

# **Russia Presidential Election Observation Report**

**June 16, 1996  
July 3, 1996 Runoff**

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## **I. INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 1996 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OBSERVATION**

The 1996 Russian presidential election represented a milestone in Russia's transition to democracy. Important choices were offered to voters in this election and the high turnout in both rounds of nearly 70 percent demonstrated that the Russian people were clearly aware of those choices. Russians demonstrated a recognition that their country's democratic process affects their future. IRI was impressed by the seriousness with which Russians approached this election as candidates, party workers, election officials, pollwatchers and voters.

IRI delegations (composed of election law, political, and Russia experts) observed the June 16, 1996 presidential election and the subsequent runoff held on July 3, 1996. While many voiced considerable concern that fraud would occur, particularly at territorial and subject levels, IRI's two observer missions witnessed no deliberate attempts to commit electoral fraud and, indeed, in the tracking of protocols through the various levels of Russia's electoral system, observed transparency in the process. IRI also observed improvements from the 1995 State Duma elections. A concerted effort was made, particularly in the second round, to remove tables and chairs in the polling stations that had encouraged open voting and discouraged the use of the polling booth. Notwithstanding the smaller, less complicated ballots, the counts were better organized and accomplished much more quickly. In observing military voting, IRI observers did not see the same kind of control as witnessed last December.

Ballot security concerns did arise over the last minute decision by the Central Election Commission to relax absentee voting rules in order to make voting available to masses of Russian citizens on holiday travel by allowing portable ballot boxes to be placed at airports, boat docks, and train stations. Indeed, the use of and procedures for the mobile ballot box were, on the whole, disturbing. In addition, previously expressed concerns deepened over hidden campaign expenditures and inadequate campaign finance reporting, as well as the media's bias in its coverage of candidates.

In the following pages, IRI makes several recommendations to address such concerns. The report will be forwarded to the appropriate Russian officials to assist them in further developing Russia's electoral process. Copies will also be provided to Russian media, political parties, U.S. government officials and U.S. media. In addition to the specific recommendations, this report also contains delegate observations on electoral environment and administration, delegate reports from the 10 monitored cities, informal exit poll results, sample ballots, protocols and other germane items.

Prior to the 1996 presidential election, IRI sponsored three observation missions in Russia. The first observed the April 1993 referendum and issued a report detailing weaknesses in technical aspects of the voting process. In the referendum voting, IRI observers found no evidence of systematic fraud or intimidation. However, they did note that the production, distribution, and

security of ballots was lax, and that various Russian regions differed in methods of tabulation. IRI's delegation further concluded that these weaknesses could be exploited easily if the stakes of elections were higher and if there were a greater incentive to cheat. The observer team's recommendations were published in Izvestiya and later introduced on the floor of the State Duma by its democratic members. A number of IRI's suggested improvements were adopted by the time of the December 12, 1993 parliamentary elections, including: clearer guidelines on validation of ballots and procedures for replacing spoiled ballots by local election officials; increased security for mobile ballot boxes; revisions in the absentee voting system; and provisions for an orderly process of accrediting domestic and international observers. These changes demonstrated a willingness to reexamine the election process and make modifications where weaknesses were found.

IRI's second Russian observation delegation, which observed the December 1993 parliamentary elections, issued a number of recommendations that were partly or substantially adopted into the new parliamentary election law signed by President Boris Yeltsin in June 1995. The Vice Chairman of Russia's Central Election Commission in a meeting on Capitol Hill in spring 1995 said that IRI's report "served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements in the election law." Eighteen of the 20 recommendations related directly to election law were partially or substantially adopted. These included: providing an adequate campaign period; establishing a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results; initiating procedures to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters using the portable ballot box; and encouraging the recruitment of new people into the election administration process along with thorough training programs.

IRI's third mission observed Russia's State Duma elections, December 17, 1995. IRI observers did not witness systematic or deliberate misconduct that would have called into question the basic integrity of the process. However, IRI observers did find areas of the electoral process that continued to present potential for abuse, such as a lack of appreciation for the need of people to be able to vote in secrecy, a disorganized counting process that provided ample opportunity for vote manipulation, and several actual abuses and potential problems concerning military voting.

## II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The International Republican Institute's observer delegations to the June 16 presidential election and the July 3 runoff found this contest to be Russia's best ever in terms of overall election administration. Generally honest, openly administered and unmarred by irregularities of a consequential scale, the conduct of this election reflected the significant strides made over the past five years by the Russian people in institutionalizing democratic electoral processes.<sup>1</sup> The presidential election gave a clear indication that Russia's democracy is developing roots.

Having gone through State Duma elections just six months before, Russian presidential candidates and political parties were plainly prepared for this race. Last December, political parties representing a full range of ideas and philosophies were able to register and campaign, getting their message out to voters much more effectively than in the 1993 parliamentary elections. Parties and candidates campaigned under an improved election law, one that had been vetted by both houses of parliament and signed by President Yeltsin in time to give parties and candidates adequate time for campaigning. In addition, the 1995 State Duma elections pointed to a determination by Russians to exercise their right to make choices. Voters turned out in higher numbers than expected -- 65 percent nationwide. This is in stark contrast to the December 1993 parliamentary elections, which were held only two months after President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies by storming the White House. The election law then was one issued by presidential decree. Parties had little time to prepare, few new parties were able to collect the signatures necessary to be placed on the ballot, and voter turnout was under 55 percent.

The election atmosphere of the 1996 presidential race was energetic and sophisticated in nearly all aspects of campaigning, particularly prior to the first round. The presidential election law had been passed in May 1995 and was in effect for the first time. Overall, the Russian Central Election Commission is to be commended for its hard work and professionalism in successfully overseeing implementation of the new law, communicating electoral guidelines to regional election commissions across Russia, and coordinating the activities of Russia's vast election administration system. Subject and territorial commissions conducted substantial training prior to round one and took steps before the second round to address round one problems. As

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<sup>1</sup> Even Gennady Zyuganov, Communist Party candidate, said with regard to the first round, "We believe in general that the elections proceeded normally, without flagrant violations of the laws," "Election Observers Give Poll Stamp of Approval," Elizabeth Owen, Moscow Times, June 18, 1996. Following the July 3 run-off, though Zyuganov announced his coalition would file complaints of election law violations, and referred to "the unprecedented mobilization of state resources" to benefit Yeltsin's campaign, he did concede to the election's final results. "The reality is that there are millions of citizens who, consciously or unconsciously, whether under pressure or not, have cast their votes the way they did. It is my duty to respect the rights of citizens and the rules of civilized society." "Buoyant Yeltsin Retains Premier...Communist Rules Out Street Protests," Lee Hockstader, The Washington Post, July 5, 1996.

required by law, the CEC set up a system of absentee certificates to increase opportunities for voter participation and offset the anticipated effects of Russia's notorious summer dacha season on voter turnout.

Voting outside the booth (or open voting) decreased, especially in the second round. This was one troubling aspect of the 1995 State Duma election; open voting prevailed, and while customary for Russians, the practice called into question free voter choice. Compared to 1995, the count went much more smoothly (although it must be admitted that the ballot was much less complicated); procedures set out in law were generally followed. In addition, unlike the 1995 State Duma election in which IRI delegates observed military involvement at certain polling sites that raised concerns of military control over voting of troops, the 1996 presidential election delegates saw fewer incidents of such behavior by military leaders.

The 1996 presidential election did produce several concerns, however. For example, the enthusiasm by the Central Election Commission and its regional and local election commissions for increasing voter participation resulted in the most widespread use of the mobile ballot box yet seen in Russia and therefore created concerns over ballot security. In addition, while a seemingly orderly system was in place for the provision and use of absentee certificates, the potential existed for abuse. The well-known advantages that a high voter turnout offers an incumbent president makes it difficult to ignore the possibility that these efforts were politically motivated.

Objectivity by the media was, in general, lacking. This is a particular concern since media outlets, even certain aspects of private media, are still controlled by the state. In the face of a possible victory by candidates unfavorable to a free press this might be understandable, but media fairness and balance are crucial to democracy and should never be taken lightly. On the campaign finance front, while difficult to prove, there can be little doubt that more money was spent than was reported in this campaign. As noted by previous IRI delegations, an enforced system for reporting and tracking campaign expenditures is crucial to the financial integrity of Russia's electoral process. There is tremendous need for public disclosure of campaign funding sources. This would help dispel rumors, charges, and countercharges that characterize discussion of money in Russian politics today.

The outcome of the presidential election is one that gives hope to Russia's future. In the 1995 State Duma elections, the strong showing of anti-democratic political parties was troubling. The Russian people clearly sent a message to pro-reform leaders in that election. The incumbent president and pro-reform parties took that message to heart. Now comes the real test -- whether a free market economy and rule of law become the order of the day -- whether promises to end the war in Chechnya and to fight crime and corruption are kept. The President and the State Duma have less than four years to accomplish these tasks. The gubernatorial and oblast and local elections scheduled over the next months are providing another opportunity for the Russian people to send a message to their leaders.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommendations that could increase transparency, solidify the election process and, most important, add to Russian voter confidence in future elections.

### CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

**Issue 1:** A number of Russian political experts and leaders question the Central Election Commission's independence from influence by the government and its ability to implement impartially the election law. These concerns were heightened and substantiated by the extraordinary steps the Commission took to maximize voter turnout for the July 3 runoff, a clear priority of the Yeltsin campaign. In the week before the runoff, the CEC instructed regional election commission chairmen to place mobile ballot boxes at major transit points within their areas of jurisdiction to ensure that summer travelers would have the greatest possible opportunity to vote. The CEC's last minute instructions caused confusion among local election administrators and effectively, even if inadvertently, sanctioned uses of the mobile ballot box that were clearly not in compliance with the election law.

**Recommendation:** Steps should be taken to strengthen the independence of the Central Election Commission and to insulate it from pressures exerted by either the executive or legislative branches of the Russian government. The CEC should be a truly independent, autonomous agency with clearly defined enforcement powers and budget authority. While the CEC's efforts to make it possible for the maximum number of Russian citizens to participate in the electoral process are laudable, responsibility for encouraging Russian citizens to vote on election day should rest with political parties, candidates for elective office, and Russian civic organizations.

**Issue 2:** The presidential election law provides that absentee certificates be made available to Russian voters unable to be present at their regular polling site on election day. While IRI observers noted the absentee voting procedure was followed for the most part, they did question the reliability of these procedures and noted no other cross-referencing mechanism was used for checking double voting. In addition, observers noted instances in which local election chairmen issued certificates on election day to voters who did not live in their locale, a clear violation of the law.

**Recommendation:** IRI recommends that every consideration be given to amending the presidential election law to establish a more credible absentee ballot system, such as the early voting system used in the State Duma elections. At the least, a clearly defined absentee voting procedure that removes all subjectivity from the process should be put in place. A well-designed and well-administered early/absentee voting system would be preferable to the widespread use of the mobile ballot box. Perhaps consideration should be given to changing the date of the presidential election so as not to coincide with the summer travel season.



**Issue 3:** The Central Election Commission's plan for releasing election results was an improvement over 1995. In 1995 the CEC had increased its computer capability, set up an impressive election night center in the Federation Council's parliamentary center, and set forth procedures for providing protocols to the appropriate electoral commissions, observers, and media. Yet, official overall results were not available until 12 days after the election. For the 1996 election, the CEC released results in a much more timely fashion. Overall results for the June 16 election were released by June 20, and for the July 3 runoff, July 9. However, as in December 1995, the CEC closed its election night center from 3 a.m. to 8 a.m. citing that election workers needed a break and that hourly updates were not necessary because so few results would come in during that time-frame.

**Recommendation:** In future national elections, the CEC should make every effort to provide hourly tallies throughout election night and into the morning as results come in from the regions. It should continue to work with its auxiliary bodies to ensure results are announced with speed, while not impairing accuracy, to increase the confidence and transparency of future elections.

**Issue 4:** By law, Russia's Central Election Commission must publish final results of the presidential election three months after election day. This is positive as it demonstrates a willingness to have transparency in the electoral system. However, while national, subject, and territorial results are included in this publication, results from local polling stations are not.

**Recommendation:** While requiring time and resources, the Central Election Commission's publication of the final election tallies should include results from local polling places. Many who were concerned about vote manipulation in the presidential election were convinced fraud would happen at the territorial level. While the precinct protocols tracked through the territorial and subject levels by IRI did not show significant or troublesome discrepancies in the figures presented in the CEC's published final results, the absence of local polling station results only fuels fears or suspicions of vote manipulation.

## **CEC GUIDELINES/PROTOCOLS --**

**Issue 5:** Polling site commissioners were thoroughly trained on voting procedures. However, counting procedures were left to the local election chairman's discretion resulting in counting methods varying from station to station. At several sites monitored, IRI delegates observed no attempts to double check figures; at other sites, poll workers arbitrarily changed numbers on the protocols to reconcile them with numbers of ballots spoiled, unspoiled, etc. It was clear many local polling chairmen were confused by the CEC's guidance on uniform counting procedures on the internal reconciliation of the protocol. Specifically, the CEC's guidance was vague on whether the number for line 9 (invalid ballots) should have included unmarked ballots, which are also reported on line 10.



**Recommendation:** This is an area IRI observers believe could provide opportunity for fraud and abuse. While the protocol adjustments witnessed would not have changed the final outcome of the vote, in a close election, such arbitrary changes would not need to happen systematically to skew an outcome or at least undermine confidence in the result. Rather than being concerned about the sanctity of the vote, local and territorial commissioners' were focused on making the numbers come out right. The CEC should make every effort to review its procedures for counting and reporting figures on protocols. It should design protocols that are clearer and easier to fill out. It should ensure that polling site commissioners are consistently trained in both voting and counting procedures.

## **POLLING SITES AND PARTISANSHIP**

**Issue 6:** Delegates who observed in Voronezh noted several polling sites were located in the same buildings as party or candidate headquarters, in some cases directly across the hall. In addition, IRI observers witnessed instances in which local election commissioners were open about their affiliation with a political party or candidate. One example was in Voronezh where campaign workers claimed to have competed for control of local election commissions.

**Recommendation:** In addition to this being a possible violation of the law, partisan presence in any form close to the polling site clearly jeopardizes the integrity of the election process. Polling sites should be located in separate buildings from party offices or campaign headquarters. The CEC should also ensure that local election commissioners avoid any partisan activity that compromises the election process.

**Issue 7:** Several IRI delegates noted ballot boxes in some polling sites were located out of view of the polling commissioners, behind the voting booths or in far corners. Though this is a situation that vastly improved compared to the December 1995 election in which ballot boxes in most polling stations were hidden from view, all polling officials should be able to see the ballot box at all times.

**Recommendation:** The Central Election Commission and its regional commissions should ensure that all local election chairmen place the ballot box in view of all poll workers on election day.

## **VOTING OUTSIDE THE BOOTH (OPEN VOTING)**

**Issue 8:** In the December 1995 State Duma election, IRI observers noted voters marking ballots outside the voting booth in every city and polling station visited. In the presidential election, IRI delegates observed this practice still in place but to a lesser degree. Fewer tables and chairs were present in voting stations, and in the runoff they were absent in many sites. In addition, more polling booths were made available. The CEC and its affiliates are to be congratulated for these

improvements. Still, there were areas of the country in which the use of tables and chairs continued to prevail, particularly in the rural areas and at polling sites on military bases or proximate to bases. There were also reports of "family voting," when more than one voter - usually a husband and wife - go into a voting booth at one time.

**Recommendation:** The CEC should continue to educate and reinforce with Russian voters the importance of the secret ballot. Regional and local election commissions should strive to ensure layouts of all polling stations are conducive to voting in the privacy of the voting booth. All polling stations should be empty of tables and chairs that might encourage voting outside the booth.

## **MILITARY VOTING**

**Issue 9:** In St. Petersburg, in several instances, IRI delegates witnessed commanding officers openly directing recruits to vote at tables placed in the polling sites rather than in the polling booths. While IRI delegates overall saw more recruits using polling booths compared to the December 1995 State Duma election, the continuation of this practice by commanding officers is troubling.

**Recommendation:** The sanctity of the secret ballot is of vital importance to the integrity of the Russian electoral process. Military leaders have the responsibility to ensure that every recruit and officer has the opportunity to vote. In many cases this will result in officers accompanying enlisted men and women to voting stations, especially if those stations are not located on a military base. In order to insure against the possibility of officers influencing the vote of recruits under their supervision, their presence within the polling station should be prohibited unless they are themselves in the process of voting or serving as polling station commissioners.

## **DOMESTIC OBSERVERS**

**Issue 10:** Unlike the 1993 and 1995 elections, party poll watchers from across the political spectrum were present at most polling stations. In the runoff, Communist Party poll watchers were more numerous and more consistently present but Yeltsin observers were nonetheless numerous and provided good coverage. However, there were incidents in which domestic poll watchers did not appear properly trained or may have deliberately stepped over the bounds of appropriate behavior by participating in the ballot counting. In addition, the overt presence of local administration officials or police security at some polling sites caused concern.

**Recommendation:** Party organizations have a responsibility to ensure that their poll watchers have a clear understanding of their responsibilities as election monitors. Their presence provides an important disincentive for voter fraud and also provides an external basis for judging the validity of the official count. IRI continues to encourage all political parties to

recruit and train domestic poll watchers to monitor the process properly, according to the letter of the law. Also, the Central Election Commission and its counterparts have the responsibility to ensure that local officials, both election and security, have a full appreciation of their proper role in elections.

## **CAMPAIGN FINANCE**

**Issue 11:** Campaign finance is a complicated issue in Western countries, much less in a burgeoning democracy such as Russia where cash transactions predominate. It is an issue with many sides, ranging from whether controls infringe on the rights of individuals or groups to participate in the political process through financial contributions, to concerns over potentially corrupting powers of money in campaigns. Clearly, campaign finance in Russia's presidential election was an issue of concern among candidates, campaigns, voters, media, and all observers. Though the CEC's expenditure report published in August 1996 showed Boris Yeltsin's campaign kept within expenditure limits, many questioned the report's veracity. Some estimated Yeltsin's campaign political advertising alone exceeded that amount.<sup>2</sup> In addition, many questioned whether government money was used for the incumbent president's reelection. Nevertheless, there is just not an effective mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing prior to the election. The current presidential law does not require candidate disclosure until 30 days after the publication of election results<sup>3</sup> and the Central Election Commission is not given the mandate or the resources to investigate complaints of unreported contributions or independent expenditures.

**Recommendation:** The campaign financial disclosure portion of the Presidential election law should be strengthened to give the CEC clear jurisdiction and investigative and enforcement authority regarding campaign finance monitoring.<sup>4</sup> The law should strive to provide scheduled

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<sup>2</sup> "Prosecutor Investigates Detention of Officials," Patrick Henry, Moscow Times, June 22, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> Article 28 of the Basic Guarantees Law of Electoral Rights, passed in 1994, suggests periodic reporting prior to election day. The CEC's campaign finance commissioner was diligent in requiring candidates to file reports but did not conduct thorough review of the reports' accuracy.

<sup>4</sup> Members of the Central Election Commission recently asked the State Duma to pass a special law to improve compliance with Russia's campaign finance regulations, according to ITAR-TASS, October 8, 1996. CEC member Viktor Karpunov said all 11 presidential candidates violated at least one of the regulations. According to official CEC figures, President Yeltsin spent about 14.4 billion rubles during the campaign, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Alexander Lebed about 14 billion rubles each, and Gennady Zyuganov about 11.3 billion rubles. Observers agree that these figures are unreliable; in particular, Yeltsin's campaign is believed to have spent many times the amount

disclosure reports prior to election day, establish a system for checking the accuracy of the reports, and provide for enforcement of sanctions under the election law for non-compliance by candidates, political parties, businesses and other entities involved in an election. Given the concerns over the sources of money flowing into campaigns, consideration might be given to establishing a multi-party commission, made up of key leaders of Russia's political parties, to make recommendations to address this issue for future elections.

## **PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA**

**Issue 12:** The Russian media for the most part abided by the law with regard to providing candidates with prescribed broadcast time and purchase of advertising time and space. However, questions arose as to the amount of influence the Yeltsin campaign and regional governments may have had in media coverage of the campaign. IRI delegates reported examples in which government-backed newspapers refused to run ads for candidates, and government officials issued veiled threats to media if they provided certain candidates coverage.

**Recommendation:** National and local government authorities and media leaders should refrain from attempts to control news and take steps to strengthen the media's independence to ensure freedom of the press. An essential ingredient of a healthy democracy is the existence of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations.

**Issue 13:** Complaints were consistent and frequent among presidential candidates and campaigns about the extreme bias Russian journalists and print and broadcast editors demonstrated in favor of the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin.<sup>5</sup> Many Russian journalists freely admitted their bias, giving the excuse that there would be no free press if a communist or ultra-nationalist candidate won the race.

**Recommendation:** It is understandable that the Russian media would take such a stance on the heels of decades of communist suppression of the press. Certainly journalists in Western democracies express views that clearly favor one candidate or one side of an issue. The debate over the proper role of the media is constant in our own country, not only among political leaders and academics but the media itself. However, Russian journalists and media leaders have a responsibility to their profession and Russia's developing democracy to inculcate a sense of fair

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officially declared. OMRI, October 9, 1996.

<sup>5</sup> A study by the European Institute for the Media shows that in the first round alone, 53 percent of broadcasting time was devoted to Boris Yeltsin, 18 percent to Gennady Zyuganov, with all other candidates receiving 7 percent of the time or less. Preliminary Report, "Media and the Russian Presidential Elections...European Monitors Criticise Russian Media Coverage--Presidential Election," The European Institute for the Media, July 4, 1996.

and objective media standards. Russian journalists should recognize that with freedom to express views or opinions comes an obligation to the electorate to provide balanced coverage of the news.

### III. ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

The 1996 presidential election represented another critical step in Russia's effort to develop and implement the legal and administrative framework for consistently free and fair elections and the peaceful transfer of political power. This election for Russia's leader was the first organized under a new presidential election law adopted in May 1995.

The election was administered by a four-tiered system of election commissions, at the top of which is the Central Election Commission (CEC). The CEC is responsible for final tabulation and reporting of the national vote, as well as for overseeing activities of subject, territorial, and polling station election commissions. It is also responsible for registering candidates for the presidency, and ensuring their equal treatment under the election law. The CEC allocates public funds for the preparation and conduct of the election, and arbitrates complaints appealed from the lower commissions. Decisions taken by the CEC are legally binding.

The CEC consists of 15 members, five of whom were proposed and approved by the State Duma. Five CEC members are appointed by the President of the Russian Federation. The final five Commission members are appointed by the Federation Council from candidates proposed by the legislative and executive branches of government. All CEC members must have higher juridical education or a degree in law.

Next in authority below the CEC are the election commissions of the 89 administrative subjects (often called regions or oblasts, comparable to states) of the Russian Federation. The Subject Election Commissions (SECs) must by law consist of between 10 and 14 members. No less than half of the members must be appointed by the regional legislature, or duma, with the rest being appointed by the regional governor. The SECs are responsible for tabulating votes at the regional level and forwarding them to the CEC. The SECs also coordinate activities within their region, printing ballots, arbitrating complaints and acting as a liaison between the CEC and the lower commissions. Both the Central Election Commission and the Subject Election Commissions are permanently established bodies whose members sit for a term of four years.

Below the Subject Election Commissions are the 2,700 Territorial Elections Commissions (TECs), which have jurisdiction within particular cities or counties. The TECs are composed of 5 to 10 members appointed by the local government and must be formed no later than 60 days before the election. TECs train poll workers, arbitrate complaints, deliver ballots to the polling stations and generally coordinate activities among the polling stations. They are also responsible for tabulating votes from the territory and passing that information up to the SECs.

Finally, individual Polling Station Commissions (PSCs) organize and update voter lists at their individual station (the law stipulates that no more than 3,000 voters will be registered on the list of any single polling station), prepare and oversee the voting process, tabulate and report the election results at the individual polling stations, and pass their protocols up to the Territorial

Commissions. They are composed of 5 to 9 members, appointed by local government bodies, and must be organized no later than 44 days prior to the election.

Each registered candidate is allowed to appoint a representative to serve on each and every commission at every level. The candidate's representatives serve as "members with deliberative vote." These representatives were allowed to participate at commission meetings, raise issues and engage in debates and discussion, but they were not entitled to a vote when decisions were formally adopted. Their presence ensured that candidates stayed informed of the activities and decisions of election commissions at all levels.

### **Voting Procedure**

Voters received one ballot when they entered the polling station. Voters indicated their choice by placing an "X" or any other mark in a box located to the right of the individual candidate of their choice. Voters also had the option of voting against all candidates. The presidential election law also provided for absentee certificate voting, which allowed Russians to vote on election day outside their normal polling site. The procedure is as follows. The voter applied to his or her local election commission for a certificate and signed for it. The commission recorded the voter's name on a special list. When the voter went to a polling site in another part of the region or country, he or she presented the certificate. An election worker recorded the voter's name on the supplemental voter list, stamped the certificate, and returned it to the voter for use in the runoff.

## **MISSION FRAMEWORK**

Both teams of observers received guidelines and other information in briefings held June 4 and June 25, respectively, and briefing books that included the election law, duties of observers, city profiles, and other important information. The first delegation departed the U.S. June 10 and arrived in Moscow June 11. The second delegation departed the U.S. June 27 and arrived June 28. The day after each delegation's arrival, a series of briefings were held with national authorities involved in election administration, party leaders and candidate representatives, and U.S. embassy officials.

On June 13 and June 29, the observers divided into teams and, accompanied by IRI staff, deployed to nine cities in Russia: Moscow, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov-na-Donu, Volgograd, Voronezh, St. Petersburg, and Kemerovo. A tenth team observed voting by Russians living in Crimea, Ukraine. With the exception of Kemerovo and Crimea, the deployment cities represent the core regional centers where IRI training and consultations with party activists, elected officials, and women and youth groups have been carried out over the past two years. IRI has conducted training in Kemerovo in the past and chose the city for observation because of concerns voiced by IRI contacts of possible vote manipulation. In order to gain even deeper and more specific understanding of the environment in which they would be working, the observers



participated in a second round of similar meetings with local election officials, party leaders, candidates, and members of the media.

Consistent with IRI policy, the election observers were not tasked with making simple findings as to whether the election could be categorized as free and fair. The observers' broader goal was to observe implemented improvements made in Russia's election administration, using the December 1995 State Duma elections as a point of departure, and to recommend further refinements to the law and the process.

Throughout election day on June 16 and again on July 3, IRI observers visited more than 100 polling stations in each round. They were present at the opening and closing of selected stations in their regions, monitored ballot counts, and tracked delivery of the precinct protocol to the territorial level. Observers sought to cover a diverse geographic cross-section, traveling to urban and especially rural areas. The mandate of the observers was to observe, and not to interject themselves in the balloting process, even if they felt it was being compromised. Observers were permitted to question election officials, but not to suggest any immediate modifications in their behavior that could be construed as interference.

Members of the delegation identified both strengths and weaknesses of the system under two broad categories: electoral environment and election administration.

## **ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT**

Delegation members were asked to observe the state of the electoral environment to determine whether there had been pervasive or systematic efforts to prevent open debate and fair competition among the candidates or political parties. How well organized were the presidential campaigns? Did voters appear adequately informed regarding who and what they were being asked to vote for? Did parties and candidates have fair and equal access to publicly provided campaign funds? Was the local broadcast media providing candidates with allotted time as required by law? Was there evidence of systematic media bias, or efforts to selectively deny parties or candidates access to the media? Were local election commissions providing the political parties and candidates with accurate and timely information? These issues characterized the pre-election environment and were of special concern in a country such as Russia where vestiges of a totalitarian, state-dominated past linger.

## **ELECTION ADMINISTRATION**

An equitable and consistent administration of the voting process is necessary to ensure a legitimate outcome. Observers were asked to evaluate activities that are the core of effective election administration: recruitment and training of polling station workers; the production and distribution of ballots and the legibility of those ballots; the availability and security of voting



booths and ballot boxes; the tabulation and tracking of ballots at the various commission levels (local, territorial, subject and the CEC), and the reporting of results. This evaluation extends to an examination of the election law to determine whether it contains clear guidelines and procedures, or if vague and ambiguous language might allow wide administrative discretion and, consequently, inconsistent application of the law.

Observers examined the process with a critical eye toward opportunity or motive to commit ballot fraud and abuse. Observers performed random checks for fraudulent voting practices while providing a disincentive against such practices by their presence. In particular, they looked for evidence of willful tampering with or destruction of ballots, multiple voting, efforts to influence voters at or around polling sites through bribery or intimidation, and manipulation of the ballot count.

