



**EUROPEAN UNION
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
TO NICARAGUA**

**PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
4 NOVEMBER 2001**

FINAL REPORT

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ANNEX 1.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVERS FORMS

EU EOM DEPLOYMENT

This report was produced by the EU Election Observation Mission and presents the EUEOM's findings on the Presidential and Parliamentary election in Nicaragua. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the Commission's. The European Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor does it accept responsibility for any use made thereof.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. An EU Election Observer Mission (EOM) was established in Nicaragua on 25 September, led by Jannis Sakellariou (Germany) Member of the European Parliament (Chief Observer). The Core Team of the EU EOM deployed in Managua consisted of Rafael López Pintor (Spain), Deputy Chief Observer, Lars Tollemark (Sweden), LTO Coordinator, Teivo Teivainen (Finland), Electoral Expert, Thomas Goransson (Sweden), Logistic Expert, and Helene Roux (France), Media Monitor. On Election Day the Mission was able to deploy 140 observers under the auspices of the EU.

2. The national elections of November 4 in Nicaragua can be considered a success in the sense that they took place timely and peacefully, and that candidates without major complaints accepted the results. But the picture seems less convincing from the broader perspective of the consolidation of democracy and the role of international assistance in democracy building.

3. With regard to the political environment the EOM observed, in the pre-election phase incidents of polarization, external interference, and destabilization by the President of the Republic, which will be described below in more detail. Concerning this last point, the post election period was no better than the pre-election phase, with President Alemán attempting to pass a bill of law against freedom of the press, and threatening again to declare a state of emergency – which would have resulted in a constitutional crisis.

4. Concerning administrative issues, although the election was the most expensive in Nicaraguan history and probably in Latin America – as has been documented elsewhere - systematic delays in the preparation of the election, and a number of other technical shortcomings occurred.

5. A less than serene campaign was evident in the coverage of media, which in Nicaragua is very ideological and partisan. Little independence or neutrality was therefore to be expected. The campaign of the PLC was essentially structured as *against* or anti-Sandinista, in addition to being more visible and intense than the campaign of the FSLN. The FSLN and Convergencia developed a less confrontational campaigning style.

6. With voter turnout over 80%, the *Partido Liberal Constitucional* (PLC) emerged victorious from polls with Enrique Bolaños elected as President, and an absolute majority in the National Assembly. Contrary to what opinion polls had predicted as a very tight race, the distribution of the presidential ballot was: PLC Bolaños 56.3%, the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) Ortega 42.3%, and PC Saborío 1.4% of the valid votes-cast. The results for the 90-seat National Assembly are: – 52 seats to the PLC, 37 to the FSLN, and the PC with only one seat in the electoral district of Managua. Final official results were proclaimed on November 21.

7. All in all, claims and complaints did not constitute such a problem as had been expected by many participants and observers of the elections. There were, however, various

irregularities, some of which had considerable effects on the quality of the electoral process.

I. MISSION BACKGROUND

Following the Nicaraguan Government's invitation of 27 April 2001 to the EU to observe the 4 November 2001 general elections, the European Commission decided to send an Exploratory Mission (ExM) with a mandate to provide further factual elements to assist with the decision whether and how the EU should support the election process in Nicaragua. The Exploratory Mission took place from June 24 to July 7 2001. On the basis of the ExM findings, the EU concluded that an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Nicaragua was advisable, feasible and useful.

Consequently, an EU EOM was established on 25 September, led by Jannis Sakellariou (Germany) Member of the European Parliament (Chief Observer). The Core Team of the EU EOM deployed in Managua consisted of Rafael López Pintor (Spain), Deputy Chief Observer, Lars Tollemark (Sweden), Long Term Observer (LTO) Coordinator, Teivo Teivainen (Finland), Electoral Expert, Thomas Goransson (Sweden), Logistic Expert, and Helene Roux (France), Media Monitor. By October 5 2001, eight LTOs had arrived in Nicaragua and were deployed in regional office in Managua, Granada, León, Matagalpa, Juigalpa, Ocotol, Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields. Finally, on October 31 2001, 43 Short Term Observer (STO) arrived in Nicaragua. Jointly with 65 locally recruited STOs from EU embassies and NGOs the Mission was able to deploy a total of 108 STOs on Election Day. This, jointly with Core Team members, LTO, ambassadors and a delegation for the European Parliament headed by MEP José Manuel García Margallo (Spain) meant 140 observers were deployed in the field on Election Day under the auspices of the EU.

Special recognition is due to the Head of the EU Delegation in Managua, Mr. Giorgio Mamberto, and his staff as well as to the Ambassador of Spain, Mr. Ignacio Matellanes, as the EU President pro-tempore for Belgium for their continuing support for the establishment of the Mission and during the Mission operations. The EU EOM is also grateful for the support and cooperation received from all EU-Ambassadors or Chargés d'Affaires in Managua.

II. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE ELECTION

The national elections of November 4 in Nicaragua can be considered a success in that they took place in a timely and peaceful manner, and that candidates without major complaints accepted the results. But the picture seems less convincing from the broader perspective of consolidation of democracy and the role of international assistance in democracy building.

Although no public disorder occurred on Election Day, and the election results were generally accepted, a tense political atmosphere, only partly nurtured by the shortcomings of the electoral administration, both preceded and followed the voting on November 4. For the fourth time since 1984 in Nicaragua, national elections have proven rather traumatic

events both technically and politically. After an electoral experience of more than fifteen years, the electoral system still needs to improve its contribution to the institutionalization of democratic government and the rule of law.

With regard to the political environment in the pre-election phase, incidents of polarization, external interference, and destabilization by the President of the Republic will be described below in more detail. Concerning this last point, the post-election period was no better than the pre-election phase, with President Alemán attempting to pass a bill of law against freedom of the press, and threatening again to declare a state of emergency –which would result in a constitutional crisis– on the grounds that his life, that of the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) Chairman and that of newly-elected President Bolaños would be in danger. These initiatives not only tainted the success achieved by Mr Aleman's own party, but most significantly undermined two of the most positive elements of the Nicaraguan political environment, freedom of expression and public security.

Concerning the administrative issues, although the election was the most expensive in Nicaraguan history and probably in Latin America – as has been documented elsewhere - systematic delays in the preparation of the election, and a number of other technical shortcomings occurred. These include the permanent damage to individual identity cards following a decision to have cards punched at the polling stations as a control mechanism against double voting, in addition to indelible ink and other formal checks.

The pre-electoral environment in Nicaragua was characterised by a highly polarized contest between the PLC and the FSLN, due to tensions within parties and the significant involvement of outside actors in the public debate. Presidential candidate Enrique Bolaños had to confront his ideological adversaries the FSLN and Daniel Ortega, as well as the manoeuvring by President Arnoldo Alemán within his own party. Other actors not directly involved in the electoral contest, such as the US Government, the Catholic Hierarchy as well as the President of the Republic de facto campaigned in opposition to FSLN Ortega. All this took place under the eyes of the electoral administration of the CSE, which often failed to take authoritative decisions and lacked technical competence, throughout the whole process from the preparation of electoral materials to the final tabulation of results.

