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REPORT OF THE JOINT ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) AND THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
(CARICOM)

PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
FIRST AND SECOND ROUNDS
REPUBLIC OF HAITI

NOVEMBER 28, 2010 AND MARCH 20, 2011



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July 24, 2012

Excellency
Stephen Vasciannie
Ambassador Permanent Representative of Jamaica
to the Organization of American States
Chair of the Permanent Council
Washington, D.C.

Excellency:

I have the honor to address Your Excellency to request your kind assistance in distributing to the members of the Permanent Council the attached report of the joint Electoral Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to Haiti. The report reflects the activities undertaken by the Mission during the Presidential and Legislative Elections, First and Second Rounds, held on November 28, 2010 and March 20, 2011.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Albert Ramdin
Assistant Secretary General
In charge of the General Secretariat



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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) AND THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
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**PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
FIRST AND SECOND ROUNDS
REPUBLIC OF HAITI**

NOVEMBER 28, 2010 AND MARCH 20, 2011

GENERAL SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (GS/OAS)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASE	Electoral security officer
ASEC	Communal Section Assembly
TDIE	Departmental Electoral Challenges Tribunal
TNIE	National Electoral Challenges Tribunal
TEC	Communal Electoral Tribunal
TED	Departmental Electoral Tribunal
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASEC	Council of Communal Section Assemblies
CEP	Provisional Electoral Council
TIN	National identification card
CNO	National Observation Council
COV	Verification Operations Center
CTV	Vote Tabulation Center
CV	Voting Center
GIAP	Public Affairs Intervention Group
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
ISC	Civil Society Initiative
LEC	Communal Voters List
LECV	Voting Center Electoral List
LEP	Partial Voters List
MOV	Polling station worker
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOEC	Joint Electoral Observation Mission
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NIN	National identification number
OAS	Organization of American States
ONI	National Identification Office
PNH	National Police of Haiti
RNDDH	National Network for the Defense of Human Rights
TNH	National Television of Haiti
UCL	Legal Control Unit

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MISSION

Presidential and legislative elections were held in Haiti on November 28, 2010. There were 68 political parties registered to participate in these elections. Nineteen candidates stood for election to the presidency, 816 candidates sought seats as deputies, and 96 candidates ran for the Senate. As none of the 19 presidential candidates obtained an absolute majority of votes (50%+1) in this first round, a runoff vote between the two leading candidates had to be held on March 20, 2011. In that second round, 172 candidates competed for seats as deputies and 14 for the Senate.

The General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) decided to organize and deploy a Joint Electoral Observation Mission (JEOM) in Haiti. For the first round, the JEOM fielded a total of 118 observers from 20 member states of the OAS (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela) and from seven observer countries (France, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Uganda).

For the second round, the Mission comprised 201 observers from 22 member states of the OAS (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela) and from nine observer countries (Belgium, France, Martinique, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).

The Mission maintained a permanent presence in Haiti. The first members of the core group arrived on August 3, 2010, and their ranks were subsequently bolstered with the arrival of the coordinators, who were immediately deployed in the 11 electoral departments. The group of long-term observers arrived later, and a week before election day the group of short-term observers arrived. In both electoral rounds the Mission fielded observers in all regions of the country. The Mission's core group left the country on May 18, 2011, after the handover of power to the new President.

B. ELECTION RESULTS

The preliminary results of the second round were announced on April 4, 2011: Michel Joseph Martelly was declared the winner of the presidential election, with 67.57% of the votes, and Mirlande Manigat came second, with 31.74% of the votes. The preliminary results were not challenged in the electoral tribunals, and consequently they became the definitive results on April 20, 2011.

C. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The OAS/CARICOM JEOM wishes to express its gratitude to those member states and permanent observers of the OAS whose financial support made it possible for the mission to maintain its presence in Haiti over a period of 10 months covering the first and second rounds of the elections:

Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Suriname, the European Union and United States of America.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The Electoral Observation Missions (EOM) of the Organization of American States (OAS) have become an essential element for promoting and defending democracy in the Hemisphere, and their presence bespeaks the solidarity of the inter-American community and its commitment to ensure that democratic institutions in member states can strengthen the organization and administration of their own electoral processes. These initiatives have helped to guarantee the integrity, impartiality and accountability of numerous electoral processes, and to reinforce the credibility of democratic institutions in member countries. The EOMs promote the right to vote and to be elected in an inclusive, free, and transparent manner, and seek to ensure that the people's will, as expressed through the ballot, is respected.

Since 1960 the OAS has observed more than 187 elections in the Hemisphere; most of these initiatives have occurred in the last 15 years, during the course of which the OAS has fielded observers in a wide variety of elections (always at the request of its member states), including general, presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections, public consultations, referendums, proceedings for the collection and validation of signatures, and even primary and internal elections for political parties.

A. ELECTORAL OBSERVATION AND COOPERATION IN HAITI

In the past, the OAS has observed various elections in Haiti. The OAS fielded observers in 1995 for the presidential elections, and in 1997 for the legislative and territorial assembly elections. In May 2000, the OAS was present for the legislative, municipal, and local elections.

Since 2005, through its Civil Registry Program (PUICA), the OAS has been supporting the electoral authorities in various ways: it assisted with the creation of the National Civil Registry ("National Identification Office", ONI) and it cooperated in the preparation of identity cards, which serve the dual purpose of allowing citizens to identify themselves and to exercise their voting rights. In this respect, the OAS program has also contributed to creation of the voters list.

During the Senate elections of April and June 2009 (first and second rounds, respectively) the OAS focused its cooperation on providing technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). Through the Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO), the OAS assisted the electoral body by providing technical cooperation for the Tabulation Center, for the printing of voters lists, and most recently for the design of programs for processing electoral data.

B. INVITATION FROM THE MEMBER STATE AND RESPONSE OF THE ORGANIZATION

On October 28, 2009 the President of the Republic of Haiti, René Prével, invited the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) to send a mission to observe the legislative elections that were to be held on February 28, 2010. Following the earthquake of January 12, 2010, those elections were postponed to November 28 of that year, the deadline set in the Constitution for presidential elections. At the time of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), held in Jamaica in July 2010, and following the exchange of opinions between heads of state and government and the secretaries general of the

United Nations and the OAS on the situation in Haiti, CARICOM and the OAS decided to field a Joint Electoral Observation Mission (JEOM). Ambassador Colin Granderson, Assistant Secretary-General of CARICOM, was named head of the mission; Doctor Bertha Santoscoy, Principal Advisor to the Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO) was named Deputy Chief of Mission, and Jean François Ruel, DECO Specialist, was appointed General Coordinator.

On August 4, 2010 the OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, signed the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities for the Mission with the Haitian Government. The OAS/CARICOM JEOM, headed by Ambassador Colin Granderson, signed the Agreement on Observation Processes for the Presidential and Legislative Elections with the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) of Haiti, which gave the observers access to all electoral activities.

C. MANDATE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE JEOM

The JEOM observers carried out their activities in accordance with the principles contained in the United Nations Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, and the OAS Manual for Electoral Observation Missions. Those principles are closely linked to the defense of human rights and they emphasize civil and political rights, which are essential for conducting free and democratic elections and include freedom of association, peaceful assembly, expression and movement, personal security, equal legal protection for voters and candidates, and the search for effective solutions when electoral rights are violated. Electoral observation also serves to reinforce electoral integrity by discouraging and denouncing electoral irregularities and fraud; to reduce the risk of election-related violence; to boost public confidence in the process; and to make recommendations to improve electoral and political processes.

At the time of the presidential and legislative elections of November 28, 2010 and of March 20, 2011, the people of Haiti were to elect the next president of the republic, as well as 11 senators and 99 deputies. Seventy-eight political parties were registered to participate in these elections. Nineteen candidates stood for the presidential election; 816 candidates for deputy; and 96 candidates for the Senate, in the first round of elections. During the second round, 172 candidates competed for the 76 deputies' seats and 14 candidates for the seven Senate seats.

CANDIDATES ELECTED TO THE SENATE

Party	First round	Second round
ALTENATIV	6	3
INITE	10	3
LAVNI	1	1
AAA	1	0

CANDIDATES ELECTED AS DEPUTIES

Party	First round	Second round
ALTENATIV	21	7
INITE	71	34
PONT	6	1
SOLIDARITE	6	1
LAVNI	12	7
MOCHRENHA	5	2
ANSANM NOU FO	16	3
PLAT. LIBERATION	5	3
UCADDE	4	0
RASAMBLE	6	1
A.A.A.	12	4
VEYE YO	2	1
MODELH-PRDH	2	0
KONBIT	5	3
PLAPH	5	1
RESPE	5	1
ENDEPANDAN	2	2
MAS	3	1
REPONS PEYIZAN	3	3

Source: cephaiti2010.org/

As a long-term mission, the JEOM had a presence that was progressively reinforced throughout the Haitian territory, beginning on August 3, 2010. The JEOM observed the various phases of organization of the two rounds of voting: the process for registering, challenging, and validating presidential candidates; the allocation of numbers for the new political parties participating in the presidential elections; drawing lots for naming the members of the voting stations on the basis of persons nominated by the political parties; updating, compiling, and publishing the voters list; technical, administrative, and logistic preparations for voting day; the unfolding of the two phases of the election campaign; training of election officials; tabulation of the results; announcement of the preliminary results, the electoral challenge period, and the announcement of the final results from the two rounds. The mission monitored the process right up to publication of the official results from the first and second rounds of elections.

The JEOM held regular meetings with the government and electoral authorities, presidential candidates, candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, representatives of the political parties, civil society representatives, national and international observation bodies, and representatives of the international community involved in the electoral process. These meetings served to take stock of the political and electoral context and to identify possible bottlenecks in the

process, such as the CEP's lack of credibility, the reliability of the voters list, concerns about irregularities and fraud that might obstruct expression of the voters' will, and general fears about the security of the elections.

The mission played an active role in observing these elections, maintaining constant communication with the electoral authorities. On the basis of its observations, as well as the concerns expressed by the political parties and candidates, the mission regularly transmitted its recommendations to the CEP, which showed itself open to receiving them. The mission also sought to facilitate meetings between members of civil society and the electoral authorities involved in organizing the elections.

With a view to being proactive, when it met with political parties the mission transmitted three messages that it deemed essential for the proper unfolding of the process: (i) the key role that the parties must play during preparations for the elections and on voting day, through appointment of MOVs and training for political party scrutineers (*mandataires*); (ii) the importance of combined vigilance on election day by political party representatives and by the national and international observers, to guard against any attempted fraud; and (iii) the importance of a sound knowledge of electoral legislation, in order to be able to identify the nature of any problems or disputes that might arise, and consequently offer the most effective response.

In the immediate aftermath of the first and second rounds, the JEOM urged political players and the general public: to await publication of the preliminary and definitive outcomes with calm and tolerance; and to use legal remedies for channeling their complaints.

The JEOM also worked with the OAS expert missions to verify tabulation of the votes and to monitor the electoral challenges phase in the first round, within the limits of its mandate.

Lastly, at the request of the executive branch, the mission reviewed the disputed decisions of the elections tribunal concerning the second round of legislative elections, and made recommendations and observations.

The first members of the JEOM core group arrived in Haiti on August 3, 2010, and the mission was subsequently reinforced with the arrival of the coordinators. For the first round, the JEOM had a total of 118 observers, 52 women and 66 men, from 27 countries. For the second round, there were 201 observers, including 99 women and 102 men, from 31 countries, which made it possible to boost coverage of the voting centers, in comparison with the first round.

CHAPTER II. POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL ORGANIZATION

A. POLITICAL SYSTEM

Haiti is a semi-parliamentary republic, the functioning and political structure of which is enshrined in the constitution promulgated on March 29, 1987. The Haitian state comprises three independent branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.

2.1. Executive branch

The 1987 Constitution calls for a two-headed executive branch, in which the President is Head of State and the Prime Minister is Head of Government.

The President of the Republic is elected by universal and direct suffrage for a term of five years. In case of impeachment, temporary absence of the president, or resignation, the President of the Court of Cassation or, in his or her absence, the highest ranking magistrate of the Court of Cassation assumes presidential functions. The Constitution limits exercise of the presidential mandate to two nonconsecutive terms.