## IV. DELEGATE OBSERVATIONS

### CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

Under provisions of the presidential election law, candidates were nominated either by an accredited electoral association, an electoral bloc composed of two or more associations, or an "initiative voters group" composed of at least 100 persons. In all cases, nominations were sent to and reviewed by the Central Election Commission. The CEC had five days to determine if the nomination submitted was in compliance with the requirements and conditions of the law. If so, a registration certificate was presented to the candidate by the CEC. If the CEC refused to register a nominating group, the decision could be appealed to the Supreme Court, which had three days to adjudicate the appeal.

Presentation of the registration certificate entitled representatives of the electoral association, bloc, or initiative voters group to begin the process of collecting signatures in support of their candidate. Each candidate was required to obtain 1 million signatures on officially authorized signature sheets, with no more than 7 percent of the signatures coming from any one of Russia's 89 administrative regions. Signatures had to come from voters residing in at least 15 of the Russian Federation's 89 subjects. Signature lists were then submitted to the CEC, along with the candidate's statement of income for the previous two years, no later than 60 days prior to the day of the election. The CEC had 10 days in which to officially register the candidate or to state its reasons for refusing to do so. Candidates rejected by the CEC had the option of appealing to the Supreme Court. From the day of official registration, the registrant officially became subject to the rights and duties of a candidate for president.

Registered Russian electoral associations, coalitions of electoral associations, and initiative voters groups presented 78 presidential nominees to the Russian Central Election Commission. A total of 17 nominees met the deadline for submitting the signature lists to the CEC. The Central Election Commission confirmed the validity of 11 signature lists for the following candidates: Boris Yeltsin, Gennady Zyuganov, Alexander Lebed, Grigory Yavlinsky, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Svyatoslav Fedorov, Mikhail Gorbachev, Martin Shakkum, Yuri Vlasov, and Vladimir Bryntsalov, and Aman Tuleev. Two of the 11 were initially rejected, then granted appeals by the Supreme Court; Bryntsalov and Shakkum. The other six denied registration following unsuccessful appeals to the Supreme Court were: Sergei Mavrodi, Vladimir Podoprigora, Artem Tarasov, Galina Starovoitova, Lev Ubozhko and Vyacheslav Ushakov.<sup>6</sup>

Reasons given for CEC rejection included invalid signatures, collecting more than the required 7 percent from one region, non-verifiable signatures, incomplete documentation, among

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<sup>6</sup> Aman Tuleev, presidential candidate from Kemerovo, withdrew from the race June 12 and threw his support behind Gennady Zyuganov.

others. The Central Election Commission's method of verifying signatures was the following: A random sample of approximately 10 percent of the signatures was compared to current voting lists. If significant problems occurred with this sample, or if the number of rejected signatures, by percentage, would bring the registered number below the required 1 million, an increased sample of approximately 35 percent would be checked. Based on the results of checking this sample, the petition would be accepted or rejected. Most of the major party candidates had an invalid signature rate of 10 to 20 percent.

Two major conflicts arose with signature collection. The first was a suit brought by the Communist Party against initiative groups supporting Boris Yeltsin. The suit alleged that officials of the Railroad Ministry, who formed six support groups for Yeltsin, were pressuring railroad workers to sign petitions for the President. The case, decided February 14 by the Central Election Commission, was found not to have merit. The second major conflict revolved around collection of signatures by paid collectors who allegedly were paying people to sign petitions. Several hopeful candidates, who were rejected because the CEC's deemed their signatures invalid because of this practice, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the CEC's decisions.

## THE CAMPAIGN

In Moscow, both delegations met with representatives of the campaigns for various candidates including the incumbent Boris Yeltsin, Grigory Yavlinsky, Mikhail Gorbachev, Martin Shakkum, Gennady Zyuganov, Alexander Lebed, and Yuri Vlasov. Candidate Vladimir Bryntsalov also addressed the delegates. In deployment cities, IRI observer teams met with party leaders and candidate representatives. The delegates monitoring in Moscow attended additional briefings with presidential candidates sponsored by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The candidates included: Svyatslav Fedorov, Mikhail Gorbachev, Martin Shakkum, Gennady Zyuganov, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Victor L. Sheinis represented Grigory Yavlinsky. In general, their concerns centered on media bias, the CEC's ability to monitor spending limits, and the expense of campaigns. Specifically, the focus of discussion was on Yeltsin's dominance of the media and the line between abuse of official power and the power of the incumbent.

Methods used in the campaign by candidates and parties varied. Candidates kept active campaign schedules and traveled to the regions to meet voters. Yeltsin's campaign preyed on fears of returning to the old days of communism and communicated heavily via television and radio advertisements and get-out-the-vote events for youth. Political advertisements focused on themes such as "communists didn't change their name and they won't change their methods." Campaign literature, such as posters, depicted "before" pictures of empty grocery shelves and long lines and "after" pictures of full shelves and no lines. Zyuganov relied on more standard tactics of the Communist Party -- reliance on local organization networks, including existing remnants of the old party cell structure at many work places -- for grassroots activities such as pamphlet and flyer distribution.

Pro-reform parties and political movements were active in this election along with many voters' groups that sprouted up overnight. Yeltsin (though he had refused to align with any party organization) relied specifically on Our Home is Russia which, because it is the so-called party of power, was able to organize strong regional support from many governors and administrators. Yeltsin received endorsements from the national Russia's Democratic Choice, Forward, Russia!, Democratic Russia, Common Cause, Party of Russian Unity and Accord, as well as such groups as Party of People's Self-Rule, Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and Union of Land Owners. Yeltsin also received pro-reform support in the regions, from active chapters of Russia's Democratic Choice, among others. In the runoff, Yeltsin was unable to obtain the unencumbered support of the Yabloko national party but did enjoy the support of many of its regional organizations.

Zyuganov was supported by a national-patriotic coalition which included the Communist Party, Agrarian Party, and like-minded groups such as All Russia's People Movement, Power of the People, and United Workers Front, and others. Zhirinovskiy was supported by his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Alexander Lebed was initially supported by the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) but later had a falling out with Yuri Skokov, one of the movement's leaders. Later in the campaign, KRO's leadership changed and it again supported Lebed. He was also supported by the Democratic Party. Grigory Yavlinsky was supported by Yabloko. Other candidates were supported by various voters' groups, rather than parties.

## **CAMPAIGN FINANCE**

### **Material Resources**

The Central Election Commission received a total of 4 billion rubles (\$810,000) to be disbursed equally among the 11 presidential candidates.<sup>7</sup> Beyond that, candidates had to establish their own election accounts and raise their own campaign funds. The candidate was allowed to receive money from their own funds, the organization that nominated him, individuals and legal entities. Candidates and blocs were not allowed to receive funds from: foreign states, organizations or citizens; charitable organizations; military units and organizations; and local and state government enterprises and organizations.

Candidates' total campaign expenditures could not exceed 250,000 times the minimum monthly Russian wage of 57,600 rubles (\$10.86).<sup>8</sup> Maximum contributions from a candidate's own funds could not exceed 1,000 minimum monthly salaries (\$10,867). Funds allocated by the

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<sup>7</sup> Aman Tuleev is required to repay the federal money deposited in this account and the costs of registering for inclusion on the ballot.

<sup>8</sup> The minimum wage as of the date when the election was called in November 1995.

nominating organization could not exceed 50,000 minimum salaries (\$543,396). Donations by individuals were capped at 50 minimum salaries (\$543), and donations by legal entities (businesses or corporations) could not exceed 5,000 minimum salaries (\$54,339).

### **Campaign Finance Reporting**

In addition to filing the required 1 million signatures, presidential candidates were required to file a personal financial disclosure form with the CEC. Most income reports filed were believed to be greatly under valued. Yeltsin claimed his annual income for 1995 was \$5,054 and Zyuganov claimed to have earned little more than \$6,000 for that year.

Campaign funds were maintained in a temporary account with the Russian Federation Savings Bank (SBER) and its branches. The Basic Guarantees Law of Electoral Rights, passed in 1994, calls for reporting during the campaign period. Banks were required by the CEC to report credits to the accounts weekly. The CEC's commissioner in charge of campaign finance was diligent in requiring periodic financial reports. However, a thorough review was not conducted to check on the accuracy of the reports. The absence of such activity by the CEC raises the issue of whether it is able to adequately investigate such issues in a timely fashion.

Candidates were required to submit financial reports of contributions and expenditures to the CEC no later than 30 days after official publication of the election results.

The CEC concedes it must rely on banks and candidates to accurately report financial contributions and that it does not have the resources necessary to completely and fully audit campaign contributions and expenditures.

Under reporting income and expenditures are common practices in commercial dealings in Russia. Because of the absence of debit checks, contributions are given through bank transfers, or in cash. This practice raises the possibility of unreported contributions and expenses, such as printing, salaries, or office rent, so campaigns keep within spending limits, and vendors pay less in taxes.

Certainly, most political observers believe the reporting did not reflect the reality of campaign contributions and spending. The general perception was that Yeltsin spent more in the first round than was allowed by law. "According to ANR/Amer Nielsen Research, the President spent over \$2.9 million on direct advertising alone."<sup>9</sup> Another estimated \$1.7 million was spent to promote the "Vote or Lose" youth events of the campaign. The Central Election Commission claimed these events were funded by private citizens and were not official campaign events, therefore, falling outside of campaign finance limits. Zyuganov was reported to have spent only

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<sup>9</sup> "Prosecutor Investigates Detention of Officials," Patrick Henry, Moscow Times, June 22, 1996.

\$10,000 on his advertising campaign in the first round,<sup>10</sup> but a Zyuganov campaign official 10 days before the runoff claimed the Communist candidate's campaign was running out of money.<sup>11</sup>

The Central Election Commission published, in its official bulletin, final campaign spending figures for the first round on August 20 and for the runoff on September 17. According to the CEC reports, Yeltsin spent 3 billion rubles more than communist challenger Gennady Zyuganov. Yeltsin spent 14.4 billion rubles (\$2.7 million) while Zyuganov spent 11.3 billion (\$2.1 million). Yeltsin spent 10.3 billion rubles on television and radio, while Zyuganov purchased only 1.5 billion rubles worth of air time. Zyuganov concentrated his resources on print media and flyers. However, few believe these figures reflect actual campaign expenditures. Indeed, the CEC made it clear in publishing the reports it could not be held responsible for the reports' accuracy.

Both candidates received most of their money from corporate contributions and stayed within the legal limit of 14.5 billion rubles. Amounts over the 14.5 billion were returned to contributors, according to candidates' financial reports filed with the CEC.<sup>12</sup> The CEC reported that corporate contributions for presidential candidates totaled \$13.2 million, of which \$2.8 million were received by President Yeltsin's campaign. In addition to corporate donations, according to CEC reports, 2,318 individuals spent 5,830 million rubles (\$1.1 million) and political parties or initiative groups donated 10,600 million rubles (\$2 million) to presidential candidates.

## **MEDIA ISSUES**

### **Media and the Law**

Russia's presidential election law guaranteed that all candidates would get a significant amount of free media time. Each candidate received 30 minutes of free air time on each of the three state-run television networks and radio stations between May 14 and June 14. Scheduling for free air time was determined by lottery. (Yeltsin and Zyuganov received free air time in the second round, time slots determined by lottery.) Some stations objected to the requirement that they provide free air time, as many had yet to be reimbursed by the CEC for the time committed for the 1995 State Duma elections. Several transmitting stations had been unable to pay their operating expenses and threatened to withhold free coverage during the presidential election, a situation aggravated by the fact that the CEC had not budgeted any money to pay stations for the

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> "Zyuganov Strapped for Cash," Associated Press, Moscow Tribune, June 25, 1996.

<sup>12</sup> Regarding contributions returned, see Appendix VI, CEC Summary of Financial Reports Filed by Presidential Candidates.

time they were required to allot to candidates. The Central Election Commission received funds to reimburse the stations for the presidential election; however, the law is unclear as to who is responsible for the expenses. All candidates were scheduled for free time, with relatively few complaints from candidates that they had been hindered or delayed in getting access to free time.

More serious allegations arose over who controlled the content of the candidates' free time; for example, advertisements ran in the context of other, politically hostile programming. The most concrete example involved the bracketing of a regional Zyuganov ad in Novosibirsk with cartoons lampooning the candidate. Zyuganov's campaign also protested that Channel 1-ORT refused to run one of the candidate's advertisements, as requested, and instead ran an earlier ad by Zyuganov that was less critical of the Yeltsin government. ORT countered that Zyuganov had not paid for the air time.<sup>13</sup> Yeltsin, of course, was criticized for using the power of incumbency to increase his visibility to the voters. The CEC rejected such claims of bias.

Different presidential campaigns took different approaches to paid television advertisement based on the expense (published rates were \$8,500 to \$30,500 per minute in prime time) and effectiveness. No candidate was denied the purchase of air time, although the best time went to Yeltsin.

Candidates were also allowed to purchase advertising space in national and local newspapers and journals. The law required newspapers and journals to make advertising space available to all candidates and parties on equal terms. However, there were cases of newspapers denying space to candidates. Campaigns recognized the tendency of voters to see political ads as entertainment in newspapers. As a result, they preferred to spend money paying for favorable "news stories" that they believed would be taken more seriously by readers.

### **Media and Responsibility**

Most Russian voters obtained political information from national TV and radio news programs and from reporting in the major newspapers, rather than from paid political ads. Television news provided a primary source of information and impressions about candidates and parties. For incumbent Boris Yeltsin, this turned out to be a big plus in his campaign.

The European Institute for Media (EIM) monitored presidential election coverage and found in the first round that "53 percent of broadcasting time was devoted to Yeltsin, and 18 percent to Zyuganov, whereas no other candidate got more than 7 percent" and "During prime time news and current affairs broadcasts, Yeltsin's scores of ratings in the two weeks of the second round was Plus 247. Zyuganov, by contrast, had a negative rating of Minus 240. The team calculated references to the two men in terms of positive, neutral, or negative depending on

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<sup>13</sup> "Reds Claim Last TV Appeal Censored," Sophia Coudenhove, Moscow Times, July 2, 1996.



the tone of the mention. This was a clearer way of detecting bias than simply counting how many times a candidate was mentioned.”<sup>14</sup>

Notably, television news covering Yeltsin on the road avoided footage of hecklers and protestors that his presence was known to draw. The usually caustic independent NTV turned unusually gentle in its coverage of the President. The tendency of the major television stations to exhibit a bias toward Yeltsin was no doubt enhanced by the heads of both ORT, Sergei Blagovolin, and NTV, Igor Malaschenko, who served as media and image consultants to the Yeltsin campaign.<sup>15</sup> In the last days of the campaign, Russian television gave relatively little attention to the astonishing disappearance of the previously very active, very visible incumbent president in his reelection fight. Again, according to EIM, Russian journalists displayed a lack of professionalism by readily taking orders from the President’s administration.

In contrast, Gennady Zyuganov received what some termed as high volume, low quality coverage. The candidate was reportedly “badgered, interrupted, and insulted,” during a 20-minute television interview with the host of the state-owned RTR’s weekly news program “Zerlako”. The host concluded the program by drawing analogies between Zyuganov and the early Bolsheviks. References to Zyuganov bringing hard-line communists into a future cabinet if he were to be elected were frequent and ominous. One example was the airing of anti-communist public service messages by state-owned television pegged to the Victory Day holiday on May 9, five days before political ads could legally run on Russian television.

Russian newspapers were clearly divided into two camps -- Yeltsin’s and Zyuganov’s. During one three-week period in which newspaper coverage of the campaign was scrutinized for bias, not one of the 56 stories printed in *Pravda* about Yeltsin were positive. Similarly, none of the 16 stories about Zyuganov in the pro-reform paper *Izvestiya* made even a stab at objectivity.<sup>16</sup>

Campaign messages of the other candidates in the first round was extremely limited. The press focused on Yeltsin and Zyuganov to the virtual exclusion of the other nine.

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<sup>14</sup> EIM’s report clarifies its discussion of positive/negatives comments with graphs, explaining that “...a positive or negative reference was only counted if we judged it to be unequivocal and clear to a large segment of viewers. Subtle references were not included. For instance, if a newscaster or talk show host referred to a candidate’s ‘noble initiative’ or ‘care for the most vulnerable Russians’ this would be interpreted by most viewers as positive.” “Media and the Russian Presidential Elections,” The European Institute for the Media, *op.cit.*

<sup>15</sup> “ORT Chief Denies Imminent Exit,” Sophia Coudenhove, Moscow Times, October 26, 1996.

<sup>16</sup> “Russia’s Free Press Opts Not to Play Fair Before Elections,” Peter Ford, Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1996.



IRI delegates reported government influence on media in regional cities. IRI delegates to Rostov were told by local members of the media that Yeltsin loyalists in the regional government had issued veiled threats in advising them not to provide Gennady Zyuganov coverage in their publications. In Perm, IRI delegates reported that Vladimir Zhirinovsky advertisements were refused by local newspapers run by the government.

Aside from government influence, independent media outlets also were subject to control by their financial benefactors. Most independent stations are owned by one or two large commercial enterprises, which have leverage over their editorial policy. Very few independent media are financed solely by a diverse base of advertising revenue. There were also reports of Yeltsin financial backers spending thousands of dollars to influence journalists to get out anti-communist stories. Other candidates' campaigns, Communist and others, reportedly spent heavily for favorable articles in the press and appearances on popular television shows but none to the extent of Yeltsin backers. This also extended to the regions<sup>17</sup>

## **ELECTION LAW**

The election law governing the 1996 presidential election first passed the State Duma on March 25, 1995 after more than three months consideration. The bill was first rejected by the Federation Council on April 12, 1995. Though the bill was not controversial as was the State Duma election law, a few interesting points were debated in the consideration of the presidential election law. The Federation Council deemed the State Duma's signature requirement to qualify as candidate were too high. The Federation Council wanted the number lowered to 500,000 from the State Duma's requirement of 1.5 million. The compromise was 1 million signatures. The Federation Council wanted to lower the voter turnout threshold to 25 percent rather than 50 percent of total registered voters. The compromise was 50 percent in the first round and no voter threshold in the second. Another proposal put forward in the State Duma draft called for the elimination of private contributions to presidential campaigns. This was ultimately rejected. The Federation Council passed the bill on May 4, and the presidential election legislation was signed into law by President Yeltsin on May 17, 1995.

## **CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION ACTIVITIES**

### **Training**

The Central Election Commission devoted much time and resources to training subordinate election commissions, carrying out the training over several months. With the exception of a few, Russia's election workers observed by IRI delegates clearly understood their duties and the

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<sup>17</sup> "Yeltsin Paying Top Ruble for Positive News Coverage," Lee Hockstader, Washington Post Foreign Service, June 30, 1996.

election law. For the most part, commissions appeared to have conducted thorough training sessions. For example, IRI delegates in Arkhangelsk were especially impressed by the fact the regional election commission had organized a mock election day training session for all precinct polling stations prior to round one balloting. That commission also produced a voter education video, which was shown eight times between June 16 and July 3 to address problems encountered during the first round of voting. The Kemerovo Oblast Commission conducted several training sessions for chairmen and secretaries of the territorial and precinct election commissions prior to the first round of voting. It then took seriously reports about procedural problems that came up in the first round and convened a meeting of election commissioners to review election law and procedures prior to the runoff. Kemerovo delegates reported an improvement at all levels in round two.

In addition to training election workers, the Central Election Commission conducted programs to educate voters of their rights and encourage the participation of younger voters. This opened the CEC to criticism for promoting participation of voter groups favorable to the President.

Overall, training was considered effective although certain aspects of the election law and administrative regulations were open to interpretation. The CEC did not give clear guidelines on its last minute instructions to place mobile ballot boxes in airports, train stations, and boat docks for the run-off. Polling station election commissions developed their own criteria for voting at these transit points. In several cases, traveling voters only had to fill out an application form to vote and were not required to present certificates, others were required to use their absentee certificates.

## **Reporting Results**

During the December 1995 campaign period, many groups across the political spectrum voiced suspicions that the state automated computer system would be used to manipulate the vote. The same concerns remained for the presidential election. The computer system was used in about 85-90 percent of the territorial commissions to forward preliminary results to the CEC. The CEC made it clear that the state automated system was to be used for tabulating preliminary results and official results would come from the actual protocols couriered from the subject commissions to the CEC.

The CEC set up the two-track system for tabulating votes. First, the protocols from polling stations were taken to the territorial commission where the preliminary results were communicated to the CEC by computer, fax or telephone. Then the actual protocols were sent by courier from the territorial commission to the subject commission to the CEC. Since this would take days, the CEC set up an election night center to announce preliminary results hourly to the public. Unfortunately, as in December 1995, the CEC closed the computer room between 3 a.m. and 8 a.m., citing that workers needed a break and that this was the best time since only a few results would trickle in during these hours. The lack of hourly results for this period did

not raise suspicions as last time but certainly lay the CEC open for accusations of vote manipulation. While there is no evidence to suggest the shut down was used for nefarious purposes, it added an element of uncertainty to the process.

By law, the Central Election Commission must publish final results within three months after the election. This publication includes subject and territorial vote totals for each of the 89 regions but does not incorporate totals from the local polling stations. Including local results in this publication admittedly would be a costly and enormous undertaking. However, many who were concerned about vote manipulation in the presidential election were convinced fraud would happen at the territorial level. While voting station protocols obtained by IRI tracked with a high degree of consistency with territorial and oblast protocols, the unavailability of local station results fuels suspicion and makes it more difficult to refute or confirm allegations of vote manipulation.

### **Complaints**

Several high profile cases alleging voter fraud were also brought before the CEC and in some cases to the courts for resolution as well. One occurred in Tartastan in which the first secretary of the Tartastan Communist Party charged that protocol results sent to the CEC were considerably different from those sent to the subject election commission. This case was forwarded to the Supreme Court, which ruled that further investigation was necessary. The Procurator General's office recently stated that it found no discrepancies. The Court has not resumed action on the case. Inaccuracies in the tabulation of votes occurred in the Dagestan Republic, which resulted in a special CEC decision to correct the data in its final protocol. The ballot discrepancy was noted by the Dagestan Election Commission after it officially announced the results in the local media. The Dagestan Election Commission, in calculating its national protocol, had used preliminary totals from the Kazbeck territorial election commission, without referring to the final protocol. The preliminary numbers did not match the final protocol totals. The Dagestan Election Commission recounted the precinct protocols from the Kazbeck territorial commission and on July 11, 1996 corrected the totals. The corrections did not affect the final results, and the case ended there. In Mordova, the CEC found mistakes were made in the reporting of territorial numbers from the Artichevskaya Territorial Election Commission. Corrections were made, again with the adjustments not affecting the outcome of the presidential race. However, the chairman of Mordova's Election Commission was reprimanded and the Republic's prosecutor is investigating the matter further.

### **MILITARY POLLING**

IRI delegates visited several polling sites at which a large percentage of voters were members of the Russian military: Arkhangelsk, Volgograd, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Rostov, and Perm. St. Petersburg delegates visited several polling sites where military members voted and also military installations on the island of Krunstadt, north of the city. Moscow delegates were allowed to observe at the Air Defense Headquarters in Timinovo, a military site where IRI delegates were refused admittance in December 1995. IRI delegates also observed the voting

process at a Military Command School for Communications in Kemerovo, a military base outside of Rostov, and Crimea, where two-thirds of Russian citizens voting were military. There was no evidence to suggest that the election law, as it applies specifically to military personnel, had been circumvented or violated in any systematic way. Unlike December 1995, when delegates reported evidence that some military recruits were subjected to inappropriate encouragement by their commanders and were exposed to group peer pressure, presidential election observers, with a few exceptions, saw soldiers voting and using the voting booths without pressure from their commanding officers.

Delegates did observe irregularities in the following polling sites. In St. Petersburg, in every case in which military voting was observed in the first round, commanding officers were seen directing recruits to vote at tables and chairs where they could be seen voting. IRI delegates were refused permission to observe balloting at a military prison site in Novosibirsk for security reasons. The delegates later reported ballot irregularities related to that site. The site at the Military Command School in Kemerovo displayed editorial messages from Yeltsin and the observers saw one instance of a commanding officer going into the booth with a recruit. The military installation in Novochoerkassk, outside of Rostov, had a mobile ballot box at its disposal from a nearby polling site for new recruits, cooks, and sick soldiers. There, delegates observed lax voting procedures, with no private area provided for the soldiers voting.

Crimea, while viewed internationally as an integral part of Ukraine, is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, its sailors and dependents. The IRI team did not witness serious or deliberate violations but did take note of the following: at a site in Sevastopol, they were told by the election chairman that satellite voting sites were operating on naval ships in the harbor. They were told that these sites were not open to observers, and that all sailors had voted before noon with the majority of votes going to Yeltsin.

It is important to note that days before the first round, on June 3, then Defense Minister Pavel Grachev announced that sailors participating in early balloting, because they would be at sea on election day, had voted unanimously for the President. Russian public television (ORT) claimed the defense minister had violated the election law by revealing early votes and that the sailors' ballots would be canceled. The CEC's investigation of the assertion resulted in Chairman Ryabov determining the secrecy of the ballots was not violated and that Grachev's remarks were his own opinion.

## **POLLING STATIONS**

IRI observers gave polling stations overall better reviews than in December. Many stations had better layouts than in December when so many of the polling stations' physical arrangements were not conducive to voting in private. Most polling stations were better prepared for high voter turnout (Kemerovo and Voronezh were exceptions). For the most part, there were more polling booths and less tables and chairs that encouraged open voting. In general, more

ballot boxes were located where election workers could see them. Local election commissions publicized polling sites in newspapers and in certain areas mailed invitation letters to voters telling them where to vote. However, many sites had served as polling sites for years so that local residents knew where they were located; most sites were in traditional locations, such as schools or administration buildings. Delegates observing in Voronezh, however, did report several polling sites located in the same buildings as campaign or party headquarters.

## **CAMPAIGN LITERATURE AT SITES**

For the most part, IRI observers did not witness overt campaigning at polling sites. They did report the following: since several polling sites in Voronezh were in facilities shared by political parties or campaigns, voters were subject to posters and murals that, though not technically campaign literature, communicated a partisan message. Most sites in Voronezh displayed at the registration desks copies of the Russian Constitution that featured a cover note from the President. This also occurred in Perm where local election chairmen distributed copies of the constitution; both Communist Party and Yabloko officials objected because of the Yeltsin quote. In Crimea, a limited number of campaign posters of Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy were placed at a few sites, although no active campaigning was witnessed. At one military voting station in Kemerovo, someone had posted a letter and a copy of a speech by the President to the armed forces, in addition to a news article favorable to the President.

## **BALLOT SECURITY**

The ballots for the election and runoff were produced and duplicated in the regions. It was the responsibility of the subject commission to deliver the ballots to the territorial commissions, who would then deliver the ballots to the polling sites. The number delivered was determined by the number of voters registered in that polling site. For a ballot to be valid, the polling site commissioner counted, signed and stamped the valid ballots for the election, then placed them in a safe until the morning of the election. This practice was followed for the polling stations that IRI delegates observed. Only Voronezh delegates reported incidents in which polling sites were initially not given enough ballots, but the problem was rectified and no site ran out of ballots as they did in December.

There appears to have been no direct evidence, or strong reason to suspect, that systematic ballot fraud occurred in any of the regions where IRI delegates observed. Delegates were able to confirm that ballots had been properly delivered to polling stations within the prescribed time frame, secured prior to election day, and properly validated.

By law, candidates' names must be withdrawn no later than 15 days prior to the election in order not to appear on the printed ballot; after that, changes must be made by hand. Aman Tuleev withdrew from the race after the ballots were printed. All ballots were marked to reflect

the candidate's withdrawal but not in any standard way. Also, in Voronezh, poll workers did not have time prior to election day to strike Tuleev's name from the ballot and were doing so on election day.

In general, ballot boxes were placed within sight of election workers. However, delegates reported several sites where ballot boxes were not kept in sight of polling station commissioners during election day, either as a result of poor planning or unexpected large crowds. In Kemerovo, ballot boxes in a large number of precincts were placed out of commissioners' view.

With the exception of a polling site in Voronezh the first round, unused ballots were properly destroyed at the close of polling stations where IRI observers were present. Rostov and Moscow delegates reported that counted ballots were haphazardly bundled and insecurely stored at both the polling site level and the territorial level. Should a recount of the vote have been necessary, serious difficulties might have been encountered.

