

# **Hong Kong**

## **Election Study Report**

**September 2-19, 1995**

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## HONG KONG ELECTION STUDY REPORT

September 2 - 19, 1995

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Before the September 17, 1995, legislative elections in Hong Kong, a team of four IRI program staff traveled to the colony to study the electoral process. Specifically, IRI's mission to Hong Kong examined the technical aspects of and political environment surrounding the September 1995 Legislative Council (LegCo) elections. Over a three-week period, the IRI delegation met with a broad range of individuals and organizations in Hong Kong, including candidates, party workers, voters, government officials, academics, and representatives from the media and business communities. The study mission resulted in the development of a complete picture of the electoral process as institutionalized by the present government as Hong Kong prepares for the transfer of its sovereignty from Great Britain to the People's Republic of China.

During its study mission, the IRI delegation was impressed with the level of commitment to and earnest support for the electoral process by all sides, pro-China, pro-democracy, government, and non-government groups alike. It seemed that the debate was not about whether or not Hong Kong should have elections, but on what direction Hong Kong should take in the future -- closer ties with China or a more independent path. The visceral anti-LegCo/anti-election comments made in Beijing the morning of the balloting was contrary to the tacit support for the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), a pro-China party. These comments, reported in the Hong Kong press, may have prompted pro-China voters to stay away from the polls and encouraged pro-democracy supporters to vote. The result could be a somewhat misleading victory for the pro-democracy forces. The election day comments made by government officials in Beijing also ran counter to efforts made in Hong Kong by Chinese "officials" and partisans to support the pro-China parties. The direct conflict of these two positions points to a greater inconsistency or uncertainty in China's overall position toward Hong Kong and its possible electoral future. Following the transition to Chinese rule, if the Hong Kong government is able to provide a solid indication that it can hold orderly, proper elections, it is possible that the electoral process in the region could continue unmolested.

The three organizations responsible for overseeing the campaign and electoral process are the Boundary and Elections Committee (BEC), its support structure, the Registration and Electoral Office (REO), and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The BEC and REO were established hastily in 1993 by the Colonial government and have yet to receive any formal training or education on proper electoral process and technique or on the government regulation of the campaign process. The ICAC was originally established to combat corruption, but was given recently the ill-defined task of fighting campaign fraud, an obligation for which the ICAC was not designed nor its staff prepared to fulfill. This addition of duties was accomplished by simply cutting and pasting electoral codes to the ICAC's ordinance. If the

electoral integrity of Hong Kong is to be strengthened, its electoral administrations and legal codes must have greater clarity and coherence.

During the run-up to the election, these administrations were almost impotent in prohibiting certain forms of improper activities. Although a mechanism was in place that effectively discouraged fraud and campaign corruption, excessive campaign spending and vicious, verbal attacks by candidates both illegal were prevalent. The election administrators were unable to curb the practice of employers giving workers a "bonus" for voting the "right way." In most cases, election administrators were unable to levy fines or punishment, due mainly to a lack of existence of fines or specific punishments attached to the codes declaring these activities illegal. For instance, it is illegal for employers to pay their workers to vote for the candidate the employer supports. However, there is no statute in any of the various electoral codes that levies a fine or outlines adequate criminal punishment.

Although the IRI team found those individuals who worked for the BEC, ICAC, and the REO to be inexperienced in electoral processes, they were committed in their support for a legitimate electoral process and worked hard to preserve its authenticity. At no time did the IRI delegation think that election officials were not taking their jobs seriously or felt it unimportant or menial. They simply did not have the experience necessary to execute their responsibilities effectively. If elections are to be held again in Hong Kong, it is these individuals who will need to receive training and preparation to administer those elections. Without an effective election administration, free and fair elections will be impossible. The BEC, as an independent, non-political organization, also can be the strongest guarantor for transparent elections in the future.

To assess the pre-election environment, IRI held over 30 meetings with influential individuals in positions to comment authoritatively on the campaign and electoral process (See Appendix). On election day, the IRI delegation visited 17 polling stations in 11 geographical constituencies to assess firsthand the political environment and conduct of the elections. Sites visited by the delegation included four constituencies in Hong Kong, three in Kowloon, and four in New Territories. Members of the delegation included Paul Grove, Head of Delegation (Cambodia); Martha Grove, Director of Women's Programs (Cambodia); Kirsten Edmondson, Program Officer, Asia (Washington); and Frederick Lawrence, Program Assistant, Asia (Washington).

