PROJECT MOZ/93/016

ASSISTANCE TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
IN MOZAMBIQUE

FINAL REPORT

Prepared by the UNDP/DDSMS
Technical Assistance Team

April, 1995
CHAPTER 2

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

1. THE PRELIMINARY STAGES

"Officially", the electoral process in Mozambique lasted for a short period of about nine months. Indeed, the National Election Commission (NEC) took office on 11 February 1994 and the final election results were announced publicly by its Chairman on 19 November.

In effect, however, this nine-month period cannot be analysed independently from earlier periods which contributed to the establishing the basic conditions for the implementation of the electoral process.

These periods, which we can term preliminary stages, comprise the following:

- the negotiation and signing of the General Peace Agreement (1990-October 1992), Protocols III and V of which defined the fundamental principles of the electoral system and the timetable for the first multiparty general elections;

- the Rome Donors' Conference (15-16 December 1992), where the Government presented a global budget for the electoral process and obtained significant funding commitments from the international community;

- the period between the Rome Conference and the Multiparty Conference (December 92 - July 93), which included the following:

  * the beginning of permanent technical assistance for the "Interministerial Elections Commission", financed by the European Community (14 March);

  * presentation of the Government's draft Electoral Law to the political parties (26 March);

  * signing of the MOZ/93/016 Project Document - Support for the Electoral Process in Mozambique - by the Minister of Cooperation and the UNDP Resident Representative (13 May);

  * the Donors' Conference in Maputo, designated a "Follow-up Meeting to the Rome Donors' Conference" (8-9 June);
* the preparation and discussion of the first version of the Action Plan for the preparation of the electoral process (May-June);

* the launching of the international pre-qualification tender for the supply of materials for voter registration (30 June);

* the Multiparty Conference and the proclamation of the Electoral Law (29 July - 28 December 93), a period which included the following:

* seven weeks of debates, interruptions, advances and setbacks in the Multiparty Conference, which ended on 17 September, without having got beyond Article 16 (Composition of the NEC);

* monthly donor meetings ("Aid for Democracy Group"), coordinated by UNDP, to exchange information and mobilise support for the electoral process;

* the visit to Mozambique by the Secretary General of the United Nations (17-20 October) which helped unblock some important issues in the peace process (the assembly and demobilisation of troops, the Electoral Law, etc.);

* a meeting between the President of the Republic, Joaquim Chissano, and the President of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, which made it possible to formalise various agreements (Understandings) on the Law and the electoral structures (24 November);

* the launching by the Government of the international tender for the supply of materials for the voter registration, financed by the European Community (10 December);

* approval of the Electoral Law by the Assembly of the Republic and its proclamation by the President of the Republic (28 December, Law 4/93).

the period until the NEC took office (28 December 93 - 11 February 94), which included:

* revising, updating and improving the "Action Plan" for the electoral process, including new phasing and a new implementation timetable;

* the reception and evaluation of bids, and the adjudication of the supply contract for voter registration materials (early February);
appointment by the Government and the political parties of the 20 NEC members and their subsequent unanimous appointment of Dr. Brazão Mazula as Chairman of the Commission;

swearing in of the NEC by the President of the Republic (11 February 1994).

2. STAGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

2.1. The TSAE Action Plan

When the NEC took office, this marked the official start-up of the electoral process, the beginning of the implementation stage.

Although the preliminary stages established some basic conditions for the beginning of the process, in practice virtually everything still had to be done.

The frame of reference for the implementation of the process was the "TSAE Action Plan" mentioned above, conceived and prepared by the technical assistance team in collaboration with Mozambican counterparts appointed by the Interministerial Election Commission.

This plan, and its respective phasing and timetable, were presented to the NEC in a series of sessions, which began on 15 February 94.

The Plan had the following structure and components:

. Organisation:
  . Training;
  . Civic Education;
  . Transports and Communications;
  . Information Technology

and programmed the development of the electoral process through the following five stages:

. 1st stage: Preparation and Inception
. 2nd stage: Voter Registration
. 3rd stage: Preparation for the Electoral Act
. 4th stage: Electoral Act and the Count
. 5th stage: Publication of Results and Termination of the Process
The TSAE Action Plan and its timetable were an important instrument for the organisation of the elections and provided a permanent frame of reference for their preparation and implementation.

