Author: Arpine Galfayan
Armenia is a small country with a population of about 3 million; it is situated in the South Caucasus region and neighbours Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and Turkey. Russia is not an immediate neighbour, but has a major influence on the country’s political processes, including elections. Armenia became an independent republic in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its history of a multiparty political system dates back to 1918–20, the First Republic of Armenia. From 1920–90, the Communist Party was the only legal political entity in the country, and elections were rather a formal event, similar to all other places in the USSR.
Armenia’s first EMB was formed in 1995, following the adoption of the Law on the Elections of the National Assembly Members, which also set out procedures for the formation of its EMB, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). While the EMB falls under the Independent Model, genuine independence of the electoral administration is seriously under question. The EMB is believed to be one of the instruments for reproducing the corrupt governing elites. Although the composition of the EMB has changed several times and the party model was replaced by a professional model, this has done little to improve public trust in the electoral process. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) report on the 2012 parliamentary elections recommends that ‘special measures should be undertaken to increase public trust in the integrity of the election process. They could include, but not be limited to, increased transparency in the work of the electoral and state authorities, additional voter education on the secrecy of the vote, and enhanced campaigns against vote buying and vote selling.’ [1]
Armenia’s constitution has no provisions about electoral administration, but rather states general electoral principles and defines the basic provisions for conducting presidential, parliamentary and local elections and referenda, such as who can run for elections, when elections shall be conducted and what the basic responsibilities of the elected public offices are. The Electoral Code of 2011 is the main legal document that regulates the administration of elections, as well as virtually all other aspects of elections. Section 2 of the code is dedicated to the structure, roles, responsibilities and competences of the EMB. It empowers the EMB to adopt normative acts/decisions on technical and procedural issues that are not regulated in the code (e.g. candidate registration procedures, ballot paper design). [2]
Elections in Armenia are administered by a three-level commission: the CEC, Constituency Electoral Commissions (ConECs) and Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs). The CEC is the main body responsible for organizing national elections and supervising their legality. ConECs are formed according to the number of electoral constituencies, which is presently 41. At national elections, they collect and transfer results from polling stations and handle electoral disputes at the precinct level; at local elections, they carry out functions similar to the CEC—they are responsible for the overall organization and supervision of local elections. PECs are formed to organize polling and counting in electoral precincts (1,800–2,000 voters on average). The CEC and the ConECs are permanent bodies with a six-year term of office, while PECs are formed for the election period only.
Under the electoral law, the EMB has the powers of:
Voter lists are compiled by the police, and the National Commission of Television and Radio (which licenses and monitors private broadcasters) and the Council of Public TV and Radio regulate media campaigns.
The 2011 Electoral Code changed the composition of the EMB from party based to professional. The CEC is composed of seven members who are appointed by the president of Armenia upon the proposal of the human rights defender (three members), the Chamber of Advocates (two members) and the Court of Cassation (Armenia’s supreme court, two members).
The CEC has a secretariat of 25 permanent civil service staff members. ConECs are also composed of seven members, appointed by the CEC from among applicants to an open public announcement. Gender quotas require that at least two commissioners in the CEC, and in each ConEC, are of the under-represented gender. PECs are composed of seven or more members, who are assigned by political parties in parliament and CECs (two members). The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and secretaries of the CEC and ConECs are elected by commission members from among themselves. The positions of PEC chairpersons and secretaries are distributed by the CEC among political party appointees, proportional to the number of seats the parties won in the proportional component of the last parliamentary elections, which in recent elections resulted in a diverse countrywide distribution of these positions. Regarding the composition of electoral commissions, OSCE/ODIHR observers reported in 2012 that representatives of parliamentary parties at the regional level generally expressed trust in the election administration since they could nominate PEC members and appoint proxies (party observers) at all levels of the election administration, while the largest extra- parliamentary force, which was not represented in PECs, expressed its lack of trust. [3] The OSCE/ODIHR observation report of 2012 parliamentary elections also expressed concern about the lack of provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest in the election administration which, resulted in a number of ConEC appointments that may have affected the impartiality of these commissions. [4]
The funding for organizing and conducting elections, and for operating the electoral commissions, is provided from the state budget. If early elections are held, or if the state budget does not have a sufficient reserve fund, the reserve fund of the Central Bank of Armenia shall be used for elections. When this is impossible, the CEC can obtain credit from private banks. The EMB drafts its own budget for both electoral and non-electoral periods and presents it to the government, which embeds it in the draft annual state budget for parliamentary approval.
The law prohibits the EMB from accepting money from any other source, including foreign donors. On the one hand, this regulation makes the EMB self-reliant and ensures that the state budget pays all necessary election costs. On the other hand, this limits its opportunities to fundraise for additional innovative development projects that the state budget would not be able (or would consider inappropriate) to fund. [5]
In the non-electoral period, the EMB’s funding is limited to staff and maintenance expenditures, yet this period would be ideal for starting new projects, such as electoral education campaigns, professional development projects for various election stakeholders and institutional development activities. This gap is partly filled by Article 38.7 of the Electoral Code, which allows the EMB to use 15 per cent of the candidates’electoral deposits for institutional development and acquisition of new technologies, for example. [6]
The CEC submits one annual financial report on expenditures to the Control Chamber of the Republic of Armenia (parliamentary body), and another to the Oversight and Audit Service, which is composed of independent experts and CEC secretariat members. In addition to financial reporting, within three months after each election the CEC chair reports to the National Assembly about the implementation of the electoral process. The ConECs contribute to this CEC report.
