NDI

HANDBOOK

How Domestic Organizations
Monitor Elections

An A To Z Guide

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Handbook would not have been possible without the contributions of several individuals who deserve special thanks. Larry Garber, NDI's senior associate for election processes from 1987-1993, first developed the idea for the Handbook and wrote most of the first two chapters. Patrick Merloe, who succeeded Garber at NDI, helped to edit the final product and see it through to completion. Significant contributions were also provided by Merloe for the section on monitoring the media and by Senior Advisor Glenn Cowan for the section on parallel vote tabulations. The task of final editing was carried out principally by NDI President Kenneth Wollack. Thanks are also due to Joseph Hennessey and Suzanne George who worked on this project during their summers in law school.

The pages of the Handbook tell the stories and lessons of domestic monitoring efforts around the world. Therefore, NDI wishes to acknowledge the dedication and professionalism of the many NDI staff and volunteer consultants who helped conduct, analyze and report on those experiences. Most important, NDI recognizes the commitment, and, in many cases, courage of the thousands of civic activists who have monitored elections in their countries as a means to promote and sustain democratic practices and values.

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NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was established in 1983. By working with political parties, civic organizations, parliaments, and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. The Institute is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has a staff of 120 with field offices in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

NDI has supported the development of democratic institutions in more than 60 countries. Programs focus on six major areas:

**Political Party Training**: NDI conducts multipartisan training seminars in political development with a broad spectrum of democratic parties. NDI draws international experts to forums where party members learn first-hand the techniques of organization, communication and constituent contact.

**Election Processes**: NDI provides technical assistance for political parties, nonpartisan associations and election authorities to conduct voter and civic education campaigns and to develop election monitoring programs. The Institute has also organized more than 25 major international observer delegations.

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</table>
# Table of Contents

**Acknowledgements** ................................................................. iii  
**National Democratic Institute for International Affairs** ........................ iv  
**Introduction** ........................................................................ vii  
**Chapter One—Monitoring Elections** ......................................... 1  
  - Why Monitor? ................................................................. 2  
  - Who Monitors? .............................................................. 2  
    - election officials ... political parties ... local media ... nonpartisan organizations  
  - What is Monitored? ......................................................... 4  
  - How Nonpartisan Organizations Monitor .......................... 5  

**Chapter Two—The Evolution of Monitoring by Nonpartisan Domestic Organizations** ................................................. 7  
  - The NAMFREL Model ...................................................... 8  
  - Building upon the NAMFREL Experience ....................... 8  
  - Consolidating Fragile Democracies .................................. 11  

**Chapter Three—Developing a Nonpartisan Monitoring Operation: An A to Z Guide** ......................................................... 13  

*Part One—Initiating a Monitoring Effort* .................................. 15  
  - A Need ........................................................................... 15  
  - A General Plan ............................................................ 16  
    - objectives and guiding principles ... specific goals and tasks ... developing an election calendar ... developing a budget ... managing the plan ... evaluating and revising the plan  
  - C Approaches to Organizing .......................................... 19  
  - D A Committee of Directors and a Democratic Organizational Structure ...................................................... 21  
  - E Credibility ................................................................... 23  
    - maintain independence and impartiality ... communicate clearly and regularly ... ensure the integrity of your plan and methodology ... execute your plan  
  - F Operating Funds ......................................................... 25  
  - G Office Facilities .......................................................... 26  

*Part Two—Preparing the Operation* ....................................... 29  
  - H Personnel .................................................................. 29  
  - I Recruiting ................................................................... 30  
    - how many people? ... what qualifications? ... where do you look? ... how will you recruit?  
  - J Training ....................................................................... 34  
    - system of training ... trainers ... audience ... agenda  
  - K Training Manual ......................................................... 37  
  - L Public Information ...................................................... 38  
    - channels of communication ... press release
Part Three—Monitoring the Pre-Election Phase

Election System .................................................. 49
   general principles and issues ... advocacy
Civic and Voter Education ................................. 52
Registration of Voters, Political Parties and Candidates .... 53
   voter registration ... political party and candidate registration
Election Campaign ........................................ 56
   general principles and issues ... resources ... intimidation and coercion ... enforcement and the
   review process ... specific monitoring techniques
Media .......................................................... 62
   general considerations ... radio and television ... print media ... reporting results

Part Four—Monitoring the Election and Post-Election Phases ........................................... 69
Voting .................................................................. 69
   general principles ... issues to monitor ... inside of the voting station ... the officials ... the voters ...
   outside of the voting station ... specific monitoring techniques
Counting .......................................................... 76
   general principles and issues ... issues to monitor ... special monitoring techniques
Tabulation ......................................................... 77
   general principles and issues ... parallel vote tabulations (PVTs)
Post-Election Developments .............................. 82

Part Five—Post-Election Activities ................................. 85
Post-Election Reporting ........................................ 85
   types of reports ... analyzing information and issuing reports
Final Considerations .......................................... 87

APPENDIX I—LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR ELECTIONS AND MONITORING ................................. 89
APPENDIX II—SAMPLE BROCHURE FOR A DOMESTIC MONITORING ORGANIZATION .... 99
APPENDIX III—SAMPLE MONITORING FORMS ................................................................ 105
APPENDIX IV—SAMPLE REPORTS ............................................................................... 125
SELECTED NDI PUBLICATIONS .................................................. 152
INTRODUCTION

This Handbook is designed to assist domestic civic organizations in monitoring elections. Most of the principles and advice presented in the Handbook are also applicable to monitoring efforts that are organized by political parties or, for that matter, by international observers.

Establishing domestic monitoring capabilities provides valuable safeguards for a fair election process. Equally important, the development of such mechanisms contributes to the evolution of a more active civil society.

The Handbook draws upon the experiences of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Since 1986, NDI has conducted 75 election-related programs in more than 30 countries. In observing elections, NDI has trained, worked with and relied upon the findings of various domestic monitoring operations. While the work of domestic election monitors is often overshadowed by international observers, its impact on the process is frequently more profound and long-lasting.

The import and relevance of international observers in encouraging electoral participation and safeguarding the credibility of electoral processes have expanded dramatically since 1980. Indeed, international observers are now routinely invited to monitor “first” or “transition” elections, and their presence in many countries has contributed to the peaceful resolution of long-standing conflicts.

The emphasis on international observers, however, may obscure the significant role played by domestic, nonpartisan monitoring groups in guaranteeing electoral fairness. Election monitoring by domestic groups, of course, is not a new phenomenon; election officials and political contestants have long sought to develop and implement mechanisms for ensuring fair elections in their countries. In recent years, however, domestic monitoring has grown more sophisticated and now involves actors other than election officials and contestants.

The implications of this development are twofold. First, enhanced domestic monitoring efforts by nonpartisan groups contribute to more genuine election processes by encouraging fairer campaign practices and a more informed electorate, as well as by reducing the possibility of fraud and irregularities on election day. Second, domestic election monitoring can develop and strengthen institutions essential to the sustainability of a democratic political system. Monitoring efforts help citizens learn organizational skills necessary to participate actively and effectively in the political life of a country between elections. Groups that have formed to monitor elections have often developed into broader-based civic organizations, contributing to the development of civil society. This, in turn, has enhanced the prospects for greater political discourse, citizen involvement in governance and heightened public confidence in government.

Domestic, nonpartisan election monitoring should not supplant election monitoring and pollwatching by political parties and candidates for office. It is in the interest of political contestants to protect their rights and the rights of their supporters, to campaign vigorously, and to guard the integrity of the voting, counting and tabulation processes. Nonpartisan monitoring complements these efforts. NDI conducts programs on election monitoring and pollwatching for political contestants as well as on nonpartisan election monitoring for civic groups. Experience in these areas clearly demonstrates the advantage for the election process when many civic and political organizations participate.

The Handbook comprises three sections. The first chapter provides an overview of election monitoring by domestic groups. The second chapter traces the evolution of several nonpartisan, domestic monitoring organizations with which NDI has been associated. The final chapter, which constitutes the bulk of the text, presents practical guidance for developing an effective domestic monitoring operation. Various sample reports and forms are included as appendices, all of which can be tailored to fit the circumstances of a particular election.
This Handbook does not presume to provide the definitive interpretation of every election issue nor to present a complete approach to monitoring those issues. Each country is different, and every new election brings with it slightly different circumstances. Nonetheless, many common issues arise. In producing this Handbook, NDI has tried to put into writing some of the lessons it has learned from a decade of working with domestic election monitors. As you respond to the circumstances and issues surrounding elections in your country, we hope that you find the principles, issues, activities, guidelines and illustrations in this Handbook useful.

Readers of the Handbook are encouraged to contact NDI with any comments, suggestions or requests.

Kenneth D. Wollack  
President, National Democratic Institute  
June 1995
CHAPTER ONE

Monitoring Elections
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) and various international treaties establish the right of citizens to participate in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration states in part that:

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of a government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Other international instruments mirror and elaborate upon these rights. (See Appendix I.) The precise characteristics of the right to participate in government and electoral rights are fully delimitled in international human rights instruments, and the role of election monitors in guaranteeing these rights is no longer seriously contested. 2

Article 7 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document of the then-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (now the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)), which calls on participating states to accept international and domestic election observers, affirms the proposition that election observers can play an important role in democratic elections. Observance of this policy is also routinely reflected in the practices of sovereign governments as well as the programs conducted by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Why Monitor?

The primary purpose of an independent monitoring operation is to guarantee the integrity of an election process. This objective exists whether the election occurs in a longstanding or in a new or transition democracy. Several related goals also justify the time and cost associated with initiating and implementing monitoring efforts.

Particularly significant in the context of transition elections is the role monitors play in reassuring a skeptical public about the importance of the electoral process and the relevance of each voter’s participation. Often in these environments, the public’s only experience with politics concerns human rights abuses, fraudulent elections and military or autocratic rule. In these circumstances, basic notions of civic responsibility need reinforcement, and anxieties must be overcome.

Publicity surrounding the formation of a monitoring operation, coupled with the pre-election activities of monitors and their presence at voting stations on election day, enhances public confidence and encourages citizen involvement in the process. Public statements and reports issued by the monitoring group may lead to changes in policies that promote a more equitable election process. Through the use of mediating techniques, monitors may help resolve disputes that emerge during the campaign period. Their presence at polling sites deters fraud, irregularities and innocent administrative mistakes. Deployment of election monitors to troubled areas also serves to discourage intimidation during a campaign and on election day. In addition, when monitors monitor the vote counting process through an independent vote tabulation or other means, they provide an unbiased source for verifying official results.

Finally, a post-election evaluation conducted by an independent monitoring group may also influence the positions of electoral contestants regarding the overall legitimacy of the process. A relatively positive assessment should encourage acceptance of the results by all parties. By contrast, a negative critique may lead to rejection of the results if the process is deemed illegitimate.

Who Monitors?

Four categories of domestic groups, each with different roles and responsibilities, are involved in monitoring elections. (See Definition I.) International actors complement the efforts of these groups, but

1 See Appendix I.

cannot substitute for them absent extraordinary circumstances.

**Election Officials** Election officials include national election administrators, regional election officers as well as voting-site and counting officials. The existence of impartial and well-trained election officials at all administrative levels usually decreases the need for developing an elaborate monitoring operation. Although these officials principally oversee the processes of organizing and implementing elections, they also have a duty to guarantee that the election conforms with the country’s election law and applicable international standards.

Election officials face certain limitations related to monitoring elections, especially in transition elections. First, since election officials are typically responsible for administering the election process, it may be difficult for them to assess, objectively, their own work. Second, in many countries officials from the executive branch, the judiciary or the ranks of the ruling party are appointed to positions of authority in the election system. Their partisan affiliations may arouse suspicion of undue government influence and bias, thus diminishing their credibility as impartial monitors. Notwithstanding these limitations, election officials can serve an important role in election monitoring. (See Illustration 1)

**Political Parties** Even in countries with longstanding democratic traditions, political party representatives are assigned to virtually all polling sites on election day. In addition to discouraging electoral manipulation, the presence of party pollwatchers demonstrates a party’s organizational strength to prospective voters, which may accrue psychological benefits for a party engaged in a closely contested election. Party pollwatchers also provide political parties with an important and timely source of information regarding voter turnout during election day and election results after the polls close.

Party pollwatchers, however, represent partisan electoral contestants. (See Definition 2) In the event of a dispute or irregularity, these pollwatch-
ers have a natural tendency to protect the interests of their party, candidate or issue. In a polarized political environment, the information collected and disseminated by political parties may be challenged as biased and untrustworthy.

LOCAL MEDIA The local media—television, radio, newspapers and magazines—also monitor elections. In addition to reporting on the election campaign and final results, the media investigate allegations of abuse, conduct pre-election polls, and establish mechanisms for quickly projecting and announcing election results. In the context of a first election, and particularly where the government owns or strictly controls major media outlets, the voters and opposition parties may perceive the media as biased. In other circumstances, the media refuse to dispense relevant information regarding the conduct of an election.

**Nonpartisan Organizations** The perceived partisanship of election officials, political party pollwatchers and the media prompted the advent of monitoring by nonpartisan civic organizations. (See Definition 3)

In most cases, nonpartisan civic organizations are more interested in the process than the outcome of an election. Consequently, if nonpartisan civic organizations develop an effective monitoring apparatus, their evaluation of an election process will be considered more reliable than one offered by a government-dominated election commission or by a party contesting the election. Moreover, domestic monitoring groups provide a neutral vehicle for organizing and engaging sectors of society that are otherwise unwilling or afraid to assume a partisan role in an electoral process.

The nonpartisan *bona fides* of domestic monitoring groups face constant challenge. (See Definition 4) Many such groups are formed by individuals who have a long history of fighting against the incumbent regime for democratic change and respect for human rights. Still, as discussed in the next section, these groups can take affirmative steps to demonstrate their objective character and to ensure that their members remain nonpartisan.³

**What is Monitored?**

The increased attention directed toward fair election processes has also affected the scope of monitoring operations. No longer is the focus limited to observing activities on election day or during the tabulation process. Rather, effective election monitoring embraces a broader mandate that begins with writing the statutes that establish the election framework and concludes with resolving electoral complaints. Chapter Three, below, presents a detailed approach to monitoring an election process.

Creating the legal framework for an election provides the initial entry point for influencing the components of a fair election process. Political parties and independent monitoring groups often

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³ See also Section E, Credibility

**non•par•ti•san**

*Nonpartisan*, as used in this *Handbook*, relates to actions and objectives that do not support or detract from any competitor in an election. Nonpartisan work is conducted in support of a democratic election process, without regard to who wins or loses. Domestic groups from Albania to Zambia have demonstrated that, notwithstanding the personal preferences or former affiliations of their members, they are capable of participating in political events, such as elections, while maintaining their credibility for nonpartisan conduct.

**bo•na fides**

*Bona fides* is Latin, meaning "in good faith," and may be used in reference to an organization's qualifications, reputation for genuineness or sincerity.
attempt to affect the content of the law. The election law debate also affords the media an excellent opportunity to begin informing the public about the significance of an upcoming election.

The election law generally establishes who should be permitted to serve as election monitors and what rights or restrictions apply to the monitors’ work. This subject has been the source of considerable controversy in many countries. Before the 1992 national election in Romania, for example, the accreditation of independent domestic monitoring groups dominated the debate concerning the adoption of a new election law, as the ruling party sought to limit access to polling sites only to individuals designated by political parties. Through concerted efforts, domestic monitors eventually secured legal status in Romania’s 1992 local and national elections.

Monitoring operations—whether undertaken by political parties, the media or independent groups—should be active during the entire pre-election period. Once the legal framework is in place, monitoring groups should examine the procedures: to appoint election officials; to register parties and voters; to designate candidates; to enforce election campaign regulations; to conduct the voting and counting; to review complaints; and to install the election winner(s). The incumbent government, the security forces and government-controlled media may deserve special scrutiny given their potential for improperly using their status to influence large numbers of voters.

The balloting and counting processes usually form the focal points of a monitoring operation. A plan of action for deploying monitors on election day must be developed, taking into account available personnel, transport and other resources. Training personnel and preparing effective mechanisms for data collection are also essential to organizing a credible monitoring effort.

A monitoring operation does not end when polls close or even when the preliminary results are released. In the period following elections, monitors should investigate alleged election-day irregularities and complaints filed with the relevant election officials and the courts.

How Nonpartisan Organizations Monitor

Chapter Three details the myriad activities that domestic election monitors should consider pursuing. This section summarizes several guiding principles that may help nonpartisan civic organizations and their members conduct a successful monitoring effort.

Developing and preserving a reputation as a credible investigator and reporter of election events constitutes a goal of utmost importance. Generally, monitors must remain objective and impartial in all of their activities; they should be advised to refrain from expressing publicly any preference for a political party or candidate.

Monitors should also perform their work with diligence and thoroughness, researching and recording their findings in an objective manner. Personal observations and other credible sources of information may form the basis for conclusions about the elections. Monitoring efforts should avoid relying on untrustworthy sources of information, conducting incomplete, unbalanced or inaccurate research, or reaching and publicizing judgments prematurely, as each of these activities will damage the credibility of the operation. Monitors should document their observations so that they are verifiable and, in all instances, attempt to distinguish objective from subjective evidence.

How a monitoring organization decides to use its findings will affect the credibility with which resulting evaluations are received. It is generally advisable, therefore, to choose a path of moderation and discretion by avoiding unwarranted extremes and portraying findings in their proper context. Moreover, findings are likely to achieve greater influence if they are presented in a constructive, rather than purely critical, manner.

Monitors will further enhance their credibility to the extent that they publicize the objectives, methodology and findings of their efforts. Informing the public, the media, the government and political parties of the group’s intentions and operating procedures diminishes suspicion and misunderstanding.
REMEMBER

- remain objective and impartial;
- conduct research and observations diligently and thoroughly;
- exercise moderation and discretion; and
- demonstrate the monitoring group's credibility by documenting and publicizing relevant objectives, methodologies and findings.
He February 7, 1986 snap presidential election in the Philippines dramatically altered the then-widely held perspective that election observing was inappropriate or ineffectual. In the Philippines, a well-trained and organized nonpartisan domestic monitoring operation demonstrated that it could, when complemented by large-scale international observer delegations, critically evaluate a fatally flawed process.

The importance of developing and nurturing local monitoring efforts was among the most significant and far-reaching lessons learned by NDI from its observation mission to the Philippine elections. Consequently, since 1986 NDI has encouraged the formation of nonpartisan monitoring organizations, trained thousands of domestic monitors and coordinated pre-election and election-day activities with domestic monitoring groups in more than two dozen countries. Many of the organizations with which NDI has worked in the context of first elections have endured beyond these contests, contributing to the development of democratic institutions in their countries.

**The NAMFREL Model**

A team of political and election specialists from NDI and what is now the International Republican Institute (IRI), visited the Philippines before the 1986 presidential election to assess the feasibility of mounting a credible international observer effort. The team's most productive and impressive meetings were held with leaders of the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), an organization formed 30 months earlier to promote electoral reform and to monitor elections. Unlike the many Filipinos who opposed participation in elections run by President Ferdinand Marcos, NAMFREL activists encouraged public involvement in the process as a vehicle for restoring democracy in their country. To this end, approximately 500,000 volunteers were recruited, trained and mobilized to monitor polling sites throughout the Philippine archipelago on election day.

Despite its initial reluctance, the team recommended that both institutes organize an international observer delegation based largely on the positive impression created by NAMFREL. Specifically, in developing a plan of action for the international observers, NDI and IRI relied on NAMFREL volunteers throughout the country to furnish information about political developments and to identify problem areas. NAMFREL's "operation quick count," which sought to collect and tabulate actual election results from all of the more than 85,000 polling sites, provided an essential mechanism for exposing the inaccuracy of the official results announced by the government-controlled Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The international observers, meanwhile, provided much needed support to NAMFREL both before and after the election, when COMELEC sought to revoke NAMFREL's accreditation and when the government alleged that NAMFREL poll watchers acted in a partisan manner.

The NAMFREL monitoring operation identified and highlighted the electoral abuses committed by supporters of the incumbent president, and reported results suggesting a victory by Marcos' opponent Corazon Aquino. Consequently, a majority of the Philippine population and the international community rejected the official results reported by COMELEC. A military revolt supported by large segments of the public, coupled with international pressure, provoked Marcos to relinquish power and leave the Philippines for exile in the United States less than three weeks after the election.

**Building upon the NAMFREL Experience**

Following adoption of a new Philippine constitution in February 1987, legislative elections were scheduled for May of that year. NDI utilized the May polling to familiarize democratic activists in other countries with the Philippine experience. The activists, from nine countries, made up NDI's 24-member international observer delegation.
These delegates studied the work of NAMFREL and many returned home to initiate similar activities in their countries. While some efforts proved more successful than others, the strategy of mobilizing volunteers for a first election and developing nonpartisan approaches to political involvement has provided considerable momentum to democratic tendencies, even where immediate gains are less than obvious.

In Chile, for example, a massive civic education program undertaken by a nonpartisan organization, CIVITAS, encouraged prospective voters to register for the October 6, 1988 plebiscite, which determined whether President Augusto Pinochet, who seized power in a 1973 military coup, would remain in office for another eight years. In the days preceding the plebiscite, CIVITAS organized various activities designed to overcome the anxieties of many citizens who doubted the secrecy of their vote and who feared reprisals if they voted against the government.

CIVITAS also supported efforts by a committee of prominent Chileans to conduct an independent vote count. Although drawing heavily from the Philippine experience, the Chileans did not attempt to monitor every polling site. Instead, they utilized statistical sampling to project the outcome based on results from a randomly selected 10 percent of the polling sites. The highly accurate projection in the presidential plebiscite led monitoring organizations in other countries to employ parallel vote tabulations based on statistical samples instead of, or in addition to, the comprehensive count used by NAMFREL.

The Philippine experience also influenced developments during the period preceding the May 1989 Panamanian national elections. Business and church leaders formed an independent citizens group to pressure the government to conduct fair elections. For the elections, a church lay group implemented a parallel vote tabulation. This independent vote count proved critical in identifying the true winner of the presidential election during which the government initially sought to manipulate the results and ultimately nullified the elections.

Paraguay is another Latin American country where various domestic groups have played important roles in monitoring a series of elections conducted since the overthrow of President Alfredo Stroessner in 1989. In addition to monitoring the balloting process and implementing parallel vote tabulations, groups such as the Center for Democratic Studies (CED) have been active in developing innovative civic education programs that inform citizens about their rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. By 1993, a coalition of diverse civic organizations named SAKA (meaning "transparency" in the native language) was developed to conduct an independent vote tabulation that confirmed the victory of Paraguay's ruling party candidate.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe became the new democratic frontier. In Bulgaria, a group of student activists constituted the nucleus of the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections (BAFE), which formed 10 weeks before the June 10, 1990 parliamentary elections, Bulgaria's first multiparty contest since 1931. Overcoming government obstruction and a frightened population, BAFE mobilized more than 8,000 volunteers to monitor election-day developments throughout the country and to implement an independent vote tabulation. Though reputed to oppose the ruling party, BAFE insisted on remaining objective and impartial in its work. The parallel vote tabulation conducted by BAFE confirmed the victory by the incumbent, former communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP).

BAFE remained active following the elections, changing its name to the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECR) to reflect an expanded mandate. Before the October 1991 legislative elections, BAFECR aggressively promoted election law reform and implemented a civic education program throughout the country. The elections resulted in the BSP's narrow defeat, which was confirmed by parallel vote tabulations conducted by BAFECR and other organizations. BAFECR mobilized more than 9,000 election monitors for Bulgaria's 1994 national elections, organized a nationwide program to encourage voter turnout and conducted numerous "candidate forums" (debates) before election day.

Domestic monitoring organizations have also emerged in other Eastern European countries,
notably Albania and Romania. The Romanian Pro Democracy Association (PDA) actively monitored the 1992 local and national elections, despite efforts by the parliament to deny 7000 PDA monitors access to the polling sites. Since these elections, the PDA, through its more than 30 chapters throughout the country, has promoted government transparency and communication between the citizenry and its elected representatives. The Albanian Society for Free Elections and Democratic Culture (now known as the Society for Democratic Culture or SDC) formed in February 1992 and played an important role in deterring abuses during the March 1992 elections, which removed from power the long-ruling Albanian Party of Labor (later renamed the Albanian Socialist Party). SDC monitored local elections and the constitutional plebiscite in 1994, and maintains an active program for citizen participation in public affairs.

The 1989 constituent assembly elections in Namibia represented a precursor to the democratic surge on the African continent. Again, domestic monitoring groups featured prominently in this development. The Namibian Council of Churches played a particularly important role in documenting incidents of intimidation during the period preceding the elections. A second organization, Namibia Peace Plan 433, conducted a civic education campaign and monitored the government-controlled media.

The Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in Africa, a pan-African civic organization known by its French acronym GERDDES-Afrique, also emerged as a leading proponent of domestic monitoring efforts, as part of a general mandate to encourage more democratic development in the region. In 1991, GERDDES-Afrique organized a delegation to observe the Benin’s national elections in March, which resulted in the ouster of the incumbent president. With chapters in more than a dozen African countries, principally in the French-speaking west, GERDDES organizes local and regional monitoring efforts and conducts training programs for election officials and pollwatchers. GERDDES played an important role in the 1995 elections in Niger and Benin, working with international organizations to train nonpartisan domestic monitors, party poll watchers and election officials.

In English-speaking Africa, the Zambia experience has proven influential. The Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) formed several months before the 1991 presidential and legislative elections, but failed to obtain the trust of key Zambian institutions, most notably the churches. Ultimately, a second organization, the Zambian Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), was organized, the board of which included representatives of six Zambian organizations. Both ZIMT and ZEMCC trained and deployed election monitors throughout the country to help implement a parallel vote tabulation. The results of the parallel tabulation were instrumental to the work of the international observer delegation jointly sponsored by NDI and the Carter Center of Emory University.

The Zambian monitoring activity enhanced the confidence of the citizenry, which was participating in multiparty elections for the first time in more than 18 years. In the presidential election, Frederick Chiluba, a long-time labor activist, overwhelmingly defeated Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s president since the country gained independence in 1964.

The National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU) in Kenya, the Group of Independent Observers in Burundi and the Public Affairs Committee in Malawi all developed effective domestic monitoring operations for recent election exercises in their countries. Each group relied on the ZEMCC model, whereby church-affiliated organizations assume the leading role in supplying personnel, infrastructure support and recognized credibility to the monitoring operation. Domestic monitoring exercises in Africa have more recently been successful in South Africa and Ethiopia as well.

Despite the success of NAMFREL in the Philippines, Asia represents the region where the experiences of domestic monitoring groups is most mixed. For example, South Korean church groups were unsuccessful in convincing
international observers of the nonpartisan bona fides of their efforts during the December 1987 presidential election.

Bangladeshis, however, succeeded in mounting a monitoring effort in 1991. Several nonpartisan groups organized for the February legislative elections, with the number of monitors recruited by each group ranging from a few to several thousand. Some of the groups have remained active following the elections, with changed names and mandates. For example, a coalition of civic organizations, the Fair Election Monitoring Alliance, has made preparations to monitor 1995 national elections.

In the Middle East, the National Committee for Free Elections (NCFE) recruited more than 4000 volunteers to monitor Yemen’s April 27, 1993 elections, the first multiparty elections in the country’s history. The government purposely sought to limit the NCFE’s effectiveness by creating a competitive organization and denying NCFE representatives access to polling sites. Nonetheless, the operation proved a major success in a region where democratic tendencies are not yet well developed.

**Consolidating Fragile Democracies**

The summary above illustrates the important contribution made by domestic, nonpartisan monitoring groups in promoting fair election practices in their countries. In accomplishing their objectives, these groups have overcome suspicions by governments and ruling party leaders, established nonpartisan bona fides, and obtained the personnel and financial commitments required to implement an effective monitoring operation.

The long-term sustainability of these organizations deserves special emphasis. In January 1993, NDI sponsored a seminar in Washington, D.C. for 15 organizations originally formed to monitor or support multiparty elections in their countries. The participants addressed the challenges involved in maintaining civic organizations in a non-election setting, including maintaining organizational momentum, retaining volunteers and raising funds. Participants also described various post-election activities that have been undertaken by their organizations.

The collective experience of these groups demonstrates their concrete and sustained contribution to the democratic process in their countries. Those interested in promoting more democratic systems of government, therefore, should place a high priority on supporting the emergence of such organizations, including providing financial and political support. Furthermore, sharing experiences among and furnishing technical resource materials to those interested in organizing a nonpartisan monitoring effort for elections have often proven to be the most direct forms of assistance.

**POST-ELECTION ACTIVITIES FOR CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS**

- promoting election law reform;
- implementing civic education programs;
- monitoring human rights;
- encouraging the participation of women in the political process;
- providing legal assistance to citizens on issues relating to privatization and land concerns;
- working with nongovernmental organizations to support civic advocacy groups at the provincial and local levels; and
- fostering transparency and accountability in government.

See Chapter Three, Section 2, Final Considerations for further discussion of this subject.
CHAPTER
THREE

Developing a
Nonpartisan Monitoring
Operation:
An A to Z Guide
This chapter describes the steps necessary to initiate and implement an effective and credible domestic monitoring operation. While the material is designed for use by nonpartisan monitors, many of the principles are applicable to projects that are conducted by political parties as well as international organizations.

Nonpartisan election monitoring organizations often emerge in a country undergoing a transition to a more democratic form of government, where the political environment is characterized by confusion and mistrust. In such a setting, citizens, political parties and candidates may have difficulty securing conditions necessary for fair and meaningful elections. In these circumstances, a nonpartisan monitoring effort strengthens public confidence by championing electoral laws that promote a fair process, by providing dependable sources of public information, and by serving as an impartial witness to the balloting and vote-counting processes.

The chapter is divided into five parts and 26 sections (A-Z) as follows:

| PART ONE | Initiating a Monitoring Effort (Sections A-G) |
| PART TWO | Preparing the Operation (Sections H-O) |
| PART THREE | Monitoring the Pre-Election Phase (Sections P-T) |
| PART FOUR | Monitoring the Election and Post-Election Phases (Sections U-X) |
| PART FIVE | Post-Election Activities (Sections Y and Z) |

This public service announcement cartoon encourages all citizens to help ensure the integrity of the 1991 elections in Guyana. It was placed in local newspapers by the Electoral Assistance Bureau, a nonpartisan, nongovernment organization.
PART I

Initiating a Monitoring Effort

In an uncertain electoral environment, a credible monitoring operation improves prospects for a fair election in which the public and the contestants accept the legitimacy of the process. Part One of this chapter provides a summary of the activities that should be considered when preparing to organize and execute a domestic monitoring effort.

1. Whether election laws are clearly defined and meet basic international standards;
2. Whether these laws are understood by election officials, political contestants and the public;
3. Whether election authorities are impartial and adequately trained;
4. Whether there has been a history of electoral problems and/or there is a possibility of manipulation;
5. Whether competing political parties and/or candidates are capable of effectively monitoring the electoral processes in order to defend their interests;
6. Whether the news media have a history of balanced and objective coverage of elections; and
7. Whether the public has a high degree of confidence in how the electoral authorities and political contestants will operate.

Having answered these questions, you should begin to rank the factors that pose the most serious threat to a legitimate election process, for

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4 For further discussion on the range of activities commonly undertaken by monitors, see Section B, A General Plan.
example, intimidation during the campaign period, unbalanced treatment by the media, fraud during the voting and counting, or all of the above.

Several sources of information will help you reach a conclusion. You should analyze news reports from the media and other written or recorded studies. You should also interview representatives of institutions that are integrally involved in the election process. These institutions include all political parties, the election commission (nationally and locally), civic organizations that are conducting voter education or promoting human rights, the security forces and the media. Whenever possible, ask them to:

1. explain their role in the elections;
2. evaluate the election process, as it is designed in the abstract and as it is developing in reality; and
3. describe the major concerns of the institution they represent.

In your research efforts, do not overlook the perceptions of average voters. Their impressions, whether accurate or mistaken, represent a fundamental factor in determining an election’s credibility.5

Once you can make an informed, preliminary assessment of the election process, you should discuss your conclusions among the leaders of your organization or coalition of organizations. Then you can begin to develop a general plan by which you will respond to those needs.

**A General Plan**

The general plan (also called a program or operational plan) is your strategy for achieving the goals of the monitoring effort, which reflects the organization’s priorities based upon your assessment of needs and available resources.6 Your plan describes the means by which you hope to achieve certain objectives. It is generally a good idea to put the major components of a plan (including objectives, guiding principles, goals and tasks) in writing.

**Objectives and Guiding Principles**7 Your organization’s broad objectives are the foundation upon which any monitoring plan is built. You should begin development of your plan by reviewing the needs of the election process in conjunction with your organization’s desires and capabilities. This review involves fundamental policy decisions and typically warrants participation by the organization’s leaders. Traditional objectives for monitoring organizations include the following: promoting public confidence in legitimate electoral process; assisting development of adequate election laws and procedures; encouraging public understanding about the election process; helping to mediate and resolve disputes; reducing levels of violence, intimidation and fear; and deterring election law violations and reporting them when they occur. The process of review helps you to conceptualize, analyze and evaluate your plan as well as to eliminate alternatives that are not directly related to achieving your objectives.