# HONG KONG ELECTION STUDY REPORT

## September 2 - 19, 1995

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### I. BACKGROUND

When Hong Kong's Legislative Council (LegCo) was established in 1843, it consisted of only three members, appointed by the Crown, one of whom was the Governor of the colony. As originally established, LegCo was merely a policy advisory board to the Governor made up of prominent British citizens from the banking, business, and legal sectors. Over the years, the functions of LegCo have changed, as the board has gained more independence and a greater role in policy development. Today, the three main functions of the LegCo are legislating, controlling public expenditures, and monitoring the performance of the government. Typically, the Council considers legislative and appropriations matters that are initiated and submitted by the government.

As the role of LegCo changed, so did the make-up and membership of the board. At first, the number of members changed, although membership still was by appointment by the Governor and was limited to elite Caucasian members of the community. Then gradually over time, the list of possible members was extended to the elite members of the Chinese community. However, it was not until 1985 that the first election of members to the Council was held.

In anticipation of that first election, Governor Edward Youde, in an effort to allow limited enfranchisement while simultaneously maintaining the elite-based system of representation, established only two categories for representation: the functional constituency and the electoral college representatives. The functional constituencies numbered nine and were based on employment in one of the following fields: commercial, industrial, trade union, financial, social services, medical, education, legal, and engineering. A total of 12 seats were elected to the nine functional constituencies. Another 12 seats on the first LegCo were elected by the electoral college, a body of elite members of society selected by the Governor. The remaining 22 member of LegCo were appointed directly by the Governor.

By the September 1991 LegCo elections, the new Governor, David Wilson, had begun to implement a number of preliminary reforms that included the expansion of the number of elected seats to 39 and decrease of the number of appointed members to 18. For the first time, direct elections were held across the Territory of Hong Kong through nine geographical constituencies, which elected 18 members (two from each constituency). The number of functional constituencies, expanded to 15, elected a total of 21 members to the legislative body. Therefore, the composition of the 60-member LegCo prior to the September 1995 elections included: three ex-officio members (Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Attorney General), 18 appointed members, 18 members elected from nine geographical constituencies, and 21 members elected from 15 functional constituencies.

## *Recent Reforms*

In 1992, with the appointment of Christopher Patten as Governor of Hong Kong, electoral reform progressed further than it had in the past 140 years. Governor Patten's proposed reforms included the abolishment of all ex-officio and appointed members (all seats in LegCo were to be elected), the expansion of functional constituencies, and the expansion and reorganization of the geographical constituencies.

To ensure direct democracy for the colony, Governor Patten implemented reforms that allowed for the direct election of all members of the District Boards and Municipal Councils, in addition to the LegCo. In addition, the Governor lowered the voting age from 21 to 18, thereby enfranchising an additional 10 percent of the population. The electoral process was further expanded to include nine new functional constituencies covering a larger portion of employed workers, the abolishment of corporate voting in old functional constituencies, same-day voting for the geographical and functional constituencies and the Election Committee, modifications to rules and regulations governing campaigning and voting procedures, and the creation of a non-political election administration and regulation organization, called the Boundary and Election Commission (BEC), to oversee the procedures of the campaign and election.

The new functional constituencies created were: (1) Primary Production, Power, and Construction; (2) Textiles and Garments; (3) Manufacturing; (4) Import and Export; (5) Wholesale and Retail; (6) Hotels and Catering; (7) Transport and Communications; (8) Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services; and, (9) Community, Social and Personal Services. The 20 new geographical constituencies were: Hong Kong Island Central, East, South, and West; Kowloon Central, North-east, East, South-east, South, South-west, and West; and New Territories Central, North-west, North, North-east, South-east, East, South, South-west, and West.

Following the 1995 election, the 60-member LegCo included: 20 members elected from 20 geographical constituencies, 30 members from 29 functional constituencies, and ten members elected from an Election Committee consisting of all district board members.