## **VOTING PROCEDURES**

IRI delegates reported that voting procedures at most polling stations were overall orderly and standard. There appeared to have been generally uniform and adequate procedures for verifying the identity of voters. There were a few reports of problems or irregularities involving voter lists, largely due to the confusion over voting certificates and the last minute instructions by the CEC to make mobile ballot boxes available in airports, sea ports, and train stations. One problem arose in Moscow during the first round in which a complete apartment bloc of 500 people were left off the list at a polling station. Moscow had recently undergone redistricting, which may account for the error but caused a tremendous amount of confusion.

In the second round in Perm, IRI delegates were told by the oblast election commissioner that 25,000 names had been added recently to that region's voter list. While this was less than 1 percent of the total voting population, IRI delegates questioned why the additions were being made at that time when the election law is clear that voting lists are to be updated well in advance of the election. Reasons given were Russians turning the voting age, people moving to the area, people taking holiday in the Ural mountain area where Perm is located. Crimea had a particularly sticky problem at a precinct in which in the first round the polling site chairman had allowed Russians to vote without proper identification due to an unexpected large turnout. By the second round, the chairman had been replaced and voters who did not have properly stamped passports were turned away. This is clearly an example of poor voter education and dissemination of information.

The election law specifically states that ballots should be marked in the voting booth with only the voter present. In December 1995, few Russians used polling booths either because of tables and chairs set out at the site that encouraged discussion about and marking of ballots in the open or because an inadequate number of booths was available. In the presidential election, open



voting was greatly reduced in cities IRI delegates observed, especially in the second round. In the second, many polling sites no longer offered tables and chairs as an alternative place to cast votes, and had increased the number of polling booths. A few incidents of families voting in the booth together occurred without any attempt by election workers to enforce the law. But given that family voting was traditionally allowed in the old Soviet system, the diminishing number of incidents reported suggests positive development.

#### **USE OF ABSENTEE CERTIFICATES (Certificate of the Right to Participate)**

Absentee certificates allowed Russians to vote in electoral precincts outside their regular polling stations. Voters applied to their local election commission for the certificate. The name of the certificate user was recorded on a list of voters at the local election commission. When the voter used the certificate to vote at another site, the certificate was stamped and returned to the voter for use in the second round. This system, although it appeared to work without substantive problems, did cause concerns over possible abuse of people voting twice. In the first round, 1,062,068 absentee vouchers were issued with 852,043 used. In the runoff, 1,834,398 certificates were issued with 1,483,262 voters using the certificates to vote.

The following are examples of confusion over and the variety of uses of absentee certificates. In Crimea, where a large number of Russian nationals travel for summer holiday, voters were allowed to cast ballots without use of certificates. They simply had to fill out a form stating they were either vacationing or there on business. In Perm, IRI delegates reported the Perm Oblast Election Chairman had given individual polling site chairmen the authority to issue absentee certificates to unregistered voters on election day. In St. Petersburg, in the runoff, delegates reported there was confusion over whether voters who had voted outside their home districts June 16 with an absentee voucher could be allowed to vote in their home district July 3. In one instance, the voter had to sign an affidavit that her certificate had not already been used in the runoff. In the second instance, the voter had lost his certificate and so was not allowed to vote at all.

#### **MOBILE BALLOT BOXES**

In its effort to give Russian voters the opportunity to vote, the Central Election Commission may have been overzealous in making the mobile ballot box available. A week or so before the second round, the CEC sent a telegram to subject election commission chairmen (see Appendix V) instructing them to "organize voting places in airports, sea ports, river ports, and railway stations." The telegram specifically instructed the chairmen to use "mobile voting boxes" to accomplish this, to make at least two local election commissioners available to ensure that procedures were followed and that observers were to be accommodated. However, no system was in place for cross referencing whether a voter had cast a ballot in his or her district that morning and voted again enroute to holiday. In addition, subject election commissioners took wide berth

in interpreting either the election law or the last-minute instructions on mobile ballot boxes. For example, in Volgograd, the oblast commissioner stated that voters at airports, train stations, etc., would not be required to show certificates. While the CEC claims less than 1 percent of voters used this method, the broad application the mobile ballot box use was troubling.

In nearly all polling sites observed by IRI delegates, procedures regarding mobile ballot boxes appeared to have been followed. There appeared no significant evidence of unaccounted for ballots. However, there were instances in which clear violations of the law occurred with regard to the mobile ballot box. In Novosibirsk, for example, IRI delegates observed election workers taking out a mobile ballot box with more ballots than requests. The reason given was to save time; the workers would call the election commission secretary to see if new requests had come in and make stops without having to return to the polling site first. Delegates in Voronezh reported an exceptionally high number of ballots being cast via the mobile ballot box. In that city, observers noted a general pattern of disregard for the requirement that the mobile box be made available only by request, that the number of blank ballots be no greater than the number of requests, and carelessness with the voter list. In Perm, IRI observers witnessed cases in which polling station chairmen in rural precincts sent mobile boxes along with an indeterminate number of ballots to outlying communities without having previously received requests for boxes. This also occurred in Rostov.

In St. Petersburg, IRI delegates found two instances in which mobile boxes were made available to incapacitated voters on the basis of local commission members' knowledge of their need rather than by formal request. One chairman allowed the voter list to accompany the mobile ballot box, a clear violation of the election law. Prior to the runoff election, two rural polling station chairmen in Leningrad Oblast canvassed area villages to see if voters wanted the mobile box. Both stations had a large number of requests, 175 and 145, respectively.

## **DOMESTIC OBSERVERS**

The numbers of pollwatchers increased markedly in this presidential election compared to the December 1995 State Duma election. As in December, throughout the election day, IRI delegates reported that pollwatchers were present at a very high percentage of all polling stations visited. However, in December, most were representatives of the Communist Party, with pollwatchers from reform and centrist parties generally absent.

In the presidential election, based on interviews with the pollwatchers and election commissioners, pollwatchers were present during the critical opening and closing phases of the election day process at most voting stations. The pollwatchers with whom IRI delegates spoke throughout the day did not substantially contradict what the delegates themselves were seeing; isolated instances where more serious breaches of procedure had taken place, but no evidence to suggest that the underlying integrity of the balloting was threatened.



In general, the delegates reported that the pollwatchers with whom they spoke were adequately informed and conscientious in their work. There were, however, several reported instances in which pollwatchers deviated from procedure and overstepped their bounds. In Kemerovo, in the first round, domestic poll watchers representing Zyuganov were extremely critical of the election commission during the counting process, so much so the local election chairman threatened them with expulsion. According to IRI observers the count was careful and transparent. But when the results were announced in Yeltsin's favor, the pollwatchers reacted with hostility and charged the commissioners had purposefully miscounted. (The territory and Kemerovo Oblast went for Zyuganov.) In Volgograd, in the first round, a domestic poll watcher for KPRF, the only one present, assisted in vote tabulation. In Moscow, at one precinct, a Yeltsin poll watcher assisted in ballot sorting; this also occurred in St. Petersburg. In Rostov, one poll watcher was allowed to handle a mobile ballot box.

## BALLOT COUNTING

This is an area in which improvement was witnessed by IRI election delegates. In December 1995, the vote count was on the whole disorderly and confused.<sup>18</sup> In both June 16 and July 3 rounds, the vote count observed by IRI observers went much more smoothly, although there were polling sites in which procedures were not completely followed. In Arkhangelsk, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Crimea, Novosibirsk, and Perm only minor difficulties arose, such as confusion over the election law or minor "sequencing" irregularities in the ballot count. In some precincts, particularly in Moscow, the internal reconciliation of the protocol caused much confusion. In both Rostov, Novosibirsk, Volgograd, and Kemerovo, poll workers had difficulty getting their protocols to properly total, but the discrepancies were small - usually no more than 5 votes - and not significant with respect to vote totals for the candidates. Rostov election commissioners had a particularly complex count in the second round due to three voters casting ballots in a box in the adjacent polling station. (It is not uncommon for two, three or even four polling stations to be organized in proximate locations in the same building.) But the commissioners were diligent in solving the discrepancy and observers were impressed with their diligence in preserving the integrity of the process. In addition, bundling and storage of ballots was done properly and according to procedure with the exception of Rostov (and one precinct in

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<sup>18</sup> In part, this was attributed to the unexpected high voter turnout on election day. Several polling station chairmen or chairwomen were described as being overwhelmed by the sheer number of ballots to be arranged and counted. The fundamental problem, however, seems to have been rooted in poor preparation and/or ignorance of proper procedure. That the problems were so apparent and widespread is especially notable given the contrast with the generally orderly and procedurally correct counting process observed by IRI delegates during the last national election in December 1993. See page 23 of IRI's State Duma Election Observation Report, December 17, 1995.

Moscow), where ballots were not properly sealed after the count nor stored properly at the territorial commission.

With the exception of Voronezh and one polling station in Novosibirsk during round one, all observers were able to obtain copies of the precinct protocol on the spot as well as copies of the territorial protocols. IRI staff who remained in the observed cities to track had little trouble obtaining oblast protocols.

## V. DEPLOYMENT REGIONS

### ARKHANGELSK

The Arkhangelsk Oblast is located in the northern portion of European Russia, 618 miles north of Moscow and adjacent to the Arctic Ocean. It is populated with 1,577,000 people who live in one of the region's 13 cities or 38 towns. The region is divided into 20 rayons or administrative districts. The capital, which is also named Arkhangelsk, is situated on the Dvina River about 25 miles from the White Sea. Almost a third of the region's population lives in Arkhangelsk city (population 428,200).

In response to the strong showing of communist and ultra nationalist candidates in the State Duma election of December 1995, oblast Governor Pavel Balakshin was abruptly dismissed by President Yeltsin. Balakshin chaired the local chapter of Our Home is Russia, the reform movement identified with the President. Yeltsin appointed loyalists Anatoli Yefremov and Pavel Pozdeev as the new governor and presidential representative, respectively. Their efforts, combined with a May visit by Yeltsin during which he signed presidential decrees to support local industries and pay back wages to workers, succeeded in breaking what looked like an emerging communist stronghold in the region. Yeltsin won a strong plurality of the vote - 41.3 percent - in the first round of the election on June 16, and overwhelmed his Communist Party rival by 64.5 percent to 28 percent in the July 3 runoff election. The Arkhangelsk Oblast Legislative Assembly was also elected on June 16, making this one of the relatively few places where voters were asked to cast more than a single ballot.

The IRI observation team in Arkhangelsk for round one of the election consisted of delegate Harry Singleton, IRI Program Officer Mary Schwarz and IRI Assistant Program Officer Aleksei Korlyakov. The round two team included Thomas Herman, Lynn Urbanski, Ms. Schwarz and Assistant Program Officer Alexander Kupriyanov.

Based on meetings with local political party leaders; election administrators and representatives of the media, the delegates found no reason to believe that any candidate or party had been prohibited from campaigning actively and openly. All parties reportedly conducted active campaigns prior to the first round of voting and trained pollwatchers. Campaign activity in the period leading up to the runoff, however, was negligible. Observers concluded that local election administrators were adequately prepared to manage the balloting and tabulation processes. Delegates were especially impressed by the fact that the regional election commission had organized a "mock election day" training session for all precinct polling stations prior to round one balloting. The commission also produced a voter education video, shown eight times between June 16 and July 3, to address problems encountered during the first round of voting.

Regarding the role of the media in the campaign, no parties reported having been denied either the free television and radio advertising to which the law entitles them, or access to outlets for paid advertising. However, there was a commonly expressed opinion that the media had been

partial to Yeltsin throughout the campaign and election cycle, an allegation which the press took no pains to refute. Local communist party activists also complained that the Yeltsin campaign was being improperly financed out of the state budget - a widely suspected but unproven allegation.

IRI observers visited 22 polling sites during the first and second rounds of voting. The sites were geographically diverse and included locations where large numbers of military voters were registered as well as a detention center in central Arkhangelsk. They reported no evidence of fraud or procedural irregularities which might have called the integrity of the balloting process into question.

The observer teams reported that all sites visited were generally well organized and properly arranged, although round one delegates noted that several sites were not clearly designated by exterior signs as polling stations. Turnout at these locations was nonetheless reported as generally brisk, indicating that voters were not having difficulty locating the stations. Poll workers were reported to have been uniformly knowledgeable and well trained. Ballots were properly handled from the time of receipt. Delegates reported no significant problems with registration lists or the voter identification process. Separate lists were kept at all polling stations to accommodate voters using certificates or new residents of a precinct. The size of the supplemental lists did not appear unusually large at any of the sites, although delegates did report some confusion regarding the certificate system and the proper means of registering voters possessing absentee certificates.

IRI delegates reported that family voting and open voting were prevalent at several of the polling stations during round one, as was discussion about the ballots among voters. This was facilitated by the presence of the tables in the center of several voting sites and, in some cases, an inadequate number of voting booths. Delegates reported that poll workers in all but one location acquiesced in the practice. Round two delegates reported that the problem was far less prevalent. Neither team of delegates made mention of serious irregularities involving the use of mobile ballot boxes, although the round two delegates did note that mobile boxes from some polling stations had been deployed to transit points, such as train stations, as instructed by the CEC in a memo issued after round one. Domestic pollwatchers were reported present at all but one of the voting stations visited, and did not raise issues of serious concern with IRI delegates.

At the one polling station where a significant number of military personnel were reported to be voting, there was no evidence that attempts were being made to improperly influence their vote or that they were being accommodated in a manner different than civilian voters. At a detention center visited by IRI observers, things were again reported to be normal, a view confirmed by the one domestic poll watcher present.

The ballot counting and reporting process at both polling stations observed by IRI delegates was described as orderly and efficient, although round one delegates did note that workers referred several times to the election law for help in overcoming confusion about how to properly complete the protocol. Neither team had any difficulty in tracking or obtaining copies

of the election protocols from precincts or the Territorial Election Commissions where they reported that the handling and computer entry of precinct data took place efficiently and correctly.

## UKRAINE/CRIMEA PENINSULA

The Crimean Republic is located on the southern tip of Ukraine, on the Crimean Peninsula, between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Shortly after Ukrainian independence in 1991, a Russian-led movement to secede from Ukraine was formed in Crimea, which succeeded in changing the status of the Crimean oblast to a semi-autonomous republic.

The right to vote in the Russian presidential election is limited to those who hold current Russian passports and those who hold old USSR passports with a Russian citizenship stamp. In Crimea, the number of individuals who wish to retain Russian citizenship is significantly larger than the number that actually hold a current Russian passport or have a Russia-stamped USSR passport. For various reasons related to Crimea's ambiguous status, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians wishing to retain Russian citizenship have either declined to have the old USSR passports stamped with the Russian seal, or have in fact had a Ukrainian stamp applied. It is estimated that the total number of eligible voters in Crimea is relatively modest - perhaps a few thousand. Voting took place at the Russian Embassy and consulates in Ukraine and near military bases and large cities in Crimea. A total of nine polling places were set up in five Crimean cities: Simferopol, Yalta, Feyodosia, Gvardeiskoye, and Sevastopol. Administration of the voting and tabulation at these facilities was under the jurisdiction of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which credentialed those who served as election officials in Crimea.

Prior to the election, there was a general expectation that the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov, would do best in the June 16 balloting. This presumption was based on the results of local elections held in Crimea on June 25, 1995 in which more than 50 percent of elected candidates were Communist Party members.

IRI's observer team in Crimea for round one consisted of IRI Ukraine Program Officer Chris Holzen and translator Vadim Naumov. The round two observer team included IRI Ukraine Resident Program Director Thomas Garrett and Mr. Naumov.

Prior to voting in round one of the election, the IRI observer conducted meetings with Ukrainian and Russian officials involved in the election. The representative of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission in Crimea cooperated with his Russian counterparts by forwarding a steady stream of voter inquiries to the temporary office of the Russian CEC in Simferopol. Nonetheless, there were complaints from the Consul of the Russian Federation in Odessa that the Ukraine Foreign Ministry had not permitted the Russian CEC to set up polling stations in two cities -- Bakhchisaray and Oktyabrskoye -- and that the Ukraine Government was attempting to suppress the turnout. Regarding the latter allegation, the consul could not provide specific evidence or examples to support his charges.

At the one polling place visited on the day before round one balloting, the IRI's observer was permitted free access and reported that preparations for the voting, including ballot preparation, appeared normal. With the exception of a limited number of campaign posters placed

by supporters of Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the team reported no visible evidence that active campaigning had taken place.

IRI teams visited four polling stations in three Crimean cities during round one and round two of the election. In general, observers reported that voting station workers were adequately trained and prepared, that voting places were properly arranged and ballots properly handled, and that the actual voting, vote tabulation and reporting processes appeared to follow required procedures. Domestic pollwatchers representing the Zyuganov campaign were present at all voting stations visited during rounds one and two. No other pollwatchers were encountered.

Voter turnout during both rounds was higher than expected, and observers reported that long lines developed at several of the stations visited. In one case voting had to be suspended because there were not enough ballots on hand. Two of four polling stations visited in Sevastopol were near military bases. At both sites, military and civilians were voting together, although military personnel were registered on separate lists. While observers did not report evidence that officers were attempting to influence recruits, they noted their constant presence. Voting places set up aboard Russian naval ships were not open to the public or to observers.

Although observers did not report evidence of fraud or systematic manipulation which would have called the basic integrity of the balloting process into question, significant problems related to the identification of eligible voters were reported during both rounds of balloting. A substantial number of people wishing to vote were turned away from polling stations because they did not have a Russian passport or a properly stamped USSR passport. This resulted in impromptu demonstrations being staged in front of three of the four stations visited during round one and similar protests during round two. At the fourth polling station visited during round one the chairman permitted people to vote without the stamp -- a violation of the election law. During round two, the chairman at this station was replaced, and persons without properly stamped USSR passports were prohibited from voting, again resulting in protests.

Another and potentially more serious problem involved supplemental lists, which were substantial at all polling stations visited. At one of the stations where an IRI observer witnessed the closing and counting process, the supplemental list dwarfed the regular registration list by the end of the voting day. This was accounted for by the very large number of Russian nationals traveling to Crimea -- Yalta in particular -- for summer holidays. In some cases, these visitors appear to have been permitted to vote outside of their proper precincts without presenting absentee certificates. They were required simply to sign a statement confirming that they were either vacationers or visiting businessmen. This procedure was also followed in round two, and in fact facilitated by the fact that at two of the four stations visited, xeroxed copies of the aforementioned written statement were prepared in advance. The Zyuganov pollwatchers present at these polling stations voiced very strong objections to the procedure. IRI observers noted the potential which the procedure created for multiple voting.



## KEMEROVO

Located nearly 2,000 miles from Moscow, Kemerovo is situated in the Kuzbass coal-mining region. The Kemerovo Oblast was created from the Tomsk Oblast in 1943 when industrial plants and factory workers were moved eastward to avoid the advancing Nazi army. Once named Scheglovsk, Kemerovo was developed in the late nineteenth century to supply the coal needs of the expanding Trans-Siberian Railroad. With the introduction of the Communist's first five year plan, the region underwent rapid industrial development, and it emerged as an important center of Soviet coal, steel, and heavy machine production. Kemerovo Oblast is home to 3,153,000 people, of whom 513,000 live in the city of Kemerovo.

Although all of the major national political parties have organizations in Kemerovo, the strongest organization and largest political base belongs to the communists, who nearly succeeded in capturing an absolute majority of the regional vote in the December 1995 State Duma election. The chairman of the Oblast Duma, Aman Tuleev, led a very strong local nationalist-patriotic movement that is aligned with the Communist Party and was a candidate for president until the last week of the election campaign. He withdrew in support of KPRF candidate Gennady Zyuganov. As expected, Zyuganov won a clear plurality of the regional vote in round one of the election - 38.8 percent - and out polled Boris Yeltsin in the July 3 runoff election by a margin of 10 percent.

IRI's observer delegation to the first round of the election consisted of delegate Dr. John Dunlop and IRI Program Officer Linda Googins. The delegation to round two included delegate Charles Greenleaf and Ms. Googins.

Prior to round one of the election, the IRI delegation met with local political party leaders, election administrators, and representatives of oblast and city governments. These meetings - with a single exception - produced no evidence to suggest that any of the candidates or parties had been systematically or significantly interfered with in the conduct of their campaigns, or that there was widespread concern about the possibility of fraud in the election. As elsewhere, IRI observers heard numerous complaints about a pro-Yeltsin bias in the news media, although there were no reported instances in which candidates had been denied access to venues for free or paid political advertising.

The exception referred to above was local nationalist-patriotic leader Aman Tuleev, who charged that as a candidate he had been discriminated against by a Yeltsin-controlled Central Election Commission in signature collection, media access, and campaign financing. In regards to the latter issue, Tuleev claimed to have received his allocation of campaign funds from the CEC later than the other candidates. Tuleev stated that he was planning to file a suit against CEC Chairmen Nikolai Ryabov. To date, he has not initiated that suit but it is unlikely he will proceed now that he has been named Minister for CIS Affairs in the current government.

IRI observers to both rounds also concluded that the Kemerovo Oblast Election Commission had made a good effort to prepare for the elections. The OEC organized several training sessions for the chairmen and secretaries of the territorial and precinct election commissions prior to the first round of voting. Based upon reports of procedural problems and complaints lodged after round one balloting, the Commission took the initiative in convening a meeting of election commissioners to review election law and procedures prior to the runoff. IRI observers reported an improvement in the work of election commissions at all levels in round two.

During rounds one and two of the election IRI observers visited 26 polling stations in urban and rural communities around Kemerovo. Delegates reported that, in general, the balloting process had been conducted in a manner that would not cause them to question the overall integrity of the balloting process. They saw no evidence of major or widespread problems with registration lists, voter identification, or ballot security during the voting and vote tabulation process.

There were, however, numerous, and in some cases significant irregularities and procedural deviations which occurred. The most significant of these occurred during the first round of balloting. Observers noted that many polling stations were poorly arranged. Ballot boxes at several stations were placed out of view of the commissioners, and at one station the box was actually set near an unlocked rear entrance. (When IRI observers visited this polling place again during round two, the problem had been eliminated.) In one rural precinct, three extra ballot boxes were laying on the floor behind the voting booths. Many stations were also set up with open tables and pens, thus encouraging the voting outside the booth that was prevalent during both rounds of the election. The practice was in almost all cases accepted without comment by polling station workers and domestic pollwatchers, who were present at almost all polling places.

Round one observers reported that at one polling station, located in a hospital, the chairwoman of this precinct stated that she was affiliated with Tuleev's party -- a breach of the regulation prohibiting precinct commissioners from official affiliation with political parties.

At the one military voting station visited during round one, observers noted numerous violations which, cumulatively, suggested an overall effort to encourage support for Yeltsin. Observers found posted at this voting site a letter and a copy of a speech by the President to the armed forces and an article favorable to the President. Observers also noted that the flow of voters through the station was disorderly, and that there was a substantial amount of open voting by military recruits and the civilians who were also voting at this military training academy. At least one instance was noted in which a military officer accompanied a recruit into the voting booth.

At both voting stations where IRI observers witnessed the ballot tabulation and reporting process, the delegates reported there were deviations from the procedure set out in the election law, but that the process had been orderly. Ballots were counted openly and checked carefully. Vote totals were clearly announced before being entered on the protocol. As in many other

regions, IRI observers did note that polling station chairmen had some difficulties in getting their protocols to properly sum. In both cases the discrepancies involved only a few votes, but the confusion did result in delay. Round one observers also noted that the domestic pollwatchers present at the count behaved inappropriately. They were extremely vocal and critical of the commission during the counting process and had to be threatened with expulsion by the chairman. Moreover, when the results of what IRI observers described as a careful and transparent count were announced, the pollwatchers, whose candidate finished in second place, reacted with great hostility and charged that the commissioners had purposefully miscounted the ballots and engaged in other forms of misconduct. IRI observers could not confirm the charges. Observers reported no irregularities at the level of the Territorial Election Commissions to which protocols were reported.

## MOSCOW

Moscow is the sixth largest city in the world, and its seven million eligible voters are represented by 35 single mandate seats in the State Duma. It is unquestionably the political and economic center of Russia. Moscow, along with St. Petersburg, has been a stronghold for the political and economic reform movement in the post-Soviet era, and reform party candidates have dominated electoral politics in the city. As expected, Boris Yeltsin won a commanding victory here in the presidential election, helped by the strong endorsement of Moscow's extremely popular Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov was reelected on June 16 with nearly 90 percent of the vote, and his strong performance no doubt added to the incumbent president's electoral success in and around the capital.

Two IRI observation teams were in Moscow for round one of the election and three teams monitored the voting during round two. In round one, delegation co-chairmen U.S. Senator John McCain and Former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh were accompanied by IRI President Lorne Craner, Vice President Grace Moe, IRI Regional Director for Eastern European Programs Claire Sechler, and Resident Program Director David Denehy. The second team consisted of delegate Lawrence Halloran, IRI Regional Director for CIS Programs Judy Van Rest and IRI Program Officer Frances Chiappardi. For round two of the election, three teams observed in the Moscow Oblast: delegation leader William Ball and delegate James Dyer were accompanied by IRI President Lorne Craner, Senior Russia Adviser David Merkel, and Resident Program Director David Denehy. Observer team two consisted of Ms. Van Rest, Assistant to the IRI Vice President Beth DeWeerd, and IRI Program Officer Alexander Stupnikov. The third observer team consisted of Ms. Moe and Ms. Chiappardi.

Prior to both rounds of the election, IRI's Moscow delegates and staff held meetings with representatives of the candidates, national political parties, national media, and the Central Election Commission. Based on those meetings and discussions, observers concluded that all candidates had had the opportunity to campaign and to present themselves and their ideas to the Russian electorate. At the same time, it was evident that the incumbent president's campaign enjoyed numerous and very significant advantages. Media bias, which IRI observers in all regions were told of repeatedly, was a major concern and a clear reality in Moscow. Senior managers of major state-owned and privately-owned national television stations, for example, had been recruited as members of the Yeltsin campaign team. Observers were also inundated with allegations that the Yeltsin campaign was receiving money from the state budget in amounts that far exceeded the limits established by the Russian presidential election law. Based on the sheer quantity of pro-Yeltsin campaign literature with which Moscow was decorated, it was hard to ignore the charges.

On election day during rounds one and two of the election, the five IRI observer teams visited more than 50 polling stations. While a variety of technical and administrative irregularities were noted, the delegates concluded unanimously that these problems did not call the basic integrity of the balloting process into question.

Observers to both rounds of the election reported that polling places were, in general, well organized and prepared to accommodate the high voter turnout that had been predicted. Polling station workers and chairmen were reported to have been generally well-trained and conscientious in carrying out their duties. It should be noted, however, that one observer to the second round reported, on the basis of several conversations with polling station workers, that they did not consider poll worker duty to be entirely voluntary.

There were no widespread problems reported with the voter registration lists or with the procedures for identifying voters, although round one observers did visit one polling station at which it appeared that the residents of an entire apartment bloc had not been included on the registration list. Confusion over whether the list was incorrect, or whether the residents of that bloc were in fact registered to vote at another polling station, was not settled conclusively. Instead, the precinct chairman permitted the voters to cast ballots at the precinct and simply added their names to a supplemental list. With this exception aside, observers did not report serious irregularities or questionable practices involving the use of supplemental registration lists or with procedures for receiving and recording voters with absentee vouchers.

However, observers did note that the Central Election Commission had allowed the Moscow City Election Commission to deviate from the absentee voucher process. Special voting precincts were designated for voters who were not able to obtain absentee vouchers and who did not meet Moscow's residency requirements. These voters were issued special certificates and were allowed to vote at one of the three following polling sites: No. 1 at 19 Bolshaya Nikitskaya; No. 49 at 7 Tveryskaya; and No. 63 at 25 Neglinnaya. The Moscow City Election Commission also allowed poll workers to give ballots to those who did not possess the CEC approved identification but had "other documents, equal to identification papers." A representative of Gennady Zyuganov requested the CEC to reverse the ruling but the CEC did not.

Observers noted that domestic poll watchers representing candidates and parties were present at virtually all polling stations during both rounds of the election. Their comments to IRI observers suggested no serious or widespread pattern of violations. On a less positive note, round two observers did report the presence of local administration officials at several of the rural polling stations they visited. While this was not a violation of the law, and while observers did not see these officials engaging in any overt efforts to influence voters, the observers did note that the presence of these officials could be intimidating to voters.

