Some final considerations regarding cost effectiveness in elections include the following:

1. In the specific scenario of emerging democracies, dramatic cost decreases may be expected once peace is achieved and reconciliation fares well. All steps toward and investments in peace, security and national reconstruction—disarmament, demobilization, integration to civilian life, interethnic reconciliation and infrastructure development—lead to a reduction in the integrity costs of elections. Other electoral costs may remain constant or even increase (i.e., personnel and technology), but significant integrity costs will certainly be reduced with democratic progress. In addition, just as national security, transport and communication infrastructures are of paramount importance in determining integrity costs, state building is a key determination of core electoral costs. Few would doubt that democracy is much less expensive than civil conflict, but decreasing electoral costs should not be assumed once democracy is stabilized and a state administration continues to develop well. There are no grounds to expect that such massive processes as voter registration and voting are not subject to the same challenges and expectations experienced by other undertakings by modern state administrations (i.e., tax collection, educational services, postal services and communications).
2. Previous and current research indicates that duration of electoral practice is in itself a cost-reducing mechanism, perhaps the most important one during the stage of democratic consolidation. Since a longer-term perspective is by definition difficult when assessing election costs in new democracies, the research findings offer strong support for the claim that efforts at capacity building in electoral administrations are probably cost-effective in the longer term. These findings also support the idea that establishing and consolidating a permanent electoral administration as the repository for managerial capacity—within both the political and the administrative systems—is a cost-effective practice.  (Cambodia was among the countries showing a dramatic reduction in the electoral budget. The first election within a peacekeeping operation in 1993 cost approximately $46 per registered voter; subsequently, per-voter costs went down to $5 in 1998 and $2 in 2003.
3. In well-established democracies, electoral costs tend to increase due to personnel expenses, high-tech investment and maintenance, and special efforts to enfranchise certain populations (i.e., aging people and citizens abroad). For example, postal voting within country and abroad is growing and is rather expensive.
4. Concerning the cost of voter lists, a main lesson learned from previous research (and still relevant) is that permanent registries promote both transparency and cost-effectiveness,  particularly when they are periodically updated with corrections, additions and deletions without obliging voters to re-register. Recent reforms in this direction have been implemented in a number of new as well as older democracies including Botswana, Cambodia, Canada and Chile. The single most important cost-cutting measure is probably continuous voter registration. Given the huge costs involved in undertaking voter registration operations for the first time, permanent registers that can be updated periodically will prove cost-effective in the long run (UNDP, 2000, pp. 126, 128).
5. Regarding the use of voter cards, a lesson learned is that allowing citizens to vote with a variety of identification documents, such as a driver’s license or passport, rather than requiring a voter card, should be considered good practice. The use of a voter card does not in itself add anything to democratization; furthermore, the high cost of producing them, in addition to the tasks involved in distribution, can deter voter turnout and otherwise delay or disrupt the electoral process. Moreover, the use of voter cards does not prevent multiple voting, which can be restricted by other means ranging from indelible ink to computerized systems (UNDP, 2000, p. 126).
6. Expense line items undergoing the greatest reductions sometimes refer to staff savings (Canada), voter education (Australia), or voter registration after establishing a permanent registry (Cambodia, Canada). In contrast, in other countries like Spain, no significant cost reduction can be reported from one election to the next, while in the longer term a number of cost-reducing measures have been singled out. Spain’s electoral authorities have developed experience during the last 20 years with a number of cost-effective measures.
7. High-technology investment in itself should not be considered as a cost-effective measure unless it is related to products and processes leading to long-term cost reductions in the electoral operation. Such would be the case with permanent voter lists vis-à-vis ad hoc voter registration before every election. Indeed, electoral authorities may reasonably expect some cost savings by introducing new technologies.
8. Political party finance and campaign expenses fall largely in a grey area concerning electoral costs. Some cost effectiveness can be expected in these areas by filling the legal vacuums prevailing in so many countries (on issues like expense limits, disclosure obligation, sanctioning and enforcement powers of public authorities). Political parties may receive public subsidies and international public aid, which are relatively easy to track and take into account; however, they may also receive funds from their membership, private donors, investment revenues and bank loans, all of which may be hard to quantify or even estimate. Consequently, the issuance of legal provisions is a first step towards transparency and likely cost-reduction of campaign expenses. Recent research efforts in this domain have been undertaken by UNDP, International IDEA, the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico and IFES.
9. In most well-established democracies and in an increasing number of the new ones, the electoral budget is prepared by the electoral authority and processed through the finance ministry for approval in parliament. The ministry does not have the authority, at least formally, to curtail or amend an electoral budget prepared by electoral authorities. Nevertheless, the government and the legislature may place constant pressure on electoral authorities—along with other publicly funded agencies—to continually review their operational performance and to contain costs. In fact, constant concern over the budget by governments and legislatures should be considered in itself as cost effective and as a tool for good management because it encourages strategic and operational planning by the electoral authority.