There is a major side effect of the electoral reform in Hong Kong. The election law amendments summarily derailed the "through train" process envisioned by drafters of the 1984 Joint-Declaration that would ensure a smooth transition of sovereignty. In 1993, when Governor Patten and the British Government began efforts to amend Hong Kong's electoral laws to guarantee the institutionalization of democracy through direct elections, the British Foreign Office opened discussions on the reforms with their Chinese counterparts. As agreed to in the Joint-Declaration, the amendment process was to include close consultation, cooperation, and agreement with the Chinese government in Beijing. However, due to substantial disagreement on the technical details between the two governments, negotiations proved futile; and Governor Patten chose to proceed with reform, with the blessing of the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign Office, and the British Parliament. However, China continues to contend that the

amendments do not conform to the Basic Law, which will serve as Hong Kong's constitution after 1997, and officials have made it clear that no candidate elected in 1995 will serve in LegCo beyond June 30, 1997. However, China has continued to insist that it will hold elections under its sovereignty after 1997.

## II. FINDINGS

During its study mission, the IRI delegation began to discover that, although the commitment to democracy and the supporting structure are solid, those who have been given the responsibility of overseeing and administering the process are rather inexperienced and, in some cases, lack a complete understanding of the details and technical aspects of campaigns and elections. This is not to say that they are not committed to the integrity of the process. IRI witnessed a deep concern for electoral integrity. However, until recently, elections and representative democracy have not been a priority of the Colonial government. As such, training and education in the duties and technical aspects of administering elections have been ineffective and for the most part, inconsequential.

With this in mind, IRI set out to discover those issues, both problems and positive attributes, that were on the minds of the electorate, civil servants, academics, and politicians as the city prepared for and participated in the LegCo elections. It will be these issues and the attitudes, rather than the actions of either the Chinese or British governments, that will affect the pace and sustainability of democracy in Hong Kong.

### 1. Electoral Administration -- the effectiveness and integrity of the Borders and Election Commission

Originally, the Boundary and Election Commission (BEC) was established to review the electoral boundaries for the geographical constituency in preparation for the LegCo elections and to recommend changes to the Hong Kong Government. After its initial report in 1994, additional duties were added. In preparation for the September 17 elections, the BEC and its Registration and Electoral Office (REO) were tasked with the responsibilities of overseeing the campaign, administering the elections, and registering and maintaining eligible voter lists. The BEC was established as a non-political body by the colonial government to ensure that the administration of the electoral process was completely removed from all parties so as to refute accusations of manipulation, and to provide an extra-legal framework for election-related disputes to be resolved.

Under its first jurisdictional authority, overseeing the campaign, the BEC had the power to investigate persons or organizations involved in "questionable" campaign activities. Activities listed as questionable by the Chairman of the BEC, Justice Woo, were vote buying, exceeding campaign spending limits, slandering one's opponent, campaigning in restricted areas -- such as no-canvassing zones -- using a third party to finance campaign activities, and forcing or enticing employees to vote for the employer's candidate by using vacation days or threat of firing.

One of the BEC's primary duties, however, was to maintain and update voter registration lists. Although the BEC was effective in its efforts to register voters in the nine new functional constituencies, reservations remain about the ability of the BEC to maintain an accurate electoral registry for the geographical constituencies.

Although there were many problems associated with voter registration, or lack of registration, a good example of the serious complaints by party workers was expressed by canvassers at the Shung Ching School polling station in Yuen Long, New Territories. Canvassers here revealed that some people could not vote because they were not registered on the station's voter rolls. Wan Toi Shan polling station, also in Yuen Long, was closed for several hours because of a violent protest by the unregistered voters. According to newspaper accounts, over 100 people disrupted polling for over two hours because their names were not on the registry.

Before the election, the BEC dropped over 100,000 names from the geographical constituencies electoral registry lists. When asked about the problems with registering voters, BEC officials identified unrecorded demolition of housing estates, changes of address, and emigration as major factors hampering voter registration efforts. With fewer than one million voters going to the polls (35.8 percent of all registered voters), and with numerous races decided by less than 1,000 votes, the results may have been different if these citizens had been registered to vote.