Polarization between candidates escalated up to Election Day. The main parties, which managed to field strong candidates, PLC and FSLN, were in opposite not so much over their programs which were quite similar, but in terms of the personality of the presidential candidates who were frequently presented as life and death alternatives. Aggressive remarks about the candidates were prevalent, particularly from the PLC whose very aggressive campaign often violated the Code of Electoral Ethics. In no instance did the CSE intervene or criticise such misconduct. One example was that of a daily TV program by two candidates for the Asamblea Nacional (subsequently elected). They were prosecuted in court for the content of their programme, but the CSE did not intervene.

Toward the end of the campaign and even on election day the “rumour mill” escalated. Various catastrophic scenarios were presented, some of which risked self-fulfilment simply through repetition. However, Nicaraguans can congratulate themselves that these rumours

were not borne out, and that free, transparent and democratic elections were celebrated in spite of the inactivity of the CSE and the behaviour of President Alemán.

The three main political parties have to be commended as, on the eve of polling day, they publicly agreed to abstain from complaints against each other, both on election day and at the counting of the vote.

The media also reported remarks by senior officials of the US Government both in Washington and Managua which were critical of the FSLN candidate, harking back to the Sandinista regime and confiscation of property, which took place at that time, and announcing that they would reconsider co-operation programmes with Nicaragua if the FSLN candidate was elected. Pressure intensified after September 11 when US officials in Managua were reported to have made remarks associating Daniel Ortega directly with terrorism and with Arab leaders such as Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. Media coverage of such statements may have had an impact on the election campaign.

Further details of the media coverage of the main candidates can be found in section III.

A week before the elections, President Alemán indicated in political and diplomatic circles, as well as in public statements, that it might become necessary to declare a state of emergency. These remarks related to the possibility that no clear winner would emerge, and that either candidate could declare himself President. The President indicated that he feared that in such a scenario, public disorder might explode and that the Police would not have the means to contain it, creating the need for the Army to step in and for the President to declare a state of emergency on the basis of Article 185 of the Constitution, provoking a constitutional crisis in which the standing National Assembly would elect an interim President.

The two main presidential candidates distanced themselves from President Aleman's remarks, and the Army Commander in Chief General Carrión made clear to the President that the Army could only accept a declaration of emergency in the limited cases foreseen by the Constitution. Nonetheless, Alemán continued to refer to a possible state of emergency on both TV and Radio, even on the very morning of Election Day.

After the elections, Alemán attempted to present a bill of law against freedom of the press through one of the PLC deputies. It was only after a generalized opposition to the Alemán initiative from the other parties, the media, Catholic Church, business associations and trade unions that a decision was made at the national directorate of the PLC to stop the bill being tabled in Parliament. Moreover, new attempts to declare a state of emergency were made by Alemán later in the week after the election, emerging in the written press on 19 November 2001. Both initiatives by the Chief Executive should be considered against the background of Nicaragua's positive achievements, such as freedom of expression and personal security against ordinary criminality. In the latter regard, Nicaragua is the safest country in Central America.

In spite of a Pastoral Letter in August where a position of political neutrality was taken, the role of the Catholic hierarchy during the campaign should be considered less than neutral. A number of high-ranking priests openly campaigned against the FSLN and Ortega in religious ceremonies, and Cardinal Obando was very visible during the campaign.

On 1 November 2001, the first of a three-day period of campaign silence, a public mass was celebrated in front of the new cathedral of Managua. The entire “political class” attended including candidate Ortega and his wife as well as President Alemán. In his sermon, strongly focusing on peace, justice and the family, Cardinal Obando clearly expressed that only a Catholic candidate should be the right choice, therefore implicitly rejecting Ortega by pointing out that the family life of candidates should be the decisive criterion on which to base a voting decision. Visibility of the Cardinal remained high up to Election Day. On the night of November 3, he was shown on TV in blessing the premises of the National Counting Center.

Regarding the presence of observer missions, the number of both international and domestic observers for these elections was curiously larger than in 1996 and 1990. 9,500 domestic observers were accredited by CSE, compared to 4,763 in 1996. There were 1,230 international observers in 1996, 2,578 in 1990 (data from the CSE published by *La Prensa*, November 3) and 3,000 in 2001. On the international side, only two of the observer missions came from intergovernmental organizations, OAS and EU. The others came from NGOs, either related to political parties in their countries of origin (i.e. American NDI, IRI, Carter Center, groups of party activists from neighbouring Central American countries), or related to development assistance agencies (i.e. CONFOCOS and Comissió Popular Catalana both from Spain). Most of these observers were barely visible both before and after the polling day. Most of them did not issue any election assessment declaration or, if they did, the media did not voice it.

Some of these groups failed to maintain a neutral position and de facto supported one or the other contestants. Their observation methodology was also dubious. The main organisations active in election observation should endeavour to establish, in a coordinated manner, best practices in election observation with the aim of reducing the scope for unprofessional and potentially damaging observation initiatives.

The domestic monitoring organisation, Ética y Transparencia delivered its quick count at 18:00 on 6 November. The other main domestic monitor IPADE made its post-election declaration on the same evening.

The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) can be characterized by its lack of authority, efficacy and efficiency, especially at the national level. Almost no contravention of the Code of Electoral Ethics was identified or addressed by the CSE. On the technical side, in spite of conducting five different data transmission rehearsals, the CSE was only able to test the computer program for data processing on the eve of November. They were still training new operators for the computer operation on the very night of the elections by 23:00. It came as no surprise that the ballot counting was completed only by November 14. These technical failings and inefficiency on the part of the CSE were in spite of the fact that this

election turned out to be the costliest ever in Nicaragua with an estimated budget of USD 45 million, and an average cost per registered voter of around USD 15, according to data provided by the CSE.

While the voting process and the electronic data transmission presented relatively few serious problems during the electoral night, the data processing system of the National Counting Center broke down the day after the elections. Apparently the main technical reason for the problems was a mistake in the allocation of different security codes for different kinds of elections in the tally sheets. Once the reason was discovered the problem might have been relatively easy to resolve, but the mutual distrust of the main parties added to the delay. After the problem was finally resolved, the counting process advanced rapidly.

Fortunately, at the local level, those involved in running the election performed effectively, as did the Police and the Armed Forces who guaranteed security at the polls and in the country. The EU EOM statement recognised the important role they played.

III. THE MEDIA

On the basis of the evidence seen in the context of this electoral campaign, the media in Nicaragua is not truly independent. Historically, the main media groups have been clearly associated with political parties (liberals, conservatives, sandinistas) – and specific economic interests .