The Prime Minister is chosen by the President from among the parliamentary majority and must be ratified by a vote of confidence of the two chambers. The Parliament may issue a motion of censure against the Prime Minister, which implies his dismissal. This triggers anew the procedure of nomination and ratification for his replacement. Members of Parliament also have the right to question the prime minister and to issue a vote of censure which is equivalent to his removal. In this case, a new prime minister must be appointed and ratified by the entire National Assembly.

2.2. Legislative branch

The Legislature is bicameral. The Chamber of Deputies comprises 99 deputies elected by direct universal suffrage, by electoral district, for a four-year term. The Senate has 30 seats, and its members are elected on the basis of three senators per department for a six-year term, staggered so that one third of the membership is renewed every two years. Prior to these elections, the Senate had only 19 members, and one third of the Senate had completed its mandate on January 10, 2010. The Chamber of Deputies was also dissolved, as its mandate expired on May 10, 2010.

2.3. Judicial branch

The judiciary consists of the Court of Cassation and the appeals courts, the courts of first instance, justices of the peace, and special courts, the number, composition, organization and jurisdiction of which are established by law. The Court of Cassation is the highest court of the land. It has 12 members and is divided into two sections. At the time this report was prepared, the position of President of the Court of Cassation was vacant, as were four positions of the supreme magistracy.

B. ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES

The 1987 Constitution stipulates that the Permanent Electoral Council must comprise nine commissioners elected from a list containing three names proposed by each of the departmental

assemblies: three are appointed by the Executive Branch, three by the Court of Cassation, and three by the National Assembly. However, in the absence of a law on subnational government organization, the departmental assemblies do not exist. For this reason, the Permanent Electoral Council could not be established in accordance with constitutional provisions. Accordingly, after the first elections held under the new constitution in 1990, Provisional Electoral Councils (CEP) were appointed to perform the functions attributed by the Constitution to the electoral institution.

The CEP for these presidential and legislative elections was constituted by decree of October 16, 2009. It comprised nine members, nominated by various sectors of Haitian society: the Catholic Church, the Protestant churches, the Episcopal Church, the voodoo sector, the National Council of Political Parties, the CASEC and ASEC (local councils and assemblies), sectors representing persons with disabilities, women, and labor unions. Each of these sectors proposed two names, and the executive branch selected one. This mechanism for nominating commissioners was designed to give a degree of legitimacy to the provisional electoral institution. This CEP received the mandate to organize the first and second rounds of the presidential and legislative elections, as well as the subsequent municipal and local elections.

The CEP is responsible for organizing and overseeing all electoral operations throughout the territory of the Republic, until proclamation of the voting results. It is represented in the departments by the Departmental Electoral Tribunals (TED) and in the communes (municipalities) by the Communal Electoral Tribunals (TEC).

The CEP also hears electoral challenges, and represents the highest body for the settlement of electoral disputes. Its decisions regarding disputes are not subject to appeal.

C. POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT

The mission observed the organization of the electoral process, from the time of registration, which took place from August 1 to 7, 2010, and the validation of presidential candidacies, which culminated on August 17. On the other hand, it was not present during the first phases of organization for the 2009 legislative elections, which was interrupted by the earthquake of January 12, 2010. Preparation for the legislative elections began again as a result of the decree of June 24, 2010, calling upon the people to vote, and publication of the list of candidates for the legislative elections on July 16.

The first members of the JEOM core group arrived in Haiti on August 3, 2010, at the time of the preliminary visit of the chief of mission to observe the first stages of the electoral calendar. The mission was progressively reinforced with the arrival of its first departmental coordinators in mid-September; all the coordinators (21) were in place by the end of September. The teams of coordinators were each assigned an electoral department, and the mission thus had a permanent presence in the 11 electoral departments as of the first days of October. Later on, with a view to strengthening the mission's presence in the field, in the later stages of the electoral calendar, a group of 18 long-term observers arrived at the end of October, and another group of 12 in mid-November. At the same time, the various members of the core group joined up with the first members who had arrived in August, installing themselves at mission headquarters in Port-au-Prince.

The short-term observers arrived in Haiti one week before the first round of voting on November 28 and they left two days after election day. For the first round, the mission had a total of 118 observers, including 52 women and 66 men, from 27 countries (see Annex J).

Upon their arrival in Haiti, the observers, coordinators and all members of the core group attended a day of training on the mandate, methodology, and principles of electoral observation, the political and electoral context of these elections, the voting procedure in Haiti, the observation forms used from the beginning to the end of voting, the drafting of reports, security measures, health precautions to be taken against cholera, and various issues relating to the mission's logistics. The day after their training, the observers were deployed in groups of two to their respective departments, returning to the capital after the elections for a debriefing session with the chief of mission and handover of their observation materials.

The departure of the observers, coordinators, and members of the core group also took place in stages, and the last members of the mission left the country on May 18, 2011, nine and a half months after their arrival.

2.4. Political and electoral dynamics in the run-up to the elections

As soon as it arrived in the country, the mission identified the CEP's lack of credibility in the eyes of the political parties as the principal challenge to the proper conduct of the 2010-2011 electoral process in Haiti. It should be noted that the nine members of the CEP were appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of recommendations submitted by various sectors of Parliament, in which the governing party (Inité) had a majority. During that process some political parties accused the CEP of partiality. Moreover, *Fanmi Lavalas*, one of the previously most popular political parties, had not participated in the legislative elections, for technical reasons, and was not registered for the presidential elections.

To ensure the success of the legislative election process, which was to take place on February 28, 2010, but for which preparations were interrupted by the earthquake of January 12, 2010, President Préval convened many sectors of civil society to confirm or invalidate his selection of the CEP membership, in accordance with the mechanism for nominating provisional commissioners established in 2006. The political parties had been very vocal in their criticism of the makeup of the former council, following accusations of fraud that had marred the Senate elections of June 2009. One of the sectors involved, the Convention of Political Parties, decided not to participate in the new makeup of the Council, with the intent of repudiating the process in question. It was replaced by the sector constituted by the local authorities, i.e. the ASEC and the CASEC which, in turn, proposed two candidates to the executive branch. This led to the establishment of a new CEP on October 16, 2009, with a mandate to organize the legislative, presidential, municipal, and local elections. The political expedient of resorting to a recomposition of the electoral institution did not have the expected effect, as only four of the nine commissioners were replaced, and one of the institutions, representing the political parties, opted not to participate in the process.

The legitimacy of the CEP was further eroded after the *Fanmi Lavalas* was excluded from the legislative elections. During the period for registration of political parties seeking to compete in the legislative elections, two different lists of candidates were presented in the name of *Fanmi Lavalas* by two different factions of the party which, in the absence of their leader, Jean-Bertrand

Aristide, were contesting leadership of the party. One of the factions presented, after the legal time limit, a copy of the mandate granted by Aristide to the coordinator of the *Fanmi Lavalas* executive committee, Maryse Narcisse. As the legality of that mandate was challenged by the other party faction, the CEP requested a mandate authenticated by the national representative, which the party was not in a position to supply. Consequently, the CEP rejected the registration application from *Fanmi Lavalas*.

Interrupted by the earthquake of January 12, 2010 and its consequences, the electoral process began anew on July 15, 2010, after positive evaluations by the United Nations as well as assessments of political priorities by the OAS with respect to the relaunch of the legislative elections and the beginning of preparations for the presidential elections.

The polarized political climate and the lack of confidence in the electoral institution were aggravated by the launch of the presidential competition. Many opposition parties demanded, without success, that the CEP be reappointed in order to provide the necessary guarantees of transparency that would allow them to participate in the electoral process. They thereupon decided to boycott the elections. However, with the exception of *Fanmi Lavalas*, most of the parties were already registered for the legislative elections, their candidates had been approved by the electoral authorities, and they were therefore entitled to compete in the elections of November 28, 2010. A majority of legislative candidates from the parties boycotting the elections decided to remain in the contest, despite instructions from their party not to compete in the polls.

In this way, as the process advanced, the activities of the electoral organization were reinforced and political parties increased their participation. This progressive consolidation resulted in: (i) mass participation of candidates for the legislative elections, despite instructions from their parties; (ii) support by those parties for some of the presidential candidates; and lastly, (iii) the support given by grassroots organizations to some of the presidential candidates. This improved political climate was in part a result of the electoral authorities' efforts to expand the flow of information and to improve communication with political players and the general public.

Meanwhile, the relative recovery in the CEP's credibility was dissipated shortly before the first electoral round. This came on top of interference by CEP members in the selection of voting center supervisors and the difficulties encountered in preparing the lists of members of the voting stations appointed by candidates and political parties: in some cases these lists were incomplete or names were duplicated as representing two parties at once. There were also allegations of massive fraud by some political parties.

2.5. Validation of presidential candidacies

The process of validating presidential candidacies was politically one of the most delicate phases. The agreed list of political parties for the presidential elections was published on July 30, 2010. The time period for registering presidential candidacies began on August 1 and ended on August 7, according to the electoral calendar. The mission was present during this first phase in the presentation of candidates and it was there for the time period for challenging candidacies, which took place between August 3 and 17, exceeding the time limit originally established in the electoral calendar. This additional time resulted from a significant number of challenges that were considered

initially by the Departmental Tribunal for Electoral Challenges (TDIE) West I and then by the National Tribunal (TNIE), as stipulated in the electoral law.

Of the 34 candidates presented, 15 were rejected and 19 were accepted. Among those rejected, eight were challenged by the TDIE and that body's decision was appealed to the TNIE in seven of the eight cases, which explains in part the delay in completing this phase. The mission was present for the challenges, both departmental and national. The challenges were filed in the context of the electoral law, but under very difficult material conditions resulting from the shortage of infrastructure materials in the CEP offices in Delmas after the January 2010 earthquake. The mission confirmed that all the challengers present as well as the attorneys of the challenging parties were heard in the two challenge tribunals prescribed by the electoral law.

Following the TNIE decisions and examination of the evidence submitted by candidates to the legal service of the electoral body, on August 20, 2010, i.e. three days later than due, the CEP announced the list of candidates accepted to participate in the 2010 presidential elections. That list was publicly released at 10:30 p.m., without any explanation of the reasons for rejecting 15 candidates. In its press release #2, published on August 21, the mission indicated that explanations concerning the reasons for not validating certain candidacies would have contributed to the transparency of the process (see Annex I). The CEP advised the candidates in its press release #24 of August 26 that there was a structure available to candidates that would allow them to discover why they had been rejected.

The mission interviewed many of the candidates whose documentation had not been accepted and it reported its concerns to the CEP. The electoral body showed itself willing to provide the pertinent information and explanations to members of the mission.

During the period for validating candidacies, the position adopted by the CEP with respect to rejection generated a controversy that required the mission's attention. Article 135 of the 1987 Constitution provides that, in order to be elected President of the Republic, a candidate who has managed public funds must first obtain clearance. Consistent with Article 233 of the Constitution, a favorable report must be obtained from the Superior Court of Accounts issued by a bicameral legislative committee constituted to issue such clearance. As the Chamber of Deputies' mandate had expired on May 10, 2010, candidates could not receive this document to validate their candidacy. In its press releases #16 and #17, published on August 3 and 6 respectively, the CEP reported on the possibility that candidates who had managed public funds in the past could register by submitting a favorable report from the Superior Court of Accounts, subject to reservation. This decision evoked controversy, and gave rise to a real constitutional dilemma. On the one hand, the Constitution required presentation of clearance as a prior condition for being a presidential candidate, but the institutional vacuum made it impossible to satisfy this demand. On the other hand, the Constitution guarantees citizens the respect of their civil and political rights. To prevent citizens from registering, despite the situation of force majeure in which they found themselves, was tantamount to trampling their constitutional guarantees.