By articulating the various stages and components of the process, the Action Plan helped it to be seen as a whole and gave it internal coherence, while at the same time permitting monitoring and control of its various components.

2.2. 1st Stage: Preparation and Inception (11 February - 31 May 94)

This stage contained the most important steps for the organisation, recruitment, installation, equipment and funding and "start-up" of the electoral machine, namely:

- the internal organisation of the NEC and the central TSAE and the official appointment of the latter (26-27 May);

- the appointment, organisation, installation and training of the electoral commissions at provincial (took office by end March) and district level (April-May), and the respective TSAE offices, totalling more than 2,600 people;

- the supply and distribution of the materials for the voter registration (April-May);

- the recruitment and training of 8,000 registration agents and 1,600 civic education agents (April-May) and the production of manuals and other training materials (see Part II - Section II);

- the preparation and launching of the civic education campaign (May) supported by the respective promotional materials: posters, leaflets etc. (see Part II - Section III);

- the launching of international tenders (May) for the supply of vehicles (purchase and hire), camping materials and foodstuffs, and for the hire of planes and helicopters etc (see Part II - Section I;

- the establishment of funding agreements between UNDP and donors, and the materialisation of the first financial contributions for the electoral process, through cost-sharing (Project MOZ/93/016) and the Trust Fund, established through a document signed in April between the Minister of Cooperation and the UNDP Resident Representative (see Part II - Section V).

As the process evolved, the electoral timetable was adjusted accordingly. Consequently, on 31 March, the Chairman of the NEC announced in public that voter registration would begin on 1 June and would end on 15 August.
These dates were subsequently confirmed by an official notice of the NEC, published on 28 April.

On 11 April, a Presidential Decree fixed the dates of the elections: 27 and 28 October 1994.

On the whole, this 1st stage was perhaps the most difficult and complex of them all, both politically and from a technical and organisational point of view.

The atmosphere of distrust and political conflict, the inexperience and professional and institutional insecurity of the members of the electoral structures, the lack of almost everything - from funds to vehicles, buildings and furniture, particularly in the provinces and districts - coincided in this stage with the need for immediate practical activities to launch the process and to meet the (tight) electoral deadlines.

The need to reach consensus within the NEC sometimes caused delays in taking decisions, thus provoking operational difficulties in the work of the TSAE. However, with hindsight the importance of this procedure by the NEC is recognised, contributing to its internal cohesion at critical moments in the process and to the image of coherence, independence and reflection it conveyed to Mozambican public opinion and to the international community.

Shortcomings in the functioning of the central TSAE and difficulties in establishing correct articulation with the NEC were perhaps the greatest obstacle to the correct development of the process at this stage, causing delays in decisions and in the implementation of activities, and hampering the provision of assistance to the provincial structures. Although the situation improved slowly over time, this problem persisted throughout the electoral process.

The reasons for these shortcomings can be related to the following:

- the "political sharing" of the TSAE resulting from the "understandings" of 24 November 93 (50% of the members appointed by the Government, 25% by Renamo and the remaining opposition parties, 25% by the United Nations for technical assistance) and the persistence of "party blocks" with strong mutual distrust;

- the existence of substantial professional and salary differences among members of the same level but with different origins (seconded by the public sector or coming from other sources);

- internal instability caused by substantial delays in defining hierarchical positions and appointing TSAE technical staff,
the limited experience of operational work and the frequent absence of some important members of this structure;

- poor management and coordination methods at various levels.

Under these circumstances, the pondered and firm NEC leadership, the dedication and spirit of sacrifice of the thousands of Mozambican cadres spread throughout the country - many of them young people - and support from UNDP and the international community, were determining factors in meeting the first "historical target" of the electoral timetable: the beginning of registration on 1 June 1994.

This undoubtedly also resulted from the correction of conceptions and strategies in the Action Plan ("cascade training", decentralised operations, the conception of the organisation of registration etc.) and the prior identification of the action required.

Throughout this 1st stage, the technical assistance team was strengthened, with the arrival of the first group of UNVs (end March) and three advisers for civic education, social communication and legal matters (May).

