

European Network of Election
Monitoring Organizations
International Observation Mission
Ukraine Parliamentary Elections 2007

Європейська мережа організацій, що спостерігають за виборами Міжнародна місія спостереження Парламентські вибори в Україні 2007

ENEMO FINAL REPORT ON 2007 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE

The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) fielded 400 short-term observers to monitor the 2007 early parliamentary elections in Ukraine on September 30, 2007. The short-term observers were coordinated by 25 long-term observers covering all oblasts of Ukraine. ENEMO observers monitored all stages of the voting process, including the opening, the vote, the vote count and the tabulation of results in polling stations and district electoral commissions throughout the country. ENEMO observers monitored the opening of 195 polling stations, vote procedures in more then 2000 polling stations and the vote count in 195 polling stations.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

- ENEMO considers that Ukraine's 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections were generally free of pressure, intimidation and harassment against voters, political parties and blocs and generally met the international standards.
- Due to the intricate legal and constitutional circumstances underpinning the preterm 2007 parliamentary elections, the amended election law was a product of political compromise adopted once more only shortly before election which had a negative impact over the electoral process.
- ENEMO assess the recent amendments to the election law, especially concerning the special border crossing lists and the abolishment of absentee ballots, as a step back compared to the previous elections since they had a disenfranchising effect on specific groups of electorate
- The Central Election Commission (CEC) worked in a relatively transparent manner, but some of its decisions reflected the partisan political affiliations of its members and negatively impacted the electoral process. With regard to the work

- of the Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) ENEMO observers noted progress compared to 2006 elections.
- ENEMO remains concerned about serious flaws in the voter registration process. In particular, double entries in the voter lists had created space for possible multiple voting and ballot stuffing.
- The process of border crossing registration of voters was significantly delayed and unevenly enforced, thus ENEMO signaled the possibility of abuses. Moreover, ENEMO considers that the provision itself unjustly disenfranchised a significant number of voters;
- ENEMO feared that delays in setting clear procedures for homebound mobile voting negatively influenced the preparation and organization of electoral process.
- Compared to 2006 parliamentary elections, ENEMO observers reported slight increase of cases of involvement of state and local officials in the campaign and usage of local administrative resources for campaign purposes.
- Delays in the formation of precinct election commissions (PEC) have raised serious concern about the ability of these commissions to fulfill their duties and operate optimally in the electoral process.
- Mass media enabled the electorate to familiarize itself with the programs of competing political parties via extensive coverage of the election campaign in news programs, television debates, and paid advertisements.
- The campaign period for the 2007 early parliamentary elections was competitive and generally free of intimidation, pressure, and harassment.
- The role of courts in adjudication electoral disputes in the pre-election period and during election campaign was very important and in most cases courts were taking decisions in a timely manner. However, pending decision of the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the border guard provision triggered doubts over the legality of the whole process.
- Significant drawbacks were registered during the filling of PEC protocols and the tabulation of results causing significant delays in announcing the final official results by the CEC (only as of October 15, the last day of the legal deadline).

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Ukraine's election administration is a three-pronged system comprised of the Central Election Commission (CEC), 225 District Election Commissions (DECs) and over 34,000 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). The election law and its amendments stipulate the manner in which these structures should function and interact, while outlining precise deadlines for all stages of commission activities in the electoral process.

Central Election Commission

ENEMO observers noted that the CEC has worked in a relatively fair and transparent manner during the pre-election period. However, due to sharp political divisions among the commissioners, some decisions have been highly politicized or significantly delayed.

One delay that has significantly hampered the activity of lower administrative bodies is the failure of the CEC to respond quickly to the court decision regarding mobile voting procedures¹. After long and sometimes non-transparent debates, on September 18 the CEC managed to pass a resolution on the format of the request for mobile voting. However, the CEC has offered little guidance to the DECs about the practicalities of checking and registering requests for mobile voting.

ENEMO observers reported that many DEC and PEC members were still unaware of mobile voting procedures for election-day. ENEMO long-term observers also noted that, in absence of clear provisions issued by the CEC on this matter, election commission members followed their own personal understanding of the law. Thus, in Chernihiv oblast (DEC 214), there were 1,000 voters registered to vote at home because DEC members combined disabled people with the elderly. A similar situation was reported in DEC 211 of the said oblast where the members of the commission were determined to send the mobile ballot box to elderly without any written request. Furthermore, in Donetsk oblast (DEC 47, 48, 49) commissioners used printed versions of mobile voting request forms instead of the required handwritten form, which raised fears of possible abuses.