As in other regions, irregularities in the handling of the mobile ballot boxes were reported. Specifically, in rural voting precincts during round two observers noted that the box was being routinely brought to the homes of elderly voters lacking means of transportation to voting stations. (Observers also reported at one polling station that a van was being dispatched throughout the day to shuttle elderly voters to and from the voting station.) Voters were asked to fill out request forms for the box once it had arrived. This practice clearly violates the requirement that requests be received prior to sending the box, as well as the prohibition against traveling with more ballots than requests.

Observers witnessed military voting both on military bases and at civilian polling stations. Compared to previous elections observed by IRI delegations in and around Moscow, access to military facilities was much improved. Round two observers were the first international observers to be admitted to the polling stations within the Yuri Gagarin Air Force Academy, and members of other observer teams during rounds one and two of the election also reported that they were granted entry to military bases which had previously been closed to observers, including the Air Defense Headquarters located in Timonovo. Observers reported that turnout at all the military facilities was exceptionally high, suggesting that recruits had at least been offered positive inducements to vote. At one location visited during round one, IRI observers discovered that recruits who voted were being given the rest of the day off. IRI observers also witnessed balloting at two voting stations within an astronaut training center in Shchelkovo, which lies outside of Moscow. The two stations were located in the same room, separated by rope and stanchion. Turnout was heavy there but voting was orderly with all voters using the polling booths. In a visit to another territory, observers noted that in order to entice young voters to the polls, the territorial commission had set up a raffle for youths at polling stations with prizes that included an apartment. Poll watchers in one of the stations in that territory said they had filed a complaint about this but poll watchers at other stations seemed to have no problems with this. In general, proper procedures were followed for the mobile ballot box. One exception was a site at which the box had been sent out to a military base where 250 recruits had voted.

With regard to the actual balloting procedure, observers reported no major or widespread irregularities or evidence that recruits were being denied the opportunity to vote without interference by their peers and/or senior officers. The only non-civilian facility where observers did report problems with access was at a prison, Lofortovo, visited during round two. After what was described as heated discussion, however, observers were permitted to enter the facility and observe the balloting process, which they described as normal.

Observers noted a significant improvement in the tabulation process compared to what was encountered in December 1995, and reported that, for the most part, the process had been handled efficiently and in keeping with the procedural requirements of the election law. As in other regions, observers to both rounds did report instances in which precinct chairmen had difficulty in properly summing their protocols, resulting in arbitrary adjustments. This was clearly due to confusion over the internal reconciliation of the protocol. In no case were the adjusted subtotals significant in number or to the advantage of a particular candidate. It was noted by observers in round two that the procedure for the packing and storage of ballots at the conclusion of the election could have made it difficult to recount ballots. No delegates reported significant problems in obtaining validated copies of precinct or territorial level protocols.



## NOVOSIBIRSK

The region of Novosibirsk, or Novosibirskaya Oblast, is considered the geographic center of Russia as measured from the eastern to the western border. Located in the south-eastern portion of Western Siberia, Novosibirsk's land mass spans one time zone and is approximately one-half the size of Germany. The region shares its southern border with the Republic of Altai and with Kazakhstan. Ranked the seventeenth most populous oblast in Russia, Novosibirsk is populated by 2.8 million people, 92 percent of whom are ethnic Russians. An estimated 1.5 million inhabitants populate the capital city of the region, which is also named Novosibirsk.

The results of the December 1995 State Duma election suggested that political sentiment in this oblast was deeply divided. Communists, nationalists, centrists and reformists could all claim at least partial victory. The Communist Party, however, received the largest percentages of party list votes and its candidate was an easy victor in the race for oblast governor. In the presidential election, Boris Yeltsin's very strong showing in the city of Novosibirsk in the July 3 presidential runoff was not enough to overcome the communist base outside the capital, and Gennady Zyuganov defeated Yeltsin by more than 70,000 votes across the entire region.

The IRI observation team deployed to Novosibirsk for the first round of the election consisted of delegate Dr. Constantine Menges, IRI Deputy Regional Program Director John Anelli, and IRI Assistant Program Officer Alexander Stupnikov. The team assigned to Novosibirsk for the July 3 runoff election consisted of delegates Christopher Henick and Edward Chow, Mr. Anelli, and IRI Assistant Program Officer Andre Metrofanov.

Prior to both elections, IRI observers met with representatives of political parties, the media, and the oblast election commission. There were no serious indications that any parties or campaign organizations had been unfairly restricted or interfered with in the conduct of their campaigns, most of which appeared to have been actively waged, although pro-Yeltsin media bias was widely reported. Allegations of bias were not limited to news reporting, but also to the media's presentation of paid political advertisement. Leaders of the local Communist Party organization complained that the presentation of Zyuganov's paid advertising had been bracketed by cartoons which were demeaning and obviously intended to satirize the candidate. News reporters and editors with whom the teams spoke offered no convincing rebuttal to the allegations, and in fact substantiated them, claiming that the media had a right and an interest in seeking to prevent a return to communism in Russia.

The observation teams visited over 20 polling stations in and around the city of Novosibirsk during the two days of voting and were present at the opening and the closing of polling stations on both days. While irregularities were reported, neither delegation found evidence that suggested systematic or intentional efforts to manipulate the vote or otherwise undermine the integrity of the balloting process. Poll watchers encountered at virtually all stations visited by IRI observers offered no information that contradicted this general view.



Polling station workers and chairmen were generally well trained and organized. Polling stations were properly arranged and balloting was orderly despite high turnout. Instances of family voting were surprisingly rare, although voting outside the booth was observed at approximately half of the voting stations during round one. No open voting was observed during the second round of balloting, nor were there tables available for open voting as there were in round one. There were no significant or widespread problems with voter registration lists or with voter identification procedures, including the procedures for voters with absentee certificates. No significant or widespread problems related to ballot security were noted.

There were irregularities involving the mobile ballot box, but they did not appear to be of a magnitude to significantly effect the outcome of the balloting, or intended to do so. As in many other places, IRI observers in Novosibirsk learned that a mobile ballot box had been set up at the local railroad station during round two to accommodate travelers carrying absentee certificates. IRI observers also discovered that polling station workers at one precinct had taken more ballots with them when they went out with the mobile box than the number of requests they had received for the mobile ballot box service. The precinct chairman communicated new requests to the workers by phone while they were on the road. It appeared the intent was to save time and reduce the number of individual trips that workers would have to make with the mobile box.

During both rounds, IRI teams observed voting at civilian polling stations which were adjacent to military bases. There were no reported irregularities. Troops were transported from their bases to the polling stations at regular intervals. They were issued ballots based on a separate registration list, although they registered at the same table as other voters. The recruits all voted, individually, in closed voting booths and had the opportunity to place their folded ballots in the common ballot box.

During round two, observers also visited a military prison, where they reported irregularities. Neither international or domestic observers were permitted to see the voting station within the compound, although the chairman of the polling station election commission did meet with IRI observers in a reception room. The reasons given for denial of access pertained to security. The situation here was also unusual in that the polling station established within the prison - which accommodated approximately 600 inmates, officers, and prison workers - had been established "in association with" a nearby civilian station. Ballots cast at the prison were not tabulated or recorded on a standard protocol, but rather carried, at day's end, to the nearby civilian station and mixed with the contents of that station's ballot box. When questioned about this practice, the facility's polling station chairman explained that to make known the electoral preferences of the personnel at the facility would be to risk "politicizing" the military. The policy on observers, coupled with the absence of a protocol, raised concerns about the integrity of the balloting process at the facility.

IRI observers witnessed three polling station closings and ballot counting and reporting procedures in Novosibirsk during rounds one and two of the election. Generally, the procedures were orderly and correct, although the sequencing of tabulation and reporting activities did not

always follow the letter of the law. In the handling, counting, and recording of the ballots IRI observers saw nothing which would indicate either intentional or unintentional inaccuracies in the protocols that were reported, although there were minor but time consuming problems at all stations in getting the precinct protocols to add up correctly. In all cases the counting or summing errors involved less than five ballots. Observers described the work of the Territorial Election Commissions as efficient, and received properly validated copies of all protocols requested.

## PERM

The Perm Oblast is located on the western slope of the Ural mountain range that separates Siberian Russia from European Russia. The region is populated by 3 million people of predominantly Russian ethnicity, who live in the Oblast's 25 cities and 57 towns. The region is divided into 37 rayons, or counties. The largest urban and industrial center in the Oblast is the city of Perm, which was founded in 1723 and became the Oblast's capital in 1789. Perm is located on the Kama River, has a population of 1 million and was a closed city during the Soviet era. Its prisons and labor camps were home to many dissident Russian writers and intellectuals.

Perm voters showed evidence of divided political sentiment in December 1995 parliamentary elections, electing one deputy each from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Russia's Democratic Choice, and two independents. The ultra nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party finished first and second in party list balloting. Reformers had much the better of it during the presidential election, however. Pro-reform political parties in Perm Oblast, such as Our Home is Russia, the Democratic Party of Russia, and Russia's Democratic Choice cooperated closely during the recent presidential campaign, setting aside differences and pooling resources in order to launch an aggressive campaign in support of Boris Yeltsin. Owing in part to their efforts, Yeltsin performed significantly better in Perm Oblast than he did nationally, receiving 56.1 percent in round one and 71.5 percent vs. Zyuganov's 23.8 percent in the runoff.

The IRI observer delegation to round one of the election included Mr. Jay Banning and IRI Assistant Program Officer Lara McDougall. The second round delegation was composed of delegates Ambassador Robert H. Phinny, Mr. Stephen Biegun and Ms. McDougall.

Prior to both rounds of voting, delegation members participated in meetings with local political party officials, election administrators, and representatives of the local media. Based on their many discussions, neither team concluded that the pre-election environment in Perm had been such as to interfere with free and open campaigning by any of the parties or candidates' representatives. Local election administrators appeared to be adequately prepared and local party organizations appeared to have campaigned actively and without substantial interference, although the Yeltsin and Zyuganov campaigns charged each other with vandalizing campaign posters in and around the city. Observers also heard complaints of media bias in favor of the Yeltsin campaign. The several media representatives with whom IRI observers met prior to rounds one and two of the election clearly indicated an anti-communist sentiment, lending substance to the allegations of media bias. Candidates appeared to have had unhindered access to free media time and to paid advertising, the one exception being the refusal of a local newspaper editor to run paid advertisements for the Zhirinovsky campaign.

IRI observers visited 25 polling stations in rural and urban locations during the first and second rounds of voting. Delegates reported no evidence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing of

a magnitude that might have called the integrity of the balloting process into question. They did, however, note several procedural irregularities.

IRI observers reported that polling stations were generally well organized and arranged to facilitate the registration and balloting processes. Ballots appeared in general to have been properly handled and secured prior to and during the voting, and there were no reported problems with the voter registration lists or the process of confirming the identification of registered voters. Family voting and open voting were not reported to be prevalent. Observers reported only one instance in which campaign literature was found at a rural polling station, but they did note that the chairmen at several polling stations during round one were distributing copies of the Russian Constitution - a practice to which Communist poll watchers and, later, Yabloko officials objected because the cover bore a Yeltsin quote and signature. Domestic poll watchers were present at most polling stations visited and reported no persistent pattern of violations. In rural locations, IRI observers commented on the general laxity with which polling officials carried out their duties, and their seeming indifference to procedural irregularities.

As elsewhere, delegates reported numerous irregularities in the use of mobile ballot boxes. During rounds one and two, delegates witnessed cases in which polling station chairmen in rural precincts sent mobile boxes - along with an indeterminate number of ballots - to outlying communities without having previously received requests for the boxes. The legal requirement that voters request the mobile ballot box, and that it go out of the polling station with a number of ballots equal to the number of requests, seems to have been commonly ignored. In another case reported during round two, a mobile box was positioned at a railway station for the convenience of voters in transit. This was clearly done in response to a directive which the CEC had issued to all Subject Election Commissions after the first round of balloting to maximize voting among absentee voters. While the objective appeared to be convenience and increased voter participation, rather than fraud or manipulation, the potential for the latter was deemed substantial in all cases.

Observers also noted a relatively heavy use of absentee certificates during the first and second rounds of voting. While this did not cause concern in and of itself, IRI observers did note that the Perm oblast election commissioner had given individual polling station chairmen the authority to issue certificates to unregistered voters on election day. This is a deviation from the law, which gives citizens 30 days prior to election day to obtain the certificates from election administrators in the territory where they reside. The commissioner suggested that the decision to issue or withhold a certificate should be based on how far the voter was from his official home. The procedure was highly irregular and open to abuse. It was unclear whether this practice was also followed at the rail station where the mobile box was stationed.

IRI observers reported no significant problems or procedural deviations in the ballot counting and reporting during rounds one or two. Precinct Poll workers appeared to be experienced and to understand the requirements of the law. Procedures for counting and recording ballots taken from mobile boxes were correct, previously noted irregularities in the

handling and stationing of the boxes notwithstanding. Observers encountered no difficulties in obtaining signed copies of the precinct protocols, and reported no irregularities or disorder at the Territorial Election Commissions where the precinct protocols were delivered and entered into the computer system.

## ROSTOV

The Rostov Oblast is located on the eastern Ukrainian border, northeast of the Sea of Azov in the southwestern region of European Russia, known as the Northern Caucasus. The region has a population of 4.3 million, 71 percent of which live in one of the region's six urban centers. Rostov-na-Donu, the capital of the oblast, was founded in 1749 and is the most populated city in the region. The remainder live in one of the region's 16 small cities or 35 mostly agricultural towns.

Rostov voters demonstrated divided political sentiments when they went to the polls in December 1995 State Duma elections. Of the seven deputies elected to represent Rostov in the State Duma, four were communists and three had reformist leanings. In party list voting, the Communists claimed a clear plurality of the vote with 26.5 percent, with reform-oriented Yabloko and ultra nationalist LDPR finishing with 14.1 percent and 10.2 percent of the vote, respectively. Going into the presidential election, Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov appeared to be in a very strong position, and he clearly topped the field of 10 candidates, including Boris Yeltsin, in round one of the voting with a 35 percent plurality. Yeltsin, however, topped his communist rival by a decisive 7.5 percent -- 51.6 percent vs. 43.1 percent in the runoff -- thanks to help from voters who supported Grigory Yavlinsky and Alexander Lebed in the first round.

The IRI observer delegation to round one of the election included delegate Margaret Cifrino and IRI Assistant Program Officers Ginta Draugelis and Larissa Kurenaya. The round two team was comprised of delegate Thomas Hiltachk, Ms. Draugelis and Ms. Kurenaya.

Prior to both rounds of voting IRI observer teams participated in meetings with local political party leaders, election administrators, and media representatives. Based on these meetings, observers found no evidence that campaign organizations for any of the candidates had been significantly interfered with or obstructed in organizing or carrying out their campaigns. While there were reports that campaign literature had been papered over or torn down, these did not appear very serious or widespread. All parties appear to have campaigned actively, the highlight being a Yeltsin campaign stop during which he danced on stage before a crowd of more than 20,000. The performance received nationwide media attention and came to symbolize his energetic campaign.

Meetings with campaign organizations - with one exception - did not suggest to the observers that they had major concerns about the capacity of the regional election administration to competently and honestly manage the balloting and tabulation processes. Officials of the Communist Party with whom IRI observers met prior to round one told them of certain "rumors" of planned fraud involving the distribution of several thousand extra ballots to be held as insurance for President Yeltsin. When met again prior to the runoff, these same officials claimed that a massive fraud had been committed during the first round balloting which involved the use of these extra ballots. IRI observers found no evidence that these rumors had any basis in fact, nor was

there any evidence of ballot box stuffing or improper handling of ballots during round one or round two voting.

As in almost all other regions, there was a nearly unanimous view that the news media had been openly biased in President Yeltsin's favor during the campaign. In Rostov, however, these allegations were compounded by statements to IRI observers by local members of the media who claimed that Yeltsin loyalists in the regional government had issued veiled threats in advising them not to provide Zyuganov with coverage in their publications.

IRI observers visited 20 polling stations in rural and urban areas of the oblast during rounds one and two of the election. Observers reported no evidence of fraud or systematic procedural irregularities which could have called the integrity of the balloting or the election result into question. Neither round one nor round two delegates reported any serious problems involving the organization and interior arrangement of polling stations, the conduct or preparedness of polling station workers, the accuracy of registration lists or methods of identifying registered voters, ballot security, or the processes for accommodating voters with absentee certificates. Rostov observers also reported a relatively low incidence of community voting or open voting. Domestic poll watchers representing two or more candidates were present at all 20 polling stations visited, and IRI observers reported receiving no serious complaints, or consistent pattern of complaints, which would have led them to question their own generally favorable characterization of the process. Observers did suggest, however, that both poll watchers and precinct chairmen should have a clearer understanding of the rights and responsibilities of poll watchers while at the voting stations. Specifically, poll watchers were twice observed either handling ballots or mobile ballot boxes, which is not permitted.

As in many other regions, IRI observers noted irregularities involving the use of mobile ballot boxes. One polling station chairman allowed a mobile box to be situated for several hours at a military installation where officers, recruits and support staff who showed their military identification cards were given ballots and allowed to vote at open tables. Rules requiring that the mobile box be circulated at the request of voters, as well as rules limiting the number of ballots to be carried with the mobile box, were clearly disregarded. During round two, and consistent with directives from the CEC, observers noted that a mobile box had been stationed at a Rostov railway station, in effect establishing a satellite polling station for the convenience of absentee voters. This departure from election law was compounded by the fact that travelers were being permitted to register at the station. Intermittent announcements over the public address system informed travellers that the box was available. While the procedure violated several rules related to the handling of the mobile box and the issuance of absentee certificates, neither domestic poll watchers or IRI observers reported ballot box stuffing or direct solicitation of individual voters. The potential which the practice created for multiple voting and other forms of abuse, however, was significant.



Observers reported procedural irregularities during the counting and reporting of ballots during both rounds of the election, but did not find evidence suggesting that fraud, rather than convenience, was the motivation. During round one, observers noted that the precinct chairman had obviously made minor but arbitrary arithmetic changes, rather than recount the ballots, in order to get his protocol to sum properly before delivering it to the Territorial Election Commission. Observers also reported concerns with the security of the ballots after the count, as they were not properly sealed nor stored at the TEC. Round two observers witnessed the count at a station where, earlier in the day, they had seen a voter place a ballot in the ballot box belonging to an adjacent polling station. (It is not uncommon for two, three or even four polling stations to be organized proximate to each other at a single location, such as a school.) As they suspected, this caused a problem for both stations when ballots were tabulated later in the day. However, the chairmen of the polling stations appear to have handled the problem with extreme diligence. When the protocol did not sum properly, all ballots were recounted. When the problem persisted, the protocol of the adjacent polling station was checked, and it was discovered that the ballot surplus at one station matched the deficit at the other. The protocols of both stations were adjusted to accommodate the three-vote discrepancy and reported to the Territorial Election Commission. While the adjustments may have constituted technical irregularities, the way in which the problem was identified and managed spoke well of the individuals involved and the basic integrity of the process.

Precinct level protocols were received and recorded efficiently at the Territorial Election Commission during both rounds of the election, and IRI observers reported no problems in getting properly validated copies of protocols.

## ST. PETERSBURG

St. Petersburg is one of Russia's two federal cities, the other being Moscow.<sup>19</sup> Construction of the city began in 1703 during the reign of Peter the Great, whose purpose in establishing a great western center was to anchor Russia's position as a principal and recognized Great Power in Europe. The city is strategically located at the junction of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland in Russia's northwestern corner, and for nearly 300 years it has been a center of new ideas and change in Russia.

St. Petersburg citizens were confronted with a total of four elections in less than two months during late spring this year. In early March, the St. Petersburg legislative assembly voted to change the title of the head of the city's executive branch from mayor to governor, and to hold the election for the office on May 19. A total of 13 candidates appeared on the ballot, which resulted in a runoff between incumbent Anatoly Sobchak -- a leading reform figure in post-Soviet Russia -- and his former deputy, Vladimir Yakovlev. Yakovlev, also a strong supporter of political and economic reforms, won a surprising victory. Less than three weeks later, St. Petersburg voters gave Boris Yeltsin nearly 50 percent of their vote in a field of 10 presidential candidates. Yeltsin won the runoff against Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov with a remarkable 73 percent of the vote. Turnout for the first round was 63 percent and for the runoff, 64 percent.

For round one of the election IRI sent two election observation teams to St. Petersburg and to rural voting precincts in the surrounding Leningrad Oblast. Team one included Ms. Janet Mullins and IRI Senior Russia Advisor and Director of Program Assessment David Merkel. Team two included Mr. Peter Madigan, IRI Program Officer Elizabeth Dugan, and IRI Assistant Program Officer Marina Tyazhelkova. A single observer team, including Ms. Maria Cino, IRI Program Officer Elizabeth Dugan and IRI Assistant Program Officers Marina Tyazhelkova and Aleksei Korlyakov, monitored the runoff.

The three teams conducted an extensive series of meetings with candidates, political party officials, election administrators, and media representatives prior to each round of voting. Based on what they heard and saw, they found no evidence to suggest that any party or candidate had been interfered with in organizing or conducting their campaign. Media campaigning is reported to have been especially active. Free air time on television and radio was provided according to law, and there were no reports of anyone being denied access to venues for paid advertising. The Yavlinsky campaign did, however, report delayed approval of some of its requests to place adds.

Regional election administrators appeared well-organized and prepared, election workers at all levels had access to training, and all ballots and other election-related materials had been provided according to requirements. People with whom the delegates met did nonetheless suggest

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<sup>19</sup> Federal cities have a similar relationship with the national government as oblasts.

that IRI observers pay particular attention to several things on election day. These included the quality of registration lists in rural areas, improper use of mobile ballot boxes, protocol tampering, campaigning at polling stations, and irregularities with the voting at military polling sites. With the exception of the first round in which delegates saw troubling aspects of military voting, delegates to rounds one and two of the election reported no serious problems in these areas.

IRI observers to rounds one and two of the election visited more than 30 polling stations in St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. Though irregularities were observed and reported, the delegates reported no evidence of fraud or other systematic manipulation which could have compromised the essential integrity of the voting process.

Delegates reported that polling stations were generally well-organized and prepared to administer the balloting. IRI observers, as well as domestic poll watchers who were present at most but not all polling stations, were welcomed and given appropriate cooperation. Despite the overall good order, there were several irregularities which were noted. Delegates reported that tables with pens were set up in several stations during both rounds of voting, thus encouraging open voting. The problem was reported to be far less prevalent during the second round, but it appears that it was still significant. Round one delegates also reported that non-CEC political profiles of the candidates were posted at a few polling stations, although they did not appear favorable to any one candidate in particular. At one polling station a woman was found to be distributing what delegates described as "minimal" candidate information. Similar problems were not observed during the second round.

In general, problems with the registration lists and voter identification process at polling stations were not deemed significant, and the procedure for maintaining supplemental lists was reported to be normal. No significant problems were reported involving voters with certificates during round one, but there did appear to be confusion in the second round. Both voters and precinct chairmen appeared confused about whether or not voters who voted outside their home districts with a certificate on June 16 needed to present that certificate to vote in their home districts on July 3. In one reported instance, a voter was permitted to vote without a certificate after signing an affidavit, in another, the right to vote was denied.

Irregularities were also reported involving the use of mobile ballot boxes. Round one delegates reported that in two instances they were informed that mobile boxes would be made available to incapacitated voters by virtue of commission members' personal knowledge of their need, and not because formal requests for the service had been received by the polling station. At one of the stations, the chairman informed delegates that he took the voter list with him when he went out with the mobile box. This is a clear violation of election law. During the second round of voting, delegates learned that commissioners at two rural polling stations in Leningrad Oblast had actually traveled to outlying villages prior to election day to inquire if voters there wanted the mobile box. By election day both stations had received an unusually large number of requests for the mobile box -- 175 and 145 respectively.

During round one, many of the civilian voting places visited by observers were proximate to military installations, and voter lists at several polling stations comprised more than 50 percent military personnel. Delegates reported a widespread incidence of open voting that created an environment for the possibility of officers' control over recruit voting; specifically, delegates observed commanding officers directing recruits to vote at tables where they could be seen rather than in polling booths where they could cast their ballots in private. At one voting site visited by delegates, there were in fact no voting booths at all, and all balloting was done at open tables.

There were no reports of serious irregularities in the ballot counting and protocol reporting witnessed by IRI observers. One team reported minor "sequencing" irregularities in the ballot count, and also reported that domestic poll watchers who were present for the count gave some assistance in the sorting of ballots. Other teams reported no problems, and even went so far as to describe the tabulation and reporting processes observed in rounds one and two as "flawless." Observers encountered no difficulties in obtaining validated copies of protocols at either the precincts or Territorial Election Commissions.

## **VOLGOGRAD**

The Volgograd Oblast is located in the southern half of European Russia. Kazakhstan is on Volgograd's eastern border and Ukraine on its western border. The capital city, formerly Stalingrad, was renamed after Stalin's death, and is situated on the Volga river, close to one of the largest waterways west of the Ural mountains, the Volga-Don canal.

Volgograd constitutes a key part of the Russian "red belt," and after five years of economically and socially painful transition, nostalgia for the political past is particularly strong among voters in the region. Three members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), and a member of the Agrarian Party won the four single mandate district seats in Volgograd in the December 1995 elections. The communists also claimed a plurality of the vote in party list balloting. As expected, the presidential election provided but another opportunity for the communists to demonstrate their strength in Volgograd Oblast. Gennady Zyuganov easily won both rounds of the election, defeating Boris Yeltsin by 13 percent in the July 3 runoff.

IRI's observer delegation to the first round of the election consisted of delegate Clifford Kupchan, IRI Program Officer Brian Keeter, and IRI Assistant Program Officer Andrei Litvinov. The delegation to round two included delegate Mary Arnold and IRI Assistant Program Officer Julie Brennan.

Prior to both rounds of voting, IRI delegations met with local political party leaders, election administrators, and representatives of the media. It appeared from these meetings that all parties had campaigned vigorously on behalf of their candidates and that none had been systematically or significantly interfered with in organizing and carrying out their campaign. While there were numerous complaints of a pro-Yeltsin bias in news coverage of the campaign, there were no reports of candidates or parties being denied the free air time to which the law entitles them, or denied access to venues for paid advertising.

Observers to both rounds also concluded that the Oblast Election Commission had done a competent job preparing voter registration lists, distributing ballots, organizing polling stations and providing voters with the basic information they needed on when and where to vote. Observers report that the OEC may have exceeded the bounds of the law, however, in its determination to encourage voter participation in the second round of the election. In response to a memo issued by the Central Election Commission in Moscow shortly before the runoff election, regional commissioners told IRI observers that they planned to station mobile ballot boxes at major transit points in the city. Moreover, and more clearly a deviation from the election law, the oblast commission stated that voters at those locations would not be required to show absentee certificates to cast ballots.

During the two rounds of voting, observers visited 30 polling stations. Observers cited irregularities, but did not find evidence of systematic violations which may have called the integrity of the balloting process into question. Domestic poll watchers representing one or more

candidates were present at all 30 of the stations visited - KPRF was most consistently represented - and IRI observers reported no pattern of complaints or comments from them that would have indicated serious problems. IRI delegates in the first round reported one incident of mild intimidation from a local militia officer at a polling station in which the IRI team observed a case of proxy voting. After the delegates discussed the illegality of proxy voting with the local election commission chairman, the officer forcefully and repeatedly questioned the identity of delegates and the authority by which they acted. IRI delegates presented CEC credentials when they first entered the polling site. Although the militia officer later telephoned his superiors about the presence of the IRI delegates, no further action occurred. In the second round, delegates reported that a militia woman providing security for the station was unfamiliar with the law with regard to the rights of international observers.

IRI observers found polling stations to be well-organized and polling station workers to be experienced and adequately trained. No significant problems were reported during either round involving registration lists, supplemental lists or the accommodation of absentee voters using vouchers. Observers to round one reported few instances of open voting, although they did report one instance, at a rural voting station, where a voter appeared to have been issued two ballots. When questioned about this, the polling station commissioner said that he sometimes permitted proxy voting if he knew the voter. Contrary to what observers noted in many other regions, the prevalence of open "voting tables" and the incidence of open voting was greater during round two, when observers witnessed this at approximately half of the polling stations visited.

Problems involving the mobile ballot box were related to the aforementioned instruction by the CEC prior to round two. IRI observers reported that polling stations proximate to major transit points had been instructed to dispatch workers, along with the mobile boxes, to these locations, where they in effect established "satellite" voting stations for the convenience of voters traveling away from home. It was unclear whether or not the boxes were being made available only to voters carrying absentee certificates. In either case, such use of the mobile boxes is a violation of the election law and open to abuse.