However, the BEC was not the sole campaign regulatory organization in the colony. In a rush to prepare for the election, the colonial government haphazardly inserted election codes in various, and in most cases inappropriate, existing ordinances. One such case was the Corruption and Illegal Practices ordinance that established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). With the insertion of an election code that criminalized bribery and incorporated various types of campaign fraud into the Corruption and Illegal Practices ordinance, the ICAC was transformed from a effective fighter against corruption to a campaign monitor. Unfortunately, the ICAC was not prepared to monitor campaigns and has been playing an admirable game of catch-up ever since.

To educate candidates on the rules and regulations of campaigning in Hong Kong, the BEC prepared and distributed the "Guidelines on Election-related Activities in Respect of Legislative Council Elections." The ICAC, too, attempted to inform candidates through the distribution a similar publications -- in the form of a campaign calendar -- that reminded candidates about regulations perceived to be under its jurisdiction. Both are effective tools and were credited with lowering the instances of illegal campaign activities.

By the end of election day, the BEC reportedly had received 825 complaints and completed action on 659. According to BEC officials, the two major categories of complaints were illegal canvassing activities and improper display of election advertisements. The ICAC reportedly had received a total of 38 complaints by election day, with the majority of complaints relating to allegations of bribery and treating voters to various favors.



Complaints filed in the pre-election period to the BEC and the ICAC included calls by a Democratic candidate for an investigation into "pro-China" companies offering their employees a day's vacation as an incentive to vote, an Independent candidate's allegation that her opponent received free election advertisement in a monthly women's magazine in violation of election guidelines, a Democratic candidate's concern that his opponent's efforts to obtain signatures from the electorate unfairly intimidated and influenced the public, and a complaint against an office of the Democratic Party for discounting mooncakes (a cake eaten to celebrate the new year) in an alleged attempt to bribe voters.

The system of dual regulatory organizations proved confusing and contradictory at times. Because the election codes are not in one place and the colonial government did not delineate roles between the BEC and ICAC, there was confusion among the citizens, candidates, and the staffs of the BEC, REO and ICAC on the specific jurisdiction of the BEC versus the ICAC. In many cases complaints were reported to both the ICAC and the BEC. On occasion, the BEC and the ICAC would comment publicly on an issue, each supporting an opposite opinion. If the electoral process is to be strengthened and institutionalized, all electoral functions should be placed under the jurisdiction of the BEC and its staff at the REO. This will help to professionalize the electoral process, thereby providing further legitimacy.

2. Electoral Codes -- an ordinance that is centralized, easily understood, and enforceable

One of the most daunting challenges to future elections will be the source of electoral law in Hong Kong. At present, codes pertaining to the regulation and conduct of campaigns and elections are scattered in numerous laws and ordinances. This decentralization of the law resulted in varied interpretation of infractions during the elections. As mentioned above, this also caused confusion among the regulatory and administrative organizations charged with organizing elections.

An example of the regulation is the code pertaining to "negative campaigning." The code, placed in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance, does not define "negative campaigning" nor does any other code or ordinance in Hong Kong. According to ICAC officials, charges of "negative campaigning" would be subject to defamation and libel laws, which are under the jurisdiction of the BEC, and punishable under the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance. Neither group, however, is willing to define "negative campaigning" or to tackle this difficult issue. Additionally, at the time of this writing, no efforts are underway to consolidate the election codes into one law.

In addition to being contradictory, none of the electoral codes have, by themselves, punitive damage clauses attached. These clauses allow the organization to forward cases to the Attorney General's office. Electoral codes under the ICAC have been given punitive damage clauses through extension of like clauses in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance. However, the BEC has not been given the ability to forward cases of criminal violation of the laws under its jurisdiction. For example, when the BEC found that a candidate had illegally provided mooncakes to potential supporters, its response was a public censuring, not criminal

finer. Without a consolidated, understandable and enforceable law, the future of effective, free and fair elections is in doubt.

3. Functional Constituencies -- the reorganization of functional constituencies that allows a specific, and thereby effective, representation of members

The functional constituency (FC) was originally created as part of limited democracy in Hong Kong. FCs gave members of certain elite groups the right to vote and a voice in the development of policy in the colony. With the appointment of Governor Patten in 1992, the structure of FCs, as the guarantors of the status of the elite, changed to allow the working class a "seat at the table."