Formation and Staffing of Commissions

ENEMO observed that parliamentary parties had difficulties to properly staffing a large number of PECs and DECs in all regions of the country. While this problem has been largely resolved by the end of the campaign period, the late opening of PECs disturbed the crucial process of updating the voter lists.

Many lower election commissions had to cope with resignations during the pre-election period. As a result, many DECs and PECs functioned only with a minimum number of members or did not function due to a lack of legal quorum. Since the amended electoral law provision stipulates that only parliamentary parties can be represented on election commissions, the process of replacing the resigning members was very slow. Among the

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¹ September 12th ruling of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv

main reasons invoked for resignation is low payment, long working hours, criminal liability in case of mistakes, and, in limited instances, pressure and threats.

Significant problems occurred in Kherson oblast (DECs 184, 185, 186, 187 and 188), Crimea oblast (DEC 7), Kyrovohrad oblast (DEC 95) and Odesa oblast (DEC 137). PECs encountered even bigger problems in properly staffing the legal number of commissioners. ENEMO observers reported that 70 percent of the PECs in Odesa oblast (DEC 139) and Zarkarpattya (DEC 69) were understaffed, while 20 percent of the PECs observed in Kyiv faced similar shortages.

In Mykolayiv oblast (DEC 126 and DEC 128) and Rivne (DEC 151) up to 20 percent of election commission members were replaced several times as of September 18. In Donetsk (DEC 45), 200 PEC members were substituted in a single week, while 80 similar cases were documented in Rivne (DEC 154). In Kherson (DEC 185) PEC 58 failed to meet legal quorum as of September 26. High amounts of staff changes also occurred in Vinnytsya oblast. As of September 18, 10 PEC heads resigned in Vinnytsya (DEC 9). In Vinnytsya (DEC 10), PEC 13 was reported to be late sending out invitations to the voters because the Head and the Secretary was not attending PEC meetings on a regular basis.

A more dramatic situation was registered in Kherson oblast (DEC 184) where six out of twenty PECs visited by ENEMO observers were not functioning as of September 25. Eleven of those did not have the legal minimum of members. In PEC 73 (DEC 184) none of the four Socialist Party members took part in the work of election commission. PEC 4 (DEC 73) in Zaporizhya oblast, as of September 19, functioned without a chairperson. Due to shortages in staff members a significant number of PECs opened after the legal deadline, which resulted in overwhelming the activity of the DECs and the process of updating the voter lists. Massive delays were recorded in Poltava oblast (DEC 143², 146, DEC 150³); Odesa oblast (DEC 132, DEC 133); Luhansk (DEC 102, DEC 105, DEC 107, DEC 111⁴); Kyrovohrad oblast (DEC 95, DEC 101); Kherson (DEC 184⁵), and Kharkiv (DEC 174).

Logistical Shortcomings

ENEMO observers reported that many DECs and PECs encountered logistical problems, including a lack of office supplies, a shortage of computers, poor telephone connections, and insufficient transportation. While these shortcomings were overcome before the election day, they have hampered the election preparation process.

More serious deficiencies were reported in Odesa (DEC 139, PEC 21) and in Luhansk (DEC 110, PEC 2) regarding the illegal set up of the polling stations. ENEMO observers also reported that some PECs were smaller than the legal required size by the number of

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² PEC 49 closed as of September 24

³ PEC 1 and PEC 109 remained closed as of September 19

⁴ PEC 104, PEC 105, PEC 108, PEC 110, PEC 111 remained closed as of September 25

⁵ PEC 37 still closed on September 25

registered voters.⁶ Due to logistical shortages, a number of DECs failed to follow legal procedures and meet the prescribed deadlines. This was the case in Vinnytsya (DEC 11), Odesa (DEC 132), Lviv (DEC 119), Kherson (DEC 187), Rivne (DEC 157), and Kirovohrad (DEC 95). While there is no evidence of deliberate mishandling of preelection activities in these DECs, their improper activity adds to an already tense and hectic pre-election period.