Round one observers also visited several civilian polling stations where significant numbers of military personnel were voting, and one military polling station. In none of these locations did they report any signs that recruits were being interfered with or influenced during the balloting process.

Both teams observed the vote count at rural polling stations outside of the city of Volgograd. Problems with the count were reported by round one observers, although they pertained to organization and procedure, and not to fraud or manipulation. A domestic poll watcher with KPRF - the only one present - assisted in the vote tabulation, and polling station workers had to rework their protocol numbers several times, and recount ballots, before the protocol summed correctly. Observers reported that the attitude of the polling station's workers appeared careless and inattentive. Round two observers reported that the count was handled in an organized and serious manner, although ballots had to be counted twice to properly sum the

protocol. Neither team reported any difficulties in getting signed and stamped copies of the protocols at either the polling stations or the Territorial Election Commission. Procedures at the TEC were reported to be normal and well organized.



## VORONEZH

Voronezh Oblast is located in the central portion of European Russia approximately 580 kilometers south of Moscow. The Oblast borders Ukraine, and is part of the fertile Black Earth region. Covering a landmass of over 52,000 sq\km, the Oblast has a population of 2.5 million, 900,000 of whom live in the capital city of Voronezh.

Voronezh lies in what is frequently described as Russia's "Red Belt," the portion of the country where support for the Communist Party has remained strongest since the fall of the Soviet Union. This strength was confirmed in the December 1995 parliamentary election, in which Communist Party candidates won 3 of the 4 single mandate seats. In party list voting, the KPRF won a strong plurality with nearly 27 percent of the vote in a field of 43 parties. As anticipated, Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov won a convincing victory -- 64 percent to 36 percent -- over Boris Yeltsin in Voronezh Oblast in the presidential runoff election held July 3.

IRI sent two observer teams to Voronezh for round one of the election. The first team consisted of delegate Richard Williamson and IRI Program Officer Karl Feld. The second team included delegate Michael Harper and IRI Ukraine Program Director Thomas Garrett. The round two observer team consisted of delegate Ariel Cohen and Mr. Feld.

Prior to both rounds of the election, IRI delegates met with local political party leaders and activists, election administrators, and representatives of the media. Based on their discussions, the observers concluded that the pre-election environment in Voronezh allowed for generally fair, open and competitive campaigning. Campaign literature and posters were evident in abundance, and the larger parties had all also trained and registered large numbers of volunteer poll watchers. No claims were made that access to free media time on state television or radio was hindered, or that access to local venues for paid advertising was denied, although Yeltsin and Zyuganov campaign officials did accuse each others' supporters in the oblast administration of showing favoritism. As in almost all other locations, there was widespread complaint about the clear media bias in favor of the Yeltsin campaign, although the largest newspaper in the region was solidly pro-Zyuganov.

Observers reported that the Oblast Election Commission had taken steps to address problems reported during the December 1995 State Duma election, but that there were lingering concerns among commissioners and party representatives about whether adequate preparations had been made to accommodate the expected high voter turnout. More serious concerns noted by IRI observers to both rounds of the election related to the location of numerous polling stations in facilities where the major political party organizations had offices, and the frequent presence of individuals affiliated with political parties on the precinct commissions. In fact, Yeltsin and Zyuganov campaign operatives openly admitted to a "competition" for control of the precinct commissions. There were also several reports that precinct commission chairmen had been harassed, causing several to resign prior rounds one or two of the election. Cumulatively, these

problems suggested that the Voronezh Oblast Election Commission's administration of the election was not exemplary.

IRI observers visited over 30 polling stations during round one and round two of the election. They did not report evidence of organized fraud or manipulation which would have led them to question the basic legitimacy of the balloting process. They did, however, discover numerous procedural irregularities as well as evidence suggesting that local government administrators - generally supportive of the Yeltsin campaign - had been overly involved in the administration of the election.

At many of the polling stations visited, IRI observers reported a general pattern of laxity in organization and in adherence to procedure, not all of which could be associated with the heavy voter turnout. While no general problems were reported with registration lists or methods of identifying registered voters at the stations, many polling places did not receive ballots on time or in quantities that equaled the number of registered voters at the station. While there were no reports of stations running out of ballots, there were cases during round one where poll workers did not have time, prior to election day, to strike from the ballot the name of Aman Tuleev, who had withdrawn from the race. There was also a widespread incidence of family voting and open voting during both rounds of the election. Delegates to both rounds also noted that many polling stations had been set up in facilities shared by political parties or campaigns, and that voters were subjected to signs, posters and murals which, though not technically campaign literature, communicated a partisan political message. As in two other regions, Voronezh observers noted that copies of the Russian Constitution, with a cover message to young voters signed by President Yeltsin, were being distributed to voters at several precincts.

Observers noted that domestic poll watchers representing one or more parties and candidates were present at almost all polling stations. In addition, however, they reported the unusual presence of local government administrators at all polling stations visited. They were present in the apparently official capacity of "administrative observers," responsible for providing "organizational and technical assistance." Russian election law contains no reference to these roles or functions. In several cases, IRI observers reported that these "observers" very conspicuously monitored their interviews with precinct chairmen to the chairmen's obvious discomfort. In rural areas they are reported to have engaged actively in the work of the polling station commissions.

Reported irregularities in the handling of mobile ballot boxes were similar to those received from other regions, although the percentage of ballots cast via the mobile box was exceptionally high at some precincts and territories visited by IRI observers in Voronezh. Observers noted a general pattern of disregard for the requirement that the mobile boxes only be made available to voters who called to request them, and that the number of blank ballots sent out with the boxes be no greater than the number of requests. There was also a loose application of the requirement that voter registration lists be marked to indicate the names of voters using the boxes.

IRI observers at rounds one and two of the election reported on procedural irregularities involving sequencing and the handling of ballots from mobile ballot boxes during the counting and reporting processes, but none that would suggest efforts to falsify the overall vote count. As in many other regions, observers also noted that precinct chairmen had difficulties in getting protocols to properly add up and resorted to arbitrarily adjusting subtotals. All observers in Voronezh also reported that they were not given copies of finalized precinct protocols at the voting stations, as required by law. They were instead given the copies only after the protocols had been submitted to the Territorial Election Commissions and computer-checked for accuracy. This having been done, precinct chairmen stamped and signed their protocols. With this condition met, copies of the validated protocols were provided. Territorial Election Commission protocols were provided in accordance with the law.

## APPENDIX I: Presidential election results of June 16, 1996

In compliance with the Federal Law on the Election of the President of the Russian Federation, the Central Election Commission hereby officially announces the results of the election of the President of the Russian Federation, based on the summarized data contained in the aggregate protocols prepared by Subject Electoral Commissions, and the protocols submitted by Polling Station Election Commissions formed outside the Russian Federation.

Number of subject election commissions	89
Number of precincts formed outside the Russian Federation	397
Number of protocols from subject election commissions	89
Number of protocols from precincts formed outside the Russian Federation	397
Number of registered voters, including those added to the voter lists on election day	108,495,023
Number of ballots issued to polling station election commissions	105,669,479
Number of ballots issued to voters at polling stations on election day	72,267,772
Number of ballots issued to voters, who voted outside the polling cities	3,476,777
Number of invalidated ballots	29,924,930
Number of ballots in mobile ballot boxes (minus ballots of irregular format)	3,471,935
Number of ballots in stationary ballot boxes (minus ballots of irregular format)	72,115,204
Total number of valid ballots	74,515,019
Total number of ballots recognized as invalid	1,072,120
including unmarked ballots	175,922
Number of voters, who took part in the elections	75,744,549
Number of voters, who took part in the ballot	75,587,139
Number of votes cast for each of the candidates	
BRYNTSALOV Vladimir Alexeivich	123,065
VLASOV Yuri Petrovich	151,282
GORBACHEV Mikhail Sergeivich	386,069
YELTSIN Boris Nikolayevich	26,665,495
ZHIRINOVSKI Vladimir Volfovich	4,311,479
ZYUGANOV Gerndai Andreivich	24,211,686
LEBED Alexander Ivanovich	10,974,736
FEDOROV Svyatoslav Nikolaivich	699,158
SHAKKUM Martin Lutsianovich	277,068
YAVLINSKI Grigori Alexeivich	5,550,752
Number of Votes Cast for Withdrawn Candidate Tuleev	308
Number of Votes Cast Against All Candidates	1,163,921
Number of Voters Who Received Absentee Certificates	1,062,068
Number of Voters Who Voted At Polling Stations with Absentee Certificates	852,043
The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation thus has recognized the elections as valid.	

**06.20.96 Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation**

## Runoff presidential election results of July 3, 1996

In compliance with the Federal Law on the Election of the President of the Russian Federation, the Central Election Commission hereby officially announces the results of the election of the President of the Russian Federation, based on the runoff summarized data contained in the aggregate protocols prepared by Subject Electoral Commissions, and the protocols submitted by Polling Station Election Commissions formed outside the Russian Federation.

Number of subject election commissions	89
Number of precincts formed outside the Russian Federation	397
Number of protocols from subject election commissions	89
Number of protocols from precincts formed outside the Russian Federation	397
Number of registered voters, including those added to the voter lists on election day	108,589,050
Number of ballots issued to polling station election commissions	105,816,822
Number of ballots issued to voters at polling stations on election day	71,185,187
Number of ballots issued to voters, who voted outside the polling cities	3,615,262
Number of invalidated ballots	31,016,373
Number of ballots in mobile ballot boxes (minus ballots of irregular format)	3,613,423
Number of ballots in stationary ballot boxes (minus ballots of irregular format)	71,077,867
Total number of valid ballots	73,910,698
Total number of ballots recognized as invalid	780,592
including unmarked ballots	103,144
Number of voters, who took part in the elections	74,800,449
Number of voters, who took part in the ballot	74,691,290

### Number of votes cast for each of the candidates

YELTSIN Boris Nikolayevich	40,203,948
ZYUGANOV Gennadi Andreivich	30,102,990
Against All	3,603,760
Number of voters who received absentee certificates	1,834,398
Number of voters who voted at polling stations with absentee certificates	1,483,262

The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation thus has recognized the elections as valid.

08.10.96

Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation

## APPENDIX II: Presidential Election Results by Subject

Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996									
	Adygeya	Aginski-Buryatski	Altai Krai	Altai	Amurskaya	Arkhangelsk	Astrakhan	Bashkortostan	Belgorod
Registered Voters	338369	44176	1950248	130610	697451	1056542	734487	2846065	1093357
Ballots issued to EC	324683	42839	1926686	130197	675670	990100	726257	2828635	1071162
Ballots issued at polling site	215865	26437	1323352	91066	454735	679577	480212	2169526	757476
Ballots issued outside site	11482	4086	56572	5807	24238	27571	29280	84766	70855
Ballots cancelled	97336	12316	546762	33324	196697	282952	216765	574343	242831
Ballots in portable boxes	11478	4084	56562	5807	24234	27542	29274	84630	70831
Ballots in boxes	215140	26424	1321597	90980	454081	678111	479494	2164665	756984
Valid ballots	223819	29852	1360019	94629	472210	697608	501069	2204156	817418
Invalid ballots, total	2799	656	18140	2158	6105	8045	7699	45139	10397
Invalid ballots, unmarked	450	85	2946	406	724	2108	1650	5396	1865
Bryntsalov	319	72	1642	173	746	1440	704	3949	1018
Vlasov	342	42	1861	228	867	1590	762	2992	1106
Gorbachev	557	340	6387	967	2374	3981	1623	17411	2777
Yeltsin	45374	13647	300499	27562	127233	288225	150190	769089	189320
Zhirinovskiy	11494	1732	101669	4671	37852	46277	36407	64541	35666
Zyuganov	116701	10903	578478	42204	200186	129299	185925	941539	383688
Lebed	31710	1630	267216	12614	56610	121910	82140	200859	140322
Fedorov	2245	231	9439	836	5651	11037	4674	12256	4336
Shakkum	720	77	4688	473	1484	3805	916	7202	1220
Yavlinsky	11977	794	69619	3347	28985	76136	30710	152557	47592
Tuleyev	0	0	0	2	0	34	0	0	0
Against All	2380	384	18521	1552	10222	13874	7018	31761	10373
Absentee ballots cast	961	166	8090	550	2526	8876	4284	19735	4857
Absentee ballots total	932	209	8875	621	4339	14902	6539	24107	5217



Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996									
	Bryansk	Buryatiya	Chechnya	Chelyabinsk	Chita	Chukotski	Chuvashiya	Dagestan	Evenkiyski AO
Registered Voters	1110307	688483	507243	2663820	823299	58848	959432	1172872	12932
Ballots issued to EC	1088915	660744	481820	2578026	795842	58169	970084	1120034	13134
Ballots issued at polling site	768268	417974	300734	1827848	506605	38580	619338	783919	7786
Ballots issued outside site	34463	23569	73282	48778	24635	4475	25686	27877	685
Ballots cancelled	286184	219201	107804	701400	264602	15114	325060	308238	4663
Ballots in portable boxes	34455	23559	72186	48739	24626	4467	25680	27700	684
Ballots in boxes	767144	417227	296291	1823602	505224	38552	618696	780828	7786
Valid ballots	790071	430245	352159	1841854	521205	42601	620431	787110	8345
Invalid ballots, total	11528	10541	16318	30487	8645	418	23945	21418	125
Invalid ballots, unmarked	2180	1739	1646	4920	1538	73	4489	1551	15
Bryntsalov	856	554	817	2703	840	114	977	1026	16
Vlasov	1035	770	1489	2716	949	124	916	622	30
Gorbachev	2657	2544	6508	8936	2870	264	2329	2791	69
Yeltsin	210257	134856	239905	685273	130011	20859	132422	230614	3678
Zhirinovskiy	40777	21329	5172	97937	68603	3254	27381	9041	597
Zyuganov	397454	177293	60119	463071	207282	5808	347524	511202	1694
Lebed	92948	46609	9371	371120	61981	7337	49296	10799	1390
Fedorov	4746	5464	3804	13732	6688	844	20906	2208	140
Shakkum	1190	1190	1118	6594	1794	116	2166	703	41
Yavlinsky	27904	33451	15666	164230	29071	2741	29446	13753	533
Tuleyev	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	15	0
Against All	10247	6185	8190	25542	11116	1123	7068	4336	157
Absentee ballots cast	5196	2023	0	15217	1926	288	4900	1376	40
Absentee ballots total	4632	2900	0	20807	2930	1623	5618	1947	115

**Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996**

	Ingushetia	Irkutsk	Ivanovo	Jewish AR	Kabardino-Balkariya	Kaliningrad	Kalmykia	Kaluga	Kamchatka
Registered Voters	114605	1798752	957607	140631	507194	724142	200224	832954	272757
Ballots issued to EC	113059	1760690	951763	140134	491139	696595	196665	817920	264400
Ballots issued at polling site	78334	1105541	642925	89644	361731	505401	138272	563407	163057
Ballots issued outside site	2162	26877	47303	5674	14110	15401	13442	44388	4766
Ballots cancelled	32563	628272	261535	44816	115298	175793	44951	210125	96577
Ballots in portable boxes	2158	26775	47296	5674	14102	15371	13439	44375	4767
Ballots in boxes	78103	1102412	642094	89379	360423	503896	138057	562453	162727
Valid ballots	78647	1112168	680436	93759	365578	513449	148053	598476	165754
Invalid ballots, total	1614	17019	8954	1294	8947	5818	3443	8352	1740
Invalid ballots, unmarked	186	3417	1935	222	471	936	268	1270	331
Bryntsalov	305	1698	1128	201	465	878	177	1140	347
Vlasov	148	2635	1082	190	452	823	121	1158	487
Gorbachev	3574	7150	2549	626	1290	2245	531	2379	872
Yeltsin	37129	363648	204084	28859	163872	173769	88615	190706	57435
Zhirinovskiy	1398	95810	48275	7594	5358	37412	5407	31018	16689
Zyuganov	19653	311353	160105	31220	139521	119830	38964	214933	31307
Lebed	1796	183962	203997	14544	36685	110264	8215	94650	23549
Fedorov	616	22271	4215	1725	1809	3189	633	5249	1731
Shakkum	299	4552	1864	348	712	821	227	2791	542
Yavlinsky	12195	100075	41938	6134	12590	66703	3791	45258	28935
Tuleyev	0	11	0	0	0	9	0	0	20
Against All	1534	19003	11199	2318	2824	7506	1372	9194	3840
Absentee ballots cast	22	3350	7638	549	799	3602	475	14232	883
Absentee ballots total	19	5731	7420	635	913	4345	716	7338	2171

Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996									
	Karachayevo-Cherkesiya	Kareliya	Kemerovo	Khabarovsk Krai	Khakasiya	Khanty-Mansy	Kirov	Komi	Komi-Permyatski AO
Registered Voters	293024	577087	2167343	1103898	393711	827553	1199668	799889	102136
Ballots issued to EC	283900	487468	2130077	1089245	363904	793410	1183911	778671	100514
Ballots issued at polling site	201360	375171	1390380	713719	247761	498209	819353	485741	63044
Ballots issued outside site	11229	16551	56314	27594	11737	19102	53801	15238	7612
Ballots cancelled	71311	95746	683383	347932	104406	276099	310757	277692	29858
Ballots in portable boxes	11229	16563	56266	27547	11736	19092	53800	15236	7612
Ballots in boxes	201093	374377	1387583	712229	247475	497414	818370	484721	63038
Valid ballots	208000	384803	1422738	732196	255345	510363	860976	491385	69300
Invalid ballots, total	4322	6137	21111	7580	3866	6143	11194	8572	1350
Invalid ballots, unmarked	341	999	3596	1292	420	692	2581	1383	334
Bryntsalov	616	744	1565	988	458	799	1688	878	174
Vlasov	229	722	1967	1391	677	822	1609	949	116
Gorbachev	1060	1914	7154	5097	1643	2984	3706	2992	603
Yeltsin	54823	165584	332376	288585	75801	271345	272471	202373	37649
Zhirinovskiy	5286	33134	167925	64007	25108	39217	75155	49103	6013
Zyuganov	117677	66428	561397	169586	91956	66241	252624	81572	16751
Lebed	18624	47053	220789	90550	32491	78175	119504	90830	3850
Fedorov	1014	3817	23566	15991	3098	7178	7232	4262	360
Shakkum	525	2066	5260	2680	1074	2424	3499	1990	208
Yavlinsky	6527	55768	77099	77077	18784	34138	105934	47240	2116
Tuleyev	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	3	0
Against All	1619	7573	23640	16239	4255	7040	17554	9193	1460
Absentee ballots cast	659	4785	5726	4031	919	5880	7935	3092	422
Absentee ballots total	936	5746	6550	6445	1080	18105	8796	9441	439



**Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996**

	Koryaksi AO	Kostroma	Krasnodar Krai	Krasnoyarsk Krai	Kurgan	Kursk	Leningrad	Lipetsk	Magadan
Registered Voters	21783	596580	3868024	2141669	786510	1007467	1329030	945709	170058
Ballots issued to EC	20808	592652	3750800	2133445	768759	1000954	1280874	936424	152750
Ballots issued at polling site	14547	406186	2506040	1454758	557607	685062	887710	613439	105270
Ballots issued outside site	1269	33068	97426	51592	25217	52714	44267	57261	5246
Ballots cancelled	4992	153398	1147334	627095	185935	263178	348897	265724	42234
Ballots in portable boxes	1267	33065	97321	51563	25190	52710	44260	57259	5244
Ballots in boxes	14542	405791	2501784	1451885	556971	684427	885975	612775	104912
Valid ballots	15542	433126	2569314	1484038	574165	723893	920377	659499	109169
Invalid ballots, total	267	5730	29791	19410	7996	13244	9858	10535	987
Invalid ballots, unmarked	52	922	4986	2680	1470	2253	1862	1635	177
Bryntsalov	55	747	4284	1947	1071	971	2210	750	259
Vlasov	45	875	4002	2471	958	1140	1812	1070	296
Gorbachev	136	2024	8092	8885	3112	2661	5757	1898	517
Yeltsin	7270	122971	682602	523135	170311	177328	348505	168077	40679
Zhirinovskiy	1028	33426	165721	113953	58143	28666	39882	35638	12021
Zyuganov	2367	125399	1024603	428781	218464	376880	215511	310671	17666
Lebed	2497	102078	454555	208494	64877	81555	168540	88165	26288
Fedorov	208	3357	23266	13264	4582	4280	11038	4616	1570
Shakkum	66	1197	5498	6127	2029	1145	3491	1279	421
Yavlinsky	1411	34112	165231	150527	38479	39641	107896	37251	6770
Tuleyev	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	5
Against All	459	6940	31460	26434	12139	9626	15735	10084	2677
Absentee ballots cast	31	4664	24050	8916	4868	5069	39149	5502	367
Absentee ballots total	154	4112	12134	13519	4987	4791	11147	3788	1418

Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996									
	Mari-El	Mordovia	Moscow City	Moscow Oblast	Murmansk	Nenetski AO	Nizhni Novgorod	North Osetia	Novgorod
Registered Voters	550104	688846	6784920	5385052	787978	29097	2852173	435145	577881
Ballots issued to EC	543627	684376	6721193	5177255	77480	29380	2780768	384179	564653
Ballots issued at polling site	358889	462403	4617495	3669596	459377	19258	1809168	292027	377297
Ballots issued outside site	23951	21426	87495	130731	11340	1943	84009	8721	39611
Ballots cancelled	160787	200547	2016203	1376928	306763	8179	887591	83431	147745
Ballots in portable boxes	23946	21422	87371	130663	11315	1927	83987	8715	39605
Ballots in boxes	358515	461924	4590520	3663912	458228	19256	1805077	291316	376660
Valid ballots	375705	467419	4635180	3743655	465188	20851	1860018	296132	411531
Invalid ballots, total	6756	15927	42771	50920	4355	332	29046	3899	4734
Invalid ballots, unmarked	1347	1704	9094	7649	928	69	6763	555	1063
Bryntsalov	650	627	8891	9575	1154	64	4426	460	960
Vlasov	696	961	20614	11721	1743	68	4220	556	733
Gorbachev	1790	1439	23524	17478	2447	215	8070	861	2437
Yeltsin	93124	116693	2861058	1675374	190719	9033	657961	57849	148515
Zhirinovskiy	28418	33138	68285	113883	32775	2104	102621	9703	25813
Zyuganov	166131	240263	694862	912684	56789	3891	614467	187007	98682
Lebed	41948	51434	449900	571886	119396	2537	279053	28795	76912
Fedorov	5047	3323	37790	34510	4177	465	16620	1705	3398
Shakkum	2327	652	29858	31929	1166	105	5074	503	1250
Yavlinsky	28179	14493	372524	298656	45435	1619	134905	5390	45786
Tuleyev	0	0	0	0	42	12	0	0	0
Against All	7395	4396	67874	65959	9345	738	32601	3303	7045
Absentee ballots cast	2683	2934	80271	133797	2896	102	21119	583	7090
Absentee ballots total	3204	2649	233835	76568	19680	303	24670	706	3645

Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996									
	Novosibirsk	Omsk	Orel	Orenburg	Penza	Perm	Primorski Krai	Pskov	Rostov
Registered Voters	2036397	1528138	687020	1582780	1166105	2020049	1580011	648971	3301262
Ballots issued to EC	1986372	1510211	679546	1563610	1165378	1975112	1534697	641526	3235137
Ballots issued at polling site	1410366	1093539	467195	1081506	835115	1285691	1013182	407570	2374358
Ballots issued outside site	42371	37367	41262	33016	40127	60940	34017	83307	128272
Ballots cancelled	533635	379305	171089	449088	290136	628481	487498	150649	732507
Ballots in portable boxes	42357	37314	41256	32988	40110	60929	34005	83302	128166
Ballots in boxes	1407157	1090191	466875	1079546	833571	1283416	1010837	407130	2368287
Valid ballots	1428383	1108816	501754	1094699	860845	1324278	1031745	485935	2468600
Invalid ballots, total	21131	18689	6377	17835	12836	20067	13097	4497	27853
Invalid ballots, unmarked	2499	2576	1076	2761	1985	4138	1973	703	4643
Bryntsalov	1505	1364	589	1836	1055	2346	1889	823	3114
Vlasov	1864	1907	788	1620	1289	2367	2084	738	3591
Gorbachev	16106	5061	1580	7036	2447	8303	5751	2028	7925
Yeltsin	371210	369782	109020	288865	181839	742968	308747	121667	725949
Zhirinovskiy	141440	78352	22402	83523	46188	83952	133029	49999	115162
Zyuganov	506791	417029	275643	468689	442066	216713	256574	149056	873609
Lebed	144918	94396	59972	151489	105389	130203	203384	115549	500263
Fedorov	14609	8693	3187	10316	5775	12410	13094	3319	15082
Shakkum	3086	7961	783	2378	1724	4295	8692	1196	5312
Yavlinsky	202117	101027	19788	65027	60565	96926	74840	34537	192273
Tuleyev	2	0	0	0	0	0	42	0	2
Against All	24735	23244	8002	13920	12508	23795	23619	7023	26318
Absentee ballots cast	11145	7547	3261	5062	6191	12762	7852	7371	15016
Absentee ballots total	13452	9444	2994	5746	6656	16606	101819	4329	20335

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Ryazan	Sakhalin	Samara	Saratov	Smolensk	Stavropol Krai	St.Petersburg	Sverdlovsk	Tambov
Registered Voters	1031496	461110	2455498	2042831	887257	1870996	3659544	3452336	980607
Ballots issued to EC	1005922	447106	2468073	2017431	877105	1863822	3438351	3353810	963683
Ballots issued at polling site	666939	276763	1690626	1439791	568228	1274431	2348944	2160154	605125
Ballots issued outside site	69017	9848	64559	70667	45919	68771	38992	86105	63066
Ballots cancelled	269966	160495	712888	506973	262958	520620	1050415	1107551	295492
Ballots in portable boxes	69004	9847	64482	70658	45917	68765	38988	86101	63062
Ballots in boxes	666459	276403	1687462	1437533	567740	1271773	2343789	2158460	604663
Valid ballots	728888	283458	1737163	1491281	608667	1327962	2375206	2226627	661843
Invalid ballots, total	6575	2792	14781	16910	4990	12576	7571	17934	5882
Invalid ballots, unmarked	818	540	2215	2006	892	1776	1524	2766	943
Yeltsin	313087	152795	910134	664799	234125	548749	1759950	1726549	217499
Zyuganov	379626	111085	747946	753173	345190	722889	502533	401515	419639
Against All	36175	19578	79083	73309	29352	56324	112723	98563	24705
Absentee ballots cast	23756	1735	35329	28665	12722	15979	77373	38498	9798
Absentee ballots total	18809	3742	45251	35422	11552	16852	165731	51219	6387



Presidential Elections - June 16, 1996									
	Tartarstan	Tamyrsky AO	Tomsk	Tula	Tuva	Tver	Tyumen	Udmurtiya	Ulyanovsk
Registered Voters	2635844	28940	745336	1440267	170685	1256109	907788	1151991	1090344
Ballots issued to EC	3620948	28194	736468	1445001	164145	1218904	888623	1038440	1085073
Ballots issued at polling site	1867704	16953	495047	978912	106797	848365	579131	720623	749598
Ballots issued outside site	76940	2039	17578	62091	10133	85407	31578	19090	25869
Ballots cancelled	676304	9202	223843	403998	47215	285132	277914	298727	309606
Ballots in portable boxes	76937	2038	17566	62079	10133	85379	31573	19086	25861
Ballots in boxes	1866630	16942	494312	976976	106616	847054	578040	719575	748835
Valid ballots	1889847	18773	503626	1023024	111898	922683	600693	727286	763014
Invalid ballots, total	53720	207	8252	16031	4851	9750	8920	11375	11682
Invalid ballots, unmarked	6610	26	1349	3487	447	1833	1477	3010	2393
Bryntsalov	3553	33	725	1462	175	1587	982	1404	989
Vlasov	3289	35	881	1762	169	1804	982	1679	1136
Gorbachev	15775	192	3096	3334	1167	3551	3224	5092	2557
Yeltsin	745181	9434	178881	311280	69971	299435	238171	271865	184218
Zhirinovskiy	50119	1920	36419	47545	3529	51496	57206	44243	57167
Zyuganov	740451	2304	113281	314098	24716	313168	166491	225074	355066
Lebed	143429	2843	100788	249663	5297	159813	80961	85125	95559
Fedorov	17895	292	4026	6196	532	6799	4988	6802	7158
Shakkum	4620	100	1525	3543	246	3820	2150	3056	2061
Yavlinsky	134161	1234	55780	68439	4926	64843	34750	68215	45748
Tuleyev	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0
Against All	31374	386	8224	15702	1170	16367	10770	14731	11355
Absentee ballots cast	12958	124	3307	14147	330	22034	4754	5127	7368
Absentee ballots total	16320	833	4499	12513	501	13691	4349	6782	8520