Part of the traditional business class (conservatives as well as traditional liberals) consider President Aleman and his allies as « blow-ins » and economic rivals. The two main media outlets – TV Canal 2 and La Prensa, which are historically linked with respectively the liberals and conservatives, have consequently opposed President Aleman and given their support to the PLC's candidate, Mr Bolaños – a businessman from a well known conservative family.

This helps to explain why in an election dominated by economics, Mr Bolanos has been presented as the candidate of the private enterprise association – COSEP – and clearly differentiated if not disassociated, from the outgoing president, who belongs to the same party.

Similar treatment, as for President Aleman, was vetted out to the sandinistas by the government and the liberals .

The biased media campaign in favour of Mr Bolanos was seen in:

- The (political) pro PLC of the pro government media (La Noticia, Trinchera de la Noticia, Canal 6 and Radio Corporación)
- The (economic) pro Bolaños campaign of the private media (Canal 8)
- The (political and economic) anti sandinista campaign

To counteract these criticisms from the private business, the sandinistas stressed their good relations with foreign investors to try and reassure the electorate of their ability to manage the economy well. Indeed, it's hardly surprising that the economy was at the centre of the election campaign in a country in deep economic crisis where most of the workforce doesn't have a permanent job.

Public media : Canal 6 Case

Canal 6 is the only public TV channel in Nicaragua. Its budget is small and its output consists mainly of poor quality imported programmes. It can't afford the soap operas from South America which top the ratings in Nicaragua. The election laws oblige the public media to offer ½ hour paid slots to each of the parties in an election. But Canal 6 seemed to exclusively reflect the government's political line. Convergencia Nacional didn't even try to use it, whilst the conservatives complained that their request for a slot on the channel went unanswered.

Indeed, the President had a personal one hour program on Canal 6 every Monday entitled "The President talks to his People" in which political views and comments are only welcome if they praise the president's actions. The news program gave extensive coverage to the charity activities of the first lady and emphasised that she got most of her donations from mainly US based international organisations.

During the campaign, there were three current affairs-discussion programs which were interesting to look at: two out of three are chaired by parliamentary candidates (Luis Mora on the evening debate and Fernando Avellán and Enrique Quiñonez on the morning « *Fuego cruzado* »); the third program « *Dardos al Centro* » led by Carlos Guadamuz. Mr. Guadamuz was a member of the FSLN and former candidate for Mayor of Managua for the FSLN in 1996. After a dispute with FSLN he changed his political convictions and went to the PLC. His program is systematically centered on controversial subjects and he deals with them in a biased way.

Several complaints against Canal 6 were introduced between August and October. The daily newspaper El Nuevo Diario published at least 6 articles on the subject. These dealt with an audit requested to find out whether PLC had benefited from free access to the paid slots spaces for its political propaganda. The electoral law specified that public channels cannot be used by parties outside the preestablished ½ hour spaces. To that effect, Canal 6's management and the director of communication for the President's office, Mrs Marth McCoy (a parliamentary candidate for the PLC) were summoned to the CSE. In the end however it was concluded that they were not responsible for the contents of the programs put out by private individuals on Canal 6.

« En fuego cruzado » Program

A complaint has also been introduced in the CSE against the program « En fuego cruzado » for violation of electoral ethics but this has not yet been answered.

In this programme the two directors, Enrique Quiñonez and Fernando Avellán, candidates to the parliament, appear against a background of crossed machine guns, with the subtitle: « Without fear of the truth ».

Both speakers, were former members of the Somoza « Guardia Nacional ». The program frequently shows pictures of them wearing the “Guardia” uniform along with members of the « Resistencia Nicaraguense » (the contra) which both joined in 79 after the takeover by the FSLN.

Enrique Quiñonez is a founding member of the « Partido de la Resistencia Nicaraguense » (PRN) which was allied to the PLC in the present elections.

Fernando Avellán becomes famous later when as an official of the government of Alemán he leads 30 men in an exchange of fire in the pharmaceutical plant SOLKA which used to be owned by the Solorzano together with the Somoza families who are now reclaiming it. Several people were reported injured but the matter was swiftly hushed up with no charges ever brought against Fernando Avellán. Several years later his name appears on a list of Judges to be appointed to a Tribunal on Property Rights, a conciliation body created to resolve the problem caused by the FSLN policy of confiscation of private property.

In June 2001 Salvador Talavera (contra-alias El Chacalin) takes over a PLC building to protest against his omission from the list of parliamentary candidates. Fernando Avellán and Enrique Quiñonez dislodge the intruder. Mr Talavera introduced a complaint for death threat and putting a person in danger. On 22 October Judge Juana Mendez ordered that Avellán and Quiñonez be put in prison. The same day both appear in the program announcing that they will give themselves up. The day after Avellán appears on the program with Quiñonez’s wife. The day after Quiñonez’s wife appears with Avellán’s companion, Rhina Cardenal. At the same time Judge Mendez declares herself incompetent in the matter and says that she has been put under pressure. Both accused are released and continue their program.

The program is live between 6 and 7 a.m. and a repeat between 4 and 5 p.m. Both speakers make comments about the political news and more specifically denigrate their political opponents, the sandinistas.

Among the insults, these are two examples:

Against Daniel Ortega : terrorist, thief, « moclin » (paedophile)

Against Walmaro Gutierrez (deputy at the Parliament) « piri tutti fruti » derived from « piricuacos » (name given by the contras to the new comers to the Sandinista Army) and from « tutti fruti » (used to describe a feminine person and by and large a homosexual).

In between the conversation and the viewers calls, videos are projected showing particularly crude images from the 1980’s war. The main objective for showing those images was to appeal to the memory of the people and instil the fear of a come back to war and the military service should the FSLN win the elections to which an off voice making a constant reference. On the other hand the program is littered with images (paid by Camino Cristiano – partisan of the PLC) showing Daniel Ortega with Saddam Hussein, Muammar

Khadaffi and Fidel Castro. The image of Osama bin Laden (alone) appears also on a pink screen with flowers imitating *Convergencia Nacional*'s layout. At the end one can read « if they could vote here, they would vote for Daniel ».

The most shocking images presented joyfully by the speakers are those called « the holocaust », where images from the nazi camps are mixed with images from the 1980's war in Nicaragua. The text beside these images start with the « holocaust of Jewish » followed by the « holocaust of Daniel Ortega » and ends by « it is the same as in the past ».

One may be amazed by the CSE's reaction if one remembers that during the electoral campaign for Mayor of Managua the CSE ordered that an ad be forbidden. In that ad Mr Solorzano (candidate for the Conservative party then and now head of the PLC electoral campaign) referring to the changes on the geographical limits of Managua presented a black line dividing on one side red spots (PLC) and black and red (FLSN) - making reference to the Pact – and on the other side a nice clean green color of the Conservative party.