Table of Candidates for the Presidency and Political Parties

CANDIDATES	POLITICAL PARTIES
Alexis Jacques Edouard	MPH
Martelly Michel Joseph	REPOUS PEYIZAN
Celestin Jude	INITE
Jeune Leon	KLE
Abellard Axan Delson	KNDA
Cristalin Yves	LAVNI
Joseph Genard	SOLIDARITE
Voltaire Leslie	ANSANM NOU FO
Baker Charles Henri	RESPE
Anacacis Jean Hector	MODEJHA
Charles Eric Smarcki	PENH
Judy Wilson	FORCE 2010
Jeune Jean Chavannes	ACCRHA
Laguerre Garaudy	WOZO
Ceant Jean Henry	RENMEN AYITI
Blot Gerard Marie Necker	PLATFORM 16 DESANM
Neptune Yvon	AYISYEN POU AYITI
Manigat Mirlande	RDNP
Bijou Anne Marie Josette	INDEPENDANT

2.6. Preparation of the voters list

Preparation of the voters list posed a considerable technical challenge for the competent authorities as it had to be updated within a very tight timeframe to take account of the many individuals displaced by the earthquake of January 12, 2010. The CEP and the ONI took steps to guarantee citizens' right to vote according to the provisions of the electoral law. Article 25 of that law stipulates that the electoral registry is to be prepared on the basis of data supplied by the ONI, which has the task of identifying persons 18 years of age and older and delivering to them a national identity card (CNI), the only document that will allow them to vote. To cope with rising demand, the ONI increased the number of staff devoted to new registrations and the replacement of lost cards.

The CEP, which had the task of updating the voters lists and, in particular, the mandate to register the changes in the assignment of the voting centers, carried out a broad campaign for the purpose of updating the voters list through the establishment of Verification Operation Centers (COV) in all departments. These COVs, located within the voting centers, allowed voters to choose the voting station closest to their home. In an effort to accommodate the realities and challenges following the earthquake, 42 COVs were established in 14 displaced persons camps in the Ouest Department.

The COV campaign began on August 19 and ended on October 18. Observers present in the field witnessed the unfolding of that campaign, when more than 1 million voters came to the COVs either to confirm or to change their voting centers or to seek information on how to register to vote.

However, as the mission indicated in its press release #3 of September 30, 2010 (see Annex I), service at the COVs varied by region, because of the above-mentioned lack of awareness

and information on the part of potential voters themselves, who were slow to understand the objective of this verification exercise.

The CEP doubled its staffing level at the data compilation center in an effort to capture all the new data obtained in the COVs and integrate it into the voters' list, which was to be published at least 30 days prior to voting day, i.e. on October 28. In this way, the data compiled by the COVs was registered in a database that combined data provided by the ONI on October 15, 2010. On this basis, the CEP established the Communal Voters list (LEC), containing the full name of voters together with the voting center and office, which list was announced as planned on October 28 in all the communal voting offices (OEC). On the basis of the lists published by the CEP, 4.7 million voters were registered.

On October 26, two days prior to the official publication of the list, the CEP announced the publication and addition of 35,000 names to the LEC which the ONI had supplied. These names could not be included in the LEC published on October 28, as the lists were printed in the days prior to that date in order to respect the time limit. All of these persons registered were included in the LEC and a supplementary list with these new names was attached to the LEC in the communes where this was necessary. To allow the newly registered voters to verify that their names were on the list, the CEP made available to voters, as of November 19, 2010 (CEP press release #49 of November 19) a center that was open 24 hours a day to inform voters of the voting center to which they had been assigned. The observers deployed in the different departments noted that many voters lists published at the communal level were damaged by rain and bad weather, and voters were consequently unable to verify whether they were registered on those lists. The mission drew the CEP's attention to this aspect. The late launch of the voter awareness and information campaigns was a great weakness in the first electoral round and contributed in part to the difficulties that voters encountered in verifying their polling stations on election day. This situation is understandable, in light of Haiti's infrastructure shortcomings, aggravated by the damages caused by the earthquake.

The mission also monitored the process of registering new voters in the ONI and handling requests to provide copies of lost TNIs. According to the electoral law, the cutoff date for voter registration is supposed to be 60 days before election day. Persons who registered after September 28, 2010, the last day for registering on the voters list, were not able to vote. The increased number of citizens registering in the second month was a real test of the ONI's capacity to respond to citizen demands. The mission observers, present in the ONI offices until the last days of registration, noted that this was done in a disorganized manner, which did little to speed the response to requests. The distribution of voter cards was held up by organizational problems.

The 2008 electoral law required that the number of voting centers be increased from 785 to 1,500, and this entailed a different distribution of voters in the voting centers, according to CEP technicians. A good number of voters who did not inform themselves in advance of the location of their voting center were unable to find their names on the voters' lists in the voting centers in which they had been accustomed to voting. On voting day a great many voters who were in a displaced persons camp in the Ouest II Electoral Department experienced difficulties. The explanation provided by CEP technicians was that residents of the camp had not availed themselves of the possibility offered by the COVs to register to vote in the same camp.

2.7. Preparations for election day

The mission monitored the CEP's work of organizing preparations for voting day. One of the important aspects was the appointment and training of electoral officers.

According to Article 140 of the electoral law, polling station workers (MOV) are recruited by public lottery from a list supplied in advance by the political parties at least 60 days before the elections.

During the month of September, the observers deployed in the 11 electoral departments confirmed the holding of the lotteries for designating the MOVs and their transparency. The political parties in some cases provided lists that were incomplete or contained duplications, i.e. persons registered as representing two parties at once. The CEP took on the responsibility of providing additional personnel. In order to complete the MOV list, the CEP used names provided by the candidates of the parties and platforms that did not participate in the elections. The CEP had to verify the list in detail in order to avoid duplications. The work of cleaning up the list not only delayed the process but also increased further the shortage of names and sharpened criticisms leveled at the CEP. This led to demonstrations against the CEP, which could not meet the deadline of October 28 for publishing the MOV list.

Training of supervisors in the voting centers was obstructed by interference from certain electoral commissioners who succeeded in introducing persons close to them to the detriment of others who had experience as electoral officers and who lived close to the voting centers, two criteria that the mission considered key for holding the elections. The interference of certain commissioners in the compilation of the lists of supervisors held up publication of the lists and in this way delayed training for the supervisors. Consequently, training for the MOVs was also postponed, in some cases until the eve of election day, which had an adverse impact on the quality of training. Moreover, the supervisors and the MOVs who had been rejected in favor of persons close to the commissioners disrupted the training sessions for supervisors and the MOVs in many cases. In some voting centers, training was interrupted by acts of violence aimed at preventing training.

The mission also assisted in preparing trainers for the supervisors, a task that took place on November 2 and 3, as well as in training supervisors in their respective departments and in training the MOVs. The trainers were deployed in the departments and training was provided to the supervisors and deputy supervisors, who in turn prepared the MOVs with the help of a training manual in Creole. Bearing in mind the conclusions from the MOVs during the partial elections of 2009, with respect to the handling of reports and the packaging of delicate electoral materials, the JEOM recommended that the CEP should highlight this aspect of the work during the preparatory meetings.

The printing of ballots, tally sheets (*procès-verbaux*, PVs) and other documents essential to the electoral process was completed on time. The documents were stored in the MINUSTAH bases throughout the territory and delivered to the voting centers one or two days prior to the vote. The distribution of 12,000 sets of non-sensitive materials in the departments was also completed on time. The MINUSTAH stored this documentation in its premises and delivered it to the voting centers two or three days before the election.

The mission noted the efforts made throughout the country by the CEP and in the departments by the electoral authorities, the MINUSTAH and the National Police of Haiti in organizing meetings and debates between candidates and political parties. These encounters served to underline the shared responsibility for respecting the provisions of the electoral law and for preventing acts of intimidation and violence during the campaign.

The CEP organized three information meetings with the political parties, which were conducted at key stages of the process, such as on voting day and during tabulation of votes and the processing of electoral challenges. These meetings provided an ideal opportunity for dialogue between the CEP members and political party representatives. The mission also recognized the work performed by civil society organizations and international organizations with the numerous departments, through the signature of undertakings of tolerance and good conduct during the electoral process. The mission added its voice to these initiatives through its successive press releases calling for calm, harmony, mutual respect and tolerance. Its observers also took part in the dialogues that were held in the field.

2.8. Conduct and financing of the campaign

The election campaign for the first round was conducted in two phases: a first phase, known as the "silent" phase during which the candidates were authorized to engage in political advertising through posters, banners, and all kinds of visual materials, took place between September 27 and October 15; a second phase, in which the candidates were able to campaign via the press and public meetings, began on October 15 and ended on November 25. Until November 14, the campaign unfolded in relative calm, with a few exceptions. That tranquility was abruptly shattered on November 15 when there were serious incidents in Cap Haitien and Hinche in which groups of people attacked the MINUSTAH forces, and in Port-au-Prince on November 18, when there were similar but less serious incidents. These actions were sparked by allegations of a link between the outbreak of cholera and the Nepalese soldiers of the MINUSTAH. There were also clashes between partisans of the various presidential candidates.

The mission monitored the two phases of the campaign closely and issued numerous warnings about the failure to comply with the provisions of the electoral law as they relate to the use of government materials and resources, and it expressed its serious concern about the security environment, even before the incidents in Cap Haitien and Hinche.

The government provided financing to the political parties participating in the elections, the amount of which was defined in light of the number of candidates they fielded, pursuant to Article 125 of the electoral law. The mission received no complaints about the allocation of these funds to the political parties. However, the candidates who decided to participate in the elections despite instructions from their parties did not receive any public funding, as the law states clearly that the funds must be allocated to the political parties and not directly to the candidates.

2.9. Awareness campaign

The mission observed that the CEP's awareness campaign began on October 20, much later than the starting date of September 18 established in the electoral calendar. Voter motivation programs were broadcast by radio and television, with technical support from IFES. Also with IFES

support, the CEP produced a short film of voter motivation and education, which was distributed in the electoral departments. Large awareness posters went up all over the country. With the help of MINUSTAH, the CEP also distributed 4 million motivation posters and notebooks for schoolchildren, which were distributed or posted by the OEC. Lastly, in order to facilitate voters' access to information about their voting centers, on November 15 the CEP opened a center that operated 24 hours a day.

The media played their part in organizing and disseminating debates between candidates. The televised debates organized by the Public Affairs Intervention Group (GIAP) allowed weekly exchanges among presidential candidates of three different parties. Haitian National Television (TNH) organized a series of broadcasts with exchanges of ideas among presidential candidates. Radio Metropole allowed presidential candidates to present their programs, with advance notice. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), in collaboration with the GIAP, hosted a series of eight debates in Port-au-Prince and in the provinces with participation by civil society and candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. As to the printed press, *Le Nouvelliste* and *Le Matin* helped to boost public familiarity with the presidential candidates and their programs, through portraits and the publication of opinion polls. As the campaign evolved, the mission noted that the candidates became more courteous, using appropriate language and showing signs of mutual respect.

2.10. Security

The observers received numerous unverified complaints of intimidation and aggression by certain candidates and their sympathizers when they came upon other political players. There were isolated acts of violence, including the ambush of a bus carrying journalists to a public meeting featuring the presidential candidate Jaques Edouard Alexis in the north of the country; the attack on the home of the Executive Director of the *Respè* party, and the ransacking of the automobile of the Minister of Justice, Paul Denis. Other complaints were filed concerning isolated confrontations between sympathizers of different political parties, gunfire and the illegal carrying of weapons by certain candidates and their partisans, verbal threats, and destruction of campaign posters.

The mission also noted widespread fear among the electoral authorities, candidates, and representatives of political parties and civil society organizations over the tendency of campaign tensions to degenerate into incidents of violence on, and in the lead up to, voting day. The acts of violence perpetrated in Cap-Haïtien, Hinche, and Port-au-Prince during the week of November 15 aggravated these fears. The mission stressed the importance of the joint security plan of MINUSTAH and the PNH, designed to prevent disorder and violence. The mission called on all political players to redouble their efforts to ensure that the presidential and legislative elections of November 28 would be peaceful.