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Adygeya	Aginski-Buryatski	Altai Krai	Altai	Amurskaya	Arkhangelsk	Astrakhan	Bashkortostan	Belgorod
Registered Voters	340508	44231	1953564	131097	700393	1058566	735471	2851338	1098946
Ballots issued to EC	339428	43663	1934171	128212	690912	947590	728629	2833243	1092219
Ballots issued at polling site	208376	25319	1253774	87241	435900	670298	459142	2116248	778140
Ballots issued outside site	12595	3990	57534	5805	23778	32271	30316	81180	50276
Ballots cancelled	118457	14354	622863	35166	231234	245021	239171	535815	263803
Ballots in portable boxes	12594	3990	57527	5805	23774	32258	30267	81105	50266
Ballots in boxes	208227	25310	1252925	87190	435642	669451	458814	2213878	777868
Valid ballots	217386	28843	1297847	91610	455683	695496	484514	2244406	819355
Invalid ballots, total	3435	457	12605	1385	3733	6213	4567	50577	8779
Invalid ballots, unmarked	258	81	1657	191	353	1176	926	3093	1294
Yeltsin	76146	14405	505270	40026	186867	448477	229153	1170774	300481
Zyuganov	133665	13839	727548	48057	243823	194704	233738	990148	485024
Against All	7575	599	65029	3527	24993	52315	21623	83484	33850
Absentee ballots cast	1542	224	14386	841	4327	16291	7280	33394	8538
Absentee ballots total	1546	257	16268	893	6626	24409	8525	42541	9248

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Bryansk	Buryatiya	Chechnya	Chelyabinsk	Chita	Chukotski	Chuvashiya	Dagestan	Evenkiyski AO
Registered Voters	1114079	689933	503671	2667324	827378	52771	962349	1208348	12852
Ballots issued to EC	1110288	647846	499487	2539386	828247	58060	961488	1148179	13060
Ballots issued at polling site	753843	400043	343508	1793650	487653	35555	620028	872533	7336
Ballots issued outside site	35822	26454	33541	59014	26485	4993	27596	26446	683
Ballots cancelled	320623	221349	122438	686722	314109	17512	313864	249200	5041
Ballots in portable boxes	35822	26448	33539	58998	26468	4993	27595	26250	683
Ballots in boxes	753604	399420	341864	1789728	486595	35404	619671	868736	7336
Valid ballots	781240	419760	371516	1826132	506510	40174	632702	879723	7954
Invalid ballots, total	8186	6108	3887	22594	6553	223	14564	15263	65
Invalid ballots, unmarked	1182	671	625	2789	789	43	2692	900	10
Yeltsin	286515	192933	275455	1081811	209803	30009	205959	471231	5273
Zyuganov	467552	210791	80877	646306	269359	7730	405129	401069	2272
Against All	27173	16036	15184	98015	27348	2435	21614	7423	409
Absentee ballots cast	9125	3391	12	26872	3393	420	9089	2014	84
Absentee ballots total	8478	5243	38	35978	5109	2694	9670	1637	221

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Ingushetia	Irkutsk	Ivanovo	Jewish AR	Kabardino-Balkariya	Kaliningrad	Kalmykia	Kaluga	Kamchatka
Registered Voters	113849	1802839	957311	141466	513132	724343	200806	839267	274830
Ballots issued to EC	114687	1770692	957634	141323	504162	695080	201180	825529	263320
Ballots issued at polling site	93033	1069053	604720	86722	392340	486777	132807	552217	156691
Ballots issued outside site	1973	31513	52655	6078	16739	15151	14642	46642	5235
Ballots cancelled	19681	670126	300259	48523	95083	193152	53731	226670	101394
Ballots in portable boxes	1973	31448	52647	6078	16732	15146	14640	46639	5231
Ballots in boxes	92977	1067544	604152	86567	390953	485933	132671	551384	156524
Valid ballots	93642	1084661	651407	91588	402552	496935	145788	592987	160545
Invalid ballots, total	1308	14331	5392	1057	5133	4144	1523	5036	1210
Invalid ballots, unmarked	12	1602	1178	139	224	679	127	859	223
Yeltsin	75768	578469	349443	45791	259313	289088	103515	290595	99980
Zyuganov	14738	437105	256556	40464	135287	177077	39354	272592	47664
Against All	3136	69087	45408	5333	7952	30770	2919	29800	12901
Absentee ballots cast	28	6932	12382	1006	1447	6734	762	21858	1513
Absentee ballots total	6	10498	12129	1041	1634	6927	1138	12113	3554



**Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996**

	Karachayevo-Cherkesiya	Kareliya	Kemerovo	Khabarovsk Krai	Khakasiya	Khanty-Mansy	Kirov	Komi	Komi-Permyatski AO
Registered Voters	296321	580909	2169590	1106030	396347	814664	1201171	791846	102567
Ballots issued to EC	294098	477065	2146195	1107465	343591	810377	1200059	781026	101826
Ballots issued at polling site	207839	362406	1308503	700652	236475	475994	783079	463925	62600
Ballots issued outside site	12510	17669	59917	31122	11030	21512	56751	15955	7717
Ballots cancelled	73749	96990	777775	375691	96086	312871	360229	301146	31509
Ballots in portable boxes	12509	17665	59913	31108	11028	21441	56746	15950	7717
Ballots in boxes	207449	361728	1306770	699444	236382	475096	782370	462990	62590
Valid ballots	216412	376334	1352182	725013	245215	491660	831229	474051	69428
Invalid ballots, total	3546	3059	14501	5539	2195	4877	7887	4889	879
Invalid ballots, unmarked	295	509	2056	785	239	383	1594	907	138
Yeltsin	109747	251205	567751	430870	116729	368650	425465	308250	44136
Zyuganov	101379	100104	704322	246378	116644	100303	348835	134224	22908
Against All	5286	25025	80109	47765	11842	22707	56929	31577	2384
Absentee ballots cast	1882	8772	10560	7173	2340	8698	13959	6114	629
Absentee ballots total	2373	10001	13043	10589	1863	30485	15154	13732	668

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Koryaksi AO	Kostroma	Krasnodar Krai	Krasnoyarsk Krai	Kurgan	Kursk	Leningrad	Lipetsk	Magadan
Registered Voters	21889	598475	3904612	2145968	786547	1010449	1344260	948106	166632
Ballots issued to EC	20261	597837	3831923	2125617	785768	1003935	1255153	947009	146775
Ballots issued at polling site	13494	382765	2440174	1380607	541189	678407	883132	601105	98140
Ballots issued outside site	1360	34972	106160	52588	26193	34357	48584	71607	5804
Ballots cancelled	5407	180100	1285589	692422	218386	291171	323437	274297	42831
Ballots in portable boxes	1360	34970	106140	52583	26193	34351	48519	71603	5801
Ballots in boxes	13493	382498	2436381	1378426	540739	678026	881722	600483	97968
Valid ballots	14680	414110	2521524	1418022	561496	702638	924118	665139	103066
Invalid ballots, total	173	3358	20997	12987	5436	9739	6123	6947	703
Invalid ballots, unmarked	23	545	3326	1694	828	1363	1185	884	106
Yeltsin	10364	208163	1116007	764633	246097	258183	570702	259529	65965
Zyuganov	3401	178238	1308765	572555	284731	419756	300501	378393	28573
Against All	915	27709	96752	80834	30668	24699	52915	27217	8528
Absentee ballots cast	72	7928	41133	15649	7858	9229	58809	9156	760
Absentee ballots total	276	6989	20830	24819	8640	8939	20440	6549	2323

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Mari-El	Mordovia	Moscow City	Moscow Oblast	Murmansk	Nenetski AO	Nizhni Novgorod	North Osetia	Novgorod
Registered Voters	550715	692878	6672788	5417224	763877	28606	2860893	441614	584018
Ballots issued to EC	549930	690266	6452572	5195014	734685	27327	2777908	410917	571065
Ballots issued at polling site	352387	493661	4617236	3690403	421969	17438	1782012	300836	374667
Ballots issued outside site	26479	29106	92611	149055	11129	1934	91243	11630	38533
Ballots cancelled	171064	167499	1742725	1355556	301587	7955	904653	98451	157865
Ballots in portable boxes	26476	29102	92537	148955	11118	1934	91234	11602	38531
Ballots in boxes	352229	493401	4603571	3685974	421524	17435	1778234	299462	374297
Valid ballots	373801	504220	4665341	3803184	429916	19140	1850360	305373	409829
Invalid ballots, total	4904	18283	30767	31745	2726	229	19108	5691	2999
Invalid ballots, unmarked	758	1020	5402	4715	643	31	3619	374	602
Yeltsin	154301	238441	3629464	2462197	303401	11919	967307	133748	244129
Zyuganov	199872	249451	842092	1146348	94664	5596	791738	164308	140329
Against All	19628	16328	193785	194639	31851	1625	91315	7317	25371
Absentee ballots cast	5283	7970	170093	206460	5907	172	37073	1220	12467
Absentee ballots total	5927	8149	408261	131527	28029	422	42212	1545	6329



Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Novosibirsk	Omsk	Orel	Orenburg	Penza	Perm	Primorski Krai	Pskov	Rostov
Registered Voters	947009	1525989	686945	1595245	1168541	2022676	1586108	656216	3295420
Ballots issued to EC	2039828	1527652	685768	1590584	1170888	1965575	1567804	652668	3266505
Ballots issued at polling site	2001147	1072921	458564	1049053	805418	1253084	969854	402237	2266788
Ballots issued outside site	1326014	40778	41369	33430	40102	65623	35240	78928	146211
Ballots cancelled	39853	413953	185835	508101	325368	646868	562710	171503	853506
Ballots in portable boxes	635280	40769	41367	33424	40089	65620	35231	78924	145657
Ballots in boxes	39849	1071818	458339	1047660	804316	1251775	968176	401921	2261105
Valid ballots	1323944	1100123	495526	1069676	836287	1303949	994107	476913	2385022
Invalid ballots, total	1349120	12464	4180	11408	8118	13446	9300	3932	21740
Invalid ballots, unmarked	14673	1322	664	1428	1366	2411	1170	536	3278
Yeltsin	1515	514384	160162	441163	299780	933294	524428	217500	1219594
Zyuganov	596564	528562	316213	583090	497773	310546	395463	231201	1063135
Against All	666858	57177	19151	45423	38734	60109	74216	28212	102293
Absentee ballots cast	85698	13417	5941	8545	10832	22458	12530	13731	27653
Absentee ballots total	19577	16738	5851	9454	11299	26712	18616	7485	36148

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Ryazan	Sakhalin	Samara	Saratov	Smolensk	Stavropol Krai	St.Petersburg	Sverdlovsk	Tambov
Registered Voters	1031496	461110	2455498	2042831	887257	1870996	3659544	3452336	980607
Ballots issued to EC	1005922	447106	2468073	2017431	877105	1863822	3438351	3353810	963683
Ballots issued at polling site	666939	276763	1690626	1439791	568228	1274431	2348944	2160154	605125
Ballots issued outside site	69017	9848	64559	70667	45919	68771	38992	86105	63066
Ballots cancelled	269966	160495	712888	506973	262958	520620	1050415	1107551	295492
Ballots in portable boxes	69004	9847	64482	70658	45917	68765	38988	86101	63062
Ballots in boxes	666459	276403	1687462	1437533	567740	1271773	2343789	2158460	604663
Valid ballots	728888	283458	1737163	1491281	608667	1327962	2375206	2226627	661843
Invalid ballots, total	6575	2792	14781	16910	4990	12576	7571	17934	5882
Invalid ballots, unmarked	818	540	2215	2006	892	1776	1524	2766	943
Yeltsin	313087	152795	910134	664799	234125	548749	1759950	1726549	217499
Zyuganov	379626	111085	747946	753173	345190	722889	502533	401515	419639
Against All	36175	19578	79083	73309	29352	56324	112723	98563	24705
Absentee ballots cast	23756	1735	35329	28665	12722	15979	77373	38498	9798
Absentee ballots total	18809	3742	45251	35422	11552	16852	165731	51219	6387

Presidential Elections - July 3, 1996									
	Tartarstan	Tamyrsky AO	Tomsk	Tula	Tuva	Tver	Tyumen	Udmurtiya	Ulyanovsk
Registered Voters	2632389	28920	744010	1440510	171742	1268488	915585	1156145	1093057
Ballots issued to EC	2609619	29102	737369	1441628	149671	1239113	897564	1023728	1090365
Ballots issued at polling site	1967392	15746	472574	956391	104572	820463	580976	714025	733953
Ballots issued outside site	73109	2114	18520	68852	11474	89124	35097	29756	25107
Ballots cancelled	569118	11242	246275	416385	33625	329526	281491	279947	331305
Ballots in portable boxes	73104	2114	18518	68834	11474	89108	35089	29743	25105
Ballots in boxes	1966122	15741	471917	955094	104449	819514	580102	713272	733161
Valid ballots	1986081	17720	485107	1012886	112763	902235	608673	735502	748806
Invalid ballots, total	53145	135	5328	11042	3160	6387	6518	7513	9460
Invalid ballots, unmarked	3212	13	904	2055	171	1143	796	1249	1250
Yeltsin	1253121	12787	290199	536783	73113	455731	343391	392551	286860
Zyuganov	658782	3851	165241	421169	37227	396627	234743	302649	426778
Against All	74178	1082	29667	54934	2423	49877	30539	40302	35168
Absentee ballots cast	20584	167	6177	23434	461	35651	7552	9059	12896
Absentee ballots total	26766	1125	9737	21632	619	21379	7810	11761	15481

Presidential Elections -July 3, 1996									
	Ust-Ordynski AO	Vladimir	Volgograd	Vologda	Voronezh	Yakutia	Yamalo- Nenetski AO	Yaroslav	TOTAL RUSSIA
Registered Voters	82814	1250544	2006436	989121	1968924	601252	271902	1100070	108600730
Ballots issued to EC	83132	1219849	1963278	962629	1935554	487752	266382	1091890	105829539
Ballots issued at polling site	56514	768685	1338493	596109	1253712	394322	164120	699859	71200562
Ballots issued outside site	3114	49451	57438	71241	103238	30581	15758	73647	3615336
Ballots cancelled	23504	401713	567347	295279	578604	62849	86504	318384	31013641
Ballots in portable boxes	3113	49448	57424	71225	103230	30555	15742	73643	3613497
Ballots in boxes	56501	767699	1336770	595568	1252218	394175	163956	699293	71093148
Valid ballots	58640	809486	1383648	661979	1344396	418751	178230	766932	73926240
Invalid ballots, total	974	7661	10546	4814	11052	5979	1468	6004	780405
Invalid ballots, unmarked	55	1241	1619	831	1639	600	155	1031	103175
Yeltsin	29014	421352	616368	426532	501114	274570	142458	467896	40208384
Zyuganov	28016	342077	703784	189989	781260	126888	27272	243526	30113306
Against All	1610	46057	63496	45458	62022	17293	8500	55510	360455
Absentee ballots cast	409	25243	16945	18582	22468	7241	2875	24846	1483340
Absentee ballots total	255	15232	16776	17560	23669	16685	29159	25792	1834467

### APPENDIX III: IRI Exit Poll Results

IRI conducted regional voter exit surveys in conjunction with its 1996 presidential observation mission. While the results of this self-administered survey are not scientific, they provide a quantitative complement to the findings of the report.

A total of 663 voters responded to the polling questionnaire, designed to be self-administered by Russian respondents with minimum explanation by the observer teams. IRI collected responses in all regions in which it conducted election observation.

Broad observations can be made from a review of the survey's results. Clearly Russian voters made up their minds early in this presidential contest. It appears those who voted for candidates other than Yeltsin and Zyuganov in the first round, knew who they were going to vote for in the second round.

Overall, Russian voters believed their vote counted. While most appear to have been confident that Yeltsin would win, they did not believe warnings of impending fraud by various quarters. However, those who thought the country was on the wrong track had less confidence that their vote mattered or that the outcome would reflect the will of the people. This indicates that Zyuganov supporters believed the rhetoric from the Communist Party about possible fraud in the elections.

Voters in this poll indicated they were driven to vote by economic forces. Many supported economic reforms and indicated that though they were gravely concerned with the direction the reforms were taking, they believe they should be continued. Throughout both rounds, those supporting reform appeared constant. More educated voters in the sample thought the reforms were on the right track and supported Yeltsin.

In the campaign communications sphere, these respondents clearly relied on radio advertising and newspaper articles for their information about the candidates and their campaigns, rather than from television. Of those candidates heard from most, Yeltsin dominated the field, followed closely by Lebed, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovskiy. Most of the respondents claimed to have heard little from other candidates.

The pattern of decision making by voters in these elections is clear: voters made decisions early in the election cycle, based primarily on economic messages outlined by the incumbent and received information on his campaign through mostly radio advertising and news articles.

**1. Do you feel things in Russia are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?**

Right direction	62%
Wrong direction	34%
No answer	5%

**2. Do you approve or disapprove of the economic reforms?**

Approve of reforms	33%
Disapprove because reforms have gone too far	24%
Disapprove because reforms have not gone far enough	39%
No answer	4%

**3. When did you make up your mind which candidate you would vote for?**

In the polling booth on election day	5%
During the last week of the campaign	10%
Two weeks ago	6%
During May	11%
During April	4%
Before the campaign began	64%
No answer	1%

**4. Which comes closest to your opinion about the results of this election?**

The result will reflect the choices of voters like me	69%
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My vote does not matter much. The results have basically already been determined by the authorities	29%
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No answer	2%
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**5. Please write down the one issue or problem that was most important to you in deciding who to vote**

Economics	14%
Children's/country's future	7%
Freedom/democracy/peace	7%
Don't want past/communism back	6%
Strengthening and preserving Russia/order/stability	6%
Normal life	4%
Social issues	4%
Standard of Living	3%
Not enough reforms/continue reforms	3%
Crime/laws not obeyed/no rule of law	2%
Strong leader	2%
Legislative programs	1%
No problems	1%
War in Chechnya/ don't want war	1%
Corruption	1%
Agree with views of candidate	1%
Poverty/Black Sea Fleet deterioration	Less than 1%
Other	8%
No answer	28%

**6. Regardless of who you voted for, which candidate have you heard most about in the last two months?**

Yeltsin	62%
Lebed	3%
Zyuganov	4%
Zhirinovsky	3%
All/About the same	6%
Other	1%
No answer	21%



**7. How have you heard about the candidate you previously mentioned?**

Party advertisement on radio	55%
Television news shows	13%
Newspaper articles	50%
Party debates	23%
Radio news shows	8%
Party literature	6%
No answer	35%

**8. What is your age?**

18-24	25%
25-29	9%
30-34	9%
35-39	10%
40-44	11%
45-54	15%
55-64	13%
65+	7%
No answer	1%

**9. What is the last level of education you have completed?**

Less than eight classes	3%
High school incomplete	4%
High school graduate	17%
Technical/Vocational school	19%
Incomplete higher education	17%
Complete higher education	39%
No answer	2%

**10. What is your gender?**

Male	56%
Female	43%
No answer	1%

RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

Table 1-1  
CITY  
BANNER 1

	MALE		FEMALE		EDUCATION			DIRECTION		REFORM		TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS			
	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRITTEN	
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663 100%	252 100%	168 100%	116 100%	155 100%	240 100%	256 100%	408 100%	224 100%	216 100%	161 100%	261 100%	30 100%	105 100%	524 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%
KEMEROVO	125 19%	41 16%	34 20%	23 20%	32 21%	43 18%	50 20%	70 17%	49 22%	39 18%	34 21%	48 18%	5 17%	17 16%	103 20%	79 17%	44 23%	107 18%	27 21%	41 25%
CRIMEA	99 15%	46 18%	17 10%	16 14%	20 13%	38 16%	41 16%	68 17%	31 14%	38 18%	22 14%	38 15%	2 7%	12 11%	84 16%	78 17%	21 11%	86 15%	16 13%	22 13%
MOSCOW	98 15%	39 15%	20 12%	20 17%	25 16%	30 13%	41 16%	63 15%	34 15%	34 16%	27 17%	37 14%	7 23%	19 18%	71 14%	59 13%	34 18%	91 16%	15 12%	25 15%
VOLGOGRAD	83 13%	40 16%	29 17%	7 6%	15 10%	33 14%	34 13%	53 13%	25 11%	26 12%	12 7%	41 16%	9 30%	14 13%	59 11%	48 11%	31 16%	72 12%	16 13%	7 7%
VORONEZH	73 11%	26 10%	17 10%	15 13%	24 15%	22 9%	24 9%	36 9%	27 12%	16 7%	25 16%	24 9%	2 7%	15 14%	56 11%	56 12%	17 9%	59 10%	13 10%	20 12%
NOVOSIBIRSK	60 9%	21 8%	17 10%	13 11%	21 14%	21 9%	16 6%	29 7%	26 12%	15 7%	17 11%	22 8%	2 7%	10 10%	48 9%	40 9%	17 9%	54 9%	17 13%	18 11%
ROSTOV	56 8%	14 6%	18 11%	9 8%	5 3%	22 9%	28 11%	35 9%	18 8%	16 7%	15 9%	24 9%	-	5 5%	50 10%	37 8%	18 9%	52 9%	11 9%	7 4%
ARKHANGELSK	48 7%	19 8%	14 8%	7 6%	9 6%	24 10%	14 5%	37 9%	11 5%	20 9%	6 4%	21 8%	1 3%	9 9%	38 7%	39 9%	8 4%	43 7%	5 4%	17 10%
PERM	11 2%	5 2%	3 1%	2 2%	3 2%	3 1%	5 2%	8 2%	3 1%	6 3%	2 1%	3 1%	2 7%	2 2%	7 1%	10 2%	1 1%	10 2%	3 2%	1 1%
ST. PETERSBURG	10 2%	1 -	3 3%	1 1%	1 1%	4 2%	3 1%	9 2%	-	6 3%	1 1%	3 1%	-	2 2%	8 2%	9 2%	1 1%	9 2%	3 2%	2 1%

	MALE		FEMALE		EDUCATION		DIRECTION		REFORM		TIME OF DECISION		VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS					
	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APP-ROVE	DISA-PPROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRI-TEN
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663	114	168	116	155	240	256	408	224	216	161	261	30	105	524	455	192	583	126	164
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ROUND 1	376	61	100	71	86	127	152	225	131	127	94	139	15	64	294	253	114	334	74	80
	57%	54%	60%	61%	55%	53%	59%	55%	58%	59%	58%	53%	50%	61%	56%	56%	59%	57%	59%	49%
ROUND 2	287	53	68	45	69	113	104	183	93	89	67	122	15	41	230	202	78	249	52	84
	43%	46%	40%	39%	45%	47%	41%	45%	42%	41%	42%	47%	50%	39%	44%	44%	41%	43%	41%	51%

Table 3-1  
QUESTION 1:  
Do you feel things in Russia are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?  
BANNER 1

	MALE				FEMALE				EDUCATION				DIRECTION				REFORM				TIME OF DECISION				VOTE RESULTS				ADVERTISEMENTS			
	18-44		45+		18-44		45+		HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APP-ROVE	DIS-APPROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT- TEN	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT- TEN			
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663 100%		252 100%		114 100%		116 100%		155 100%	240 100%	256 100%	408 100%	224 100%	216 100%	161 100%	261 100%	30 100%	105 100%	524 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%			
RIGHT DIRECTION	408 62%		159 63%		57 50%		67 58%		81 52%	147 61%	176 69%	408 100%	-	195 90%	32 20%	174 67%	17 57%	57 54%	333 64%	328 72%	71 37%	365 65%	65 52%	104 63%	328 72%	71 37%	365 65%	65 52%	104 63%			
WRONG DIRECTION	224 34%		85 34%		52 46%		40 34%		66 43%	82 34%	71 28%	-	224 100%	18 8%	119 74%	77 30%	10 33%	44 42%	168 32%	112 25%	109 57%	197 34%	50 40%	58 35%	112 25%	109 57%	197 34%	50 40%	58 35%			
NO ANSWER	31 5%		8 3%		5 4%		9 8%		8 5%	11 5%	9 4%	-	-	3 1%	10 6%	10 4%	3 10%	4 4%	23 4%	15 3%	12 6%	21 4%	11 9%	2 1%	15 3%	12 6%	21 4%	11 9%	2 1%			

## RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

Table 4-1  
QUESTION 2:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the economic reforms?

BANNER 1

	MALE			FEMALE			EDUCATION			DIRECTION			REFORM			TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS		
	18-44	45+	TOTAL	18-44	45+	TOTAL	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRITTEN	
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663 100%	252 100%	663 100%	168 100%	116 100%	663 100%	155 100%	240 100%	256 100%	408 100%	224 100%	216 100%	161 100%	261 100%	30 100%	105 100%	524 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%	
APPROVE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS	216 33%	86 34%	216 33%	51 30%	40 34%	216 33%	38 25%	67 28%	106 41%	195 48%	18 8%	216 100%	-	-	10 33%	25 24%	181 35%	180 40%	31 16%	188 32%	33 26%	58 35%	
DISAPPROVE BECAUSE REFORMS HAVE GONE TOO FAR	161 24%	46 18%	161 24%	36 21%	42 36%	161 24%	50 32%	57 24%	50 20%	32 8%	119 53%	-	161 100%	-	8 27%	21 20%	130 25%	77 17%	82 43%	136 23%	38 30%	33 20%	
DISAPPROVE BECAUSE REFORMS HAVE NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH	261 39%	114 45%	261 39%	74 44%	27 23%	261 39%	56 36%	112 47%	90 35%	174 43%	77 34%	-	-	261 100%	12 40%	52 50%	195 37%	183 40%	72 38%	238 41%	50 40%	68 41%	
NO ANSWER	25 4%	6 2%	25 4%	7 4%	7 6%	25 4%	11 7%	4 2%	10 4%	7 2%	10 4%	-	-	-	-	7 7%	18 3%	15 3%	7 4%	21 4%	5 4%	5 3%	

## RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

Table 5-1  
QUESTION 3:  
When did you make up your mind about which candidate you would vote for?

BANNER 1

	MALE				FEMALE				EDUCATION				DIRECTION				REFORM				TIME OF DECISION				VOTE RESULTS				ADVERTISEMENTS											
	18-44		45+		18-44		45+		HS OR LESS		SOME COL		COL GRAD		RIGHT		WRONG		APP-ROVE		DISA-PROVE		NOT FAR ENOUGH		BOOTH		LAST STAGE		MAY AND BEFORE		YES		NO		TV		RADIO		WRIT-TEN	
	TOTAL	18-44	45+	100%	TOTAL	18-44	45+	100%	155	100%	240	100%	256	100%	408	100%	224	100%	216	100%	161	100%	261	100%	30	100%	105	100%	524	100%	455	100%	192	100%	583	100%	126	100%	164	100%
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663	252	114	100%	168	100%	116	100%	155	100%	240	100%	256	100%	408	100%	224	100%	216	100%	161	100%	261	100%	30	100%	105	100%	524	100%	455	100%	192	100%	583	100%	126	100%	164	100%
IN THE POLLING BOOTH ON ELECTION DAY	30	10	7	4%	8	5%	4	3%	10	6%	11	5%	8	3%	17	4%	10	4%	10	5%	8	5%	12	5%	30	100%	-	-	-	-	21	5%	8	4%	26	4%	6	5%	5	3%
DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN	63	28	7	11%	20	12%	7	6%	10	6%	33	14%	19	7%	33	8%	27	12%	17	8%	12	7%	28	11%	-	63	60%	-	-	39	9%	19	10%	56	10%	15	12%	9	5%	
TWO WEEKS AGO	42	21	5	4%	11	7%	5	4%	11	7%	14	6%	17	7%	24	6%	17	8%	8	4%	9	6%	24	9%	-	42	40%	-	-	21	5%	21	11%	41	7%	7	6%	8	5%	
DURING MAY	71	31	8	12%	20	12%	10	9%	14	9%	29	12%	26	10%	50	12%	16	7%	24	11%	10	6%	35	13%	-	-	-	-	71	14%	50	11%	62	11%	13	10%	24	15%		
DURING APRIL	29	10	6	4%	9	5%	4	3%	6	4%	11	5%	12	5%	21	5%	8	4%	10	5%	7	4%	11	4%	-	-	-	-	29	6%	23	5%	6	3%	27	5%	3	2%		
BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN BEGAN	424	151	80	60%	100	60%	86	74%	103	66%	142	59%	173	68%	262	64%	144	64%	147	68%	113	70%	149	57%	-	-	-	-	424	81%	300	66%	118	61%	370	63%	82	65%		
NO ANSWER	4	1	1	1%	-	-	-	-	1	1%	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	1%	-	-	2	1%	2	1%	-	-	-	-	-	1	1%	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	

## RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

Table 6-1

QUESTION 4:

Which comes closest to your opinion about the results of this election?

