the end of December 2001 until 1st January 2002.
82. The approach consisting in mixing funds has proved to be highly unsatisfactory and to create time consuming procedural difficulties. Mixing EDF and B7 funds not only associate different set of procedures, but also different services of the EC, adding to the complexity of the intra-EC administrative circuit.
83. Given the defects of the design and the very tight timeframe, the fact that the EOM was able to deploy observers and to address the challenging administrative and financial issues described above, can be considered as an achievement in itself.
84. This exercise also shows that EDF is not a suitable resource for an observation mission. Exceptional procedures (co-funding, MoU, incentive amount) had to be used in order to fit EDF resources contribution with the pre-conditions of the conduct of an EOM (independence from the local authorities, particular type of recruitment procedures).
85. **Effectiveness.** However, the deployment of an EOM occurred. Long term observers were deployed one month before Election Day and short term observers could be deployed throughout the country and fulfil their activities according to the required methodology.
86. **Impact.** Given the context, the impact of the EOM has not been substantial in terms of building confidence in the process as a whole and of providing credibility to the elections results. However, the presence and reports of the EOM recall the basic standards of a democratic election.

VII. GLOBAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

A. Relevance, overall design of the project

87. The choice of supporting the Zambian Electoral process in 2001 was relevant. Given the fact that the incumbent president could not run for a new term (without a change in the constitution) and that the previous 1996 elections were not satisfactory, there was both a need for support and an opportunity for an improvement of the democratic system. In addition, Zambia is a pole of stability in a region that has seen many conflicts.
88. The issue of the conditionality has been raised by most of the team's interlocutors. As a rule, these persons did not challenge the legitimacy in principle of formulating conditionality. It is not up to the evaluation team to assess the political opportunity of this conditionality; however, it must be assessed with regards to its consequences on the implementation of the project.
89. The inclusion of some elements of conditionality for the implementation of the Financing Agreement did not bring about the expected improvements. In practice, these elements of conditionality have proved to be counterproductive, and must be considered as a failure as regards the strategy for change.
90. To that respect, the main consequence has certainly been to delay the beginning of the implementation of some aspects of the project, which eventually would challenge the actual expected outcome. Considering the duration of the tender procedures, the delayed start of the project might have contributed to prevent some beneficiaries to receive the expected items on time. Eventually the elements of conditionality have operated as a blocking system rather than an incentive for change.
91. The long lasting issue of voter registration, which had been identified in the Selsey report and mentioned in the FA, was not addressed adequately at the time the project was designed (technical assistance and civic education). The weaknesses of the DNR as regards its capacity to issue National Registration Cards should have been better taken into consideration as a constraint on any project aimed at increasing the registration of voters.
92. The evaluation team has noticed that the real needs of the ECZ and DNR in terms of technical assistance had not been properly addressed. From the various interviews the evaluation team had in Lusaka, it seems that at the time the needs were assessed, the nature of the dialogue between the donors and the beneficiaries, as well as between the beneficiaries themselves, did not allow for a proper identification of the real needs.
93. The shape of the project allowed some confusion and overlapping to occur between the 3 components. This creates a risk to duplicate activities and some confusion as regards the competence of each participant. This feature is aggravated by the fact that the design does not provide for some kind of guidance that would co-ordinate the different activities. Such guidance should have been provided from the political level (HoMs, HoD).
94. This confusion in the design is striking and has caused an over-concentration of responsibility in the hands of the Electoral Unit, which allowed critics to single out its Team Leader. Given the context of the Zambian elections 2001, the high visibility of the EUEU Team Leader made him an easy target of criticism and added an element of personalisation in the EU – ECZ dialogue.

95. As regards Observation, the conduct of an observation mission requires total independence and neutrality that is not compatible with the involvement in capacity building/technical assistance. Both activities should be kept strictly separate and never carried out by the same actor. The design of the project seems to ignore the fact that these two activities do not have the same objectives, methodology and constraints.
96. No particular post election monitoring was planned. The developments of the post electoral phase (petitions, complaints, challenge of the results) show the importance of planning substantial post election monitoring from the start.
97. The constraints of the EDF procedures (length, principles of partnership and ownership) have not been appropriately taken into account at the time of the drafting. Eventually some of these procedures appeared not to have been followed at all for it was impossible to respect them given the many contingencies and short deadlines. These elements of emergency should have been better taken into account in the design.
98. In the overall design of the project, greater attention should be paid to the proportionality between the priorities established in the FA and the consecutive allocation of funds. The specific objective of improving voter participation (registration and turnout) could have benefited a greater share of the projects funding.
99. Finally, the design should take into account that the way one part of the project is carried out might have an impact on the outcome of another. For instance, failure to improve voter registration has limited the impact of projects aimed at increasing voter participation.

B. Efficiency

100. As a rule, the overall implementation of the project seems to lack guidance and does not prevent from duplicating activities.
101. Contrary to what has become common practice on this type of project, UNDP did not ensure donors coordination. Even though this issue is not in the scope of our evaluation, it has had some consequences on the actual implementation of the overall support to the electoral process; in particular, it reduced the possibility to adopt a common strategy and restrained the international community on the developments of the electoral process. The overview of donors support looks like a patchwork of individual initiatives, rather than like a coordinated policy or strategy for change.
102. As a rule, much more time seems to have been spent in administrative and bureaucratic work than in the actual guidance of the project.
103. An element of personalisation, in particular as regards the relation between the EUEU Team Leader / EOM Chief Observer and the Chairman of the ECZ seems to have had a negative impact on the implementation of some elements of the project.
104. The implementation of the first component (support to ECZ and DNR) is to be considered as less than satisfactory. For instance, only 2 out of 5 supply contracts did reach the objective. The 3 others encountered problems of mistakes in the specifications or too late delivery.
105. The second component (support to Civil Society Organisations) has been a success with the reservation that the cost effectiveness of the EUEU (actual cost / actual input) is not totally satisfactory.

106. The Election Observation Mission has encountered several difficulties: a “damage control” logic of management, a complicated budgetary arrangement, the nomination of the Chief Observer and the absence of an exploratory mission, among others.

C. Effectiveness

107. The contribution of the European Community to the DNR (€ 500.000 / 7% of the total EC support) did not bring about the expected results. The timeframe partly explains this failure. The beneficiary did not have the capacity or did not use its capacity to be a real partner in the planning and the implementation.
108. The Electoral Commission of Zambia received a total 4,100,060 € (i.e. 59% of the total EC support to the electoral process) from the EC. The implementation of contracts showed that its management lacks efficiency, transparency and readiness for innovation.
109. In addition the ECZ seems incapable of receiving the benefits of Technical Assistance. In general there is an obvious reluctance to accept external advises and recommendations, even though the need to improve internal management is obvious.
110. Support to Civil Society Organisation did bring about the expected results. The high number of project proposals received by the EUEU clearly shows that there was a capacity among local CSOs to benefit from the project.
111. Election Observation took place, despite the procedural difficulties and the tight deadline. It facilitated the deployment and work of domestic observers and party agents and contributed to improve transparency.

D. Impact

112. As stated in the Financing Agreement and the other preparatory documents, the main objectives of the projects were :
- Increased voter participation ;
 - Increased confidence in the electoral process and in the Electoral Commission ;
 - Promotion of a levelled playing field for the contesting parties.
113. The objective has been partially reached on voter participation. It is very likely that the small scale projects conducted by local NGOs through the Civic Education Trust Fund contributed to the surprisingly high voter turnout. However, as regards voter registration, the EC support had no impact at all.
114. The aim of increasing confidence has not been met. The results of the elections have been contested; some electoral petitions are still under examination by the Courts. The Electoral Commission of Zambia is not perceived by many of the stakeholders in Zambia as being impartial and independent from the executive branch.
115. As regards the objective of promoting a levelled playing field, the objective has not been reached either. There is a consensus among observers that the access to the media was unbalanced. Furthermore, misuse of public funds has been observed during the electoral campaign, without any type of regulation being enforced to prevent it or adopted to control political parties funding. Finally, no public institution has shown willingness in ensuring the enforcement of the Code of Conduct.