In conclusion, the media electoral campaign was all but serene. Without speaking about those media openly partisan to one particular party, the media in general, because of their links to some economic or political sectors, have been used as a means of pure political propaganda. In general, the PLC campaign was more significant and enjoyed more visibility with an « antisandinista » tendency. From a general point of view the *Convergencia Nacional* campaign and its contents was non-confrontational (with few exceptions due to individual responsibilities)

The negative campaign in the media violated the basic ethical rules through insults and conscience manipulation (referring to the tragic events that still affect the collective memory). The public TV channel played an important role not only in the negative campaign but as well using government positions as partisan propaganda. Although the CSE had showed on other elections to have the power to stop inadequate messages, this time it failed to issue any rule against messages to be considered damaging for the dignity of the person portrayed.

IV. THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS

With the highest voter turnout in recent Nicaraguan electoral history, the PLC emerged victorious from the polls with Enrique Bolaños elected as President, and an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

One of the most surprising elements of the elections was the estimated turnout of around 90% of registered voters. The exact figure is difficult to measure because of deficient voter registers, but there is ample consensus that the turnout was higher than expected and also higher than in previous elections in the country.

The distribution of the presidential ballot was: PLC Bolaños 56.3%, FSLN Ortega 42.3%, and PC Saborío 1.4% of the valid votes. The first partial results were communicated in the early morning of November 5. They were based on a lower percentage of votes than originally planned, but the tendency as regards the presidential winner was already clear. The FSLN candidate Ortega accepted the victory of the PLC candidate Bolaños soon after the first partial results were announced. The progress of the counting has confirmed this result, and based on 99.8% of the votes, this implied that the PC would lose its legal status because it did not reach the 4% threshold established by the electoral law. The results were further corroborated by the partial results of the quick count by *Ética y Transparencia* for the presidential elections over a sample of 10% of the polling tables or *Juntas Receptoras de Votos* (JRV), according to which the PLC would get 55.9%, FSLN 42.6% and PC 1.4 %.

The results for a 90-seat National Assembly as proclaimed officially on 21 November 2001 are the following: 52 seats to the PLC, 37 to the FSLN, and 1 to the PC for the electoral district of Managua. These results come out of adding seats obtained at a national list and at the different departmental and regional districts. One must add two more *ex officio* seats: one for Arnoldo Alemán, as the outgoing president, and other for Daniel Ortega, as the second-runner to the presidency.

While the presidential race was considered by far the most important of the various elections of November 4, its early resolution soon brought the other elections into the focus of public debate. The parliamentary elections for the National Assembly were organized through the election of 20 representatives elected from a national electoral district and 70 representatives elected from 17 departmental or regional districts of different sizes. There was not as much tactical voting split between parties in different ballots as expected by some analysts before the elections. By far the most significant split vote was that which went for the PC in the parliamentary elections but for another, mostly PLC, candidate in the race for presidency. The results of the tactical PC vote cannot, however, be deemed a great success. While the party received over three times more votes in the parliamentary elections than for the presidency, the electoral system allowed it only one parliamentary seat.

In Nicaragua, the general method of transforming votes into seats to ensure proportional representation is relatively simple, conforms to international standards and leaves little room for speculation on its application. There are, however, some modifications to the general rule, especially as regards the electoral districts with only two seats. The wording of Article 147 of the electoral law is somewhat ambiguous in this respect. This ambiguity motivated high-ranking FSLN representatives, including Ortega, to claim that according to that Article, whatever the percentage of respective votes in the districts where two seats are allocated, they should be divided equally (1-1) between the two main parties. The FSLN-affiliated CSE magistrates have also defended this interpretation of the law, most probably due to party pressures rather than to serious juridical considerations. In fact, if such an interpretation were to prevail, parliamentary elections in five out of the seventeen electoral districts of the country would have been meaningless. This is not likely to happen, and the seat distribution will follow the standard interpretation.

On the other hand, the distribution of the 20 seats of the national electoral district presented few problems. With 53.2% of the vote, the PLC gets 11 seats, with 42,1%, the FSLN gets 9 seats, and with 4,7% the PC gets no seats. It has to be noted that at the moment of closing down the Mission office, the exact numbers were still being revised and the CSE had not made any announcements regarding the distribution of parliamentary seats.

Even if it seems clear that the PLC will dominate the National Assembly, its parliamentary group is not as unified as that of the FSLN. First of all, it is likely that four of its members come from the ranks of the Partido Camino Cristiano Nicaraguense (CCN) that along with the Partido Resistencia Nicaraguense (PRN) had made an electoral alliance with the PLC. It is possible that the CCN members will form their separate parliamentary group, though in practice they probably keep close to the PLC. Also, the possible rivalry between ex President Alemán, one of the strongest figures of the new parliament, and the new President Bolaños may also weaken the unity of the PLC.

The elections for PARLACEN, the Central American Parliament, received much less public attention than the presidential or national assembly elections. The 20 seats of PARLACEN allocated to Nicaragua were distributed among the candidates in a national electoral district. According to the preliminary results, the PLC secured 11 seats, while the FSLN took the remaining 9. The front-running PC candidate voiced some concern over the results at the beginning of the counting, but finally accepted the results.

Regarding the distribution of popular support to the main parties in the different departments and regions of the country, certain geographical patterns can be identified, though not as clearly as had been anticipated. In fact, the PLC got an absolute majority in most areas of the country; the exception being Estelí, León and Chinandega, all former Sandinista strongholds. Even if the latter two are also the departments with the highest number of voters outside of Managua, a slight FSLN majority there was far outweighed by the surprisingly large margin of the PLC victory in some other traditionally FSLN-leaning departments such as Managua and Matagalpa.

In the following table, the distribution of the presidential vote by departments (including the autonomous regions RAAS and RAAN) is presented in percentages of valid votes. The departments are listed according to the percentage of votes received by the winner. It is to be noted that the first four departments with highest relative PLC vote border each other in the Center and South-East of the country around Chontales, whereas the four departments where the FSLN fared best also form a geographical unity in the North-West of the country.

Table 1: Presidential vote in different geographical areas

District	PLC %	FSLN %	PC %
RAAS	76.6	22.3	1.1
Boaco	71.3	27.5	1.3
Chontales	69.2	28.4	2.4

Río San Juan	63.6	35.1	1.3
Jinotega	60.9	38.2	0.8
Matagalpa	59.6	39.5	0.9
Masaya	57.3	41.5	1.2
Rivas	56.6	42.0	1.4
Granada	55.2	41.7	3.1
RAAN	54.6	43.8	1.6
Nueva Segovia	54.0	45.4	0.5
Managua	53.7	44.4	1.8
Carazo	52.8	45.6	1.6
Madriz	52.2	47.2	0.6
Estelí	48.3	50.9	0.8
Chinandega	47.8	50.9	1.3
León	47.6	51.3	1.1

Compiled by EU EOM on the basis of CSE statistics

An explanation of the results of the elections should start with the fact that, once again in Nicaragua, the opinion polls did not accurately predict the election results. Based on opinion surveys, the prevailing opinion was that the election would be resolved by a very narrow margin, which, as in the previous elections in 1996 and 1990, proved wrong. Given that in all the national elections since 1990 proved false the opinion polls have tended to overestimate the FSLN votes, one can presume that the FSLN supporters are more likely to express their preferences to the pollsters than the supporters of other parties.