CHAPTER III. MISSION ACTIVITIES AND OBSERVATIONS

A. PRE-ELECTORAL STAGE, FIRST ROUND

The Joint Mission, in its press releases and in its discussions with the various participating parties, including the CEP during the lead-up to the elections, had flagged or deplored publicly several of the problems mentioned above:

- Recalling that, by signing the Electoral Code of Conduct, the candidates and political parties had committed themselves to promote tolerance and to renounce the use of weapons, physical or verbal aggression, and to respect the right of rival parties and their supporters to meet and to campaign without disruption throughout the country.
- Calling on all political leaders to demonstrate responsible leadership and insist that their partisans remain calm and display restraint and tolerance.
- Expressing its concern over the substitutions made by the CEP, without any proper explanation, in the lists of supervisors and the exclusion of persons who had been appointed by political parties as poll workers.
- Recalling the crucial role of the supervisors in ensuring that the polling stations functioned smoothly on election day.
- Urging voters to fulfill their public duties and to turn out en masse at the polls.
- Appealing for calm on election day and for patience while awaiting the preliminary results; and
- Appealing to the national police and the justices of the peace to live up to their responsibilities on election day in a professional and fair manner.

In addition to the concerns mentioned above, the mission stressed repeatedly in its press releases and its public comments that the main obstacle to fair elections was the CEP's lack of credibility and the high degree of mistrust as to its impartiality. The mission also noted that, in light of this lack of confidence, any shortcomings and flaws would be amplified and viewed through that particular lens. Aware that it was perceived in a negative light, the CEP had taken steps to improve its image by establishing communication and relations with the candidates and political parties, and in this way it had to some extent overcome the lack of credibility and confidence inspired by its inability to respond to the political parties' concerns over the changes to the lists of supervisors and poll workers.

As election day approached, there were a number of disconcerting signals, particularly the widespread acts of pre-electoral violence, and many fears were expressed about how the elections would unfold.

B. ELECTION DAY, FIRST ROUND

3.1. November 28, 2010

Repeated rumors of massive fraud produced an atmosphere of mistrust in which any problem or mistake was amplified, taken out of context, and seen as a manifestation of premeditated fraud. Toward the end of the day, chaotic organization, voter frustration, and the ransacking of several voting centers produced an alarming increase in tensions, which were further aggravated when 12 of the 19 presidential candidates demanded that the voting be annulled because of massive fraud.

The head of the JEOM, Ambassador Colin Granderson, was advised by the special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Edmond Mulet, that the security situation was deteriorating, especially in the capital city but also in other departments. Taking into account the situation and the signs of imminent problems and the real possibility of widespread violence in Port-au-Prince, the chief of mission took the decision to call in the observers deployed in the Ouest department. He asked for an assessment of the situation in other departments where there had been acts of violence that might jeopardize the safety of the observers. The mission decided as well to recall the observers stationed in the Nord department, which amounted to withdrawing 50% of the JEOM observers.

Despite the call by the majority of presidential candidates to have the elections annulled, the electoral process continued to its conclusion, including the recount of votes and publication of the results in the majority of polling stations. In the afternoon of voting day, two of the presidential candidates, Mrs. Manigat and Mr. Martelly, who had demanded annulment of the elections, changed their position, as they foresaw the possibility of being elected in the second round. This new stance no doubt helped to enhance the legitimacy of the vote.

Generally speaking, the observers witnessed a number of irregularities that marred the election. Most of the polling stations observed opened late, as the MOV had to count the ballots one by one because their number varied from one station to the next. In addition, the presence of a great many political party representatives flocking around the polls tended to delay their opening. The CEP had stated that at any time it would admit a maximum of five scrutineers during voting, and many of the polling stations had to resort to rotation of representatives, given that there were 68 parties competing in the elections. The JEOM observer teams looked into the complaints received from party representatives who said their scrutineers had been barred from the polling stations, and found that most such complaints were unfounded.

The observers also reported that some voters were unable to find their voting station or to locate their names on the partial voters list. The saturation of the call centers, overwhelmed by the volume of voters' calls, the ill will and lack of knowledge on the part of polling station officials, which kept voters from voting, served to increase voter frustration.

In the departments of Artibonite and Nord, the teams reported cases where ballot boxes disappeared. The observers also witnessed the practice of repeat voting by certain voters with the complicity of poll workers and unidentified party agents.

The process continued until the stipulated closing time in all departments, despite the destruction of polling stations in some places and the annulment of the vote in more than 10% of stations because of insecurity and acts of violence. According to data supplied by MINUSTAH, the number of polling stations destroyed did not exceed 4% of the total across the country.

Given the controversial nature of the events that occurred on voting day, the Joint Mission decided to make public promptly its position with respect to the validity of the elections. Based on reports provided by the field coordinators, a report was drawn up with the mission's observations on the proceedings in the presidential and legislative elections and the context in which they took place. That report was made public on November 29 during a press conference. The mission considered whether the irregularities it had observed were sufficiently widespread and numerous as to render the process illegitimate. On the basis of its observations in the 11 electoral departments, the mission concluded that those irregularities, serious as they were, did not necessarily invalidate the process. It also considered that the decision of nearly all the presidential candidates to demand the annulment of the elections was precipitate and regrettable, and it underlined the fact that proceedings had continued through to the end. It also noted that the electoral law contains provisions allowing a candidate to challenge the election of another candidate as the result of irregularities and fraud.

3.2. Coordination with national and international observer groups

The Joint Mission held meetings with the international missions that participated in observing the elections: the Electoral Experts Mission of the European Union, the Observation Mission of the International Organization of the Francophonie, and the Embassies of the United States, Canada, and Japan, which had fielded observers. These debriefings revealed that the international observer missions had a similar appreciation of events on election day in terms of disorganization, irregularities, incidents of violence, and their opposition to annulment of the elections.

The Joint Mission also met bilaterally with the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) to exchange views on the elections. That meeting showed that the two organizations had similar opinions. The reports of the Private Sector Economic Forum and the Haitian electoral observation groups (RNDDH, JuriMedia and CNO) were made available to the mission. Despite accusations of errors, irregularities, and fraud that marred election day, those reports did not demand annulment of the elections.

C. POST-ELECTORAL STAGE, FIRST ROUND

3.3. Observation of vote tabulation

The mission continued its observation of the electoral process after the voting. On November 29 it deployed a team of observers to monitor the compilation of votes in the Vote Tabulation Center (CTV), to which were sent the bags containing the tally sheets and supporting documentation from all the voting stations around the country. After receipt and visual inspection of the bags, the tally sheets were counted and were sent to the Legal Control Unit (UCL) for review. The tabulation procedures and criteria are contained in the CTV Manual of Procedures, but the sections concerning tabulation were not approved by the CEP until the second round.

One of the mission's first observations had to do with the initial control measure used to identify the tally sheets for visual verification. This control threshold had been set at 225 votes, equal to 50% of the total of voters assigned to each polling station. The mission insisted that, taking into account the low turnout rate, to consider 50% of the number of voters at a station was excessive and did not allow sufficient identification of irregular ballots. This control measure was finally reduced to 150 votes.

The greatest difficulty encountered by the mission was to ensure monitoring of the work of the six CEP lawyers assigned to the Legal Control Unit located in the CTV. The office in which they were working was cramped without adequate space for the observers to move between the work tables. Moreover, the time allowed for observation at this stage of the process was irregular, and this impeded sustained observation, as entry was limited to two observers at a time, and in some cases only one observer, for 10 minutes. The UCL lawyers were for the most part uncooperative and not prepared to answer questions put to them. The mission found that a great many of the tally sheets reviewed by the UCL were piled together, with the risk that the documents could be mixed up. The review of their work, performed by the CTV director and his technical coworkers in the context of final quality control, was done in a more favorable workplace, which allowed for more rigorous observation.

In a letter sent to the CEP on January 26, 2011, the mission also expressed its concern over the significant number of polling stations in which counting did not take place by closing time, and it recommended reopening the count in settings where more than 10% of the tally sheets had not been received and where there were a considerable number of voters who had been disenfranchised.

3.4. Publication of the preliminary results

The publication of the preliminary election results on the evening of December 7 placed Mirlande Manigat in the lead, followed by Jude Célestin. That announcement was immediately followed by violent demonstrations in favor of Mr. Martelly, who was then shown in third place. Disturbances of this kind paralyzed Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes in particular, as well as other cities and regions of the country, for about three days.

In the hope of finding a solution to the post-electoral crisis, the CEP proposed creation of a special commission to verify the preliminary results of the presidential elections. It would be composed of representatives of the CEP itself, national and international election observer organizations, the private sector and the international community. This initiative was rejected by civil society groups, who insisted that the elections law made no provision for such a situation. The attempt to create this commission failed, and it was after this reversal suffered by the CEP that President Préval asked the OAS, on December 13, 2010, to send two expert missions: one to verify the tabulation of votes from the first round of the presidential elections, and the second to monitor the contestation phase of the presidential election.

The negotiation of the terms of reference for these two missions and their actual realization resulted in the postponement of the second round of the presidential and legislative elections (which were supposed to be held on January 16, 2011), putting them off until March 20, 2011. The handover of the mandate, which was expected to occur on February 7, 2011, according to the Constitution, could therefore not take place on time and the mandate of President René Préval was extended until

May 14, pursuant to Article 232 of the Electoral Law. The main stakeholders involved agreed on the need to have a legitimate government and to avoid, as far as possible, creating a transitional regime which might have postponed yet further the installation of an elected government.

3.5. OAS mission of experts to verify the vote tabulation

The OAS, the Government of Haiti, and the CEP signed an agreement on terms of reference for the two expert missions (see annexes H and I) on December 29, 2010. The mission of experts to verify the vote tabulation, comprising nine members, arrived on December 30 and began its work in the CTV on December 31. The expert mission's mandate was to evaluate the practices and procedures applied in the presidential elections of November 20, 2010 concerning the tabulation of votes, and any other factor that might have affected or had a bearing on the preliminary results published by the CEP, in accordance with the OAS Charter, the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the standards established and applied in this matter by the OAS General Secretariat for electoral observation missions, as well as the Constitution of Haiti and the electoral law.

The mission comprised OAS officials and outside experts in such areas as statistics, verification of electoral results, data analysis, tabulation of voting results, information technologies, electoral organization, and election observation. The mission began its work in accordance with the following precepts: to conduct a transparent and impartial verification, consistent with the electoral law; to maintain responsible control so that the chain of custody in the inspection of CEP documents could be audited; and to examine as many data sources as possible in order to prepare its recommendations.

Members of the JEOM core group provided pertinent data to the international experts and took part in the verification work. After analyzing a random sample of tally sheets, defined by the invited experts and with the help of statistical tools, they were able to identify some of the more "problematic" tally sheets that affected the three candidates with the most votes, in different proportions, and they could also define the criteria established by the electoral law for determining their validity. The expert mission recommended, among other measures, the exclusion from the final tabulation of 234 tally sheets considered irregular, and it attached a simulated table of the electoral results. As well, the expert mission presented recommendations to the electoral authorities concerning the entire elections process and on the tabulation of votes (Annex H).

On the day the international experts left, one of the invited specialists with the mission deliberately leaked to the press a copy of the last draft of the final report. This breach of the terms of reference, which stipulated that the report must be transmitted to the Haitian authorities before being made public, clouded the perceived integrity of the work performed. The final report was sent officially to President Préval on January 13 by the head of the OAS/CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission. Following the visit of the OAS Secretary General, President Préval transmitted the report to the CEP for consideration on January 18, despite his objections and his unhappiness over the deliberate leaking of the report before its official delivery.

The CEP immediately announced that it would implement the technical recommendations to improve the second round of the elections. It also indicated that it would take into consideration the recommendation concerning the ranking of the candidates during the challenge and appeals phase, which had been suspended while awaiting the report of the OAS Expert Mission.

3.6. The OAS Legal Experts Mission and the contestation phase

The second OAS expert mission arrived in Haiti on January 24 to monitor the resumed contestation (challenge and appeals) phase of the electoral process and the adjudication by the National Electoral Challenges (TNIE) of the complaints over the preliminary results of the presidential elections. Its report was transmitted to the Government of Haiti on February 4, 2011.

The Joint Mission observed the challenges and appeals phase with regard to the legislative elections at the TNIE level. Because of the delays in the electoral process and the departure of the last departmental coordinators on December 21, the Mission was unable to observe how the challenges were handled by the departmental tribunals (TDIE). The mission took note of the large number of complaints submitted to the national tribunals by the candidates for the legislative elections. Those candidates also availed themselves of the legal recourses provided by the Electoral Law to seek redress for their complaints. They claimed that irregularities or fraud had prejudiced their results. This resort to due process in an election was of critical importance in demonstrating that grievances can be effectively addressed through legal procedures.