BANNER 1

	MALE				FEMALE				EDUCATION				DIRECTION				REFORM				TIME OF DECISION				VOTE RESULTS				ADVERTISEMENTS			
	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APP-ROVE	DISA-PROVE	NOT ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT-TEN	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT-TEN					
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663	252	114	168	116	155	100%	240	256	408	224	216	161	261	30	105	524	455	192	583	126	164	455	100%	192	100%	583	100%	126	100%		
THE RESULT WILL REFLECT THE CHOICES OF VOTERS LIKE ME	455	175	83	114	76	101	65%	155	193	328	112	180	77	183	21	60	373	455	-	401	78	121	455	100%	-	401	69%	78	62%	121	74%	
MY VOTE DOES NOT MATTER MUCH. THE RESULTS HAVE BASICALLY ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED BY THE AUTHORITIES	192	75	28	53	34	48	31%	82	60	71	109	31	82	72	8	40	143	-	192	173	46	42	-	-	192	100%	173	30%	46	26%		
NO ANSWER	16	2	3	1	6	6	4%	3	3	9	3	5	2	6	1	5	8	-	-	9	2	1	-	-	-	9	2%	2	2%	1	1%	



QUESTION 5: Please write down the one ISSUE or PROBLEM that was most important to you in deciding who to vote for.

BANNER 1

	MALE				FEMALE				EDUCATION				DIRECTION		REFORM		TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS		
	TOTAL	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	NOT ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663	252	114	168	116	155	240	256	408	224	216	161	261	30	105	524	100%	100%	455	192	583	126	164	
ECONOMICS / UNEMPLOYMENT	91	37	10	21	23	24	32	33	48	36	30	29	32	3	14	74	100%	100%	59	28	78	24	23	
CHILDREN'S FUTURE / COUNTRY'S FUTURE	47	17	5	16	9	4	24	19	33	13	18	13	13	1	8	38	100%	100%	32	15	43	9	13	
FREEDOM / DEMOCRACY / PEACE	44	16	14	9	4	10	9	25	39	4	21	4	19	-	2	42	100%	100%	40	4	40	10	8	
DON'T WANT PAST / COMMUNISM BACK	42	16	3	17	6	5	14	23	38	4	18	2	22	1	2	39	100%	100%	37	4	33	4	12	
STRENGTHENING AND PRESERVING RUSSIA / ORDER / STABILITY	40	15	7	13	5	6	15	19	23	16	10	12	18	-	7	33	100%	100%	34	6	37	9	5	
NORMAL LIFE / COUNTRY	29	12	6	6	5	6	10	12	14	14	9	7	12	-	2	27	100%	100%	21	8	28	2	10	
SOCIAL ISSUES	26	8	8	1	9	4	6	15	15	10	6	8	10	1	7	17	100%	100%	19	7	21	4	5	
STANDARD OF LIVING	23	9	2	6	6	8	9	6	11	12	7	10	6	-	4	19	100%	100%	9	14	21	6	7	
NOT ENOUGH REFORMS / MUST CHANGE / CONTINUE REFORMS	19	8	5	5	1	4	7	8	17	2	7	3	9	1	1	17	100%	100%	16	3	17	1	5	
CRIME / LAWS NOT OBEYED / NO RULE OF LAW	14	5	3	2	3	3	5	6	4	10	-	5	8	2	3	9	100%	100%	8	6	13	5	4	
STRONG LEADER	11	4	1	3	3	2	4	5	7	4	5	-	5	-	2	9	100%	100%	8	2	11	-	4	
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS	8	3	3	-	1	2	1	5	4	2	4	1	1	-	1	1	100%	100%	5	3	7	4	2	
NO PROBLEMS	7	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	5	2	4	1	2	-	-	7	100%	100%	5	2	5	2	3	
WAR IN CHECHNYA / DON'T WANT WAR	7	2	-	3	1	1	3	3	6	1	2	2	3	1	2	4	100%	100%	6	1	7	-	1	
CORRUPTION	6	1	4	2	-	-	3	3	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	1	100%	100%	2	4	6	2	2	
AGREE WITH VIEWS OF CANDIDATE	5	1	2	2	-	2	2	1	3	2	3	2	1	-	1	4	100%	100%	2	4	6	2	2	
POVERTY	3	-	1	1	1	1	2	1	-	3	-	3	-	1	3	2	100%	100%	1	2	3	-	-	
BLACK SEA FLEET AIR FORCE DETERIORATION	2	1	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	100%	100%	2	-	1	1	-	

Continued

Continued

QUESTION 5:  
Please write down the one ISSUE or PROBLEM that was most important to you in deciding who to vote for.

BANNER 1

	MALE			FEMALE			EDUCATION			DIRECTION			REFORM			TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS		
	TOTAL	18-44	45+	18-44	45+		HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRITTEN	
BLACK SEA FLEET AIR FORCE DETERIORATION	2	1	-	-	1	1%	-	-	-	2	1%	1	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	1	1	-	
OTHER	52	20	7	14	10	8%	13	20	19	30	18	17	12	19	10%	3	37	34	16	50	12	12	
	8%	8%	6%	8%	9%	8%	8%	8%	7%	7%	8%	8%	7%	7%	10%	11%	7%	7%	8%	9%	10%	7%	
NO ANSWER	186	75	31	46	26	37%	58	71	49	107	68	52	45	79	15	35	133	112	66	157	31	46	
	28%	30%	27%	27%	22%	37%	37%	30%	19%	26%	30%	24%	28%	30%	50%	33%	25%	25%	34%	27%	25%	28%	

Table 8-1  
QUESTION 6:  
Regardless of who you voted for, which candidate have you heard the most about in the last two months?  
BANNER 1

	MALE				FEMALE				EDUCATION				DIRECTION				REFORM				TIME OF DECISION				VOTE RESULTS				ADVERTISEMENTS										
	18-44		45+		18-44		45+		HS OR LESS		SOME COL		COL GRAD		RIGHT		WRONG		APP-ROVE		DISA-PROVE		NOT FAR ENOUGH		BOOTH		LAST STAGE		MAY AND BEFORE		YES		NO		TV		RADIO		WRIT-TEN
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663	252	114	168	116	155	240	256	408	224	216	161	261	30	105	524	455	192	583	126	164																		
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%																		
YELTSIN	410	153	71	115	67	76	159	170	246	149	121	113	161	15	72	322	272	132	383	98	94																		
	62%	61%	62%	68%	58%	49%	66%	66%	60%	67%	56%	70%	62%	50%	69%	61%	60%	69%	66%	78%	57%																		
LEBED	19	10	2	4	2	6	7	6	11	8	7	2	9	1	2	16	14	5	17	2	4																		
	3%	4%	2%	2%	2%	4%	3%	2%	3%	4%	3%	1%	3%	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%																		
ZYUGANOV	27	10	5	4	8	8	7	12	20	7	10	6	11	2	1	24	23	4	23	2	11																		
	4%	4%	4%	2%	7%	5%	3%	5%	5%	3%	5%	4%	4%	7%	1%	5%	5%	2%	4%	2%	7%																		
ZHIRINOVSKY	23	6	2	9	4	6	11	6	14	8	11	3	8	1	8	14	16	6	21	3	8																		
	3%	2%	2%	5%	3%	4%	5%	2%	3%	4%	5%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	4%	3%	4%	2%	5%																		
ALL / ABOUT THE SAME	43	15	9	9	10	11	12	20	35	5	18	5	18	-	5	38	37	6	38	8	17																		
	6%	6%	8%	5%	9%	7%	5%	8%	9%	2%	8%	3%	7%	-	5%	7%	8%	3%	7%	6%	10%																		
OTHER	5	1	-	3	1	-	5	-	5	-	3	-	2	-	1	4	4	1	5	-	1																		
	1%	-	-	2%	1%	-	2%	-	1%	-	1%	-	1%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	-	1%																		
NO ANSWER	136	57	25	24	24	48	39	42	77	47	46	32	52	11	16	106	89	38	96	13	29																		
	21%	23%	22%	14%	21%	31%	16%	16%	19%	21%	21%	20%	20%	37%	15%	20%	20%	20%	16%	10%	18%																		

How have you heard about the candidate you previously mentioned?

BANNER 1

## RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

	MALE			FEMALE			EDUCATION			DIRECTION			REFORM			TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS		
	TOTAL	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRITTEN		
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663 100%	252 100%	114 100%	168 100%	116 100%	155 100%	240 100%	256 100%	408 100%	224 100%	216 100%	161 100%	261 100%	30 100%	105 100%	524 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%		
PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS ON RADIO	365 55%	142 56%	55 48%	103 61%	62 53%	86 55%	137 57%	139 54%	224 55%	125 56%	108 50%	100 62%	141 54%	17 57%	67 64%	280 53%	242 53%	119 62%	365 63%	74 59%	54 33%		
TELEVISION NEWS SHOWS	87 13%	29 12%	17 15%	17 10%	22 19%	18 12%	28 12%	40 16%	46 11%	32 14%	23 11%	29 18%	32 12%	5 17%	18 17%	64 12%	56 12%	29 15%	77 13%	87 69%	4 2%		
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES	334 50%	123 49%	66 58%	87 52%	55 47%	79 51%	113 47%	139 54%	227 56%	100 45%	111 51%	68 42%	146 56%	14 47%	52 50%	267 51%	239 53%	87 45%	334 57%	29 23%	81 49%		
PARTY DEBATES	150 23%	52 21%	32 28%	36 21%	26 22%	39 25%	54 23%	56 22%	96 24%	52 23%	54 25%	30 19%	61 23%	5 17%	14 13%	131 25%	111 24%	39 20%	131 22%	6 5%	150 91%		
RADIO NEWS SHOWS	53 8%	19 8%	9 8%	16 10%	6 5%	6 4%	27 11%	19 7%	31 8%	20 9%	21 10%	12 7%	20 8%	2 7%	5 5%	46 9%	38 8%	13 7%	53 9%	3 2%	5 3%		
PARTY LITERATURE	42 6%	14 6%	8 7%	13 8%	6 5%	9 6%	21 9%	11 4%	20 5%	20 9%	11 5%	10 6%	19 7%	1 3%	5 5%	36 7%	24 5%	18 9%	29 5%	42 33%	4 2%		
NO ANSWER	235 35%	99 39%	33 29%	55 33%	42 36%	59 38%	82 34%	86 34%	137 34%	83 37%	84 39%	56 35%	84 32%	14 47%	41 39%	177 34%	159 35%	68 35%	167 29%	9 7%	15 9%		

Table 10-1  
QUESTION 7:  
What is your age?  
BANNER 1

RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

	MALE		FEMALE		EDUCATION			DIRECTION		REFORM		TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS			
	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APP-ROVE	DIS-APPROVE	NOT ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT-TEN
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663 100%	252 100%	114 100%	168 100%	155 100%	240 100%	256 100%	408 100%	224 100%	216 100%	161 100%	261 100%	30 100%	105 100%	524 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%
18-24	164 25%	111 44%	-	53 32%	36 23%	107 45%	21 8%	104 25%	57 25%	56 26%	34 21%	71 27%	10 33%	46 44%	108 21%	106 23%	57 30%	150 26%	29 23%	41 25%
25-29	59 9%	38 15%	-	21 13%	11 7%	20 8%	28 11%	40 10%	18 8%	24 11%	8 5%	26 10%	1 3%	5 5%	53 10%	45 10%	14 7%	53 9%	3 2%	14 9%
30-34	59 9%	31 12%	-	27 16%	14 9%	20 8%	24 9%	44 11%	13 6%	23 11%	8 5%	27 10%	2 7%	9 9%	48 9%	39 9%	20 10%	50 9%	14 11%	20 12%
35-39	66 10%	30 12%	-	35 21%	13 8%	20 8%	33 13%	46 11%	16 7%	16 7%	11 7%	36 14%	2 7%	10 10%	54 10%	48 11%	16 8%	59 10%	10 8%	15 9%
40-44	75 11%	42 17%	-	32 19%	17 11%	20 8%	38 15%	45 11%	26 12%	19 9%	21 13%	30 11%	3 10%	10 10%	61 12%	54 12%	21 11%	66 11%	15 12%	13 8%
45-54	102 15%	-	46 40%	-	15 10%	27 11%	59 23%	64 16%	29 13%	31 14%	30 19%	36 14%	5 17%	12 11%	85 16%	74 16%	25 13%	89 15%	30 24%	22 13%
55-64	87 13%	-	45 39%	-	27 17%	16 7%	38 15%	44 11%	40 18%	30 14%	33 20%	21 8%	4 13%	8 8%	74 14%	61 13%	23 12%	75 13%	15 12%	27 16%
65+	44 7%	-	23 20%	-	20 13%	9 4%	15 6%	18 4%	24 11%	15 7%	15 9%	10 4%	2 7%	5 5%	37 7%	26 6%	14 7%	38 7%	10 8%	10 8%
NO ANSWER	7 1%	-	-	-	2 1%	1 -	-	3 1%	1 -	2 1%	1 1%	4 2%	1 3%	-	4 1%	2 -	2 1%	3 1%	-	2 1%

RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

Table 11-1  
QUESTION 8:  
What is the last level of education you have completed?  
BANNER 1

	MALE				FEMALE				EDUCATION				DIRECTION				REFORM				TIME OF DECISION				VOTE RESULTS				ADVERTISEMENTS			
	18-44		45+		18-44		45+		HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APP-ROVE	DISA-PROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT-TEN	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRIT-TEN			
	TOTAL	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663	252	114	168	116	155	240	256	408	224	216	161	261	30	105	524	455	192	583	126	164	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
LESS THAN EIGHT CLASSES	17	4	6	1	5	17	-	-	8	9	8	5	2	2	3	12	11	4	15	-	6	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
HIGH SCHOOL INCOMPLETE	28	12	8	-	6	28	-	-	10	14	6	10	8	3	3	22	20	8	23	7	8	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	110	45	13	27	22	110	-	-	63	43	24	35	46	5	15	89	70	36	99	20	28	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
TECHNICAL / VOCATIONAL SCHOOL	129	47	19	45	17	-	129	-	76	47	34	36	56	8	23	98	80	47	116	26	34	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
INCOMPLETE HIGHER EDUCATION	111	57	7	38	9	-	111	-	71	35	33	21	56	3	24	84	75	35	100	21	27	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
COMPLETE HIGHER EDUCATION	256	86	59	57	53	-	-	256	176	71	106	50	90	8	36	211	193	60	224	50	60	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
NO ANSWER	12	1	2	-	3	-	-	-	4	5	5	4	3	1	1	8	6	2	6	2	1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		



## RUSSIAN NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLLS

Table 12-1  
QUESTION 9:  
What is your gender?

BANNER 1

	MALE			FEMALE		EDUCATION			DIRECTION			REFORM			TIME OF DECISION			VOTE RESULTS		ADVERTISEMENTS		
	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	18-44	45+	HS OR LESS	SOME COL	COL GRAD	RIGHT	WRONG	APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	NOT FAR ENOUGH	BOOTH	LAST STAGE	MAY AND BEFORE	YES	NO	TV	RADIO	WRITTEN
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	663 100%	252 100%	168 100%	116 100%	155 100%	240 100%	256 100%	408 100%	224 100%	216 100%	161 100%	261 100%	30 100%	105 100%	524 100%	455 100%	192 100%	583 100%	126 100%	164 100%		
MALE	368 56%	252 100%	-	-	90 58%	130 54%	145 57%	218 53%	137 61%	121 56%	82 51%	154 59%	17 57%	61 58%	288 55%	260 54%	103 54%	323 55%	68 54%	97 59%		
FEMALE	286 43%	-	168 100%	116 100%	62 40%	110 46%	110 43%	186 46%	83 37%	92 43%	78 48%	102 39%	12 40%	43 41%	230 44%	190 42%	88 46%	255 44%	55 44%	65 40%		
NO ANSWER	9 1%	-	-	-	3 2%	-	1 -	4 1%	4 2%	3 1%	1 1%	5 2%	1 3%	1 1%	6 1%	5 1%	1 1%	5 1%	3 2%	2 1%		

## APPENDIX IV: Sample Ballots

### BOTH ROUNDS

МЕСТО ПОДПИСЕЙ ДВУХ ЧЛЕНОВ  
УЧАСТКОВОЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КО-  
МИССИИ И ПЕЧАТИ УЧАСТКОВОЙ  
ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КОМИССИИ

**ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ**  
**для выборов**  
**Президента Российской Федерации**  
**при повторном голосовании**

**РАЗЪЯСНЕНИЕ ПОРЯДКА ЗАПОЛНЕНИЯ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОГО БЮЛЛЕТЕНЯ**

Поставьте любой знак в пустом квадрате справа от фамилии только одного кандидата на должность Президента Российской Федерации, за которого Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате, расположенном справа от строки "Против всех кандидатов".

**ЕЛЬЦИН**

Борис

Николаевич

1 февраля 1931 года рождения. Президент Российской Федерации. Проживает  
в городе Москве

☐

**ЗЮГАНОВ**

Геннадий

Андреевич

26 июня 1944 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания  
Российской Федерации, депутат, руководитель фракции "Коммунистическая  
партия Российской Федерации". Проживает в городе Москве

☐

**Против всех кандидатов**

☐

**ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ**  
**для выборов**  
**Президента Российской Федерации**  
**16 июня 1996 года**

МЕСТО ПОДПИСЕЙ  
ДВУХ ЧЛЕНОВ УЧАСТКОВОЙ  
ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ  
КОМИССИИ И ПЕЧАТИ  
УЧАСТКОВОЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ  
КОМИССИИ

**РАЗЪЯСНЕНИЕ ПОРЯДКА ЗАПОЛНЕНИЯ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОГО БЮЛЛЕТЕНЯ**

*Поставьте любой знак в пустом квадрате справа от фамилии только одного кандидата на должность Президента Российской Федерации, за которого Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате, расположенном справа от строки "Против всех кандидатов".*

**БРЫНЦАЛОВ**  
Владимир  
Алексеевич

23 ноября 1946 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат. Проживает в поселке Салтыковка Балашихинского района Московской области. Состоит в Общероссийской общественной организации "Русская социалистическая партия".

☐

**ВЛАСОВ**  
Юрий Петрович

5 декабря 1935 года рождения. Писатель. Проживает в городе Москве. Состоит в межрегиональной общественной организации "Народная патриотическая партия".

☐

**ГОРБАЧЁВ**  
Михаил Сергеевич

2 марта 1931 года рождения. Международный фонд социально-экономических и политических исследований, президент. Проживает в городе Москве.

☐

**ЕЛЬЦИН**  
Борис Николаевич

1 февраля 1931 года рождения. Президент Российской Федерации. Проживает в городе Москве.

☐

**ЖИРИНОВСКИЙ**  
Владимир  
Вольфович

25 апреля 1946 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат, руководитель фракции "Либерально-демократическая партия России (ЛДПР)". Проживает в городе Москве. Выдвинут избирательным объединением ЛДПР. Состоит в Либерально-демократической партии России (ЛДПР).

☐

**ЗЮГАНОВ**  
Геннадий  
Андреевич

26 июня 1944 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат, руководитель фракции "Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации". Проживает в городе Москве.

☐

**ЛЕБЕДЬ**  
Александр  
Иванович

20 апреля 1950 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат. Проживает в городе Москве.

☐

**ТУЛЕЕВ**  
Аман-Гельды  
Молдагазыевич

13 мая 1944 года рождения. Законодательное Собрание Кемеровской области, председатель, член Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации. Проживает в городе Кемерово.

☐

**ФЁДОРОВ**  
Святослав  
Николаевич

8 августа 1927 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат. Проживает в городе Москве. Состоит в Партии самоуправления трудящихся.

☐

**ШАККУМ**  
Мартин  
Люцианович

21 сентября 1951 года рождения. Международный фонд экономических и социальных реформ, первый вице-президент. Проживает в городе Красногорске Московской области.

☐

**ЯВЛИНСКИЙ**  
Григорий  
Алексеевич

10 апреля 1952 года рождения. Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации, депутат, руководитель фракции "ЯБЛОКО". Проживает в городе Москве. Выдвинут избирательным объединением "ЯБЛОКО". Состоит в Объединении "ЯБЛОКО".

☐

Против всех  
кандидатов

☐

**APPENDIX V:**  
**CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION NOTIFICATION**  
**ON USE OF MOBILE BALLOT BOXES AT TRANSIT POINTS**  
**FOR RUNOFF ELECTION**

## Government Telegram

To Chairmen of Election Committees of the subjects of the Russian Federation

In order to create the best conditions for realization of the rights of Russian citizens to vote, I require you to organize the voting places in airports, sea ports, river ports, and railway stations. On July 3 from 8.00 till 22.00 you must organize in these places voting spots with the help of mobile voting boxes. The presence of at least two commissioners of precinct election committee is required. The requests to vote with the help of mobile voting box must be properly filled. You must create proper conditions for the work of the observers.

Organize and maintain communication with proper departments of the Railroad ministry and the Ministry of transportation, which have received all necessary instructions and recommendations. Also coordinate your work and keep communication with administrations of ports and railway stations.

Chairman of the Central Election Committee  
N.T. Ryabov

**APPENDIX VI:  
CEC SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL REPORTS FILED  
BY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES**



Summary Table of Financial Reports filed by the Presidential Candidates

	Yeltsin	Zyuganov	Yavlinski	Shakum	Tuleyev	Zhirinovski	Fedorov	Gorbachev	Vlasov	Bryntsalov	Lebed
Contributions Total	16408606400	11370070000	13967744300	3975601910	340360000	14160420010	411509092	303497500	300000000	465010000	14561701000
CEC	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000	300000000
Own Resources	62375000	0	10000	55000000	0	57000000	0	10000	0	10000	0
Nominating Group	280000000	2850000000	2200000000	2838700000	0	2887500000	0	0	0	0	347600000
Legal Entities	14985350000	7151771000	11467634300	764771910	40000000	7356000000	107611592	0	0	16500000	13549922000
Individuals	780881400	1068299000	100000	17130000	360000	3559920010	3897500	3487500	10000	0	364179000
Illegal Donations*	1980644300	19300000	5000000	3483582	0	0	112500	0	0	0	299112000
Total on Account	14427962100	11350770000	13962744300	3972118328	340360000	14160420010	411396592	303497500	300010000	465010000	14262589000
Total Spent	14421787449	11328482000	13962744300	3972118053	314110000	14160420010	411268223	303497000	300010000	465010000	14258289000
TV/Radio Ads	10357576101	1536426000	13553631800	2822760508	36000000	13522751340	41510000	80200000	0	267236000	8299407000
Printed Media Ads	748240552	4839537000	230271300	224137304	104088000	165657750	234045214	6400000	20000000	22574000	3766401000
Events	56800000	289884000	0	0	1000000	19437501	0	0	36000000	0	0
Outdoor Ads **	3021570796	4167798000	129800000	919605396	116412000	386695970	135713009	117025000	129998600	175200000	2192481000
Other camp expenses **	237600000	494837000	49031200	5614845	47610000	65877449	0	99872000	114011384	0	0
Total unspent	6174651	22288000	0	275	26250000	0	240869	500	0	0	4300000
Returned to CEC	128433	0	0	0	0	0	175598	500	0	0	90000
Returned to Budget	6046218	0	0	0	0	0	65271	0	0	0	4210000

\* Illegal refers to contributions returned to contributors.

\*\* Some of the candidates gave a more detailed account of their expenses for this line.

## **APPENDIX VII: IRI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1995 STATE DUMA ELECTIONS**

The International Republican Institute's observer delegation found the December 17, 1995, Duma elections to be a technical step forward in Russia's democratic transition, as demonstrated by continued refinements in the election law and practices, the range of views offered by political parties, and the level of interest displayed by Russian voters in the election.

The atmosphere of these elections was vastly different from those held in 1993. The December 1993 parliamentary elections were held only two months after President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies, the federal legislature, with the storming of the White House. The election law was issued by presidential decree. Parties had little time to prepare, and few new parties were able to collect the signatures necessary to be placed on the ballot. Contrary to popular expectations, pro-reform parties performed poorly. Together they received only 116 of the 450 seats.

IRI believes that democratic and free market reform is the basis for security and prosperity of the Russian people. There were positive aspects of the 1995 election that encouraged this movement to reform. Political parties, representing the full range of opinion, were able to register and campaign, getting their message out to the voter much more effectively than in 1993. Parties and candidates campaigned under an improved election law, and they had adequate time to campaign. These elections point to a determination by Russians to exercise their right to make choices. Voters turned out in higher numbers than expected -- 65 percent nationwide.

While the election results released by the Central Election Commission reflect voter preference, a number of steps must be taken to assure greater confidence in the integrity of the system for the future. In general, IRI delegates did not witness systematic voter fraud or abuse, but they did observe several aspects of the 1995 electoral process that could have created an opportunity for vote manipulation. Open voting (that is, voting outside the booth) was very common, with little regard for the sanctity of the secret ballot. While open voting is customary for Russians, the practice could, at some point in the future, lead to questions regarding free voter choice. In general, the counting process was conducted in a somewhat arbitrary manner. This appeared to be due to lack of training; nevertheless, failure to follow procedure could create opportunities for deliberate vote manipulation. Military involvement at certain polling sites raised concerns of military control over voting.

The outcome of the election is also a source of serious concern. Although reformers were able to sustain their presence in the Duma with a net gain of three seats (119), the strong showing of political parties whose dedication to democratic institutions and continued reform is scant is especially troubling. Of course, any imperfection in the system undercuts

confidence in democratic institutions and lends credibility to those opposed to reform; thus, a cycle of cynicism could replace one of confidence.

The following are recommendations that could increase transparency, streamline the election process and, most important, add to Russian voter confidence in future elections.

## **ELECTION LAW**

**Issue:** Since 1993, political parties have proliferated, and low signature requirements resulted in a three-fold increase in parties on the ballot, thus increasing the expense of the election and diluting support for political parties. This resulted in a large, cumbersome paper ballot listing 43 parties, which in many cases was confusing to voters.

**Recommendation 1:** It is important for the electorate to have the ability to make educated choices. If political views are to be channeled through fewer parties that enjoy greater support from the electorate, signature requirements for registration of political parties and candidates should be increased. Consideration should also be given to absolving parties of the signature requirement if they passed the 5 percent threshold in the two most recent elections. In addition, the 5 percent threshold should be continued as it has the beneficial effect of encouraging consolidation of political parties.

**Issue:** Campaign finance continued to be an issue in the campaign period as there was not an effective mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing prior to the election. The current State Duma law does not require disclosure until 30 days after the publication of election results.<sup>20</sup> With campaign expenditure reports not due until after the final election returns are announced, possible violators may be sworn into office before violations are discovered. Because of the complexities of Russian law, it is unlikely that State Duma deputies, once sworn in, would be prosecuted.

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<sup>20</sup> The Basic Guarantees Law of Electoral Rights, passed in 1994, suggests periodic reporting prior to election day. The CEC's campaign finance commissioner was diligent in requiring electoral blocs to file reports but did not conduct thorough review of the reports' accuracy. The campaign finance section of the State Duma election law should be expanded to give the CEC clear jurisdiction and investigative and enforcement authority not spelled out under the Basic Guarantees Law.

**Recommendation 2:** The campaign financial disclosure portion of the State Duma election law should be strengthened by requiring periodic disclosure prior to election day, a process for checking the accuracy of the reports, and enforcement of sanctions under the election law for non-compliance by political parties, candidates, businesses and other entities involved in an election.