Similarly, you should enumerate the principles that will guide every decision and action of the monitoring group. Typical examples of these principles are nonpartisanship and non-violence. You may choose, as other groups have, to adopt the guiding principles of your organization in a written code of conduct.

**Specific Goals and Tasks** Divide your broad objective(s) into component parts (“goals”) that you intend to actively pursue. For any group that monitors elections, a few basic goals to be considered include observation, evaluation, reporting and advocating reforms. You will find that each of these goals may be applied to the various events that constitute an election process. A partial list of the major election events includes:

1. adoption of the election law;
2. registration of voters;

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5 See Section Q, Civic and Voter Education for further discussion of monitoring voters’ general level of understanding about an election.
6 See Section A, A Need.
7 See Appendix II, a brochure prepared by NAMFREL describing the objectives, guiding principles and other essential information about the organization.
8 See Section D, A Committee of Directors and a Democratic Organizational Structure.
delimitation of election constituencies (or “districts”);
registration and qualification of political parties and electoral contestants;
the election campaign;
voter education and election official training programs;
voting and counting;

8. tabulation and announcement of the official election results; and
9. installation of the election winners.

Your goals can and should be further distilled into sub-goals and so that you can develop a list of specific activities (“tasks”) to pursue in order to achieve your goals and objectives. (See Illustration 2)

Suppose that your objective is to enhance public confidence in the legitimacy of the election process. In order to accomplish this objective, you may adopt the goal of pursuing a program to ensure that voters are accurately registered. As you prepare to develop your registration program, suppose also you determine that the major problems experienced in past elections have involved:

A. long distances between registration stations; and
B. the improper deletion of a significant number of names from the lists.

You then may decide your sub-goals for the upcoming election are:

A.1. to change the location of registration stations (e.g., from one every 100 kilometers to one every 50 kilometers) to make it easier for average citizens to register; and
B.1. to prevent fraud in the registration process.

Therefore, you develop a plan of tasks by which you will accomplish your sub-goals and, ultimately, meet your objective. These tasks might involve:

A.1.a. Advocating changes in the election regulations to make registration sites easier to reach by:
   1. submitting letters or editorial articles to local newspapers;
   2. soliciting the support of political parties;
   3. meeting government officials to persuade them to support your proposed policies; or
   4. organizing a mass meeting in which the issue is publicly debated.

B.1.a. Monitoring the registration process by:
   1. advocating that registration lists be made available to the electoral contestants and the public with sufficient time for review and consideration of amendments;
   2. announcing your intention to monitor the process and describing your methodology;
   3. recruiting, training and deploying volunteers to observe the inscription process at local registration centers;
   4. checking a statistically significant random sample of registrations to verify the accuracy of the voter lists;
   5. assuring timely access to the voter registry by all political contestants so that they may evaluate whether the registry contains names that should be removed or is missing names that should be included;
   6. researching all names deleted from the list to determine if they were properly removed;
   7. writing and distributing a report on the accuracy of the list; or
   8. recommending a mechanism to ensure that those whose names were improperly removed from the list are re-registered.
Part Two and Part Three of this chapter discuss plans and methods for monitoring registration and achieving other monitoring goals. First, consider these general suggestions about how to implement the plan.

**Developing an Election Calendar**

An election monitoring effort must be well planned and organized in order to meet the many deadlines related to the election. As a preliminary step in your planning, you should develop a calendar that identifies dates and time periods in which the most significant election events will take place, such as when:

1. the election laws and political party laws are debated and adopted or decreed;
2. the election date is announced;
3. the national election commission is appointed;
4. organizations involved in the election process, including nonpartisan election monitoring groups, must register with the proper authorities;
5. voters may register;
6. the public may verify, appeal and amend the voter registration lists;
7. parties and candidates may register;
8. the official campaign period begins and ends, particularly noting the last date that political activities may take place (e.g., releasing public opinion polls, scheduling rallies, appearing on public media, etc.);
9. election officials are recruited and trained;
10. pollwatchers and other monitors apply for accreditation;
11. election materials are distributed to voting sites;
12. votes are cast;
13. votes are counted, tabulated and announced;
14. complaints and appeals are filed;
15. run-off elections (if any) are held; and
16. winning candidates are installed.

The election calendar provides a useful visual aid that can help you determine which events you should monitor, how your plan will be organized, what kind of personnel and financial resources will be available, and what logistical preparations are needed.

**Developing a Budget**

You should also draft a budget. A budget should reflect both the expected revenue and the allocation of funds to specific tasks. Often, with a new venture, several budgets should be prepared based on high and low revenue projections. Among the expenditures you should anticipate are:

1. rent for office space of national and regional headquarters;
2. office equipment (e.g., computers, typewriters, photocopiers, etc.);
3. utilities (e.g., heat, water, electricity, etc.);
4. salaries for full-time and part-time employees;
5. communication (e.g., telephone bills and installation charges, fax machines, modems, other equipment, postage, etc.);
6. office supplies (e.g., pens, paper, tape, staples, etc.);
7. printing and copying costs for stationery, brochures, identification badges, posters, training manuals and reports;
8. travel expenses for recruiting, training and actual monitoring;
9. event costs (e.g., facility rentals, food, sound equipment, etc.); and
10. professional services (e.g., accountants, lawyers, computer specialists, etc.)

Some of these expenditures can be avoided if you are able to acquire equipment or services that are donated without compensation. In any event, the operation must establish a system for authorizing and documenting revenues, contributions and expenditures in order to operate effectively and efficiently. Moreover, your reputation for good management and transparency, professional bookkeeping will reflect favorably on the group's credibility as an election monitor.

**Managing the Plan**

Limit yourself to undertaking only as many goals and related activities as you can accomplish...
while maintaining a reputation for quality and credibility. Additional goals may be added as more time and resources become available.

In a monitoring operation, there is always more work to do than there are people to do it. In such circumstances, it is imperative that you manage efficiently your time and the time of your personnel by:

1. **delegating** tasks to various members of your operation on the basis of geographic region, functional expertise or personal interest, particularly where you have multiple goals and a complex or a multifaceted plan; and
2. **coordinating** the various activities of the organization to assure that the multiple activities are carried out efficiently, consistently and in accordance with your guiding principles.

In some cases, organizations appoint a single person or group of people to coordinate information and activities among the various elements of a monitoring operation. When many activities are being conducted simultaneously at many levels, this liaison function helps to maximize the flow of information to decisionmakers and to allocate resources efficiently.

Coordination can be enhanced by scheduling frequent meetings with individuals responsible for specific tasks, including office managers and logistics staff. Through this forum, you can assure that lines of communication remain open in order to identify and resolve problems that arise during the planning or execution phases of your collective operations. Also, remember that some aspects of coordination should concentrate on the relationship between your field operations (regional and local) and your headquarters. This enables representatives in each region to learn what is happening in other areas of the operation and helps to ensure that the regions receive appropriate attention and support.

**Evaluating and Revising the Plan**

When you develop the election calendar and plan your activities, you should also create an operations **timeline**, indicating the date(s) by which various activities should be accomplished. From this timeline you will be able to periodically evaluate the execution of your plan and make changes based on whether you have successfully met your scheduled deadlines. One method for evaluating your plan is to answer certain questions, including:

1. Are you achieving initially projected results (e.g., number of volunteers recruited, brochures distributed, training sessions held, etc.)?
2. Are the staff and volunteers meeting their individual responsibilities?
3. Are the media and public responding positively to your efforts?
4. Do you have adequate resources to meet the needs of the program?

**Approaches to Organizing**

Most domestic monitoring groups organize themselves by using one of three basic approaches:

1. transforming, or temporarily reorienting, a **pre-existing civic group** into an organization whose primary focus is to monitor an upcoming election. Such groups often include, but are not limited to: human rights leagues, trade unions, religious organizations, cultural societies, professional associations and student alliances;
2. creating a **new organization** dedicated to non-partisan election monitoring; or
3. creating a **coalition** of various organizations whose members will work together to monitor an election.

The organizational model you select will depend on many considerations. Access to resources (personnel and financial), specialized capabilities, and political reputations are only a few of the factors that are pertinent to choosing your approach. There are strengths and weaknesses associated with each model.
Pre-existing institutions enjoy established organizational structures, experienced leadership and membership, public recognition and, in some cases, material and financial resources. In some cases, however, these same characteristics may present problems. For example, the existence of strained relationships with other groups or political parties or having a partisan reputation may hinder future activities and alliances. Similarly, a pre-existing organization may have conflicting priorities or may be reluctant to commit the resources required to sustain a successful election monitoring effort. In the case of a coalition, a further complication may arise if all decisions must be made through protracted negotiations with the leaders of various organizations. (See Illustration 3)

By comparison, establishing a new organization can be time consuming. Also, the infancy of any organization is likely to be a period of uncertainty. Uncertainty results naturally from the organization’s preliminary efforts to recruit directors and executive officers, develop the plan, solicit financial resources, etc. One particularly difficult challenge is recruiting prominent, influential leaders—who do not have excessively partisan reputations—to participate in a new organization. Another challenge involves developing an effective organizational structure in a short timeframe.

On the other hand, compared to a coalition of multiple groups a new organization need not reconcile competing mandates and management styles. New groups may also benefit from having no pre-existing reputation or ties to partisan interests. Moreover, a new group often experiences a burst of interest and excitement that can, in certain circumstances, make easier such tasks as recruiting, mobilizing volunteers and attracting media attention. (See Illustration 4)

Still, establishing a new organization is rarely easy, as demonstrated in Illustration 5.

In addition to selecting a model for organizing, your monitoring effort must develop an organizational structure, recruit and train personnel, and collect resources. The next section discusses the role and formation of your organization’s leadership.

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31 See Section E, Credibility for more discussion of this issue.
When [Zambia's] President Kenneth Kaunda initially rejected the opposition's demand for international observers, a group of Zambians ... proposed the creation of the Zambian Independent Monitoring Team [ZIMT] ....

ZIMT was formally registered as a society under Zambian law in July [1991]. ZIMT recruited a board of directors comprised of prominent Zambians, including businessmen, representatives of the legal, medical, accounting and architecture professions, two student leaders and several members of the clergy.

ZIMT, however, encountered some early internal difficulties. Many of ZIMT's natural constituents, including members of the clergy, students and others, charged that ZIMT was unduly influenced by [the ruling party]. ... Although ZIMT had recruited representatives of the churches and the Law Association for its board, ZIMT insisted that it was not an umbrella organization and that all members of the board served in their individual capacities; they were not designated or chosen as representatives of other groups. Representatives of the church, the Law Association and other civic groups, however, sought an institutional role in the process. ... In early September, as dissatisfaction with ZIMT grew, three church representatives on the board resigned.

At the end of September, six Zambian organizations combined to form the Zambian Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee [ZEMCC]. ... Each of ZEMCC's constituent organizations chose two delegates to serve on the board. ZEMCC published training manuals, sent mobile teams to train volunteers around the country and used the media and the pulpit to deliver messages about their activities and the responsibilities of the citizenry. An estimated 3,500 people participated in ZEMCC training sessions...

The beneficiaries of this effort were the Zambian people, who went to the polls with great confidence. From now on, independent monitoring will be seen as an integral part of the electoral process in Zambia.

This illustration is taken from The October 31, 1991 National Elections in Zambia, pp. 63-64, 68-69 (NDI and The Carter Center of Emory University, 1992).

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A Committee of Directors and a Democratic Organizational Structure

A first step in organizing a nonpartisan domestic monitoring operation involves forming a committee that will direct all major decisions of the operation. This committee is variously called an executive committee, board of directors, coordinating council or steering committee. Monitoring organizations commonly select one person who will serve as chairman or chairwoman of the committee, as well as someone to fill the positions of vice-chair, treasurer and secretary. Subcommittees are also sometimes formed to deal with special issues such as fundraising, recruiting, government relations, developing internal operating procedures, etc.

The importance of enlisting prominent personalities for this committee cannot be overemphasized. The reputation and personal integrity of the committee members reinforce the legitimacy of the endeavor; encourage ordinary citizens to join the effort and help guarantee that the organization is taken seriously by the government, the election commission, the contesting parties and the media. Committee members need not have a background in politics; indeed, popular sports and cultural figures may be recruited, when appropriate, in order to provide publicity. (See Illustration 6)

Depending upon how its role is conceived, the committee of directors may have several responsibilities, including:

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12 See generally Appendix II.
1. hiring an executive director;
2. developing the objectives, guiding principles and initial plan for monitoring the election;

The names and professions of the chairpersons of some notable nonpartisan monitoring organizations include: NAMFREL, Philippines—José Concepcion, leading businessman and citizen activist, and Bishop Antonio Fortich, a prominent church leader; Committee for Free Elections, Chile—Sergio Molina, coordinator of the National Accord and a former cabinet minister; CED, Paraguay—René Recaide, executive secretary of a Catholic lay association; BAFE, Bulgaria—Kevork Kevorkian, host of the country’s most popular television show; ZEMCC, Zambia—Rev. Foston Sakala, leader of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia; and NCFE, Yemen—Mustapha Noman, former diplomat and human rights activist.

3. reviewing and, where necessary, refining the monitoring plan;
4. preparing a budget;
5. raising funds;
6. authorizing public statements;
7. conducting relations with members of the government, political leaders, other civic organizations and the international community; and
8. assuming legal responsibility for the operation (e.g., securing official registration and accreditation for the monitoring operation).

Your organization or coalition will benefit from efforts to adopt democratic structures and procedures for managing its own affairs. For example, mutually agreed upon rules of order (e.g., voting procedures to be used when making major decisions) or by-laws will help you to debate and resolve difficult issues more efficiently and effectively. The alternative, in which non-democratic methods become characteristic of your efforts, may make you vulnerable to accusations of employing a double standard. In some cases, this phenomenon has inspired prominent committee or coalition members to withdraw from or criticize the monitoring effort. These events may prove embarrassing and diminish the group’s credibility.

When creating a new organization, you should take steps to ensure that the legal statutes of your entity provide for easy incorporation of new members into the decisionmaking process. It is also desirable to encourage inclusion of members and leaders from various geographic, ethnic, racial or other sectors of the country and to have a balance of men and women. If your group is working on a national scale, it is also important to facilitate acceptance of new chapters into the organization from around the country. You should also consider adopting democratic processes by which local and national leaders, including members of the committee of directors, are eventually elected to, ratified or removed from their offices.

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13 See Chapter Two, The Evolution of Monitoring by Nonpartisan Domestic Organizations, for more background on the activities of these organizations.
14 See e.g., H.M. Robert, Robert’s Rules of Order (1893).
Credibility

Projecting an image of credibility enhances the effectiveness of a monitoring operation and, therefore, must play a prominent role in your decisionmaking process. Your credibility may suffer if you:

1. are closely associated with partisan interests or project a partisan image;
2. fail to explain the objectives or methodology of your effort;
3. pursue an unsound methodology;
4. execute activities incompetently; or
5. withhold reports of your activities and findings.

You can take at least four affirmative steps to establish your credibility.

Maintain independence from partisan associations and promote an image of impartiality. Your monitoring effort may become associated with other institutions before or during the course of an election. These relationships arise when you: form a coalition or coordinate your operation with others, receive funding, material assistance or guidance from a particular source; or, in some environments, merely engage in frequent communications (e.g., with government officials or party leaders).

Developing and maintaining relationships with other organizations and institutions is inherent in monitoring and does not automatically impute your credibility. However, you should be careful to avoid excessive reliance on any person or group with partisan interests. If you decide that the monitoring effort should associate itself with partisan interests, take special precautions to assure that the resulting image is balanced and does not appear to favor any electoral contestant. (See Illustration 7)

When raising money for your monitoring operation, be aware that using resources from contributors with a personal or partisan interest in the outcome of the election may create an impression that you will consequently owe a debt of allegiance to these contributors. This phenomenon may occur even if the contribution is made with no expectation of something in return. If you do receive contributions from partisan interests, try to counter potential allegations of bias by insisting on, or at least inviting, equal contributions from all competitors in the election.

You should consistently promote an image of impartiality (also sometimes referred to as being neutral, nonpartisan, apolitical, independent or objective). Your credibility will be strongly affected by the composition of your committee of directors and the reputation of the chairperson as well as by the actions and reputation of senior staff. Similar to the approach of creating a coalition or receiving contributions, you should avoid forming a committee of directors that appears, from the combined associations of its individual members, to favor one political interest. (See Illustration 8)

In Paraguay four domestic civic organizations formed SAKA, a coalition to monitor the 1993 presidential elections. Before the coalition was created, one of the groups was viewed as nonpartisan, two smaller groups had reputations for favoring opposition political parties, and the fourth group was known to strongly support the ruling party. Although the disparate composition of SAKA made daily operations challenging, it resulted in a balance of partisan interests that established the coalition's reputation for impartiality.

With less than 30 days before Romania's first multiparty local elections in 1992, the Pro Democracy Association (PDA) faced a crisis. PDA founder and president Adrian Moruzi accepted an invitation by a coalition of opposition parties to run as a mayoral candidate in Brasov, one of Romania's largest cities. Because he aligned himself with a partisan cause, Moruzi was asked by PDA to resign immediately. PDA subsequently designated its vice president, Marian Tata, to serve as acting president and successfully preserved its nonpartisan image.

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15 See Section F, Operating Funds.
16 See Section D, A Committee of Directors and a Democratic Organizational Structure.
Similarly, staff and volunteers in your organization must pledge to refrain from working for, or exhibiting any public preference for, the advancement or defeat of a particular political party or candidate. The primary concern of a nonpartisan monitor should be to protect the integrity of the electoral process, regardless of who wins or loses. However, this directive does not (and should not) preclude monitors from expressing their personal political choice in the privacy of the voting booth.

At the same time, you should realize that impartiality and independence from political contestants does not mean your organization should have no contact with political parties or candidate organizations. On the contrary, it is essential that you communicate to political contestants what your objectives and guiding principles are and what your activities will entail. (Also, you should not preclude the possibility of contributing to the level of voter education, as many nonpartisan groups have, by sponsoring policy debates and candidate forums.) Open lines of communication will help the contestants to respect and appreciate the purpose of your organization and may encourage them to provide you with information that will be useful to your monitoring efforts.

COMMUNICATE CLEARLY AND REGULARLY
Many monitoring groups are hesitant to publicize their activities. This tendency is often prevalent in environments characterized by serious repression or polarization. Nonetheless, your credibility will be enhanced to the extent that you pursue a policy of communicating openly with the political parties, the government and the media. You should clearly and openly present your objectives, goals, methodology and proposed activities in order to answer questions and clarify any misunderstandings about the nature of your effort. (See, for example, the brochure prepared by the Philippine group NAMFREL in Appendix II.)

These communications may take the form of press conferences, press releases, advertisements, letters, telephone calls or personal interviews. You should convey any relevant information before you conduct your activities. Such advance notice generally helps to deter fraud or intimidation and may also facilitate the execution of your activities. Moreover, demonstrating your dedication and courage through public pronouncements delivers a strong message that your monitoring effort is serious about its mission.

It is also valuable to share information about your efforts after they transpire. Distributing written and verbal reports about your activities and findings helps you to document your achievements and provides a useful reference for the media and other election observers.

ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF YOUR PLAN AND METHODOLOGY
Your plan and your methodology (the specific approach you employ to execute your activities) are liabilities if they are perceived to be unsound, unreasonable or unlikely to be achieved. This means that your plan must be logistically and financially feasible and must, assuming it is properly executed, appear capable of accomplishing your established goals. A plan and methodology can best maintain this integrity if their underlying assumptions are sensible and valid.

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17 See also Section I, Recruiting.
18 See Section V, Post-Election Reporting.
19 Issues regarding methodology are addressed in Part Two and Part Three of this chapter in the context of specific election monitoring activities.
For example, suppose that you set a goal of collecting vote count results from 100 counting stations located throughout the country and that you plan to deploy one volunteer to observe the count inside each station. If you can recruit only 10 volunteers, your plan may not be logistically feasible. If you have no money or vehicles to transport your volunteers, then your plan is similarly flawed. Alternatively, suppose that all of your volunteers have been instructed to collect vote count results by simply interviewing the first political party observer they can find who has been inside the counting center. In this situation, your methodology may be criticized because you cannot guarantee that the resulting data is convincingly trustworthy. In other words, even if it is properly executed, critics may argue that your methodology lacks integrity.

**EXECUTE YOUR PLAN** The best plans and methodologies will be irrelevant if they cannot be properly executed, in which case your operation will lose credibility. Good execution requires the proper personnel and resources and, above all, good training.20 (See Illustration 9)

It is common for critics to accuse monitoring organizations of bias or incompetence, particularly when the organizations are new and untested. Your conduct in executing the plan represents your most potent defense against such charges. If the performance of your members is characterized by impartiality, objectivity, and professionalism, all reasonable critics will eventually be silenced, and your credibility will be assured.

**Operating Funds**

Soliciting funds for a domestic monitoring effort poses several challenges. The often short time-frame for organizing an operation places enormous pressure on those responsible for fundraising and may compete with other, seemingly more important duties.

NAMFREL’s reputation as a credible, independent monitoring organization was tested when it publicly projected election results that contained serious mathematical errors following the May 1987 legislative elections in the Philippines. Upon discovering the mistake, NAMFREL promptly revised its announcement.

Nonetheless, parties opposed to President Corazon Aquino were convinced that NAMFREL was part of a plot to ensure overwhelming victories for pro-Aquino legislators. In the end, NAMFREL’s excellent reputation, the organization’s prompt retraction and correction, and its willingness to subject the quick-count results to an independent audit convinced a majority of the population that the error was indeed innocent.

This urgency for raising funds, however, should not compromise the group’s impartiality as stated above in Section E, Credibility. Depending on the circumstances, a perception of partisanship may be created if your organization accepts funds from the government, political parties or other groups that are supporting electoral contestants.

The election law may or may not provide precise directives regarding nonpartisan fundraising. Violating the terms or spirit of such legal regulations would likely contradict a fundamental goal of the operation and, therefore, should be avoided.

Common sources of funding for domestic monitoring operations include:

1. membership dues;
2. revenue from sales of your organization’s paraphernalia, such as buttons, t-shirts, posters and banners;
3. contributions from businesses and wealthy individuals, some of whom may be asked to join the steering committee;
4. donations of materials or services from businesses and individuals, also called “in-kind” or “in specie” contributions (e.g., office space, equipment, transport and communication.

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20 See Section I, Recruiting; Section J, Training; and Section K, Training Manual, for further discussion of this subject.
devices, legal or accounting services, houses for meetings, food for election monitors, etc.); and

grants from domestic or international foundations interested in supporting democratic processes.

International organizations often provide domestic election monitoring groups with a large share of their initial funding needs. However, some groups refuse to accept monetary support from external sources in the belief that generating funds domestically demonstrates popular support and avoids any perception of outside control.

You should assign one or more people to concentrate on soliciting and collecting resources. Many organizations also establish a subcommittee for this purpose within the committee of directors.

As a preliminary step, you should analyze the budget to determine your estimation of expenditures needed to conduct the monitoring effort.21 Next you should develop a plan by which you will solicit the resources. Some commonly used fundraising techniques include:

1. sponsoring entertainment events (e.g., a large dinner, musical presentations, etc.) at which you collect a fee for entrance or request voluntary contributions;
2. selling goods or services (e.g., artwork, food, cleaning services, etc.) for a profit, which is in turn donated to the monitoring operation;
3. directly soliciting contributions of money, equipment, office space, transportation, etc. (This may be accomplished by using mail, telephone, newspaper, radio, or personal appeals); or
4. writing and submitting grant proposals to foundations and other donor institutions.

In general, you should begin by soliciting resources from people who share your beliefs about the importance of the monitoring effort. Also, allocate a high priority to contacting people who can afford to contribute larger amounts of money or other resources before calling on others.

However, do not underestimate the importance of small donations received from multiple sources; the cumulative effect of many small contributions provides a basis to claim broad public support (which enhances your credibility) and provides a pool of names from which to recruit more volunteers. Finally, it is wise to record the name and address of each contributor as well as the amount and date of his or her donation. These records may be required by law, but more importantly they provide valuable information for the next time you ask for assistance.

Office Facilities

A national office or headquarters provides a place where the staff of the monitoring group can meet to work, plan and communicate among themselves, regional groups and others. Factors to consider in choosing a national office include:

1. financial resources that can be dedicated to this purpose (i.e., how much can you afford to spend?);
2. types of projects anticipated before, during and after election day (e.g., assembling materials, convening meetings, conducting training sessions, holding press conferences, etc.), and the space necessary to implement those projects efficiently;
3. electrical and structural capacity to install communications networks and other equipment (e.g., photocopy machines, telephones and computers);
4. convenience, comfort and security for staff and volunteers, since they may be working late hours under difficult conditions;
5. easy access for ordinary citizens;
6. proximity to other participants in the electoral process; and
7. the possibility of using the facilities after the election, in the event that the organization decides to continue to operate. (See Illustration 10)

21 See also the discussion on budgets in Section B, A General Plan.
Upon its formation in April 1990, BAFE situated its offices on the ground floor of the Palace of Culture, located in the center of Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria. The Palace is a well-recognized landmark in the area, with access to conference rooms and other amenities. Bulgarian television also used the Palace of Culture as the headquarters for election-night broadcasts, thus enabling BAFE to relay with ease information collected from its parallel vote tabulation to the television studio.
**Personnel**

Monitoring is an activity that relies upon the eyes and ears of observers. Monitoring media coverage in newspapers or on radio may require only a limited number of such observers. By comparison, the effort to administer and carry out a nationwide operation to monitor election-day voting and ballot counting processes often requires hundreds or even thousands of observers as well as a sizable nucleus of managers, professional advisors and support staff. During the 1986 elections in the Philippines, more than 500,000 volunteers participated in NAMFREL's nationwide monitoring operation. Whether a monitoring operation uses 50 or 500,000 observers, human resources are the key to success. This section briefly outlines the different types of personnel you may need to recruit and their various duties.

The committee of directors has as one of its major responsibilities the selection of an executive director to oversee and manage the operation of the entire monitoring effort. The executive director must have the authority to:

1. direct the daily execution of the general plan;
2. recruit and manage personnel;
3. establish contacts with government officials, political party leaders, journalists and representatives of other organizations; and
4. address any serious problems of a political or administrative nature.

Other staff for a monitoring operation may include:

- **Administrative staff** that manages other staff members and the office(s), answers the telephones, operates computers, drives vehicles and maintains correspondence;

- **Field coordinators** who coordinate communication between centralized decisionmakers and the volunteers at the regional and local levels, and are responsible for recruiting, training, deploying and supervising volunteers;

- **Public information officers** who answer all press questions, generate publicity for the organization and develop civic education materials and training manuals;

- **Logistics officers** who oversee the provision of communication, transportation and certain accommodations for the operations;
Professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, demographers, statisticians, computer specialists, etc.) who help prepare formal submissions to the election commission and courts, receive and evaluate complaints regarding election-related problems, pay bills and salaries, ensure financial accountability and design independent, parallel vote tabulations.

Whether compensated or not, the administrative staff and the observers should commit themselves to attend training sessions, to follow instructions and to accept specific assignments. The number of people assigned to each function depends on the population and geographic size of the country; the scope of the organizational plan, and the availability of staff and volunteers.

Recruiting

Once you have determined the type and number of personnel needed to fill various functional roles in the operation, you should begin the process of recruiting. As a first step you will need to identify volunteers with relevant expertise and a willingness to devote time to your effort.

You must begin by answering several questions, similar to those that are considered when developing an organizational plan, raising funds or selecting office space.

How many people, both skilled and unskilled, are necessary to accomplish your goals? What types of professional expertise are needed? To answer this question you must first determine what you plan to monitor. From Section B, A General Plan you should have completed the process of analyzing what goals and tasks lie ahead. For example, will you monitor the fairness of the media, the impartiality of police, the accuracy of voter registration, voting and counting, or all of these electoral components? Next you must decide how you will monitor these components. Will the organization read every newspaper, watch every police officer, check each entry on the voter registry, observe every voting and counting station or will you select a representative sample from which to collect your observations? Also, you must consider factors of time and location. Will you monitor for four months or four days? Will you monitor the entire country or just a few selected regions?

Having answered these questions you will begin to have a picture of how many individuals you will need to recruit. Finally, when calculating the number of workers to recruit, remember to plan for extra volunteers who will be needed to replace workers that are fatigued, sick or absent for whatever reason.

The type of people you must recruit is similarly dependent upon answers to the questions posed in the previous paragraph. In selecting personnel to observe elections, you should consider whether certain skills are necessary—such as reading, writing, speaking multiple languages, knowing simple arithmetic, using equipment (e.g., telephones, computers, facsimile machines, photocopiers, etc.) and driving. You should also think about any physical requirements necessary for the job. Do people need good vision or hearing? Will personnel need to be able to walk long distances or stand on their feet all day?

You also may determine that the services of trained professionals will benefit your efforts. For example, if you plan to monitor legislation or human rights, you may wish to recruit people with legal training; if you are monitoring campaign finance issues, you will want accountants on your team; if you are collecting information on a computer data base to conduct a parallel vote tabulation, specialists in computers and statistics will be extremely helpful.

These professionals can also help administer the operations of the monitoring organization. They may be ideally suited for developing training material, filing the proper papers to register the organization, preparing a budget and accounting for expenditures.
How many people, and with what qualifications, are already available to the monitoring operation and how can new recruits complement or improve these pre-existing assets? You should begin by creating an inventory of people who have indicated a willingness to work for the monitoring effort and the skills or experience they offer. (See Definition 5)

Then you should compare the inventory with a complete list of the tasks that need to be completed. Your efforts should concentrate on recruiting people who can perform the tasks for which you do not already have adequate numbers or skills in your personnel inventory. For logistical and political (or cultural) purposes, you should recruit representatives from every region or ethnic concentration in which you plan to monitor. For the more important objective of demonstrating impartiality, it is often desirable to assure that your organization has, to the extent possible, an equitable and diversified composition with regard to gender, ethnicity, religion, region and previous political affiliation.

Where do you look for people to join your effort? Pre-existing organizations offer the simplest source to find and recruit volunteers. Religious laity groups, business associations, student or human rights organizations and social clubs are common examples. (See Illustration II.)

You may also recruit volunteers from the general public. Recruiting from this source is very time consuming because it requires more effort to explain a project to someone who does not know you or is unfamiliar with your project. Nonetheless, the general public is often the only source from which to find large numbers of volunteers if you are planning an extensive operation.

How will you recruit people? What will you tell them about the monitoring operation and the planned activities in order to convince them to join your efforts? You cannot recruit volunteers by simply asking them to appear at voting stations on election day to observe the events. Preparing monitors to perform their election-day responsibilities requires careful groundwork and training, which begin at the recruitment stage.

You should plan to invite prospective volunteers to a recruitment meeting. For pre-existing groups, you can ask leaders of those groups for permission to address a regularly scheduled meeting for their assistance in arranging a special meeting. When recruiting from the general public, you should advertise your meetings through the media, posting and passing out notices, and using "word-of-mouth."

You must therefore develop a short and meaningful message to attract people. When recruiting, your message should:

**in•ven•to•ry**
An inventory is an itemized list, or catalog, of current assets such as property, personnel or funds. It may include descriptions of specific characteristics (e.g., ages, genders and skills of people), quantities in which the assets are available, and information about where they can be found or contacted.

The large number of mountain climbers who directed local clubs of Bulgaria's BAFE illustrates how a pre-existing organization was used to recruit volunteers. Miroslav Sevilevski, BAFE's executive director, was executive secretary of the Bulgarian mountain climbers association in April 1990. Sevilevski asked many of his former associates to organize BAFE clubs in their regions. Sevilevski's pre-existing contacts helped establish a nationwide network and brought to BAFE individuals with proven organizational skills and an appreciation for teamwork.
1. explain the objectives of the monitoring operation;
2. describe the general plan by which the objectives will be achieved;
3. outline the activities for which volunteers are needed and how these activities accomplish the goals of the operational plan;
4. define the duties and responsibilities for recruits; and
5. ask members of the audience to join your effort. (See Illustration 12.)

Remember the importance of asking each volunteer to help recruit more volunteers. Each of them has family, friends and fellow students or co-workers. In the Philippines, NAMFREL developed its corps of 500000 volunteers by suggesting that each new member recruit at least five other volunteers.

In order for a recruiting meeting to be successful, you should incorporate several approaches into your presentation. First, try to explain the objectives of the monitoring effort in a way that each member of your audience understands why and how these objectives are relevant to his or her life—personalize the presentation.

Second, explain to prospective volunteers that election monitoring is a way that each person can, individually, participate directly in democratic politics and government. Third, since you are asking people to contribute time and energy for little or no monetary compensation, consider making your presentation in a manner that is appealing and enjoyable. For example, monitoring organizations often provide entertainment, such as music, dancing and food, or the promise of a pleasant social experience as additional inducement to volunteers.