Under the Electoral Code, decisions, actions and inactions of the electoral commissions can be appealed to the superior commission, while all complaints against the CEC are under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court. Local and international election observers have criticized the EMB’s handling of electoral disputes. The OSCE/ ODIHR observation report on the 2012 elections mentions that ‘The manner in which election commissions and courts dealt with election complaints often left stakeholders without effective consideration of their claims.’ [7] Both the electoral commissions and the courts often take a formalistic approach to dealing with complaints. The vast majority of reported complaints were either denied consideration or rejected for technicalities. [8]
The OSCE/ODIHR election observation report for the 2012 parliamentary elections also recommends that:
Election commissions, law enforcement bodies, and courts should interpret, implement and enforce the electoral legal framework taking into consideration the spirit and intent of the law, which aims to ensure an equal playing field for contestants, free will of the voters, and the integrity of the electoral process. This would include a wider interpretation of vote buying and enforcement of the ban on campaigning in schools and on involvement of educational staff and students in campaigning. In addition, the Criminal Code could be amended to include offenses for abuse of official position and administrative resources for campaigning. The criminal offense for distribution of libellous campaign material should be repealed.
The Electoral Code stipulates the professional requirements for all levels of electoral commissions, which include educational background and professional experience. CEC members are required to have:
There are similar criteria for ConEC members. PEC members must complete an accreditation process. At least once each year, the CEC organizes professional development courses in all provinces of the country. Citizens with the right to vote can individually apply to and participate in the courses, and political parties can submit lists of their members or supporters. Upon completion of the course, those who successfully pass a qualification test receive certificates that allow them to be selected as precinct election commissioners. The qualification tests can be taken by any citizen, irrespective of their prior participation in the professional development course. Both the courses and tests are open for monitoring by mass media representatives and NGOs. In addition to these courses, training is carried out (in 2012 in collaboration with IFES) upon appointment to the PEC. Despite these efforts, a large number of PEC members withdraw from the commission shortly before election day; their replacements have not attended the second round of training, which results in poorer professionalism of the polling officials and more violations on election day. [10] Training for ConECs is carried out upon formation of the commission.
There is no training requirement for CEC members. All secretariat members are civil servants, and therefore must pass a standard legal test every three years in order to maintain their position. [11] The civil servant position for CEC secretariat members was introduced in 2004 in order to preserve institutional memory and protect the secretariat staff from the frequent changes that previously occurred after the formation of every new commission.
According to the final report of OSCE/ODIHR on the 6 May 2012 parliamentary elections, ‘before election day, the election process was administered in an overall professional and efficient manner. The CEC and TECs [ConECs] worked in an open and transparent manner, granting to proxies, observers and media representatives information and access to their sessions. However, CEC and TEC decisions were taken with limited open discussion, somewhat reducing transparency. All necessary election preparations were made within legal deadlines.’ The same report points out that the CEC ‘also organized nationwide training for the majority of TEC and PEC members; PEC training was overall assessed positively by OSCE/ODIHR long term observers, although many PECs faced problems with counting procedures on election night’. The OSCE/ODIHR further recommends that ‘training of election commission members on election procedures should be continued and enhanced, with a particular focus on counting and tabulation procedures.’ [12]
No public relations problems were reported by international and local observers, the media or the EMB. The EMB usually provides public information in a professional manner, informs the media about upcoming events, organizes frequent briefings and press conferences during the election period, and updates its official website. CEC events are usually well attended by the media, especially during the election period.
Criticism usually concerns issues of the media campaign. The Electoral Code regulates free and paid campaign airtime on public television and radio. Public and private broadcasters are required to ensure non-discriminatory conditions and to provide unbiased information in their news programmes. The responsibility of regulating campaign airtime on public and private broadcasters was moved from the CEC to the National Commission of Television and Radio (NCTR, for monitoring private broadcasters) and the Council of Public TV and Radio. The EMB’s role is to develop a timetable for allocating airtime to all parties and candidates. The CEC and NCTR work closely together, and the CEC relies on NCTR data when reporting on elections or dealing with election complaints regarding the media campaign.
Half of the NCTR’s eight members are elected for a six-year term by parliament, and half are appointed by the president. The president also appoints the five members of the Council of Public TV and Radio. Election observation reports since 2003 consistently identify problems with regard to balanced media coverage. [13] The coverage is usually more balanced for parliamentary elections, while for presidential campaigns the incumbents or governmental candidates have continuously had overwhelmingly positive coverage and more time than opposition candidates. While public broadcasters, which are strongly controlled by the government, have never been sanctioned for violations, two private TV broadcasters faced administrative cases for biased coverage in the 2012 parliamentary elections; one of them was fined about EUR 2,000 for breach of the election silence period. Violations regarding biased coverage were not punished.
