Elections are an instrument through which the power balance in societies can be altered. There are two key dynamics that determine whether this power change takes place in a peaceful or in a violent manner. The first relates to the context in which elections take place. In countries where large-scale violence is present due to unresolved long-standing grievances and/or the activity of spoilers, it is likely that violence will affect elections, as electoral stakeholders are accustomed to using violent means in order to try to either hold onto or gain power.
The second relates to the quality of the electoral process itself. Electoral processes consist of many building blocks. According to the electoral cycle approach, a well-known paradigm among both practitioners and researchers, electoral processes consist of three periods (pre-, election and post-election) with a total of eight phases: establishment/review of the legal framework, planning and programming, training and education, voter registration, the electoral campaign, voting operations and election day, verification of results and post-election). Each phase consists of micro-processes and activities that usually need to be completed in order for the next phase to start (see figure 2: The Electoral Cycle). It is important to highlight, however, that in some instances good quality electoral processes may still yield results that are contested by the population; while, in other instances, technically poor electoral processes may yield results that are viewed as acceptable.
When elections are not designed and managed sensitively, and if stakeholders do not perceive the process as occurring on a level playing field, they can lead to violent epilogues. Particularly sensitive issues include the legal and institutional framework, for example: electoral management body composition or the rules defining the eligibility of voters, candidates and parties; campaigning culture; procedures for the announcement of results; effectiveness of and trust in electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; and so on.
Drawing on its research papers on this topic, International IDEA has classified and described 26 internal and 10 external risk factors that can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. Internal factors (Alihodžić and Asplund 2018a) are election-specific and do not exist outside of the electoral context. They relate to risks surrounding electoral actors, events, practices and materials across the electoral cycle. External factors (Alihodžić and Uribe Burcher 2018) originate and exist outside the electoral context. They include exogenous conditions that can negatively influence electoral processes.
Distinguishing process and structural factors has several practical benefits. It illuminates the need for enhanced collaboration between different communities of practice, such as election, governance, conflict, peacebuilding and security specialists, in addressing election-related violence. It also underlines the need for combining long- and short-term approaches to addressing both process triggers and structural causes of election-related violence.
Internal factors are clustered into the seven phases[1] of the electoral cycle (reflected in the seven sections below). The eighth phase of the electoral cycle, post-election, is not included. Although there is a possibility that post-electoral violence is linked to the elections themselves, the risk factors underlying such violence may not be process-related. Rather, the incident should be examined in the context of structural risk factors. External factors are not tied to specific electoral phases. Each factor is described through:
a) an introduction that provides a general definition and explanation of the context in which a given factor can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence;
b) empirical cases illustrating particular countries and electoral contexts in which the given factor was identified as either a trigger in itself, or a factor that contributed to triggering election-related violence. Interrelated factors point to the wider context in which violence took place. This includes both internal and external factors. References to the source documents are provided.
The list is not exhaustive. Also, the way in which factors are named or described may not match local terminologies and specifics.
[1] The eighth phase of the electoral cycle, namely the post-election phase, is not included. Although there is a possibility that violence occurring after the implementation of election results is linked to the elections this may not be the key trigger.