From 21 April onwards, the monthly meetings of the donor "Aid for Democracy Group" became fortnightly meetings of the "Electoral Monitoring Group". The group retained the same composition and continued to be coordinated by the UNDP Resident Representative, but the meetings now concentrated exclusively on the development of the electoral process and donor assistance to this process.

2.3. 2nd Stage: Voter Registration (1 June - 2 September).

Initially planned to run from 1 June to 15 August, registration was extended twice:

- from 15 to 20 August
- from 24 August to 2 September

These extensions were decided by the NEC, initially due to the existence of special cases (Art. 57 of the Electoral Law) and later due to alterations to the Electoral Law approved by the Assembly of the Republic (23 August), which permitted an extension to 2 September, and expanded its coverage to all eligible Mozambican citizens and to the whole country.

These extensions arose essentially in response to three kinds of situations:

- the need to complete or intensify registration in rural areas where the process (for political and/or logistical reasons) had been subject to delays, namely, areas controlled
by Renamo (districts of Muanza, Cheringoma, Maringué, Chigubo and Mavago, for example);

- the need to register as many returning refugees as possible;

- the need to register recently demobilised soldiers, or those demobilised during the extension periods, and who had returned to their home areas.

Registration was undertaken by 1,600 brigades, each with 5 members (1 supervisor, 1 photographer, 2 interviewers, 1 card issuer), totalling 8,000 agents.

Calculations as to how many brigades would be necessary were based on the estimated number of voters (8.5 million), the number of working days for registration and an average daily rate of about 80 registrations/brigade.

Many of these teams worked in rural areas which had been severely affected by the war, and thus required assistance in the form of camping equipment and food.

The registration materials for each brigade were provided in a set of numbered metal boxes (kits) containing all the items necessary for registering 3,000 voters, from a Polaroid camera to pens and registration forms. The concept of the complete kit - which was to be used again for the voting phase - proved to be extremely effective and secure, and permitted rigorous planning and control in the distribution of materials. In all, 1,600 “registration kits” were distributed.

Registration resulted in three documents:

- the Voter's Card, printed on security paper, with a black and white photograph of the voter, and covered in plastic;

- the Voter Registration Form, an A4 sheet containing information identifying the voter, his/her photograph, signature and fingerprint;

- the Electoral Register containing a list of the voters registered by the brigade, up to a maximum of 1,000 per register.

For the registration period as initially planned (2.5 months) it was estimated that each brigade could register about 5 to 6,000 voters. The brigades were distributed and located on the basis of this estimate of voters. In some places where people were more dispersed it became necessary to send teams out to the more distant populations, while attempting not to exceed a radius of 10 km (2 hours on foot).
At the beginning, the process faced many difficulties, particularly with regard to organisation and logistics. Indeed, the first vehicles only arrived in the provinces at the end of June-early July. The constant failure of suppliers to meet deadlines and time-consuming customs procedures were the main causes of the substantial delays in essential supplies.

There were also difficulties and delays in obtaining and distributing food supplies for the registration and civic education brigades, particularly during the initial registration period. Assistance from WFP - which provided its traditional products (maize, beans, oil, sugar) and the acquisition of canned fish, plus the payment of cash allowances, helped alleviate this situation. However, the problem of food for the brigades was not completely resolved, particularly in rural areas which were hard to reach.

In addition, many district structures in some provinces still had no funds, installations, furniture etc. The central TSAE continued to work inefficiently and had difficulty in articulating with and supporting the provinces.

From 9 June onwards 3 light planes became available (in Maputo, Beira, Nampula) and 6 large helicopters (Inhambane, Beira, Quelimane, Nampula). During this initial period they had to make up for the lack of road transport, with serious consequences for operating costs.

These problems were gradually reduced throughout July and August, owing to the purchase and hire (at central and province level) of various kinds of vehicles.

Support for the registration brigades - blankets, tents, food - also improved, although delivery deadlines were frequently not met and there were distribution problems, particularly in the rural areas.

This situation forced the provincial and district structures and the brigades themselves to try and resolve problems on their own, sometimes with help from the population. In many instances, however, only the spirit of sacrifice and commitment to the process kept brigade members at their posts for days or weeks on end in very precarious living conditions.