ELECTION DAY FINDINGS

Despite the noted shortcomings, compared to the parliamentary elections in 2006, ENEMO acknowledged an improvement in the opening process and in the conduct of precinct election commissions (PECs) as shown in the following tables.

Opening of Polling Station	2007 Elections	2006 Elections
Polling Station Opened on time	87,9 %	61,6 %
Polling Station Opened up to 15 minutes late	9,2%	26,2 %
Polling Station Opened Late	1,0%	12,2 %

PEC Conduct Evaluation OPENING	2007 Elections	2006 Elections
Very good	44,6 %	26,2%
Good	51,3%	57,4 %
Bad	3,0%	13,4 %
Very bad	1,0%	3,0 %

Furthermore, a significant improvement was registered for the conduct of voting procedures, as the following figures eloquently suggest:

PEC Conduct Evaluation VOTING	2007 Elections	2006 Elections
Very good	41,9%	26,4%
Good	53,5%	62,8%
Bad	3,7%	9,5%
Very bad	0,9%	1,3%

Even though the activity of the election commissioners was overall assessed as positive, a series of incidents were reported throughout the election day:

Limitation of Observers' Rights

In general, the electoral process was transparent and ENEMO observers were allowed to monitor all stages of the electoral process on Election Day. However, observers were initially prevented from entering the polling station in Odesa (DEC 132, PEC 136); Kharkov (DEC 175, PEC 26); Kyrovohrad (DEC 96, PEC 134 and DEC 96, PEC 62);

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⁶ PEC 19 and PEC 22 in Odesa (DEC 139) and PEC 22 in Crimea (DEC 4)

and Sumy (DEC 158, PEC 27). Observers could not observe properly the vote counting process in Kharkiv (DEC 173, PEC 17) and in Donetsk (DEC 50, PEC 72 and DEC 48 PEC 88), where ENEMO observers were denied access to some information from election commissions.

Improper Sealing of Ballot Boxes

ENEMO observers noted several cases of improper sealing of ballot boxes or failure to insert control sheets in ballot boxes as required by law. These incidents were usually related to commissioners claiming to be unaware of the procedures, as was the case in Crimea (DEC 1, PEC 124). In this instance, ballot boxes were unsealed when ENEMO observers entered the polling station. This problem was only corrected after the short-term observers brought it to the attention of the PEC chairperson. The ballot boxes were improperly located behind the voting booths and thus difficult to be observed at DEC 8, PEC 57 in Crimea.

Unauthorized Persons in Polling Stations

Observers noted several isolated cases where unidentified individuals believed to be in a position of authority influenced the activities of PECs or voters. These incidents should be investigated rigorously, since they undermine the work of the commissioners and jeopardize the fairness and transparency of the electoral process. Such cases were observed in Odesa (DEC 138, PEC 95) and Zakarpattya (DEC 70, PEC 7). Policeman was present in polling stations in Kirovograd (DEC 96, PEC 43), in Kiev (DEC 94, PEC 29, 2, 11, 25, 21, 23, 12), Crimea (DEC 6, PEC 26; DEC 5, PEC 12; DEC 2, PEC 89, 106). Moreover, a journalist of newspaper "Svoboda" was registering documents in Crimea, DEC 8, PEC explaining that as a lawyer she can handle documents.

Mobile Homebound Voting

Despite initial confusion about the procedures for mobile voting and the late Central Election Commission (CEC) ambiguous decisions on the implementation of these procedures, ENEMO observers noted that no more than 5% of the visited PECs violated legal requirements. Mobile voting was conducted without proper applications in Kharkiv (DEC 176, PEC 22) where 45 people voted while only 30 applications were filed and in the same DEC 176, (PEC 7) 26 people were found on the lists and only 19 applications. A voter in Kharkiv (DEC 180, PEC 17) was included in the list for mobile voting and not allowed to vote in polling station even though she claimed that she never applied for homebound voting. In Donetsk (DEC 55, PEC 83) Chair of the commission claimed that there were filed 116 applications but after checking only 30 applications were found.

Illegal Campaigning

Generally, the election-day was free of illegal campaigning. However, our observers witnessed one casein Mykovaev (DEC 128, PEC 118), where Deputy of local council was present in polling station loudly trashing incumbent authorities and praising the communists.