Fourth, make sure that the expectations of the prospective volunteers match the reality of what they will be asked to do and what you will be able to provide them. A successful understanding between you and the volunteers requires that you speak candidly with the prospective monitors about the terms on which they are expected to participate. Tell prospective recruits what they can expect from you regarding instruction, supervision and assignments as well as prospects of payment (or nonpayment) for wages, food, transportation and other expenses.

Also, be frank about your expectations for personnel and the importance of each volunteer to the entire effort. Let them know that the monitoring operation is a team effort that requires a serious commitment. Be sure to inform volunteers about your rules regarding attendance, training, dress, nonpartisan conduct, abiding by the election laws, etc., and explain why each rule is designed to promote conduct that reflects favorably on the monitoring mission.

Finally, do not end your presentation or close the meeting until you have recorded the names and contact information for those who wish to participate in your efforts. Also, you should take this opportunity to tell the new recruits about their next assignment. For example, you might remind them to “come to our first training meeting at the same location and time as this meeting, three weeks from today.” All volunteers should be asked to complete an information card, which solicits the following data:

1. name, address and telephone number;
2. place of employment;
3. special skills;
4. times/days available for work; and

Pro Democracy Association (PDA) made effective use of the mass media to recruit volunteers before Romania’s 1992 nationwide elections for local offices. PDA obtained an agreement from the television station to broadcast a short advertisement promoting civic education. The theme of the advertisement was “Romania Needs You!” It emphasized the importance of the upcoming elections and the need for citizen involvement to monitor the process. It showed PDA volunteers as they conducted their work and asked all interested citizens to join the effort. PDA also recruited volunteers by purchasing newspaper advertisements, hanging posters and distributing leaflets.
names and phone numbers of other individuals who may be interested in the operation.

(See, for example, the sample information request from NAMFREL in Appendix II)

The information contained on the cards generally should be compiled in the national headquarters files and, if possible, entered into a computer data base. Take reasonable precautions to assure that this information is not used by those who may want to intimidate volunteers or obstruct monitoring.

WHAT PROCEDURES WILL YOU IMPLEMENT TO ENSURE THAT RECRUITS WILL RESPECT AND ENHANCE THE ORGANIZATION'S REPUTATION FOR CONDUCTING QUALITY, NONPARTISAN WORK? Remember that credibility is an essential characteristic of a successful monitoring operation. One component of credibility is quality. The best way to assure quality in an operation is to recruit and train capable personnel. Actively demonstrating your nonpartisan bona fides is another important ingredient in the formula for a credible operation. During the recruiting process, you should develop procedures that will help protect the organization's reputation for nonpartisanship and enhance understanding among volunteers of how they should conduct themselves.

A monitoring group can protect its reputation by limiting its selection of volunteers to those people who: support the group's objectives; will comply with supervision from the group's leaders; and will make a reasonable effort to fulfill their membership duties and responsibilities. Monitoring organizations can use different ways to determine a prospective volunteer's commitment to these guidelines, including a requirement for membership fees. In order to safeguard yourself or at least help insure some level of commitment from your volunteers, you may ask them to sign a pledge card wherein the participant promises to conduct all monitoring activity in a nonpartisan manner during the election period. (See Illustration 13)

Having taken steps to influence the type of individual who is admitted into the monitoring effort, you should also develop procedures to control the volunteers who remain in the operation. Often there are some people initially recruited to join your organization who later behave in a manner that forces you to remove them from the ranks. To prepare for this eventuality, you should put into writing the criteria and procedures by which personnel will be removed. You should distribute and clearly explain your policy to all newly recruited personnel during their initial orientation or in their training sessions.

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In Guyana, the civic group called the Election Assistance Bureau (EAB) requested its observers to sign the following:

**OBSERVER'S PLEDGE**

Local Authorities Elections 1994

I, the undersigned, hereby pledge as follows:

1. That I agree to serve on behalf of the Election Assistance Bureau as a polling place Observer at the Local Authorities Elections on 8th August 1994.
2. That I am neither an activist nor a candidate for any group or party contesting these elections.
3. That I have attended a training session and that I fully understand the duties of an Observer.
4. That I shall execute my duties impartially and objectively and to the best of my ability, and in keeping with the directions for observing provided by the Electoral Assistance Bureau.
5. That the reports I shall give, both orally and in writing shall represent an accurate account of the proceedings witnessed by me.

______________________________
Signature

______________________________
Name in Block Letters

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22 See Section J, Training
Training

You can help guarantee the quality and impartiality of your operation by training personnel in the skills and general information relevant to election monitoring.

Most personnel, especially the actual observers, understand their role in the monitoring effort only after they have completed a training program. Careful consideration, therefore, should be given to the design of the training program, which forms an integral part of the overall election monitoring operation. In addition to providing instruction to the prospective monitors, a training program demonstrates to the public that the group is well organized and is approaching its mission in a methodical manner. It also enables personnel to meet each other and to promote enthusiasm, loyalty and a sense of shared dedication to the mission.

Training programs for prospective monitors vary in scope, intensity and duration. The following are key questions to examine when organizing a training program:

1. Who is available to conduct the training sessions? (e.g., leaders of the organization, a trained cadre of junior officers, functional experts, international experts, local officials, etc.);

2. Who will be the audience for the training sessions? (e.g., future trainers, pre-election or election-day monitors, political party pollwatchers, government officials, journalists, etc.);

3. What training materials and documents should be prepared? (e.g., a description of the organization—including its goals, important dates, names, addresses and telephone numbers; instruction manuals; checklists or other forms; a code of conduct; election laws; other teaching devices such as sample election materials, flip charts, transparencies for an overhead projector, audio and video tapes, etc.);

4. What logistical arrangements and what costs are involved in conducting the training program? (e.g., meeting rooms, transportation, per diem, food, lodging, etc.);

5. What information, instructions or skills do you intend to convey during the training?

6. How sophisticated are the members of your audience and how familiar are they with the objectives of the organization, the legal and administrative procedures for the elections and the constraints involved in working with a nonpartisan organization?

7. What format(s) should be used to communicate different types of information? (e.g., lectures, workshops, question and answer sessions, simulations or role-playing);

8. What systems will you employ to convey the training information to appropriate personnel?

**System of Training** When you conceptualize your approach to training you will face the challenge of conveying the necessary information, instructions and skills to your personnel. If you are attempting to monitor events that happen at the local level (e.g., voter registration, voting and counting, intimidation, etc.) you will probably also need to recruit and train your observers at the local level. The description offered here applies principally to training that is intended to reach the local level.

Important factors in selecting your approach include how much time you have and what type of financial resources, trainers, communications and transportation are available for this endeavor. At one extreme, you may have the time and resources to pursue a comprehensive, "grassroots" approach in which individual members receive personal training at the most local level. This approach has the advantage of allowing trainers to distribute materials, utilize visual aides and conduct simulations. It also provides members of the audience an opportunity to ask questions directly to the trainer. At the other extreme, you may be limited to indirect training. Using the mass media, such as newspapers or radio, is one example of indirect training. While this enables you to reach a large number of people in a short

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23 See also Section B, A General Plan, Section I, Recruiting and Section M, Logistics, for more discussion on the subject of training personnel.
time, it severely limits the use of instructional aids and the opportunity to ask questions.

Monitoring organizations typically adopt some combination of the following three systems: (1) training the trainers (the pyramid system), (2) mobile workshops, and (3) national training days.

The pyramid system is so named because if you draw a picture to describe the flow of information from the original trainer to the most localized trainee (the local monitors) it looks like a pyramid. The concept behind this approach is that if you concentrate on providing information, instructions and techniques for conducting the training to a small group of individuals, they will learn the material well enough that they can repeat the training to others. In effect, every group that receives training is empowered to repeat the training; for example, if you train 10 people adequately, they then become trainers. If each member of this group trains 10 more people, they will have contacted 100 individuals, who can repeat the process to reach one thousand, and so on.

This system of personal contact requires transportation. In order to disperse the training information throughout the country, you must either bring the local audience to the trainers or bring the trainers to the local audience. The former system assembles individuals from outlying regions or cities in a central location (e.g., the capital or other important cities) so they, in turn, can be dispatched to their homes where they will repeat the training to others. The newly trained trainers then repeat the process for individuals who are brought in from outlying villages and towns. The villagers and townspeople are, in turn, dispatched to their homes to continue the pattern.

This decentralized approach enables you to quickly build a large organization using minimal logistical and organizational resources. However, since your direct oversight is largely absent at the training conducted outside of the capital, you should realize that you will have less control over who is recruited and the quality and consistency of their training.

A second system, in which a group of trainers disperses to visit local audiences who then repeat the training for family and friends in the same locale, is a simple variation on the approach described above. This system typically employs mobile teams of two or three trainers each.

This system helps preserve quality and consistency in the training from one level to the next. It may also conserve costs by minimizing the number of people who need to be transported to the training forums. One potential challenge is finding enough qualified trainers who are available to travel throughout the country for an extended period.

In a further variation, mobile teams can be used as a substitute for the system of training the trainers. Under this scheme, special teams are assigned to conduct a circuit, departing from a central location to conduct local training programs along a route of planned stops, eventually returning to the central headquarters. These trainers may represent the only source of information, instructions and skills that are conveyed to audiences even at the most local levels. This model, which depends on the continual use of experienced trainers, helps ensure that the training meets a high standard for quality and uniformity. In addition, the presence of trainers from central headquarters often generates enthusiasm locally and may encourage recruitment.

Another option involves sponsoring national training days, during which training sessions are conducted simultaneously throughout the country. While this approach allows the organization to create a high profile national event, it initially requires an intensified period of activity when many trainers must be trained and a massive quantity of materials must be created, produced and distributed.

**Trainees** It is important that you identify and prepare the trainers who will, in turn, train all the individual personnel in your monitoring operation. People who have experience with speaking to large groups and conveying instructions are often ideal candidates. Many monitoring organizations have relied upon school teachers, professors, and church and civic organization leaders to serve as trainers.
AUDIENCE You should consider inviting other groups to your training sessions in addition to your recruits and prospective recruits. Specifically, by inviting (or at least notifying) government officials, political party representatives, journalists or international observers to some of your training programs you can enhance your reputation, demonstrate the nonpartisan nature of your work, and foster relations with these important institutions. In many cases, participation by these organizations will add to the quality of the program. For example, you can invite them to explain and interpret the election laws and related procedures, to participate in question and answer sessions, or just to observe the discussion. On the other hand, there are some occasions when participation by people from outside of your organization can inhibit or interfere the training. In these cases, the better practice is to limit participation to members or supporters only.

AGENDA You should prepare an agenda for the training program that provides an opportunity to discuss the following topics:

1. introduction of trainers and participants;
2. introduction of the organization and the purpose of the training program (e.g., description of the monitoring group, its mandate and objectives and its activities to date; explanation of the goals and agenda for the training session);
3. distribution of training manual and other materials;
4. review of election procedures;

In Togo, the domestic monitoring group GERIDES conducted simulations of voting for audiences of prospective volunteers. The purpose of the simulations was to give the audience a clearer idea what problems to expect when monitoring election day. In advance of the exercise, trainers had prepared all of the necessary materials and equipment:

- the registration list was a sheet of lined paper with a place to mark the voters name, address and signature;
- ballots were made from cut up pieces of plain white paper. The symbols for three candidates—a rooster, a star and a flower—were hand-written on the ballots;
- a ballot box was made using a cardboard box with a small opening cut in the top;
- a felt tip marker was acquired to put ink on the fingers of those who had voted; and
- a curtain from a nearby window was stretched around a chair to make an improvised voting booth.

Trainers began by selecting five members of the audience to be election officials. The election officials sat at a table in front of the room. Their first responsibility was to conduct voter registration. Trainers then chose 20 volunteers from the audience to register as voters. When registration was complete, monitors were taken from the audience: one to represent each political party, two representing a nonpartisan domestic monitoring group and two representing international observers. Finally, one volunteer was assigned to represent the military.

Next, the voting process began according to the election law of Togo. The election officials supervised every stage of the process—opening the voting station, casting ballots, closing the voting station, resolving disputes, counting ballots and announcing results—and were closely watched by the observers.

To make the exercise more challenging, trainers conspired with some of the voters and election officials to simulate irregularities. These included attempts at double voting, voting without registering, stuffing the ballot box, campaigning inside the voting station, etc. Observers and officials were taught how to look for the problems and record any complaints. Questions from the audience were encouraged throughout the simulation.
discussion of monitoring techniques;

simulation and role-playing exercises;

elaboration of situations and specific challenges that monitors may encounter in the course of their work;

timetable for implementing plan of action; and

questions and answers.

Some of these topics can be discussed in five or 10 minutes. Others, such as the review of election procedures, may require one or two hours. Remember to provide brief intermissions. Experience has shown that audiences have difficulty maintaining their concentration for more than 50 minutes at a time, no matter how interesting the subject matter.

Simulations have proven to be one of the most popular and effective methods of communicating information about election processes and monitoring. A training agenda should allow sufficient time for simulation exercises and a period to exchange questions and answers. (See Illustration 14.)

The precise contents of the training manual may vary depending on the unique environment of each election and the focus of your monitoring activities. Most domestic monitors produce manuals that contain some or all of the following basic information:

1. an introduction, which briefly describes the formation of the organization and its principal goals;

2. a concise historical perspective, which explains the significance of the upcoming election;

3. a short overview on the evolution of nonpartisan election monitoring efforts, which should reassure the observers that the task before them is not an impossible one and has been accomplished by other organizations (examples may be taken from the descriptions of groups included in Chapter Two of this Handbook);

4. a synopsis of the election code and regulations, including a description of the responsibilities of various election officials, the election procedures, and the mechanisms for recording and filing complaints (samples of these materials are often published by the central election commission and may be copied and incorporated into your own materials);

5. a code of conduct for observers describing guidelines for acceptable behavior; and

6. a description of the activities undertaken by observers before and during election day, and the details involved in serving as an election monitor, including:

   a. when to arrive at the assigned site;

   b. with whom to speak upon arrival;

   c. what to do if problems arise; and

   d. where to deliver written or oral reports.

In addition, the training manual should include specially designed checklists or other forms on which the monitors may record their observations, accompanied by an explanation of how to
properly complete the forms. (See Appendix III)

If your monitoring operation becomes more sophisticated or if teams are assigned for specialized functions, you may wish to prepare correspondingly specialized manuals. Potential topics for specialized manuals include:

1. monitoring the pre-campaign period (e.g., electoral reforms, voter registration, party registration, candidate nomination, delimitation of electoral districts, etc);
2. monitoring the campaign period (e.g., media coverage, intimidation, voter education, political party activities, campaign finance, impartiality of election officials, etc);
3. monitoring preparedness of election administrators;
4. monitoring the voting and counting;
5. implementing a parallel vote tabulation; and
6. monitoring the electoral complaint process.

You should carefully calculate the amount of time needed to produce training manuals from conception, to writing, to printing, to distribution. There is a tendency to underestimate the length of time required to complete this process, which may delay training and disrupt the overall monitoring plan. In any event, your budget should provide necessary funds to print and distribute the manual to all observers so they can keep it for future reference throughout their monitoring assignment.

Managing public information is one of the most difficult duties in a monitoring operation. Thus, you should assign one or more public information officers or press officers to fulfill your public information needs. Individuals who have journalistic or editing experience and the capacity to develop a message make ideal candidates for the job. Experience in using or creating artwork, designing texts and printing is also helpful. It is especially important that your public information officers can adeptly communicate in front of a television camera, a radio microphone or a large audience.

The public information office has several responsibilities. The first of these is working with the committee of directors and the executive director to identify your organization's communication needs and priorities. Then, in conjunction with developing the general plan, the public information office should design a strategy for achieving these needs. Components of a good strategy include identifying the type of communication (e.g., educational, persuasive), the audience and the method of communication that will best serve your goals.

The public information office is also responsible for developing the specific message your group wants to communicate. The message may serve to:

1. recruit or train volunteers;
2. advise the public and election officials about your methodology and proposed activities;
3. answer questions or accusations aimed at your organization; and
4. report upon your activities, findings, evaluations and/or recommendations.

All information that is distributed outside of your operation should consistently and accurately reflect your objectives and activities. For this reason, it is important that all substantial communications, from training manuals to press releases, be conceptualized and reviewed by the public information office with the assistance of other relevant members of your operation.
All other members of your organization should exercise prudence in talking to media reporters. Most organizations discourage everyone except the public information officers from speaking with the media, unless they are authorized to do so, in order to avoid sending conflicting messages or premature evaluations. In furtherance of this concern, you should consider developing and distributing media guidelines to all members of the organization so that they know how you want them to interact with the media and how to direct inquiries to the public information office.

Once the strategy and message have been developed, it is the public information office's constant obligation to convey the information inside and outside of your organization. This duty commences when the organization first announces its existence and intention to monitor the elections and continues until all of its findings are reported and questions are answered.

**Channels of Communication**

You can communicate your message through three types of channels: (1) personal contact; (2) publications; and (3) mass media.

**Personal Contact**

Whenever you address an audience in person, you are employing a channel of communication called personal contact. Private meetings, telephone calls, public rallies, conferences and interviews represent several types of personal contacts.

Personal contact conveys the style and emotion of your organization and your message. Given the immediacy and interactive nature of this medium, you can also emphasize important points and tailor your presentation based on the reactions of the audience. Most important, this channel of communication provides an opportunity for the audience to ask questions.

Personal contact is especially useful in countries where there is a low level of literacy and where the mass media reaches a limited audience. While personal contact is perhaps the most powerful method for communicating a message, it has the disadvantage of being less efficient than publications or the mass media.

**Publications**

Many monitoring groups employ publications such as posters, informational leaflets, instructional manuals and written reports in order to communicate a message. (See Definition 6)

Publications can be designed, written and delivered by your organization independently. With the exception of the actual printing or reproduction process, publications offer a monitoring group the advantage of not requiring the assistance, or potential for interference, of an intermediary (such as a newspaper, radio or television).

As a first step, the public information officer should prepare materials explaining basic information about your organization. Such materials often take the form of a document (variously called a leaflet, pamphlet or brochure) of one to 10 pages that can be distributed in the mail or by hand.24 The brochure may serve many uses. You may distribute it with press releases, hand it out at meetings, or include it in other publications. It should describe the origins, objectives and methodology of the organization, and should include basic information about the organization's leaders, associated members, location, telephone number, etc. Many organizations recycle some or all of this information by attaching it or inserting it into the text of other written materials, including proposals, training manuals, press releases and reports.

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24 See, for example, the NAMFREL brochure in Appendix II.
Special attention should be placed on the task of issuing written reports. Monitoring organizations around the world have written various types of reports, including: election law analyses, proposals for reforming the election system, pre-election assessments, studies of media fairness, post-election reports (preliminary and interim), as well as comprehensive reports about the entire electoral process.

The reports about the information you collect are the public record from which your credibility is assessed and by which the election’s legitimacy is evaluated. These reports contain answers to the questions about your objectives, methodology, execution, impartiality, findings, conclusions and recommendations. The information you share and the manner in which you deliver it will, in large measure, determine the influence of your organization. The reports you write and distribute are also a valuable source of information for future generations of election monitors in your country. Finally, reports provide tangible evidence of your activities and may contribute to your success in obtaining funds and recruiting volunteers in the future.25

It is worth noting that many fledgling organizations are unaccustomed to, or intimidated by, the prospect of publishing information about themselves or their findings. It may be wise, therefore, to address certain questions during your planning meetings. For example, you should determine what your approach to report writing is and who, within your organization, is responsible for drafting, editing and publishing.

If you decide to issue reports, you must also decide when, and to whom, they should be distributed. You must also determine how much information to share and on what topics. One option, albeit extreme, is to share no information at all. Another approach involves relating general information about your objectives, methodology, personnel, election-related activities and future plans, but withholding any comment on your findings or evaluations. A third option may include all of these components and place heavy emphasis on your findings, evaluations and recommendations.

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25 See Section Y, Post-Election Reporting, Section F, Operating Funds and Section I, Recruiting and Appendix IV.

26 See also Section T, Media, for a discussion about monitoring the mass media.
sometimes called public service announcements ("PSAs"). The mass media occasionally publishes or broadcasts these communications free of charge in recognition of their value to the "public good" (i.e., an informed public). In other situations, the government or other sources will subsidize the costs. Such communications must nominally benefit the entire public, not just a particular segment of the community, in order to maintain the attribution of being truly in the public interest. Thus, PSA messages should be nonpartisan. PSAs often discuss issues relevant to the process rather than policies or criticisms about individual candidates. In the context of elections, PSAs may be used as a tool in conducting voter education on such topics as registration, voting, basic rights and obligations relevant to the election process, and information about all the candidates.

You may also choose to submit a public letter or a short article for publication in the newspapers. These communications, sometimes called letters to the editor, commentary or opinion articles, cost nothing and they may reach a large audience. However, you have no guarantee that they will be published, so you should not rely exclusively on this mechanism.

Of course, if you purposely or otherwise attract the mass media's attention with something that merits a news story, the information related to this story may be printed or broadcast. Although there are little or no financial costs associated with this communication, unfortunately there is correspondingly limited opportunity for you to control the substance or timing of the message that is sent.

To the extent that news coverage by the mass media can be influenced, your public information office should make every effort to do so. This responsibility entails constant attention, including answering questions from reporters, responding to criticism, conducting interviews and briefings about your activities, and informing the media in advance about future events.

**Press Release** In order to increase attention from the media, the public information office should know how to issue a press release. A press release is a very short (usually one page) written notice publicizing an event that may be of general interest to the readers, listeners or viewers.

The press release and follow-up telephone conversations should, if properly prepared and timely distributed, help to convince the media that the story and the event are, indeed, worthy of discussing in the news. The public information office must, therefore, provide adequate details about your activities (e.g., recruitment meetings, rallies at which reforms are advocated, election-day monitoring, etc.) and subsequent findings and analyses.

Before you send out a press release, however, you should consider a number of factors that will improve your chances for coverage:

1. Create a press list. Identify the news organizations that receive press releases, the format they prefer, and the information they require. Compile addresses, telephone/fax numbers and the names of appropriate personnel, including assignment editors and reporters, likely to cover your story.

2. Identify the deadlines for each media outlet with which you will be working. It is very important to understand that news organizations work under deadlines. For example, if a newspaper is published for distribution on Wednesday, and the deadline for receiving submissions is Tuesday morning, then a story you send them on Tuesday afternoon will be too late for publication.

3. Say something in your press statements that is newsworthy. If a reporter becomes accustomed to receiving press releases from you that do not merit news attention, the reporter may dismiss all of your future press releases without even reading them. The same is true for your prospective readers.

4. Try to limit your press release to one page that summarizes the major points or issues and their significance.

5. Prepare timely press releases. Do not send out a release a week after an event. The press is not going to print or broadcast it. Likewise,

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do not send out a release so far in advance that the recipients forget about the event before it occurs.

6. Use vivid language in the press release. Quotations are valuable especially in press and television.

7. If possible, supply the newspaper media outlets with good quality photographs of events, fully explaining what is depicted (e.g., the names of those appearing in the photo, the date, location and nature of the event.) Many newspapers are more likely to use a press release if it is accompanied by a picture.

8. Follow-up on your press releases. Call those to whom the press release was sent to make sure they received it. Before an event, inquire whether someone from the news organization will be able to attend. After an event, contact the press who attended to answer any questions and emphasize important points or issues.

9. Develop relationships and good rapport with individual reporters at the news organizations. Such contact is a fundamental element of success.

10. In all press releases, be sure to list the name of your public information officer and the telephone number/address at which he or she can be contacted.

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Logistics

This Handbook describes many activities that your monitoring operation may attempt to execute. As previous sections suggest, developing an organization and a good plan are important preliminary steps. Logistics touch every aspect of preparing for and implementing the various components of your plan, as outlined in the following steps. (See Definition 7)

First, you should consider designating a logistics officer or logistics office in your organization to take responsibility for all relevant planning and supervision. Individuals in the logistics office should, ideally, have experience in organizing large events and have working knowledge of basic communications and transportation systems. Most aspects of logistics have significant budget implications, thus it is also a good idea to encourage close cooperation between the logistics and accounting or budgeting offices. Similarly, since the execution of every activity both emanates from and impacts upon the general plan, you should ensure that the logistics office attends planning discussions and reports any logistical successes or failures in the operation.

You must consider three fundamental components of logistics: (1) communication; (2) transportation; and (3) accommodation (i.e., meals and lodging). When developing or using your communication, transportation and accommodation resources, you should determine the following:

1. What quantity of each is needed?
2. How much will it cost?
3. What are the procedures that must be followed to prepare for and use the resource?
4. What are the restrictions on their use?
5. What timeframes or deadlines apply? and
6. Whom should you contact (e.g., the driver, the hotel keeper, the caterer, etc.) regarding their use and how can they be reached?

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Communication

Communication is perhaps the single most important capability your monitoring operation needs in order to be successful. It is at the heart of your ability to invite regional field coordinators to a meeting, to receive urgent reports of election problems, or to draft a press release to announce your findings. With regard to most communications, the public
information office should decide what information needs to be shared and all the details about how and when it should be disseminated. Similarly, managers at the headquarters and in the field can take responsibility for knowing what they need to communicate and how they want to do it. But they and everyone else in your organization must first have access to a system by which to communicate. It is a principal job of the logistics office to develop and maintain the infrastructure and essential information (e.g., names and telephone numbers, etc.) of the communications system.

First, you must identify everyone with whom you need to communicate and where they can be reached. In the beginning stages of the monitoring plan, you should collect the names and essential information (e.g., telephone number, address, etc.) of your steering committee members, staff and volunteers as well as representatives of the government, political parties, media and other civic organizations. Record this information so that it is secure but easy to retrieve. Where available, simple computer data bases are commonly used for this purpose.

Second, establish a comprehensive system by which participants in your operation can communicate. A partial list of mechanisms you might use in this system includes: telephone, facsimile (fax), electronic mail (by modem), regular mail, delivery services, foot and bicycle messengers, public address systems, as well as reproduction for printed materials (photocopying) and the various channels described in Section L, Public Information. Specialized communication systems such as those used for interpretation (verbal) or translation (written) and for mobile communication (e.g., two-way radio and cellular telephone) may also be helpful.

An efficient system may also include procedures by which individuals communicate with each other. For example, some organizations create a procedure called the telephone tree (referring to the trunk, which leads to the branches, which connect to the small twigs of a tree). Under this procedure, one person (at the bottom of the tree) initiates the communication of a message to five members of the operation. Each of these five is instructed to contact five others, who in turn are instructed to repeat the process, and so on. The key to making the telephone tree work is assuring that each person has a mechanism for communicating (e.g., a telephone or a means of transporting the individual to make a personal contact) and knows where the next person can be contacted (e.g., their telephone number or address). The tree can be used in reverse to pass information to your central headquarters when large numbers of volunteers are in action, such as on election day.

Constraints of technology, infrastructure and budget are important considerations. For example, dedicating resources to buy fax machines is not a good plan in a country where the telephones do not work well. And computers are worthless if you do not also have the proper software or trained personnel to operate them. Complexity and high cost are not the best indicators of a good communication system; mechanisms that provide speed, accuracy and reliability of communication will serve your needs better and may save you money.

**TRANSPORTATION** In addition to being able to communicate, a successful election monitoring effort must have the capacity to transport materials and people. For example, transportation is needed for delivering recruitment materials to regional headquarters, taking observers to voting stations or flying trainers to remote parts of the country.

You should begin by identifying your transportation needs. Thus it may be useful to refer to, or develop, a calendar of events as discussed in Section B, General Plan, to determine what type, frequency and quantity of transportation is contemplated for the execution of the general plan. Activities such as recruitment, training, and election-day monitoring often place heavy reliance on transportation.

Modes of transportation can be expensive and hard to find, particularly in less economically developed countries. Therefore, you should develop an inventory of the resources available to you. First, plan to make use of any means of

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28 See Section L, Public Information and Section Y, Post-Election Reporting.
29 See also Section B, A General Plan, for the discussion on budgeting.
transportation that are available free of charge (e.g., walking, bicycling, sharing a ride, borrowing temporarily donated vehicles or using volunteers' vehicles). Next, consider how public transportation can meet your needs. Taxis, buses, boats, subways and trains are relatively inexpensive options, though with regard to scheduling or availability they lack the flexibility and reliability of other means. Finally, you must decide what should be purchased or rented. This approach initially appears to require significant funds, but it may be the most economical approach if you require frequent use, flexible application or continuous availability.

Also, try to efficiently match the type of transportation needed with the demands of the duty. For example, you may need a four-wheel-drive vehicle to carry trainers into rural regions, but not to carry messages between city blocks.

**ACCOMMODATION** As already noted, executing an election monitoring effort can entail working long hours and travelling long distances. In cases where travel takes people away from home, you must be prepared to provide lodging for the night and adequate meals.

For example, when trainers make a circuit through the regional capitals in the country, they may be away from home for two or three weeks. The inexpensive solution for lodging is to find members or supporters of the monitoring effort who can make available extra rooms in their homes. Where free lodging is not an option, you may need to reserve hotel rooms.

Accommodations are also needed for meetings. Thus, you will need to identify and reserve the use of spaces in which to hold conferences, training workshops, recruitment rallies and strategy meetings. For large meetings, monitoring groups often use auditoriums, school rooms, conference halls in major hotels and in government buildings, and outdoor spaces such as soccer fields or village squares.

Where the monitors' duties keep them busy through normal meal times, monitoring operations sometimes provide food or reimbursement for the cost of purchased meals. The traditions regarding this practice vary among countries, and many organizations do not have enough money to pay for food. You will have to decide what you can afford and what is a fair policy. Experience from around the world has shown that if there is any misunderstanding about your policy or any inconsistency in its application, no matter how minor, volunteers can become extremely upset. Thus you should seriously consider developing and communicating a policy to all workers in advance of their activities, and apply the policy equitably and consistently. (See Illustration 15)

Finally, a good logistics operation contains a contingency plan for the possibility of systems or procedures that fail to work as you had hoped or expected. (See Definition 8)

Contingency plans should anticipate any number of potential problems that can undermine the logistical stability of the monitoring effort.

**Illustration 15**
At the 1994 elections in South Africa, the domestic monitoring group NEON nearly ceased to function during the critical period of the election count. Some NEON volunteers, many of whom had risked their lives in carrying out their monitoring duties, believed that NEON's leaders had promised to pay certain wages and/or food expenses. After the voting (and after much of the monitoring), when the leaders explained that this understanding was not correct, many volunteers were so disappointed and angry that they went on strike. NEON's reputation and credibility were severely damaged when the strike became violent.

**contingency plan**
A contingency plan is a plan of activities to pursue if unexpected or unforeseen circumstances arise.

**Definition 8**
from election to election. In some countries, international organizations recruit, train and deploy indigenous individuals who work under the auspices of the international group. In other countries, international organizations may provide financial or technical support to the formation of a domestic monitoring group, which then operates as a fully autonomous entity. The domestic group may or may not choose to coordinate monitoring activities with its international supporters. Finally, some international observers adopt a detached attitude toward domestic monitoring groups. In these situations, the coordination between international and domestic groups may be limited to sharing reports.

You should be aware that in some circumstances coordination may compromise your monitoring group's independence and impartiality. This can occur if any of the organizations with which you are coordinating is too partisan, is not committed to conducting a quality operation, or has a tendency to employ undemocratic procedures to manage its operation. In these situations you must take steps to avoid damaging the credibility of your own institution, which may mean withdrawing your participation from the coordinated effort.

EXAMPLES OF SECURITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

- All monitors should report threats of intimidation or violence to the executive director (and/or to the police).
- The executive director should pursue all reports of intimidation or violence with the police.
- Monitors should immediately remove themselves from potentially dangerous environments and call their supervisor for further instruction.
- Where the police or government authorities are the source of the problem, their activities and their enforcement (or lack of enforcement) of complaints should be monitored and reported to the media and international institutions.

Transition elections often occur in volatile environments. A polarized political setting, a tradition of violence or recent armed conflict in the region may heighten concerns about the safety of those participating in the electoral process, including domestic monitors.

For the monitoring group, security issues may raise difficult policy dilemmas. For example, publicizing the presence of monitors and challenging irregularities are activities that help promote confidence in the election process. However, accomplishing these goals may require exposing volunteers to danger. Monitors should be aware that their findings, in some circumstances, could be viewed as embarrassing or even incriminating by individuals and the institutions they represent. In order to prevent monitors from publicizing their findings, individuals or groups may attempt to intimidate or incapacitate the monitors.

There is no simple solution to this dilemma. You can, however, take steps to avoid security problems and to handle these situations prudently when they arise. First, do not pretend the issue does not exist. If you have reason to believe there are potentially dangerous situations that your monitors will face, you should discuss the issue. The discussion must begin in the committee of directors, who should adopt relevant policies and procedures. (See Examples, at left.)

You should then communicate and reinforce the policies and procedures that are adopted to all members of your operation. Include a discussion of the relevant information in your training manual, training workshops, and in your conversations with individual monitors. They need to know how to identify a potential problem and how they want them to respond. You may also choose to establish channels of communication between your operation and the local, regional and national offices of the security forces. At a minimum, you should give monitors a telephone number to call in the case of an emergency. (See Illustration 18)
Security issues are also relevant to evaluating the freedom with which candidates campaign, voters vote and election officials administer. How you can monitor the effect of security and intimidation on these activities is discussed more fully in Sections P–S, U and V.

