The characteristic feature of the Latin American model of electoral tribunals is the establishment of specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in charge of resolving disputes on electoral results. The nature of these tribunals can be either judicial or executive and they can function as higher or lower courts. This can be considered as a major Latin American contribution to political science and electoral law as an important condition of recent democratic processes in this region, and it validates as well the rule of law and dispute resolution through legal bodies. Main advantages to the specialized tribunal process include more timely resolution and adjudicators with strong experience and familiarity with the issues and law.[i]

The jurisdiction to resolve electoral disputes granted to these specialized Latin American electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils), which in some cases have autonomy with similar powers to the judiciary, has fulfilled the need of guarding the judicial nature of qualifying the election. In this way, resolutions are made in accordance with constitutional and legal principles and without exposing either the judiciary or the Supreme Court to frequent criticism at their response to political or party interests. This competence has been extracted from political assemblies whose members were not impartial, allowing their political interest to influence their resolutions.

During the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the following one, electoral systems for dispute resolution in Latin America were politicized. In contrast, in the last seventy years there is a gradual but definite trend in the region towards specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in charge of resolving electoral disputes, and in some cases even in charge of organizing the election. These electoral authorities have an executive or judicial nature (some of them are independent and others are part of the judiciary or executive power). Two early examples of this model are the Electoral Court of Uruguay, which was first introduced in the law in 1924, and the Qualifying Tribunal of Elections in Chile included in the Constitution since 1925.   

The gradual establishment of these specialized electoral tribunals (courts, juries, boards or councils) in the region comes after the politicized system of conflict resolution. They were first introduced –generally and taking into account that each country has its own history–by means of an administrative electoral organ prescribed by law and with a temporal character. This structure is made up by representatives of the political parties and the executive power. The next step resulted in awarding these structures a constitutional level and granting them protection to guarantee their autonomy and impartiality (political parties are less present and in contrast citizens participate more in their functioning; qualified majorities are also required in the structure that finally designates its members). Most of the time, such a transformation also implies that these models of electoral authority become permanent, specialized and aimed at resolving conflicts (yet keeping administrative powers or establishing parallel electoral authorities, some of them in the judiciary).