Institutional Gamblers: Majoritarian Representation, Electoral Uncertainty, and the Coalition Costs of Mexico's Hybrid Electoral System —
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Institutional Gamblers: Majoritarian Representation, Electoral Uncertainty, and the Coalition Costs of Mexico's Hybrid Electoral System

Calvo, Ernesto, and Juan Abal, Institutional Gamblers: Majoritarian Representation, Electoral Uncertainty, and the Coalition Costs of Mexico's Hybrid Electoral System (México: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Sede Académica de México, 2001)

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