Although the idea was quite egalitarian, problems arose quickly as it became apparent that the program was not well thought out. The first problem lay in the fact that the new, broad functional constituencies caused the newly registered voters some difficulty in identifying their constituency, since many of the FCs were so broad and all encompassing. In addition, each FC had its own colored ballot. With 29 FCs, many of the colors were similar, causing even more confusion. Most voters did not know which ballot to take and in many cases, the poll worker was of little help.

Second, candidates in the larger FCs had difficulty campaigning in those races because the electorate was difficult to reach when it was not contained within any geographical area. For example, voters in the Hotels and Catering functional constituency were located in hotels and catering businesses across the entire Territory, but they also could be located in businesses one would not associate with hotels, such as laundry services.

Third, there were problems in the functional classification of workers. For instance, reporters have been classified as members of the Community, Social, and Personal Services functional constituency. Other members of this FC include social workers, teachers, and massage girls. In another example, telephone operators, taxi cab drivers, and dock workers are included in the Transport and Communications constituency. It will be impossible for a member of LegCo who is elected to represent the larger functional constituencies, such as those mentioned above, to effectively represent all their constituencies.

Last, unemployed workers, students, the retired, and housewives (numbering 600,000 by some estimates) do not receive a vote in an FC. Individuals in these groups receive only one vote within the geographical constituencies, but those registered voters with jobs in represented functional constituencies can vote two or even three times, depending on the number of FC to which they belong.

All of these problems served to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the functional constituency races and tended to subvert the process in general. Without a more representative form of voting in the FCs, the voters will remain unconvinced of their validity and thereby unsupportive of the process.

4. Ballot Counting -- the assurance of ballot integrity and therefore the securing of voter confidence

Despite the fact that the BEC is responsible for counting ballots and securing the integrity of the process, and the analysis of the counting process could have been mentioned above, the delegation felt that this process merited a separate section in this report.

Unlike the LegCo elections in 1991, geographical and functional constituency elections occurred on the same day and within the same polling stations. Counting of ballots took place at one central counting station in Kowloon, rather than at centers located within each geographical constituency, as had occurred in the past. Ballot boxes from around the Territory - including outlying islands -- had to be transported to the central counting station. The logistics proved problematic.

The central counting station was spacious enough to provide ample room for the over 3,000-member counting staff. However, traffic jams associated with the location of the center impeded the ability of candidates and ballot boxes to reach the center in a timely manner. There also was no official manner to transport ballot boxes to the counting site. Members of the IRI delegation witnessed firsthand the traffic problems, and saw ballot boxes arriving in such a haphazard manner so as to call into question BEC claims of no instances of fraud. For example, in many instances, ballot boxes arrived in taxis, hired to transport the boxes from the polling station to the central counting station. In one instance, IRI staff witnessed a taxi arrive with the boxes in the open trunk of the taxi. Matters were made worse when no elections personnel were seen escorting the ballots. The driver stated that he was stopped by two people carrying boxes and asked to deliver them to an address written on the slip of paper he was given.

Logistics, however, were not the only problem. Counting procedures, although diligently drawn up by the staff of the REO, were not closely followed. In one instance, the counting of one of the functional constituencies' ballots commenced before all the ballot boxes from that constituency had arrived. Concern that the sorting and counting of functional constituencies ballots would be problematic was justified. The different colored ballots for all of the 29 functional constituencies were placed in the same box at polling stations and had to be hand sorted by color at the central counting station. This time-consuming process lasted 15 hours.

In some areas, there were discrepancies in the number of ballots issued and the actual number of ballots counted. For instance, in the Kowloon Southeast geographical constituency, unsuccessful candidate Tam Yui-chung complained to the BEC that a miscount showed over 900 more votes being recorded than had been cast in his race. An examination of the counting record sheets revealed that polling station staff had erred, giving Tam Yui-chung 1,000 more votes than he should have received.

