Integrity problems may arise at the polling station or counting center where the ballots are counted and/or tabulated. They may be the result of a genuine mistake or a deliberate effort to manipulate the outcome.

Machine counts reduce the risk of error but a machine cannot determine a voter’s intention if the voter did not mark the ballot precisely, in a way that can be read by the machine.

To maintain the integrity of the electoral process, vote counting must produce results that are valid, accurate and accepted by all participants. A number of important measures must be taken to achieve this objective:

Counting should be done as soon as possible after the polls close

The longer that ballots remain uncounted, the higher the risk of tampering with the results. Before beginning the count, however, it is important to ensure that the site is secure and observers are present.

When there are problems of intimidation or security, counting at the polling station may be impossible. In this case, counting may be moved to a different site (for example, a regional centre) where ballots from several tables are brought together before counting. This provision is included in the election laws of several countries, including South Africa, which allows electoral administrators some discretion to move the counting location if necessary.

The voter's intention must be properly determined

A voter may mark the ballot but miss the designated box or space, making it difficult to know how to count the vote. Too strict an interpretation of the rules may invalidate an otherwise valid vote.

A best practice in this area is to adopt, through legislation, a tripartite approach. First they should look at whether the voter has made a mark, and in the correct area. Then examining whether any other marks (that could be interpreted as possible alternative votes, or evidence of ballot spoilage or which could identify the voter) had been made elsewhere. Lastly, looking as to the apparent intention of the voter, when the first two criteria were not sufficient to resolve the matter. (This approach is followed, among other places, under the Electoral Code of FRY Macedonia.)  In cases where an approach like this is followed, there is a definite need for the counting official to display the ballot at issue and solicit the views of those present, including members of the voting committee and candidate/party monitors.

Not using the designated space to mark the vote is a major problem if machines are used for counting. Machines can read only the designated spaces and cannot take into account a voter’s obvious intention.

During Indonesia’s 2004 presidential election, ballots that were perforated twice became a major issue in the electoral process. Each ballot had been folded in such a way that a voter could perforate it without opening the ballot fully. The poor design raised the number of invalid ballots. Indonesia’s General Election Commission had to pass an emergency order allowing use of the criterion of obvious intention. Nonetheless, some counting centres did not comply.[1]

Accuracy of the count must be ensured

The following should be applied to guarantee the accuracy of the count:

• Good management of the count is essential, as is proper training of all the counters.
• A transparent count with monitors and observers present is highly desirable. Monitors and observers compare the official results with the results they received; their participation is a good mechanism for ensuring accurate counts. In some countries, such as Denmark, anyone may attend the count, increasing the transparency of the process still further. [2]
• There should be predetermined rules about what to do with spoiled ballots and ballots on which the voters’ intention is not clear.
• Spoiled or rejected ballots should be separated from ballots that are marked and valid.
• Disputed ballots also need to be separated for review at a higher level.
• All relevant tally sheet information should be recorded, including: the number of ballot-papers delivered to the polling station; the number available at the start of voting; the number of ballots issued; the number of ballots voted; the results; and the number of disputed, spoiled or unused ballots.
• In many countries where ballots are counted by hand, the choice marked on each ballot is read aloud. The ballot is shown to all monitors and election officers present to demonstrate that the vote has been properly counted.  In some countries, where there is a higher level of confidence among election workers (staff and political party representatives, if any), the counters may instead take a more cooperative approach.
• It is important that monitoring continue through the consolidation of the count until release of the official results, since tampering may occur after the initial count.
• In many systems, monitors keep track of the count and sign the tally sheets to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the results (stating their reasons in the case of disagreement).
• An effective appeals process is necessary. Candidates and monitors should be able to challenge the results of the count. The appeals process is usually set out in the legal framework. Since it may allow a recount, ballots are usually kept for as long as the law requires, and at least through conclusion of the appeals stage.
• Good law enforcement is crucial. In every system, it is a crime to tamper with election results by not counting some ballots, deliberately misreading votes, changing the results, destroying ballots or falsifying tally sheets. Election fraud may be averted by investigating allegations of tampering as soon as they are reported, and by enforcing the law strictly.

Secrecy of the vote must be protected

The secrecy of the vote is best maintained when ballots are not marked in a way that could identify the voter. If ballots are validated by a stamp or signature, the use of a standard mark can minimize the possibility of connecting a particular ballot with a voter.

The secrecy of the vote may be at risk when votes are counted locally. If few people voted at a table and the votes are counted at that same table, it may become obvious who voted for whom.  In this case, it may be an important protection for vote secrecy if the ballots from areas with few voters are admixed with ballots from other areas before being counted.  In extreme cases, in which voters from certain areas could face repercussions from having voted in a particular way, it may be advisable not to include the results from those polling stations in a published breakdown of the results by station.