Vote Counting Process

Compared to the 2006 parliamentary elections, ENEMO observers found that the vote count process slightly improved. Reports from ENEMO short-term observers suggest that no major problems were witnessed during the count.. One exception occurred in Luhansk (DEC 102, PEC 99), where PEC members violated legal procedure by taking unused ballots and control coupons out of the polling station and preventing observers from monitoring all parts of the count.

Complaints	2007 Elections	2006 Elections
There were no complaints on counting	91,3%	80,4 %
There were some minor not substantial	8,7%	15,7 %
complaints		
There were some unfounded complaints	0,0%	1,3 %
PEC received substantial complaints	0,0%	2,6%

PEC Conduct Evaluation COUNTING	2007 Elections	2006 Elections
Very good	45,3%	24,1%
Good	46,1%	51,0 %
Bbad	7,9%	19,0 %
Very bad	0,7%	5,9%

Tabulation and Announcement of Results

Observers noted a number of difficulties and organizational problems during the process of transferring PEC protocols to DEC level. Thus, in Donetsk (DEC 29) at 5 am on October 1 the commission returned the protocols to 4 PECs. On October 2, CEC returned the protocols to the respective DECs in Zaporizhia (DEC 75 and 78) and in Poltava (DEC 142). According to the CEC, the protocols from DEC 75 and 78 were returned for further specification of the technical errors noticed in filling the data and did not concern voting results. Likewise, the reason for returning the protocol to DEC 142 was of technical nature since the additions to the protocol were handwritten and not computer-typed as the procedure requires.

The Central Election Commission announced final results on October 15, 2007 which was the legal deadline.

If the activities connected to the election day seemed to be, to a large extent, properly handled by the election commissioners, as ENEMO STO reports showed, vote count have fallen short of general expectation. There is a two pronged explanation for this matter of fact. The voters registered for a polling station seems to exceed the possibility of the commissioners to properly administer all the election related procedures. Consequently, the count of, say, 2500 votes (especially in condition of understaffing) might take very long while adding to the fatigue of the PEC members. Then, the low preparation of

election commissions became highly visible in filling in the protocols following the vote count. Despite the fact there is no rigorous statistic, from the information provided by CEC and ENEMO LTO alike, many PEC protocols were returned by DECs for revision on grounds of mistakes in filling in the protocols. Consequently, even though ENEMO does not exclude or ignore the delays in vote count due to political entrenchments of the PEC members, ENEMO conclusion on the matter is that a professional body of election commissioners would decrease the number of such problems (for further reference see the recommendations section of this report).

VOTER REGISTRATION

ENEMO is highly concerned about a number of flaws reported on the voter lists and the election administration's ability to properly address these deficiencies.

The most common problems with the voter lists included double registrations, inaccurate transliterations of voters' names, the inclusion of deceased voters, and the omission of voters, including the absence of entire buildings or streets in certain precincts. Due to the previously mentioned delays in the formation of PECs, the process of updating the voter lists has been slow. ENEMO underlined that many inaccuracies were not corrected before the legal deadline. These deficiencies reflect poor performance of the responsible bodies to revise the voter lists before the parliamentary elections, even though most international observers had recommended this step after the 2004 and 2006 elections.

The poor quality of the voter lists was evident in complaints from DEC and PEC members regarding the activity of the Working Groups (WG) that made little or no changes to the 2006 lists, thus maintaining lists known to have serious inaccuracies.

ENEMO expressed worries about the possibility of multiple voting and ballot stuffing due to reports of multiple entries on the voter lists. Long-term observers have received reports of the following figures: 94,000 double entries in Kharkiv, 3,624 deceased people and 76 double entries appear on the lists in Kyrovohrad oblast (DEC 95), 15,000 double entries allegedly discovered on voter lists in Kyiv, 16,000 double entries in Dnipropetrovsk, 2,000 double entries in Donetsk (DEC 43), and 700 double entries in Rivne (DEC 154).