3.7. Proclamation of the final results

At the conclusion of the challenges and appeals phase, the final results of the first round were proclaimed on February 3, 2011 after an all-night wait. The published results did not show the number of votes or the percentage of votes obtained by each of the legislative and presidential candidates. Only four of the eight electoral commissioners signed the statement of results from the first round.

Despite the many criticisms over the way in which the presidential results were corrected, most stakeholders accepted the outcome and agreed to participate in the second electoral round.

3.8. Period between the two rounds of voting

The Joint Mission took advantage of the period between the proclamation of the contested preliminary results and the continuation of the electoral process to undertake an analysis of the process, express its concern, and raise questions, some of which had already been expressed by the candidates, on which the CEP was to provide explanations. Those questions dealt, among other things, with the accuracy of the voters lists and the difficulties encountered by voters in finding their polling stations, as well as the scattering of voters with the same address among multiple voting centers. After its analysis of the process, the JEOM transmitted to the CEP a list of recommendations to be implemented in the short term, with a view to improving the process for the second round of voting on March 20, 2011.

D. PRE-ELECTIONS STAGE, SECOND ROUND

The second round of presidential voting was considered a historically unprecedented event. To begin with, this was the first time since the adoption of the Constitution in 1987 that a run-off election had been held. Secondly, for the first time one of the two presidential candidates admitted to a second round was a woman. Lastly, there was a considerable improvement in the political climate,

compared to the first round, which allowed the electoral authorities to prepare the second round in a propitious environment.

The announced return of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide sparked speculations among some stakeholders as to its possible impact on the electoral process. In the end, he returned to the country on March 18, i.e. ten days before voting day. His arrival did not disrupt the elections, and the fears expressed by certain sectors did not materialize.

The long period of time that elapsed between publication of the preliminary results from the first round on December 7, 2010 and the proclamation of the final results on February 3, 2011 was put to good use by CEP technical staff. They conducted an in-house analysis of the problems that arose during the first round and offered pertinent recommendations. The electoral authorities also took on board the recommendations made by the JEOM, by the OAS Expert Vote Tabulation Verification Mission and by other international and national observation missions.

3.9. Voters lists

On this occasion the CEP and the ONI coordinated their efforts to examine the reliability and the accuracy of the electoral register. Working sessions were held with, among others, the technical assistants of MINUSTAH and the UNDP to determine the feasibility as well as the potential cost of implementing the array of recommendations put forward with respect to the voters list. As a result, the partial voters list was amended so that the polling station to which each voter was assigned would be more visible and more readily identifiable. This measure had a positive impact on voters' ability to identify their polling stations.

3.10. Awareness campaign

The "Where to Vote?" campaign was launched sufficiently in advance and the capacity of the call centers to respond to voters' questions was reinforced. Information on the polling stations assigned to each voter was disseminated through SMS texting and the CEP website. The public response, thanks in particular to the facilitation made possible by the call centers, was noteworthy. On this score, the CEP purported on March 15, 2011, five days ahead of the election, that the center had received 195,000 requests, around 20,000 people visited the "Where to Vote?" Campaign online, and around 20,000 SMS had been sent out. The number of voters seeking information on the location of their polling station was interpreted as auguring well for voter turnout, reflecting the general public interest in the second round of elections.

Other methods of awareness raising and education were also used: these included radio and TV spots, posters and flyers, megaphone announcements in markets and other public places. However, the general perception of the real impact of these measures on voter turnout was at best mixed. According to mission observers, these measures were applied unevenly in the departments.

3.11. Training of electoral officers

The CEP initiated a training program for supervisors and members of the polling stations. However, the program was implemented unevenly. In some departments, observers noted a clear improvement in the quality of training for supervisors, including an assessment of agents after the

training sessions. But this did not occur everywhere, and in some parts of the country the quality of training left much to be desired. In some places, there was last-minute manipulation of the lists of poll workers, and of supervisors in particular, although to a lesser extent than during the first round, and this again cast doubt on the credibility of the process and held up training of the members of the polling stations, with the consequent adverse effect on the quality of training.

One of the recommendations made by the JEOM and the Expert Mission for Verification of Vote Tabulation was to appoint facilitators to help voters find their polling station on election day. Implementation of this recommendation was hampered by the manipulation of the lists of these agents, which in many cases prevented them from being published on time. In other cases, the lists of facilitators were published one or two days before the election. Consequently, not all voting centers had facilitators on election day. In fact, when the voting centers opened the observers identified a facilitator in only 57% of the centers observed, although this figure rose to 73% by closing time. The observers' reports indicated that, in the cases observed, the facilitators generally did a good job.

3.12. Security

The traditional impunity surrounding electoral violations was combated on this occasion by the expulsion of supervisors, poll workers, and security agents responsible for serious irregularities on election day. During the first round several persons were accused of electoral violations by the CEP, but the mission knew of no case where the justice authorities followed up on those charges.

The environment of security and peacefulness which had prevailed since mid-December was in general maintained after the proclamation of the final results of the first round, even though the governing party's presidential candidate, Jude Célestin, was excluded from the runoff. In addition, MINUSTAH reevaluated the level of risk in each polling station in order to respond more effectively to any incidents.

3.13. The Election Campaign

The short election campaign, which began on February 20 and lasted until March 18, 2011, was marked by huge rallies in different parts of the country in support of the two presidential candidates. Though initially peaceful, the presidential campaign was marred in its last days by a more strident tone, rising friction and disruptive incidents. While the media paid less attention to the legislative campaigns, these generated far more tension than the presidential elections, and this at times led to acts of violence. Nevertheless, the more moderate atmosphere represented a vast improvement over the first round.

E. ELECTION DAY, SECOND ROUND

3.14. March 20, 2011

On the occasion of the second round of presidential and legislative elections on March 20, 2011, voters were asked to elect the President of the Republic in addition to filling 76 of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and seven of 11 seats in the Senate. Mirlande Manigat of the RDNP and Michel Joseph Martelly of *Repons Peyizan* competed for the presidency.

Voting was more orderly than in the first-round thanks to the corrective measures adopted by the CEP, which clearly produced a substantial improvement in the organization of the elections.

Observers' reports also reflected a positive change in the security situation on voting day. The action of the security forces was better coordinated. The PNH, MINUSTAH and the electoral security agents worked proactively to prevent disruption of the voting process and to respond to the violent incidents that occurred on March 20. This allowed voters to exercise their franchise in a more peaceful setting. One positive indicator that reflected this improvement was the number of tally sheets forwarded to the CTV. In fact, only around 1% of the tally sheets for the legislative and presidential elections went astray, in comparison with 10.3% in the first round.

3.15. The voting process

The presence of facilitators in the voting centers proved very useful for helping voters find their polling stations. In addition, the observers noted that there were fewer problems with the voters lists.

Access for political party scrutineers to the polling stations was not as problematic as during the first round, as there were fewer political parties participating in the elections in each district. At the opening of the polling stations, there were an average of four scrutineers per station. Consequently, there were far fewer disputes over access for scrutineers to the stations. Nevertheless, observers reported some cases of intimidation attributed to political party representatives.

There were still many shortcomings. In the Ouest Department, and to some extent in other departments, the principal weaknesses involved errors in the delivery of electoral kits and voting materials (ballots, ballot boxes, and indelible ink) which caused the affected stations to open late. According to figures provided by MINUSTAH, around 70 voting centers in the capital city were affected by these irregularities in the delivery of election materials. The prompt response of the UN peacekeeping mission in addressing these errors prevented the situation from getting out of hand. The CEP extended voting time in the metropolitan zone by one hour in order to make up for the delay and to allow voters to cast their votes. Although the electoral law does not specifically give the CEP this power it implicitly allows it: Article 164.1 indicates that if, at 4:00 p.m., there are still voters waiting to vote, they must be admitted. Despite these incidents, the average opening time of the stations was 6:57 a.m., i.e. much earlier than in the first round.

The JEOM also observed irregularities confined to the "red zones", including the removal of ballot boxes, cases of voter intimidation, and persons who voted several times. However, these incidents were not widespread and did not reflect the reality of the voting process in the country.

The voter turnout rate was slightly higher than for the first round, but it did not live up to the expectations generated by response to the "Where to Vote?" campaign.

The Joint Mission fielded nearly twice as many observers for the second round, in comparison to the first. There were a total of 201 observers, including 99 women and 102 men, from 31 countries, making it possible to cover urban and rural areas in the 11 electoral departments and to boost the coverage of the voting centers. The mission established mechanisms of coordination with

many of the national observer groups and took part in information sharing sessions with MINUSTAH on election day. It also helped the CEP to establish a more effective emergency center.

Assessments performed on election day generally agreed that the second round of voting was relatively calm and orderly, and that organizational improvements had reinforced the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process and, to some extent, of the CEP.

F. POST-ELECTORAL STAGE, SECOND ROUND

3.16. Observation in the Vote Tabulation Center (CTV)

The CTV's capacity for verification was considerably reinforced, and most of the recommendations of the OAS expert mission for verifying vote tabulation were implemented. CTV procedures were updated and strengthened and verification criteria were harmonized and given statutory authority. The capacity of the Legal Control Unit (UCL) was doubled, from 6 to 12 lawyers, thereby improving its working methods. The unit's working space was also adapted, allowing the lawyers and the observers to carry out their tasks under better conditions. Quality control measures were applied at all important stages of the process, particularly when it came to verifying the validity of the tally sheets and the Visual Control Unit.

The mission deployed a team of specially trained observers to monitor the functioning of the CTV 24 hours a day. The observers paid special attention to the process of legal verification by the UCL, and were particularly active in alerting UCL supervisors or CTV management to shortcomings observed in the verification process, so that immediate corrective measures could be taken. These observations and questionings struck a positive note with the CTV directors who, despite some doubts in principle, realized that the observers' approach was enhancing the reliability and integrity of CTV verification.

The Mission had proposed to the CEP an observation protocol for the CTV. The CTV itself drafted observation guidelines setting out the relationship between the observers and the Center, a relationship that was initially rather testy but mellowed gradually as both sides came to understand each other better.

Among the welcome innovations was the instituting of information sessions conducted by the CTV directors, where the observers could learn in detail about the progress of work, ask questions, and make observations and recommendations. Though these sessions did not commence as early in the process as promised, they did prove to be quite useful. Another innovation was to invite the presidential candidates to deploy their own observers. This was a welcome gesture of transparency on the part of the CEP.

With the adoption of parameters to select tally sheets for inspection, the CTV in fact verified some 60% of the tallies, compared to 10% for the first round. This huge increase in the volume of work sparked the need to strengthen the UCL and also caused a four-day delay in tabulating the preliminary results, which were finally made public on April 4. As a result of the increased number of tally sheets verified, a greater number of sheets were discarded for irregularities. For the presidential vote, 15.32% of all tally sheets were discarded; for the legislative elections, the corresponding figures were 12% for senators and 7% for deputies.

The UCL devoted more time to examining the presidential tally sheets, as in this case the lawyers paid closer attention to the partial voters list (LEP), which contains the national ID numbers (NIN) of persons who have voted. The presence, absence or falsification of the NIN makes it possible to check the validity of the information reported in the tally sheet and, consequently, the votes cast. This represented an innovation that enhanced the reliability of the preliminary results. The CTV decided to annul legislative tally sheets from voting stations where the LEP was deemed irregular after verifying the presidential tally sheets to ensure that there was not more than one LEP per station. The effort to make the verification more rigorous than in the first round was worthwhile, and allowed the CTV to enhance the reliability of the preliminary results.

On the last day before the preliminary results were transmitted, the work of the CTV was disrupted by rumors about the eventual winner of the presidential contest. Ill-advised late-night visits by CEP commissioners merely reinforced suspicions that the results were being manipulated. After an investigation, the JEOM concluded that the allegations were groundless and it stated this conclusion publicly on April 5, 2011, through press release #26.