The number of voters registered each week rose steadily from about 260,000 in the first week (1 - 6 June) to maximum of almost 700,000 in the 7th week (11 - 17 July), subsequently falling to about 300,000 in the final week of the extension (29 August - 2 September).

At the end of the process, 6,363,311 voters had been registered, surpassing the expectations of many observers (when registration started some people considered that it would be difficult to register more than 4 million!).
This final figure corresponds to about 81% of the estimated 7,894,850 voters, a figure "officially" adopted by the NEC during the 2nd national Meeting of Electoral Bodies (25-27 July), on the basis of calculations by the Directorate of Statistics.

The number of potential voters had previously been estimated at 8,500,000 and it was this number which had served as the basis for calculating many aspects of the process (registration materials, number of brigades required etc.). However, it was found that this figure had been overestimated and it was subsequently corrected. It is possible that even the corrected figure (7,894,850) is still overestimated, but it was not possible to obtain more precise data at the time.

Throughout this period there were serious financial management problems at central and provincial level. Despite the transfer of substantial amounts by UNDP to the central TSAE, administrative and banking procedures delayed the provision of funds in the provinces and districts, interrupting cash flows and thus affecting the productivity of the electoral structures.

The problem of the emigrant vote was a "hot subject" throughout the months of June and July. The TSAE made a study of the subject which, after various improvements, was submitted for consideration by the NEC. Since there was no consensus within the NEC as to the existence of conditions for holding elections abroad (Art. 11 of the Electoral Law) voting by emigrants, and thus their respective registration, did not take place.

The problem of the computerisation of the count was also the subject of special attention by the NEC and the political parties. The doubts and distrust raised about the possibility of "computer fraud" - aggravated by recent news of sabotage of the electoral computer system in South Africa - delayed approval of computerised solutions and the respective (technical and political) guarantees from February (presentation of the Action Plan) to August.

The identification of technical errors and irregularities by registration brigades led to frequent and persistent accusations of fraud by Renamo and the other opposition parties. This resulted in complicated situations to which the NEC and TSAE tried to respond, correcting the most serious situations and giving guidance as to future action. Nevertheless, these problems were subsequently reproduced during the preparation of the Electoral Act stage, when the TSAE issued Instructions 28 and 29, which provoked much heated discussion.

The existence of these errors - except for some isolated cases of fraudulent voter registration - was essentially due to poor training and qualification, and the limited educational level of the brigade members recruited in some districts, aggravated by poor (or non-existent) integration and monitoring of the work done by the brigades (see Part II - Section III).

In general, however, and despite the enormous difficulties encountered on the ground, voter registration was a success, and made a decisive contribution to the credibility of the electoral process in the eyes of the Mozambican people and the international community.
Various factors could have contributed to this success. Among the most important was the mobilisation undertaken through the civic education campaign and by political, civic and religious organisations. In addition, the fact that the voter's card (with a photograph) was of high, durable quality, and was the only identification document which many people possessed, served to mobilise many potential voters. Underlying this mobilisation there was also the Mozambican people's strong desire for peace and change.

Given the current circumstances in Mozambique - the fallibility of demographic statistics, inadequate and poor Civil Identification (Identity Card) coverage, the return of refugees and substantial population movements - registration was essential in order to identify the electoral universe, how many voters there were and where they were. It also provided the fundamental basis for planning correctly all the components of the electoral act (how many polling stations and where, election materials, the logistical resources required, the training plan etc.).

Throughout this 2nd stage various activities were begun in preparation of the following stages, namely:

- the tender and adjudication for the supply of voting materials;

- the preparation and production of training manuals for the 52,000 polling station officers and refresher courses for the 1,600 civic education agents, and starting the respective training of trainers (29 August);

- the preparation and production of civic education materials (graphic materials, video and audio programmes, promotional materials, etc.).

Throughout this period, UNDP maintained intensive contacts with donors, both bilaterally and through the fortnightly meetings of the Monitoring Group. The effective mobilisation of funds speeded up, thus demonstrating the donor community's willingness to provide financial support.