E. Sustainability

116. Regarding the ECZ and DNR, the benefits of the EC support seem limited in the long term.
117. Some elements of the material provided to the local institutions in charge of the electoral process should have been purchased instead of hired.
118. The fact that ECZ is a permanent body and has permanent staff and material should have acted as a factor of sustainability. The reasons for lack of sustainability must therefore be looked for on the side of the management of the ECZ.
119. Civil Society Organisations would still need capacity building. There is also a need for a better co-ordination and an increase of professional standards, in particular as regards the impartiality in conducting monitoring activities.

VIII. LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

- Recommendations related to the design of the project.
120. A project should not be limited to a simple addition of individual actions. It is recommended to better integrate those individual actions in a more consistent framework including workable complementarities and a real strategy for change. The interrelationship between the different elements of the project has to be detailed at an early stage. The supplies should be linked more clearly with a timetable and a planning of activities.
 121. More attention should be paid to the fact that democracy building requires long term support to the local institutions and should not merely focus on electoral periods.
 122. Too much was done in terms of logistical and financial support. Not enough was done in terms of legal and administrative reform and in terms of development of management skills (ex. simplification of registration procedures, free access to the media, increased transparency).
 123. The design of such a comprehensive project should avoid concentrating too many activities in the hands of a consultant.
 124. We should avoid the confusion between different activities. The mixing of responsibilities in the design between activities of support to civil society and the setting up of an observation mission should have been avoided. Support to civil society and election observation are activities that must not be conducted by the same team for they have different logic, methodology and objectives. They should be kept strictly separate.
 125. There is a need for a better appraisal of the relative proportion of each item in terms of budget allocation. We should look for a better adequacy between the priorities and the allocations in the budget.
 126. Conditionalities should be formulated in a more precise way than it was done. Some specific indicators should be worked out and constantly monitored in order to operate as a tool for the political dialogue between the EU and the Government. Zambian authorities have expressed the wish that such conditionalities should be part of a working protocol and should not be left

to subjective decisions. The conditionalities should work as an incentive, rather than as a threat. They should be part of a strategy for change. We should rather try to work together for a common achievement than simply wait for the fulfilment of some obligations by one of the parties. The approach should be dynamic rather than static.

127. More flexibility and adaptability are required. The needs initially expressed during the identification phase should be updated at a later stage. Need assessment should be continuous. More time-effectiveness is also required. The length, the slowness and the complexity of the tender and procurement procedures have to be anticipated.

128. More attention should be given to the sustainability of our activities.

- Recommendations related to the implementation of the project.

129. The lack of communication, lack of dialogue, lack of explanatory work between the different parties involved in the project design, identification and implementation have to be addressed as it can greatly affect the outcome of a project.

130. There is a need for a steering committee in charge to provide global guidance in the implementation of the project. This need has been specifically stressed by the Zambian partners in order to determine the role and competence of each actor and to be able to revise the logical framework during the implementation phase. Some room must be left and some flexibility must be recognised to allow a continuous adaptation to a context evolving permanently and to changing needs.

131. A similar need exists for a better overall co-ordination of the donors' assistance.

132. Regarding the procurement and tender procedures, the length and the complexity of the procedures have to be taken into account properly. We should recommend relying as much as possible on the local capacity to manufacture some items on site. This could result in a better execution of the contracts (better adequacy to the needs, quicker delivery) and in a positive impact on the local economy.

- Recommendations related to the relationship with the Zambian authorities.

133. The need for a better communication and for a permanent training is obvious. Generally speaking, the channels of communication have to be simpler, more direct, less bureaucratic, and less formalistic. It could avoid a lot of misunderstanding, delays, and mistakes. A better communication is required in order to allow a correct identification of the real needs. An increased effort has to be produced to explain the EDF procedures in a simple and clear manner. A short pre-procurement training should be organised drawing the attention of the beneficiary to the procedures, timing, and requirements to be complied with. Better communication during the implementation of the project would help to avoid mistakes and delays. As a rule, it is particularly important to emphasise the development of local capacity as regards procurement.

134. A better co-operation between different administrative services should also be promoted (regarding transportation, mapping, registration for instance).

- Recommendations related to the use of appropriate tools to fund electoral activities.

135. Some financial and procedural aspects deserve a particular attention. The relevance of the use of the different resources and their consequences as regards operational and methodological constraints have to be looked at closely.
136. The work programme can be seen as an interesting tool for this kind of project. For instance, the work program adopted to support the ECZ started with five items of expenditures and was further detailed in the annexes. This gives some flexibility to the implementation.
137. The choice of using a Trust Fund for civic education activities is appropriate. It allowed for other donors to contribute to the project and increased its capacity. Eventually it allowed for a quick response to some unexpected changes (the short noticed imposition of observation fees by the ECZ for instance).
138. Budget line should be the only acceptable resource to fund observation activities. Using EDF resources to fund an Election Observation Mission creates unnecessary constraints and challenges the independence of the mission.
139. The tender procedures have proved to be long, complex, slow and bureaucratic and globally inadequate to respond to an urgent and evolving need. They should be used more judiciously.
- Recommendations related to the inter-services co-ordination at EC headquarters.
140. The political assessment on the opportunity to observe an election and the negotiation of a protocol with local authorities on the rights and obligations of international observers are two sensitive issues that should not be left in the hands of a technical assistant. This project shows that there is a need for an exploratory mission, independent and external to the project, to evaluate the suitability, the usefulness and the feasibility of an EU observation mission, to assess the preconditions for observation and to establish the rights and obligations of international observers. In this regard, the regulations laid down in the note on the Division of Responsibilities for Election Observation and Assistance activities between RELEX, DEV and AIDCO are fully relevant and should be strictly observed.
- Recommendations related to the need for review of the legal framework and administrative reform.
141. Many of the limitations or flaws identified during the electoral process have to be addressed much earlier. A review of some aspects of the legal framework and a reform of some administrative constraints could greatly contribute to improve the quality of the electoral operations and to increase the impact and the effectiveness of the donors' contributions.
142. A simplification of voter registration procedures could be recommended. The secrecy of the vote could and should also be increased by a reform of the voting procedures. The voting process could be accelerated by distributing all ballot papers to the voter at the same time. Transparency of the process could be easily increased. A reasonable timing is needed to announce the election date in order to allow a better planning of the activities (the delay in the announcement of election date made it difficult to plan and implement some of the programmes with time-effectiveness). The law should also provide for free access to the public media for the contesting political parties and candidates, and for an observation free of charge. In addition, party funding need to be fully and efficiently regulated. Finally, attention should be paid to the setting up of an effective electoral disputes resolution system.

- Recommendations related to the support provided to the Electoral Commission of Zambia.

143. ECZ should not try to take everything under its control. It should rather look for more co-operation, both with civil society and with other public institutions (with regards to registration, access to media and mapping) instead of trying to carry out all the tasks alone. We could possibly keep the conflict management programmes within the scope of the ECZ activities, as the electoral staff could clearly be involved in this activity. On the contrary, we should recommend removing the civic education activities out of the ECZ responsibilities.
144. In any case, two activities should clearly be dealt with separately : direct public awareness on election and support to NGOs to conduct civic education activities. The ECZ should not be involved in the second one.
145. Even though it is clearly not in the scope of this evaluation mission to appreciate deeply into details the overall functioning of the ECZ, the issues of the composition, independence and management capacity of the ECZ are a clear concern for many interlocutors and have to be addressed in the future. Transparency and communication skills within the ECZ are still underdeveloped.
146. We would also recommend the ECZ to consider creating a mechanism aimed at finding solutions to issues related to the conduct of the electoral process in cooperation with political parties and civil society organisations.

- Recommendations related to the Department of national registration.