3.17. The contestation phase

The efforts to improve the second round of the presidential and legislative elections also involved the challenges and appeals phase of the electoral process. Recommendations to improve the procedural aspects of this phase and to guarantee a minimum of procedural impartiality were proposed to the CEP by a UNDP judicial expert. During the training sessions, those recommendations were transmitted to the presidents of the TDIE and to the CEP lawyers who served as judges at the two levels of adjudication.

The Joint Mission observed the handling of complaints concerning the legislative elections in 11 departmental tribunals (TDIE). Seventy-seven cases concerning candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and four cases concerning candidates for the Senate were submitted to the TDIE. Some tribunals dismissed the complaints on procedural grounds, while others heard the cases presented. Nevertheless, 98% of the decisions adopted stipulated that the departmental tribunals were not competent in this area and the complaints were sent on to the national tribunals. Of these cases, 64 corresponded to the Chamber of Deputies and four to the Senate. Considering the number of decisions referred to the national tribunals, it would seem that most of the departmental tribunals were functioning as complaint registration offices instead of attempting to determine the truth of the allegations presented by the claimants and taking a decision that could then be rejected or confirmed by the national tribunals upon appeal.

The recommendation of the Joint Mission and the OAS Expert Mission for verifying the vote tabulation by publishing scanned copies of the tally sheets at the CEP website proved very useful. The copies gave the lawyers a source of information on the grounds for excluding the tally sheets, which they were able to use for the benefit of their clients.

The national tribunals did not function particularly well. The time allocated to the hearings was not in all cases sufficient for the lawyers to develop their arguments properly. The judges presiding over the hearings did not require the lawyers and the candidates to provide evidence for their allegations or to substantiate their claims for the incorporation or the exclusion of results. This

approach adversely affected the quality of the decisions of the national tribunals, which for the most part were rendered without any supporting evidence or reasoning and were based on the exclusion or incorporation of tally sheets without any prior verification. The integrity of the national tribunals' work was undermined by rumors that certain candidates had "bought" favorable rulings. Those rumors reached such a pitch that the Senate created a committee of investigation to determine their legitimacy. Judicial proceedings were also brought against the magistrates of the CEP. These measures continued until the JEOM left Haiti.

3.18. Proclamation of the final results of the elections

The final results of the presidential and legislative elections were published on April 20. The victory of Michel Joseph Martelly was a mere formality, as no complaints concerning the presidential elections were brought before the electoral tribunal. On the contrary, announcement of the legislative election results gave rise to a new controversy: following the decisions handed down by the national tribunal, 17 preliminary results for deputies' seats were overturned, 15 in favor of the ruling party, *Inité*. The outcomes for two of the Senate seats were also overturned, one in favor of the *Inité* candidate. This reinforced the criticisms and suspicions expressed during the contestation phase to the effect that the electoral judges had deliberately changed the results. These decisions of the CEP sparked a new crisis as violent protests erupted in many districts. The disputed results also led Commissioner Ginette Chérubin, who rejected the changes in rankings, to submit her resignation. This gesture further eroded the credibility of the electoral institution and its decisions.

3.19. Examination by the JEOM of the disputed outcomes of the legislative elections

With the object of putting an end to the crisis, the Haitian authorities requested the Joint Mission to verify the disputed results. The Mission accepted this task, acting within the limits of its mandate and following the procedures established by the two OAS expert missions deployed in the wake of the challenges to the results of the first round. The mission examined the disputed cases and conducted a verification in the CTV of the tally sheets in question.

Following its verification, the mission observed that the national tribunal did not take its decisions with the required critical rigor. In general, the tribunal merely proclaimed the winner without setting out the arguments or the reasoning that led to the decision and without assessing the evidence. Ignoring completely the criteria established by the CEP itself, the judges of the national tribunals decided to annul or validate the tally sheets as requested by the plaintiffs or the defendants without performing the prior verification required by the Electoral Law. This state of affairs undermined the fairness and the validity of the national tribunals' decisions.

The JEOM concluded that in the absence of reasons underpinning the decisions and in the absence of prior verification to determine which tally sheets should have been set aside or counted in order to change the number of votes and therefore the ranking of the candidates, the CEP should go back to the preliminary results in each of the eighteen cases examined.

In the face of domestic and international pressure, the CEP finally decided to establish a special national tribunal to re-open and hear the 18 disputed cases. This time around, the tribunal took the critical step of verifying the tally sheets at the CTV, which had been totally omitted previously. This verification was done in the presence of the JEOM and other national and international

observers. After reviewing the files and completing the work at the CTV, the judges deliberated behind closed doors. The CEP informed the observers of the results of the decisions of the special national tribunal shortly before announcing them publicly.

At this meeting, the Mission and other observers expressed reservations about the treatment of three cases in particular. For these cases, the JEOM recommended that the Special Tribunal apply the same verification procedures it had used for all the other cases examined and which had helped to determine the accuracy of the results. However, these recommendations were not taken on board. Though the results were transmitted to the President of the Republic several days before the handover of power to the new president, they were not immediately published.

With no publication of the results in the official gazette, *Le Moniteur*, the crisis over the final legislative results dragged on, and this sparked sharp criticism of the CEP and obstructed the work of the Chamber of Deputies, in particular, by denying it a parliamentary quorum. The CEP found a way out by submitting the individual lists before they were published in *Le Moniteur*. Finally, 13 of the 17 results for Deputy were published, as well as the two results for the Senate. The authorities had made no public statement about the handling of the four remaining parliamentary outcomes by the time the JEOM left Haiti.

3.20. Women in the elections

The OAS/CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission, following the precepts of the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001 and Resolution 1325 (2000) of the UN Security Council, gave special consideration to the representation of women at all stages in its observation of the electoral process in Haiti. Thus, the four-member core group that initially set up the JEOM office in Port-au-Prince included two women, one of whom served as deputy chief of mission and the other as political analyst. The core group was subsequently extended to a total of 15 members, five of whom were women (including the legal advisor, financial officer, and logistics officer). As the election process advanced, the mission was reinforced with the arrival of 20 coordinators, of which nine were women. For the first round of the presidential and legislative elections, the JEOM had a total of 118 observers, 52 women and 66 men, from 27 countries. For the second round, the number of female coordinators rose to 11 and there were a total of 201 observers, including 99 women and 102 men, from 31 countries.

During the Joint Mission, the observers paid special attention to the role of women in the electoral process. For the first time in Haiti's history, two of the 19 candidates for president were women: Mirlande Manigat and Bijou Anne Marie Josette. One of them, Mirlande Manigat, received the greatest number of votes in the first round and participated in the runoff, where she came second with 31.74% of the votes. Michel Joseph Martelly was the winner, with 67.57%.

In the Chamber of Deputies, women were elected to only six of the 99 seats. No woman was elected to any of the 11 seats in the Senate. In 30% of the polling stations observed, a woman presided; in 39%, the Vice-President was female; and in 34%, the Secretary was a woman. Of the 11 Departmental Electoral Offices, only one was headed by a woman; another had a female Vice-President.

FEMALE CANDIDATES	ELECTORAL DISTRICT	POLITICAL PARTY
Marie Denise BERNADEAU	CENTRE - THOMONDE	LAVNI
Guerda BENJAMIN BELLEVUE	CENTRE - SAVANETTE	ANSANM NOU FO
Ogline PIERRE	SUD – CAMP PERRIN/MANICHE	MOCHRENHA
Phanese J.R. LAGUERRE	NORD EST/ VALLIERES/ CARICE/MOBIN CROCHU	SOLIDARITE
Ruffine LABBE	SUD EST- LA VALLEE DE JACMEL	ANSANM NOU FO
Marie Jossie ETIENNE	NORD - MILOT/PLAINE DU NORD	RASAMBLE

3.21. Acts of intimidation against the media

The tensions and protests that stemmed from disputed aspects of the electoral process had a negative impact on the media. Threats were made against a private radio station in the capital perceived as having sided openly with one of the presidential candidates. Political divisions over reporting policy at the state television station led to internal turmoil and to the dismissal of many staff members. In the wake of the problems caused by the disputed legislative results, several radio journalists in the provinces were forced into hiding because of their reporting or the position they adopted. At least two community radio stations were damaged or destroyed. These incidents of intimidation or violence against the media were completely at odds with the freedom of the press that Haitians have enjoyed in recent years.

G. COMPLAINTS

ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS FORM
OAS-CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission
to the Presidential and Legislative Elections in Haiti scheduled for
(First Round - November 28, 2010)

Date	Department/Observer	Location	Name of Complainant/ Title/Political Organization	Description/Relevant Electoral Provisions
28/11/10	Artibonite / Tomas Jaldedo	Ecole Nationale de Platon	Valmy Jacques/CNO ISC	Observed individuals voting multiple times; members of BV did not take action to prevent
28/11/10	Artibonite / Laura Kalfon	Ecole Sainte Claire	Casseus Danica /Superviseur Adjointe	Alleges that two individuals who had already signed the provisional voters list were prevented from voting by the VP (Vice President) of the BV (Polling Station)
28/11/10	Artibonite / Laura Kalfon	Ecole Sainte Claire	Hubermann Orelus	Alleges that VP of BV left several times during the vote and was not replaced
28/11/10	Grand-Anse / O. Asturias	Ecole Nord Alexis	Etienne Marie Flore Jessica	Complains that name was on the partial list but not on list within BV – as a result, prevented from voting
28/11/10	Grand-Anse / O. Asturias	Lycee Nord Alexis	Marie Giselaïne Dessources	Had CIN but could not find name on list in any BV – as a result, prevented from voting
28/11/10	Ouest / Ingvild Burkey	Delmas Ville, David Mondesir Institution Mixte	Dave-Ansy Laguerre	Alleges that BV did not open until 9:30 and that most individuals could not vote because names were not on list; further alleges that ballot boxes were 1/3 rd full upon opening of BV
27/11/10	Ouest / Lara Bremner	College Mission Baptiste Fermantre	Jean Robert Ermilus/ CEP Superviseur Principale Kenscoff	A ballot box had only one safety strap instead of two
28/11/10	Ouest / Lara Bremner	Fermathe	Evelyne Cheron / Candidate for Senate / RESPE	Complains that many individuals could not find their names on list and as a result were prevented from voting
28/11/10	Ouest / J C Herraud	Institute Info	Pierre Cambel	Had CIN but could not vote because name was not on list
28/11/10	Ouest	Ecole National Geffrard	Jean Baptiste Samuel / AYITI AN AKSYON	Complains that supervisor of BV refused to work – when he complained he was replaced by

				someone close to supervisor
28/11/10	Nippes / Nancy Robinson	Bureau de Bezin 1e Section	Dare Jean Kechener / RENMEN AYITI	Could not enter CV (Voting Center) to monitor vote
28/11/10	Nippes / Nancy Robinson	Ecole Nationale de Charller	Jean Claude Remy	Was unable to vote because did not receive CIN, despite applying well in advance of the deadline (showed COV receipt) – alleges that many in his community faced same problem
28/11/10	Nippes / Nancy Robinson	Ecole Nationale du Petite Rivere	Flaurence Sandonee	Was unable to vote because did not receive CIN, despite applying well in advance of the deadline (showed COV receipt)
28/11/10	Ouest / Eric Mielczarek	Ecole Nationale de la Croix des Missions	Multiple	Many instances of individuals being unable to vote despite having verified their appropriate voting locations earlier at the COV; list of names of individuals who could not find their names on list – nor on lists in surrounding area (21 names)

ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS FORM
OAS-CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission
to the Presidential and Legislative Elections in Haiti
(Second Round - March 20, 2011)

