Monitoring of the process by organized national NGOs acting as independent observers is an essential tool for promoting election integrity. These groups span a wide spectrum of organizations and other civil society groups, including national and local citizen groups, citizen networks, human rights groups, student associations, professional bodies and religious groups.[1]

The sponsoring organizations typically collect information in a systematic way from their observer teams, analyze the significance of their findings, and assess the overall quality of electoral procedures and the electoral process more generally, and publish their findings. Well-organized national observers can be very effective guardians of election integrity, especially in countries in transition. The activities of national observers foster transparency and accountability on the part of the electoral administration, and can help to instill public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. Codes of conduct for observers set ethical and professional standards for observing elections.

An outstanding example of domestic monitoring was during the 1997 elections in Kenya, for which civil society organizations trained more than 28,000 national observers. These were posted at nearly 12,600 polling stations and each vote counting station. Their pervasive presence also encouraged voter turnout.[2]

In Indonesia, more than 600,000 national observers covered the 1999 elections and helped ensure the integrity of the election results through their close monitoring of the count. However, in the 2004 presidential elections, Indonesia’s General Electoral Commission refused to accredit the Independent Monitoring Committee of the Election (KIPP) because that body had published an observation report on the previous legislative elections without approval from the election authorities.[3] Some countries impose severe restrictions on organized national observation. In the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, the law limited national observation to candidates’ representatives. Ukraine’s Committee of Voters nonetheless deployed thousands of observers accredited as journalists. In that capacity, however, the observers were not entitled to receive copies of electoral documents or to demand that these documents be made public.[4]

In Ethiopia’s 2005 parliamentary elections, the country’s EMB limited the access of national observers, an action that was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court ruled against the electoral management body but the decision was not handed down until the day before the election, when it was too late for national observers to effectively carry out their monitoring activities on a large scale.

Similar issues were averted in Romania in 1996, during the historic first regular national elections of the post-Ceausescu period.  In Romanian elections, so-called “phantom” NGOs have often interfered with legitimate election-related activities.  (The phantoms are NGOs that are registered with the Ministry of Justice – some believe with the support of the former security service, the Securitate –  but apparently are inactive most of the time.) 

A well-established NGO in Romania, the Pro-Democracy Association (APD) had put considerable organizational effort into plans to field some 10,000 NGO observers on election day.  Under the election law only one independent observer could be admitted to each polling station, if necessary, by drawing lots.  As election day approached, a number of phantom NGOs sought accreditation for their “observers”, which could have displaced real observers on election day and ruined the process of gaining accreditation for the large number of legitimate observers.

With the assistance of IFES, the Romanian Central Election Bureau (BEC) came up with a solution that addressed the legal and logistical issues.  Organizations seeking to accredit observers were instructed to submit their names in database format.  A multi-stage computer lottery was held at the Palace of the Press, with the computer combing the databases and assigning an observer to each available polling station.  In case of multiple applications for a station, the observer’s accreditation was shifted to the next available station numerically.  (Fortunately, in Romania, polling station numbers are assigned in a geographical series; so that an observer would ordinarily not be too disadvantaged by having to go instead to the next polling station.)

Expecting that “observers” from phantom NGOs, as in the past, would not actually turn up on election day, it was also provided that observers who failed to receive accreditation during the lottery were assigned as “alternates”.  (If the accredited observer did not show up at the polling station by the time when election officers were scheduled to arrive, the alternate could claim the accreditation.)

This system – implemented by very talented volunteer computer programmers – worked smoothly even though the phantom organizations did not submit accurate data.  In the event, APD was able to get accreditations out to over 10,000 observers at the last moment using the country’s railway network.  The fairness of these elections was widely praised, and was attributed in great part to the presence of the observers along with aggressive reporting by a newly-energized press.[5]

Benefits of National Observation

In a few cases the presence of international observers is indispensable—for instance, elections in countries requiring a peacekeeping force or undergoing a difficult transition, or where non-partisan civil society groups are virtually non-existent or non-functional. In the long term, the forming of domestic groups that are able to monitor elections without external assistance is an essential part of democratic development.

National election observers have important advantages over international observers. They can more easily turn out in large numbers, even in the thousands. They know the political culture, language and territory. Consequently, they are able to notice many things that may pass unremarked by foreign observers.[6]

National monitoring groups are often better equipped than international observers to carry out particular types of specialized monitoring efficiently. Examples include verifying the voter registry, monitoring the complaints process, documenting instances of intimidation and human rights violations, and media monitoring. Unlike international observers, national civic organizations have an important role to play in implementing civic education programs and actively promoting (not simply recommending) electoral reform.[7]

Accrediting Observers

Observers and monitors can function more effectively if they are officially accredited by the electoral management or policy-making body. Accreditation gives them access to election sites. Integrity problems may arise if accreditation procedures or requirements are used to limit the number of observers, or to deny access to certain groups of observers or monitors. If the procedure is too time-consuming and cannot be completed before election day, or if accreditation is selective, the electoral process may lose credibility and the election management body will be viewed as having something to hide.

Most electoral systems establish eligibility requirements for observers and monitors in the election laws or procedures. For example, the law often requires that NGOs proposing accreditation of observers should have democracy, human rights and/or elections included in their purposes as registered in their organizational charters.  In addition, the EMB may be given authority to assess applicant organizations in terms of their past performance, not solely legal registration.  Straightforward and objective requirements for NGOs to seek observer status can help minimize problems such as discrimination or favouritism.

Sometimes additional behavioural conditions are added to eligibility requirements. These are generally used to exclude persons considered to be anti-democratic or whose activities might threaten the peace. In South Africa, for example, accreditation is provided only to observers who will pledge to uphold conditions conducive to a free and fair election, including impartiality and independence from any political party or candidate contesting the election, competent and professional observation, and adherence to the code of conduct for observers.

Security Problems and National Observation

In countries undergoing transition or in a post-conflict situation, national observers may be subject to intimidation and/or threats. This situation may affect the observers’ ability to travel, observe freely and report on the information collected without self-censorship or fear of retribution. For example, a report on the 1998 national elections in Cambodia indicates, “Threats, intimidation and violence were daunting challenges to the Cambodian observers during this year’s election process. None of the groups suggested that their ability to release public statements was compromised by the political environment. They noted, though, that intimidation affected their ability to gather information on the process and that threats coloured the reports … received from observers.”[8]