147. The design of the support provided to the DNR was not fully consistent with the objective stated. No previous analysis and assessment of the registration system was conducted (efficiency of the system, planning of activities, management skills, training of staff, public awareness).
148. The question of issuance of National Registration cards (identity cards) has to be tackled seriously. A consistent plan should be proposed to bring about an adequate and final solution to the problem in providing a full support to the Department of National Registration. The Department of National Registration still seems to be under-equipped and to suffer from a lack of methodology and management capacity. Some kind of technical assistance to be provided to this office should be proposed and discussed.
149. In general terms, the management capacity of the DNR has to be improved. The department would need this assistance to identify the real needs, to plan its activities, to decide about the specifications of the items to be supplied, to participate in the procurement process and in the drafting of the tender documents. A better co-operation between ECZ and DNR has to be promoted, in order, beyond that co-operation, to achieve a possible integration of the national registration with the voter registration system. For instance, sharing computer resources should be considered.

- Recommendations related to Election Observation.

150. Election observation has to be perceived and organised as an independent activity. A clear line should be drawn between observation and technical assistance/support to CSOs. Election observation should be funded under a single budget line in order to operate self sufficiently.

151. The European support should operate independently from local NGOs. Some methodological principles should be clearly formulated, regarding the limits to be drawn when collaborating with local civil society organisations. Too close collaboration can put the civil society organisation at risk and impede the credibility of the European support. This is particularly true as regards the reliance on an NGO as a source of information, and/or the use of an NGO to conduct monitoring activities. It is relevant to support NGOs but as a rule reliance on NGOs information is to be avoided. Media Monitoring for instance should not primarily rely on domestic sources of information.
152. The possible difficulty to identify and mobilise a Chief Observer should be addressed. A roster should be established at the Commission. The European parliament should actively play its role in trying to identify high level individuals who could be available and fulfil this responsibility.
- Recommendations related to the civil society.
153. The fight against voter apathy is obviously still a challenge and has to be tackled.
154. We would recommend keeping the civil society acting separately from the ECZ. More co-ordination is needed within the civil society, but not by ECZ. The NGOs should co-ordinate themselves in order to design a consistent national voter education programme.
155. More professionalism is required in order to achieve a higher degree of impartiality. Capacity building is still needed to achieve more efficiency. A better co-ordination is also needed within the donors.
- Recommendations related to the media.
156. The law should provide for free access to the public media for the contesting political parties and candidates.
157. After the election, the unequal access to the media was still identified and assessed by the observation mission as a flaw contributing to the creation of an unlevelled playing field. This issue deserves more attention. In particular, open political debates should be promoted and accepted.

ANNEXES

1. Reconstitution of the Logical Framework (original and updated).
2. Terms of reference of the mission.
3. Abbreviated curriculum vitae of the two evaluators.
4. Selected document of reference for the project.
5. Bibliography on democracy in Zambia.
6. List of persons met, contacted or interviewed.
7. List of acronyms.

ANNEXE 1

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK – As in the Financing Agreement (November 2000)
Support to the Electoral Process leading up to the elections 2001**

	<i>Intervention Logic</i>	<i>Objectively verifiable indicators</i>	<i>Sources of Verification</i>	<i>Assumptions</i>
Overall Objective	Improvement of Democracy and Good Governance	Electoral process recognised, nationally and internationally, as being more acceptable and free and fair than the National Elections in 1996.	Post-election Reports (Delegation, HoMs, Observers)	
Project purpose	Support to elections in 2001 and other related activities.	Voter turnout returns to at least 1991 levels, as a percentage of registered voters.	Post election reports indicating number of registered voters and number of voters actually casting their vote.	- Continued political will by GRZ to hold elections when so required under the Constitution. - Clear and evenly balanced electoral legislation. - All parties are committed to the democratic process and willing to engage in constructive dialogue.

	<i>Intervention Logic</i>	<i>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</i>	<i>Sources of Verification</i>	<i>Assumptions</i>
Results	1. More Zambian citizens are registered and issued with NRCs on a national basis, thus enabling them to be registered as voters. 2. The potential electorate and participating political parties and candidates are better informed as to their rights and duties.	1. Up to 4.9 m citizens issued with National registration Cards (NRCs) in both rural and urban areas and, subsequently, up to 3.3 m potential electors registered as voters in both rural and urban areas, a 45% increase on 1996. 2. (a) for the electorate: Sufficient voter and civic education materials made available on a national basis through the ECZ's provincial offices covering the registration and voiting phases; to be available at the start of each activity. Distribution will be through print (posters, press) and TV and radio in relevant local languages. (b) for participating political parties and candidates information programmes and up to 1,000 manuals made available at the ECZ's provincial offices at the start of the electoral process, to inform participating political parties and candidates as to their rights and duties (as outlined in the electoral Act and the Electoral Code of Conduct) 3. An increase in media time and media space made available to	Report of Project Supervisor and Observers Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers	Adoption by the DNR of an acceptable budget for the issue of NRCs. Adoption by the ECZ of an acceptable budget for the electoral process. Adequate and timely disbursement of complementary financing by GRZ, the EDF and other bilateral or multilateral donors to enable proposed actions to take place. Enactment by the GRZ and Parliament of minor legislative amendments conducive to free and

	3. Participating national political parties are assisted in informing the electorate of their policies	participating national political parties and candidates, compared to 1996.	Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers	fair elections
	4. The efficiency of the electoral process is improved through the training of temporary electoral officials in their duties and the design, printing and through the procurement of supplies and equipment.	4. The following parts of the electoral process become more efficient – the continuous registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, the running of polling stations and the counting of votes	Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers	Maintenance by the ECZ of the confidence of all participants in the electoral process.
	5. Potential voters have improved access to polling stations.	5. (a) Elections are held during the ‘dry’ season. (b) The distance to polling stations is reduced for potential voters especially in rural areas, compared to 1996. (c) Polling stations are staffed by officials with command of relevant local languages and voter education materials are in relevant local languages.	Reports of project supervisor Relevant legislation passed Constituency boundaries and polling district boundaries modified Reports of Project Supervisor and electoral observers.	Creation by the ECZ of an action plan timetable, and adherence to it The ECZ carries out a review of constituency boundaries as required under the constitution.

		<i>Means</i>	<i>Cost (euros)</i>	<i>Assumptions</i>
Activities	1. Procure and deliver to DNR in Lusaka: - Polaroid Films (25,000 packs) - Polaroid cameras (100) - Security pouches (1,500,000) - Laminating machines (100) - Generators (20) - Typewriters (100) - Boats for access to riverside areas (10)	Supplies contracts	525,000	GRZ provides necessary import clearance
	2. Design materials for voter and civic education covering the registration phase and the voting phase	Service contract	70,000	ECZ approves contents of all manuals and information programmes when necessary
	3. Print and deliver to the ECZ materials for voter and civic education.	Supply contract	300,000	Programmes co-ordinated with other civic education programmes funded by other donors

4.	project activity n°4: training for potential democratic leaders	Service contract	20,000	Other Donor(s) fund media monitoring facility
5.	Print and deliver materials for the political party/security services information programme	Supply contract	80,000	Other donor(s) fund editorial advice to political parties for the presentation of their message.
6.	fund ECZ with means to purchase media time/space on behalf of those political parties participating on a national basis in the Presidential and parliamentary elections	AWP	175,000	Agreement reached amongst stakeholders on rules for access to media by national parties
7.	Design, print and deliver to the ECZ in Lusaka up to 7,000 training manuals	Service contract	280,000	GRZ releases funds to ECZ to enable trainers carry out their tasks and to enable electoral officials to attend training sessions.
8.	Train up to 500 electoral officials as trainers and organise training schemes for up to 14,000 electoral officials.	Service contract	185,000	ECZ provides adequate training aids (ballot boxes, voters stain, up to date forms, specimen ballot papers, etc)
9.	Procure and deliver to the ECZ in Lusaka the following materials: - up to 60 fax machines - mapping materials - up to 7,000 ballot boxes - up to 7,000 polling booths - sufficient voters stain for up to 3.3 m voters - hire up to 100 road vehicles - purchase security paper for the local printing of ballot papers	Supply contract	2,740,000	GRZ provides necessary import clearances
10.	Engage the following TAs: - TA to chairman and director of ECZ Civic and Voter Education - TA to Chair of finance Committee and Finance Manager	Service contract	350,000	ECZ agrees ToRs for TAs
11.	Electoral Support Unit			
12.	Assistance to civil society organisations	Service contract	600,000	
13.	Observers	Agreement through Trust Fund managed by	200,000	

		the Electoral Unit		Depending on other donors
	14. Evaluation and audits	To be decided (under EDF rules)	200,000	
	15. Contingencies	Service contract	125,000	
			150,000	