The Albanian Society for Democratic Culture (SDC) encountered problems with voter intimidation in the 1994 by-elections. SDC monitors documented the incidents in the face of personal threats. Following election day, SDC members received several communications attempting to discourage the group from releasing its findings. SDC carefully considered the potential consequences for individual members and took precautions to protect them (as well as sources of information who wished to remain anonymous). Then, SDC leaders concluded that the importance of releasing the information in a balanced and professional manner outweighed the risks and demonstrated the group’s resilience in the face of intimidation and outside pressures. In a preemptive maneuver, SDC also mobilized support from NDI and others to demonstrate international solidarity in support of the safety of SDC members. SDC then held a press conference to release its uncensored statement on the elections.
Election System

The system used to determine who wins and who loses in an election (i.e., seat allocation methods, including proportional representation, majoritarian, mixed, etc.) is one of the most significant aspects of an election. The seat allocation method influences the political process and the government that will emerge. The structure and rules (sometimes called the election framework) by which the election system is implemented, enforced and reviewed have an equally important impact.

With regard to the election system, monitors should consider, early in the process, developing a plan to:

1. assess the election system as it is designed in the abstract (i.e., as it is theoretically supposed to operate according to written laws and regulations);
2. evaluate the election system as it operates, in practice; and
3. advocate improvements, as appropriate, through legislative and/or regulatory amendments to the system.

This section provides a framework for discussing points 1 and 3 above. Suggestions about how to evaluate the election system as it operates in practice are treated in Sections Q.-X.

You should begin an assessment of an election system by studying the relevant laws and regulations in your country. These domestic laws can be found in your country's constitution, statutory provisions (e.g., election law, political party law, media law, criminal code and rules of procedure, etc.) and legal judgments. These laws generally contain the rules that govern:

1. seat allocation;
2. designation of election administrators;
3. delimitation of election districts;
4. registration of voters;
5. registration of political parties and their candidates;
6. campaign practices, including use of the media, financing of campaigns and utilization of state resources;
7. balloting and counting procedures;
8. processing and reviewing complaints and appealing judgments; and
9. election monitoring.
Assign a small team in your organization to read these rules and, if necessary, request further explanation and interpretation from lawyers or responsible government officials.

Once you have analyzed the structure and rules, consider whether the election system, as it is designed in the abstract, is likely to produce a legitimate process. First, evaluate whether the election scheme is reasonable from a logistical standpoint. For example, list all of the deadlines in the election calendar and determine if the voters can be registered, election materials can be printed and delivered, the officials trained, and the campaign completed in the time allowed.

Next, compare the election law provisions with the legal norms of the local jurisdiction. For example, if there is a provision restricting political rallies, does this restriction violate any provisions of the country’s constitution?

Also compare these provisions with internationally accepted standards. You can find selected provisions of the major human rights instruments enumerated in Appendix I. International standards may also be found in the official judgments or resolutions made by the international governmental organizations and by domestic courts of various countries.

From your analysis, you may conclude that legal or regulatory reform is appropriate in order to enhance the fairness and transparency of the electoral process. You may also decide to convene a roundtable conference or seminar with government officials and/or political party representatives to discuss potential electoral reforms, discussed further in the sub-section on advocacy, below.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES  

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a common starting point for discussing international standards for evaluating elections, states in relevant part:

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his [or her] country directly or through freely chosen representatives . . . .

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote . . . .

There is no universal rule defining how these broad international standards apply to individual assessments of a given election. Nonetheless, one commonly used approach identifies, in the abstract, minimum conditions that satisfy the principles of a free, fair and genuine election. The book, *Guidelines for International Election Observing* 31 offers a concise enumeration of such minimum conditions:

1. no unreasonable restrictions are imposed on parties or voters;
2. participants (representing the government, the military, the political parties and others) respect the rights of free expression, free association, and free assembly for a period adequate to allow political organizing and campaigning, and to inform citizens about the candidates and the issues;
3. adequate guarantees of a secret vote and freedom from intimidation are provided; and
4. the integrity of the balloting and counting processes is secured.

This list can be expanded to include broad principles that are essential to an election’s legitimacy. These principles include:

5. *non-discrimination* in the treatment of political contestants, voter eligibility and other political rights;
6. *due process*, including legislative, regulatory and judicial procedures that provide notice, hearings and appeals, that protect against arbitrary or biased rulings and that provide an effective remedy for the abridgement of protected rights; and
7. *good faith efforts* to ensure the integrity and credibility of the electoral process, including

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assurances that there is transparency in the process and that voters understand their rights, the choices being presented and the voting procedures.

Election systems should not violate any of these fundamental principles. In particular, the principle of non-discrimination requires that every vote should carry approximately equivalent value. The maxim ‘one person, one vote’ should be guaranteed by provisions that recognize the universality of the right to vote and that ensure each vote carries approximately the same value. For example, regarding universality of the franchise you should evaluate whether the election law limits electoral participation on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property ownership, birth or other status.32

The framework of the election system should be designed to assure that the election is credibly implemented or administered and that the public has confidence in the system. To achieve this objective, an election system must have a mechanism for appointing election officials that will administer the elections with impartiality and independence. Where impartiality is in doubt, the system should provide other mechanisms to bolster the credibility of the process.

Allocating balanced representation of diverse political interests to election commissions and review bodies is one commonly used remedy where impartiality is in question. Another, complementary solution involves creating a system of checks and balances whereby the election commission is subject to review by independent legislative, judicial and/or monitoring bodies. The degree to which an election process is open to review by monitors is called the level of transparency. A system that is characterized by a high level of transparency creates strong incentives for election officials to administer the process fairly and, more important, fosters confidence among the voters and contestants. You should review the level of transparency as well as the issues of impartiality, independence, balanced representation and checks and balances when evaluating the design of an election system.

Guarantees of due process are also essential to ensuring an election process that is fairly administered. For every significant aspect of an election process, the election system should provide procedures, in the election code, in other laws, or in regulations that offer the ingredients of due process. These include:

1. notice of important deadlines, of procedures to register as a candidate or voter, of procedures for voting, of changes in the law, and other important matters;
2. a hearing, or opportunity to be heard, in order to present views, arguments or important facts before an administrative ruling or adoption of election regulations;
3. an opportunity for independent review of important rulings or decisions, including established criteria, standards and procedures that govern appeals and ensure timely rulings; and
4. an effective remedy for redressing any abridgment of political, participatory or electoral rights.

ADVOCACY Your election monitoring group’s contribution to the electoral process will be limited if your country’s legal framework is so flawed that it precludes the possibility of competitive, meaningful and transparent elections. Thus, if your scrutiny of the election system identifies significant defects, you should advocate changes with the government, the legislature or the election administrators. For example, laws authorizing domestic monitors to enter voting and counting stations and to be given access to other important stages of the election process are important to your efforts. (See Illustration 19 and Appendix 1)

The ability of your monitoring group to influence the design and operation of the election system may require recruiting lawyers, public policy advocates, election experts and others who have access to decisionmakers in the government. Mobilizing public opinion on the subject—through the media, rallies and letter-writing

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See also Section R., Registration of Voters, Political Parties and Candidates.
campaigns—is another important means for initiating change.

You should try to list your concerns about the election law in order of priority. Prioritizing your concerns helps you avoid expending resources on insignificant issues and will enable you to develop specific strategies. Draw distinctions between flaws that are so serious they will prevent a meaningful election and other issues where the imperfections will not materially affect the outcome.

In Romania, before the September 1992 national elections, a lobbying campaign by volunteers of several nonpartisan groups, coupled with expressions of concern from the international community, helped convince the legislature to adopt legal provisions enabling domestic monitors to enter voting stations.

By contrast, as noted earlier, nonpartisan monitors in Yemen were effectively barred from most voting stations on election day and instead could only evaluate the elections based on interviews conducted outside of the voting stations.

Voters receive information about their democratic rights and about elections through civic education generally and voter education more specifically. The national election commission, certain government ministries, government-controlled media, the political parties and civic organizations typically assume responsibility for providing voter education.

The cumulative effect of all voter education in an election should be evaluated by the degree to which pertinent information is reasonably available to all eligible voters in a form they can comprehend, and in a timely fashion (i.e., allowing a reasonable time for the audience to make use of the information). You should also attempt to assess whether this information adequately discusses essential facts, procedures, rights and issues.

There are no fast and simple methods by which to make these evaluations. To do so, you need to determine the level of voter understanding about the election. You must also determine whether their lack of understanding is of such a pervasive or profound nature that the election results might not reflect the true will of the people. Lack of voter understanding may be manifested by an unusually low level of voter participation or by a large number of improperly cast ballots (also called null or spoiled ballots). A public opinion survey, which collects information from a representative cross-section of the voting population, is a technique you may use to make these determinations.

You may find that the cumulative impact of existing voter education programs is inadequate. This deficiency often occurs because governments and election commissions lack the resources or commitment to implement impartial voter education programs or because their existing communications about voter education are ineffective or misleading. Another common explanation is that governments fail to allow enough time in the election schedule for the development and execution of voter education programs.

In these circumstances, your domestic monitoring group may conduct its own voter education program. If you consider conducting a
more comprehensive voter education program, you should also consider how it relates to your monitoring objectives. Specifically, to what extent will a voter education program take resources (financial, personnel and time) away from your monitoring efforts? Which activity is more important to the support of the democratic system in your country? For which activity are you better suited? Are other organizations planning to conduct voter education programs, and how will your programs complement or conflict with one another? Will your involvement as a provider of voter education create a conflict of interest that diminishes your ability to evaluate the election process objectively?

In a sense, all of your training and information-sharing can and should be considered valuable voter education. The knowledge the electorate gains about voting and monitoring as a result of your nationwide workshops, newsletters, public service announcements and news coverage helps voters to better understand their rights and the election process. Thus, you should not underestimate the value of your contribution, through the development of a monitoring operation, to the civic education of your fellow citizens.

VOTER REGISTRATION  Election systems require criteria and a mechanism for identifying eligible voters and preventing ineligible persons from voting. The mechanism is also used to guarantee the “one person, one vote” principle by preventing people from voting more than once or from voting in the wrong location.

The universal right “to take part in” government is directly affected by the eligibility/voter registration process. Specifically, since establishing a potential voter’s eligibility is often a prerequisite to voting, you should evaluate the process by which eligibility is determined, paying special attention to whether significant segments of the population are being disenfranchised (prevented from voting) by:

1. unreasonable criteria restricting eligibility, such as the use of distinctions based on race, color, gender, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, social group, past political affiliations, literacy, property ownership and ability to pay. Reasonable restrictions have included distinctions based on age, citizenship, residency and mental competence;
2. inadequate voter education about how potential voters may establish their eligibility;
3. failure to respect other guarantees of procedural due process, especially where there are no provisions for monitoring the process, verifying the registry’s accuracy or challenging rulings; and
4. intimidation that prevents or inhibits eligible citizens from learning about or engaging in the process.

The registration period offers an excellent opportunity to mobilize volunteers and assign them specific duties. These duties may include initiating a voter education campaign, monitoring the
conduct of government officials and political party supporters, and implementing a system to process complaints. Also, since the voter registration process is highly decentralized (often administered at local voting stations and municipal offices), it is analogous to the voting and counting processes. Therefore, by monitoring voter registration your staff and volunteers can gain first-hand experience directly relevant to their election-day plans.

First, you must research the system your country uses to determine voter eligibility. Various systems include:

1. no registration—voters establish their identity and eligibility at the voting site, on election day, by showing officials acceptable forms of identification (e.g., national identity card, driver’s license, passport, residence card, military service card, etc.);

2. registration (often called “registration”)—at a prescribed time and location (usually a municipal government building or the registrant’s residence), prospective voters establish their identity and eligibility to designated officials to have their names inscribed on a registration list.

Next, you should identify problems that occur, or are likely to occur, in the execution of voter registration. Below is a partial checklist of common problems associated with voter registration:

1. procedures that cause unreasonable difficulty for certain sectors of the population to register or obtain the identification card necessary for voting, including: limiting hours or days for registration; placing registration sites at inconvenient locations; levying fees; conducting literacy exams; or subjecting registrants to unfairly burdensome procedures such as presenting multiple identification cards or photographs, making multiple visits to the registration site, etc.;
2 inappropriate conduct of registration officials, committed either intentionally or accidentally, including: intimidating registrants; rejecting or deleting eligible voters; accepting ineligible registrants; fraudulently altering or improperly maintaining the list; failing to distribute voter's cards (also called registration cards or identification cards); etc.;

3 inaccurate lists, such as lists: that include the names of individuals who have died or left the constituency, fictitious individuals, or registrants who are listed more than once or are otherwise ineligible; that fail to include the names of eligible individuals who have properly applied to register; or that record registrant's names in ways making it impractical to locate them on the lists; and

4 failure to assure transparency in the registration process, as evidenced by restrictive regulations or recalcitrant officials who prevent monitors from analyzing the process in a timely manner.

There are other good reasons to monitor the registration process. In addition to causing problems on election day, inaccurate voter lists may also affect adversely other aspects of the election process. For example, in many countries political parties develop their campaign strategy using registration data. Also, constituency boundaries and the number of seats assigned to each constituency are influenced by census and registration information. The location of polling sites and the distribution plan for ballots are similarly determined by information collected during the registration process.

Below are some techniques you may use to evaluate the registration process:

1 deploy volunteers to monitor the registration activities throughout the country, particularly in areas where your research indicates that there is a high probability of problems;

2 verify the accuracy of the information on the voter lists (e.g., by selecting a statistically significant sample of names and then determining, through interviews or other research, if the information is correct);

3 compare voter lists from previous elections with the current list to identify statistical anomalies (e.g., extreme changes in the number of registrants for one political party or in one region);

4 review the lists, visually or by computer, to determine duplicate registrations and the registration of ineligible voters; and

5 provide training and civic education to others about how to conduct techniques 1-4, above.

The first, second and the fifth techniques require considerable time and personnel, but they also afford the best opportunity to develop and test a national network. The third and fourth techniques can be accomplished in the central headquarters, without deploying any personnel to the field. In some countries the central election authority provides a computerized registration list to political parties or observers so they can independently verify the accuracy of the lists.

**Political Party and Candidate Registration**

The issues involved in the processes of registering (also sometimes referred to as accrediting or determining eligibility of) political parties and candidates are similar to those for voters. Of paramount concern is the right "to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, and to be elected at genuine, periodic elections." This right lies at the root of determining whether an election provides a meaningful opportunity for candidates to present competing options and for voters to choose among them.

Restrictions on who can form a party and who can compete in elections for government office are considered reasonable if they do not unjustly discriminate. Historically, only certain types of limits have met this test. For example, concerns about security are one commonly cited justification for denying participation to specific political parties or candidates. The desire to

33 Article 25, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Appendix I.

34 See, e.g., Article 24, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Condition of the OSCE in Appendix I.

35 The international standard of proportionality, however, generally holds that a ban on a party's electoral participation is justified only against those who espouse violence to overthrow the government or undermine the territorial integrity of a state. See also, ibid.
assure effective governance by inhibiting a proliferation of parties has also been used to justify restricting party registration. This justification, however, must be applied with considerable care in a country emerging from a nondemocratic past, where the establishment of new political parties or independent candidates is a goal of the electoral exercise.

When monitoring party and candidate registration, you should try to identify any arbitrary or discriminatory application of the law; evidence of such administration indicates a violation of international norms. Improper administration includes instances where candidates are not given adequate notice of the deadlines or the procedures required to apply for candidacy or cases where the requirements (such as collecting signatures or paying a deposit) are unreasonably arduous or discriminatory. Also, when applications for candidacy are rejected, you should examine the appeals process to determine whether there are adequate provisions for a hearing and independent review.

During the election campaign period, partisanship is pervasive as each electoral contestant competes to ensure his or her own victory. Such partisanship often produces robust competition that is typical of a healthy democracy. Sometimes, however, the competition results in abuse and injustice which, in the pre-election period, may have a substantial or even decisive effect on the outcome of an election. A failure to define and enforce the parameters of competition can result in conduct that is contrary to a fair and genuine election. Therefore, you should seriously consider monitoring the campaign period.

This section discusses how to monitor three broad aspects of the election campaign: (1) resources; (2) intimidation; and (3) enforcement and independent review. Media access and media coverage, extremely influential factors in a campaign, are addressed in the following section. The General Principles and Issues subsection identifies major issues and activities inherent in the election campaign as they relate to the internationally recognized freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement. It also reviews the standards by which these issues should be analyzed. Suggestions on how to collect and analyze information are provided in the following subsection entitled Specific Monitoring Techniques.

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES**

Often, in order to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of an election process, you must assess whether the process has provided a "level playing field" and an opportunity for a genuine and/or meaningful expression of the will of the electorate.

The level playing field metaphor is used to describe a process that protects equal treatment and fair opportunity. It is evaluated by considering, among other issues:

1. the degree to which competitors are afforded equitable access to resources (e.g., finances and material resources, media access and news coverage);
2. the effective compliance with, enforcement of and review of the election law (especially in terms of non-discrimination and good-faith application).

The terms "genuine" and "meaningful" are standards used to evaluate other essential components in the campaign period, including:

1. the freedom and capacity candidates have to convey their programs to the voters;
2. the adequacy of the voters' understanding about the process (e.g., how to register, where to vote, how to mark a ballot, etc.) and the substantive issues subject to the vote; and
3. the freedom voters perceive they have to choose and express, independent of anyone else's wishes and in full secrecy, their preference at the ballot box.

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30 See Section F, Media. For further discussion on related pre-election period activities see also Section P, Election System, Section Q, Civic and Voter Education, and Section R, Registration of Voters, Political Parties and Candidates.
Resources

Both the administrators and the competitors in an election need resources. If certain resources are not available in adequate and equitable proportions, an election’s fairness may be called into question.

The most valuable resource during an election is time. Election officials need time to: choose an election system; organize logistics; train and deploy officials and security forces; ensure a minimum level of voter education; develop a voter registry or other means of verifying voter eligibility; register candidates; prepare and distribute materials; accept, count and tabulate votes and announce results; and review complaints.

Political contestants (e.g., parties, candidates, competing sides in a referendum or plebiscite) need time in order to: develop an organizational structure and message; nominate and train candidates; collect financial and material resources; train and deploy supporters; conduct campaigns and promote voter education and participation; and organize an effective monitoring operation.37

Another valuable election resource is money. Often referred to in the election context as finance or campaign finance, money is needed to: pay salaries; establish offices; purchase media time or space; produce campaign materials; provide transportation, communication and other campaign support; distribute voter education materials; etc.38 Resources (including labor, commodities or media access) that are contributed, without compensation, to a campaign are equally valuable.

Many election systems regulate campaign finance by dividing it into two categories: contributions (money coming in) and expenditures (money going out).

The amount and the sources of individual contributions are often restricted. (See Illustration 20)

Campaign expenditures can also be regulated, although with the exception of criminal uses, most countries place fewer restrictions on expenditures than on contributions.

Campaign finance regulations often require candidates or their political parties to maintain and disclose financial records. Where such requirements exist, they commonly seek information about the source of the contribution (or object of the expenditure), and the amount and the date of the transaction. If you intend to monitor campaign finance, you should attempt to determine if the financial reports are complete, accurate and issued according to the prescribed deadlines. You can also monitor how the governing authority is enforcing the campaign finance regulations. On this matter, it is important that you evaluate whether candidates are being treated equally and the degree to which the law is being administered in a timely fashion.

Another possible object of monitoring is the distribution of campaign resources by the government. In some cases, governments automatically grant each registered electoral contestant resources such as offices, telephones and money for use in the election campaign. You might initially consider whether resources are distributed equitably and in a timely manner and whether these resources are adequate to conduct a fair campaign. Funds may be distributed equally to contestants or may be distributed based upon some criteria, such as the amount of money independently collected or the number of signatures the contestant has independently collected. In these situations, you should analyze:

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37 See Section P, Election System, for suggestions of how to assess the election calendar and monitor levels of administrative preparedness.

38 Section Q, Civic and Voter Education offers recommendations about how to monitor the adequacy of voter education.
1. whether the criteria are objective and clearly defined;
2. whether the criteria are reasonable and fair;
3. whether the criteria are administered similarly for all contestants; and
4. whether the resources are distributed in amounts and at times that do not unfairly disadvantage any contestants. (See Illustration 21.)

Many election systems attempt to limit the use of government property and the activity of government employees. Monitoring how these perquisites of government are used represents yet another important task. In a democracy, it is the generally accepted rule that government property and civil servants’ salaries are paid for, and belong to, all the inhabitants of the country on an equal basis. Thus, government vehicles, office space and telecommunications should not be used for partisan purposes unless equitable access is provided to other contestants. Similarly, guidelines should strive to ensure that government-controlled media only provides news coverage of government activities and government officials that are truly newsworthy.

Moreover, government officials directly involved in administering elections (e.g., election commissioners, voting station officials, judges and security forces) have a special obligation to maintain impartiality. In light of the actual and the psychological impact of their conduct on the electorate, these officials should conduct their activities in such a way that their impartiality cannot reasonably be doubted. Other government employees, those who are not directly involved in election administration, should not use their official authority or influence to interfere with the election process. No government official should participate in partisan activity while on duty. If these standards are not established by domestic law or regulation, you may want to consider advocating their adoption in an electoral reform program.

The use of patronage, public works and similar programs for electoral advantage represents another area of potentially improper governmental action. While it is difficult to identify and measure the effects of manipulating job creation, anti-poverty and similar programs to create an electoral advantage, you might consider documenting whether government officials who administer such programs are providing benefits in the name of a political party rather than in the name of the government. It is also possible to document the initiation of public works projects in exchange for support at the ballot box, particularly where such projects are awarded during or just prior to the election period. Accurate and objective documentation and analysis of such actions can illustrate their potential or even likely effects on election results.

Intimidation and Coercion

The importance of impartial behavior increases in situations where the ruling party or the military has played a dominant role in government and might unfairly influence...
participation in the election by means of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation and coercion—whether perpetrated by the armed forces, government officials, paramilitary groups or supporters of a political party—produce psychological and sociological effects constituting a deterrent to free voting. Where such a phenomenon exists, only the most aggressive reassurances coupled with direct protective measures by a government can overcome the fear people feel.

Since the presence and reports of impartial domestic and international observers can be an effective deterrent against intimidation, coercion and breaches of impartiality, you should consider monitoring the activities of those who might potentially cause intimidation during the pre-election period. Where problems have already occurred, monitors should request or initiate administrative and/or judicial remedies.

The effects of intimidation and coercion are not easy to measure. If you systematically investigate, measure and record allegations, however, it is possible to ascertain who has perpetrated such acts and whether they have deterred or prevented:

1. candidates from campaigning;
2. voters from registering;
3. voters from casting their ballots;
4. voters from casting their ballots according to their personal preference; or
5. election officials from enforcing the electoral law.

There are several manifestations of intimidation and coercion that are relevant for your monitoring, including:

1. physical violence, which includes murder, kidnap, torture, drive-by shootings, bombings, beatings, assaults and damage to property;
2. threats of physical violence, including the mere presence of security or paramilitary forces in sensitive environments (e.g., political rallies, registration tables, voting stations, counting centers, etc.) that unreasonably intimidate sectors of the population;
3. cultural or social pressures that the election system addresses inadequately (such as those felt by women or minority groups in certain societies);
4. threats of financial hardship, including loss of employment, loss of land or housing subsidies or other financial benefits for failing to vote in accordance with the wishes of their employer or a government functionary;
5. other abuses of authority, such as acts designed to demonstrate a candidate’s inability to protect the well-being of his or her supporters or secure basic infrastructural amenities (e.g., cutting telephone or electricity lines); and
6. deliberate failure to protect political contestants, campaigners and/or prospective voters against any of the foregoing.

For purposes of evaluating intimidation, you should attempt to measure the relative impact of any irregularity or abuse to determine its magnitude and its potential effect. You may find it helpful to classify irregularities or abuses in varying degrees of seriousness, such as: (a) minor; (b) significant, but not likely to affect the outcome of the vote; or
(c) serious, materially affecting the outcome of the election. You might also try to determine whether the problem was the product of an innocent mistake or an intentional, willful act. Consideration should also be given as to whether the problems disproportionately affected a particular party. Remember that your findings should be objective, accurate and, to the extent possible, verifiable.

Sometimes the effects of intimidation or coercion can be quantified (e.g., where a number of individuals testify their votes were coerced) or can be clearly defined (e.g., where certain political contestants are prevented from campaigning in a particular geographic area). In other cases, quantifying the effect is difficult, such as when hundreds of voters, whose preferences are unknown, are scared away from the polls, or when certain candidates are prevented generally from campaigning as much as they would like.

**Enforcement and The Review Process**

An important issue in the campaign period is the effectiveness of government officials, security forces and the judicial system in the enforcement of election laws. Law enforcement institutions have an affirmative obligation to take steps to prevent violations of the guiding principles of free expression, free association, free assembly, non-discrimination and due process and the attendant election laws. Whenever there is reason to believe that these rights or laws have been violated, authorities should investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute. This obligation is heightened during an election period. Any omission, unequal treatment or abuse of authority by the body whose duty it is to enforce election laws poses a serious threat to an election’s legitimacy and may cause voters to doubt that the system will protect their rights.

You should attempt to determine whether enforcement problems materially affect the election campaign and the election outcome. Your evaluation should attempt to determine if these problems have had a disproportionate effect on certain political contestants and, if so, whether the effect is significant. When evaluating the cause of enforcement problems you may find that ineffective enforcement is the result of unintentional oversights, inadequate resources or inexperience. While these factors do not excuse ineffective enforcement, your conclusions regarding fraudulent actions and your recommendations should take such findings into account.

The review process is designed to protect the integrity of the election system from improper administration and ineffective enforcement. The review process serves as an essential factor in guaranteeing fairness. It is often the final peaceful arbiter of disputes. It therefore should be monitored like all other major components of an election system. (See Definition 9)
You should assess, as a preliminary issue, whether the authorities engaged in the review process are independent. Rule of law standards suggest that a credible review mechanism should be independent from the influence or control of the authority whose initial decision is being challenged. Therefore, after complaints are decided by an election commission or election official, in the first instance, a higher authority should be available to review appeals from that decision. The higher reviewing authority should be an appellate level court or similarly independent commission where fundamental rights and other significant issues are considered. Rulings should also be reviewable in a timely fashion, and in the first instance, as well as upon appeal, the reviewing body must be endowed with the power to order effective remedies. Useful indicators as to the level of independence in the review process include: the terms of tenure for members of the review authority; the degree of autonomy of the institution; and the supreme authority of its decisions.

A second issue is whether the review mechanism is impartial. Evidence of the following may suggest that impartiality is in question, and should therefore be a potential object of your monitoring:

1. the authority to select members of the review body does not provide for multiparty input and/or is not subject to checks and balances by independent institutions;
2. the ultimate composition of review bodies results in voting majorities loyal to one political party;
3. individual members who purport to be independent have ties to partisan interests (i.e., a review body drawn from members of the judiciary might be considered partisan if they were all appointed to their judicial positions by the same party or if the judiciary suffers from a reputation of not being independent); or
4. a significant number of members of the review body have conflicts of interest, either partisan or economic.

Third, the review process should provide the same guarantees of due process discussed above concerning administration of elections. Procedures for complaints, challenges and appeals should be expressly enumerated in the election law. In particular:

1. deadlines for filing complaints should be reasonable;
2. the opportunity to file should be available to interested political contestants and prospective voters;
3. the right to appeal important decisions should be available according to reasonable criteria and standards of review that are applied equally and consistently;
4. this appeal should be available in an independent court of law or other competent independent body with jurisdiction to hand down effective remedies;
5. decisions should be made in a timely manner so as to provide an effective remedy; and
6. decisions should be recorded and made public.

Specific Monitoring Techniques To meet the goals of detecting and deterring campaign problems, your strategy for monitoring should consider pursuing some or all of the following activities:

1. deploying monitors to sites where problems are likely to occur (e.g., campaign rallies);
2. preparing and distributing written materials and organizing workshops or similar programs for voters, party workers and candidates so they know their rights and obligations as well as how to seek remedies if their rights are violated;
3. offering your organization as a focal point to which citizens and political contestants may report electoral abuse;
4. submitting complaints concerning campaign abuses and/or assisting citizens in filing complaints, where appropriate;
5. monitoring the response of law enforcement or other authorities in preventing violence.

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41 See also Section 8, Election System.
intimidation and coercion, investigating and prosecuting such abuses and providing effective remedies to those affected by such abuses; and

6 preparing and publishing reports describing the different types of campaign problems.

Monitors should be instructed to complete a standardized form in order to make the evaluation process more objective and to expedite compilation of information. **Emphasis must be placed on compiling accurate and verifiable information.** The form should record the following:

1 the name, address and telephone number of the complaining person;
2 the name and/or position of the person responsible for the alleged abuse;
3 a brief description setting forth the nature of the complaint (e.g., intimidating candidates, misusing government resources, disrupting campaign meetings, etc.) and a summary of the circumstances surrounding the complaint (e.g., the date, time and location of relevant events);
4 the names of any witnesses and information about how they can be contacted; and
5 the status of the complaint or appeal, including the official response of responsible government authorities.

In addition, the form should provide space for the monitor to indicate the nature of the investigation conducted in response to the complaint and the date(s) of further contact with the complainant to gather more information or to report on the status of the investigation. Where an individual fears retribution for having filed the complaint, the complainant’s identity should be kept confidential.

In situations where you decide to conduct your own investigation into a matter, you must exercise care. Fairness dictates that individuals accused of wrongdoing be offered the opportunity to explain their perspective on the controversy. The inquiry should be undertaken without prejudice. In many instances, placing emphasis on resolving the problem rather than assigning blame may be appropriate.

Often, the nature of an allegation will require you to consider whether official representatives—police, prosecutors, election or government officials—have responded to a specific complaint. In these circumstances, you should contact the appropriate officials, determine whether a complaint was filed, whether action was taken in response to the complaint, and other relevant information. Sometimes, the fact that you are making an inquiry will suffice to stimulate a more aggressive investigation by the government authorities. On the other hand, an official’s failure to respond to a properly filed complaint may be an indication of the government’s lack of commitment to prevent similar incidents.

You may decide to establish a team of lawyers and others to specialize in monitoring the complaint process. You may also ask such a team to assist citizens in filing complaints or even to file complaints, where appropriate, in the name of your organization. Again, care must be exercised if you choose to assist citizens in filing complaints or if you decide to file complaints in the name of your organization. Keep in mind that the process of pursuing complaints may be time consuming and resource intensive, and, in some countries, the courts are either too corrupt or too slow to provide effective remedies for election-related problems. In these situations reliance on the courts may divert your resources from other, more fruitful, activities.

Moreover, you should remember that elections are a political process. Thus, pursuing solutions through political channels may be the most appropriate and effective approach to correcting the problems you encounter. Therefore, you may want to consider taking your case to audiences such as the media, the political parties or the international community rather than turning solely to the legal complaint process.

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The media play an essential role in contributing to a fair election. In a transition setting, the
situation is often complicated by the fact that the mass media outlets have been, or remain, government-controlled. Public broadcast media, where they exist, may not be truly independent, and even private media may be biased in favor of particular contestants.

Your monitoring group can play an important role in pressing for the elimination of censorship, more equitable distribution of media access for political contestants, fair news coverage of contestants and election issues, and adequate voter education through the media.\(^3\) Equally important, once the legal framework has been set, you should scrutinize the implementation of the sanctioned rules. For this purpose, you should assign a special team to assess media fairness.

Media monitoring has become a significant activity for domestic election monitors. The Mexican Academy for Human Rights, a member of Civic Alliance/Observation '94 (a coalition of more than 400 Mexican citizen organizations), issued a series of influential reports on media coverage of the 1994 Mexican elections. The Media Monitoring Project of South Africa not only reported on media behavior during the 1994 elections, but published a journal on the subject entitled Media Mask. NGOs in many other countries have added media monitoring to their election activities, while government oversight bodies and political parties also have begun to monitor media behavior during the election period. The discussion in this section is intended to be useful to media monitoring by any of these actors.

**General Considerations** There are four principal aspects to media monitoring. The first aspect concerns monitoring how the government acts to ensure the news media's right to gather and impart information and ideas. The second concerns how the government and the news media act to provide access to political contestants so that they may effectively communicate with the public during election campaign periods. The third concerns how the government and the media act to ensure fair and objective coverage of political contestants in news and information reporting. The fourth aspect concerns how the government and news media act to educate the electorate on how and why to vote.\(^4\)

**The Media's Right to Gather and Impart Information**

Media monitoring should begin with an analysis of government actions to ensure the media's right to gather and impart information. This analysis should focus upon the media's ability to criticize activities or inaction of the government and governing party, to investigate corruption and to operate independently of political pressures.\(^5\) A number of factors that may inhibit the media from performing these functions can be identified and documented by media monitors. Among such factors are the following.