As in previous elections, the winner polled over 14 percentage points more than the second-placed, the candidate of FSLN. The main reason for the large difference was the unexpectedly high rate of voter turnout, with over 90% of the estimated eligible voters. It seems clear now that most voters who concealed their voting intention in the opinion surveys turned out in support of the PLC rather than the FSLN. The factors which triggered such a high voter turnout, and consequently the PLC victory, shall hopefully be the subject of specialized research. However, a working hypothesis, based on comparative electoral research, some main reasons can be advanced.

Firstly, political participation is a direct function of the degree of political interest of the electorate, and interest is frequently associated with political polarization and conflict. In this sense, the more an electoral campaign becomes polarized the more likely it is that citizens get mobilized to vote. In Nicaragua, the pre-electoral scenario intensified by the day. The electors not only received the stimuli of contending candidates in a highly confrontative game, but they were also influenced and put under undue pressure by top political actors who were not legitimately part of the electoral contest, like representatives of the US Government, the President of the Republic and the head of the Catholic Church.

In a standard analysis of voting behavior, all the aforementioned factors should be considered as affecting participation and the direction of the vote. Additionally, the fact that

the FSLN appeared for the third time at the polls with its traditional leadership as front candidates for the presidency and the legislature must have also significantly contributed to the FSLN poor results. Even though the unresolved charges against Ortega, accused of having sexually abused his stepdaughter, did not play an important role in the campaigning, the issue probably strengthened the doubts some voters had about his personal integrity.

V. IRREGULARITIES, CLAIMS AND COMPLAINTS

All in all, claims and complaints did not constitute such a problematic issue as had been expected by many participants and observers of the elections. There were, however, various irregularities, some of which had considerable effects on the quality of the electoral process. One problem was that the electoral authorities were not sufficiently committed to enforcing the electoral rules on some issues such as media behavior.

Before the elections, various kinds of irregularities were reported, but the authorities addressed few. The CSE, a constitutionally autonomous electoral authority, dismissed most of the cases. According to the electoral prosecutor Blanca Isabel Salgado, 70 complaints were filed in the Courts between August 18 and October 31 2001, the campaign period, before the courts of justice. Most of these were settled by mediation and conciliation between the representatives of the political parties involved. From those remaining only one case of destruction of campaign materials ended with a custodial sentence (*La Prensa*, November 3). Additionally, the court of Masaya is processing a homicide case, presumably linked to electoral hostilities that occurred during the final campaign day.

Apart from the claims and complaints directly related to campaigning, there was one pre-electoral legal dispute that had, and to an extent still has, potentially severe consequences for the rule of law in Nicaragua. The government executed the relocation of three municipalities from the electoral district of Chontales to that of the RAAS in an unfortunate manner. Even if the move had a legal basis in a presidential decree, the process presented various irregularities and juridical dilemmas. It also led to a jurisdictional dispute between the ordinary judicial branch and the constitutionally autonomous electoral branch. Even if the case did not visibly affect the stability of the electoral process, it remains to be resolved by the Supreme Court. It is also likely to be an issue that may complicate the forthcoming March 2002 regional elections in the autonomous regions.

According to the fears expressed by relevant political actors and the media, it was expected that the claims and complaints during and after the voting could delay the election process significantly. Surprisingly, however, only 677 complaints at the local level of JRV were filed. Among them, 169 complaints were dealing with ballots for president; 184 complaints concerning the ballots on parliamentarian candidates at the department list; 157 complaints dealing with ballots to the national lists to parliament; 167 regarding ballots to PARLACEN.

In general, the FSLN presented the greatest number of complaints, amounting to 54% of the total complaints according to the estimate presented by the national observer coalition Consorcio Cívico Electoral and based on 2898 JRV. The PLC was responsible for 30% of

the complaints, while the rest corresponded to the PC and, to a much smaller extent, to the regional parties Yátama and PAMUC.

Most of the complaints were resolved at the departmental or regional level without major disagreements. Disputes on 47 cases reached the CSE. These included two municipalities and 45 single JRV. Most of these cases reached the CSE because one of the parties appealed the decision of the departmental and regional councils. In some cases, the CSE took action because the departmental or regional council did not reach a decision within the 48-hour deadline established by the electoral law. The most important cases handled by the CSE concerned the municipalities of Waslala and San Jorge.

In the municipality of Waslala in the Department of Matagalpa, there was an error in the distribution of ballot papers, which had been printed as if the municipality belonged to the RAAN. This meant that the names of candidates printed in the ballots for the departmental or regional district were those of the RAAN and not those of Matagalpa. Even though Waslala is in principle part of the Autonomous Region of North Atlantic RAAN, in the Law on Administrative and Political Divisions it is defined as temporarily belonging to the Department of Matagalpa. In electoral terms, there is no disagreement about its legal status as a municipality within Matagalpa. The Departmental Electoral Council of Matagalpa, therefore, declared all the elections annulled in the municipality of Waslala. The CSE, however, revoked the decision and declared the Waslala elections valid.

Regarding the municipality of San Jorge, all the elections were annulled by the Departmental Electoral Council of Rivas because the president of the Municipal Electoral Council had opened certain electoral material that she was not entitled to. In a fiercely contested decision, the liberal majority of the CSE revoked the decision. According to the FSLN minority of the CSE who presented a dissenting vote, the revocation was illegal because no appeal had been presented. According to the CSE president Roberto Rivas, the CSE was legally entitled to intervene because the Departmental Electoral Council had not reached a decision within the 48-hour deadline.

Waslala and San Jorge shared a feature that reveals a typical pattern of decision-making by the electoral authorities. In both municipalities, the PLC got a much clearer victory than the average in their respective departments. The FSLN and PC who formed a majority against the PLC made the departmental annulment decisions. In the CSE, however, the PLC holds a 4-3 de facto majority (President Roberto Rivas is formally not a PLC representative but in practice votes according to PLC interests) and therefore it was not surprising that the annulment would be revoked. Even if the approximately 18,000 votes of Waslala and 4,000 votes of San Jorge did not significantly affect the overall results, the pattern these decisions illustrate is that much of the CSE decision-making is based on electoral calculations rather than legal considerations.

When all the pending complaints had been resolved by the CSE, the provisional results were published on November 14. It was followed by a three-day period during which the parties could present claims on the basis of numerical discrepancies in the results. The FSLN and PC did ask for a revision of votes in various districts, the latter apparently

hoping this might give it enough new votes to achieve a second parliamentary seat. There are also some indications that various electoral authorities may have committed violations of the electoral law. For example, the members of the Regional Electoral Council of the RAAN may be prosecuted for having lost hundreds of tally sheets. Similar offences, though on a smaller scale, took place in the Municipal Electoral Council of Nueva Guinea. The CSE is contemplating the possibility that a punishment of the functionaries involved in these offences could serve as a precedent for future elections.