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK – Ex-Post Reconstructed
Support to the Electoral Process leading up to the elections 2001

	Intervention Logic	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
Overall Objective	Improvement of Democracy and Good Governance	Electoral process recognised, nationally and internationally, as being more acceptable and free and fair than the National Elections in 1996.	Post-election Reports (Delegation, HoMs, Observers)	
Project purpose	Support to elections in 2001 and other related activities.	Voter turnout returns to at least 1991 levels, as a percentage of registered voters.	Post election reports indicating number of registered voters and number of voters actually casting their vote.	- Continued political will by GRZ to hold elections when so required under the Constitution. - Clear and evenly balanced electoral legislation. - All parties are committed to the democratic process and willing to engage in constructive dialogue.
	<i>Observation component:</i> (a) To contribute, by its very presence to reduce the possibility of fraud and manipulation that could de-legitimise the election process. (b) To make a global assessment of the election process, including the electoral campaign, the voting and counting, and the post-election period.	- Percentage of Polling Stations visited by observation teams, - Statistical output of observation forms.	Long Term Observers weekly reports, spot reports, voting and counting reports. Mission weekly field reports and an informed final report on the organisation and conduct of the election process in all its aspects.	Formal invitation by the National Authorities, Endorsement by the Africa Working Group of decision to deploy the mission.

	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
Results	6. More Zambian citizens are registered and issued with NRCs on a national basis, thus enabling them to be registered as voters.	6. Up to 4.9 m citizens issued with National registration Cards (NRCs) in both rural and urban areas and, subsequently, up to 3.3 m potential electors registered as voters in both rural and urban areas, a 45% increase on 1996	Report of Project Supervisor and Observers	Adoption by the DNR of an acceptable budget for the issue of NRCs. DNR is able to express needs and technical specifications.

				<i>DNR is involved as a full partner in the design of the requests.</i>
	7. The potential electorate and participating political parties and candidates are better informed as to their rights and duties.	7. (a) for the electorate: Sufficient voter and civic education materials made available on a national basis through the ECZ's provincial offices covering the registration and voting phases; to be available at the start of each activity. Distribution will be through print (posters, press) and TV and radio in relevant local languages. (b) for participating political parties and candidates information programmes and up to 1,000 manuals made available at the ECZ's provincial offices at the start of the electoral process, to inform participating political parties (currently ** parties are registered) and candidates as to their rights and duties (as outlined in the electoral Act and the Electoral Code of Conduct)	Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers	Adoption by the ECZ of an acceptable budget for the electoral process. <i>Timely release of national budget funds for ECZ by the GRZ.</i> Adequate and timely disbursement of complementary financing by GRZ, the EDF and other bilateral or multilateral donors to enable proposed actions to take place.
	8. Participating national political parties are assisted in informing the electorate of their policies	8. An increase in media time and media space made available to participating national political parties and candidates, compared to 1996.	Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers	Enactment by the GRZ and Parliament of minor legislative amendments conducive to free and fair elections <i>Possibilities to ensure enforcement of the Code of Conduct.</i>
	9. The efficiency of the electoral process is improved through the training of temporary electoral officials in their duties and the design, printing and through the procurement of supplies and equipment	9. The following parts of the electoral process become more efficient – the continuous registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, the running of polling stations and the counting of votes	Reports of Project Supervisor and of observers	Maintenance by the ECZ of the confidence of all participants in the electoral process.
	10. Potential voters have improved access to polling stations.	10. (a) Elections are held during the 'dry' season. (b) The distance to polling stations is reduced for potential voters especially in rural areas, compared to 1996. (c) Polling stations are staffed by officials with command of relevant local languages and voter education materials are in relevant local languages.	Reports of project supervisor Relevant legislation passed Constituency boundaries and polling district boundaries modified Reports of Project Supervisor and electoral observers.	Creation by the ECZ of an action plan timetable, and adherence to it. The ECZ carries out a review of constituency boundaries as required under the constitution.

	11. Observation Component: (a) To contribute to the transparency of the process by deploying additional Core Team experts, 18 LTOs and 100 Short Term Observers internationally recruited, visiting at least 10% of the country's polling stations, observing the counting and tabulating of results. (b) To produce mission weekly reports, Preliminary Statement issued to the local and international media, Final Report including recommendations for improvements in the process for future elections (c) To contribute to equal access to media by performing media monitoring.	LTOs are recruited and sent to the country; STOs are recruited and effectively deployed; Logistical arrangements concerning local staff, transportation and accommodation are correctly done. LTOs produce weekly reports and send them to EOM core team. Chief Observer releases statements and reports. Parties and candidates airtime.	Reports of Project Supervisor and electoral observers. Observation statistics. Media monitoring statistics.	(a) There is an effective participation of candidates and political parties in the electoral campaign. The authorities in charge of conducting the elections process will act Impartially. The EOM will be able to deploy observers throughout the country (b) Election observers will be accredited and have access to information. (c) There is effective participation in the electoral campaign; ECZ ensures the implementation of the Code of Conduct.
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		Means	Cost (euros)	Assumptions
Activities	16. Procure and deliver to DNR in Lusaka: - Polaroid Films (25,000 packs) - Polaroid cameras (100) - Security pouches (1,500,000) - Laminating machines (100) - Generators (20) - Typewriters (100) - Boats for access to riverside areas (10)	Supplies contracts	525,000	GRZ provides necessary import clearance Flow of communications between donors, NAO and beneficiary is functioning.
	17. Design materials for voter and civic education covering the registration phase and the voting phase	Service contract	70,000	ECZ approves contents of all manuals and information programmes when necessary
	18. Print and deliver to the ECZ materials for voter and civic education.	Supply contract	300,000	Programmes co-ordinated with other civic education programmes funded by other donors

19.	project activity n°4: training for potential democratic leaders	Service contract	20,000	Other Donor(s) fund media monitoring facility
20.	Print and deliver materials for the political party/security services information programme	Supply contract	80,000	Other donor(s) fund editorial advice to political parties for the presentation of their message.
21.	fund ECZ with means to purchase media time/space on behalf of those political parties participating on a national basis in the Presidential and parliamentary elections	AWP	175,000	Agreement reached amongst stakeholders on rules for access to media by national parties
22.	Design, print and deliver to the ECZ in Lusaka up to 7,000 training manuals	Service contract	280,000	GRZ releases funds to ECZ to enable trainers carry out their tasks and to enable electoral officials to attend training sessions.
23.	Train up to 500 electoral officials as trainers and organise training schemes for up to 14,000 electoral officials.	Service contract	185,000	ECZ provides adequate training aids (ballot boxes, voters stain, up to date forms, specimen ballot papers, etc)
24.	Procure and deliver to the ECZ in Lusaka the following materials: - up to 60 fax machines - mapping materials - up to 7,000 ballot boxes - up to 7,000 polling booths - sufficient voters stain for up to 3.3 m voters - hire up to 100 road vehicles - purchase security paper for the local printing of ballot papers	Supply contract	2,740,000	GRZ provides necessary import clearances
25.	Engage the following TAs: - TA to chairman and director of ECZ Civic and Voter Education - TA to Chair of finance Committee and Finance Manager	Service contract	350,000	ECZ agrees ToRs for TAs
26.	Electoral Support Unit	Service contract	600,000	
27.	Assistance to civil society organisations: - <i>Support to Civil Society Organisations performing anti voter-apathy projects and civic education.</i>	Agreement through Trust Fund managed by the Electoral Unit	200,000	- <i>Other contributors to the trust fund are found,</i> - <i>DNR and ECZ manage to deliver enough registration cards and voter cards.</i>

	28. Observers <u>Election Observation Mission:</u> (a) From EUEU in a proper EOM core team; - extend core EUEU team members mission - recruit additional core team staff (b) LTO component (Recruitment, contract, travel, payment, training,...) (c) STO component	To be decided (under EDF rules) - Rider to the service contract setting up the EUEU (b) and (c) - Increase the ceiling of the FA - Use the incentive amount; - Use of B7-709 budget line.	200,000 550.000 50.000 570.995	- GRZ agrees to the ceiling increase of the FA, - Possibility to use a Trust Fund managed under a MoU, - Announcement of the elections date leaves enough time to deploy EOM. - Chief Observer and enough STOs are available.
	29. Evaluation and audits	Service contract	125,000	
	30. Contingencies		150,000	Depending on other donors

Evaluation of European Communities Support to Zambia on Democracy and Good Governance

Terms of Reference

A: Introduction

The project “Democracy and Good Governance – Support to the Electoral Process in Zambia” was conducted in connection to the process leading up to the Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government elections in Zambia held on the 27th December 2001. The aim of the project was to contribute to the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Zambia through a variety of inputs into the electoral process.