The chairman and deputy chairman of the NEC were invited to participate in monthly meetings of this group. This participation was extremely useful since it enabled donors to obtain information directly from the NEC about the development of the process, the problems and the need for additional support from the international community. These meetings strengthened the credibility of the electoral process and confidence in it.

By June the technical assistance team was complete, reaching 80 people that month, including advisers and support staff.
2.4. **3rd Stage: Preparation for the Electoral Act**  
**(2 September - 26 October)**

The third stage comprised all aspects of the preparation of conditions for holding the elections on 27-28 October, namely:

- completing the process of checking and accepting candidatures (12 candidates for President; 14 political parties and coalitions running for the Assembly of the Republic);

- drawing lots for the positioning of candidates on the ballot papers (13 September);

- the production, transport to Mozambique and distribution of voting materials;

- the correction, at provincial level, of mistakes which occurred during the registration;

- termination of voter registration and the publication of the definitive list of seats per constituency;

- preparation of the distribution plan and location of polling stations throughout the country (7,417 stations in about 2,600 locations);

- recruitment and training of polling station officers and their respective assistants (about 52,000);

- running the civic education campaign, including simulation sessions on the vote and on mobilising people to vote;

- tender and adjudication for additional logistical resources for the voting phase (vehicles, helicopters);

- preparation of the communications system (Fax) and the computer system for the count, at central and provincial level;

- the acquisition and installation of radio equipment (HF and VHF) in provincial capitals, to service the respective PECs and TSEAs;

- the installation and inauguration of the Press Centre, which functioned from 24 October to 13 November (see Part II - Section IV);

- the transport of voting materials and staff to the polling station locations.
There was considerable political tension during the weeks immediately preceding the vote, particularly during the week 20-27 October, and all the electoral structures had an excessive workload. The intensification of the civic education campaign, the organisational demands and the enormous logistical operation which preceded the 27th (involving more than 300 vehicles, 6 planes and 26 large capacity helicopters) all required a tremendous effort and dedication, which warrants special mention.

Meanwhile, the election campaign ran from 22 September to 27 October. With the exception of a few small localised incidents, it was conducted peacefully and without interference. Prior to the launching of the campaign, in the presence of the NEC and the international community, the political parties and candidates for the Presidency of the Republic signed the respective Codes of Conduct (16 and 19 September), an event of great political and civic importance, since it represented a commitment made before the Mozambican people.

One extremely important activity during the preparation of the electoral act was the training of the party monitors throughout the country (about 35,000), undertaken by foreign NGOs with international funding. The presence of adequately prepared "monitors" at the polling stations was to be essential in ensuring the transparency of the process and in reducing tension and mistrust among the various political parties.

The international community financed and organised the logistical operation to transport party monitors to polling stations and their stay there.

From 8 September onwards, the meetings of the Monitoring Group coordinated by UNDP became weekly, thus permitting constant monitoring of the process by donors and faster and more effective response as and when the need arose. In this way, in a short space of time it was possible to obtain various additional contributions which completely covered the outstanding deficit in the electoral budget, amounting to some USD 5 million at the end of September.

In early October the technical assistance team was reinforced by 7 specialists in air traffic operations, who worked with the central TSAE and in various provinces.

2.5. 4th Stage: The Electoral Act and the Count
(27 October-19 November)

Voting took place on 27 and 28 October and was extended to the 29th, by a NEC decision announced on the second day.

More than 5.4 million voters turned out, about 85% of those registered. Throughout the country, voting took place in an atmosphere of tranquility and civility - which came as a surprise to many foreign observers, and even nationals. On the first day, long queues formed
hours before the polling stations opened. The population thus expressed clearly and massively their confidence and desire to participate in the process, contributing to the consolidation of peace and democracy in the country.

The enormous tension which arose during the night of the 26th to the 27th when Renamo announced its withdrawal, had little influence on the attitude of the electorate, and was resolved on the afternoon of the 27th when the President of Renamo announced his party's return to the electoral act.

Once again, the firmness, cohesion and coherence of the NEC in the face of this situation contributed substantially to the confidence of the people and the international community in the electoral process.