At the moment of closing the EU EOM office on November 22, the numerical revision was finished. On the other kinds of complaints already resolved by the electoral authorities, there exists no appeal mechanism to any superior instance. Final official results were announced on November 21 and published on November 23.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU EOM would like to offer the following recommendations to the Nicaraguan authorities in order to improve the election framework in view of future elections.

1. Problems with the Electoral Law

Electoral legislation in Nicaragua has been modified every few years since 1984 when the first general election of the post-Somoza era took place. This is contrary to what is generally recommended if political stability is to be enhanced, also through the electoral system. The current election law is a product of reform enacted in January 2000.

Many of the deficiencies of the present electoral law are related to legal gaps, lack of by-laws or ambiguous wording. In political terms, however, the most serious problems reside in the exclusive and restrictive nature of the law. It is extremely difficult to establish new political parties, and most of the existing ones have lost their legal status. The restrictive way the CSE has interpreted the law in particular cases further accentuates the problem. Even in the autonomous regions of the Atlantic coast where the law allows for regional parties to exist, the electoral authorities have at times frustrated their electoral participation.

Among the unreasonable restrictions to the founding of new political parties, one can cite the requirement that a new party is to have an assembly and a governing council, established under the control of the electoral authorities, in every municipality of the country. This requirement may, for instance, block the emergence of parties that at some point have a significant social base in all major cities but are unable to reach every single one of the 151 municipalities. A further restriction to the establishment of new parties is the requirement that they must collect legally certified declarations of support from 3% of the electorate.

The way the two main parties have frustrated the opportunities for other groups to compete in the elections are generally regarded as a significant restriction to democracy in Nicaragua. This restriction is reflected both in the rules themselves and their interpretation by the electoral authorities. The criticisms directed at the exclusive aspects of the electoral system by various national and international groups and experts are therefore mostly justified. At the same time, it must be taken into account that even though there are no sanctions against those who abstain from voting, a high percentage of the electorate did choose to vote on November 4. This indicates that the electoral system can by no means be considered entirely illegitimate. It also needs to be remembered that in international and historical perspective, a two-party system is not necessarily in itself a sign of grave democratic deficits.

In order to make the system more legitimate, the EU EOM recommends that the Nicaraguan authorities consider relaxing the highly restrictive requirements for the founding of new parties. It is also somewhat problematic that in order to survive as a political party one is required to obtain 4 % of the presidential vote no matter what percentage one may get in the elections for the National Assembly.

One of the more general problems of the electoral rules is that much of the electoral administration is based on separate resolutions issued over a long period that extends to the days immediately preceding the elections. It would be more transparent and efficient to have a coherent body of election rules that should not be changed during the campaign period.

2. Composition and professionalism of the CSE

One of the most criticized aspects of the present electoral administration is the way in which the main political parties participate in the electoral bodies at all levels. This fact is widely perceived as the main reason for the lack of professionalism in the electoral administration. While the perception is not totally unfounded, the issues of partisan control and of insufficient professionalism should not be considered as necessarily associated, but as somewhat separate issues. On the one hand, the electoral administration in Nicaragua has always been party based. On the other hand, partisan loyalties should not be considered tantamount to partisan managing behavior.

On the highest level, the CSE, the two main parties PLC and FSLN share all the seats. In departmental, regional and municipal electoral councils as well as the JRV a third force, in practice always PC, is given a share in the electoral body. Whenever there is an impasse between the two main parties, PC in principle decides who constitutes the decisive majority in the council. As a preliminary hypothesis for specialized research, it could be stated that having a third force in the lower-level councils makes decision-making smoother because it is easier to establish majorities. In the CSE, one of the problems has been that if one party does not want to cooperate, it can be absent from the sessions and thereby eliminate the quorum. In the increasingly two-party system of Nicaragua it may not be easy to establish presence for a third force in the CSE, but in the long run it is worth considering.

The EU EOM find it unrealistic that the role of political parties could be totally eliminated in the Nicaraguan electoral authority in any near future. The party involvement could be modified in various ways, but it is probably neither feasible nor desirable to aim at its complete eradication. For example, a system where the government appoints supposedly neutral members to the highest electoral authority might mean that the opposition has few possibilities to present checks and balances to the possibility of governmental manipulation. We believe that a realistic reform would aim at clear and transparent rules for party involvement and at removing the harmful effects which a flawed kind of partisan control has had for professional standards.

A reputable tradition of career civil service has not yet emerged in Nicaragua. This lack is reflected in most public institutions, including the electoral authority, but not in the Armed Forces and the Police, where the degree of professionalism has improved significantly during the last decade. In the CSE there have been numerous cases of relatively long-serving staff being replaced by less qualified political appointees. Even if the authoritative decision-making organs remain controlled by the parties, it would be very important to create a permanent professional staff whose employment is not subject to shifting partisan quotas. In this task, one of the main obstacles is the culture of mistrust between the main parties. According to some information from within the government party, the new legislature that will start functioning in January will soon produce a new law of civil service. This could provide an opportunity to construct a new political culture in public institutions, though much more than a simple legal reform is needed for this task.

Moreover, a reform of the electoral authority should include a serious reconsideration of the number of people employed. The CSE, with its workforce of approximately 3,000, has functioned too much as a job pool for political associates. Reducing the number of personnel should be accompanied by strengthening the professional level of the institution. In other words, the electoral authority could have fewer employees but provide them with adequate employment conditions including continuous training and a decent salary.

3. The Voter Registers

The main problem with the voter lists is that they are not properly updated. According to most estimates, hundreds of thousands of citizens registered as voters have either died or moved abroad. This creates problems for the electoral administration while planning for electoral materials and organization of the polling stations. Moreover, it makes difficult a more effective control of double voting. Finally, this creates some additional problems such as the difficulty for estimating accurate rates of voter turnout.

While there are no quick-fix solutions to the problem of updating the voter rolls, improving the way in which death certificates are produced at the municipality level and then transmitted to the electoral administration seems of the utmost importance in Nicaragua. Since the CSE at the same time administers the general civil register, voter register reforms would need to take into account the inadequate connections between different branches of the register system in different parts of the country.

A related issue to that of voter rolls is that of availability, conservation and replacement of identity cards. This has been a serious problem in the past, and may again be as serious and costly in the near future. For the first time in Nicaragua a single national identity card was issued in 1993 with the financial and technical support of the international community, more particularly Spain and other European countries. The project involved identity cards producing and distributing to all Nicaraguan citizens by the year 2000. In fact, there are still over one hundred thousand of these cards pending distribution at a time when a decision was made by the CSE to have identity cards punched at the polling stations as yet another control mechanism against double voting. This decision has caused an irreparable damage to these “flimsy” documents in a country with poor living conditions and wet climate. This may actually turn out to be the beginning of a process of destruction of identity documents whose earliest recipients are not supposed to have them renewed until 2003. Naturally, the latest recipients of these cards would be holding a valid document until 2013 since the documents were issued for a ten-year period. The punching of identity cards has most likely created a new problem –and a very costly one– without necessarily being the main solution to the problem it was meant to solve, that of double voting.