The counting process was chaotic, unorganized, and fraught with problems. This situation could have been contained if the poll workers had been properly trained and prepared. Electoral legitimacy cannot be assured without professionalism in ballot counting. Although the process

was transparent -- opening the BEC to more criticism for questionable practices than a closed counting center would have afforded -- it was flawed. With the obvious commitment of the staff of the BEC and the REO, and a modest amount of training, these problems can be avoided easily in the future.

### III. CONCLUSION

The process by which the Hong Kong government held its elections was, on the surface, professional, well coordinated, and effectively executed. On election night, Justice Woo, Chairman of the Borders and Elections Commission, stated, "Not bad, for our first time." In that assessment, he was right; the September 17 election was not bad for their first time. It is unfortunate that the Hong Kong government has had only one chance to prove the effectiveness and fairness of the electoral process and their ability to administer it. Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, Nicholas Ng, stated that many "firsts" had been accomplished in the elections, including the use of a central counting station and the simultaneous holding of geographical and functional constituency elections. But, he further stated that for Hong Kong, improving the electoral process was an ongoing event; the Territory learns from its experiences and there is "always room for improvement."

The government of Hong Kong, if its hopes to sustain its fledgling democracy, will need to improve its capability to ensure effective electoral administration. If voter turnout is any indication of the effectiveness of the total electoral administration, then Hong Kong voters have little confidence in the ability of the BEC, ICAC, or the Hong Kong government to conduct legitimate elections in the future. Voter turnout in the functional constituencies decreased by seven percent and 3.3 percent in the geographical constituencies. While no one would say that the professionalization of electoral administration was the only factor in the low turnout, or even a major one, it is the legitimacy of the process, in the eyes of the Chinese government and the Hong Kong people, that has the best chance of salvaging democracy in Hong Kong.

With the decline of British influence in Hong Kong, it is incumbent on those who will be left behind to manage the colony to institutionalize a professional, well-structured electoral process in Hong Kong. With continued support, education and training, the Hong Kong government will acquire the experience its members so desperately need to develop and professionalize the haphazard system instituted by the British. With experience, the BEC and the Hong Kong government will be prepared to hold legitimate, effective elections when the Chinese assume sovereignty, thereby institutionalizing the process and proving to the people of Hong Kong and their government in Beijing that democracy is not inherently chaotic, but is instead, inherently stable and a critical ingredient in ensuring prosperity.

Hong Kong Election Assessment  
September 2 - 19, 1995

LIST OF MEETINGS

The Honorable  
Ronald Arculli, OBE, JP  
Woo Kwan Lee & Lo Solicitors

Frank Ching  
Senior Editor  
Far Eastern Economic Review

Michael DeGolyer, Ph.D.  
Director  
Hong Kong Transition Project

Paul Harris  
Chairman  
Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor

Fung Kin Kee  
Chairman  
Hong Kong Association for Democracy  
and People's Livelihood

Kenneth Ko Kwan-lok  
Chief Press Information Officer  
Independent Commission Against Corruption

The Honorable  
Woo Kwok-ling  
Chairman  
Boundary and Election Commission

Joseph Y.T. Lai  
Deputy Secretary for Constitutional Affairs  
Government Secretariat

Martin C.M. Lee, Q.C.  
Legislative Councillor  
Hong Kong Government

Simon Lee  
Senior Manager  
Compliance Department  
Standard Chartered Bank

Gladys Li  
Chairman  
The Hong Kong Bar Association

Edward Llewellyn  
Personal Adviser to the Governor  
Office of H.E. Christopher Patten

P.Y. Lo  
Member  
Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor

Christine Loh  
Legislative Councillor  
Government of Hong Kong

Mark Michelson  
Vice Chairman  
American Chamber of Commerce  
in Hong Kong

Cheng Kai Nam  
Secretary General  
DAB Candidate

Nicholas Ng  
Secretary of Constitutional Affairs  
Government of Hong Kong

Ted Prior  
Chief Government Planner  
Government of Hong Kong

Louise do Rosario  
Hong Kong Correspondent  
Far Eastern Economic Review

Dr. Lau Siu-kai  
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Bertrand de Speville  
Commissioner  
Independent Commission Against Corruption

Peter Stien  
Hong Kong Bureau Chief  
Asian Wall Street Journal

Robert Chung Ting-yiu  
Research Officer  
Social Sciences Research Centre  
The University of Hong Kong

The Honorable  
Emily Lau Wai-hing  
Ward Office

Carrie Willis  
Chief Electoral Officer  
Registration and Electoral Officer

Po Wing-kay  
Deputy Political Editor  
Eastern Express

Andrew W.F. Wong  
President  
HK Foundation Ltd.