The EMB works well and coordinates with other state agencies involved in elections. This includes the police (which are responsible for voters’ lists), the NCTR and Council of Public TV and Radio (which are responsible for media monitoring), and local governments (which allocate space for polling stations, design the polling stations, etc. in accordance with CEC decisions). [14]
The EMB’s relations with the executive, legislative and judiciary branches are also rather cooperative. In Armenia, the executive, legislative and judiciary branches are strongly linked, with little independence or opposition to each other. The EMB is perceived and acts as part of the ‘team’ in the ruling political elite.
Independent NGOs, especially the prominent human rights and election watchdog organizations, are critical of the EMB’s status and work. Other, more technically focused organizations have some formal cooperation with the EMB and coordinate, for example, on voter education campaigns and disability-friendly polling stations.
The CEC collaborates with international organizations that carry out electoral observation or provide technical assistance. Although foreign organizations do not fund elections and are not officially considered donors to the CEC, election-related projects are usually coordinated with the CEC.
The Electoral Code guarantees that elections and the EMB are funded from the state budget in election and non-election periods. The fact that the EMB’s secretariat is composed of civil servants with long-term contracts also supports sustainability and the institutional memory of the organization.
During the election period, about ten temporary staff are hired to organize elections. The restricted funding provides little possibility for the implementation of innovative or development projects in non-election periods.
The Armenian EMB considers one of its achievements to be the creation of a network between CEC and ConECs that facilitates the transparency of election results tabulation. As soon as the data is filled in by computer at the constituency level, the results appear in the network at the CEC and are immediately publicized in the CEC media centre. Future plans include broadcasting of all CEC meetings, so that ConECs in their constituencies can follow them online.
During the past year the CEC revamped its website, which is now available in Armenian and English. The website provides information about the CEC and past and future elections, and provides access to a range of electoral and legal documents.
Limited electronic voting was also introduced in 2011. It only involved personnel and family members of embassies and consulates, and staff members of legal persons registered in Armenia who have branch offices in foreign countries (altogether around 200 people). For all other citizens, voting abroad is unavailable.
The EMB does not have the power to initiate legal reform in the legislature. This is normally done through the government, which has the constitutional right to submit legal initiatives. In practice, the EMB drafts a good portion of electoral law reforms, but it must negotiate with the government before going to parliament, which limits the independence of the EMB.
Armenian legislation provides a sound foundation for the conduct of democratic elections. The technical (if not ethical) professionalism of electoral administration has also substantially improved over the last 20 years. However, electoral integrity is the biggest issue faced by the EMB today. It is largely controlled by the ruling political elites, and is not an impartial and ethical institution. Political will and positive systemic change are needed to change this, as well as a major increase in democratic awareness among the citizenry, particularly an increased appreciation of democratic processes by the people, and active and responsible engagement from voters and civil society.
A diversification of funding opportunities would allow the creation of projects such as a professional development centre and a youth electoral and citizenship education centre within the EMB, together with academic and civil society institutions, which in the long run can contribute to democratization and the improvement of electoral practices.
Staffing the EMB with fully independent and ethical election professionals is another way in which it can win voters’ trust and conduct independent, impartial electoral processes. Stricter individual responsibility for electoral violations can also be an instrument for enforcing more democratic electoral processes.
Notes
[1] OSCE/ODIHR, Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, 6 May 2012: Final Report, 2012.
[2] Article 36.1 of the 2011 Electoral Code of Armenia states that ‘The Central Electoral Commission shall adopt regulatory and individual legal acts, whereas constituency and precinct electoral commissions – individual legal acts.’
[3] OSCE/ODIHR 2012.
[4] OSCE/ODIHR long-term observers were informed about several cases of conflict of interest. For example, the chair of the CEC was the wife of one of the candidates. See ibid, p. 8.
[5] In an interview with Liana Simonyan, head of the CEC Foreign Relations Department, she mentioned the idea of creating a Training Center and Youth Electoral and Citizenship Education centre within the EMB, which cannot be done with the existing resources.
[6] All parties and candidates have to pay an electoral deposit to participate in elections; the deposits of those who do not pass the prescribed threshold go to the state budget.
[7] OSCE/ODIHR 2012.
[8] Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center’s iditord.org website, which offered citizen reporting during the May 2012 parliamentary elections in Armenia, received frequent reports of violations of campaign rules (e.g. a period of silence on the election eve and election day, bribing voters, voter list inaccuracies, violations of voting day procedures, etc.).
[9] Electoral Code of Armenia, Article 40.3.
[10] Interview with Ruben Sargsyan, APR Group (Free Public Law Protective Youth), local NGO, 30 October 2012.
[11] Exceptions: the CEC media speaker, chairperson’s assistant and referent may be selected based on merit and do not have to be civil servants.
[12] OSCE/ODIHR 2012.
[13] Vardanyan, Edgar, ‘OSCE/ODIHR and Armenian Elections’, The Changing World: A Glance from Yerevan, 1, ACNIS, 2012.
[14] The CEC’s decisions (normative acts) are binding for all institutions involved in organizing elections.