4. Election Finance

There are several problems with election finance in Nicaragua. One is that, in general, elections are an operation too expansive both for international and in local standards. In previous elections, the cost per elector amounted to USD 11.8 in 1990, when a brand-new voter register had to be compiled, this being considered the single most expensive item of an electoral budget. The cost per elector in 1996 went significantly down to USD 7.5, but the trend was drastically reversed at the municipal elections of 2000 at an estimated cost per elector of around USD 12, and again at the most recent general elections. In a regional comparative perspective, this should be considered a highly expensive election. Estimated costs in some neighboring countries are as follows: Mexico in 1997 at USD 5.9; Guatemala in 1996 at USD 1.8; El Salvador in 1994 at USD 4.1 and in 1997 at USD 3.1; Panama in 1994 at USD 6.2; Costa Rica in 1994 at USD 1.7; and Haiti in 1995 at USD 4.0¹.

On the other hand, the electoral authorities have tended to spend money on processes that have made the system unnecessarily complicated. The combination of significant foreign aid flows and incompetent electoral administration has created inefficiencies that should be avoided. The empirical evidence of the 2001 elections points to a conclusion that in many aspects the system might have worked better if less money had been allocated to complicated technical innovations.

Finally, so strong a dependence on foreign electoral aid also led to a situation where the Nicaraguan government, especially the Minister of Finance, was reluctant to authorize the use of funds earmarked for the elections in the national budget. The attitude of the government seemed to be that since the electoral authorities may be able to get an almost

¹ Rafael López Pintor, *Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance*, New York: UNDP, 2000, p. 74

unlimited flow of funds from foreign donors, there are few incentives to resort to the national budget.

In the forthcoming regional council elections programmed for March 2002, municipal elections of November 2004 and general elections of November 2006, Nicaragua will probably still require some foreign assistance. In order to ensure that the assistance will be rationally allocated, it will be useful to plan the possible strategies in a long-term perspective. Coherent assistance during the inter-electoral periods to help in the organization of voter registers as well as administrative and legal reforms may be more effective than large sums of aid focused on the short term when people actually cast their vote.

Annex

Summary of Observers Form

JRV observadas:	637 (6,2% de total de JRV)
Municipios observados:	75

	SI	NO
Procedimientos de apertura	%	%
1. ¿Abrió la mesa de la JRV a las 7 de la mañana?	45	55
2. ¿Hay material de campaña en el recinto de la votación?	7	93
3. ¿Hubo problemas en la instalación de los miembros de JRV?	10	90
4. ¿Se firmó el acta de apertura?	90	10
5. ¿Recibió la mesa suficiente boletas electorales?	96	4
6. ¿Se revisaron las urnas y se expusieron en un lugar visible?	98	2
7. ¿Tiene la mesa suficiente material de trabajo?	94	6
Personal de JRV		
8. ¿Está la JRV informando a los votantes sobre el procedimiento del voto?	92	8
9. ¿Está el Presidente y los demás miembros de la JRV actuando imparcialmente?	95	5
10. ¿Está el Presidente y los demás miembros de la JRV actuando de manera competente?	88	12
Procedimientos de votación		
11. ¿Hay observadores nacionales o internacionales presentes en el centro de votación?	78	22
12. ¿Observa alguna persona no autorizada dentro del centro de votación?	14	86
13. ¿Se comprueba la identidad de los votantes como prescribe el procedimiento?	93	7
14. ¿Hay fiscales de partidos políticos en el centro de votación? Si hay ¿de qué partido?	99	1
15. ¿Se examina la existencia de tinta indeleble en el votante antes de que se le permita votar?	44	56
16. ¿Se aplica la tinta indeleble correctamente en el dedo pulgar después haber votado?	97	3
17. ¿Se marca el Padrón Electoral después de que el votante haya emitido su voto?	83	17
18. ¿Se marca la cédula o el documento supletorio después de que el votante haya emitido su voto?	94	6
19. ¿Se permite votar sin ningún documento de identidad?	11	89
20. ¿Se respeta el secreto del voto?	89	11
21. ¿Ha visto algún caso de voto familiar?	12	88
22. ¿Se otorga asistencia a los votantes discapacitados de acuerdo a la Ley?	96	4
23. ¿Pueden los discapacitados físicos acceder fácilmente al centro de votación?	86	14

24. ¿Considera que se ha respetado el procedimiento de votación?		98	2
25. Evaluación del proceso de votación en el JRV			
1.	Bueno - sin problemas	68	
2.	Aceptable - pequeños problemas técnicos que no alteran el proceso de votación	29	
3.	Malo - problemas técnicos graves que alteran el proceso de votación	3	
4.	Muy malo - manipulación de materiales electorales que puede afectar el resultado en la JRV	0	

Procedimiento de cierre y escrutinio		Sí	No
1.	¿Se permitió votar a la gente que llegó después de las 18:00?	95	5
2.	¿Firmaron el Acta de Cierre de Votación todos los miembros de la JRV?	98	2
3.	¿Se ofreció a los fiscales una copia del Acta de Constitución y Apertura y del Acta de Cierre de la Votación?	98	2
4.	¿Hubo diferencias entre número de votantes y boletas electorales emitidas?	30	70
5.	¿Pudieron los fiscales de los partidos políticos revisar las boletas electorales?	93	7
6.	¿Hubo impugnaciones?	14	86
7.	¿Se respetó la imparcialidad en el escrutinio?	100	0
8.	¿Se anunció el resultado de la votación en el exterior de la JRV?	90	10

26. Evaluación del proceso de escrutinio

1.	Bueno, sin problemas	75
2.	Aceptable, pequeños problemas técnicos que no afectaron el resultado del escrutinio	25
3.	Malo, problemas graves que afectaron el resultado del escrutinio en la JRV	0