Date of incident	Department/Observer	Location	Name of Complainant/ Title/Political Organization	Description
20/03/11	Sud-Est / J.M. Baudot	Ecole Nationale du bourg	Clervilson Chrisnel/Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Complaint directed at INITE candidate Lesly Guirand – alleges he threatened PLAPH BV member (Edzer Jean) and used his authority to intimidate other BV members
20/03/11	Sud-Est / J.M. Baudot	Ecole Nationale de Mayette	Clervilson Chrisnel/Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Complaint directed at Berthony Ulysse, supervisor of CV – alleges supervisor is an INITE partisan and allowed children to vote and assigned the 3 representatives of PLAPH to one BV
20/03/11	Sud-Est / J.M. Baudot	Boucan Belier et Bordes	Clervilson Chrisnel/Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Complaint directed at Canes Arreus, CASEC – alleges he offered money to voters while in line so that he could direct their votes (resulted in votes for INITE)
20/03/11	Sud-Est / J.M. Baudot	Ecole Presbyterale de Pelagie	Clervilson Chrisnel/Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Complaint directed at supervisor of CV – alleges supervisor is an INITE partisan and that he encouraged supporters to assault a PLAPH scrutineer (Aloner Uranus)
20/03/11	Grand Anse / L.J. Narvaez	Duchity	Ronald Etienne/ Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Multiple allegations – including: 1) a police officer assaulted a PLAPH scrutineer, creating a distraction which allowed INITE partisans to stuff the ballot boxes; 2) other instances of ballot-box stuffing by INITE partisans which were not recorded by Supervisors
20/03/11	Grand Anse / L.J. Narvaez	Beaumont	Ronald Etienne/ Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Alleges partisans of INITE stuffed ballot boxes at CV Ecole Nationale Nouvelle and that Supervisor did not record incident

20/03/11	Grand Anse / L.J. Narvaez	Iles Cayemitte	Ronald Etienne/ Candidat a la Députation/PLAPH	Hand writing - illegible
20/03/11	Grand Anse / L.J. Narvaez	Iles Cayemitte	Alteda Pierre Etienne/PLAPH	Alleges multiple voting by INITE partisan – further alleges that when he confronted the above, he was assaulted – further alleges ballots were destroyed and thrown into the sea
21/03/11	Artibonite / A.M. Caceres	Dessalines	Innocent Herold	Complaint directed against partisan of LAVNI – alleges he made death threats and threatened to burn down the BEC and the Tribunal de la Paix
20/03/11	Nord-Est / D. Faguudes	Ecole Presbyterale (Ferrier)	Beauvais Fedend	Alleges presence of campaign propaganda in CV
20/03/11	Ouest / V. Benavente	Ecole Normale de Martissant	Jean Geanin	Complainant could not find his name on the LE (voters list)
20/03/11	Ouest / V. Benavente	Ecole Normale de Martissant	Bouronze Seiveilles / RESPONS PEYIZAN	Hand writing - illegible
20/03/11	Ouest / D. Rose		JEOM S Jean	Complainant could not find his name on the LE
20/03/11	Ouest / ?	La Voix des Enfants	Paul Jean Michel / PLATFORM LIBERATION	Alleges that partisans of ALTERNATIV threatened him and others present in the BV
20/03/11	Ouest / E. Roux	Ecole Eglise Conservatrice Lamothe	Lamore Harold	Complainant alleges that CV did not open until 9:30 am
20/03/11	Ouest / E. Roux	Ecole Eglise Conservatrice Lamothe	Filama Inelie / REPOS PEYIZAN	CEP asked to open the BV at 6:00am, but it was 9:00am, and nothing had started yet.
20/03/11	Artibonite	Lycee Bicentenaire	Francois J. Lucizno / INITE	Alleges presence of AAA and RDNP campaign propaganda in CV
20/03/11	Grande Anse / P. Minn	Ecole Nationale Petion La Forest	Serge Louis	Complainant could not find his name on the LE, presented himself at three CVs
20/03/11	Nord / P. Ruotte	Ecole Jean XXIII	Ivonne Valneus	Complainant could not find her name on the LE, called hotline but without result

20/03/11	Nord / L.R. Pintor	Ecole Louverture (sp?) La Playe	Jules Lunise / CNO	Alleges group of bandits entered the CV and took all the ballots for Deputies, returned with them and stuffed the ballot boxes. Also alleges that scrutineers pressured electors to vote for their candidates
20/03/11	Ouest / V. Benavente	Ecole Normale de Martissant	Simon Guyto / RESPONS PEYIZAN	Alleges an INITE partisan received money from INITE in exchange for blocking access of supporters of RP to BVs
20/03/11	Ouest / V. Benavente	Ecole Normale de Martissant	Julot Magna / INITE	Alleges supervisors were partisans of RESPONS PEYIZAN
20/03/11	Ouest / V. Benavente	Ecole Normale de Martissant	Jean-Claude Vernet	Complainant could not find his name on the LE
21/03/11	Artibonite / J. Barranco	BEC de Dessalines	Innocent Herold / President du BEC de Dessalines Berto Vertilus / VP du BEC de Dessalines	Allege ongoing threats against them made by Max Lamothe and Hubermann Aurelius (partisans of LAVNI) – threats to their lives and to burn down the town, if the results do not support their candidate (Garcia Delva) Lamothe and Hubermann accuse the complainants of altering PVs (tally sheets) to support another candidate
20/03/11	Ouest II / T. Auguste	Croix des Bouquets / Thomazeau	Price Cyprien / Candidat a la Deputation / PONT	Alleges that rival Candidate Jean Tholbert Alexis (ANSANM NOU FO) has received support and preferential treatment, including license to commit illegal activities, from number of high powered Haitian officials (including the Minister of Justice, VP of the CEP, Police Commissioner) – his making these allegations he further alleges has resulted in death threat against himself and his family Alleges massive fraud in a total of six CVs (Lycee de Dumay, Lycee de Sibert, Centre d'Etude de Marin, Ecole Jacques Stephen Alexis, Ecole National de Vaudreuil, Ecole National de Lillavois) Alleges Alexis manipulated

				supervisor list with support from BED and CEP, intimidated supervisors and ordered an assault on an individual
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IV. CONCLUSIONS

The JEOM had to work in a particularly difficult political environment. The lack of trust in the electoral agency constituted a permanent obstacle and influenced the behavior of political players in the electoral process. Despite this, the process continued to its conclusion and allowed for a peaceful transition of power from one democratically elected government to another.

The Joint Mission maintained excellent working relations with the various stakeholders in the electoral process, including the political parties and candidates, the government authorities, civil society, the communications media, and international participants involved in the electoral process. A key factor here was the series of recommendations that the JEOM made at various stages to the CEP for improving the process and its credibility. The second round of voting went much better than the first round from the technical, organizational, and security viewpoints.

The members of the Joint Mission pursued their observation work proactively. They deployed efforts to help the CEP and its election officials identify problems, address shortcomings and resolve disputes. This approach also involved close cooperation with all stakeholders participating in the elections.

The mission's efforts to strengthen training for election officials and to foster a sense of civic service to a broader community represented a powerful tool for reducing the number of irregularities and did much to enhance the electoral process.

The work of the Vote Tabulation Center was critical for detecting and filtering out irregular results. This was made possible by the improvement to its procedures and the strengthening of its verification capacity. However, there is still room for improvement, especially through more effective training for staff of the Legal Control Unit. The problems encountered during the contestation phase of the second round underscore the need to forge stronger links between the verification work of the CTV and the decisions taken by the electoral tribunals, consistent with the pertinent articles of the electoral law.

A fundamental step forward was taken with the strengthening of the link between the CTV's verification work and the deliberations and decisions of the electoral tribunals for determining the final results of the elections. This will result in making the Haitian electoral process of the future more robust, transparent, and equitable, and thereby enhancing its credibility and legitimacy.

The OAS/CARICOM JEOM wishes to express its gratitude to those member states and permanent observers of the OAS whose financial support made it possible for the mission to maintain its presence in Haiti over a period of 10 months covering the first and second rounds of the elections: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Suriname, and the European Union.

The OAS/CARICOM JEOM also wishes to thank all those national and international players involved from near or far in the elections. Without their collaboration, the JEOM's work would not have been possible.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The mission presents the following suggestions to the CEP with a view to remedying the weaknesses identified during observation of the electoral process that led to the holding of the first and second rounds of the presidential and legislative elections in Haiti on November 28, 2010 and March 20, 2011, respectively.

5.1. Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)

On the basis of its observation work, the mission considers it essential to constitute a permanent electoral body that will not only enhance the accountability of the magistrates but will also institutionalize good practices among the CEP operating agents. This is crucial in order to preserve the institutional memory, to take advantage of election officials' experience, and to reinforce the political accountability of the magistrates.

The mission urges the new Government of Haiti to take all the steps necessary to give effect to the constitutional provisions for appointing a Permanent Electoral Council.

5.2. Legal framework

The mission considers that the electoral law should be revised in order to fill the existing gaps, simplify certain mechanisms, clarify the responsibilities of the bodies that make up the electoral institution, and specify the scope of that law's provisions in order to limit ambiguities.

5.2.1. Election officials

It is essential to have effective mechanisms of sanctions against any electoral authority that seeks in any way to manipulate the list of election officials.

The mission recommends establishing a clearly defined role for political party representatives and the conditions for granting them access to the polling stations on election day, in order to avoid controversies.

The mission considers that the appointment of poll workers by the political parties, as stipulated in the electoral law, was prejudicial to the proper conduct of voting. It suggests that the mechanism for recruiting members of the polling stations should be changed in order to make the process more transparent.

5.2.2. Administrative provisions

On the administrative front, the JEOM considers that the responsibilities and the role of the electoral commissioners, as well as those of the senior management and the resulting executive structure, should be more clearly defined by the law in order to avoid any ambiguity.

The current provisions of the law are not sufficiently clear as to the role and responsibility of the Departmental Election Tribunals (TED) and the Communal Election Tribunals (TEC). The

mission considers that a better definition of the tasks of the different levels of the electoral institution could contribute to better control of both bodies and greater efficiency in the electoral machinery.

The same logic applies to the tribunals responsible for hearing electoral challenges at the departmental (TDIE) and national (TNIE) levels: their powers and responsibilities need to be clearly defined in order to make the procedure more efficient.

5.2.3. Voters list

After consulting stakeholders involved in compiling the voters list, the mission recommends strongly that the deadline for registration of voters should be legally established at six months prior to election day, in order to give the National Identification Office (ONI) sufficient time to process the data on new registrants and transmit them to the CEP so that it can respect the time limits imposed by the electoral law. At the same time, the ONI would benefit from more time for printing and distributing the TIN throughout the country.

5.2.4. Vote Tabulation Center (CTV)

The electoral law should redefine the role of the CTV to include the verification of tally sheets as well as pre-established criteria for determining their validity.

5.2.5. Electoral challenges

The electoral law should clearly stipulate that in considering whether to include or exclude tally sheets the TNIE (in the absence of a specific commission for this purpose) must first consult the CTV, which will verify the documentation in question and prepare a report for the tribunal.

5.3. Political parties

- The mission urges the Haitian authorities to adopt the Political Parties Law as quickly as possible, in order to provide a legal framework for political groups, to regulate the establishment of political parties, and to foster transparency in their financing. The mission recommends that the financing of political parties during and outside the electoral period should be made public in order to enhance transparency.
- The mission urges the electoral authorities to work with the political parties outside the electoral period to strengthen the links between political players and the electoral authorities and to enhance stakeholders' understanding of the legal framework governing elections and the procedure to be followed in each phase of the process. Regular meetings could be held between political party representatives and the electoral authorities with a view to institutionalizing channels of communication and agreeing on uniform criteria for the recruitment of party scrutineers and polling station staff.
- The mission calls on the CEP to continue holding information sessions with political parties during the election period.

5.4. Electoral organization

5.4.1. Electoral administration

- Strengthen communication between the OEC, the OED and the CEP in order to ensure proper coordination of their activities on election day.
- Strengthen communication among the various directorates of the CEP to achieve better coordination of electoral operations.
- Adopt procedural manuals for all phases of the elections process, clearly spelling out all the responsibilities of each section.
- Computerize the election day emergency center to make it more effective and to speed the handling of problems detected.