Moreover, ENEMO observers reported that the correction process has been disorganized and inefficient. Thus, in PEC 73 in Zhytomyr (DEC 56), a group of voters could not check their names on the list because the precinct commission had closed as of September 19. A similar case occurred in Crimea (DEC 4), where commissioners of PEC 17 prevented voters from verifying their names on the list because the PEC was not working at full capacity. Furthermore, the Head of DEC 199 in Cherkasy oblast told an

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⁷ In DEC 174 alone 16,000 double entries are reported

⁸ In DEC 100, PEC 17, PEC 19 and PEC 21 register 46 double entries

ENEMO observer that it was unlikely that the quality of the voter lists would significantly improve before election day.

Border Crossing Registration

New provisions in the election law required that border guards begin registering voters who crossed the Ukrainian border and did not return within three days prior to elections in order to erase these names from the voter lists. Although this border registration process was scheduled to start on August 1, ENEMO long-term observer reports show that the whole process was severely delayed in all regions of Ukraine and unevenly enforced.

For example, in Zarkarpattya observers reported that only some border guards fully registered the date of departure and expected return for people crossing borders there. ENEMO observed similar cases in Vinnytsya, where border officials made no special records for the use of forthcoming parliamentary elections. In contrast, the border officials in Lviv completed almost 100,000 registration cards regarding people that left the country from that region. These discrepancies raise serious questions about the functionality of the whole system.

While it is very difficult to determine the exact number of disenfranchised voters, the extent of the problem is made apparent by the number of reports received about voters omitted from the lists or denied the right to vote. ENEMO short-term observers witnessed such problems in 31% of the polling stations they visited.

ENEMO's major concern remains the adoption of contrasting regulations and uneven application of decisions by PECs and DECs in various parts of the country. In particular, ENEMO noted problems related to unclear provisions regarding border crossing registration and deletion from the voter lists of those names of voters not returning to Ukraine three days before Election Day. Some of the PECs and DECs decided not to allow anyone from the border guard list to vote, while other PECs and DECs decided to ignore information from the border crossing lists and did not delete any voters from this list. Finally, a third group of PECs and DECs instructed the respective voters to address the court.

The following cases highlight these overlapping problems. In Luhansk (DEC 108, PEC 22, 24), almost 20 percent of voters were registered with mistakes in the voter lists. A significant number of inaccuracies also were recorded in Cherkasy (DEC 203, PEC 30); Luhansk (DEC 108, PEC 22 and PEC 24; DEC 110 PEC 113); Sumy (DEC 158, PEC 10, DEC 158, PEC 43); and Kharkiv (DEC 180, PEC 17).

Despite recommendations from international observers in previous elections, the quality of the voter lists has not improved. The following table shows ENEMO's observation of the voters list this year in contrast to the voter lists from the parliamentary elections in 2006:

Voter Lists (VL)	2007 Elections	2006 Elections
There were no obvious problems with VL	69,4%	70,0%
There were some voters not found on VL	27,8%	28,0%
Significant number of voters could not vote	2,8%	2,0%
due to VL		

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN VIOLATIONS

Parties and blocs campaigned primarily through paid media advertisements, televised debates and door-to-door campaigning. The energy of the campaign has been described as low.

Compared to the same pre-election period during 2006 parliamentary elections, ENEMO observers witnessed slight increase of cases in which state administrative resources were used for campaign purposes. ENEMO observers also documented a few incidents in which campaign agitators were physically abused and campaign materials destroyed. Although these appear to be isolated cases, legal authorities would set a strong precedent by closely investigating such reports and holding the responsible individuals accountable.

The governor of Lviv oblast is reported to have used government facilities for campaign purposes, although no official complaint has been registered. In Sumy, the governor of the oblast prevented a paid article of the Party of Regions from being published. As a result, the Party of Regions organized a rally of its supporters to denounce "orange censorship" by the local media. In Kherson oblast, the governor is reported to be overtly campaigning for Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense (NU-NS), while the Mykolayiv oblast administration is accused of agitating for Lytvyn Bloc.

On September 11, one of the Party of Regions campaign tents in Kyiv was dismantled by local authorities who said that they lacked the proper authorization papers. Party of Regions representatives argued in a press conference that local authorities were overzealous and politically motivated in their actions. Subsequently, the matter was taken to court and resolved in favor of the Party of Regions.

ENEMO observers documented clear instances of mayors and local officials being involved in the campaign and misusing administrative resources in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava and Simferopol on behalf of the Party of Regions; in Lutsk for Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT); and in Uzhhorod for Lytvyn Bloc.