The direct linkage of each voter to one polling station ("his/her" polling station) with a maximum of 1,000 voters each, greatly facilitated the organisation of the process. After the first few hours of voting, when there was some confusion owing to delays and inexperience, the electoral act proceeded at a reasonable pace.

In many polling stations more than 60-70% of registered voters turned out on the first day, making the second day calmer and the third almost unnecessary. In general, voting procedures were impeccable and the polling station officers showed that they had been well prepared, a fact widely acknowledged by the many international observer missions (see next page - "EUMOZ" Press Release).

Given the total number of registered voters, 7,417 polling stations were established, each with 5 officers and 2 assistants, amounting to 52,000 people. If we add the 35,000 party monitors and the members of the electoral structures, almost 90,000 Mozambicans spread throughout the furthest reaches of the country, were directly involved in the electoral act.

As in the case of registration, voting kits were used. These comprised metal boxes containing all the materials necessary for each polling station: 2 numbered metal ballot boxes (Assembly of the Republic and President of the Republic), 2 dismountable voting booths, ballot papers, printed forms for the public notices and the records of the electoral acts, bottles of indelible ink, ink pads for stamping the ballot papers, pens, pencils, lamps, batteries etc.

For reasons of credibility and security, the ballot papers were printed on paper with a water mark and supplied in numbered blocks. The kits were also numbered and their distribution strictly defined and controlled by the central TSAE and by the provincial and district election structures.

The combination of voter card - electoral register - indelible ink made it virtually impossible for fraud to occur during the vote, either through double voting or voting by ineligible people.
PRESS RELEASE (Nov 2, 1994)

The European Union Election Observers Mission in Mozambique is satisfied that the elections in Mozambique have been conducted in a calm, peaceful and effective manner.

The election campaign involved a certain amount of heated rhetoric. But no major incidents occurred and there were no serious injuries reported.
On the eve of the polling complaints were presented claiming that the conditions required for the elections to be free and fair had yet to be established. In a spirit of constructive co-operation such anxieties were however successfully overcome. Agreement was reached to prolong voting for a third day and to set up a special commission to deal with complaints, thus enabling RENAMO to participate fully in the electoral process.

The voting proceeded in an orderly and dignified manner and without any disturbances. Despite some administrative and logistic problems, Mozambicans turned out in enormous numbers to vote. Long queues formed in the early hours of the first day of voting before polling-stations opened. People evidently felt confident about the secrecy of the ballot and were able to participate freely in the elections. In some areas the turnout reached up to 90% or more. Irregularities which were noted proved to be of a minor character and had no significant effect.

Counting procedures at polling-stations were characterized by a high degree of transparency, conscientiousness and diligence on the side of the Mozambican polling staff, excellently trained by both national and UN personnel.
As the counting proceeds at provincial and national levels we are hopeful that the elections will end successfully marking a new point of departure towards lasting peace and a stable development in Mozambique.
In addition, strict controls over the distribution and use of ballot papers prevented "stuffing", i.e., the fraudulent introduction of extra votes in the ballot boxes in a polling station.

The presence in all polling stations of party monitors for the various parties and candidates as well as more than 3,000 international observers guaranteed the transparency of the process and was of great importance in its final acceptance.

The counting of votes at the polling station itself, in front of all the polling staff, the party monitors and observers, and the immediate publication of the results, was another factor which contributed to the credibility of the process.

Various kinds of errors were found in the counting and registration of votes. The most important and those most difficult to resolve concerned the count and the way special votes (polling station officers, police, and party monitors who voted away from their registered polling station) and contested votes, were registered.

The reasons for these errors may have been the following:

- inadequate practical training in filling out the public notices and election records;

- late approval of the legislative alteration authorising special voting situations, which prevented polling officers from being properly informed about the procedures to be followed in these cases;

- accumulated fatigue after three days and nights in the polling stations.

To a large extent it was these errors which initially blocked the computerisation of the public notices in the central and provincial TSAEs, since they required the revision and local correction of the figures in these notices and greater flexibility in the control of data input in the computer system.

It should be mentioned that, given the persistent mistrust among the parts, the TSAE proposed and the NEC approved, the transport of all the notices to the central TSAE by land or air, with fax being used only in exceptional circumstances (lack of transport), which did not occur.