**Direct government censorship and intervention, including:**

1. enjoining prior restraints, usually pursuant to law, on publication of material concerning certain subjects (often on grounds of national security and sometimes touching topics like redrawing national or internal boundaries);
2. banning media access for certain political parties and/or candidates;
3. refusing, by government-controlled media, to run stories about or advertisements by certain political contestants;
4. confiscating publications for political reasons;
5. closing media outlets for political reasons;
6. prosecuting journalists and/or publishers for sedition or other charges (such as libel) for carrying out legitimate professional activities;
7. imposing martial law or states of siege to curtail media activity in order to gain electoral advantage; and
8. using threats of any of these actions to gain electoral advantage.

**Indirect forms of censorship, including:**

1. government action or inaction that places journalists and/or publishers in fear for their

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\(^3\) See Section P, Election System, for more information on advocating changes in media rules. See Sandra Coliver and Patrick Meleo, *Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Transitional Democracies* (ARTICLE 19; London: 1994), for a comparative analysis of problems with radio and television access and news coverage in transition elections as well as international standards for avoiding such problems.

\(^4\) See also Section Q, Civic and Voter Education, for suggestions on monitoring voter and civic education activities.

\(^5\) The analysis should also consider significant developments affecting press freedoms in the country's recent history. This is necessary where such developments are likely to be reflected in the media's approach to election campaign reporting.
safety or for the security of their property; and

2. manipulating: (a) licensing of media outlets; (b) import licensing of equipment and/or supplies necessary to effectively run media outlets; and/or (c) government-controlled resources (such as newsprint or electricity), in order to gain electoral advantage.

**Intimidation and attacks on the news media** aimed at preventing the media from fulfilling their legitimate role in the electoral process, including:

1. government attacks on journalists, such as security forces physically beating them or firing on them, their vehicles or premises; and

2. arbitrary detention of journalists and publishers in order to interfere with their reporting on events pertinent to the election.

**Failure of the government to provide adequate protection** for journalists and publishers against intimidation and attacks by supporters of political parties or candidates and/or from political extremists, as well as failure to investigate such acts and to prosecute vigorously those responsible for such acts.

**Self-censorship** that is a consequence of attempts to avoid government censorship and intervention, indirect censorship or intimidation and attacks by nongovernmental forces aimed at preventing the media from fulfilling their legitimate role in the electoral process; self-censorship may also entail publishers or editors suppressing accurate information in order to favor a political contestant they support or to harm one they oppose.

In addition, media monitoring should evaluate the availability and function of complaint mechanisms accessible to the media for seeking redress against abuses as well as complaint mechanisms available to political contestants to redress media mistreatment. These mechanisms could include procedures before a government election commission, a government body charged with media oversight, and/or the judicial system.⁴⁶

**Direct Access Messages (Political Advertisements)**

Monitoring “direct access programs” or messages (sometimes called “political advertisements”) for political contestants should include the following considerations.

The **types of access time provided**, including: whether the broadcast time is live or taped; whether all political contestants must use the same formats (i.e., whether they use the same print layouts and space, one person must deliver a broadcast message or a variety of sources can be employed, music and images may or may not be used, etc.); and whether all contestants are given the same opportunity to present high quality productions.

Whether the **amounts of access to printed space or broadcast time are allocated equitably**, including: whether equal space or time is given to all political contestants; or, in the case where a division is made between major political contestants and more numerous minor contestants, whether equal amounts of space or time are given to contestants in each category and whether the minimum amount given is sufficient to present meaningful messages to the public.

Whether there are **impartial criteria** for qualifying political contenders for direct access print space or broadcast time and for the allocation of that space or time, including provisions for new parties and independent candidates.

Whether an **impartial system** is used to ensure that no political contestant is favored by receiving premium (more desirable) access space or times, while others are consistently aired at less desirable times (e.g., late at night) or given less prominent printed space.

Whether **financing of direct access messages is equitable**, including: whether adequate print space or broadcast time for meaningful messages is provided free of charge to the political contestants or at a nominal rate; whether additional commercial space or time is available; and whether there are limitations to ensure that one party or candidate cannot monopolize that space or time or otherwise take undue advantage of such time or benefit from political favoritism of media owners.

⁴⁶ See Section 5, Election Campaign, for suggestions on monitoring the enforcement and review of complaints.
News and Information Coverage

You should also consider monitoring news and information coverage relevant to the election. Among the factors to evaluate in this area are the following:

Whether there is balance or imbalance in the quantity of coverage given to the contending political parties and/or candidates. To gauge this factor, monitors will need to review news stories and information broadcast coverage with a stopwatch and note the number of seconds devoted to each party and candidate and printed stories with rulers to determine the amount of coverage.

Whether there is balance or imbalance in the quality of coverage. A number of elements must be evaluated, including:

1. whether certain political contestants are disproportionately presented in a positive (or negative) light;
2. whether certain parties or candidates appear disproportionately as the first political contestant covered;
3. whether the actual voice of the speaker is used in reports about certain political contestants, while no quotations are used by the print media or the voice of the announcer is used in broadcast reports about other political contestants; and
4. whether photographs or film footage of certain political contestants or their events is used in reports, while no photographs of film footage is used in reports on others.

Whether standards of accurate reporting are violated to a degree reaching manipulation of coverage. Examples of this in broadcast media include: consistent use of camera angles that make the crowds at political rallies of certain contestants appear larger than the crowds were in reality, while using angles at rallies of other contestants that make them seem smaller than they actually were; broadcasting film footage that does not correspond with the events reported in order to favor certain political contestants; broadcasting unsubstantiated reports that favor one contestant or that damage another in the eyes of the electorate.

Whether reporting fails to distinguish between coverage of government officials conducting newsworthy government business and such officials conducting election campaign activities.

Whether reporting on opinion polls is given undue prominence, which could favor one political contestant over others. Factors to consider in this regard include whether: the polls come from reputable sources; the source of the poll was revealed in the report; the margin of error; the time the poll was conducted, the size of the sample, the location of the sample, the actual questions asked and other contextual material was reported; the media reported that gaps between political contestants were within the margin of error; the results of other reputable polls on the same subject at about the same time were included in the report; and polling trends over time were included in the report.

Information programming by radio and television includes activities such as individual and panel interviews, debates, forums, so-called “talk-back” programs with party representatives and/or candidates, and roundtable discussions concerning topics of import to the election. Among the factors to consider in this area are the following:

1. whether there is interviewer or moderator bias toward certain parties or candidates;
2. whether parties and candidates receive equitable and sufficient time to present their ideas; and
3. whether all participating parties or candidates were provided the same amount of time to prepare for the program.

When the print media covers such events, general considerations discussed above apply.

Voter Education Programming

The last type of coverage to monitor is voter education programming. Factors to consider in this area include:

1. what time of day such programs or announcements were aired or what prominence they were given in the print media;
how frequently they were published or aired;
3. did the messages adequately inform voters about how to vote and why to vote;
4. did the messages use minority languages and/or were they especially aimed to reach any group that traditionally has low voter participation; and
5. did the messages favor any party or candidate.

MONITORING THE RADIO AND TELEVISION Radio and television are often the media through which most of the population acquires information regarding political developments. In developing your plan to monitor access for political contestants, as well as fairness and objectivity in news and information programming, you should consider a number of practical issues, including the following.

First, the number of radio and television stations to be monitored must be decided. National radio and TV channels are obvious monitoring choices. Local stations may also be important. This is particularly true where the topography of a country makes it difficult to receive stations and channels transmitted from distant locations and/or in countries where there are important language differences among various regions. Also, the relative importance of monitoring electronic media is affected by the literacy rate and the distribution systems for the print media, as well as the number of and access to radios and television sets.

Second, the number of monitors that will be needed depends on: (1) the number of factors to be monitored; (2) the number of stations and channels included in the project; (3) the number of hours of relevant programming to be monitored; (4) whether a comprehensive review of all programming is to be undertaken; (5) whether relevant programming is aired at the same time on different outlets; and (6) whether tapes are available for each relevant program. More than one person (perhaps two or three) should evaluate each program to eliminate potential monitor bias.

Third, the types of programming to be monitored may include: direct access programs that allow the political contestants to communicate campaign messages directly to the population through free time slots and/or paid advertisements; news coverage; special information programs that cover topics of import to the elections, such as debates, candidate interviews and panel discussions; voter education messages developed by the government or nonpartisan citizens' organizations. General programming can be reviewed for subtle forms of manipulation, such as using candidates or party representatives, symbols, slogans and/or songs in entertainment programs.

Fourth, the number of factors evaluated will depend in part on the type of programs monitored, as described above in the sections on direct access, news coverage and other topics.

Fifth, once data is collected, it can be evaluated according to how a particular media outlet treats each political contestant. It can also be evaluated to determine how each contestant is treated over a range of outlets.

Sixth, the number of parties and candidates to track in the monitoring project will depend on the number contesting the election. Resources may necessitate limiting the number of political contestants tracked to those that have a realistic chance of winning seats.

Seventh, the duration of the project must be determined. It must start sufficiently in advance of election day to evaluate radios and television's likely effect on voter behavior. In some countries this question arises a considerable time before the election, while in others it only becomes an important issue several weeks before election day.

Eighth, a budget must be developed to cover the costs for: (1) obtaining radios and televisions (although they usually can be made available by volunteers); (2) audio and video tapes and taping equipment (in some instances, radio and television stations may make tapes available for monitoring free of charge); (3) stopwatches; (4) developing and producing evaluation forms; (5) paying monitors for their time, if necessary; and (6) developing and distributing reports concerning results of the monitoring project. Because
extensive commitments of time may not be needed to monitor news, information, political advertisements and voter education programs, it may be possible to recruit volunteer monitors. On the other hand, continuity of monitors is important for removing bias and producing comprehensive results; therefore, it may be necessary to pay monitors.

**Monitoring the Print Media**

There are a large number of newspapers and magazines published in a country, and it is usually not possible to monitor all of them. Typically, only newspapers with national circulations and papers with large circulations in major cities or regions can be monitored.

Monitoring the print media is a resource-intensive endeavor. The benefit of monitoring the potential impact on the electoral process of problems in the print media must be carefully compared to the human resources available in your monitoring effort in order to determine whether and how to monitor this media. When there is a diversity of political opinions reflected in the national press, you also should consider the degree to which such pluralism may mitigate the effects of bias as part of your decision about monitoring.

Several interrelated considerations must be evaluated before deciding whether and how to monitor the print media.

First, you must decide upon the number of newspapers to be monitored. Papers that influence large or particularly important segments of the population should be given first priority for monitoring. The actual number of papers to be monitored will ultimately depend on an evaluation of other considerations, discussed below.

Second, the number of monitors that will be needed should be calculated. This will in part depend upon the number of factors to be evaluated for each monitored publication, discussed below. If seven factors are evaluated for each publication, for example, then the amount of time will include that needed: (1) to review a publication to identify pertinent articles; (2) to separate those articles for record keeping, if that is to be done; (3) to evaluate each article according to the seven factors and to record the evaluation on monitoring forms; and (4) to tabulate and report on the results. This easily could amount to two or more hours per monitored publication. One person, therefore, could probably monitor three to five publications in an eight-hour period.

In addition, it is important to identify and eliminate potential monitor bias. This means that more than one person should evaluate each monitored publication. While several persons might monitor each publication in an ideal circumstance, two or three persons per publication is likely to be the most possible. This means that if three persons evaluate each monitored publication, only three to five publications could be effectively monitored each day, while six to 10 could be monitored by six persons.

Third, the number of factors to be monitored must be determined. The number of factors monitored will depend upon the number of monitors and the financial resources available to the project. Typically, most of the following factors are evaluated:

- **1.** the number of column inches given to each political party and/or candidate;
- **2.** the number of times a party's or candidate's name is mentioned;
- **3.** the page number of the article and the article's location on the page;
- **4.** whether a photo appeared with the article;
- **5.** who was depicted in the photo;
- **6.** whether the article was about election campaign activity or something else (such as a governmental function or personal action); and
- **7.** whether the tone of the article and/or photo was positive or negative.

If a political advertisement appears for a political contestant, an evaluation should be made to determine whether it was given adequate space, whether its layout was treated equitably and its location was equitable compared to advertisements by other contenders. Positive and negative weights can be assigned to such factors.
to arrive at an overall score for each article or advertisement.

Fourth, the data collected can be evaluated according to how a particular publication treats each political contestant over specified time intervals. The data can also be evaluated to determine how each contestant is treated over a range of publications.

Fifth, the number of political contestants to track in the monitored publications will depend on the number in the election and the resources available to the monitoring project. When there is a large number of contestants, it might be necessary to monitor only those contestants that have a realistic chance of winning the election. In proportional elections with party lists, it may be necessary to limit monitoring to candidates who are actually likely to take seats.

Sixth, the duration of the monitoring project must be determined. The project should start sufficiently in advance of election day to measure the effect of the print coverage on voter behavior. While voters may not pay considerable attention to the treatment of political contestants far before election day, it is not sufficient to monitor the media simply for the few days before the election. In some countries, media manipulation may be a particularly important issue well in advance of the election.

Also, at least a week should be planned at the beginning of the project to test monitoring methodology in order to make necessary adjustments. Limiting the number of political contestants covered, the number of factors evaluated and/or the number of publications monitored may be necessary given the amount of financial and human resources available for the project.

Seventh, a budget must be developed to cover the costs of: (1) subscribing to the monitored publications; (2) developing and producing evaluation forms; (3) paying monitors for their time, if necessary; and (4) developing and distributing reports concerning results of the monitoring project. It may be possible to obtain free subscriptions and to use volunteer monitors. Maintaining continuity of the monitors, however, is very important in limiting monitor bias, which may mean that they should be paid for the substantial amounts of time required.

**REPORTING RESULTS** The results of your media monitoring should be seen as part of your overall election monitoring effort. (See Appendix IV.) Results may be used to seek changes in government behavior towards the media and to seek changes in media behavior toward parties and/or candidates. A plan, therefore, should be developed for disseminating reports on media monitoring.  

Monitoring results may be used, where necessary, as part of efforts to secure the rights of parties, candidates and voters to impart and receive information needed to make informed choices in a fair electoral process. This use may include presenting your findings in complaint procedures before the national election commission, the governmental body responsible for media oversight and/or before the courts. The results of media monitoring also can be provided to the international news media and to international election observers that are monitoring the electoral processes of the country.

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47 See also Section IV, Post-Election Reporting.
Voting

Voting is the process by which eligible individuals express their political preferences. Although voting throughout the world is accomplished by many different methods, perhaps the most common technique in use is casting a ballot into a ballot box. This section discusses the basic principles, issues to monitor and specific monitoring techniques related to the voting process.

**General Principles** A thorough analysis of the voting process should attempt to answer two broad questions:

1. Was the voting process administered in compliance with provisions of the election laws and international norms? and,
2. To what degree did any problems materially affect the outcome of the election?

Several principles are relevant to answering these questions.

**Principle One:** All eligible individuals must be given a fair opportunity to vote (or “exercise the franchise”) in periodic elections. This principle derives from the internationally recognized right of universal suffrage.\(^6\) When eligible voters are improperly prevented from voting it can be said that they are unfairly disenfranchised and that their fundamental rights have, therefore, been abridged.\(^9\) Where disenfranchisement occurs on a large enough scale it may alter the outcome of an election, which raises serious questions about the election’s legitimacy.

Likewise, when ineligible individuals are allowed to vote or when invalid votes are counted as valid (through double voting or ballot box stuffing), an election’s legitimacy is equally damaged. In either case, it is important to determine the magnitude of the problems and whether it disproportionately affects a particular class of voters in order to decide if it materially affects an election.

**Principle Two:** The voting process should protect fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression. When evaluating the general

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\(^6\) See Article 21, Section 3, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in Appendix I.

\(^9\) See also Section R., *Registration of Voters, Political Parties and Candidates.*
degree of freedom, keep in mind that your determination must be made in relative terms—taking into consideration the prevailing circumstances surrounding the elections (e.g., a recent civil war, significant ethnic tension or a peaceful and relatively stable environment, etc.). Voting can only be considered free if voters perceive that they are uninhibited from casting their vote according to their individual will. Intimidation, bribery and a failure to guarantee the secrecy of the vote (either real or perceived) pose serious threats to a free voting environment. Unequal or arbitrary treatment by responsible government authorities represents another potential violation of the principle.

*Principle Three:* Voters should have an adequate understanding of the procedures for, and significance of, expressing their choice.\(^\text{30}\)

**Issues to Monitor** In the course of developing your general plan, and especially during the pre-election period, you should have identified potential issues that need to be monitored during the voting. You should concentrate your observations on the following four general components of the voting.

*Environment Inside of the Voting Station*

*Location and Arrangement:* Upon arriving at any voting station (variously called the voting site or polling place), a monitor should initially verify that the station is properly identified and located. Renaming or moving voting stations is one way in which voters can be disenfranchised.

Next, a monitor should assess the environment inside of the voting station. The first step in this process is to observe how the station is arranged. (See Definition 10)

The physical structure and design of the voting station should guarantee secrecy of the ballot. The voting booth(s) should be structured and positioned so that the voter can cast a ballot in privacy. Ideally, the voting station should not be located in a place that may intimidate voters, such as a police station or a political party headquarters.

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\(^\text{30}\) See Section Q, Civic and Voter Education, and the discussion on Conduct of Voters, below, for more information on this issue.
orderly voters move through the process of entering the voting station, verifying eligibility, receiving ballot(s) (and envelopes in a "multiple-ballot" system), proceeding to the voting booth, casting the ballot in the box, receiving proof of voting and exiting. Remember, one of your goals is to determine whether inefficient or improper procedures are causing eligible voters to be disenfranchised or are allowing ineligible voters to cast ballots.

*Staffing:* Monitors should take note of who is present inside of the voting station. Typically, only authorized individuals and people in the act of voting should be present inside of a voting station. First, you should determine if any election officials are absent or have been replaced, and the consequence of this development on the voting. Often, the absence of an official delays voting until the proper officials are present. Second, you should determine which political parties and other domestic and international organizations are represented by observers. Third, you should note whether there are unauthorized people inside the voting station and the effect of their presence.

*Materials:* Finally, examine the availability and positioning of election materials. Election materials—including registration lists, ballots, envelopes, indelible ink, ballot boxes, seals, tally sheets, voting booths, tables, etc.—should be present in adequate quantities to enable the voting to proceed quickly. In a single-ballot system, you should review the ballot to ensure that all parties or candidates are properly listed. In a multiple-ballot system, you should verify whether ballots for each party or candidate are available in approximately equal quantities and are displayed in non-discriminatory locations.

*Conduct of the Officials*

Election officials are responsible for administering the voting process in accordance with prescribed laws and regulations. As a monitor of the voting process, you should observe and record the conduct of election officials in order to deter fraud, to help correct inadvertent mistakes, as well as to detect and record actual irregularities.

The first step in most voting processes involves verifying the eligibility of the prospective voters. In determining eligibility, officials typically compare the voters identity card with the registration list to certify that the voter is qualified and

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51 See also Section R., Registration of Voters, Political Parties and Candidates
is voting at the proper location. In some cases a part of the prospective voter's hand (e.g., the thumb or finger) is examined for the presence of indelible ink, which helps to indicate whether the person has already voted.

One common problem for you to monitor occurs when officials improperly reject prospective voters. A second, frequently experienced problem occurs when officials allow ineligible voters to vote. In either case, where officials improperly reject (or admit) a significant number of voters in the voting process, monitors should request an explanation from the officials and should ask to verify the voter's registration and identification information (or lack thereof) if it is permissible.

You should also monitor problems related to the ballot. Many voting systems allow voters whose names do not appear on the registration list to vote by using a tendered ballot. In addition, many systems permit political party representatives to challenge the voter's identity or some other basis of eligibility. In these circumstances, the officials may authorize the vote to be cast and counted as a challenged ballot.

Monitors should be familiar with the definitions given to these or related terms under the prevailing election law and with how these ballots are processed. Tendered and challenged ballots are usually cast and counted separately from the regular ballots. Some form of documentation typically accompanies these ballots to the counting stage of the process where a higher level authority rules on whether the ballots should be added to the official results. The use of tendered and challenged ballots can reduce tension at the polling station by postponing, temporarily, isolated disputes while allowing the business of regular voting to continue. They also allow for an analysis and quantification of related problems and provide a basis for including a number of votes that otherwise might have been disqualified. It is especially important that you urge monitors to analyze and, if possible, record the pertinent information contained in these documents.

In many countries the name and/or number of the voter on the registration list as well as the voter's identification card or finger are marked to indicate that the person has voted. These steps ensure that voters do not vote more than once. Monitors should carefully observe whether the voting officials conduct these procedures properly. Also, it is a good idea for some monitors (after they have voted) to test the ink in order to determine whether it can be washed off.

Election systems often require officials to stamp and/or sign ballots before giving them to a voter. Any ballot lacking the required mark may be subject to invalidation during the counting process. Monitors must determine whether election officials are properly marking the ballots.

A critical step in the voting process occurs when the voter physically indicates his or her preference, either by selecting a particular ballot or by marking a ballot in a prescribed manner. Since voting is intended to be secret, you might expect that officials would have minimal involvement during this time. However, in the process of handing voters their ballots, directing voters to the voting booth, assisting those needing special treatment (i.e., those unable to read, walk or see) and maintaining order, officials have many opportunities to control the voting environment and influence voters.

For these reasons, monitors should carefully evaluate whether the officials:

1. understand the prescribed procedures;
2. effectively apply and enforce the procedures;
3. maintain strict impartiality and, when providing assistance, demonstrate appropriate discretion and respect for the secrecy of the vote;
4. establish an orderly environment in which all eligible voters have a reasonable opportunity to vote and feel free from undue influence; and
5. respect the rights of observers and political party representatives.

Voting station officials are also accorded broad authority to make decisions regarding complaints, disputes or challenges. You should monitor
the pattern of their responses, if any, and note their willingness to record details of the issue.

In some countries, election officials transport a mobile voting station to hospitals, homes of incapacitated or elderly voters, or remote villages. In this situation, monitors must try to verify that:

1. the ballot box is empty before it leaves the voting station;
2. election officials keep a careful account of the ballots at every step of the process (e.g., how many were taken, how many were cast and how many were returned); and
3. the number of ballots in the box matches the number of voters who cast ballots.

A voter’s right to cast a secret ballot is particularly vulnerable in mobile voting stations. Therefore, you should consider paying extra attention to the conduct discussed earlier in this sub-section.

Maintaining continuous scrutiny on the activities of a mobile voting station presents a serious challenge for monitors. You may find that there is no announced schedule or itinerary for the mobile stations or that you cannot find transportation for your observers. One option you should consider is asking officials if a place will be reserved for your monitors in the same vehicles that transport the ballot boxes. If there is no place for your observers, you may have to rely on your own transportation or the observations of other observers (e.g., political party agents or representatives of other nonpartisan groups).

**Conduct of the Voters**

A third category of activities you should monitor is the conduct of the voters. As discussed in *Section Q, Civic and Voter Education*, above, a genuine, meaningful election presumes that voters understand both the voting procedures and the policies of the candidates or the substance of the issue(s) being voted upon. Since a voter’s level of comprehension about these two issues affects the amount of time he or she requires to complete the voting process, a low level of understanding may cause serious delays in the voting process. Therefore, you should try to determine whether voters understand the process for voting and the options from which they may choose. You should also evaluate the degree to which problems in the voting, if any, are the result of inadequate voter education and are the cause of disenfranchisement due to unreasonably long delays or improperly cast ballots.

Often, voters who do not understand the process or their options seek (or are offered) assistance from election officials or others in the voting station. As suggested above, you should monitor the potential problem that arises when election officials or others fail to maintain strict impartiality as they provide the assistance.

Voters’ conduct may also be the cause of intimidation during the voting process. Such intimidation typically occurs in the line (or queue) in which prospective voters wait before entering the station to vote. Monitors should attempt to identify these incidents of intimidation and to determine their effect on other voters.

**Environment Outside of the Voting Station**

Although most election-day monitors concentrate on assessing the voting procedures (inside of the voting station) you should devote some of your attention to analyzing the environment outside of the voting station.

As noted above, conduct of the voters can be evaluated, in part, outside of the voting station. Obviously, other people may be active in this arena as well, and their activities can have a significant impact on voting. You should look for incidents of undue influence or intimidation outside of the voting station. In so doing, try to identify the target, the source, the form and the impact of the intimidation.

These problems, which at a minimum violate the principle of the secrecy of the vote, may be directed at the voters in the queue or at the election officials inside. Potential sources of intimidation include election officials, political partisans who behave in an overzealous manner or members of the security forces. In this environment, intimidation is exhibited in many forms.
and intensities. One example is the relatively insignificant problem of improper campaigning (e.g., exhibiting posters and t-shirts or shouting slogans in restricted areas). Bribery is another, more serious illustration of the problem. Violence or threats of violence represent intimidation at its most extreme form.  

As discussed at the end of Chapter One, you should assess the impact of intimidation. Attempt to document relevant events and measure the magnitude of any incident. Important questions to address in your election-day reports include the following:

1. Did voters disregard the attempted intimidation, were they influenced by it; or were they ultimately prevented from voting?
2. How many voters were affected?
3. What are the identities (or descriptions) and associations of people involved (e.g., the perpetrators, the victims, the witnesses, etc.) in the incident?
4. How was the situation resolved?

(See Appendix III for a sample incident report form.)

Specific Monitoring Techniques Having reviewed the various issues you may encounter during the voting, you should consider several specific monitoring techniques that will help you to assess the events of election day.

Scope of Coverage

Your monitoring group must make a preliminary decision about coverage (i.e., the scope of your monitoring activities measured in terms of geography, demographics, time, quantity of voting stations, quantity of registered voters, etc.). If you are fortunate enough to recruit more volunteers than there are voting stations, you may decide to place at least one monitor in each voting station in order to provide full coverage or comprehensive coverage. If full coverage is not possible or desirable, you may opt to conduct some form of partial coverage.

Deploying stationary teams to a select portion of the voting sites represents one partial-coverage approach. In this model, each team, comprised of one or more observers, is assigned to monitor a single, predetermined voting station for the entire period of the voting process.

This approach guarantees that your monitoring effort will witness 100 percent of the activities wherever a team is present, but it provides you with little or no information about what transpires in the stations where your teams are absent. Such a method also limits the impact of your capacity to deter fraud. For example, anyone planning to commit fraud who learns of the presence of stationary monitors at certain voting stations can easily direct their activities to other, unmonitored sites.

Deploying mobile teams that move from one voting station to another throughout the course of voting is a second approach. From a logistical perspective, use of mobile teams is more complicated and expensive (typically requiring vehicles in order to be effective) than the stationary team approach. Mobile teams cannot provide a comprehensive assessment of the process at individual stations since they typically do not remain in any one place for the full voting period.

However, the mobile approach has the advantage of maximizing the geography, the quantity of voting stations and the quantity of registered voters monitored. Also, since teams pursue a spontaneous and unannounced itinerary, this approach often provides a potent deterrent to fraud. Mobile teams may also return to a voting station more than once. In fact, you should always remind election officials that you may return later in the day. Furthermore, unlike their stationary counterparts, teams possessing transportation have a valuable capacity to independently investigate serious problems, transmit urgent reports or pursue official discussions beyond the confines of the voting site.

Even with the help of mobile teams, you may not be capable of observing every voting station. Therefore, you should develop clear priorities about which stations you will visit. For example, you may attempt to achieve broadly representative coverage from around the country or constituency.

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32 See also Section 5, Election Campaign, subsection on Intimidation and Coercion.
in order to report on the overall character of the election. On the other hand, you may prefer to concentrate your efforts in those places where there have been election problems in the past, where election contests are expected to be very close, or where certain residents (e.g., an ethnic group or strong supporters of a candidate) are likely to be the targets of abuse.

Demeanor and Observation Procedures

Regardless of the approach or combination of approaches that you adopt, you should provide detailed instructions to the volunteers about their responsibilities, code of conduct (i.e., their general demeanor) and specific techniques for monitoring.34

You should instruct monitors to preserve, above all else, the operation’s reputation for impartiality and competence. To begin with, monitors should employ an open and cooperative approach to their work. Upon arrival at the polling site, monitors should introduce themselves to the election officials and political party representatives and should find a place from which they can, unobtrusively, observe the proceedings. At the same time, monitors must be diligent in pursuit of monitoring and recording all relevant events. Therefore monitors should not easily be dissuaded from seeking access to information.

You should train monitors about the proper procedures to follow in the event of irregularities. For the purposes of maintaining safety and credibility, they should be instructed to exercise discretion and moderation in these situations. Several possible responses are listed below, which may be utilized in various combinations as appropriate.

1. Advise the presiding election official, political party representatives or other observers about any irregularity or other concerns.
2. Record details of the event on personal checklists or other paper (include all relevant quantities, times and places, names, affiliations, resolutions) and report the information to supervisors in your monitoring organization.

3. As with 2, above, seek to have the event recorded on the official tally sheet.
4. Lodge a formal complaint, where permissible.
5. Appeal preliminary rulings to higher officials, where appropriate.
6. Report your observations.35

Communications System

A good communications plan is crucial when you monitor the voting.35 Before election day, try to locate a telephone in or near the voting site that observers can use to report problems to a central location and through which they can receive urgent instructions. Possible telephone locations include a supporter’s home, a local business or an election office, other government offices (such as the post office) or media outlets. If telephones are not available, other communication relays should be set up wherever possible. Your ability to receive reliable, periodic reports is essential to monitoring election-day developments in order to be aware of and respond to significant problems.

Monitoring Materials

Before voting begins and monitors are deployed, you should review the status of your preparations. Attempt to ensure that all of your monitors have received:

1. Voting day assignments (e.g., to monitor a voting station or to complete another task);
2. A badge, certificate or letter accrediting the bearer’s observer status and authorizing entry into the voting station;
3. Monitoring guides, (ideally contained in a monitor’s manual), including:
   (a) a copy or summary of the election code;
   (b) a reporting form or checklist (See Appendix III);
   (c) a list of important names and telephone numbers as well as any communication or reporting plan you have developed;

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35 See Section Y, Post-Election Reporting.
36 See Section B, A General Plan, Section L, Public Information and Section M, Logistics for more information on communication systems and developing a communication plan.
(d) instructions (e.g., about where and when to begin monitoring, how to implement the communication and/or reporting plan, etc.); and

(c) a code of conduct.

4 supplies for the day (e.g., food and water, paper and pens, flashlights, etc.).

**Counting**

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES** In assessing the counting process, your evaluation should be based upon the degree to which:

1 ballots are counted accurately, reflecting the choices expressed by the voters;
2 ballots that are ruled invalid (spoiled, void or null) or irregular (sometimes called challenged or tendered) are properly identified and, ideally, preserved for review;
3 the results of the count (also called the returns) are transmitted to the appropriate authorities, who tabulate the results accurately and are reported to the political contestants, the election observers and the public as provided by law and in a timely manner; and
4 the processes of counting ballots and transmitting and tabulating the results are conducted in a transparent environment such that they are accepted by all competitors and the electorate.

**ISSUES TO MONITOR** Most of the issues that you monitor during the voting also merit scrutiny during the counting. You should pay attention to the environment inside of the counting station, the conduct of the officials, the conduct of the party agents (i.e., poll-watchers) and the environment outside of the counting station. (See generally Section U, Voting for further discussion.) For example, inside of the voting station, you should determine whether the appropriate arrangement, staffing and materials are in place.

**SPECIFIC MONITORING TECHNIQUES** As a preliminary matter, you must adapt your approach to reflect the particular vote counting system in use. In some elections, the votes are counted in the same location where they were cast, while in others the votes are transported to a centralized counting place. Also, some systems count the votes immediately after voting is terminated, but others wait to count votes on the following day(s).

Where voting and counting are conducted in the same location, monitors should remain at the site until the count is completed and record the results on a form prepared by the monitoring group or, if possible, obtain a copy of the official tally sheet. Where ballots are counted centrally, monitors should accompany the ballot box from the polling site to the counting center, at which point monitors assigned to the counting center may assume responsibility for ensuring that the count is conducted properly. Where there is a delay between the voting and counting processes, monitors should take special precautions to ensure the integrity of the votes inside of the ballot box. In some countries, monitors have stayed beside ballot boxes throughout the night so they could be sure nobody tampered with the contents.

When observing the count, monitors should be vigilant for the following possible irregularities:

1 violation of the integrity of the ballot box (e.g., broken locks or seals, prematurely opened boxes, etc.);
2 improper counting procedures (e.g., tearing or marking ballots to invalidate them; failing to record valid ballots according to the clearly expressed intention of the voters; adding pre-marked or invalid ballots to the contents of the ballot box; substituting, stealing or destroying ballots or entire ballot boxes; etc.);
3 intimidation of counting officials or observers;
errors or omissions in computing or completing official tally sheets;
5 improper refusal to allow monitors or others to observe the process or record complaints on the official tally sheet; and
6 failure to report results according to prescribed procedures or time periods.

