Introducing new ICT systems in elections is always challenging, and requires careful deliberation and planning. Electronic voting (e-voting) is arguably the most difficult upgrade, as this technology involves the core of the entire electoral process: the casting and counting of votes. E-voting greatly reduces direct human control and influence in this process, and provides an opportunity to solve some old electoral problems, but it also introduces a whole range of new concerns. Therefore e-voting can be expected to trigger more criticism and opposition than any other ICT application in elections.

There are a number of e-voting and vote-counting systems that are marketed as a means of improving voting methods and reducing costs. Some of the systems claim to offer a high degree of reliability and resistance to electoral malpractice.

• Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines can come with or without a paper trail (VVPAT, or voter-verified paper audit trail). VVPATs are intended to provide physical evidence of the votes cast.
• OMR systems are based on scanners that can recognize the voters’ choice on special machine-readable ballot papers. OMR systems can be either central count optical scanning (CCOS) systems (ballot papers are scanned and counted in special counting centres) or precinct count optical scanning (PCOS) systems (ballots are scanned and counted in the polling station directly as voters feed them into the voting machine).
• Electronic ballot printers (EBPs) are similar to a DRE machine, and produce a machine-readable paper or electronic token containing the voter’s choice. This token is fed into a separate ballot scanner, which conducts the automatic vote count.
• Internet voting systems transfer votes via the Internet to a central counting server. Votes can be cast either from public computers or from voting kiosks in polling stations or — more commonly — from any Internet-connected computer.

The accuracy and integrity of these machines depend not only on the companies and persons that design, programme, test and maintain them, but also on the systematic checks and balances introduced by the EMB, including system audits and certifications.

Comprehensive controls and accountability measures come at a price. More transparent and secure systems cost more. A system with the highest possible levels of transparency and security can increase costs so much that the benefits of the e-voting solution no longer justify the expenditure.

System Requirements, Certification and Audits

More than for any other electoral technology system, certifications and audits are of crucial importance for building trustworthy and credible e-voting and counting systems. Certifications and audits confirm the compliance of the e-voting system against a clearly defined set of functional and operational requirements. The exact requirements are different in each context, and need to take into account legal, technical, operational and functional aspects as well as key stakeholder needs.

System certifications provide EMB-and vendor-independent, third-party confirmation that an e-voting and counting system meets the requirements. System audits verify the proper functioning of the e-voting and counting systems through stringent testing before, during and after usage. However, thorough certification and audit can come at a significant additional cost, and can for smaller implementations come close to the technology costs of the system.

Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails

One response to concerns about the integrity, reliability and security of e-voting systems and the need to conduct transparent audits has been the use of a voter- verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) process. The voter is provided with a printout of the vote just cast, which can be checked on the spot and then placed in a ballot box, to be used if necessary to audit the validity of figures produced by the automated system. Many e-voting systems can provide audit trail facilities, including electronic voting machines (EVMs) that have been used in countries such as Belgium, the United States and Venezuela in recent years. In 2013 the Indian Supreme Court directed the Election Commission to introduce paper trails for voting machines, and the EMB has taken steps to introduce VVPAT after more than 20 years of using e-voting machines that did not provide such a facility.

The use of OMR devices to count votes, such as in the Philippines, can also provide accuracy and time effectiveness in the electoral process while producing a paper ballot that can be physically examined if necessary in post-election disputes.

VVPATs only work for e-voting in the controlled environment of a polling station (not, for example, with Internet voting). The Venice Commission has undertaken a detailed analysis of the compatibility of remote voting and e-voting with the broader electoral standards of the Council of Europe.

Beyond technical performance issues, some of the debate regarding the integrity of elections technology entails the propriety of politically aligned or foreign-influenced suppliers. Media reports of alleged integrity problems with mechanical and e-voting machines has increased pressure on EMBs to be open and accountable in their sourcing and use of technology.

Costs

Although there is no reliable cost-effectiveness analysis  on the use of new technology for voting and counting, the evidence that technology such as EVMs may reduce election costs over time, especially costs associated with printing and storing ballot papers and vote counting, is controversial. India has used relatively cheap EVMs for decades and has concluded that EVM-based elections are much cheaper than paper-based ones. Yet the Netherlands abandoned old EVMs in 2007 and subsequently investigated the introduction of a modernized system. Their findings as of 2013 were that voting with new EVMs would be twice as expensive as paper-based voting.