FURTHER DETAILS ON STO DEPLOYMENT BY DEPARTMENT
 MANAGUA, RIO SAN JUAN

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EU	LEONINI Riccardo	M	IT	Managua
2	EU	D'AMBROSIO GOMARIZ Aldo	M	ESP	Managua
3	EU	DE DOMINGO ANGULO	M	ESP	Managua
4	EUL	RENESES Eduardo	M	ESP	Managua
5	EU	DE DEUS Joao Marco	M	PO	Managua
6	EU	GILOLMO Emilio	M	ESP	Managua
7	EUL	NAVARRO SANCHEZ Anastasio	M	ESP	Managua
8	EUL	NAVARRO SANCHEZ Pilar	F	ESP	Managua
9	EUL	REZA LOPEZ Miriam	F	ESP	Managua
10	EUL	ORTEGO Enrique	M	ESP	Managua
11	EUL	DOSPITAL Michelle	F	FR	Managua
12	EUL	VLEUGEL Machiel	M	NL	Managua
13	EUL	GARCIA ALVARO Remedios	M	ESP	Managua
14	EUL	RUIJS Franciscus	M	NL	Managua
15	EUL	GUTIERREZ Cindy	F	NL	Managua
16	EUL	RAVASCO NUNES Maria do Carmo	F	PO	Managua
17	EU	FORTES Cecilia	F	SWE	Managua
18	EUL	METELL Karin	F	SWE	Managua
19	EUL	BIRKOFF Carl	M	SWE	Managua
20	EUL	HORNO COMET Maria	F	ESP	Managua
21	EUL	LEHTONEN Kimmo	M	FIN	Managua
22	EUL	BASSI Carmen	F	ESP	Managua
23	EUL	AZAGRA SOLANO Mercedes	F	ESP	Managua
24	EUL	BONAFE TOVAR Maria Jesus	F	ESP	Managua
25	EUL	SANCHEZ DEL ARCO Patricia	F	ESP	Managua
26	EU	HABEL Gisela Andrea	F	DE	Managua
27	EUL	RODRUIGEZ VILLA Fernando	M	ESP	Managua
28	EU	GALLART Ana	F	ESP	Managua
29	EUL	IRARTE Yolanda	F	ESP	Managua
30	EUL	TORELLI Christine	F	FR	Managua
31	EUL	RODRÍGUEZ Aniceto	M	ESP	Managua
32	EU	WESTPHAL Kirsten	F	DE	Managua
33	EUL	GOTSI María	F		Managua
34	EUL	RUCHE Alain	M	BE	Managua
35	EUL	NIETO REY Jorge	M		Managua
36	EUL	MOHEDANO Isabel	F	ESP	Managua
37	EU	MATASCONI Barbara	F	IT	Managua
38	EUL	COEN Gabriele	M	IT	Managua
39	EUL	WETTERBLAD Torsten	M	SWE	Managua
40	EUL	MIGALLON CORELLA Margarita	F	ESP	Managua
41	EUL	SHENK Anette	F	DE	Managua
42	EU	WARD Cathy	F	UK	Managua
43	EUL	FERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ Susana	F	ESP	Managua
44	EUL	CASABLANCA Susana	F		Managua
45	EU	HAGON Anabelle	F	BE	Managua
46	EUL	TRONCOSO FERRER Maria Luisa	F	ESP	Managua

LEON, CHINANDEGA

Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
HUERTAS Ma. Angeles	F	ESP	León
FIGUEROA ABRIO Lourdes	F	ESP	León
TORRES Miguel	M	ESP	León
SAGREDO David	M	ESP	León
LEHTO Marko	M	FIN	León
BERNARDEZ Antonio	M	ESP	León
MORCILLO ASENSIO Ignacio	M	ESP	León
VON BOTHMER Hans	M	DE	León
OTERO Eva	F	ESP	León
MENCHON Isabel	F	ESP	León
COBOS FLORES Francisco	M	ESP	León
GARCIA RUIZ Almudena	F	ESP	León
SAINT-MARTIN Sophie	F	FR	León
BISSUEL Clémence	M	FR	León

MATAGALPA, JINOTEGA, ESTELÍ

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EUL	OLSEN Leif	M	DE	Matagalpa
2	EUL	ANDURI Ulrich	M	SE	Matagalpa
3	EUL	GONZALEZ GARCIA Belarmina	F	ESP	Matagalpa
4	EU	LAAKSONEN Tarja-Lisa	F	FI	Matagalpa
5	EU	DRAY Emmanuel	M	FR	Matagalpa
6	EU	SCHACK MELLEN Trine	F	DE	Matagalpa
7	EU	KOLSTEE Theo	M	NL	Matagalpa
8	EUL	ROVIRA Teresa	F	SWE	Matagalpa

RAAN

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EU	ARAGAO-LAGERGREN Aida	F	SWE	RAAN
2	EU	KILJUNEN Veikko	M	FIN	RAAN
3	EU	ORTIZ SANZ Lucía	F	ESP	RAAN
4	EU	PERKIC-KREMPL Sonja	F	AU	RAAN
5	EU	DU CHATENET Scipion	M	FR	RAAN
6	EU	JORDAN Andreas	M	AU	RAAN

RAAS

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EU	PRADES Max	M	SWE	RAAS
2	EU	WARTHA Sabine	F	AU	RAAS
3	EU	LEVY Michaël	M	FR	RAAS
4	EU	GUTIERREZ Pablo	M	ESP	RAAS
5	EU	DALAMANGA Anna	F	GRE	RAAS
6	EU	LINDHARTSEN Svend	M	DE	RAAS

BOACO, CHONTALES

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EU	DA CRUZ Daniel	M	LX	Chontales
2	EU	GIL CASADO Maria Victoria	F	ESP	Chontales
3	EU	SOUSA FERREIRA Vigidal	F	PO	Chontales
4	EU	SANZ CATEDO Miguel	M	ESP	Chontales
5	EUL	KEMPS Adrianus	M	NE	Chontales
6	EU	RICO Covadonga	F	ESP	Chontales

GRANADA, MASAYA, CARAZO, RIVAS

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EUL	HUERTAS Maria Angeles	F	ESP	Granada
2	EUL	GONZALEZ Agustín	M	ESP	Granada
3	EUL	TORRES Franck	M	FR	Granada
4	EUL	BOURSE Clément	M	FR	Granada
5	EU	RANTSIOU Fotini		GRE	Granada
6	EUL	HENRY Cécilie	F	FR	Granada
7	EUL	VAILLARD Sylvain	F	FR	Granada
8	EUL	THOMASSON Asa	F	SWE	Granada
9	EUL	BRANDIN Roger	M	SWE	Granada
10	EUL	BURBA Heike	F	DE	Granada
11	EUL	MUÑOZ JIMENEZ Raúl	M	ESP	Granada
12	EUL	PERAHUHTA Outi	F	FIN	Granada
13	EUL	VAN DE POL Catharine	F	NL	Granada
14	EU	SANCHEZ ALVARO Belen	F	ESP	Granada

NUEVA SEGOVIA, MADRIZ

No	Type	Name	Gender	Country	Deployment
1	EU	GIORGETTI Catherine	F	LX	Nueva Segovia
2	EU	ALVES Cristina	F	PO	Nueva Segovia
3	EU	SCHALLER Michael	M	AU	Nueva Segovia
4	EU	BOSMANS Marleen	F	BE	Nueva Segovia
5	EU	PEREIRA DA COSTA Luis	M	PO	Nueva Segovia
6	EU	KEATING Tamara	F	GB	Nueva Segovia