For enforcement to be successful, the political finance regulator (PFR) should have clear authority to enforce the political finance laws in administrative, civil and criminal forums, and must have access to a range of penalties and sanctions. Even if the PFR has full oversight authority, it cannot meaningfully enforce the political finance laws without the power to impose sanctions or initiate proceedings against offenders. Japan, for example, has extensive disclosure requirements but the election agencies that administer disclosure regulations are not authorized to verify financial statements, investigate financial transactions, or impose sanctions on parties or politicians.[1] Without penalties, a system of political finance regulation is ultimately toothless and is forced to rely entirely on the good faith of electoral participants.

Enforcement will be better and more consistent if  a full range of penalties of varying degrees of severity are available. Sanctions may include:

• modest administrative fines for minor violations;
• heavier monetary penalties for serious violations;
• criminal sanctions for significant violations that undermine the integrity of the elections;
• loss of reimbursement for election expenses, withdrawal of public funding and ineligibility for future funding;
• loss of seat in the legislature, disqualification from standing for future elections and ineligibility for appointment as a public official;
• dissolution of a party; and/or
• cancellation or annulment of an election, in whole or in part.[2]

If the political finance laws provide only for severe sanctions, such as the reversal of an election or criminal penalties, the PFR may be reluctant to bring an enforcement action or is likely to face considerable resistance from the violator and supporters. Equally problematic is a general belief that penalties for relatively minor transgressions are too severe: this may raise doubts about the fairness of the political finance system, with the result that non-enforcement or the “under-charging” of offences is tolerated.

In the Republic of Georgia, for example, the absence of civil penalties is widely thought to have led to the non-enforcement of political finance disclosure laws. The only penalty for disclosure violations is disqualification from future electoral contests, and this sanction has yet to be imposed by judicial authorities.[3] Similarly, the Canada Elections Act can be enforced only through the criminal courts, not an administrative tribunal or civil court. As a result, the Canadian PFR has developed a policy of imposing light sanctions for many offences.[4]

A final consideration in the establishment of an effective enforcement system is timing. For many aspects of political finance, enforcement is meaningful only if it takes place during the election period. For example, if the PFR does not ensure that campaign committees are making contemporaneous disclosure of their financial transactions, the public will not receive accurate and timely information on which to base voting decisions. If penalties are not assessed before election day, the sanctions may come too late to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. Further, media coverage of political finance violations during an election draws public attention to the integrity of campaign committees, and this attention may be a far greater deterrent to offending committees than any monetary penalty imposed after the election.