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Encyclopaedia   Preventing Election-related Violence   Factors that may trigger electoral violence   Internal factors   Electoral campaigning  
Provocative party rallying

Political parties organize rallies during an election campaign in order to reinforce links between political leaderships, party activists and party supporters. Electoral rallies are also demonstrations of strength, unity and power.

In conflict-prone societies where political divides often correspond with social divides, election rallies may represent high-risk events. Irrespective of the organizer’s intentions, the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech can quickly inspire violent action. Additionally, actions taken to limit, obstruct or prevent competitors from holding political rallies may trigger violent reactions.

Empirical cases:

  • Azerbaijan presidential election 2003. During the election campaign period international observers recorded cases of opposition candidates being denied venues for rallies. The local authorities in the capital, Baku, for example, refused a popular opposition party leader, Isa Gambar of the Musavat party, permission to hold a rally in a cinema. Hundreds of supporters gathered outside the cinema to demonstrate against this decision, de facto showing their support for the candidate. The police used violence to disperse the demonstrators.[1]

    Interrelated factors: poor socio-economic conditions (external); problematic accreditation of domestic observers (internal);[2] human rights violation (external).[3]
  • Nepal parliamentary election 2008. In the Tarai region the Nepali Congress held mass meetings. These were interrupted by opposing political parties using threats of violence and bombings.[4]

    Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external).[5]


[1]     Human Rights Watch, ‘Crushing Dissent’, 22 January 2004, p. 12, available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12183/section/6>.

[2]     Human Rights Watch, ‘Azerbaijan: Presidential Elections 2003’, Briefing Paper, 13 October 2003, pp. 4, 17, available at <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-elections2003.pdf>, accessed 8 November 2011.

[3]     Human Rights Watch, ‘Azerbaijan: A Stolen Election and Oil Stability’, 20 October 2003, available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/10/19/azerbaijan-stolen-election-and-oil-stability>, accessed 8 November 2011.

[4]     Carter Center, ‘Observing the 2008 Nepal Constituent Assembly Election’, April 2008, pp. 35–6, available at <http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/FinalReportNepal2008.pdf>.

[5]     International Crisis Group, ‘Nepal’s Election: A Peaceful Revolution?’, Asia Report no. 155 (2008), pp. 10, 11, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/155_nepal_s_elections___a_peaceful_revolution.pdf>, accessed 26 September 2011.