B: Objectives of Evaluation

The evaluation will be undertaken as per the provisions of the Financing Agreement and will serve as a lesson-learning exercise for the application of future projects within the field.

The target audience is the European Commission and the Government of Zambia and it is expected that the evaluation will result in a debriefing of the target audience and a draft and final evaluation report.

C: Background of Project

The financing agreement was signed in December 2000 and the tender and contraction period lasted approximately 6 months. The actual implementation ran over a 13 months period from June 2001 to June 2002, with an emphasis on the months leading up to the elections.

However as these Terms of Reference are written some outstanding issues remain in relation to the supplies to the Department of National Registration.

A preparatory study to identify the needed support was conducted in the first half of 2000. This study identified a number of interventions designed to support the process in several ways.

The project had the following main components:

Supplies to the Department of National Registration	€ 525.000
Technical assistance to ECZ (Electoral Commission of Zambia)	€ 350.000
Training programmes and training manuals for the ECZ	€ 465.000
Support to ECZ voter programmes	
Support to ECZ civic education programmes	
Support to information programmes for political parties	
Support to information programmes for candidates	
Support to information programmes for security force	€ 470.000
Funding to secure equal access to the media for political parties	€ 175.000

(The Royal Danish Embassy co-financed this component)

Supplies to the ECZ	€ 2.740.000
Establishment of an EU Electoral Unit	€ 600.000
Contribution to Observers costs	€ 200.000
Assistance to civil society organisations	€ 200.000

(This was supplemented by contributions from Member States, administered by the EU Electoral Unit)

Contingencies	€ 150.000
Audits	€ 75.000

In connection to the project, long and short-term observers from the European Union were deployed to observe the elections. The EU Electoral Unit organised their travel and work. The amount, which was allocated initially to the election observation mission was insufficient leading to a ceiling increase of the overall project with an amount of €550.000 and a realisation of a 'partner project' covering expenditure undertaken in Europe from the funds of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Finally, a small project to cover the expenditure pertaining to the international travel of Long-Term Observers covering the expenditure pertaining to the international travel of Long-Term Observers (€50.000) was realised from the intra-ACP-incentive funds linked to democracy and good governance projects.

In the course of implementation the Financing Agreement has been amended 3 times to provide necessary flexibility in the project.

D: Issues to be studied

The evaluation, supported by the logical framework found in the Annex of the Financing Agreement will study the following:

1. **Relevance of the Project in terms of project preparation and design:** Was the information on which the project and its components were based appropriately collected and analysed (identification, feasibility study etc)? Was it consistent with the programme proposed (goal, purpose, results, activities etc)? Were risks and pre-conditions clearly and comprehensively identified? Was the intervention logic coherent with prevailing conditions in the country? Did the project design adequately consider the timeframe for implementation vis-à-vis internal commission procedures?
2. **Efficiency:** Did the activities achieve the desired results? Did the inputs efficiently contribute to the achievement of results? Could similar results have been obtained at lower costs? Were activities timely implemented, and if not, did delays result in the need for additional resources and /or time? Were procurement arrangements adequate (services/supply)? Were organisational arrangements adequate for an optimal cost-efficiency? How did the TAs to EU Electoral Unit and the ECZ and international/ domestic observers fit in the electoral process in Zambia in 2001? What were the strengths and weaknesses in management and co-ordination (communication, human resources deployment, information, budgeting and financial management)? Could these weaknesses have been anticipated and avoided? What were the levels and stages of involvement of key stakeholders in the various stages of the electoral process? Have partnerships been built and with whom? How strong is the sense of ownership at various levels? How efficient were approaches/ methods (training of trainers, voter education, training of election observers/ monitors, training manuals etc) for the achievement of results? Were the anticipated results reached? How were the needs for flexibility and predictability balanced? Were there appropriate monitoring indicators and baseline data?

3. **Effectiveness:** To what extent do the results obtained based on representative selection of provinces/districts/constituencies, contribute to the project purpose? Are there additional results, both positive and negative, or additional beneficiaries, which were not initially identified? Were assumptions realised, and if not, what were the consequences for the programme?
4. **Impact:** What has been the project's impact (contribution to its goal)? What assumptions at this level have materialised and what have been the consequences?
5. **Overall Quality and Sustainability:** What is the likely sustainability of the project with respect to policy, legal electoral frameworks and constitutional measures, economic and financial sustainability, social factors (including public involvement, gender, technology) institutional and management capacity in both the ECZ, NGOs and other key players in the electoral process in Zambia?
6. **Conclusions and Recommendations:** In particular (a) Overall successes and failures, and causes; cost efficiency; adequacy of means and time to achieve purpose (b) Sustainability and (c) alternative solutions
7. **Lessons Learnt:** (a) Policy, legal, constitutional, organisational and operational lessons, (b) Pre-conditions that would be required in the future for such projects, (c) general development lessons (national and regional instruments and strategies)

E: Plan of Work

It is likely that a joint evaluation of the impact of all donor funding in connection to the electoral process will take place shortly before this evaluation. The evaluating consultants should reconstitute the log frame as at the start and end of the project. It is anticipated that the evaluating consultants will interview stakeholders and other donors in the evaluation process.

Of particular importance is the projects relevance vis-à-vis the following objectives:

- Increased voter participation
- Increased confidence in the electoral process and the Electoral Commission
- Promotion of a levelled playing field for the contesting parties.

F: Reporting

It is envisaged that a draft report will be presented after 4 weeks and a final report is to be presented after compilation of the feedback received by the GRZ and the Delegation of the European Commission. It is further required that the team will debrief the Government of Zambia and the Delegation of the European Commission at the end of their stay in Zambia.

G: Expertise required

The following service is required:

- Team leader
- Consultant

Level of Professional Competence:

Both Team leader and Consultant should have relevant, diversified and progressively responsible professional experience in monitoring and evaluation of election-related projects, legal advice and co-ordination of Observer Missions.

Mission Specific Requirements:

Mandatory

Strong background in monitoring and evaluation, particularly in personnel, logistic, administrative and finance matters pertaining to election-related projects and field missions;

Proven experience in the provision of technical advice and assistance on the legal, technical, administrative, and human rights aspects of organizing and conducting democratic elections, including such fields as electoral administration and planning; voter registration; civic and voter education; review of electoral laws and regulations; training of election officials; logistics; computer technology applications; procurement of election materials; polling and counting procedures; election security and fraud and electoral dispute resolution; boundary delimitation and operational arrangements; election budgeting, administration and costs considerations;

Proven experience in co-ordination and support of international observers including technical and political preparation of observers to enhance the control of compliance of electoral operations with the Electoral Law and legal advice for Election Observation Missions; briefing and de-briefing of observers; liaising with electoral authorities and donors; supervision and implementation of logistical requirements; deployment; security; team leadership; reporting; coordination of international donor assistance;

Proven experience in civil society strengthening and support; domestic observation capacity building; training and advisory assistance;

Proven experience in the procurement and contracting field;

Proven experience in the preparation and evaluation of the projects;

Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity;

Cultural sensitivity and sound policy judgement;

Flexibility and ability to work with limited time frames;

Preferable

Knowledge of EU administrative regulations, rules, policies, procedures and practices;

Strong knowledge of Zambia and Southern African region as a whole, preferably with experience on the ground in Zambia;

Role:

The team of experts will undertake a systematic process to collect information about activities and outcomes both to inform program staff and to provide relevant information to others who want to adopt or adapt elements of Project ELY to promote electoral assistance in developing countries. The programme as described above and in attachments will serve as a basis for undertaking this evaluation. The team of experts will jointly assume responsibility to assure that evaluation is carried out in a timely manner.

