Integrity in elections depends on the institutional foundations set forth in the legal framework. The institutional framework is composed of the agencies and organizations that implement or oversee specific aspects the electoral process.

The main institutional players in an election are:

• those responsible for election policy and administration – the electoral management body;
• oversight agencies;
• political parties and candidates competing in elections
• groups interested in the election outcome and attempting to influence it;
• independent electoral observers;
• media and the press; and
• supervisory/enforcement agencies, including investigative agencies, prosecutors and the courts

The roles of these institutions in maintaining electoral integrity are discussed in the following subsections.

It is important for the roles of each institution involved in maintaining electoral integrity to be clearly defined in the legal framework. A clear separation of powers and an integrated system of checks-and-balances can help maintain effective oversight. As discussed in the Guiding Principles, for instance, if an electoral management body is given too many (potentially conflicting) roles—such as drafting electoral legislation, applying and enforcing the law, then acting as a court of last resort for electoral matters—there would be few effective institutional checks and balances on its actions.

One of the primary institutional questions is whether or not to have an independent electoral management body. In emerging democracies, or countries in transition which have a history of one-party domination or authoritarian rule, the creation of an independent electoral commission is widely viewed as a vital measure to ensure impartial administration of elections and help build the confidence of voters and parties.[1]   

At the same time, the benefits of autonomous electoral administration are largely based on perceptions; so an independent electoral commission must prove itself before lasting improvements to the image of elections are achieved.  The establishment of an autonomous commission does not, in and of itself, guarantee a successful electoral process.

If the main political and civil society actors agree on the type of institutional framework to be adopted, the result will be a more credible election administration structure. Without agreement, discontent and distrust can spring up and continue to fester throughout the process.  As noted earlier, since some electoral issues are likely to be resolved by a voted decision of the electoral authority, the selection of the Chair of the commission requires special care and attention.  Confidence can be increased if the Chair is chosen in a way in which various governmental branches and socio-political sectors play a role in the selection.