Once the ballots from individual polling sites are counted, the process of collecting and computing (tabulating) results from the various sites begins.

tabulation

Tabulation is used here to describe the processes of: (a) transmitting voting results from the point where they are counted to a central collection point where they are combined with results from other locations; and (b) calculating the overall election results.
anomaly

An anomaly is a deviation or departure from the normal order, form or rule. You may find anomalies by comparing election results (e.g., rates of voter participation, numbers of spoiled ballots, margins of victory, etc) from a current election with election data from other years or other regions. You can also analyze the results in light of information from other sources, including a census or other demographic study, voter registration list and political party lists.

For example, suppose you analyze voting results and find that approximately 40 percent of the votes were nullified in Election District A. If the results from rest of the country indicate that the average rate of spoiled ballots is 10 percent, then you have identified an anomaly in District A that may deserve further investigation.

observations. These observations should be transmitted to your monitoring headquarters as soon as possible so the organization’s leaders may determine what action should be taken, if any, and so they can begin the process of preparing a comprehensive evaluating of the election. If you wait too long to report important findings, you may miss the opportunity to influence the process.56

PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION (PVT) A parallel vote tabulation (PVT) is a method for monitoring the tabulation of votes whereby election monitors record results obtained from individual voting stations and compare these findings with official results.57 It is a tool for use in monitoring the vote count. PVTs collect actual results that are reported by election officials; they do not rely on the techniques of exit polling.58

The general purpose of a PVT is to verify the accuracy of the results reported by the electoral authorities as these results are transmitted from the local to central levels of the election's administration (e.g., from the voting station, to the district level, to the regional capital, to the national headquarters). Properly implemented PVTs can help to:

1. deter fraud by increasing the prospect that manipulation during the tabulation process will be discovered;
2. suggest a “true” vote count when fraud is attempted; and
3. enhance confidence in, and acceptance of, official results if they are consistent with the PVT.

The chart of four successful domestic monitoring efforts on the following page illustrates the degree of precision that can be achieved by a well designed and carefully implemented parallel vote tabulation.

Implementing a PVT requires that you establish a special team dedicated to this purpose and create a special training program and manual for volunteers in the field. You must also appreciate the weight of responsibility that will be upon you once you embark on a PVT. If improperly executed or inexpertly interpreted, the information from your PVT can cause considerable confusion. Thus, it is extremely important that you conduct the PVT with professionalism and care and that, without revealing the exact sites you plan to monitor, you disclose and explain the methodology of your efforts.

In designing a PVT, the advantages and disadvantages of speed and accuracy should be considered at the outset. This usually involves choosing between a quick count that relies on random sampling and statistics to project the outcome based on results from a limited number of voting sites, versus a comprehensive effort that collects and tabulates the results from all or nearly all of the voting sites.

The strategic choice between speed and comprehensiveness is relatively simple: if it is necessary to obtain accurate, credible election returns quickly, a random sampling is more appropriate. On the other hand, if only a comprehensive voting-site

56 See also Section Y, Post-Election Reporting.
58 The technique of surveying voters’ preferences, after they vote and as they as they leave the voting area, is referred to as “exit polling.”
count will suffice to convince the electorate of the true results, then a more complete, and necessarily slower, system should be employed.

In most circumstances, a quick count will meet the criteria of accuracy, credibility and speed, and can be accomplished by tabulating results from several hundred randomly selected voting sites. The first step in initiating a quick count is to determine the size of the sample. Because relevant electoral history is often limited in transition situations, the tendency has been to use rather large samples (often constituting at least 10 percent of the voting sites) and to rely on a high degree of randomness. Where the demographic data is extensive, the voting population is very high, or the society is relatively homogeneous, a smaller sample may be adequate. In the United States, for example, where all three of these factors are in effect, public opinion polls require fewer than 2,000 randomly selected respondents for an accurate projection of what the other 250 million residents believe.

Stratification is an advanced technique that you can use in order to further reduce a sample’s overall margin of error and to permit early projections where only some of the sample points have reported. Voting sites may be stratified according to administrative region, demographic characteristics (e.g., urban, semirural, rural, etc.), socio-economic status and gender, for example.

A monitoring group should subdivide the PVT operation into the following tasks:

1. general administration and organization;
2. sample design and computer programming;
3. data processing;
4. statistical analysis;
5. volunteer recruitment, training and deployment;
6. communications and logistics; and
7. public relations.

Recruiting volunteers with expertise in specialized areas such as demographics, statistics, computer programming and communications will contribute enormously to the success of the operation.

The following information is important in order to plan the operation:

1. a list of all the voting sites and their locations;
2. the total number of people on the registration list at each voting site;
3. the total number of registered voters in each district or constituency; and
4. demographic information useful for sampling and stratification purposes.

Do not underestimate the potential difficulty of obtaining basic information needed for your PVT. National election commissions in several countries have been unable or unwilling to relate with precision the authorized number of voting sites or the total number of registered voters prior to election day.

In the case of a quick count, you will also need a computer and trained computer operator.

### COMPARISON OF PVT RESULTS TO OFFICIAL RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Contestant</th>
<th>PVT (%)</th>
<th>Official Results (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988 Chile</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.01</td>
<td>44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>54.71</td>
<td>53.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>46.99</td>
<td>47.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>36.13</td>
<td>36.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party D</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>6.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Zambia</td>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>74.10</td>
<td>76.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Paraguay</td>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>40.14</td>
<td>40.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>32.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>24.97</td>
<td>23.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Computer capabilities can be used to draw (extract) the sample, to record the results and to calculate the projected outcome, particularly in cases where all sampling points have not reported. You will also need a statistician and perhaps a person familiar with the demographics of the region in the likely event that you do not receive results from 100 percent of your sample. In very well supplied organizations, computers can be distributed to different locations throughout the country to expedite collecting the results. From the field, information can then be transmitted to the central headquarters by modem or computer disk. In the alternative, you can use traditional, albeit slower, methods of communication and transportation.

Before election day, the following data fields should be entered on the base record:

1. name of the voting station;
2. location of the voting station;
3. identifying numerical code of the voting station (either as denominated by the central authorities or as established by the monitoring group);
4. name of the district or constituency in which the voting station is located; and
5. number of registered voters in the voting station.

Each monitor assigned to retrieve actual results should be at the site where counting occurs before the ballot box is opened. The monitor should follow the counting process, observe and record any irregularities, and collect the results of the count. The monitor should complete a checklist (see Appendix III) that includes the following information:

1. name of the reporting monitor;
2. time of reporting;
3. total votes cast;
4. votes received by contestants (e.g., candidates, political parties or referendum issues); and
5. the reporting monitor's subjective evaluation of the integrity of the process at his or her individual voting/counting site.

Monitors should attempt to communicate their findings to the PVT headquarters as soon as possible.

The statistics team should take responsibility for designing the sample and analyzing data as it becomes available on election night. The sample design and the size of the sample are affected by the choice of sample points (e.g., voting stations or individual voters), the desired degree of accuracy and confidence interval, and the vote counting methodology adopted by the government. The statistics team also will need to formulate a strategy for dealing with replacement sample points where personnel or logistics problems prevent the use of the original sample points.

An important part of the PVT effort includes running simulation exercises prior to election day. A partial or full-scale simulation may help you to train staff, generate publicity, work out problems in the system or demonstrate the credibility of the operation.

You should emphasize the issue of communications in the development of your PVT plan. The availability of a large and secure nationwide telephone network is ideal. Alternatives to reliance on the telephone include radios or the physical delivery of results to regional and national headquarters. Always develop contingency plans to report PVT information in case of communication problems resulting from such impediments as sabotaged telephone lines or bad weather.

You should also make sure the PVT plan is adequately explained, at the earliest opportunity, to the government and election officials, the news media and political party leaders. The cooperation of election officials is often necessary to ensure that a PVT is feasible. For example, a special regulation may be required to permit PVT volunteers access to the vote-counting process or to obtain an official tally sheet. If such

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59 See also Section M, Logistics.
permission is not forthcoming, alternative arrangements may have to be made with one or more political parties whose agents have access to the voting sites.

Do not expect the idea of a PVT to receive immediate support. Election officials may view such an effort as an infringement of their responsibilities and as a potential source of confusion to voters. A serious attempt must be made to convince election officials, and in most instances the ruling party, that implementation of a credible PVT is in everyone’s interest.

Announcing the findings of your PVT is an important component of a credible PVT. You should take care to issue your report in a manner that ensures maximum trust from all interested parties. Thus it would be wise to select a neutral site for the announcement, to maintain any publicized schedule (in order to avoid the appearance that you are falsifying calculations) and to be prepared to explain or defend every aspect of your operation. You must be prepared to resist pressures to rush your report in a race with other sources or to delay your report if its results seem unpopular. (See Illustration 22.)

It is important to remember that a PVT only addresses problems that may take place in the tabulation process. Correct tabulations of the counts may mean little if there are basic flaws in the voting process or there are other serious problems on election day. The PVT, therefore, should be treated as part of a larger election monitoring effort. One way to reinforce this is to include assessment of qualitative aspects of the process within the PVT operation. A first report can be made by PVT monitors from polling stations several hours after the polls are scheduled to open. This report can address several central questions for the voting process. The report of the vote count can also include answers to several qualitative questions relevant to the voting and counting processes. These reports can be calculated by computer and can augment the ballot count aspect of the PVT. Moreover, the PVT itself should be supplemented by reports from observers at polling stations that were not part of the PVT sample to produce an overall evaluation of election day events. (See Illustration 23)

Following a possible press conference in the middle of the election day on qualitative issues and a press conference to release the PVT’s calu-

Illustration 22

The importance of the quick-count was demonstrated on the night of the October 1988 Chilean plebiscite when the Interior Ministry delayed announcement of the official vote tabulation, despite promises that results would be released immediately upon receipt. Some feared wholesale manipulation or even nullification of the results. The release of two separate PVT results by opposition parties and a nonpartisan group helped convince key Pinochet supporters, including pro-regime party leaders and members of the ruling junta, to acknowledge that the "No" campaign was victorious. The Interior Ministry ultimately released the results at 2 a.m., six hours after the polls closed. 50

Illustration 23

In Peru’s April 1995 elections, Transparencia mobilized a monitoring effort for thousands of voting stations. Within the overall effort, a number of stations were included in the PVT. All PVT monitors made three reports. The first report, transmitted in the late morning, covered questions about the voting station arrangements, such as whether the stations were in the proper location, had adequate staff and materials, provided secret voting facilities, etc. Transparencia conducted an early afternoon press conference to report on these matters, which helped to establish the organization’s visibility and to distinguish it from exit polling efforts. A second report was made upon conclusion of the count and a third, more comprehensive report, was made the day after the election.

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51 See below, Section Y, Post-Election Reporting, for further definition and explanation of qualitative assessments.
52 See Appendix III for a sample reporting form on qualitative issues.
lation of election results, your organization may choose to turn to developing a post-election statement, perhaps an interim statement, and then a final report of the election. These activities are discussed below in Section Y, Post-Election Reporting.

Post-Election Developments

The days following an election are often filled with uncertainty, which may be caused by delays in the release of election results, incomplete information about election results, unresolved challenges pending in the complaint system, rumors about what will happen after the results are announced (i.e., riots or oppression), etc. In a post-election environment, uncertainty raises the level of tension and in severe situations can result in serious breaches of election procedures or even violence.

You can minimize uncertainty and levels of tension by monitoring post-election developments in addition to the tabulation process. As indicated above, specific activities that deserve monitors’ attention include:

1. the process of filing and resolving complaints or other disputes;
2. the announcement of provisional and final results;
3. the general reaction to the results by key institutions such as the government, the military, the media and the defeated political parties/candidates; and
4. the installation of elected officials and the implementation of successful referendum issues.

You should be vigilant for various specific threats to a fair process, including:

1. failure to comply with laws and procedures that control reviewing complaints, tabulating results, announcing results and installing elected officials (e.g., by missing deadlines, by employing irregular decisionmaking procedures, or by improperly excluding or including individuals from monitoring or participating in hearings or rulings, etc.);
2. reprisals or threats directed at citizens for having participated in the election or for having voted for a particular electoral contestant;
3. pressure placed on the election officials to alter the true election results; and
4. media bias that tends to indicate the media is producing news coverage that facilitates public acceptance of a fraudulent result.

You should concentrate on problems (whether merely rumored, reported in the media, or officially filed through a complaint mechanism) that appear to be “significant” (i.e., those that indicate a systematic pattern of intentional manipulation or that are likely to materially affect the outcome of the election). Your plan for monitoring the post-election period should include making a list of priority issues you wish to investigate and preparing special teams to conduct the investigations.63

You should pay close attention to the conduct of election officials during this period. As with the functions of the pre-election period, election officials that are engaged in reviewing complaints and disputes, announcing provisional and official results, and installing victorious candidates have a duty to comply with the election law. This means they must treat all complaints fairly and objectively. They must also exercise diligence in completing their duties in a timely manner. For example, allegations of serious voting irregularities should not be allowed to languish in the complaints process until the election results have already been determined. Complying with the laws also means these officials must certify and announce the official results and install the winning candidates into office, notwithstanding any personal preferences to the contrary.

Official rulings may also deserve special monitoring. Evaluate any nullification of results, alterations to preliminary results, major delays in making rulings and, in extreme cases, a call for new or complementary elections.

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63 See Section S, Election Campaign on Enforcement and the Review Process and on Specific Monitoring Techniques, for discussions relevant to such investigations.
Finally, keep a close watch on the level of transparency afforded by election officials. During this extremely sensitive phase of the election process, you should note whether officials have changed or restricted, without justification, the access of monitors to various activities.

You should also consider monitoring the conduct of other institutions, including political parties, military and paramilitary factions, and the media. You should actively seek information from these institutions regarding the election. It is useful to know how they viewed the process and how they intend to react to expected results. For example, you might ask representatives of the military whether they would accept election results that declared an opposition candidate the winner.

Also, these institutions probably recorded events during the process that would complement your own findings. For example, they may possess information about an alleged irregularity that occurred in an area where you had no monitors. You should ask them for any documentation they may have, the names of individuals who were involved or witnesses and relevant the dates and places.

During the post-election period, your monitoring organization may find itself in a position to mediate disputes. By virtue of having collected credible information about the quality of the election and the election results, and/or because you are perceived by contesting parties as impartial, professional and fair, you may be in a position to help resolve disputes and reduce the incidence of violence. You should be aware that anyone involved in mediation begins to cross the line between independent, detached observing and active participation in the process. On the other hand, you may decide that mediating disputes is an appropriate use of your organization’s information and position, and that it will not impede your ability to achieve your future goals.64

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64 See Section 2, Final Considerations.
Post-Election Reporting

Sharing information is a practice common to any successful monitoring activity in the post-election period. As noted in the previous section, a major source of tension in the post-election period is uncertainty, which is largely the result of incomplete or inaccurate information. Therefore, your efforts to collect and report accurate, balanced information can serve an important first step to combat uncertainty and enhance prospects for a peaceful and legitimate election. Your reporting may also contribute to the acceptance of legitimate election results or, in the case of a significantly flawed process, discourage approval of the results.

Your methodology for collecting information should include interviewing officials, political party representatives, independent observers and witnesses who are related to the issue or event in any way. It is particularly important that you seek to establish evidence or testimony that substantiates or discredits reports. If you fail to scrutinize your own observations or other reports on which you plan to base your analysis, you may find that your reports and future activities (discussed in the following section) are given little credence.

Sharing information is a two-way process. Whereas the previous sections have described collecting and analyzing information, this section concerns whether and how the information should be disseminated.63

**Types of Reports** After the voting and counting processes, you can distribute information that you have collected in a variety of forms and at different times. (See sample reports in Appendix IV)

A post-election statement is a short (no more than a few pages) written summary of your activities and, if you choose to include them, your findings and evaluations. In some cases, recommendations about how to remedy disputes or reform the process may be added. You should issue a post-election statement soon after the votes have been counted (usually within 48 hours) in order to help the voters and political parties evaluate the process and to ensure that your information does not lose its newsworthy

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63 See also Section I, Public Information.
quality by the passing of too much time. It is especially useful in order to make an immediate and forceful point about a particular electoral event or issue. Monitoring groups commonly issue the preliminary statement before official results have been certified.

An interim statement, which is generally longer than the post-election statement, serves to provide more detailed explanations about your findings or conclusions or about continuing events (e.g., unsettled disputes, resolution of certain problems, fears of impending improprieties, etc.). It typically is published after the post-election statement but before the more comprehensive (and time consuming) final report.

When issuing either a post-election or interim statement, you should emphasize that the contents are preliminary. By expressly acknowledging that these reports are not definitive or complete, you can release valuable information in a timely manner while preserving your right to amend your findings at a later date, if necessary. This practice helps protect your credibility in the event your findings prove to be premature or inaccurate.

You can correct any initial inaccuracies and provide further details regarding previously incomplete information in your final report (or comprehensive report). This report, which you may release weeks or even months after an election, should provide all information that is relevant to understanding the election and your activities, including any final reflections or recommendations you believe appropriate.

Verbal reports typically provide a strong complement to written reports, although they need not be delivered together. Verbal reports, which can be prepared in less time than their written counterparts, are particularly useful when you need to convey an immediate message or reaction to current events. Also, the immediacy and interactive nature of verbal reports enable you to emphasize important points and answer questions from your audience.

**Analyzing Information and Issuing Reports** A post-election report represents a high-profile opportunity to enhance the credibility and influence of your organization but only if the information you present is accurate, objective and verifiable. Therefore you should take precautions to distinguish between facts and impressions based on impartial judgments. This does not mean, however, that impressions cannot influence your overall evaluation of an election.

The quantitative indicators such as vote tallies, preliminary vote counts and participation rates do not, by themselves, provide enough information to evaluate the process or assure the integrity of the election results. Therefore, you should try to provide a qualitative component to your reports.

To make a qualitative assessment, first you must attempt to evaluate, somewhat subjectively, the nature of a given process. (See Definition 13) For example, at the end of an election-day checklist for a particular voting station, monitors often record their overall assessment of the voting process. To do so, they might be asked to characterize the process as having: (a) no problems; (b) minor, insignificant problems; (c) significant problems of indeterminate effect; or (d) serious problems that invalidate the local voting.

Second, and more important, you must try to determine the cumulative effect of your quantitative and qualitative analyses when considered together. This determination requires that you evaluate the effect of individual findings or analy-

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66 See also Section L, Public Information regarding personal contacts.
ses relative to each other as well as to the overall political context in which the election transpired. (See Illustration 24.)

You must also decide to whom you will distribute your reports. Potential recipients include government officials, members of independent review authorities (such as judges), political party leaders, other election observers and the media. Next you must determine what medium you will employ to communicate your message.

You might choose to send a letter to responsible authorities and provide a copy to interested individuals and the media. This method may be used for all three types of reports described above. The publicity you receive may be enhanced if you release the information at a press conference. A press conference underscores your findings in a very public venue and provides an opportunity for the media to take photographs or videotape and to ask specific questions.

If you choose to issue a public statement, the timing is a critical issue. For example, if you release a premature statement on election day that identifies procedural irregularities, you may discourage citizens from voting. On the other hand, if you make no statement, despite your knowledge of serious irregularities, you may encourage election officials or partisans to continue acting with impunity.

Once the polls close, you may receive pressure to make a definitive statement as quickly as possible, regardless of whether you have completed your data collection and analysis. If you issue a statement based on incomplete information, you must emphasize the preliminary nature of the report and you should announce your intention to release subsequent statements. The better practice is to collect information from a significant portion of the country, however long this may take, before issuing a statement evaluating election-day activities.

**Final Considerations**

Once a successful monitoring operation has been conducted, you may want to consider whether to continue functioning, perhaps with a different mandate, or whether to disband, having accomplished the purpose for which the group or coalition was established.

Suppose that intimidation marred election day proceedings in one town where you monitored the voting. How will you analyze this problem?

1. Attempt to quantify, objectively, how many votes were affected. Was it 10 votes or 1,000 votes that were affected?
2. Note the degree to which the intimidation affected the election relative to (or compared to) any other problems you observed (such as fraud or voter confusion). Did voters disregard the intimidation so that it had no effect, or were they completely terrified such that the effect (e.g., voters refrained from voting) was significant?
3. Consider how important the problem is in the context of the prevailing political, historical and economic environment. Was this intimidation extremely unusual (as it might be in a long-established and peaceful democracy) or commonplace (as might be the case in a country that recently concluded a civil war)?
4. Determine the degree to which this problem may have affected the results within the constituency. Did this intimidation *materially* affect *the outcome of the election*? If the voters had not been intimidated, might a different candidate have won?

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67 See also Section 1, Public Information.
The following factors may be relevant to your decision:

1. An election does not, by itself, guarantee the conditions required to secure a democratic political system or to establish the processes of a free society in the consciousness and behavior of the citizenry; nor does it end the transition period;
2. Nonpartisan groups are necessary to invigorate civil society, to establish mediating institutions that mobilize and articulate the people’s will and to promote good government and respect for human rights; and
3. The networks of people that were established to monitor an election can be transformed to accomplish other goals essential to strengthening the democratic system.

The challenges also are significant. Without an election on the horizon, funds to pay for support staff and office space may disappear. The willingness of individuals to volunteer their time and energy also may dissipate. Thus, to survive, an organization must choose a mandate that will respond to an established need, take advantage of available resources and inspire the continued association of volunteers with the effort.

To find a focus for post-election activities your organization may look to other activities, such as:

1. Analyzing or advocating reform of the election law or other laws and policies, including those concerning citizen participation and transparency in government;
2. Conducting education programs on civic responsibility and democratic processes;
3. Furnishing technical assistance to legislators (and their staff) and government officials;
4. Evaluating the performance of legislators;
5. Monitoring civil and human rights matters;
6. Enhancing the participation of under-represented or minority sectors, such as women or ethnic groups, in the political process;
7. Monitoring media fairness concerning treatment of political parties and contemporary policy issues;
8. Promoting responsible and honest government; or
9. Promoting dialogue between citizens at the local and national levels.

There remains to be discussed the question about what monitoring personnel do when election monitoring is finished. Some may want to participate in government. All countries need talented and honest public servants, particularly during a period of major transition. Members of your monitoring group who have demonstrated these virtues in the course of their monitoring efforts may be welcomed in official government positions and in public life. In order to protect your organization’s reputation for impartiality, it is prudent to develop a policy that determines whether these personnel should relinquish their official connections to the organization.

On the other hand, as noted above, you should not forget that independent, impartial civic organizations can and should play an important role in the life of a democracy. Therefore, while some leaders and members of your organization contemplate working directly for the government or political parties, they should remember that assistance will also be needed to support newly elected democratic institutions and to prepare for future elections.
APPENDIX

Legal Provisions for Elections and Monitoring
LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR ELECTIONS AND MONITORING

EXCERPTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

During this century intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization (formerly the Conference) on Security and Cooperation in Europe have memorialized in writing the principles of their member states with regard to fundamental human rights. The resulting declarations, charters, conventions and covenants are referred to as instruments.

Member states that have chosen to sign these instruments undertake to respect and support the minimum standards enumerated therein. The excerpts in this appendix focus on provisions that are relevant to conducting, participating in and monitoring elections. For example, basic principles of equal treatment (nondiscrimination), freedom of speech and freedom of association appear throughout. Similarly, most of the instruments expressly recognize the universal right of people to participate in their government by casting a secret vote. Some instruments, acknowledging the trend of recent years, extend this right of participation to those who would monitor the electoral process. (See especially, Article 8, Document of the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.) As an observer, you should determine which of these instruments your government has agreed to uphold.

Familiarity with the provisions in these instruments is often helpful when advocating reforms, defending observers' rights, or evaluating the election process. Obviously, if your government has signed a particular instrument you may rely on the provisions of the instrument as legal authority. However, you may find the provisions useful even if your government is not a signatory to a specific instrument. The fact that these instruments claim multinational origins supports the position that the principles they contain are, to some degree, universal and therefore may be applicable in your country.

SAMPLE PROVISIONS FOR DOMESTIC MONITORS

This part of the appendix presents two samples of laws relevant to domestic election observers. The first, an unofficial translation of Article 51 of the 1992 Law on Local Elections in Romania, provides a good example of a legal provision that expressly conveys to nonpartisan, nongovernment domestic organizations the right to monitor the electoral process. Does the election law in your country contain such a provision?

The second, a Code of Conduct for Observers, is a regulatory provision designed and approved by the election commission in South Africa pursuant to the 1993 Independent Electoral Commission Act. During South Africa's 1994 elections, the election law strongly upheld the rights of nonpartisan domestic groups (as well as political party pollwatchers). This regulation illustrates how observers, in return, were expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would ensure the integrity of their activities and, more broadly, of the overall electoral process. This regulation is exemplary in that the specific prescriptions of the regulation (e.g., to maintain impartiality, to display identification, to conform with the laws, etc.) in no way attempt to inhibit observers' access to the electoral process or the ability of observers to conduct and publicize a thorough assessment.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 21
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chose representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 2
(1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to this jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

(2) Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

(3) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedom as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined to competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
**Article 25**

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

**INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

**Article 5**

In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in Article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:

(c) Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections—to vote and to stand for election—on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service.

**CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN**

**Article 7**

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:

(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

**CONVENTION OF THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN**

**Article I**

Women shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

**Article II**

Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

**Article III**

Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

Article 13
(1) Every citizen shall have the right to freely participate in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.

AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION (ARUSHA 1990)

7. We affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people.

8. We, therefore, have no doubt that at the heart of Africa’s development objectives must lie the ultimate and overriding goal of human-centered development that ensures the overall well-being of the people through sustained improvement in their living standards and the full and effective participation of the people in charting their development policies, programmes and processes and contributing to their realization.

9. We are convinced that to achieve the above object will require a re-direction of resources to emphasize self-reliance on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to empower the people to determine the direction and content of development.

10. In our sincere view, popular participation is both a means and an end. As an instrument of development, popular participation provides the driving force for collective commitment for the determination of people-based development processes and willingness by the people to undertake sacrifices and expend their social energies for its execution. As an end in itself, popular participation is the fundamental right of the people to fully and effectively participate in the determination of the decisions which affect their lives at all levels and at all times.

11. We believe strongly that popular participation is, in essence, the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits. Therefore, there must be an opening up of the political process to accommodate freedom of opinions, tolerate differences, accept consensus on issues as well as ensure the effective participation of the people and their organizations and associations. This requires the State and the international community, to create the necessary conditions for such an empowerment and facilitate effective popular participation in societal and economic life. This requires that the political system evolve to allow for democracy and full participation by all sections of our societies.

12. It is the consensus of this conference that the attainment of women’s full participation must be given highest priority by society as a whole and African Governments in particular.

17. We believe that for people to participate meaningfully in their self-development, their freedom to express themselves and their freedom from fear must be guaranteed. This can only be assured through the extension and protection of people’s basic human rights.

24. We proclaim the urgent necessity to involve the people in monitoring popular participation in Africa.
AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN

Article XX. Every person having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be honest, periodic and free.

Article XXXII. It is the duty of every person to vote in the popular elections of the country of which he is a national, when he is legally capable of doing so.

Article XXXIV. . . . It is likewise his duty to hold any public office to which he may be elected by popular vote in the state of which he is a national.

Article XXXVIII. It is the duty of every person to refrain from taking part in political activities that, according to law, are reserved exclusively to the citizens of the state in which he is an alien.

AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 23
(1) Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:
   (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
   (b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and
   (c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country.

(2) The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.

DOCUMENT OF THE 1990 COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION

The (participating States) recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law.

In order to strengthen respect for, and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to develop human contacts and to resolve issues of related humanitarian character, the participating States agree on the following:

(3) They reaffirm that democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law. They recognize the importance of pluralism with regard to political organizations.
(5) They solemnly declare that among those elements of justice which are essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings are the following:

(51) free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure in practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the choice of their representatives;

(53) the duty of the government and public authorities to comply with the constitution and to act in a manner consistent with law;

(54) a clear separation between the States and political parties; in particular, political parties will not be merged with the State;

(59) all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law will prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination of any grounds;

(510) everyone will have an effective means of redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect of fundamental rights and ensure legal integrity;

(511) administrative decisions against a person must be fully justifiable and must as a rule indicate the usual remedies available . . .

(6) The participating States declare that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government. The participating States will accordingly respect the right of their citizens to take part in the governing of their country, either directly or through representatives freely chosen by them through fair electoral processes.

(7) To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the participating States will:

(71) hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law;

(72) permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a popular vote;

(73) guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens;

(74) ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public;

(75) respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination;

(76) respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities;

(77) ensure that laws and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear or retribution;

(78) provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of impeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process;

(79) ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.
EXCERPTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

(8) The participating States, consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other OSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavor to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.

(10) In reaffirming their commitment to ensure effectively the rights of the individual to know and act upon human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to contribute actively individually or in association with others, to their promotion and protection, the participating States express their commitment to:

(101) respect the right of everyone, individually or in association with others, to seek, receive and impart freely views and information on human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights to disseminate and publish such views and information;

(103) ensure that individuals are permitted to exercise the right to association, including the right to form, join and participate effectively in non-governmental organizations which seek the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including trade unions and human rights monitoring groups;

(104) allow members of such groups and organizations to have unhindered access to and communication with similar bodies within and outside their countries and with international organizations, to engage in exchanges, contacts and co-operation with such groups and organizations and to solicit, receive and utilize for the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms voluntary financial contributions from national and international sources as provided for by law.

(24) The participating States will ensure that the exercise of all the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out above will not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law and are consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and with their international commitments, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These restrictions have the character of exceptions. The participating States will ensure that these restrictions are not abused and are not applied in an arbitrary manner, but in such a way that the effective exercise of these rights is ensured.

Any restriction on rights and freedoms must, in a democratic society, relate to one of the objectives of the applicable law and be strictly proportionate to the aim of that law.

PROTOCOL (NO. 1) TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Article 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free and fair elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.
SAMPLE PROVISIONS FOR DOMESTIC MONITORS

page 1 of 1

LAW ON LOCAL ELECTIONS
PARLIAMENT
ROMANIA, 1992

Article 51
The polling operations may be attended by foreign observers and Romanian (i.e., domestic) observers, accredited for this purpose.
Accreditation as Romanian observers can be given to representatives of legally created non-governmental organizations whose only goal is to protect human rights.
Such organizations may nominate only persons who are not members of a party or political organization.
The accreditation of a Romanian observer can be questioned at the Central Electoral Commission.
Besides the members of the electoral bureau of the polling station, the persons accredited in keeping with (this) law and Romanian and foreign journalists, no other person shall be allowed to remain in the public places in the polling area or in the polling station longer than the time needed for the polling operations.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OBSERVERS
REGULATION OF THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
SOUTH AFRICA, 1994

PRELIMINARY
1. This Code shall be binding upon all Observers registered with the Commission.
2. The object of this Code shall be to ensure that the activities of Observers are facilitated by the Commission, conducted with integrity, and contribute to public confidence in the electoral process.

THE CODE
All registered Observers undertake that their observer activities throughout the election period shall be conducted in accordance with the following principles, viz:
(a) Observers shall maintain strict impartiality in the conduct of their duties, and shall at no time indicate or express any bias, or preference with reference to any registered party or nominated candidate.
(b) Observers shall when so requested immediately identify themselves to any interested person, and shall during the conduct of their activities at all times carry, wear or otherwise prominently display the prescribed identification badges or cards issued by the Commission to registered Observers and their vehicles.
(c) Observers shall refrain from carrying, wearing and displaying any electoral material or any article of clothing, emblem, colours, badges or other item denoting support for or opposition to any party or candidate, or with reference to any of the issues in contention in the elections.
(d) Observers shall refrain from the carrying or displaying of arms during the conduct of their observer duties or while wearing the insignia issued by the Chief Director (of) Monitoring.
(e) Observers shall ensure that their conduct strictly conforms to the laws and regulations . . . and they shall both acknowledge the overall authority, and abide by the decisions of the Commission, and its sub-structures, in relation to their conduct as Observers.


Every monitoring operation should develop and distribute forms on which personnel can record their observations. Forms enhance the uniformity of the information you collect and, in some cases, facilitate the effort to quantify findings. Note that by including simple instructions and using multiple choice questions (i.e., those that prompt observers to indicate “Yes” or “No,” or to select answers “a,” “b,” or “c”) you can help ensure that the observers can record their findings quickly and accurately.

The selections that are reproduced in this appendix were designed and used by domestic groups when monitoring different phases of the electoral process—from the campaign rallies of the pre-election period through the voting on election day to the post-election lodging of formal complaints.

**Campaign Activities Report Form**

The *Campaign Activities Form* was used to monitor campaign activities in the pre-election period by members of the coalition of civic organizations called the National Electoral Observer Network (NEON) and by international observers during South Africa’s 1994 national elections. The form was produced by the U.S.-based Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Note the placement of simple instructions at the top of the page.

**Media Observation Report Form**

The *Formular Pentru Urmarirea Stilor Telezitate* was produced by the Pro Democracy Association (PDA) to monitor the amount and quality of campaign coverage by television stations during Romania’s 1992 local elections. Questions 2-5, respectively, ask the observer to record: the length of a television news story (from 15 seconds to more than three minutes); any political party named in the story; and whether the story was favorable or unfavorable for either the government, the parliament or a particular political party.

