Irrespective of the method of vote counting; manual or automated, each jurisdictions’ vote counting process often consist of the following:
Verification
Verification includes:
Sorting
The ballots are sorted according to political parties or candidates (in the case of referendums, by choices). In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the sorting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection. (see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid).
Counting
The counting officers then count the number of votes cast for each party or candidate. In some jurisdictions party and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the counting by objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the counting will then have to determine action on the objection.
The counting officer will set aside challenged ballots and determine acceptance or rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules. (see Criteria to determine when votes should count as valid).
Completing the results sheet or statement of the vote and capturing the results
The statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or national level. Representatives of political parties and national and international electoral observers should receive an official copy of the results. A copy of the statement of the vote should be made public to the electorate by posting it at a public and easily accessible spot at the voting station thereby adhere to the transparency requirement as per international best practise.
There is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting station is released and sent in a secure manner together with other election results relevant material to the local office of the electoral management body. The results forms are often transported in a tamper-evident bag, or sealed inside the ballot box with ballot papers, voters list and other pivotal material. This material is transported by a pre-determined EMB official, who ought to be accompanied by observers and party agents. Prior to departing the very same results are often communicated directly to the next level of the results system hierarchy and/or to the national tally centre in order to facilitate the release of interim results.
As with all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative considerations, which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with it.
Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of the count. In many countries, observers and party agents are not allowed to physically handle any official election material, including ballot papers. As a result, the counting process must be laid out in such a way that it facilitates visual access to the count.
Using a count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote to avoid any mathematical errors or inconsistencies.
The ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed tamper-evident bag.
In some countries, party and candidate representatives have the opportunity affix their seals or signatures to the resealed ballot box/es.
The count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount, all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing the ballot box contents, are important as not to break the chain of custody.
The local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as results of any special ballots, advance polls, and mobile voting stations. However, observers, party agents and media representatives should always be able to trace the results from a single voting station through the tabulation process and verify that the results remain constant, unless a recount prove the results incorrect, or the results form contains mathematical errors.
Interim results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancies between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or spreadsheet, as they become available.
Unofficial interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to the electoral management body.
In the following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.
Manual or automated vote counting, or a combination of both?
While the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible and effective, and more countries are opting to use them, despite the sometimes high initial investment required.
Automated counting, using appropriate technologies and properly procured can be cheaper, faster, and more accurate than manual counting.
It can also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral systems easier to use. Moreover, in general, it makes the counting process safer from fraud, since less people are manipulating the ballots.
Technological approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting process.
Computing technology is often used to tabulate the results of manual ballot counts, to produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level. Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic format. However, more sophisticated software applications, using client/server or web architectures, customised data input screens, data validation, strict security, auditing and logging controls, are typically necessary to raise the standard and performance offered by generic database or spreadsheet applications.
Computer vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations, data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an election.
Rigorous testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time.
Data entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy.
As with any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that output results are consistent with inputs.
For example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to voters at that level.
Data entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures after data entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice, by different operators using what is known as double blind data entry.
Contingency plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure. Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up that can take over if the main server fails.
Trained support technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed countries.
Power supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems.
Worst-case scenarios should also be anticipated. Provision should be made to switch to a completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. (See Elections and Technology).