This method, contrary to that suggested by the UNDP advisers, guaranteed the desired conditions (credibility, confidence) but made the collection of the notices excessively time-consuming. This made it impossible to publish partial results of the count quickly.

Consequently, the process entered a phase which gradually became increasingly critical. As the days passed without any announcement of significant official results, tension rose both
among public opinion and within the electoral structures. This peaked on the eve of 19 November in the final reappraisal of invalid and contested votes.

This reappraisal took more than a week. It suffered the consequences of the absence of clear initial NEC criteria for the validation of invalid and contested votes sent by the provinces. This meant that the operations had to be repeated and the determination of the final results was delayed.

Finally, on 19 November, before many national and foreign entities and individuals, the chairman of the National Election Commission announced the results of the national count.

It was a very emotional moment for all those who had lived through this election process, and one of great joy at its success.

2.6. The 5th Stage: Publication of the Results and Conclusion of the Process (19 November 94 - 23 March 95)

As determined by the Electoral Law, the results announced on 19 November by the NEC President were officially published in the Government Gazette.

An analysis of the table with the national results (see next page) warrants the following comments:

- there is a significant discrepancy between the "total number of voters recorded in the electoral registers" mentioned in this table (6,148,842) and the number of people registered as announced by the NEC at the end of registration (6,363,311). The reason for this discrepancy of more than 200,000 voters has still not been adequately explained;

- given this discrepancy, effective voter participation would have been 87.4% or 85%, depending on the registered voter figure used; in either case, the high percentage of voters confirms the Mozambican people's commitment and interest in the election process;

- the final number of invalid votes in both elections (149,282 and 173,592) and the respective percentages for the votes cast in the ballot boxes (2.76% and 3.21%) are very low. This leads to the conclusion that the reappraisal by the NEC allowed many of the invalid votes sent by the provinces to be retrieved.
# General Elections 1994

## National Results

### Presidential Election
- Total ballot sheets in boxes: 5,405,836
- Total voters registered: 6,148,942

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<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>MÁXIMO DIOGO JOSÉ DIAS</td>
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<td>CARLOS JOSÉ MARIA JEOUE</td>
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<td>CASIMIRO JOSÉ NHAMITAMBO</td>
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<td>MÁRIO CARLOS MACHELE</td>
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<td>CARLOS ALEXANDRE DOS REIS</td>
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<td>AFRICANO MACACO MARCETA</td>
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<td>JACOB NEVES SALOMÃO SIBINDY</td>
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<td>WEHIA MONÔKACHO RIPUA</td>
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<td>JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO</td>
<td>2,633,740</td>
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### Legislative Election
- Total ballot sheets in boxes: 5,405,811
- Total voters registered: 6,148,942

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<td>UD</td>
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### Additional Statistics

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<td>Total Abstentions</td>
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<table>
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Once the stage of the dissemination and publication of the results was over, the NEC and TSAE entered a phase of "preparation for the conclusion of their mandate", which ran until 23 March 95 for the NEC and 23 April for the TSAE.

This has been essentially a period of settling accounts, preparing the NEC's Final Report, and reflecting on the future of the election institution.

Since late November, the UNDP technical assistance team has been progressively reduced. A limited number of advisers (3), a team of 6 UNVs and some administrative support staff have remained to work with the central TSAE until the end of the project (31 March 95).

They have been engaged mainly in the following activities:

- writing the final reports for the various areas, and the final project report;
- closing the administrative processes relating to project MOZ/93/016 (cost-sharing) and MOZ/95/BO2 (Trust Fund);
- assisting the TSAE in the collection of the materials left over from registration and the forms on the election officials, for future use;
- assisting the central TSAE in its accountability for the funds transferred from the Trust Fund, amounting to about USD 9.8 million.
- conducting a physical inventory of the equipment in the provincial and central TSAEs, which was acquired by the project;
- discussions and decisions about the destination of this equipment (vehicles, computers, radios, tents, bicycles etc.)

UNDP, guided by the Resident Representative, has continued to promote and chair fortnightly donor meetings, where regular information has been provided on the steps being taken to conclude the process (accountability, audit, inventory and the destination of the assets acquired).