Tasks and Responsibilities:

The team of experts will thoroughly examine and evaluate the overall design, organisation, supervision, administration, management and implementation of activities pertaining to election-related field operations carried out under the programme.

The team of experts will inspect and constructively assess the inter-relationship between the three different components of the programme, and prepare a detailed report setting out relevant findings and concrete policy recommendations, which, in turn, should result in better project design.

Time Frame:

The contract is due to commence on 3 March 2003. The team leader and the consultant are required to each spend one week in Brussels at the beginning of their contract and three weeks in Zambia for data gathering. The experts will leave Zambia at the end of the fourth week. Upon submission of the draft report stakeholders will have two weeks for comments and the consultant will then finalise the report in the course of the seventh week. The report will have to be submitted no later than 21 April 2003.

H: Time Schedule

The following time schedule is envisaged:

Week	Activity
1	➤ Briefing of Experts in Brussels by AIDCO C3 and AIDCO F3
2	➤ Arrival in Zambia ➤ Briefing by Delegation ➤ Presentation of Inception Report ➤ Meetings with Stakeholders ➤ Meetings with Stakeholders
3	➤ Debriefing of Government of Zambia GRZ and the Delegation of the European Commission
4	➤ Drafting and submission of Draft Report to GRZ, Delegation of the European Commission and AIDCO Units C3, Units F3 ➤ Departure from Zambia
5	➤ Comments and feedback to the draft report by Stakeholders
6	➤ Comments and feedback to the draft report by Stakeholders
7	➤ Submission of Final Report to Stakeholders

ANNEXE 3

Consultant's abbreviated curriculum vitae

Vincent DE HERDT (Belgium).

Legal Expert. Elections and Democratic governance. Rule of Law.

Project Design, Management and Evaluation. Teaching and Training.

Specific election-related experience.

Rwanda	April - June 2003	Electoral and Legal Expert. European Union Electoral Observation Mission.
Zambia	March - April 2003	Team leader. Evaluation of European Communities Support to Zambia on Democracy and Good Governance. Project 8 ACP ZA 046 aimed at contributing to the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Zambia through a variety of inputs into the 2001 electoral process.
Madagascar	November 2002 - January 2003	Electoral and Legal Expert. European Union Electoral Observation Mission.
Kenya	September 2002	Electoral Expert. European Commission Exploratory Mission set up to collect factual information on the electoral process, including the legal framework and the political context.
Sierra Leone	April - June 2002	Legal Expert. European Union Electoral Observation Mission in Sierra Leone.
Cambodia	January - March 2002	Team Leader. European Commission expert assistance on complaints and appeals for the Cambodian Commune Elections.
Zambia	December 2001 - January 2002	European Union Short Term Observer. Electoral Observation Mission to the Presidential, Legislative and Local Elections. Observation of electoral process.
Ivory Coast	September - December 2000	Co-ordinator of the European Union Electoral Observation Mission in Ivory Coast. Planning and technical co-ordination of the activities of the European Union Electoral Observation Mission set up in Ivory Coast to observe the presidential election (22 October 2000) and the legislative elections (10 December 2000).
Zimbabwe	June 2000	European Union Election Observer, UMP Constituency, Mashonaland East. Observation of electoral process.
Central African Republic	September 1999	Head of the European Union Electoral Observation Mission in Central African Republic. Project CA 7200/001 – Support to the Process of Presidential Election in Central African Republic. Technical and political preparation and co-ordination of the activities of a team of electoral observers.
Indonesia	May - June 1999	European Union Short Term Observer, Pekalongan, Central Java. Observation of electoral process.
Nigeria	February – March 1999	European Union Electoral Monitor. Observation of electoral process.
Central African Republic	November - December 1998	Head of the European Union Electoral Observation Mission in Central African Republic. Project 7 ACP CA 054/055 – Support to the Process of Legislative Elections in Central African Republic. Technical and political preparation and co-ordination of the activities of a twelve-strong European Union observation team.
Cambodia	March - October 1998	Team Leader and Legal Adviser. European Union Observation Unit. Support to the Democratic Electoral Process in Cambodia. Project KHM/B7-3000/97/513 funded by the European Commission (DG1B). Planning, co-ordination and implementation of the activities of the mission set up to observe the whole process around the legislative elections.
Liberia	June - August 1997	Election Adviser, European Commission Aid Co-ordination Office in Liberia, Election Support Programme. Project FED/LBR/7001/001. Technical assistance and logistical support provided to local authorities in charge to organise elections.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	August - September 1996	Electoral Supervisor, Mostar. Assistance to local authorities responsible for organising elections. Supervision of electoral process. Mission for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
South Africa	April - May 1994	European Union Observer, European Union Election Unit in South Africa (EUNELSA), Province of Kwazulu-Natal. Observation of electoral process.
Cambodia	May 1992 - August 1993	District Electoral Supervisor, Kampong Cham. Planning, organisation and supervision of electoral processes (registration of voters, election campaign, polling, counting of votes). United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Electoral Component.

Gilles SAPHY (France).

Specific experience by country.

Country	Date: from - to	Name and brief description of the project
Zambia	Mar. – Apr. 2003	EC Evaluation Mission – Evaluation Consultant To evaluate the design and implementation of the EC support to the 2001 Zambia Electoral process.
Rwanda	Jan – Feb. 2003	EC Exploratory Mission – Legal Expert To prepare an assessment of the legal framework for the Rwandan 2003 electoral process. To contribute to the drafting of the Exploratory Mission Report (Legal and Election Administration Section)
Turkey	Oct. – Nov. 2002	OSCE/ODIHR Assessment Mission – Legal Expert To prepare “Comments and Recommendations on the Election Law” for the OSCE/ODIHR; briefing material for the observation team deployed in Turkey; be involved in the observation team in country, meet with the Authorities and liaise with the Electoral Administration; contribute to the final report by drafting the Election Administration Section.
FYRO Macedonia	July – Oct. 2002	OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission – Electoral Expert To study the legal framework and election administration structure, prepare briefing material for the observers; report weekly on the developments of the electoral process, contribute to the final report by drafting the Election Administration and Law Section.
Cambodia	Jan. – Mar. 2002	EC Legal Expert assistance on complaints and appeals for the Cambodian Commune Elections 2002 – Legal Expert - To support the National Electoral Committee (NEC) of Cambodia in the handling of complaints and appeals, produce regular reports on project, contribute to end of mission final report, including an implementation strategy for the Complaints and Appeals Procedures for the 2003 National Assembly Elections and areas of potential support by international donors;
Ivory Coast	Sept. – Dec. 2000	EU Election observation Mission in Ivory Coast – Long Term Observer / Liaison Officer
Central African Republic	Sept. – Oct. 1999	EU Election observation mission – Electoral Observer
Indonesia	May – July 1999	EU Election Observation Mission in Indonesia – Regional Co-ordinator
FYRO Macedonia	May 1999	Evaluation – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Paris
Nigeria	Feb. - March 1999	EU / UN Election Observation Mission in Nigeria – Electoral Observer
Central African Republic	Oct. – Dec. 1998	EU Election observation mission – Electoral Observer
Togo	April – July 1998	EU Election Observation Mission – Long Term Observer
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Apr. – Dec. 1997	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina – Election branch – Election Analyst

ANNEXE 4

List of Selected Documents of Reference for the Project.