5.4.2. Electoral personnel

- Greater attention must be paid to the training of election officials at all levels. Training should be provided at various times with a view to ensuring that agents will understand and remember the information communicated. The mission also considers it necessary to do everything possible to avoid last-minute training.
- As well, the recruitment of election officials should be done in all transparency and should be based on experience and merit. To this end, the reasons for rejecting or accepting candidates as election officials, whether appointed by the CEP or by the political parties, should be published together with the lists of candidates accepted and candidates rejected.
- The performance of all election officials involved in previous elections should be assessed on the basis of objective and predetermined criteria. Agents who have not met the assessment criteria should be replaced through transparent recruitment based on professional competence.
- Training should be mandatory for all agents. They should sign an attendance sheet at the beginning and end of training.
- Election officials (supervisors, polling station workers, ASE, facilitators) found guilty of irregularities should be punished and banned from recruitment in subsequent elections.
- Following the training, manuals should be provided to agents for the use of polling station workers, along with the other materials used on election day, to help them visualize the various stages of the voting process.
- The mission invites the electoral authorities to maintain and strengthen the role of the facilitators.

- Training should emphasize the following aspects:
 - Opening the polling stations on time;
 - Rigorous verification of the TIN and registration in the LEP;
 - Exhaustive investigation of the name of voters in the LEP in order to avoid the exclusion of voters.
 - Methodical use of indelible ink.
 - Detailed treatment of the tally sheets, the release form, and the LEP.
 - Evaluation of election officials at the end of training to verify the level of knowledge acquired.
 - The importance of agents' responsibilities and the civic duty they have on election day.
- Respect the criteria of professionalism and experience in selecting supervisors, who must provide training to election officials, coordinate stakeholders, and arbitrate disputes that may arise on election day.
- Ensure the visibility of all election officials.

5.4.3. Scrutineers

- Ensure timely provision of accreditation for scrutineers and make election officials aware of the importance of valid credentials.
- Include a photograph in the accreditations.
- Establish a time limit for submitting the lists of scrutineers.
- Establish clear procedures for selection, numbers admitted, and rotation of party representatives at each polling station.

5.4.4. Vote Tabulation Center (CTV)

- Enhance the training of lawyers of the Legal Control Unit (UCL).
- Enhance quality control in the UCL.
- Prepare random samples of tally sheets to avoid having a single lawyer examine all the sheets from the same district.
- Consider uniting all the tally sheets from the same polling station to allow for more in-depth verification in light of the LEP and other documents.
- Publish the national and local results, preliminary and official, for the presidential, legislative, municipal, and local elections, by candidate and by party, so that voters will better understand the elections (preeminence of one party throughout the country) and to give

political parties the key elements of electoral geography that will allow them to refine their strategy.

5.5. Voters list

- Improve the procedure for transferring information between the ONI and the CEP with the help of a data transmission protocol that will define the responsibilities, tasks, and calendar for the pre-electoral period.
- Conduct prior quality control, comparing databases of the two institutions.
- Define in advance mechanisms for updating the voters list.
- Post the voters list (LECV) in a prominent place in the voting center at least two weeks in advance of election day to allow voters to verify that their name is registered.
- Ensure that the voters list is published in such a way that voters can readily identify their polling station.
- Standardize the format of compound names on the voters lists to avoid any confusion.
- Avoid the scattering of family members living at the same address among various voting centers.

5.6. Voter education and information

- Prolong and intensify the voter awareness campaign, with emphasis on innovative and effective media for reaching the maximum number of citizens.
- Offer voters at least one facilitator in each polling station to show them which station they have been assigned. The facilitators should be trained at the same time as the polling station workers. They should have a copy of the LECV and the LEC for the commune in which they are located. They should have privileged access to the call center on election day in order to provide guidance to voters.

5.7. Election materials

- Ballots should be numbered and contained in booklets with a numbered stub.
- Election materials should be delivered in advance and under the supervision of OED and OEC personnel.
- Instructions for use of election kits should be written in Creole.
- Change the format of the voting booth in order to guarantee secrecy of the vote.
- Ensure that ballots delivered correspond to the appropriate electoral district.

- Ensure that national and international observers as well as scrutineers and the media receive timely accreditation.

5.8. Security

- Strengthen coordination between the ASE and the PNH to guarantee security at voting stations and centers.
- Maintain a constant and effective PNH presence in the vicinity of all voting stations.
- Define clearly the role and responsibilities of personnel involved in security within and outside the polling stations.

5.9. Media

- Inform and explain to the media the conditions for access to the voting stations and centers on election day.

CHAPTER VI: FINANCIAL REPORT



Organización de los Estados Americanos
Organização dos Estados Americanos
Organisation des États Américains
Organization of American States

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Department of Financial and Administrative Management Services
Financial Reporting and Administrative Coordination Section

PRELIMINARY AND UNAUDITED

AREA Chapter 6 - Secretariat for Political Affairs
SUBPROGRAM The Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation (628)
PROJECT Electoral Observation Mission to Haiti 2010 - 2011
MANAGER B. Santoscoy OFFICER N. Monroy

DONOR Various

PROJECT PERIOD 21-Jul-10 TO 6-Apr-12

GS/OAS REF. [Project: SPA-DECO/071]

REPORT STATUS INTERIM ID # 708
REPORTING PERIOD 21-Jul-10 TO 31-Mar-12
PREPARED BY SE ON 31-Mar-12
REVIEWER *[Signature]* A. Escobar
CERTIFIED BY *[Signature]* D. Yriarren
Financial Reporting Manager

I. STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS

	Note	(in USD)
Add: receipts		
Contribution	8	4,336,205
Transfers in		-
Interest		966
Other receipts		-
Total receipts		4,337,171
Less: payments		
Transfers out		-
Return to donor		-
Expenditures	8	4,311,313
Other payments		-
Total payments		4,311,313
Increase/(decrease) in cash		25,858
Cash at beginning of period		-
Add: increase/(decrease) in cash		25,858
Cash at end of period		25,858

II. STATEMENT OF FUND BALANCE

	Note	(in USD)
Cash at end of period		25,858
Less: unliquidated obligations	5	49,490
Fund balance at end of period		(23,632)

III. STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS

	Note	(in USD)
Actual receipts		
Argentina		20,000
Brazil		350,000
Canada		115,053
Chile		45,000
China		25,000
European Union	9	655,739
Finland		288,099
France		546,827
GS/OAS Regular Fund	8	97,341
Luxemburg		4,847
Norway		335,893
Panama		10,000
Peru		10,000
Portugal		5,000
Slovenia		9,704
Spain		343,298
Suriname		1,000
Switzerland		19,784
United States (Letter of credit)	10	1,453,619
Subtotal actual receipts	3	4,336,205
Add: projected receipts		
European Union	9	55,861
United States (Letter of credit)	10	46,381
Subtotal projected receipts		102,242
Total contribution as per agreement	11, 12	4,438,447

The accompanying notes form part of the financial statements



Organización de los Estados Americanos
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FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

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PRELIMINARY AND UNAUDITED

IV. STATEMENT OF EXPENDITURES AND UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS BY BUDGETARY ITEM				
Activities	Note	(in USD)		
		A Expenditures	B Obligations	C = A + B Total
Preliminary mission		34,362	-	34,362
Deployment of the mission (international contracts)		1,452,214	-	1,452,214
OAS headquarters contracts		276,367	-	276,367
International travel		657,768	-	657,768
Local contracts		80,582	-	80,582
Local travel		964,262	-	964,262
Operating costs		266,491	-	266,491
Report, publication and distribution		13,497	-	13,497
Cost contingency		87,924	-	87,924
Evaluation cost		12,500	12,500	25,000
Audit cost		-	25,000	25,000
Publication cost (final report)		-	11,990	11,990
Total direct costs		3,845,968	49,490	3,895,458
Indirect cost recovery	6	465,345	-	465,345
Grand total project costs	8	4,311,313	49,490	4,360,803

The accompanying notes form part of the financial statements



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NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Department of Financial and Administrative Management Services
Financial Reporting and Administrative Coordination Section

- 1 **Basis of preparation.** The financial statements have been prepared under the cash basis of accounting and in accordance with GS/OAS financial rules and regulations. The accounting policies have been applied consistently throughout the period. A summary of GS/OAS financial rules and regulations may be found at:
http://www.oas.org/legal/english/admmem/OAS_Financial_Handbook_for_Specific_Fund_Agreements_Feb_2008_Rev_3.doc
- 2 **Audit of accounts.** The OAS Board of External Auditors, consisting of three Members elected by the General Assembly, is entrusted with auditing all accounts, funds, and operations of the Organization as a whole on an annual basis with the assistance of an external auditing firm. The annual external audit is intended to provide a reasonable level of assurance that the financial statements are fairly stated in all material respects. The auditing firm's opinion on the financial statements is based on auditing procedures, which include a review of internal controls and selected tests of transactions and records. The audit of all Specific Funds, including the accounts presented in this financial statement, is performed within this general context. In this regard, this project has not been subject to a specific audit but its transactions and records may or may have not been selected for tests by the external auditing firm. The latest GS/OAS annual audit of accounts may be found at:
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Digital_Audit_Book_2010_English.pdf
- 3 **Reporting currency.** The functional currency of the GS/OAS is the United States dollar (USD). All financial transactions including financial statements are denominated in USD. If the contribution is made in a currency other than USD, it is converted to USD at the exchange rate of the day of the receipt of funds.
- 4 **Award and reporting periods.** Award period refers to the timeframe when expenditures and unliquidated obligations can be incurred as per donor agreement restrictions, if any. Reporting period refers to the timeframe up to when unliquidated obligations are paid and/or when final adjustments are posted. The reporting period may extend beyond the award period as these circumstances arise.
- 5 **Unliquidated Obligations.** Unliquidated obligations are amounts related to commitments to disburse monies for the procurement of goods or services in future periods. Such amounts represent liabilities to third parties at the end of the respective periods and are anticipated to be expanded in subsequent periods in the completion of a particular program or activity. This amount may be lower in subsequent periods as deobligations occur.
- 6 **Indirect Cost Recovery (ICR).** Pursuant to OAS General Standards approved by its Member States and in accordance to Executive Order 07-01, issued by the OAS Secretary General on May 29, 2007, the ICR rate for contributions is established at a minimum of 11% (Member States) or at a minimum of 12% (other donors) of the total contribution amount. Agreements signed prior to this policy are grandfathered, thus each percentage of ICR may differ. ICR partially defrays costs incurred in the administration of projects including, among others, the following products and services: planning, monitoring, review and evaluation of projects; resource mobilization services; financial management framework (e.g., financial manuals, handbooks, guidelines, and training); staff recruitment; overall administrative functions of the General Secretariat; legal and financial review of agreements; banking operations (e.g., receipt of funds, check emission, bank reconciliations); financial reporting; external audit coordination and audits; setup and management of accounts; procurement of goods and services; recording and processing of transactions; facilities and utilities; and general use office equipment and supplies (e.g., networks), etc. Specific ICR guidelines and procedures may be found at:
http://www.oas.org/legal/english/admmem/ADMHEM116_ICR_Indirect_Cost_Recovery_GP.doc
- 7 **Rounding.** Totals may differ from the sum of individual figures shown due to rounding.
- 8 Includes a total amount of USD 97,341 financed by the GS/OAS Regular Fund.
- 9 The total amount agreed from this agreement is EUR 500,000 equivalent to USD 711,600 at exchange rate 1 EUR = 1.4232 USD.
- 10 The total amount to be drawn from this letter of credit is USD 1,500,000.
- 11 Does not include contributions from NORDEM - Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo (USD18,584 to cover the cost of five Norwegians Observers). As per donor's authorization funds have been allocated to the Fund of the Electoral Observation Mission.
- 12 On March 7, 2011, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the OAS authorized a contribution through CIDA's Multilateral Election Observation Program of up to an additional CAD 250,000 to support the deployment of 30 Canadian observers via CANADEM. A total of USD 44,221 was received from CANADEM and authorized to be deposited in the OAS Electoral Observation Missions Fund to reimburse the costs of these observers' participation in the Second Round Electoral Observation Mission to Haiti.

ANNEXES

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ANNEX B. LETTER OF RESPONSE FROM THE SG/OAS

ANNEX C. AGREEMENT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

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ANNEX E. AGREEMENT BETWEEN CARICOM AND SG/OAS

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ANNEX H. FINAL REPORT OF THE OAS VERIFICATION EXPERTS MISSION

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ANNEX J. LIST OF OBSERVERS FOR THE FIRST ROUND

ANNEX K. LIST OF OBSERVERS FOR THE SECOND ROUND

ANNEX L. PRESS RELEASES OF OAS/CARICOM JEOM