ENEMO observers recorded cases of campaigning in schools and pressure on students in Mykolayiv, Rivne and Ternopil by NU-NS; in Vinnytsya, Lutsk, Zhytomyr and Ternopil by BYuT; and in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy by the Party of Regions.

Long-term observers reported substantial examples of smear campaigns, so called black PR, against BYuT in Uzhhorod, Donetsk, Odesa, Sumy and Lviv; against NU-NS in Poltava, Sumy and Odesa and against the Party of Regions in Lutsk and Volyn oblasts.

During the campaign period, many political parties alleged that other parties were engaged in vote buying. While these claims have not been proven, ENEMO believes that they add to the tension of the campaign and threaten to discredit the electoral process.

Another issue that came to the forefront of the campaign period was the alleged campaigning of the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, on behalf of NU-NS. On September 22, the CEC decided in an eight-to-seven vote that the President should refrain from publicly supporting any party or bloc. ENEMO believes that clearer legal provisions regarding the involvement of state officials in the election campaign should be established before the start of a new electoral cycle.

APPEALS AND COMPLAINTS

During pre-election period the courts played major role in deciding on a high number of election-related disputes and complaints. In most of the cases courts adjudicated the complaints and appeals in due and timely manner. Among major significant court rulings influencing election process, observers noted the decision regarding the registration of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), the registration of Pora, the CEC instructions on homebound voting, on Party of Regions request to campaign on Kyiv streets, etc. However, in the specific case of the Central Election Commission, it failed to respect the deadline set by court to adopt on time instructions on procedures for homebound mobile voting requests.

President Yushchenko and a group of parliamentarians from Party of Regions questioned the constitutionality of border crossing provisions in the electoral law at the Constitutional Court. On September 18, the Constitutional Court began considering the President's appeal. The matter was still pending during election-day which negatively influenced the electoral process by creating uncertainty regarding the implementation of electoral law provisions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ENEMO recognizes the efforts of the Ukrainian people to comply with international standards for democratic elections. However, in order to improve both the legal framework and the election procedures for the next election cycles in Ukraine, ENEMO offers the following key recommendations:

• Review the voter registration process, and create and maintain a Central Voter Register to allow for systematic corrections and updates.

- The right of Ukrainian citizens to vote should be better protected to allow all eligible voters to exercise their right to vote. Voters crossing Ukrainian borders should not be excluded from the voter lists. Furthermore, groups of voters staying in Ukraine outside of permanent place of residence (e.g. students) shall be given more effective and flexible ways to participate in elections (e.g. absentee ballots).
- Adopt, in a timely manner, a Unified Election Code regulating all elections and referenda in Ukraine. This code should harmonize procedures for each type of elections and provide for a stable and predictable legal framework.
- The comprehensive process of staffing and training officials in the administration of elections should be established in order to build professional and qualified electoral bodies that have adequate financial means and equipment.
- The legal framework should stipulate clear rules and restrictions for **state and local officials involvement in election campaign including Ukrainian President**
- The election legislation shall define specific **procedures for homebound voting** in mobile ballot box and safeguards against fraud.

This report was written in English and remains the only official version

European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) is a group of 19 civic organizations from 17 countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. These nonpartisan organizations are the leading domestic election monitoring groups in their countries. In total, ENEMO member organizations have observed 200 national elections in their countries, monitored more than 100 elections abroad, and trained over 200,000 election monitors.

ENEMO has conducted multiple election missions to Ukraine. In 2004, ENEMO organized a full-scale international observation mission for the Ukrainian presidential elections. ENEMO deployed 50 long-term observers, who monitored the pre-election period and all three election rounds throughout Ukraine. ENEMO also deployed 1,000 short-term observers for the November runoff election and again for the repeat runoff in December. On November 21, for the original second round that was later annulled, ENEMO observers found that the poll "did not meet the will of the Ukrainian people." In 2006, ENEMO organized a full-scale international observation mission for the Ukrainian parliamentary elections. 42 long-term observers and 340 short-term observers noted significant progress in terms of free and fair elections, despite organizational drawbacks. In fall 2006, ENEMO organized an observation mission to monitor mayoral elections in 4 Ukrainian cities. Statements from these missions and other information are available at www.enemo.eu.