**Voting Process Report Form**

The *Summary Report, Checklist for Election Day* was used by members of the Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in Africa (GERDDES-Afrique) for the 1993 national elections in Niger. This form was designed to enable observers to record summary information about the voting process (but not the counting process or the election results) on a single page that could be faxed to a central collection point. Notice the use of numbers (1-9) to codify the type of irregularities observed and the use of letters (A-D) to characterize the overall quality of the process. This form was distributed with another form for observing the counting process and a training manual that explained proper voting procedures and described various problems that might arise.

**Counting Process Report Form**

The *Polling Place Report: The Count* was produced by the Electoral Assistance Bureau in Guyana. The top part of the form provides boxes in which observers are asked to circle “Y” or “N” (Yes or No) to answer certain questions about the counting process. The bottom of the form provides space for the observer to record the results of the count. Notice the small numbers (50-72) that guide computer processors in aggregating the information.
Sample Brochure for a Domestic Monitoring Organization
The text of a brochure (also called a leaflet, flyer, pamphlet or handbill) prepared by the Filipino National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) is reprinted here. In its original form, the brochure was folded three times so that it could easily be distributed at meetings or placed into an envelope for mailing.

This brochure provides an excellent model that your public information operation may wish to replicate. The brochure can achieve several objectives. It can establish the credibility of your organization by publicizing your objectives, recounting your past achievements, describing your operating principles (e.g., nonpartisan, transparent, etc.) and disclosing the names of your leaders and the sources of your funds. It can also be used for volunteer recruitment and for obtaining operating funds.
NAMFREL

THE ORGANIZATION

NAMFREL stands for the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections. It is a Filipino citizens group that has won national and international acclaim for its commitment to the restoration and strengthening of democratic institutions and processes, particularly the electoral process. It is voluntary, non-partisan and community-based.

NAMFREL .... derives its strength and continuity from the people— their willingness for self-sacrifice and their dedication to the task of nation-building. It has demonstrated what can be achieved through what has now been called “people power,” NAMFREL’s slogan in the 1984 and 1986 elections.

OBJECTIVES

NAMFREL seeks to help achieve free, orderly and meaningful elections and honesty in government by harnessing the power of an informed and concerned citizenry.

In pursuing these objectives, NAMFREL engages in affirmative action activities and encourages men and women of competence and integrity to render public service.

In past elections, NAMFREL has fielded more than 500,000 trained volunteers to watch the polls all over the country and conduct an Operation Quick Count.

NAMFREL also carries out special projects which aim to make the electoral process and public service more meaningful such as:

- voter education and assistance programs
- candidates forums
- workshops on election laws and pollwatching for representatives of all political parties
- passage of electoral laws that promote adequate safeguards and the principle of fair play
- campaigns for citizens vigilance through the full cycle of the electoral process
- citizen monitoring of government performances . . . .
- youth-involvement in national affairs and civic action

BACKGROUND

NAMFREL was organized in October 1983 by a group of concerned civic, professional, religious and community leaders. NAMFREL continues a tradition of citizens groups that have been working for political reforms for the past 18 years. In fact, NAMFREL’s organizers and participating organizations are mostly the same ones who campaigned for noteworthy reforms during the past years.

NAMFREL’S ACHIEVEMENTS

NAMFREL’s activities in the 1984 and 1986 elections and the 1987 plebiscite have brought back the people’s faith in the electoral process as a basic instrument for change and progress. Despite the massive and systematic fraud that marked the 1984 and 1986 elections, NAMFREL was able to swiftly communicate accurate results of the elections to the public as well as prevent anomalies or record them for appropriate action by authorities.
NAMFREL

page 2 of 4

NAMFREL’s efforts have earned the gratitude of the Filipino people, and this has been expressed in various awards presented to the organization.

By proving that citizen action can make a difference, NAMFREL helped inspire millions of Filipinos to achieve the peaceful February 1986 revolution.

During the 1987 plebiscite on the new Constitution, NAMFREL did its own canvassing of votes in support of (the central election commission) COMELEC. NAMFREL’s Operation Quick Count (a parallel vote tabulation) presented more than 75% of total votes cast within 48 hours and served to establish an accurate trend of the final count.

Through the sacrifices of its volunteers, (six gave up their lives and countless others have been injured since 1984) NAMFREL has given concrete expression to its slogan: “It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness.”

THE NEED

The continuing task of strengthening the electoral process is enormous. The COMELEC, for instance, has no more than 5,500 employees all over the country to serve about 26 million voters. Clearly, COMELEC needs the assistance of a citizens’ arm capable of monitoring about 100,000 precincts nationwide. These are also other ways by which citizen groups can ensure public accountability of government officials.

You can help in the following ways:
• by volunteering as NAMFREL poll-watchers or non-electoral “Bantay ng Bayan” citizen monitors
• by acting as convenor or organizer in the formation of local (NAMFREL) chapters
• by helping organize candidates forums where issues and platforms can be debated in a neutral setting
• by volunteering legal, accounting, computer and other services during elections or in support of activities which promote an honest government
• by donating money, use of equipment, vehicle and food or assisting the local chapter in resource-generating activities
• by volunteering for the national or local (NAMFREL) chapter secretariat on a part-time basis
• by providing or generating media support for local (NAMFREL) chapter activities
• by participating in Operation Quick Count
• by taking photographs of election proceedings and anomalies

The Choice for a better future is ours. Let us work for honesty in elections and honesty in Government. Join NAMFREL.

JOINING NAMFREL

Any Filipino, whether in the private sector or government service, who adheres to the beliefs and objectives of NAMFREL can volunteer through the local chapter. If there are none in the locality or if you do not know the officers, please clip this portion and send to or contact:

NAMFREL National Office
8th Floor, RFM Building
Pioneer Street
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Tel. Nos.: 77-24-72 • 77-24-74 • 77-24-81
or NAMFREL local chapter

"BANTAY NG BAYAN", Honesty in Elections/Honesty in Government
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)
Philippines
NAMFREL

I believe in the principles of NAMFREL and I want to assist through:

☐ Poll Watching
☐ Cash donation:
  ☐ I will give through our parish priest
  ☐ I will give to the NAMFREL local chapter
  ☐ Enclosed (amount) __________

☐ Serving in:
  ☐ Local secretariat of NAMFREL
  ☐ Lending of equipment like (vehicle, computer, calculator, flashlights, CB radio, etc.)
  ☐ And other services (legal, accounting, computer operations, photography, etc.)

☐ Assistance in the Special Projects
  ☐ Operation Quick Count
  ☐ Candidates Forum
  ☐ Citizens monitoring government performance
  ☐ Workshops for all political parties

Name: ___________________________________________

Address: ___________________________________________

Tel No.: ___________________________________________

THE NON-PARTISANSHIP PRINCIPLE

NAMFREL is non-partisan although it engages in political activities. It keeps a non-partisan stance because it is concerned with the protection of the electoral process and not the advancement of a particular party or candidate.

NAMFREL believes that a good and responsive government can only be achieved if the integrity of the electoral process is observed.

NAMFREL is non-partisan because it is concerned with the meaningful expression of the will of the people regardless of who wins.

NAMFREL is non-partisan because its citizen monitoring activities exercise vigilance over government performance regardless of who is in power. In short, NAMFREL, by acting as citizen watchdog and by insuring a fair play for those in opposition to government, helps strengthen the system of checks and balances vital to a true democracy.

HOW DOES NAMFREL FINANCE ITS OPERATIONS?

... NAMFREL raises its financial support from two sources:

- From donations, both in cash and in kind, from concerned Filipinos, participating organizations, and local business enterprises;
- Volunteer services, some even on a full-time basis, in both national and local levels.

Of the above, volunteer services provide the primary logistical support to NAMFREL operations with local chapters exercising self-reliance in their activities.

“BANTAY NG BAYAN” Honesty in Elections/Honesty in Government
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)
Philippines
NAMFREL

NAMFREL MANAGEMENT

NAMFREL is governed by the principle of participative decision-making, instituted through two constituent bodies—the National Council and the Regional Councils.

The National Council consists of the executive officers, national and sectoral leaders, regional chairmen, and key operating directors.

The Regional Councils are selected by municipal, provincial and city chairmen who are in turn chosen by consensus of the volunteers.

An Executive Committee of the National Council is responsible for coordinating and supervising NAMFREL's policies and activities. It is headed by the National Chairman.

Each local chapter at the provincial, city and municipal levels duplicates this pattern of organization.
SAMPLE MONITORING FORMS

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SAMPLE MONITORING FORMS

SET OF ELECTION-DAY REPORT FORMS

For the 1993 elections in Pakistan, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan distributed a package of materials called the Log book for poll-watchers that included: (1) “Points for group leaders/pollwatchers;” (2) a set of five “poll day check-lists;” (3) an “observer’s interim report form;” and (4) a list of the telephone numbers (not included here) of the organization’s regional offices and the members of the election commission. The entire package was stapled at the top, below which a perforated line allowed observers to tear off individual forms to be completed or delivered, as needed. Compared to the relatively limited, summary information requested in the preceding forms, the “poll day check-lists” prompt the observer to consider and answer a series of detailed questions about the voting process. The interim report requests summary information on any observed irregularities and the results of the counting process.

PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION FORM 1

The SAKA I.T.E. Elecciones 1993 form was prepared and used by the coalition SAKA I.T.E. (Initiative for Electoral Transparency) to collect results during the 1993 elections in Paraguay. The abbreviations for each competing party (plus the number of blank votes, null votes, and total votes) are listed down the left margin and the names of the contested offices are listed in columns across the top. Volunteers record the number of votes received by each party for each office. This form provides no space in which to record qualitative observations. Also, notice at the bottom of the form that signatures are required from the observer at the counting site, the messenger who delivered the form to headquarters, and/or the name of the operator who collected the data and entered it into the computer. The signatures verify that only authorized individuals have handled the document which in turn safeguards the integrity of the PVT’s data and its projected results.

PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION FORM 2

The Formulario de Conteo Rapido was prepared and used by the nonpartisan group Transparencia for Peru’s 1995 presidential elections. Although very similar to the SAKA I.T.E. form, this form provides a small space at the bottom in which observers can record brief information about the quality of the voting process that preceded the counting. Thus, if drastic problems were reported in this space (e.g., only men were allowed to vote) then the directors of the parallel vote tabulation would know to discount the results of the count from that location.

COMPLAINT REPORT FORM

As with the Campaign Activities Form, the Complaint Form was used during the 1994 elections in South Africa by the National Electoral Observer Network (NEON) and produced by the U.S.-based Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. This form was used during all phases of the election process and focused on incidents of violence or intimidation. Other types of complaint forms commonly emphasize administrative irregularities (as opposed to intimidation problems) that are experienced during the voting or counting process. As this sample demonstrates, it is important to record the names of the individuals and institutions involved in a reported incident as well as information about any witnesses.
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES REPORT FORM

A. POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES:

1. Which event did you attend: rallies or political gatherings?

2. Who was the sponsor/organizer?

3. How many attended the event?

4. Were any women present?

5. General atmosphere?

6. Comment on the presence or absence of campaign literature. Have you seen people actively distributing election information? Which parties were represented?

7. Can you assess how people generally feel about the election to date?

B. INTIMIDATION, HARASSMENT

1. Have you been informed of or witnessed any intimidation related to any of the above campaign activities? If so, provide details and complete Complaint Form.

2. Was there any intimidation or harassment during political events by advocates of any party?
C. VOTER EDUCATION:

1. What evidence do you see of voter education? Is there publicly accessible information about where, when and how to vote?

2. Who is the target audience and where are they located?

3. Who is conducting the voter education program?

4. Was information accurate?

5. If advertised as non-partisan, was program non-partisan?

D. MEDIA:

1. How do South Africans receive information on the election? Who seems to be best informed?

2. To what extent is equal access given to all political parties, in the press and radio?

3. Which newspapers cover election issues on a regular basis, and who are they published by?

4. Please monitor South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation coverage of the elections. Does the media appear to unfairly...
promote or diminish any political parties?

5. Was the media intimidated or prohibited from reporting freely? If so, how?

6. Did the media influence voters in a positive or negative way?

7. General comments.
ANEXA 6

FORMULAR PENTRU URMĂRIREA ȘTIRILOR TELEVIZATE

DATA :

NUMELE ȘI PRENUMELE OBSERVATORULUI :

TELEFON :

INSTRUCȚIUNI :

Indicați numărul de știri, pe subiecte, prezentate la actualitățile de seară (indicați numărul lingă fiecare din subiectele următoare):

_____ Sport  _____ Parliament  _____ Economie/Industrie

_____ Divertisment  _____ Alegeri locale  _____ Internaționale

_____ Guvern  _____ Calamități naturale  _____ Altele.

Completăți următoarele informații numai pentru știrile legate de:

GUVERN  PARLAMENT  ALEGERI LOCALE

Completăți lista în ordinea apariției știrilor.

Vă mulțumim !
Vă rugăm să înșirați în ordinea apariției științelor:

1. Despre ce era știrea: Subiect: __________________________
   (scurtă descriere) __________________________

2. Cit de lungă a fost știrea (vă rugăm să bifați una din opțiuni):
   - mai mult de 3 minute
   - 2-3 minute
   - 60 de secunde
   - 45 de secunde
   - 30 de secunde
   - 15 secunde, sau mai puțin

3. Ce parte politică era menționată în știre?
   - FSN
   - PNL
   - PNTcd
   - UDMR
   - PAC
   - PUNR
   - PER
   - MER
   - PNL-AT
   - PSD
   - PDAR
   - Altele

4. În opinia dvs., povestirea a fost favorabilă unuia din următorii:
   - Guvern
   - Parlament
   - Partide politice (nume)

   __________________________

   - un anumit(i) lider(i) (nume)

   __________________________

5. În opinia dvs., povestirea a fost nefavorabilă unuia din următorii:
   - Guvern
   - Parlament
   - Partide politice (nume)

   __________________________

   - un anumit(i) lider(i) (nume)

   __________________________
### SUMMARY REPORT
#### CHECKLIST FOR ELECTION DAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of observer</th>
<th>Date of election</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Polling site: identification (by number and name) Column A</th>
<th>Constituency: village/region B</th>
<th>Time of arrival/departure C</th>
<th>Total registered voters D</th>
<th>On average, how long did voters wait in line/ take to check in and vote E</th>
<th>Characterize the problems observed (Index I, #1-9, below) F</th>
<th>Comments (seriousness of problems, quantity of voters affected, names of officials responsible, action taken, etc.) G</th>
<th>Validity of poll, Index II below H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Index of problems (See, Column F, above):
1 - problems with election materials (e.g. distribution and use of voting booths, ballot boxes, ink, ballots, etc.)
2 - missing polling place officials
3 - mistakes by officials in administering the electoral process (e.g. identifying voters, applying ink, etc.)
4 - improper permission to vote or manner of voting
5 - improper rejection of qualified voters
6 - improper refusal to admit accredited observers or poll watchers
7 - undue influence directed at voters (by candidates, parties or authorities)
8 - acts of violence or intimidation (by civilians, by armed forces or police)
9 - other (please explain)

#### Index of validity of the poll (See, Column H, above)
Characterize the overall quality of the process at each polling station:
A - Good, little or no problems; B - Acceptable, with minor irregularities;
C - Serious problems, putting in question validity of results; D - invalid.
### POLLING PLACE REPORT

#### THE COUNT

1. **Observer(s):**
2. **Building:**
3. **Division #:**
4. **Alpha Group:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Box number:</th>
<th>50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time ballot box opened:</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock/seals checked before opening box?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballots reconciled?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents at count:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorised persons present?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents had proper view of proceedings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate lighting facilities?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision on ballots acceptable to all?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time counting ended:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents agreed with statement of poll?</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Contesting Groups</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 72
Points for group leaders/poll-watchers

1. For purposes of your special attention divide the polling stations in your constituency according to whether they are (a) sensitive, (b) partially sensitive, (c) normal.

2. Assign the members of your group so that each has three to four specified stations to watch.

3. Keep yourself and three or four other members free to move around so as to act as a coordinator between all the stations and also to keep an eye on the stations that have not been assigned to anyone.

4. Assign responsibility to some members of the group for the filling of form numbers 2-A and 2-B. Have them completed if possible before polling day. Please give source for every information you record (whether from personal inquiries, published material, candidate’s claim, some citizen’s report, etc).

5. Please have watchers familiarise themselves before hand with the log-book they will be required to fill on polling day.

6. Remember, the watcher’s job is not to supervise or monitor election but to watch it closely so that in the light of his observations, conclusions and recommendations can afterwards be compiled.

7. The watchers should be courteous and cooperative with the election staff. They should feel assured that the watcher’s purpose is not to interfere with their work but to attest to their performance later on.

8. The candidates and their supporters should also feel assured that the watcher is strictly non-partisan, that his only concern is the safeguarding of human rights and the democratic process, and that his involvement is only to the benefit of all the parties.

9. All the members of your group should strictly refrain from giving any public statement to the press or any other person. Such statement if necessary will only be issued by the HRCP central office.

10. Assign at least one person to the office of the returning officer after the polling ends for all information from that end.

Communication

1. Identify all points in your area (PCO, friend’s home etc) from where contacts can be made. All group members should know of these points and their numbers.

2. Make sure that every watcher has all the other necessary contact numbers in his log book.

3. It is not necessary for poll-watchers to interrupt their watch for minor reports. Only serious incidents should be conveyed.

4. After the end of the polling the group leader should give an interim report (specimen in log-book) to the provincial or Lahore office of HRCP either by phone or fax.

5. Both the provincial and head office of HRCP will remain open for your communications from October 6 evening to October 7 evening and October 9 to Oct. 10 evening.
Poll day check-list

Basic details

Observer’s name ___________________ Constituency No. ___________________
Polling station No. __________________ Polling booth No. ___________________
Observer’s arrival time ________________ Observer’s departure time ________________

Polling officer’s name ___________________ Military officer’s name ___________________
Polling agents’ name and party ___________________
Time the polling started ________________ Time the polling ended ________________
No. of ballot boxes used ________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of ballot books</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their serial Nos.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of ballots cast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of ballots destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of challenge votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of tender votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of unused ballots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Check list

1. Before polling

- Does the presiding officer have all the material?  
  Yes | No
- Is the polling staff exactly the same as previously notified?  
  Yes | No
- Is the polling station within 3 km of all voters of the station?  
  Yes | No
- Are polling agents of all the candidates present?  
  Yes | No
- Was the ballot box shown to be empty before start of polling?  
  Yes | No
- Was the ballot box sealed after it was shown to be empty?  
  Yes | No
### Set of Election-Day Report Forms

#### Page 3 of 5

**2. During polling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did the polling start at appointed time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the place for ballot marking fulfil secrecy requirement?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the voters' list exactly the same as earlier notified?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the voters' queue orderly?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the voters' identity cards being appropriately checked?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is every identity card being punched?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the voter's name scored off after his identity has been checked?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is every voter's thumb marked with indelible ink?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the ink indelible enough?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the presiding officer stamp and sign the back of the ballot paper before giving it to the voter?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does he make the necessary entry on the counterfoil of the ballot paper?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does every voter put the ballot paper in the ballot box after marking?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the presiding officer's stamp and initials on the back of the ballot paper visible as it is dropped in the box?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the ballot box within everyone's sight all the time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the voter allowed to cast tender or challenge vote when necessary?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the polling staff fair in responding to complaints?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the polling staff impartial?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the military official on duty impartial?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the party camps at proper distance from the station?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the prohibition on campaigning within polling premises being observed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the whole process being carried out in an orderly and peaceful atmosphere?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. After the polling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did the polling end at appointed time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the seal on the ballot boxes intact?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the ballot box within everyone's sight?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are only the authorised people present at the counting?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the counting of both Muslim and non-Muslim votes being done in the prescribed way?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the counting being done in the presence of the polling agents and poll-watchers?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the decision on doubtful ballots fair in all cases?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the destroyed, tender and challenge ballots sealed separately?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do all polling agents attest the statement of the count?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the presiding officer publicly paste up the statement of the count?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the presiding officer take the result directly to the returning officer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the returning officer's announcement in conformity with presiding officer's count?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation**

- If your answers to any of the questions above is 'no' please give details here.
Observer’s interim report constituency-wise

1. Constituency no. _______________________________
2. Total votes cast _______________________________
3. No. of polling stations visited by the observers
   - __________
4. Candidate elected
   - His party _______________________________
   - His no. of votes __________________________
5. Next losing candidate
   - His party _______________________________
   - His no. of votes __________________________
6. Time of completion of result _______________________________
7. If delayed, why? _______________________________
8. No. of polling stations where voting suspended?
   - for how long?
   - why? _______________________________
9. Were polling agents of all candidates present?
   - If not why? _______________________________
10. Was polling generally peaceful? _________________
11. Was the process impartial and transparent? __________
12. Any objection raised by the losing candidate? _______________
13. How many persons were penalised?
   - for bogus voting?
   - for causing disturbance? __________________
14. Any impediments raised in your work? __________________
### Parallel Vote Tabulation Form 1

**DEPARTAMENTO:**

**DISTrito:**

**LOCAL DE VOTAC ON:**

**TIPO DE BOLETA (C \ M \ A ):**

**DEPARTAMENTO:**

**LOCAL:**

**N. de Mesa:**

**DISTrito:**

**CANT MESA:**

**Lista** | **Presidente** | **Senadores** | **Diputados** | **Gobernador** | **Departamental**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
**ANR 1** | | | | | |
**PLRA 2** | | | | | |
**CDS 4** | | | | | |
**PL 5** | | | | | |
**PB 6** | | | | | |
**PT 7** | | | | | |
**PNS 8** | | **X** | | | |
**EN 9** | | | | | |
**MAPN 10** | | | | | |
**MID 26 11** | **X** | | | | |
**MSP 12** | | | | | |
**MUN 13** | | | | | |
**MCT 14** | | | | | |
**MPP 15** | | | | | |
**BLANCOS B** | | | | | |
**NULOS N** | | | | | |
**TOTAL T** | | | | | |

**Firma del Responsable de Mesa**

**Nombre del Mensajero**

**Nombre del Operador**

---

SAKA I.T.E. Elecciones 1993

SAKA I.T.E. (Initiative for Electoral Transparency)

Paraguay
## Elección Presidencial

**TRANSPARENCIA - Formulario de Conteo Rápido para Resultados de la Elección Presidencial**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JURADO PROVINCIAL</th>
<th>PROVINCIA</th>
<th>DISTRITO</th>
<th>NUMERO DE MESA</th>
<th>CODIGO DEL VEEDOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### TOTAL DE ELECTORES (Según padrón)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTOS EMITIDOS</th>
<th>NO VOTARON</th>
<th>IMPUGNADOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### AGRUPACION POLITICA

| A | Alternativa Perú PUMA |
| B | Partido Frente Popular Agrícola del Perú |
| C | Frente Independiente de Reconciliación Nacional |
| F | Cambio 90 - Nueva Mayoría |
| H | Movimiento Perú al 2000 - FRENATRACA |
| I | Izquierda Unida |
| K | Partido Aprista Peruano |
| L | Partido Reformista del Perú |
| O | Movimiento Independiente Nuevo Perú |
| P | CODE - País Posible |
| Q | Unión por el Perú |
| S | Partido Acción Popular |
| T | Movimiento Obras |
| U | Paz y Desarrollo |

### VOTOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALE</th>
<th>VALIDOS  (Total de Votos válidos para Presidente)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VICI</td>
<td>VICIADOS (Total de Votos viciados o nulos para Presidente)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLAN</td>
<td>BLANCOS (Total de Votos blancos para Presidente)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEL</td>
<td>APELADOS (Total de Votos apelados para Presidente)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Método de Transmisión

| OPERADOR dice Jurado, Provincia, Distrito, Número de Mesa y Código... |
| VEEDOR dice que datos... |
| OPERADOR verifica y si es correcto dice: Inicia transmisión. |
| VEEDOR dice TOTAL DE ELECTORES y cifra. |
| OPERADOR dice VOTOS EMITIDOS y cifra. |
| VEEDOR dice NO VOTARON y cifra. |
| OPERADOR dice IMPUGNADOS y cifra. |
| VEEDOR dice TOTAL de agrupación y resulta. |
| OPERADOR dice VALIDOS y cifra. |
| VEEDOR dice VICIADOS y cifra. |
| VEEDOR dice BLANCOS y cifra. |
| VEEDOR dice APELADOS y cifra. |
| VEEDOR da detalle de los APELADOS, diciendo agrupación y cifra. |
| OPERADOR dice IRREGULARIDADES y opción. |
| VEEDOR cierra transmisión. |

### Detalle de los Votos Apelados para Presidente

Escribe sólo la agrupación política y número de votos apelados

### IRREGULARIDADES

¿Había irregularidades serias durante el Acto de Votación? (Por ejemplo el recuento y anular la opción.)

---

Formulario de Conteo Rápido
Transparencia
Perú
### COMPLAINT REPORT FORM

**page 1 of 2**

**COMPLAINT FORM**

- Please be sure to fill in your ID# or name, the region, city, street location and date
- Each team must complete at least one complaint form daily, indicating whether and to what extent violence, intimidation or harassment was observed.
- Please use a separate form for each incident observed
- You may select more than one choice for questions 10-16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID#/Name:</th>
<th>Region/City:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site:</td>
<td>Date:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Did you witness the incident first hand, if not list name and address of witness?

2. Did the incident involve violence (physical attack or destruction of property)?

3. If yes, was it:
   a. Severe  
   b. Limited  
   c. Minor

4. Did the incident involve intimidation (threat of violence or other kinds of pressure)
   a. Yes  
   b. No

5. If yes, was it:
   a. Severe  
   b. Limited  
   c. Minor

6. Did the incident involve harassment (e.g. chanting speakers down)
   a. Yes  
   b. No

7. If yes, was it
   a. Severe  
   b. Limited  
   c. Minor

8. Was it at a:
   a. Rally  
   b. March  
   c. Voting/Counting Station  
   d. Other

9. Who perpetrated the incident: Members of 
   a. Political Party (specify)
   b. Security Force (specify)
   c. Unaffiliated Individual
   d. Other

10. Who was/were the victim(s)
    a. Political Party (specify)
    b. Security Force (specify)
    c. Observer
COMPLAINT REPORT FORM

11. Were security forces:
   a. Maintaining Order  b. Contributing to instability  c. Absent

12. If present, specify
   a. SAP     b. NPKF     c. SADF     d. KZP     e. APLA     f. MK     g. Other

13. Describe the actual incident/event.

14. Was an IEC official informed or aware of the incident? Who? How long did it take to notify her/him?

15. If applicable, to which Act/ Code and section does the above complaint relate:
SAMPLE REPORTS

Monitors frequently publicize their observations in various types of reports. Reporting helps to achieve several objectives, such as contributing to the acceptance of legitimate election results or, in the case of a significantly flawed process, discouraging approval of the results. Reports also provide a historical record of an election's events and of your organization's activities. These records can help future monitors compare the past elections with subsequent electoral processes. Reports may also be useful in advocating electoral reforms, establishing your organization's credibility, recruiting volunteers or obtaining operating funds. This appendix illustrates four reports on different aspects of the electoral process.

REPORT ON THE REGISTRATION PROCESS

The Findings of the Electoral Assistance Bureau on the 1992 Preliminary Voters List represents a report of an investigation on Guyana's voter registration process. Several points are worth noting from this report. First, and most important, is that this report was researched, written and issued in the pre-election period. Publication of an assessment well before election day allows time for election administrators to make corrections and to find solutions to problems. It also alerts the citizens and the political parties to potential problems meriting further scrutiny. Second, the monitors in Guyana employed the technique of random sampling, which assisted them in developing a picture of the overall voter registration process without having to review every single entry on the list.

REPORT ON THE MEDIA

Many organizations have undertaken monitoring the media and issuing periodic reports throughout the campaign and election administration processes. The sample reproduced here, the "TV news during the elections," summarizes the findings of the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) regarding the 1994 elections in South Africa. The report was one of several that appeared in MMP's August 1994 journal entitled Media Mask. It provides a critical analysis of media coverage, placing particular attention to the amount and type of coverage received by competing political parties.

POST-ELECTION STATEMENT

Immediately following an election, significant pressure is placed on monitoring organizations to publicize their observations. A good post-election statement, such as the 1995 Study and Research Group of Bangladesh (SRG) Election Observation statement reproduced in this appendix, expressly acknowledges the preliminary nature of the conclusions it contains and indicates that a more comprehensive report will be issued after the official end of the electoral process. The SRG statement is notable also because it: reports the activities, specific findings (of both problems and successes) and general conclusions of the operation in a single page; did not publish these generalized conclusions prematurely (i.e., did not rely on incomplete information or isolated incidents); yet was issued soon enough after the elections to have an impact.

INTERIM STATEMENT

The final sample in this appendix comes from Ethiopia. The Monitoring Mission Summary Report of the Ethiopian Congress for Democracy (A-Bu-Gi-Da) represents an interim report of the 1994 constitutional assembly elections. An interim report may be issued several days or even weeks after the voting at a time when the voters and contestants are still waiting for an independent assessment of the process. An interim report often provides more complete information (e.g., official election results) and more thorough analysis than is possible in the immediate post-election statement. By its very name, the interim report also suggests that the observers intend to continue monitoring events and may, at a later date, issue a final, comprehensive analysis.
SAMPLE REPORTS

In the Ethiopian Congress for Democracy report, note the special attention paid to describing and assessing the political context in which the elections occurred. This provides an excellent example of a report that balances its evaluation of the administrative and technical process with an analysis of the political progress that was achieved through the electoral process. In Ethiopia’s 1994 elections, a number of important political parties boycotted the elections, leaving many citizens and observers uncertain as to the significance of the process. Note also that the authors of the report offered limited, constructive recommendations as to how the elections might be improved from both a technical and political perspective.
The Findings of the Electoral Assistance Bureau
on the 1992 Preliminary Voters List

Among the checks of the current Preliminary Voters List the following represent the results of our investigation.

1 VALIDITY OF POLLING DIVISIONS:

Checks on the 1991 list had revealed the existence of hundreds of polling divisions for which corresponding numbers could not be found in the relevant law. What was also discovered was that a number of well-populated polling divisions had been completely omitted from the list.

In the opinion of Professor Gladstone Mills, member of last year's Delegation of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, those particular problems alone effectively invalidated the voters list and as such it could not be declared a viable one.

We were therefore particularly careful this time to carry out the same polling division checks and we were pleased to note that all but one polling division stuck precisely to Order No. 47 of 1990, which Order covers the designation of polling divisions.

The single omission was an Amerindian area, Epira, on the Corentyne River, which the current list merged with the neighbouring village, Orealla. We have been informed that the authority for this merger lay in the recommendation of the Report of the Amerindian Lands Commission. Since this merger would not prevent anyone in Epira from voting, we find the polling divisions completely acceptable and commend the Elections Commission for this major correction exercise. The merger of these two villages into one Polling Division must however be enacted in law eventually.

On this same question of polling divisions, however, there is one particular observation we need to make and that is on a decision effected in the same 1990 Order to combine several villages on the East Bank Demerara into a single polling division. These villages include Herstelling, Farm, Vreed-en-Rust, Covent Garden, Prospect and Little Diamond.

In this polling division alone the total number of registered voters is 4,024. This figure is exceeded only by nearby Golden Grove which has 4,059 registered voters.

We therefore ask that the Elections Commission pay particular attention to the polling stations for both these Divisions on election
day as they could obviously present logistical nightmares to voters and election officials alike.

We would also recommend to the Chairman of the Elections Commission (whoever might be so intrepid as to accept this post in the future) that these Divisions be subdivided into units of more manageable numbers before the following elections.

2. ID NUMBER DUPLICATIONS:

Last year our computer check discovered 1700 sets of duplicate or multiple ID numbers on the voters list — a set being two or more persons with the same number. This year we are pleased to see only 28 sets of duplicate IDs.

At least nine of these sets we think actually pertain to nine individuals, and on further checking we have concluded that in two other cases the problem arose because an incorrect ID number had been recorded.

We have drawn these discrepancies to the attention of the Elections Commission and they have promised to have these odd cases investigated and corrected immediately.

We therefore find that the problem of ID duplications, though not absolutely perfected, is not significant enough to be of concern. This exercise is certainly a welcome improvement over last year’s fiasco.

3. PERSONS LISTED IN WRONG DIVISIONS:

The number of persons listed in wrong polling divisions last year generated perhaps the most anger among voters, and certainly presented too massive a task to be undertaken by the EAB. The corrective process required for this particular problem was then, and is now, extremely burdensome for both the voter and the Elections Commission. In that two operations have to take place — putting the voter in his/her right polling division, and at the same time ensuring that the name is removed from the wrong division.

In order to determine the extent of this problem this time, the EAB did a sample test of polling divisions in Regions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 — five regions that comprise 88% of our voters. The sample we carried out represented 70% of the registered voters in these regions, or about 60% of the entire electorate.