- Communication of the European Commission on EU Election assistance and Observation, 11 April 2000.
- European Commission, Note on the Division of Responsibilities for Election Observation and Assistance Activities, June 2001.
- European Commission (RELEX, DEV), Guidance on Election Support, 20 December 2001.
- European Commission, Manual – Project Cycle Management, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, March 2001.
- Commission Européenne, EuropAid (AIDCO/H/6), L'évaluation à la Commission européenne. Guide des procédures et structures d'évaluation, 21 mars 2001.
- Commission européenne, EuropAid, Guide de l'utilisateur des procédures financières des 7^{ème} et 8^{ème} FED, version 3.0.
- Zambia – European Community, Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2001-2007.
- Republic of Zambia – European Community, Framework of Cooperation, National Indicative Programme of the 4th Lomé Convention.
- Delegation of the European Commission, Cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Zambia, Annual Report 2001.
- Nicholas Selsey, Study to Identify Support to the Electoral Process in Zambia for the year 2001 Elections, March 2000.
- Financing Proposal, Support to the Electoral Process in Zambia, 10 May 2000.
- Financing Agreement N°6337/ZA between the Commission of the European Community and the Republic of Zambia, Democracy and Good Governance, Brussels, 7 Nov. 2000, Lusaka, 12 Dec. 2000.
- Zambia Presidential, Legislative and local Elections, Experts Preliminary Report, July – August 2001.
- Zambian Elections 2001, EUEU Civic Education Trust Fund, Final Report, Jan. 2002.
- Joram Rukambe, Report on the European Union Funded Activities of the ECZ for the 2001 Tripartite Elections, 2 April 2002.
- David M. Zamchiya, Zambia Elections 2001, Evaluation of the Electoral Process, EISA, 1 July 2002.

- Noel Lee, Report on the European Union Funded Activities of the ECZ for the 2001 Tripartite Elections, 31 July 2002.

Contracts and AWP/CE.

- 1- Annual Work Programme and Cost Estimate, EUEU Running Costs, 26 July 2001.
- 2- Procurement Contract MF/ZAM/016/01 - Smith & Ouzman Ltd, Supplies to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (Ballot papers and indelible ink – lot 3).
- 3- Procurement Contract n°MF/ZAM/017/01 signed with GS Procurement Consultancy Limited, Supplies to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (lot 1).
- 4- Procurement Contract n°MF/ZAM/018/01 signed with Shonga Steel Limited (Zambia), 19 July 2001. Supplies to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (lot 2).
- 5- Service Contract No TA/ZAM/011/01 with British Council EU Electoral Unit.
- 6- Procurement Contract n°MF/ZA/015/01 signed with Skipco Proprietary Limited (South Africa), 19 July 2001. Supplies to the Department of National Registration (lot 1).
- 7- Procurement Contract n°MF/ZA/013/01 signed with Unit Export Limited (United Kingdom), 31 July 2001. Supplies to the Department of National Registration (lot 2).
- 8- AWP/CE n°1 for the period 31 July 2001 - 31 March 2002, Support to the Electoral Commission of Zambia.
- 9- AWP/CE, Trust Fund EU Electoral Unit Civic Education.
- 10- Service Contract n°TA/ZAM/012/01 signed with the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) on 25 June 2001, Support to the Electoral Commission of Zambia.
- 11- Memorandum of Understanding (25 October 2001) Election Observation Mission.
- 12- Grant Contract External Aid with British Council (B7-709/2001/3176) Election Observation Mission.

1. Zambian Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee, Setting a Standard for Africa : free and fair elections. Final Report, Lusaka, 7 November 1991.
2. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs / Carter Centre of Emory University, The October 31, 1991 National Elections In Zambia, Washington, 1992, 176 p.
3. Commonwealth Observer Group, Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Zambia, 31 October 1991. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1992.
4. B.-A. Andreassen, G. Geisler, A. Tostensen, Setting a standard for Africa ? Lessons from the 1991 Zambian Elections, Bergen, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1992.
5. C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, The Fall and Rise of multi-party politics in Zambia, Review of African Political Economy, n° 54 (1992), pp. 75-92.
6. E. Bjornlund, M. Bratton, C. Gibson, Observing multiparty elections in Africa : Lessons from Zambia, African Affairs (1992), 91/364, pp. 405-431.
7. M. Bratton, Zambia starts over, Journal of Democracy (1992), 3/2, pp. 81-94.
8. Carl W. Dundas, Organising free and fair elections at cost-effective levels, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, 183p.
This manual is intended to assist governments, electoral authorities and opposition parties to contribute to the organisation and conduct of presidential and general elections. Issues like the independence of electoral commissions and election manipulation, compilation of register of voters, costing elections and election management have been treated in some detail. Five case studies included are of Jamaica, Malta and Guyana, Zambia and Kenya.
9. The Nordic Experts, Report on improvement on the electoral process in Zambia, January 1995.
10. Peter BURNELL, The Politics of Poverty and the Poverty of Politics in Zambia's Third Republic, Third World Quarterly, vol. 16, n° 4 (1995).
11. Human Rights Watch / Africa, Zambia : Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, December 1996, Vol. 8, n° 4 (A).
12. Chris H. Chirwa, Press Freedom in Zambia. A brief review of the state of the press during MMD's first five years in office. Published by the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) with support from Norad and Sida, Lusaka, 1997, 71 p.
13. Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Final Election Monitoring Report. Zambia's November 18, 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, March 1997, 69 p.
14. Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia 18th November 1996, Lusaka, 1997.

15. C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, The 1996 Zambian Elections : Still Awaiting Democratic Consolidation, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 24, n° 71 (1997), pp. 113-128.
16. Peter BURNELL, Whither Zambia ? The Zambian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of November 1996, Electoral Studies, ISSN 02613794, Volume 16, Issue 3, September 1997.
17. J. Kees van Donge, Reflections on Donors, Opposition and Popular Will in the 1996 Zambian General Elections, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, n° 1 (1998), p. 71-99.
18. Andrew REYNOLDS, Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa, Oxford University Press, 356 pages, (publication date : 28 January 1999).
This is a groundbreaking comparative study of the effect of institutional design on representation, political stability, and inter-ethnic/racial accommodation in the emerging democracies of Southern Africa. Focusing on the experiences of Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the author presents a host of revealing conclusions that will help us to evaluate the success or failure of democratic design in other fledgling democracies.
19. Isaac PHIRI, Media in "Democratic" Zambia : Problems and Prospects, Africa Today, volume 46, issue 2, 1999.
Abstract. Zambia's transition to multiparty politics in 1991 has not led to significant changes in state-media relations. There was a brief period (just before and soon after 1991) when it appeared that the media would become an independent influence in a democratic environment. But any movement in that direction has been thwarted by the continued state control of the country's major news establishments. The independent media is weak due to a hostile political and legal environment and severe economic conditions. The ability of the independent press to contribute effectively to democratic discourse is further constrained by its failure to live up to the professional role of the press in pluralist politics. This paper examines the factors that have incapacitated the media and proposes that the same local and international civil society organisations that precipitated the 1991 transition to multiparty politics must again be mobilised to bring about a lasting transformation of state-media relations in Zambia.
20. Bratton, Michael and Daniel Posner (1999) "A first look at second elections in Africa, with Illustrations from Zambia" in Richard Joseph (ed) State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.
21. Michael KRENNERICH, Zambia in Elections in Africa. A data Handbook. Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 939-962.
22. Muna Ndulo (Prof.), Political Parties and Democracy in Zambia, in International IDEA Conference : Towards Sustainable Democratic Institutions in Southern Africa (May 2000), pp. 244-261.
23. Peter BURNELL, The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia : Continuities, Past, Present and Future, African Affairs, volume 100 (1 April 2001), issue 399, pp. 239-263.
Abstract. Zambia's record of democracy in the 1990s has been much criticised, at home and abroad. The government of the ruling party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), has been accused of perpetuating the hallmarks of the *de jure* one-party state of the Second Republic (1972-91). Critics claim that one-party dominance by the MMD under President Chiluba's leadership has almost returned the country to a *de jure* one-party state. This article argues that there are indeed significant continuities with the past. However, since 1990 the party system has resembled more closely a 'predominant party system'. Far from being a legacy of the Second Republic's one-party state, its ancestry, and other aspects of contemporary party politics, can be traced back much further, even as far back as colonial times. They owe more to enduring patterns of formal institutions and informal practice influencing political behaviour over a longer period than just the Second Republic. In Zambia as elsewhere in Africa democratisation requires political organisation to provide strong

compensation for the unfavourable socio-economic conditions. For sustainable democracy the political opposition must take its responsibilities more seriously. The article concludes by reflecting on the likely contribution of the party system to democratic transition and consolidation in Zambia beyond the 2001 general elections.