**Issue:** The passage of the new State Duma election law is an accomplishment for President Yeltsin and the parliament. However, the process of reexamination and amendment should continue in order to strengthen areas that demonstrated weaknesses in the December election. As it is, Russian voters are cynical about democracy. Consistent review of the law and efforts to strengthen it will boost Russians' confidence in the process.

**Recommendation 3:** The new State Duma should reassess the election law in light of the 1995 parliamentary election to determine areas that need to be improved or clarified.

## **ELECTION ADMINISTRATION**

**Issue:** A number of Russian political parties and the media questioned the Central Election Commission's independence from influence by the government and its ability to implement the election law. With the commission largely made up of commissioners appointed by the President and the Federation Council, many question its impartiality.

**Recommendation 4:** The Central Election Commission should be a truly independent, autonomous agency with clearly defined enforcement powers and budget authority. It should be independent from both executive and legislative branches in its decision making.

**Issue:** Several problems arose during the election registration process. Creative entrepreneurs exploited the signature collection process by collecting pages of signatures and selling them to candidates and parties (a process that appears already to have already begun for the presidential election). Many of the signatures were legitimate but others were of dead or non-existent people. Parties and candidates accused each other of fraud during the signature collection process, but generally only candidates in single mandate districts were disqualified for such violations.

Most electoral blocs that turned in signatures were approved by the CEC. However, the CEC rejected some blocs, including the popular pro-reform Yabloko and the nationalist Derzhava, for technical violations. Communists and pro-reform parties alike objected, particularly to Yabloko's rejection, accusing the CEC of manipulating the elections. The Supreme Court reversed the CEC's decision on Yabloko and Derzhava a week later. As a result of the court's decisions, the CEC became more lenient in its verification of signatures presented by parties to be put on the ballot.

**Recommendation 5:** The Central Election Commission should set out clearer guidelines for signature collection and ensure that political parties have an understanding of these requirements. The CEC should devise a better system for checking the authenticity of signatures. The CEC should ensure its enforcement of regulations are equitable. In addition, political parties have the responsibility for knowing what those regulations are and adhering to them.

**Issue:** IRI observed strong and apparently effective voter turnout efforts of Russia's military. Such an effort, as practiced in many other countries, is welcome, but must be done with great care to avoid the appearance of command influence on voter choices or compulsory participation. In a number of cities, IRI observers witnessed irregularities involving the military, including one instance of a military commander instructing his subordinates which party they should vote for.<sup>21</sup> Another IRI observer team was refused admittance to a polling site on a military reservation intended by the CEC to be open.<sup>22</sup> In addition, observers reported military voting in the open or incidents of two or three recruits piling into one booth to vote.

**Recommendation 6:** Every effort should be made by the Central Election Commission and the military to ensure the process allows soldiers to exercise their right to vote, free of command influence on their participation or vote. Every care should be given to avoid any appearances that might call into question the integrity of the process. The presence of military officers at the polling station during voting, unless in the process of voting, or those serving as polling station commissioners should be prohibited.

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<sup>21</sup> This took place at a military polling site in the city of Gorelovo, southwest of St. Petersburg and at a military base in Syertolovo, north of St. Petersburg.

<sup>22</sup> The military reservation was located in Timonovo, northwest of Moscow.

**Issue:** The Central Election Commission's plan for releasing election results was an improvement over 1993. It had increased its computer capability, had set up an impressive election night center in the Federation Council's parliamentary center, and set forth procedures for providing protocols to the appropriate electoral commissions, observers, and media. However, it took 12 days to release final results. The provision of providing protocols to observers was not always followed according to procedure and the time taken to calculate and publish election results undermined confidence in the election's results.

**Recommendation 7:** The CEC and its auxiliary bodies should attempt to increase the speed in which results are announced, while not impairing accuracy, to increase the confidence and transparency of future elections. Additionally, the CEC should announce official results as they come in, as it did with the preliminary results. Continued efforts to automate the transfer of results should be pursued as well as civic education to reduce voter concerns of count manipulation through an automated system.

**Issue:** Throughout the campaign period and immediately prior to the election, IRI observers heard concerns that vote tabulations would be manipulated at the territorial commission level, on up. An integral component of IRI's mission was to track the protocols from a sample of the polling sites to the territorial commissions, then compare the final numbers to determine the integrity of the process. In several instances, IRI observers were not able to obtain official protocols; they were left to copy down numbers from the protocol without certification by the chairman. In addition, obtaining the final numbers from the district commissions has been difficult; to date, IRI has obtained final results from district commissions in only half of the cities monitored. Nevertheless, these results match those of the polling station protocols at the time of their submission to the territorial level.

**Recommendation 8:** The CEC should work with local election bodies to ensure they are more responsive to public or media requests for election information to improve the confidence and transparency of future elections.

**Issue:** The State Duma election law states: "Each voter shall vote personally. Voting for other persons is not allowed. Ballots are filled in the booth, specially equipped place or a room for voting by secret ballot, where the presence of anybody except for the voter, is not allowed." Nevertheless, in every city and polling station, IRI delegates observed voters marking ballots in the open. Some sites were too small and did not have enough voting booths to accommodate voters. In addition, observers reported incidents of family voting; that is, father, mother, and children gathering into one booth.

**Recommendation 9:** The CEC should make every effort to educate and encourage Russian voters of the importance of the secret ballot. The layout of the polling station should encourage voting to take place in the privacy of the voting booth and customary tables set out for voting removed. The sites should be larger to avoid overcrowding and more booths added to accommodate voters.

**Issue:** Last minute changes on the ballot were not communicated in a timely fashion by the CEC to the regions. This contributed to the disorderliness of some polling sites, as poll workers were making necessary changes to the ballot the day before, and sometimes even on election day. IRI observers also noted errors made in marking names off the ballots

**Recommendation 10:**

The CEC should make every effort to communicate to the regions in a timely fashion to ensure proper adjustments are made without error and to reduce opportunities for error or abuse. Means of communication should be standardized and ballot corrections should be made at least a week in advance of the elections.

**Issue:** Polling site workers were thoroughly trained on voting procedures. When it came time for the count, polling station commissioners were not adequately trained. Clear guidelines in the law were completely disregarded. Counting procedures varied from station to station, left to the local election chairman's discretion. At nearly every site monitored, delegates observed no attempts to double check votes against the number of ballots provided to each station. In several cases, when the numbers did not balance, polling station workers were observed erasing and changing numbers. This also occurred at the territorial level where IRI delegates observed commissioners' erasing or "whiting out" numbers and making corrections so the numbers would balance.

Observers also heard consistent complaints about the length of the voting day. A voting day lasting from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. (14 hours) is too long. Voting was very light in the last several hours. Many of the poll workers were at the polling station the entire day, leaving them exhausted. This may have contributed to carelessness in the ballot tabulation process.

**Recommendation 11:**

This is an area IRI observers noted provided opportunity for fraud and abuse. Rather than being concerned about the sanctity of the vote, local and territorial commissioners' focus was on making the numbers come



out right. The CEC should make every effort to thoroughly train election workers in counting procedures that are clearly set out in the law. In addition, consideration should be given to shortening the voting day to 12 hours rather than 14.

## **POLITICAL PARTIES**

**Issue:** In 1993, IRI observers noted that parties devoted most of their efforts to candidate registration and the campaign period, ignoring the fact that parties have a crucial role to play on election day. IRI recommended that the parties make a concerted effort to train and have present on election day representatives of their parties at the poll. In 1995, IRI observers noted again the overall absence of reform or centrist party poll watchers. Only the Communist Party of the Russian Federation had poll watchers present at nearly every polling station.

### **Recommendation 12:**

Again, IRI encourages political parties to recruit and train domestic poll watchers to monitor the process in order to provide a disincentive for abuse and to provide an external basis for judging the validity of the official count. In addition, poll watchers should have a clear understanding of their responsibilities as monitors. Also, the CEC should ensure domestic poll watchers have appropriate identification.

## **PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA**


**Issue:** Numerous Russian journalists and print and broadcast editors voiced concerns about the clarity and limitations of the election law with regard to media activities. In addition, some IRI observers were told of incidents of influence by government officials and owners of media outlets on story angles and content. The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information to society is still lacking in Russian society. In addition, dependence by political parties on government-guaranteed media is not the best prescription for independent political parties.

### **Recommendation 13:**

An electoral media environment that thrives on free enterprise and a free and open press improves the overall political climate and stabilizes democratic transition. National and local government authorities and media leaders should refrain from attempts to control news and take steps to strengthen the media's independence to ensure freedom of the

press. Legislative and governmental bodies should resist temptations to promulgate rules, guidelines and laws in an attempt to level the playing field for all political parties within broadcast media.

# ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Служба	ПЛАТА		 Министерство связи Российской Федерации	ПЕРЕДАЧА	
	руб.	коп.		го ____ ч. ____ м.	№ связи ____
			ТЕЛЕГРАММА	Передан	
Итого: .....			ИЗ МОСКВЫ № _____	Факс: 258 30 70	
Принят .....	ст. ....	го ____ ч. ____ м.			

КУДА:  
печать, адрес  
КОМУ:

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЯМ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫХ КОМИССИЙ  
СУБЪЕКТОВ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

В ЦЕЛЯХ СОЗДАНИЯ МАКСИМАЛЬНЫХ УСЛОВИЙ ДЛЯ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫХ ПРАВ ГРАЖДАН РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ПРОШУ ОБОРУДОВАТЬ МЕСТА ДЛЯ ГОЛОСОВАНИЯ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЕЙ В АЭРОПОРТАХ, МОРСКИХ, РЕЧНЫХ И ЖЕЛЕЗНОДОРОЖНЫХ ВОКЗАЛАХ. ОРГАНИЗУЙТЕ ЗДЕСЬ 3 ИЮЛЯ С 8 ДО 22 ЧАСОВ МЕСТНОГО ВРЕМЕНИ ГОЛОСОВАНИЕ СИЛАМИ НЕ МЕНЕЕ ДВУХ ЧЛЕНОВ УЧАСТКОВЫХ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫХ КОМИССИЙ С ПОМОЩЬЮ ПЕРЕНОСНЫХ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫХ ЯЩИКОВ И ОФОРМЛЕНИЕМ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЙ О ПРЕДОСТАВЛЕНИИ ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ПРОГОЛОСОВАТЬ. ОБЕСПЕЧЬТЕ УЧАСТИЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫХ НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЕЙ.

ОРГАНИЗУЙТЕ ОПЕРАТИВНОЕ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЕ С СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩИМИ СЛУЖБАМИ МИНИСТЕРСТВА ПУТЕЙ СООБЩЕНИЯ И МИНИСТЕРСТВА ТРАНСПОРТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ, КОТОРЫМ ТАКЖЕ ДАНЫ НЕОБХОДИМЫЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ, А ТАКЖЕ РУКОВОДИТЕЛЯМИ ПОРТОВ И ВОКЗАЛОВ.

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ ЦЕНТРИЗБИРКОМА

Н.Т.РЯБОВ

**BALLOT**  
**for the election of**  
**the President of the Russian Federation**  
**June 16, 1996**

**INSTRUCTION FOR FILLING OUT THE BALLOT**

*Mark the empty square which is to the right from the last name of the only candidate for the President of the Russian Federation you are voting for, or to the square which is to the right from the words "Against all candidates."*

**BRYN'ISALOV**  
Vladimir Alexeevich

Born on November 23, 1946. Deputy of the State Duma. Lives at Saltykovka village of Balashiha region of Moscow district. A member of all-Russia civic organization "Russian Socialist Party"

☐

**VLASOV**  
Yuri Petrovich

Born on December 5, 1935. Writer. Lives in Moscow. A member of inter-regional civic organization "Peoples' Patriotic Party"

☐

**GORBACHEV**  
Mikhail Sergeevich

Born on March 2, 1931. President of the International Fund for the Social, Economic and Political Studies. Lives in Moscow

☐

**YELTSIN**  
Boris Nikolayevich

Born on February 1, 1931. President of the Russian Federation. Lives in Moscow

☐

**ZHIRINOVSKY**  
Vladimir Volfovich

Born on April 25, 1946. Deputy of the State Duma. Chair of the Duma caucus "Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia." Lives in Moscow. A member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia.

☐

**ZYUGANOV**  
Gennadi Andreevich

Born on June 26, 1944. Deputy of the State Duma. Chair of the Duma caucus "Communist Party of the Russian Federation." Lives in Moscow

☐

**LEBED**  
Alexander Ivanovich

Born on April 20, 1950. Deputy of the State Duma. Lives in Moscow.

☐

**TULEEV**  
Aman-Geldy Moldagazievich

Born on May 13, 1944. Chair of the Kemerovo Oblast Legislative Assembly. Lives in Kemerovo

☐

**FEDOROV**  
Svyatoslav Nikolayevich

Born on August 8, 1927. Deputy of the State Duma. Lives in Moscow. A member of the Party of the Workers' Self-Government

☐

**SHAKKUM**  
Martin Lyutsianovich

Born on September 21, 1951. First Vice-President of the International Economic and Social Reforms Fund. Lives in Krasnogorsk, Moscow oblast.

☐

**YAVLINSKY**  
Grigori Alexeevich

Born on April 10, 1952. Deputy of the State Duma. Chair of the Duma caucus "Yabloko." Lives in Moscow. A member of "Yabloko" electoral association

☐

Against all candidates

☐

**BALLOT**  
for the election of  
President of the Russian Federation  
second round

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**EXPLANATION OF THE PROPER WAY OF FILLING THE BALLOT**

Put a mark in the box on the right from the name of the candidate for President of the Russian Federation, you wish to vote for, or in the box opposite to the option 'Against all candidates'.

---

<b>YELTSIN</b> <b>Boris Nikolayevich</b>	Born February 1, 1931. President of the Russian Federation. Resident in Moscow.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>ZUGANOV</b> <b>Gennadi</b> <b>Andreivich</b>	Born June 26, 1944. State Duma deputy, Communist Party faction leader. Resident in Moscow.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Against all candidates</b>		<input type="checkbox"/>

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## APPENDIX VIII: IRI Recommendations for the 1993 Parliamentary Elections

### I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored a 24 member delegation to observe the parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum in Russia on December 12, 1993. Under the leadership of IRI Chairman, U.S. Senator John McCain, the delegates evaluated the electoral process, identified the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and made recommendations for future elections. As a matter of policy, IRI does not make simple findings as to whether an election can be categorized as free and fair.

IRI's observation mission to Russia's April 1993 referendum led to a report detailing weaknesses in technical aspects of the voting process. That observer team's recommendations were published in *Izvestiya* and later introduced on the floor of the parliament by its pro-democratic members. A number of improvements suggested by IRI monitors following the April referendum mission had been adopted by December, including clearer guidelines on validation of ballots and procedures for replacing spoiled ballots by local election officials; increased security for mobile ballot boxes; revisions in the absentee voting system; and provisions for an orderly process of accrediting domestic and international observers. These changes demonstrated a willingness to reexamine the process and make modifications where weaknesses were found.

The 25 recommendations contained in this report will be forwarded to the appropriate Russian and American officials in a constructive effort to help Russia improve the process in anticipation of the next step, local elections tentatively scheduled for March 1994. There are many traditions in the current system that, although their origins lie in the old Soviet-style elections, have positive benefits when reapplied to democratic elections; for example, the invitation to vote, universal registration, and the efficiency and dedication of polling station personnel. IRI observers, however, found other components of the electoral process that hold the potential for abuse, such as the portable ballot box, an under-appreciation of the secret ballot, and ill-defined elements of the election law. In addition to specific recommendations for improving the electoral process, this report also contains suggestions for the institutional development of political parties, a free and independent media, and a legislative branch that can serve as a genuine partner in governance. The long-term development of civil and political institutions that support and sustain a democracy will be critical to Russia's transition.

## II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The IRI delegation found the December 12 elections to be a significant, positive step forward in Russia's democratic transition that affirmed a commitment to the democratic process. The competitive nature of the campaigns waged by the parties, the interest displayed by Russian voters in the election process, the media access afforded differing points of view, the efforts of election administrators to add uniformity to the process, and the creation of a new constitutional order all signaled a momentous departure from past Soviet practices and habits.

The IRI observers applauded the Russian people for their peaceful and serious conduct in a potentially volatile campaign period. The Russian people also deserve recognition for their endorsement of a post-communist constitutional order providing a clear division of power and establishing institutional relationships. In the face of the hardship and pain found in any economic transition, the Russian people chose a democratic framework to move them beyond the paralyzing effects of the recent power struggle.

IRI observers found the campaign environment to be diverse and dynamic. The IRI delegation commended Russia's 13 political parties for their success, given a brief campaign period, in obtaining the required signatures to compete in the elections, and in recruiting and fielding candidates. The short campaign period, however, led to the issuance of an incomplete election law, the hurried appointment of a Central Election Commission (CEC), and a rush to create new political parties. Additional steps must be taken in the two-year transitional period ahead to secure the positive benefits of the election, minimize the negative consequences, and build durable democratic institutions.

### Election Law

**Issue:** Russia's new parliamentarians revising the election law or writing new laws ought to bear in mind that their counterparts in other countries, with the benefit of deeper democratic traditions and the accumulated experience of competitive elections, still seek and find ways to refine the process. Whether by applying innovative technologies, meeting new procedural challenges, or relearning old lessons, the development of electoral systems is a never-ending process.

Although the current election law contains serious shortcomings, it is nevertheless a significant step forward in encouraging the development of democratic institutions. The short period of preparation for the December 12 elections led to a hastily assembled and inadequate set of election regulations. Many directives from the CEC were, in effect, new laws rather than interpretations of existing law. While this timetable obviously was dictated by the unique set of circumstances surrounding the



dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, future elections will provide the opportunity for greater advanced planning.

Furthermore, the CEC's maneuvering on the issue of turnout had little effect in the final analysis except to erode its own credibility. It was reminiscent of past practices in which authorities manipulated the rules to achieve a pre-determined outcome. If Russians are to have faith in their new political institutions, the process must be fully defined and respected by those institutions.

**Recommendation 1:** All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period, rather than on an ad hoc basis throughout the process. The new parliament should revise and consolidate the current election law to provide a more consistent framework for future elections. The process of reexamination and amendment should be continued with successive elections.

**Recommendation 2:** Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions.

**Recommendation 3:** Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked. There also should be a greater uniformity of civic education materials at polling stations.

**Recommendation 4:** There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion and make a clear distinction between old and new methods.

**Recommendation 5:** A well-defined process of appeal should be developed and clearly defined so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse.

**Recommendation 6:** Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box.

### Election Administration

**Issue:** IRI observers saw a genuine effort made by national, regional, and local election officials to guarantee a fair process. Particularly impressive was their detailed knowledge of the election procedures. IRI observers found that the majority of election officials at the regional and local level had worked in previous elections.

**Recommendation 7:** Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration. Better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices.

**Issue:** The accreditation of poll watchers was limited to representatives of political parties, thereby excluding a large pool of prospective poll watchers from civic organizations.

**Recommendation 8:** Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic poll watchers.

**Issue:** Civic education was compromised because of the shortness of the campaign period. In addition, the CEC and constituency commissions should not be the only institutions that play a role in civic education.

**Recommendation 9:** Other civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools also have an interest in providing civic education and should be encouraged to do so.

**Issue:** The partial and incomplete release of results by the CEC implied an orchestrated and selective release of results, thereby fueling suspicion of vote tampering. Such suspicions were not immediately disproved because many of the activities of the CEC were not open to the public, the press, or observers.

**Recommendation 10:** The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results based upon a realistic timetable given the level of technology. The CEC also should provide access to domestic and international observers in the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies.

**Recommendation 11:** The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office. Every effort should be taken to ensure that the CEC is independent and free from political influence.

**Issue:** Eligible voters were counted at the end of the process. When the CEC released the number of eligible voters after the December elections, the figure was approximately one million less than the eligible voters in the April 1993 referendum, further fueling speculation about vote tampering.

**Recommendation 12:** Local governments are responsible for updating the voter registries before the election. Those numbers should be forwarded to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins.

**Issue:** IRI observers were troubled by the potential influence of military officers in military voting. IRI observers also concluded that many members of the military were disenfranchised from elections in their place of official residence because there was no method of absentee balloting.

**Recommendation 13:** Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible. The system of military voting when no civilian stations are available must be reevaluated and a new system devised, whether at civilian administered stations on military installations, absentee voting, or early voting. Military officers should be removed from civic education and all other aspects of the

voting process to avoid concerns regarding influence, and political parties and candidates should be provided greater access to military personnel.

**Recommendation 14:** Russian election authorities should continue to explore and develop other methods of absentee voting to allow persons in the military, students, or other individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots.

### *Political Party System*

**Issue:** The presence of plurality on Russia's political landscape is no longer questionable. What remains questionable is the degree to which democratic institutions capable of adjudicating societal interests can consolidate and overcome the legacy of past practices. Democratic institutions cannot be created simply by legislation, presidential decree, or a single election. Democratic institutions gain strength as they organize over time, broaden their public acceptance, learn from practical experience, and adapt to changing circumstances. Russia's transition, therefore, is tied not only to democratic elections, but also to the long-term development and strengthening of institutions necessary to support and sustain a democracy. The continued and active role of political parties in governance and in future elections will be critical components of that process. While the elections were a vital catalyst for party development, many of those gains can be squandered in the post-election period if parties fail to make the organizational transition to governance. Given the level of voter turnout in December, it will be particularly important that members of various parties in the new Duma demonstrate they are capable of working together to solve Russia's problems.

**Recommendation 15:** Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures.

**Issue:** Russian democracy is coming to life in the age of television. Methods of mass communication allow candidates to appeal directly to the voter, and thereby bypass much of the need for party structures. Party institutions, however, have many important functions in Russian society at this stage of political development.

**Recommendation 16:** Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support.

**Issue:** Parties devoted most of their effort to candidate registration and the campaign period that followed, neglecting the fact that political parties have an important role to play on election day. While effective legal mechanisms guaranteeing an equitable political process may be provided by an election law, it is the competitive nature of a multi-party system that brings those mechanisms to life. Abuses go unchallenged when one party begins to dominate political life.

**Recommendation 17:** Political parties should recruit and train domestic poll watchers to monitor the process, provide a disincentive for abuse, and conduct a parallel vote count to provide an external basis for judging the validity of the official count.

**Issue:** Many political parties found it difficult to generate interest and recruit members without clearly defined election dates. Parties lacked an organizational impetus when elections seemed a distant and uncertain event. With the scheduling of elections for December 12, parties were faced with the opposite extreme: approximately 30 days to register their candidates and 30 days to campaign.

**Recommendation 18:** Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period.

**Issue:** IRI observers found the emergence of a multi-party system within two years of the collapse of the Communist's single-party monopoly to be a truly remarkable development. Particularly notable was the identification of many voters with a specific party and the striking diversity of the parties. The provision for a proportional ballot was an important measure in encouraging the development of a multi-party system. The minimum requirement of two candidates on the single mandate ballot and three candidates on the double mandate ballot similarly were important provisions that ensured competition on the ballot. These benefits, however, were mitigated by the absence of party identification on the single and double mandate ballots. Voters unfamiliar with the candidates but wanting to support a specific party were unable to do so. In addition, deputies not elected under a party label may feel less compulsion to

maintain party loyalty after the election, making it more difficult for parties to provide discipline and play an effective role in governance.

**Recommendation 19:** The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted.

**Issue:** The funding of parties became an issue in the campaign period and thereby detracted from the debate of larger issues because there was no mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing.

**Recommendation 20:** A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be passed by the new legislature, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period and stiff sanctions for non-compliance.

**Issue:** IRI observers were struck by the noticeable absence of young voters. Political parties have a vital interest in recruiting and developing the next generation of leaders that will help their organizations become durable institutions over the long term. Young people usually are the members of society most open to new ideas, and often the most enthusiastic participants of political life, because they have more at stake in the future.

**Recommendation 21:** Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders. Parties, for example, should include a youth program in their platforms, develop organizational components specifically for young people, and include young people among their candidates.

### **Print and Broadcast Media**

**Issue:** IRI observers noted the broad spectrum of political interests participating in the vigorous campaign debate. Observers believed that political parties enjoyed equal access to unpaid television and radio, adequate access to paid advertising, and that media restrictions or cases of censorship ultimately had little impact on the public's access to information. IRI observers noted, however, that several news outlets representing views opposed to the government were closed during the initial stage of

the campaign, and temporarily operated under government-imposed editorial restrictions regarding the proposed constitution.

**Recommendation 22:** The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information are vital institutions in the development of a free society. National and local government authorities, therefore, should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence. As a first step, the new Parliament should redefine the relationship between the government and the media in a manner that allows freedom of the press.

### **Government Role**

**Issue:** Boris Yeltsin embarked upon a campaign to consolidate his power with the issuance of Presidential Decree no. 1400 on September 23, 1993, which disbanded the parliament. Although some of Yeltsin's actions in September and October could be considered undemocratic, the end result of those actions was to break his monopoly on power and create a legislative body with a new degree of democratic legitimacy.

Under the new constitution, Ministers must resign from their positions upon election to the State Duma. A two-year exception to this rule is provided for Ministers in the new constitution's transitional section. This provision, however, still allows for potential conflict of interest regarding the conduct of ministers in the campaign period. IRI observers heard widespread criticism regarding the unfair advantage many ministers enjoyed by virtue of their office, especially as it pertained to access to television.



**Recommendation 23:**

The new Russian constitution prohibits a minister from serving in the State Duma. IRI observers believe consideration should be given to extending that prohibition to the campaign period. Ministers running as candidates to the State Duma should consider taking a leave of absence, or resigning from their post, upon registration as a candidate to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources.

**Issue:** In addition, conflict of interest issues are likely to arise in future elections regarding officials who misuse the advantages and privileges of incumbency to win re-election, unless there is a legally proscribed process for regulating their activity.

**Recommendation 24:**

The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law.

**Issue:** Many parties identified the "Mafia" as a source of campaign influence for their opponents. It was often unclear whether those identified as such were true organized crime figures or simply new capitalists who had made a lot of money. In a society where the ownership of private property was prohibited for over 70 years, the latter is perhaps understandable, but Russia now needs to define what it truly means by the "Mafia" - those genuinely involved in organized crime.

**Recommendation 25:**

A law akin to the *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO) in the United States, coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the true "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system.

## **APPENDIX IX: IRI RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED BY THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAWS**

The following summary describes the status of IRI Election Recommendations relative to the Parliamentary and Presidential Election Laws passed in spring 1995 by the Russian State Duma, the lower house of parliament, and signed into law by President Yeltsin. After each IRI recommendation, its status is noted in *italics*.

Mr. Alexander Ivanchenko, Vice Chairman of Russian Central Election Commission, commented on March 29, 1995, in a meeting on Capitol Hill, that "The report provided by IRI's international observer delegation served as the road map for the CEC in making improvements to the election law."

### **IRI Recommendations:**

- #1:** All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

- #2:** Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

*Included in Presidential Election Law*

- #3:** Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked...

*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*

*Included in Presidential Election Law*

- #4:** There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

*Included in Presidential Election Law*

- #5:** There should be a well-defined process of appeal so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

*Included in Presidential Election Law*

- #6: Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box...  
*Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #7: Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration; better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices...  
*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #8: Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic poll watchers...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (law does permit observers by election associations and blocs, representatives of candidates, international observers, and the mass media)*
- #9: Civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools should be encouraged to provide civic education...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (but encouraged by CEC Vice Chairman in meeting on Hill)*
- #10: The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results; the CEC should provide access to domestic and international observers the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies...  
*Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #11: The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #12: Local governments should forward updated voter registries to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #13: Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*  
*Substantially addressed in Presidential Election Law*

- #14:** Russian election authorities should develop other methods of absentee voting to allow individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law (although questions remain about the efficacy of the methods prescribed)*  
*Included in Presidential Election Law*
- #15:** Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*
- #16:** Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*
- #17:** Political parties should recruit and train domestic poll watchers...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*
- #18:** Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #19:** The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted...  
*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*
- #20:** A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be enacted, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period...  
*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law (notably, there is no mention of reporting requirements during the campaign, only after)*
- #21:** Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders...  
*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

- #22:** To promote and encourage the creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information, national and local government authorities should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence...

*Partially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*

- #23:** Consideration should be given to extending the prohibition on government ministers serving in the State Duma to the campaign period...to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources...

*Included in Parliamentary Election Law*

- #24:** The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law...

*Substantially addressed in Parliamentary Election Law*

- #25:** A law akin to the U.S. *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO), coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system...

*Not included in Parliamentary Election Law (this is a broader recommendation that is not germane to an election law)*

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