Brian Woo  
Consul  
Economic/Political Section  
American Consulate General

Mary Stuart Worden  
Special Assistant  
Office of Mr. Martin Lee, Q.C.

*Table 1:*

September 17, 1995  
List of Polling Stations IRI Visited  
for the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (LC)	NAME	ADDRESS	NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS
LC1 - Hong Kong Island Central	Sunning Plaza	10 Hysan Avenue Causeway Bay, Hong Kong	11021
LC1 - Hong Kong Island Central	Wan Chai Post Office	Second Floor, Wu Chung House 197-213 Queen Road East Wan Chai, Hong Kong	7006
LC1 - Hong Kong Island Central	Hennessy Road Post Office	1 Hennessy Road Wan Chai, Hong Kong	7081
LC1 - Hong Kong Island Central	Henrietta Secondary School	2 City Garden Road North Point, Hong Kong	9120
LC2 - Hong Kong Island East	City Plaza 4	12 Taikoo Wan Road Taikoo Shing, Hong Kong	10205
LC2 - Hong Kong Island East	Activity Room, U.C. Quarry Bay Complex Indoor Games Hall	6th Floor U.C. Quarry Bay Complex 38 Quarry Bay Street Hong Kong	9806
LC2 - Hong Kong Island East	Hong Kong Teacher's Centre	4 Pak Fuk Road North Point, Hong Kong	11170
LC2 - Hong Kong Island East	Taikoo Primary School	Greig Road Quarry Bay, Hong Kong	8082

LC3 - Hong Kong Island South	T.W.G.Hs. Lee Chi Hung Memorial Primary School	Siu Sai Wan Estate Chai Wan, Hong Kong	10708
LC3- Hong Kong Island South	Buddhist To Chi Fat She Yeung Tam Yuen Fong Kindergarten	Ground Floor, Hin Tsui House Kai Tsui Court, Siu Sai Wan Chai Wan, Hong Kong	10796
LC3 - Hong Kong Island South	St. Peter's Catholic Primary School	Phase 2, Lei Tung Estate Ap Lei Chau, Hong Kong	9814
LC3 - Hong Kong Island South	Wong Chuk Hang Catholic Primary School	Wong Chuk Hang Estate Aberdeen, Hong Kong	11741
LC5 - Kowloon Central	Ma Tau Chung Government Primary School	1 Fuk Cheung Street Ma Tau Wai, Kowloon	8369
LC5 - Kowloon Central	C.C.C. Rotary Prevocational School	157 Lung Cheung Road Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon	11280
LC5 - Kowloon Central	Carbo Anglo-Chinese Kindergarten	Tsui Chuk Garden 8 Tsui Chuk Street Kowloon	7900
LC6 - Kowloon North-east	Fung Tak Estate Community Centre	Fung Tak Estate Kowloon	10737
LC6 - Kowloon North-east	S.K.H. Yat Sau Primary School	Luk Lau Avenue Choi Hung Estate Kowloon	9245
LC6 - Kowloon North-east	C.C.C. Kei Tsz School	(adjacent to Block 2) Shatin Pass Estate Tsz Wan Shan Road Kowloon	9405
LC8 - Kowloon South-east	Shun Lee Estate Community Centre	2 Shun Chi Street Kwung Tong, Kowloon	7517
LC8 - Kowloon South-east	Ning Po No. 2 College	Shun Tin Estate Kwan Tong, Kowloon	7981