24. Peter BURNELL, Does Economic Reform Promote Democratisation ? Evidence from Zambia's Third Republic, New Political Economy, vol. 6, n° 2 (2001).
25. Peter BURNELL, Taking Stock of Democracy in Zambia.
Abstract. Democratisation in Zambia in the 1990s is assessed along with a review of approaches to explaining its limitations. A brief resumé of events between 1991 and 1998 is followed by a survey of the 'conditions' normally considered helpful to democracy are present in Zambia, chiefly socio-economic, cultural and associational values. The problems facing democracy are located in an international context and set against the background of formal and informal institutional patterns carried forward from previous decades. Path-dependence, the relative significance of structure and agency, and the implications of crises and shocks are briefly considered in relation to Zambia's experience. The mixed nature of the evidence, when viewed from a plurality of perspectives and reference points, suggests that a nuanced assessment of Zambia's version of democracy is more appropriate than one simple uni-dimensional judgement. The future prospects range from modest further progress to significant but not fatal erosion of democratisation in Zambia.
26. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), 2001 Zambian Election Update, August Issue, prepared for EISA by Chileshe Mulenga, and Makasa Kasonde.
27. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), 2001 Zambian Election Update, September Issue, by Chileshe Mulenga, Makasa Kasonde, and Megan Phiri-Roberts.
28. Coalition 2001, Media Monitoring Results for the period 02 - 06 December 2001.
29. Coalition 2001, Media Monitoring Results for the period 07 - 13 December 2001.
30. Coalition 2001, End of Project Report, 21 p.
31. Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima & David Pottie (eds), Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa, 2002, 547 pages, 200 ZAR.
The Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa is a unique collection of commentary on the current electoral process in southern Africa. This publication draws on up-to-date analysis of each country in the region with each contribution organised according to an easy reference format. Topics include the voter registration process, electoral systems, electoral administration, civic education and election results. The publication represents an important baseline of information on elections in southern Africa and presents the basis for the creation of future updates. The chapters (including all the fourteen member states of SADC, as well as Zanzibar) draw on a number of sources, including a SADC Electoral Information Digest, SADC country electoral profiles, election observation mission reports and other relevant material. The authors of these various sources are also duly acknowledged. The editors compiled these sources and bridged them to create a single publication. An introductory chapter surveys regional trends and alerts the reader to the format of the text. Chapters are accompanied by maps and figures comparing key democratic indicators in the region. The publication is also fully indexed, with a detailed list of abbreviations.
32. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum, 2001 Zambia Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Election Observation Report, 47 p.
33. Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries (ECF), Zambian Elections Observer Mission Report, 27 December 2001, compiled by Leya Chatta-Chipepa.
34. Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), 2001 Draft Election Monitoring Report.

35. Coalition 2001, December 27, 2001 Tripartite Elections Preliminary Report, February 2002, 26 p.
36. David M. Zamchiya, Zambia Elections 2001. Evaluation of the Electoral Process. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), 1 July 2002, 68 p.
37. Claude Kabemba, Looking at the management of the 2001 Zambian tripartite elections, Journal of African Elections: Volume 1, Number 2, September 2002.
38. The Carter Center, Observing the 2001 Zambia Elections. Final Report. Atlanta, October 2002, 104 p.

ANNEXE 6

LISTS OF PERSONS MET AND CONTACTED.

A. List of persons met or contacted during the first phase of evaluation in Brussels.

1. EUROPEAID :

- Fabio FIORELLO – AIDCO/C/4 – Task manager for Zambia.
- Marie-Christine FORMENT – AIDCO/C/8.
- Victor MADEIRA-DOS-SANTOS – AIDCO/F/3.
- Maria Rosaria MACCHIAVERNA, former staff member in AIDCO/F/3.
- Orlando HENAO-TRIANA – AIDCO/H/6 (Evaluation Unit).

2. DG Development :

- Francisco ORTIZ DE ZUNIGA – Desk officer for Zambia.
- Carl-Henrik HALL – former desk officer for Zambia (now in AIDCO).

3. DG RELEX :

- Emanuele GIAUFRET – RELEX/B/1.
- Elsa FENET – RELEX/B/1.

4. British Council Brussels :

- Anne VAN HOOFF – Business Development Manager.
- Patricia FAHS – Business Development Unit.

5. Former core team members of EOM to Zambia :

- Enrico SBORGI – LTO Coordinator.
- Scipion du CHÂTENET – Logistics Officer.

B. List of persons met in Zambia.

1. EC Delegation :

- Henry SPRIETSMA – Head of Delegation.
- Edda COSTARELLI – Project Officer in charge of Human Rights and Democratisation.
- Emilio ROSETTI – former Task Manager for Zambia in AIDCO/C/3.

2. Office of the National Authorising Officer :

- Ladislous N. KANENE – Advisor, Technical Assistant to the NAO.

3. Institutions intervening in the election process :

- Honorable Justice Bobby BWALYA, Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Zambia.
- Reverend M. CHILEKWA, Commissioner, Electoral Commission of Zambia.
- Daniel KALALE, Director for Elections, ECZ.
- Priscilla ISAAC, Deputy Director for Elections, ECZ.
- G.A. CHONGO, Registrar General, Department of National Registration, Ministry of Home Affairs.
- Charles MWANZA, Deputy Registrar General, Department of National Registration, Ministry of Home Affairs.

4. Civil Society and implementing partners :

- Brendan McSHARRY – British Council, Director.
- Samantha CHUULA – British Council, Governance Programme Manager.
- Ngande MWANAJITI – AFRONET, Executive Director.
- Mbinji Tange MUFALO – AFRONET, Research and Fact Finding.
- Dominic MUMBA – AVAP, Administrative Officer.
- Elijah RUBVUTA – FODEP, Acting Executive Director.
- Simon KABANDA – FODEP, National Secretary.
- Penelope KAMUNGOMA - FODEP, Acting Programme Manager.
- Grace Manyonga KANYANGA – NGOCC, Executive Director.

5. Diplomatic Missions and International Organisations :

- Royal Danish Embassy.
- Gerard Lucius, First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy.
- Kevin Kelly, Attache Development, Embassy of the Republic of Ireland.
- Abdon Yezi, Governance manager/advisor, Ireland Aid.
- Michael Soko, Project Officer, UNDP.

C. List of persons contacted via email or telephone.

- Jochen Krebs, Former Head of the EC Delegation to Zambia.
- Anne Sofie Allarp, Former Project Manager, EC Delegation to Zambia.
- Sanne Olsen, Minister Counsellor, Royal Danish Embassy in Lusaka.
- Dren Nupen, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
- Jerome Rukambe, Technical Assistant, Advisor to the Chairman of the ECZ.
- Noel Lee, Financial Officer, Technical Assistant to the ECZ.
- Michelle Freeman, British Council, Development Services, Manchester, UK.
- Michael Meadowcroft, Head of the EUEU / EOM.
- James Piriou, Civic Education Specialist.
- Hannah Fearnley, Logistics and statistical Officer.
- Gillian McCormack, Media expert.

ANNEXE 7**LIST OF ACRONYMS.**

ACP	Africa Caribbean Pacific
AWP/CE	Annual Work Programme / Cost Estimate
AIDCO	EuropeAid – EC Cooperation Office
BC	British Council
COREU	Correspondance européenne
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DEV	Directorate General Development
DNR	Department of National Registration
ECZ	Electoral Commission of Zambia
EDF	European Development Fund
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EUEU	European Union Electoral Unit
FA	Financing Agreement
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Process
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
HoD	Head of Delegation
HoM	Head of Mission
LTO	Long Term Observer
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member States
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NGOCC	NGO Coordination Committee
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
NRC	National Registration Card
NVEC	National Voter Education Committee
PCM	Project Cycle Management
RELEX	Directorate General – External Relations
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
STO	Short Term Observer
TA	Technical Assistance