The results show that about 1.3% of listed voters have been displaced in the sampled divisions alone, and this will affect a total of just over 3,000 persons. If we take into consideration the numbers of displaced voters in the divisions we did not check, and add the
possible displaced numbers for Regions 1, 7, 8, 9 and 10, then our estimate is that there would be about 5,000 persons in all who have been listed in wrong polling divisions.

This overall average of 1.3% found in wrong divisions is a considerable achievement by the commission considering the extent of the problem last year.

Further to this the EAB undertook the exercise of identifying the names of persons who had been listed in wrong divisions, and we have tried to indicate their correct divisions based on their recorded addresses.

Computer printouts of these 3,000 names have been made available to the Elections Commission and to political parties to be used as a corrective tool during the Claims and Objections period. The numbers by Region are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTERS IN REGION</th>
<th>SAMPLE TAKEN</th>
<th>VOTERS IN WRONG DIVISIONS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23,101</td>
<td>21,927</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>50,188</td>
<td>38,209</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>148,046</td>
<td>77,389</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>28,128</td>
<td>26,364</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>72,304</td>
<td>61,265</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>321,765</td>
<td>225,154</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENTAGE 100% 70% 1.3%

4. THE PEOPLE TEST:

Last year, using the specifications recommended by well-known Trinidadian pollster Dr. Selwyn Ryan, the EAB did a computer random selection of 1475 names on the voters list and then went out to look for the corresponding persons.

In order for those numbers to be a close representation of the Guyanese society, the names chosen comprised Afro-Guyanese both urban and rural, Indo-Guyanese both urban and rural, persons of mixed race both urban and rural, and Amerindians. We also took care to ensure that the percentages of persons of those races reflected as closely as possible the racial distribution as indicated in the 1985 census, the last reliable enumeration taken.
Our field investigations failed then to locate 487 of the 1475 persons we looked for, or just over 30%.

When the 1992 list was made available to us, we therefore immediately checked how many, if any, of those persons were still on the list. What we found was that of the 487 persons not located last year only 294 were still on the present list, 193 having been removed.

We therefore went looking again for those 294 persons, especially because it seemed that the address details in particular in last year’s list were different from those in this year’s list. However for various reasons, this number was reduced to 269 and we were able to locate all but 54 persons.

The final result was that only 54 persons, or 3.7% of last year’s total test sample of 1475, have not been found.

These findings would no doubt go a long way in instilling renewed voter confidence, and in dissipating many doubts shared by the political parties.

However, there are two indicators in this test that we find particularly troubling. In West Ruimveldt we were unable to locate 49% of the persons sampled, and in Kitty (Central) we failed to find 47%. The Elections Commission itself had commissioned a study which revealed about three similar aberrations for which no explanation could be provided. A closer study therefore needs to be undertaken of at least these five areas.

These discrepancies apart, we find the overall 3.7% “not founds” to be not unreasonable, and again commend the Commission on this corrective exercise.

### Results of Extended Ryan People Test (done June 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TOTAL TESTED</th>
<th>DEAD</th>
<th>REMOVED</th>
<th>MIGRATED</th>
<th>FOUND</th>
<th>NOT FOUND</th>
<th>% NOT FOUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitty (Central)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. La Penitence</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Tree</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Mourant</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyhoc Gardens</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ruimveldt</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Grove</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cummings Lodge</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonora</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mocha/Arcadia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Sample Done (1991/1992) 1475
Total Persons Not Found 54
Percentage Persons Not Found 3.7%
EAB'S CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE

The present voters list as sanctioned by the EAB must be regarded exactly for what it is — only a preliminary tool for carving the first rough form for a new democratic process. There is much yet to be done, many more tools required, and many concerns that need to be assuaged before we can be reasonably assured of a free and fair electoral process.

Some of our concerns include the following:

ID CARDS

According to the Elections Commission, there are still about 25,000 persons on the list for whom no ID numbers have been assigned. We had expected that when the Commission was presented last year with adequate photographic material, the issue of ID card distribution would have been settled by now.

The fact remains however that distribution continues to be extremely slow, and registration personnel often leave an area without attending to everyone. In almost every area visited by the registration team therefore, there is a backlog of persons without ID cards.

The level of attention given to the public by personnel at the National Registration Centre, Georgetown, is also totally inadequate. The Centre often refuses to see persons after 2 p.m., and even those who go during morning hours are shunted away. A Commission representative should be present at all times to monitor this work at the Registration Centre.

Although the Commission Chairman has given the assurance that persons without ID cards can still vote, there is some scepticism over this, and the Commission has to accelerate the distribution process in order to increase voter confidence. The private sector has offered to provide typists to speed up this exercise, and the Commission would do well to accept this gesture of assistance.

QUALITY OF ELECTORAL INK

In Kurdistan recently, despite the best assurances that the electoral ink was of "the highest quality", the opposition parties insisted on a test before election day. The ink was found to be easily removed, and the parties demanded a more permanent ink.

The EAB therefore recommends that two days in advance of polling day, each member of the Elections Commission should place his finger in ink randomly chosen by him in order to check its permanence.
later. (This exercise should not preclude them from voting at the appropriate time.)

THE PROBLEM OF VOTER CONFIDENCE

Early feedback both from our volunteers in the field and from our Election Hotlines indicate a level of resignation by persons whose names are not on the list this year. Some persons claim they registered on two occasions last year, and cannot be cajoled to do so again this year. Others cannot understand how they could have registered and their names be on last year's list, and yet not be on the current voters list.

An uphill task to regain the confidence of voters therefore now faces not only the political parties and the EAB, but especially the Elections Commission whose early stated aims were to increase voter confidence in the electoral process.

The success of the exercise just reviewed may serve to renew total public cooperation in this vital part of rebuilding the political future.
TV news during the elections: An exercise in passivity

Rodney Tiffen, associate Professor of Government at the University of Sidney, Australia reports on the Media Monitoring Project’s study of political news on television in the run-up to the elections and concludes that TV news coverage of the election was passive and lacking in initiative.

The Media Monitoring Project carried out an extensive quantitative study of television political news during the election period. The primary aims of the study were to examine the way in which political stories were structured, and the attention and type of coverage given to different parties and groups, and to different issues and themes.

Sample and Procedures

In television, the study covered the main evening news bulletins for the major SABC channels, TV1, CCV Nguai and CCV Soho, as well as the evening bulletin of Bophuthatswana TV and the first morning bulletin on Good Morning South Africa. These five programmes were studied every day from 18 March to 24 April. Altogether the sample for the television news coverage comprises almost 1,000 political news stories spread over more than 100 bulletins on four stations during 32 days.

The procedure in television was that monitors, a different one for each programme, would complete a form summarising the stories according to a structured format, after which coders would translate this information into the categories constructed for the study. The study for television involved the coding of up to 75 different variables for each political story. The gross majority of these were to enable data to be coded on who appeared in what capacity in the news, allowing the presence of up to six people or groups to be coded in any story if necessary.

There are several gaps in the data due to problems in monitoring individual programs. The gaps are minor compared to the volume of data, and do not affect the total interpretation of the data in any significant way. But they do inhibit the capacity to make minute comparisons of particular stations or periods.

Amount and Type of Election Coverage

Coverage of political news during the election was extensive. TV1 morning news averaged 4.6 items per bulletin, Bop TV 4.3, TV1 evening news 5.0, CCV3 5.9, and CCV2 6.3. In all programmes political stories often took up more than half the bulletin during the election period.

Story Occasus

Overwhelmingly the gist for the news mill was
provided by public occasions and the publicity seeking activities of political groups and institutions. Three major categories can be distinguished. The first, comprising almost half of the news occasions reported, involved deliberate publicity manoeuvres and public campaigning. This included the parties’ election activities (i.e. rallies, leaders’ visits to particular places etc) (21%) followed by press releases and public statements by parties (16%) and interest groups (6%) with press conferences and media interviews (5%) also prominent.

The second large group of news generating occasions were formal meetings and the proceedings of political institutions, totalling about 20%. This included the issuing of official and non-governmental reports (8%), meetings of interim official bodies such as the TEC (4%), and formal negotiations between conflicting groups (5%). Here the media fed off the public and largely pre-scheduled activities of other institutions.

The third group of story occasions involved what can be broadly labelled disorder news. Incidents of group violence (4%), strikes (3%) and other protest activity (5%) were the staples of this coverage. The institutionalised activities and public statements of law enforcement and investigative agencies (8%) tended to cover similar story subjects as the disorder occasions.

The extent to which the media were reacting to what major sources did and what public events happened is shown by the rarity of reports based primarily on media enterprise. Only two stories were labelled as special media reports. None were specifically called leaks or special investigations.

Sources in the News
The coding of the political stories during the election period revealed 1177 quotes from representatives. However, only a much smaller group of individuals featured regularly in the news.

The two most visible and widely cited individuals unsurprisingly were FW De Klerk and Nelson Mandela, coincidentally both mentioned in 78 stories in our sample. They both overshadowed all other members of their parties. De Klerk was mentioned about four times as often as the next two most quoted NP figures, Roelf Meyer (18) and Pik Botha (17), with no-one else mentioned more than six times (Danie Schutte and Hernus Kriel). For the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa was a clear second (26) and Thabo Mbeki third (9), with a wide spread after that. Similarly the other four most prominent leaders dominated coverage of their groups.

Table Two reflects the categorisation on which the next several tables are based. It gives the figures for the three largest parties first, then divides the minor parties into four groupings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% all groups</th>
<th>% parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC/Azapo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF/CP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitors,etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The last two categories are not parties. The first includes representatives from all independent and interim bodies monitoring or supervising aspects of the election (e.g., TEC, IEC, IMC, peace monitors, international observers). Of these, the IEC and the TEC accounted for the majority of references. The final one includes representatives from a wide variety of groups: homeland governments, bureaucrats, police and military, interest groups like business and unions. No one of these receives sustained attention, although the police are the single most quoted group among this very scattered category.

The interpretation of the figures in Table Two must depend on various considerations which the observer brings to them: What does balance mean when the parties enjoyed such hugely differing amounts of support? When one party seemed overwhelmingly likely to be the major party in the new government, when another party had been in office for all of living memory, when the parties differed so much in their organisational capacities, in their ability to generate news, in the size and enthusiasm of the rallies they held? Some have argued that in a multi-party system, groups should get coverage roughly proportional to their electoral support. However, one key to a democratic electoral system is that all major groups accept the legitimacy of the process and result and there is an argument therefore for minority groups to receive more air time than their numbers might strictly warrant. (Here and elsewhere it should be remembered that these figures cover only news programmes and not current affairs. It seemed, for example, that the minor parties received proportionately more time in current affairs than in the news.)

Table Two shows that the ANC and its representatives were the most frequently quoted group, taking 21.6% of the total, and 35.7% of the parties quoted. The ANC received the single greatest coverage, but is the only party which received a lesser proportion of the coverage than its voting strength; the National Party received coverage roughly proportionate to its electoral support, while all other groups received a greater proportion of coverage than they received in votes.

In the results for Table Three, it should be remembered that the percentages for the minor parties are based on very small numbers, because of the small number of times others referred to them. Of the groups with sizeable references from others, the references to monitors and interim bodies are mainly positive or neutral, while the final miscellaneous grouping also gets mixed references.

The major political parties predictably draw more negative than positive references from their opponents and others. More surprisingly, Inkatha gets a substantially more positive press from the other participants and the ANC draws the highest proportion of negative references. While critical surpass complimentary references to the ANC by 6:1, and to the Nationalists by 4:1, for Inkatha it is less than 2:1, with both more positive and fewer negative references than the other two large parties.
REPORT ON THE MEDIA

Table Four shows the pattern of references to others made by each group. While the single biggest category of references to other groups is negative (33%), about 20% of references were positive, and the rest (47%) balanced or mixed. This is perhaps a less critical and negative pattern of dialogue than one might expect in an election campaign. The monitors and interim bodies are the most conciliatory in their references.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
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<td>PAC/AZAPO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitors, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Among the major political parties, Table Four shows the opposite pattern to Table Three in the ratio of complimentary to critical references about others, the ANC had a ratio of 1:1.5; the Nationalists 1:2.1, and Inkatha 1:3.9. Thus while Inkatha received a lower proportion of negative comments from other groups than the other major parties, it was by far the most critical of others in its own comments. In contrast, while the ANC had the highest ratio of critical to complimentary references, its comments about others were the most positive.

Equity and Balance
As pointed out above, whether any set of numbers constitutes balance or equity in representing the views of the different parties depends on criteria which the observer brings to them. However concluding the discussion of the representation of the different groups, and the types of claims they were making, it is pertinent to observe that whether or not they constitute some sort of equitable balance between parties overall, balance was much more rarely achieved in particular stories. The primary reason for this was the simplicity of story formats.

In the majority of stories only one source was cited. Of stories where the views of at least one group were quoted, 66% had only one source, 27% had two, and only 8% had three or more. Moreover, this was the case whether or not the story involved conflict. It was judged that 36% of stories involved an important element of conflict, but that in 77% of these only one side was cited, not both sides.

These figures suggest the passivity of the media reporting of the campaign. Little effort was made to secure a response from the criticized party in the same story. Often of course ‘balance’ was achieved over time, but the immediate action-reaction pattern by which the media secure dialogue and rough accountability between the parties was at best slow and imperfect.

Themes and Issues
The dominant issues were very much ones to do with the political and electoral process itself. Only 38% of stories were deemed to have a clear reference to policy, and over 60% of those involved issues to do with the political process. Two broad themes dominated: constitutional and election arrangements comprised about 60% of stories on political processes, while the campaign environment, whether it was free and fair, issues of voter education etc, accounted for most of the remainder (30%).

The next highest group concerned issues of crime and internal control (about 14% of total policy references). Sometimes this merged into stories of political violence; sometimes it was more general policies. One in five (18%) of the political stories coded contained some
substantial reference to political violence. These tended to be reported more prominently in the bulletin, 48% of them were one of the first three stories covered. They also tended to involve more rounded reporting: in stories with at least one source quoted, 54% of stories involving violence compared with 30% of stories without violence quoted two or more sources. The proportion of the parties in stories involving violence largely conformed to their coverage in stories without violence.

A third cluster of issues received less but still substantial coverage. Labour relations, welfare and other stories centred upon themes of re-distribution totalled nearly 12% of stories with some policy element. The major items here were about public servants' conditions, especially disputes because of insufficiencies that had arisen as a result of political change, and social welfare policies.

Relegated to virtual invisibility during the campaign were economic policy questions (about 1% of policy references) and questions to do with social policies and quality of life (health, education, environment, urban services etc) (about 20%).

The relative lack of policy emphasis and debate was unusual for coverage of an election campaign, but was less surprising in this particular election for two reasons. One was that many basic policy parameters to be followed by the Government of National Unity had already been agreed in multi-party negotiations and were not therefore to be decided by the election itself. The other was that in many ways the key issue in the election was South Africa's capacity to successfully hold a democratic election, and that this transcended all specific elements of policy. Nevertheless the emphasis has been criticised in so far as it reflected a tendency of the media to subordinate the other messages of speakers in favour of incidents of violence or the current state of negotiations.

CONCLUSION
The TV coverage of the election was extensive. In two important senses, however, these data also reveal a lack of initiative by the TV stations. Firstly, the stories concentrated overwhelmingly upon the public campaign occasions and the public statements of the parties, as well as the information releases surrounding the working of political institutions and formal negotiations. This is true to a large extent of all news reporting, but was particularly marked during this election campaign and suggests that the reporting was too passive. Secondly, there was a lack of editorial initiative in relating the claims of participants to each other, at least in the same story. Many stories had a simple source structure in which the political figures were able to put their views, without any counter-balance, even by those they were making claims about.

The figures on who appeared in the news do not present any gross departures from what might be expected given the electoral support and political resources of the major organisations. To the extent that groups talked about each other in the news, they tended to concentrate their attention on a narrower group of figures than the news cited and certainly not less diverse than, the perceptions of the political participants themselves.

The figures do reveal some interesting and subtle differences in the way the parties used their exposure. Notably Inkatha manifested a different pattern from the other two major parties. They made more references about themselves, and these had a very slightly higher proportion of positive references than the already predictably strong pattern of self-praise the others displayed. Moreover their references about other parties were more negative than the norm, and, perhaps more surprisingly, the comments by others about them less negative.
January 30, 1995

Study and Research Group of Bangladesh (SRG)
Election Observation

Four Municipal Elections
Held on January 22, 1995

SRG election teams were posted in the following manner --

Shibgonj -- Full-time observers, a Coordinator and three mobile observers monitored at the polling centers in the Shibgonj municipal election.

Sylhet -- Full-time observers along with a mobile observation team monitored forty-four polling centres of Sylhet out of fifty-six polling centres.

Chandpur -- Full-time [ ] observers with the feedback of three mobile observers and two ward Coordinators monitored all the polling centres of Chandpur municipal area.

Barisal -- Full-time observers, five ward Coordinators, and four mobile observers monitored forty-six polling centres in the Barisal municipal election out of forty-seven polling centres.

Generally, the municipal elections were held free and fair in Shibgonj, Barisal and Chandpur. Voters were enthusiastic. Election campaigning was widespread and effective. The candidates had no restrictions regarding election expenses. Polling agents were present at most of the polling centres . . . . The voter list was faulty to a certain extent. While in Barisal and Sylhet a few polling centres were [moved] even after the [official] publication of the [locations].

The election in Sylhet was generally held free, fair and peaceful except for some limited irregularities, (such as a few underage voting in different polling centres and a few cases of impersonation) but not on a massive scale. However, elections could not be held in seven polling centres because of hartal [national strikes] called by citizens of the area, who did not want their area to be a part of the Sylhet municipality. Some voters were present, but prevented from voting by pro-hartal elements. There was, however, no untoward incident.

Besides this, a ballot box was hijacked by some miscreants from Booth Number 1 of Polling Centre Number 13 of Ward Number 3. Voting was suspended here for sometime. However, the sealed ballot box was recovered with the help of the law enforcing agency within fifteen minutes of the hijacking. Balloting began as soon as the ballot box was brought back to the booth, where it belonged. Most of the candidates for Sylhet municipality election provided transport to carry the voters to the polling centres.

SRG will prepare [a] detailed election observation report covering these four municipality elections, which will be presented to the election commission in the near future.
INTERIM STATEMENT
page 1 of 8

ETHIOPIAN CONGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY

JUNE 5, 1994 CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION
MONITORING MISSION
SUMMARY REPORT
BY
A-BU-GI-DA
ETHIOPIAN CONGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY

22 June, 1994
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

I. BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION

A-Bu-Gi-Da, the Ethiopian Congress for Democracy conducted a monitoring mission of the June 5, 1994 Constitutional Assembly elections. A-Bu-Gi-Da is a non-partisan civic organization that conducts a range of activities in support of the democratic process, such as civic education, monitoring, and public policy analysis. A-Bu-Gi-Da was created on June 24, 1991.

Because election monitoring falls under A-Bu-Gi-Da’s mandate, the organization decided to monitor the Constitutional Assembly elections and established the following goals to govern the mission:

• to develop A-Bu-Gi-Da’s capacity to monitor elections;

• to strengthen A-Bu-Gi-Da’s local level democracy clubs through including them in the monitoring mission;

• to evaluate in selected localities the extent to which the election was free, fair, competitive and inclusive; and

• to issue a report of the findings of the mission outlining strengths and weaknesses of the June 5 election, and including suggested recommendations.

At this juncture, A-Bu-Gi-Da would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the fact that like all non-partisan NGOs, it too is interested only in assessing to what degree an election system is practiced in the direction of democracy and not in finding faults and fixing blames to the day’s government or its opposition.
INTERIM STATEMENT

To implement its mission, A-Bu-Gi-Da organized a team of 69 monitors, including 10 staff members, 25 volunteers from Addis Ababa, and 34 members of local democracy clubs. The volunteer monitors, who had been given training in election monitoring by national and international resource people, had to sign a statement of non-partisanship before their assignment to the various monitoring stations. These monitors followed a coordinated system of information gathering including questionnaires for election officials, candidates, members of the public, as well as a monitoring checklist for election day. The mission covered a total of 35 constituencies in the following areas:

22 constituencies in Addis Ababa
4 constituencies in Northern Shoa
1 constituency in Mojo
2 constituencies in and around Debre Zeit
1 constituency in Awasa
2 constituencies in and around Dessie
1 constituency in Dire Dawa (pre-election monitoring only)
1 constituency in Bahir Dar
1 constituency in Jimma

In these areas A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors conducted 1,232 interviews and observed the voting in 668 polling stations. Based on these observations, A-Bu-Gi-Da has developed an assessment of the election in these areas. The following statement provides a summary of A-Bu-Gi-Da's findings, which will be followed by a more detailed report subsequently.

II. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

A. Introduction

Elections are at the same time a technical exercise and a political process. The technical aspect incorporates the election administration, the logistical preparations, and the material processes used for registration and voting. The political component incorporates issues surrounding the level of competition, the level of voter involvement and interest in the election process, and the level of inclusiveness of all parties concerned. Election observers must evaluate the process from both the political and the technical angle. In accordance with this statement, A-Bu-Gi-Da has grouped its findings under two headings: "Administrative and Procedural Aspects" and "Political Aspects."

B. Administrative and Procedural Aspects of the Election

In general, A-Bu-Gi-Da concludes that, in the areas where it observed, the National Election Board did a satisfactory job in organizing and conducting the elections. In particular, A-Bu-Gi-Da found that:

1. The process was largely successful in providing citizens an opportunity to register and
vote.

2. Materials were delivered on time and in sufficient quantities.

3. The polling station officials generally conducted their work fairly competently.

4. The Election Board developed a new and inexpensive training system. Although A-Bu-Gi-Da observers noted some areas where officials were not fully trained, in general, most officials appeared familiar with the procedures. 89.7% of the election officials polled by A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors said that the training was sufficient.

5. Most administrators were open and responsive to comments from A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors. For example, in response to comments by A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors, election officials in several cases ordered armed individuals to leave polling stations.

6. The National Election Board showed commendable flexibility when it agreed to modify a regulation barring public statements of their findings by observers until after the official declaration of results. Members of A-Bu-Gi-Da and other organizations had criticized this regulation as inconsistent with the freedom of speech provision in the Transitional Charter and international norms regarding election monitoring.

In addition, A-Bu-Gi-Da notes that the institution of the National Election Board as an independent body is a commendable development.

Notwithstanding A-Bu-Gi-Da's generally positive evaluation of the administrative aspect of the election, A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors did observe certain irregularities and procedural problems. These include:

1. The ballot was unnecessarily confusing. Many ballots had more symbols than candidates, and consequently election officials had to provide explanations to the voters on which symbols could be selected. This opened up a possibility of influencing the voter's choice. In a number of instances, A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors saw officials appearing to indicate with their hands and facial expressions which candidate should be selected. In one polling station an official had actually entered the voting booth where he was helping voters mark the ballot. Although possibly well intentioned, this guidance represents a serious infringement on the most important element of elections: the secrecy of the vote.

2. The second count of the ballots at the Woreda level provided ample opportunities for fraud. The election law indicates that all ballot boxes will be counted once at the polling station at the end of the day and once at the Woreda office a number of days later. The ballot box is under careful scrutiny throughout election day, so one can be reasonably certain of the accuracy of the election day count. However, it would not be difficult to change or stuff the boxes, which are not labeled, after they have left the scrutiny of observers in the polling station. In addition, the second count is time consuming and unusual by international
standards. Although A-Bu-Gi-Da did not detect fraud during the Woreda counts it observed, the mission is concerned that the current system makes fraud possible.

3. There was insufficient voter education. In 70% (91 out of 131) of the polling stations covered outside Addis Ababa, A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors observed some confusion on the part of voters. In Addis Ababa, A-Bu-Gi-Da observed a rate of spoilt ballots of roughly 20%. In many cases voters asked for guidance on every step of the voting process. In addition, some voters also appeared ignorant of the basic idea of choosing a candidate. For example, some voters told A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors that they had chosen a particular symbol because it appealed to them, even though they could not say which candidate was represented by that symbol.

4. In at least one instance, the electorate was threatened with repercussions if they failed to vote. In the town of Armania, Northern Shoa Zone, A-Bu-Gi-Da observers heard local officials announcing on a megaphone "If you don't come out to vote, we will take some measures." Although this may have been an isolated incident, A-Bu-Gi-Da is concerned about the possibility that citizens were coerced to vote. In addition, A-Bu-Gi-Da is aware of allegations that some citizens were coerced to register. The Election Board should investigate these claims, and if they prove correct, should take corrective measures.

5. Armed individuals were allowed in or near many polling stations. For the most part, A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors did not observe these armed individuals acting in an aggressive or intimidating manner, but their presence may have had an effect on voters.

6. In one instance, the candidacy qualification signatures of one candidate looked similar to A-Bu-Gi-Da observers, and this similarity caused doubts as to the authenticity of the signatures.

7. In three cases A-Bu-Gi-Da monitors were restricted from doing their work. In one case, officials would not allow monitors to watch the vote count; in two cases monitors were briefly detained by police officials. Although these may have been isolated incidents, they represent a dangerous transgression of the election law provisions regarding observers.

8. The National Election Board was not sufficiently forthcoming to the Ethiopian public about its reasons for postponing elections in Region 5 and Dire Dawa.

C. Political Aspects of the Election

The administrative and procedural issues discussed in section B. are largely the domain of the National and Regional Election Boards, who deserve credit for the election's administrative successes and who should try to improve upon the election's shortcomings. Section C. covering the political aspects of the election, is addressed to a wider audience. A successful political process, one which is competitive and inclusive and stimulates citizen participation, is the responsibility of various government agencies as well as political parties,
civic groups, churches, unions, and other organizations. It is to this larger group of political and civic leaders that the following comments are addressed.

As part of Ethiopia’s transition to democracy, the Constitutional Assembly election was intended to resolve a political issue: who should determine the constitution, and what should be contained in that constitution. It is A-Bu-Gi-Da’s belief that a complete monitoring mission must ask the question how successful was the election in resolving this political issue.

To arrive at a sound answer to the question, A-Bu-Gi-Da embarked upon gathering information in a number of ways. First, A-Bu-Gi-Da wrote to political parties to determine their reasons for participating or not participating in the elections. Second, A-Bu-Gi-Da interviewed candidates to determine if they offered alternative policies on the draft constitution. Third, A-Bu-Gi-Da interviewed citizens to determine their views on the process. Fourth, A-Bu-Gi-Da interviewed election officials to determine if the training they had received was sufficient to conduct the elections. Fifth, A-Bu-Gi-Da monitored the election on June 5, 1994. Through these and other sources A-Bu-Gi-Da made the following observations:

1. Opposition parties, such as the Gurage People’s Democratic Front and the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition, indicated in letters to A-Bu-Gi-Da that among the many reasons for their boycott were 1) that they have been prevented from operating freely and 2) that they did not want to be a party to a predetermined EPRDF victory.

2. Because of opposition boycott, no alternative view on the draft constitution was presented in an organized and systematic manner. In 28 out of 34 constituencies that A-Bu-Gi-Da monitored only one political party was competing. The absence of organizational structures of a variety of political parties has limited the intensity of campaigning. For example, candidates interviewed by A-Bu-Gi-Da conducted on the average only 3 or 4 meetings and posted only 100 to 150 posters.

3. In many constituencies monitored by A-Bu-Gi-Da, voters did not have a choice among different views of the constitution. Outside of Addis Ababa, in 75% of constituencies monitored there was no candidate who offered a different view on the constitution. In 25% of the constituencies only one candidate was running.

4. As the table on the following page illustrates, a high percentage of citizens expressed dissatisfaction with the competitiveness of the election and with the choice of candidates, particularly outside of Addis Ababa. The table summarizes the findings of A-Bu-Gi-Da’s poll of public opinion about the election.
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION PUBLIC OPINION POLL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Number planning to vote</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>SOMEWHAT</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>SOMEWHAT</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hojo</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Zeit Town</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Zeit Rural</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimma</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Shoa</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dessie</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombo-Icha</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahir Dar</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asossa</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some people did not answer all questions.

5. Although complete figures are not yet available, a significant percentage of the population did not vote. The National Election Board announced a registration rate of 66%. If 80% of those registered voted, the percentage of eligible Ethiopians participating is only 53%.

6. The election law prohibited some former soldiers and WPE members from voting. In addition, the two-year residence requirement barred a sizeable number of eligible voters from voting. Also, there was no provision regarding eligible voters obliged to travel on election day.

7. A-Bu-Gi-Da heard an allegation from Ambo that an independent candidate named, Dejene Beilihu, and his supporters were harassed and detained for a given number of days. A-Bu-Gi-Da sent a group of monitors, who interviewed the candidate, officials and citizens in Ambo, and found the allegation convincing. Although this too may have been an isolated incident, it may contribute to the perception that the current government is not quite permissive of competition.
INTERIM STATEMENT

From the observations cited above, A-Bu-Gi-Da concludes that the level of competitiveness and inclusiveness in the election are low. For this reason A-Bu-Gi-Da finds it doubtful whether the elected members of the assembly would satisfactorily represent the range of Ethiopian opinions on the constitution.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Technical Recommendations

1. The ballots should have the same number of symbols as there are candidates. In addition the candidate's name or picture should appear on the ballot.

2. Ballots should be counted only once, in the polling station, in the presence of observers and candidate representatives, who should each receive a signed and stamped copy of the record of the counting.

3. Armed individuals should not be allowed in the voting area.

4. Polling station procedures should be clearly established and strictly enforced. In particular, these procedures should insure that voters can vote in a completely secret place and free from any undue suggestions or influence from officials, observers, police or others.

5. The right not to vote should be respected. No government official or party representative should coerce citizens to vote.

6. Greater security should be exercised over the ballots. Extra ballots should be accounted for, ballots should be printed with serial numbers and on paper that can not be easily reproduced.

7. The number of signatures required for candidates should be reduced substantially.

B. Political Recommendations

1. The TGE and the boycotting parties should enter into a good faith negotiating forum. First and foremost they should be committed to creating a more inclusive, democratic process. South Africa provides valuable lessons of the importance of good faith negotiations and an emphasis on inclusiveness.

2. Citizens and political leaders should realize that they have a role to play in bringing about free and fair elections. Fairness in the process has been greatly increased in other countries by the actions of organizations outside of the government. Political parties have, for example, deployed observers who have confirmed that the ballot box was empty at the beginning of the day, watched the voting and then observed the count. Such scrutiny throughout the process can greatly reduce the possibility of fraud. Concern about fraud may
have figured in the opposition parties' decision to boycott. In decisions about future elections, A-Bu-Gi-Da recommends that political parties not underestimate the steps they themselves can take to help create a transparent process.

3. A-Bu-Gi-Da believes that allegations about parties being unable to freely operate and other forms of harassment need to be taken seriously. A-Bu-Gi-Da intends to investigate specific allegations that it receives from parties, and encourages other independent, non-partisan organizations to do likewise. In addition, A-Bu-Gi-Da encourages the Transitional Government to actively promote pluralistic political activity throughout the country. It can do so by assuring all registered parties that their rights to organize will be respected and by ensuring that all officials and all security personnel understand and respect the inviolability of the freedom of assembly provision in the Transitional Charter.

4. Governmental and non-governmental organizations should conduct voter education programs to familiarize voters with the voting process.

5. Foreign governments, international NGOs and civic organizations should help facilitate the consolidation of the democratic process in Ethiopia.

For its part, A-Bu-Gi-Da is prepared to exert substantial efforts to contribute to more competitive and inclusive elections for the parliament. These efforts would include widespread voter education programs, training of party officials and functionaries and intensive monitoring of the entire election process.
Selected NDI Publications

- The October 13, 1991 Legislative and Municipal Elections in Bulgaria
- The June 1990 Elections in Bulgaria
- An Assessment of the October 11, 1992 Election in Cameroon
- Democracies in Regions of Crisis—Botswana, Costa Rica and Israel (1990)
- 1990 Elections in the Dominican Republic
- An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia
- The 1990 General Elections in Haiti (December 1990)
- Nation Building: The UN and Namibia (1990)
- Civil-Military Relations in Nicaragua (1995)
- Coordinating Observers to the 1993 Elections in Niger
- The October 1990 Elections in Pakistan
- Palestinian Perspectives on Democracy (1994 English/Arabic)
- The May 7, 1989 Panama Elections
- The 1989 Paraguayan Elections: A Foundation for Democratic Change
- The May 1990 Elections in Romania
- Pre-Election Report on the December 1993 Elections in the Russian Federation
- An Assessment of the Senegalese Electoral Code (1991 English/French)
- Promoting Participation in Yemen's 1993 Elections
- Building a Civil Society in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1995)
- The October 31, 1991 National Elections in Zambia
A Need
A General Plan
Approaches to Organizing
A Committee of Directors and a
Democratic Organizational Structure
Credibility
Operating Funds
Office Facilities
Personnel
Recruiting
Training
Training Manual
Public Information
Logistics
Coordination
Security
Election System
Civic and Voter Education
Registration of Voters, Political Parties and Candidates
Election Campaign
Media
Voting
Counting
Tabulation
Post-Election Developments
Post-Election Reporting
Final Considerations