LC8 - Kowloon South-east	Lam Tin Methodist Primary School	Next to Block 8, Lam Tin Estate Kwun Tong, Kowloon	9446
LC8 - Kowloon South-east	Sai Tso Wan neighborhood Community Centre	Cha Kwo Ling Road Kwung Tong, Kowloon	5891
LC8 - Kowloon South-east	Our Lady of China Catholic Primary School	Tsui Ping Road Kwun Tong, Kowloon	7724
LC13 - New Territories North-west	Yuen Long Merchants Association Secondary School	20 Fung Nin Road Yuen Long, New Territories	7914
LC13 - New Territories North-west	Yuen Long Chamber of Commerce Primary School No. 2	Block 5, Yuen Long Estate Yuen Long, New Territories	7685
LC13 - New Territories North-west	Shung Ching School	Shung Ching San Tsuen Tai Tong Road Yuen Long, New Territories	8109
LC13 - New Territories North-west	Queen Elizabeth School of Old Students' Association Primary School	Phase 1, Tin Yiu Estate Tin Shui Wai Yuen Long, New Territories	8051
LC14 - New Territories North	Wong Chan Sook Ying Memorial School	Fairview Park Orchid Road East, Tai Sang Wai Yuen Long, New Territories	6377
LC14 - New Territories North	Buddhist Ching Kok Lin Association School	12 Yat Ming Road Fanling, New Territories	5195
LC14 - New Territories North	Cheung Wah Community Hall	Cheung Wah Estate Fanling, New Territories	9321
LC14 - New Territories North	Fung Kai Liu Yun Sum Memorial School	Area 45, Wah Ming Estate Fanling, New Territories	7780
LC14 - New Territories North	Buddhist Sum Tung Fook Kindergarten	Ground Floor, Choi Yuen Estate Sheung Shui, New Territories	8447
LC14 - New Territories North	Shek Wu Hui Public School	Tin Ping Estate Sheung Shui, New Territories	10464

LC15 - New Territories North-east	Tai Po Old Market Public School	10 On Cheung Road, Area 4 Tai Po, New Territories	8641
LC15 - New Territories North-east	Tai Yuen Community Hall	Tai Yuen Estate Tai Po, New Territories	9029
LC15 - New Territories North-east	Kwong Fuk Community Hall	Kwong Fuk Estate Tai Po, New Territories	14709
LC15 - New Territories North-east	Tai Wo Neighborhood Community Centre	Tai Wo Estate Tai Po, New Territories	8942
LC17 - New Territories East	Lek Yuen Community Hall	Lek Yuen Estate Sha Tin, New Territories	6981
LC17 - New Territories East	Wo Che Community Hall	Wo Che Estate Sha Tin, New Territories	11342
LC17 - New Territories East	Pok Hong Community Hall	Pok Hong Estate Sha Tin, New Territories	10424
LC17 - New Territories East	Pok Oi Hospital Chan Kai Memorial College	Lung Hang Estate Sha Tin, New Territories	10424
LC20 - New Territories West	S.K.H. Mung Yan Primary School	1 King Fung Path Tuen Mun, New Territories	7405
LC20 - New Territories West	Yan Chai Hospital Law Chan Chor Si Primary School	29 Wu King Road, Area 44 (annexed to Sui Hei Court) Tuen Mun, New Territories	10246
LC20 - New Territories West	H.K. Red Swastika Society Tuen Mun Primary School	Leung King Estate Tuen Mun, New Territories	8854

Table 2:

Total Number of Polling Stations and Registered Voters per Constituency

LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUENCY (LC)	POLLING STATIONS	REGISTERED VOTERS
LC1 - Hong Kong Island Central	22	119771
LC2 - Hong Kong Island East	24	144468
LC3 - Hong Kong Island South	25	146240
LC4 - Hong Kong Island West	25	143030
LC5 - Kowloon Central	19	106296
LC6 - Kowloon North-east	21	134159
LC7 - Kowloon East	21	129955
LC8 - Kowloon South East	27	134826
LC9 - Kowloon South	18	105597
LC10 - Kowloon South-west	18	100314
LC11 - Kowloon West	22	145568
LC12 - New Territories Central	23	116851
LC13 - New Territories North- west	23	113799
LC14 - New Territories North	35	99352
LC15 - New Territories North- east	25	112444

LC16 - New Territories South-east	32	147995
LC17 - New Territories East	28	165127
LC18 - New Territories South	21	137318
LC19 - New Territories South-west	39	131698
LC20 - New Territories West	25	137316

*Table 3:*

Grand Total of Polling Stations and Registered Voters

POLLING STATIONS	REGISTERED VOTERS
493	2572124